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InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995June28–July1,2015

TheHagueEditedTranscript

Session1:Creatingthe“SafeAreas”

MeetingroominTheHague

TOMBLANTON:Goodmorning.Thankyouverymuchforcomingtothetable.A

reminderaboutourmethodology:everythingsaidatthistableisonbackgroundfor

nowbutwearerecordingthesessionandwillproduceatranscript.1Youwillhave

theopportunitytocorrectyourremarksbeforewereleasethetranscript.Oneofour

goalsistoexpandthehistoricalrecordonSrebrenica.

Ifyouturntoyourbriefingbooks,youwillfindasummaryofkeypointsthat

weplantoaddressineachofthefoursessions.2Thismorningwewanttostartwith

theeyewitnessesonthegroundinthespringof1993.Weknowthisisanarbitrary

date.ThereisanargumenttobemadethatthesinsthatledtoSrebrenicagobackto

1Thistranscriptwasannotatedandeditedforclaritybyconferencestaffandparticipantsinaccordancewithconferencegroundrules.2USHMM,“ConferenceAgenda,”June28,2015.

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thediplomaticrecognitionprocess[in1990-1992],thelackofprotectionforethnic

minoritiesduringthatearlyperiod,thearmsembargo,orthefamousJimBaker

comment,"Wedon'thaveadoginthatfight"whentheAmericanswentmissing.3

ButforthepurposesofthisconferenceandourfocusonSrebrenica,wewant

tobeginwithGeneralMorillon'svisittoSrebrenicainMarch1993.4MichaelDobbs,

willyouleadusoffwithafewawkwardquestions?

MICHAELDOBBS:Thankyou,Tom.Thisisthesecondinaseriesofconferencesthat

weareorganizingunderthetitle"InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeof

Genocide,"lookingatthebigcrisesofthepost-ColdWarperiod.5Lastyear,wehada

conferenceonRwandawithasimilarsetuparoundthetable.Wehadmembersof

theUNSecurityCouncilontheleft,GeneralDallaireandtheotherUNpeacekeepers

inthemiddle,andthepeoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAccordsontheright.I

thinkthat[formerUKrepresentativeontheUNSecurityCouncil]DavidHannayis

sittinginexactlythesamechairthatyouoccupiedforourRwandaconference.You

provideathreadofcontinuitybetweenthetwoconferences,asdoes[formerUS

AssistantSecretaryofStateforHumanRights]JohnShattuck.

ManyoftheofficialswhowereinvolvedinRwandadecision-makingwere

alsoinvolvedinBosnia.Therearesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthosetwo

events.Oneofthesimilaritiesisthegapinperceptionsbetweenthepeopleonthe

groundandthepeopleinNewYorkandthenationalcapitals.InthecaseofRwanda,

itwasasifthedebatesweretakingplaceonthreedifferentplanets.Therewerethe

peoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAgreements,thepeacekeeperswhoimplemented

theagreements,andtheUNofficialsinNewYorkwhosupervisedtheentireprocess.

Therewasimperfectcommunicationbetweenthesethreegroupsofactors.We

discoveredthattherewasimperfectcommunicationwithinthesameinstitution:at

3SecretaryofStateJamesA.BakervisitedBelgradeonJune21,1991,meetingwithawiderangeofYugoslavleaders,fivedaysbeforetheoutbreakofwarbetweenSerbiaandSlovenia.Hiscomment“wedon’thaveadoginthatfight”wasreportedlaterbyNationalSecurityAdvisorBrentScowcroft.4GeneralPhilippeMorillonvisitedSrebrenicafromMarch10to13,1993,attheheadofaUNhumanitarianaidconvoywhilethetownwasundersiegebyBosnianSerbforces.5MoreinformationontheInternationalDecisionMakingprojectcanbefoundontheUSHolocaustMemorialMuseumwebsite.

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theUnitedNations,forexample,betweentheSecretariatandtheSecretary-General,

orbetweentheSecretariatandtheSecurityCouncil.Isuspectthatwewillfind

similardisconnectsinthecaseofBosnia.

Tosetthestageforourdiscussiontoday,IreadRupertSmith'sexcellent

chapteronBosniainTheUtilityofForceinwhichhewritesthattheseedsforthe

Srebrenicadisasterwere“sownwiththedecisionsmadeinthespringof1993:

decisionstothreatenwithnointentiontoact,todeployforceswithnointentionto

employtheirforce,decisionsmadeinnopoliticalcontextexceptfearofthe

consequencesofactiontotheforce.”6Healsocommentsonthelackofany

overarchingstrategy.Hesaystherewasnostrategicdirection,noachievable

militarygoals,nomilitarycampaign,notheaterlevelmilitaryobjectives,only

incoherence.Hetalksabout“theimperativetodosomethingandthescrambleto

createapolicy.”WemaynotagreewithGeneralSmith’sassessment,butwewill

certainlyhavetograpplewithhiscritiqueoverthenextcoupleofdays.

Thismorning,wewilllookattheperiodfromMarch1993,whenGeneral

MorillonarrivesinSrebrenicatoaccompanyahumanitarianconvoy,throughthe

threeUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsthatestablishedtheSafeAreasandsetthe

parametersfortheirprotection.7TheeventsofJuly1995areshapedbythe

decisionstakenin1993.

Afewquestionsforustoconsider:whatwasthenatureofthecommitments

containedinthesethreeUNresolutions?Didthepeoplearoundthistable—UN

ambassadors,membersoftheUNSecretariat,thepeacekeepers—haveaclearidea

ofthepolicythatyouformulatedbackin1993?Howweretheresolutionsmeantto

beimplemented?WhatwastheproperroleofUNPROFOR?Wasitaclassic

peacekeepingmissionorwasitapeaceenforcementmission?DuringourRwanda

conference,therewasalotofdiscussionabouttherulesofengagement,authorized

underChapterVIoftheUNCharter.IntheBosnia“SafeArea”resolutions,youwill

6RupertSmith,TheUtilityofForce:TheArtofWarintheModernWorld,150.7TheUNSecurityCounciladoptedResolution819onApril16,1993,callingonthewarringpartiestotreatSrebrenicaas“asafearea”.UNSCResolution824ofMay4addedfivemore“safeareas”:Sarajevo,Tuzla,Žepa,Goražde,andBihać.OnJune4,UNSCResolution836extendedUNPROFOR’smandate“todeterattacksagainstthesafeareas.”

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findreferencestoChapterVII[e.g.in819and836]oftheUNCharter,butitis

unclearwhetherthiswasmeanttobeaChapterVIImissionoraChapterVImission.

Whatwastheproperroleofpeacekeepers?Shouldtheybestrictlyneutral,or

shouldtheytakesidesintheconflict?[TurnstoDavidHarland,authorofthe1999

UNreportonSrebrenica].InyourreportonSrebrenica,youconcludeattheendthat

peacekeeperscannotbeimpartialwhenconfrontedwith"attemptedgenocide."8We

shouldtalkaboutthat.Underwhatcircumstanceswasairpowermeanttobeused

todefendtheenclaves?Weretherealternativestotheestablishmentof“Safe

Areas”?WastheVance-Owenpeaceplanapossiblealternative?Wastherea

strategyforendingthewarinBosnia,manystrategies,ornostrategyatall?Weare

alsointerestedintherelationshipbetweenthehumanitariangoalsofUNPROFOR

andthestrategicgoals.Istherealinkbetweenthetwo?Shouldoneservetheother,

oraretheyentirelyseparate?

SHASHITHAROOR:BeforewestartatMarch1993,surelywehavetounderstand

whatUNPROFORwasdoingthereinthefirstplace:whyitwasdeployed,whatthe

logicofitwas,whyitevenhadthenameitdidandeverythingelse.Morillon'svisit

didnothappeninavacuum.TherewasayearandahalfofUNPROFORbeforethat.

EverythingRupertSmithsaysinthatextractyoureadisabsolutelyaccurate,but

thatispreciselybecauseofthewayinwhichthisoperationhadevolveduptothat

point.

DAVIDHANNAY:Ithinkitisworthspendinghalfanhourorsoonthecontext.The

documents[inthebriefingbook]arefascinating,theyrecallmuchtome,butthey

aretotallycontext-less.Youwouldnotknowfromthesepapers,forexample,that

theSecurityCouncilandmemberstatesweregrapplingwiththebiggestsplitin

NATOinlivingmemoryover“liftandstrike.”9YouwouldnotknowthattheSecurity

8UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,“ThefallofSrebrenica,”A/54/549,November15,1999,henceforth“1999UNSrebrenicareport.”9“LiftandStrike”referredtoaU.S.proposaltoliftthearmsembargoimposedontheBosniangovernment(andotherYugoslavrepublics)inSeptember1991anduseairstrikestoforcetheBosnianSerbstothenegotiatingtable.ThestrategywasadoptedbyBillClintonduringthe1992presidential

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Councilwassettingupitsfirstwarcrimestribunal.10Youwouldnotknowthatthe

SecurityCouncilwasimposingonSerbiathebiggestpackageofeconomicsanctions

thathadeverbeenimposed.11So,thereisalotmissingfromthecontext,whichdoes

notchangetheviewthatRuperthasrightlyexpressed,thattheSrebrenicadecision

andtheSafeAreasdecisionweretakenwithoutproperconsiderationoftheir

possibleconsequences,butrelatetothequestionofwhethertherewasastrategy.

Therewasastrategy.Itwasabadstrategy,butitwasastrategy.Thestrategywas

nottodoliftandstrike,nottodotheVance-Owenpeaceprocess,tosetupacriminal

tribunal,toimposesanctionsonSerbia,andhopeforthebest.

SHASHITHAROOR:Weneedtotalkaboutthebackground.WhydidMorillongoto

Srebrenica?Whatsortofmissionwashedeployedon?Youcannotstartoffwiththe

missionwithoutunderstandingwhathewasdoingthere.IwillbeasbriefasIcan,

butunfortunatelyIamthepersonherewiththelongestUNinvolvementinthis

issue.IwentoutontheveryfirstmissioninOctober1991that[UNUnder-

Secretary-General]MarrackGouldingundertookwhentheEuropeanCommunity

wasanxioustohandthisparticularhotpotatototheUN.Youmayrememberthe

Europeanpeacemonitorsbeingcalled"icecreamsalesmen"afewmonthsbefore

that.12TherewereEuropeanCommunitymonitorsinCroatiaandBosnia.Ourgoal

wastoseewhetherapeacekeepingoperationwasviableforCroatia.Therewas

enormouspoliticalpressureonusfromEuropetotakethison.Gouldingwas

relativelynewtopeacekeeping,buthadbeenverythoroughlyschooledintheDag

Hammarskjöldcatechismofpeacekeeping:thedoctrineofcompleteneutrality,not

takingsidesintheconflict,deployinginhighlyvisibleconfigurations,vehicles

campaign,andadoptedasofficialU.S.policyinMay1993,butabandonedbecauseofoppositionfromU.S.allies.See“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,"May17,1993.10TheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslaviawasestablishedunderUNSecurityCouncilresolution827ofMay25,1993.11TheUNSecurityCouncilpassedResolution820onApril17,1993,restrictingimportsandexportsfromSerbiaandMontenegro.Previousresolutionsincluded713(1991),724(1991),757(1992)and787(1992).12SeveralhundredEuropeanobserversweredeployedtoCroatiaaspartoftheEuropeanCommunityMonitoringMissioninJuly1991.Croatsdubbedthem“icecreamsalesmen”becauseoftheiruniformofwhitesuitsandwhiteshoes,whichweredesignedtogivethemprotection.See,forexample,RayMoseley,“EuropeanPeaceTalksOfferLittleHopeofYugoslavSettlement,”ChicagoTribune,September25,1991.

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paintedwhiteandallthatstuff.Thiswasthelogicwithwhichweapproachedthe

entireconcept.

UNPROFORwassetup[underUNSecurityCouncilResolution743of

February21,1992]forpoliticalreasonseventhoughwementionedinourinitial

reporttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoreallyviableconceptof

peacekeepingthatallsidesagreedupon.13Wecalledthepeacekeepingforce

UNPROFOR,meaningUnitedNationsProtectionForce,whichreflectedGoulding's

optimism.Wewerereallynotinthebusinessofprotectinganybodysignificantly.

Wehadobserverstobeginwithandlateravery,verysmallmilitarydeployment.

WhenthetroublesbeganinBosnia,intheearlyspringof1992,Europeanmembers

oftheSecurityCouncilasked[UNSecretary-GeneralBoutros]Boutros-Ghalito

extendUNPROFORtoBosnia.Itisoftenoverlookedthatthe[April24,1992]report

submittedbytheSecretary-Generalexplicitlysaid,"…inthelightofallthefactors

bearingonthecurrentsituationinBosnia-Herzegovina,thedeploymentofapeace-

keepingforcetherewasnotfeasible."14Itisthereinblackandwhite,apublic

document.

Manyofyouarenottooyoungtorememberthewonderfuloldsong,"Ifyou

can'tbewiththeoneyoulove,lovetheoneyou'rewith."Sincetheycouldnotfind

anyotherresponsetothiscrisisintheSecurityCouncil,theytooktheoneavailable

mechanism,namelyUNpeacekeeping,andappliedittoasituationforwhichitwas

manifestlynotsuited,astheSecretary-Generalhimselfsaidinblackandwhite.That

ishowUNPROFORbackedintopeacekeepinginBosnia.

Thecabletrafficthroughout1992fromthefield,uptotheMorillonvisitto

SrebrenicainMarch1993,showsthemountingcontradictionsinsuchamandate.

Youhaveapeacekeepingoperationwherethereisnopeacetokeep,withamandate

designedtoprotectSerbianciviliansinCroatia,andCroatiancivilianscaughtupin

thewar.ThatwastheoriginalmandateofUNPROFOR.ItwasinBosniaessentiallyto

beablereportbacktotheCouncilthatitwasdoingsomething.WhenSarajevo 13Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution721(1991),”S/23280,December11,1991.14Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution749(1992),”S/23836,April24,1992.

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airportfelltotheSerbs,UNPROFORbecamethemechanismtoprizetheairport

awayfromthem[inJune1992]andhanditovertointernationalsupervision.15In

theabsenceofacoherentvision,UNPROFORwasexpectedtotakeallthison.Itis

againstthisbackground,withoutanyverycoherentoragreedconceptorplanof

operationsthatMorillongoestoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Thatisaveryshort

summaryofsomethingfarmorecomplicatedandmessy,butprovidesthe

DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsperspectiveatthetimethisSrebrenica

adventurebegins.

DAVIDHARLAND:Iagreewiththepointthatyoucannotunderstandthefallofthe

SafeAreasuntilyouunderstandhowUNPROFORgotintoBosniainthefirstplace.

WeshouldalsorememberthattheideaofSafeAreaswasextensivelydiscussedin

1992longbefore“Srebrenica.”ItwasraisedbyAustriaandHungaryinparticular.

Thereisaveryinteresting,andIthinkprofound,correspondencerelatingtothe

establishmentofSafeAreas.16Theideaactuallycomesupinamessagefrom

[AustrianforeignministerAlois]Mockto[InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

PresidentCornelio]Sommarugaaskingabout“safetyzones”astheyarereferredto

intheGenevaConventions.17Sommarugathenrepliessayingthattheyhavecertain

characteristics:theyareabsolutelyunarmed,theyarefortheprotectionofhospitals

andsoon.HeaskswhetherornottheUNSecretariathasbeenconsulted.Thenthere

isanotherletterto[UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesSadako]Ogata.

Ogatarepliesfirmlyontherecordthatthisisanabsolutelyterribleideawhich,if

everused,shouldbelimitedtosimplyprotectinghospitalsbyagreement.The

reasonIraisethisisbecauseitshowshowinternationaldecisionsaresometimes

made.Anideaentersintoplayandisshapedandchanged.Thefactthatitentered

intoplayasanideatobediscountedissomethingthatsometimesgetsforgottenas

timegoesby.

15UNSC,“Resolution758(1992),”June8,1992.16ForbackgroundondiscussionofUNSafeAreas,seeparagraphs45-51,of1999UNreportonSrebrenica,A/54/549.17AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.

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MICHAELDOBBS:WewillcertainlylookattheoriginsoftheSafeAreasconcept,and

thedifferencesbetweenthewayinwhichitwasappliedinplaceslikeKurdistanand

Bosnia,butletusgotoLarryHollingworthnow.Larry,youaccompaniedGeneral

MorillontoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Canyoudescribethecircumstancesofthis

visitandwhatyourememberfromthevisit?

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:IwasinBosnia[withtheUnitedNationsHigh

CommissionforRefugees]primarilytodeliverhumanitarianaid.Iworkedprimarily

inSarajevo,butwewerealwaysremindedthattherewerethese[Muslim-inhabited]

enclaves[inSerbian-controlledterritory],andthatweshoulddosomethingabout

theseenclaves.18IhadmanagedtogetintoGoraždeandŽepa.Wetriedtogetinto

Cerska,butwerekeptout.Wehadthreehumanitarianreliefconvoysdottedaround

Bosnia.Wecouldnotmoveanyofthem.WespentthreedaysoutsideZvornik.

Finally,MadameOgatasaid“enoughisenough”andpulledusallback.Thiswasthe

veryfirsttimethatIfeltthatGeneralMorillonwasinterestedintheconvoys.Hegot

agooddebrieffrommeandsaid,"Okay,weshoulddefinitelytrytogetbackinto

Cerska."WhileIwaswaitinginthefirstconvoy[outsideZvornik]forthreedays,

Kamenicafell.Morillonrangmeupandsaid,“Look,weshoulddefinitelytrytoget

intoCerskaagainbutweshouldfirstofalldoanassessment.”Hesaid,“I'dlikeyou

tocomewithme,bringa[WorldHealthOrganization]doctorwithyou.Ihave

approvalandwewillgetintoCerska.WefirstofallflewtoZvornik.InZvornikwe

pickedupanarmoredcarfromtheBritish.WetriedtogetthenintoCerskabutwe

wereregularlystoppedintheforest.Idon'tknowwhetheritwastheBosnianside

ortheSerbside,buttheycutdownlotsoftreesanditwasverydifficulttomove.

WhenwegottotheoutskirtsofCerska,weweremetbythesoldiersofNaser

Orić[commanderoftheArmyofRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina28thDivision],

whosaid,“You'retoolate,Cerskahasfallen.”Thiswasagreatblowforus.General

Morillon,whowaswithus,said,“Okaylet'smoveonnow.WewillgotoKonjević

Polje.”WhenwegotintoKonjevićPolje,theGeneraldecidedthathewouldgoback

toZvornikandmeetupwithGeneralMladićandseeifwecouldmakefurther 18“Bosnia:AreasofControl,”September1994.

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progresstotryandgetintoSrebrenica….Tocutalongstoryshort,thedoctor,Simon

Mardel,walkedtoSrebrenica,theGeneralwenttoZvornik,andIreturnedto

Sarajevo.ThegeneralthendecidedthatwehadtotakeaconvoyintoSrebrenica.He

gotapproval[fromUNPROFORcommander]GeneralWahlgrenandfromKaradzić

andMladić.

Sooffwewent,withaverysmallconvoy.TherewasanUNMilitaryObserver

vehicle,therewasaCanadianarmoredpersonnelcarrier,therewasasmallvehicle

withMèdecinsSansFrontiéresinit,andtherewasmyself,withtwovehicles.That

wasit.WeweregoingtoenteroverthebridgeatBratunac,buttheSerbstoldusthe

bridgewasdownandwehadtogoonasideroad,whichhadnotbeenusedfora

longtime.Weweretoldveryclearlythatitwasminedandwasunderameterof

snow.SowemovedoffwiththeGeneral,whowasintheAPC.Weweregoingtoo

slowlysohezoomedaheadofustogetintoSrebrenica.Iwasthenrunningthe

convoy.Thefirstofourtruckshitamineandwasblownup.Unfortunatelythat

meantthatthevehiclebehinditcouldnotmoveeithersincetheroadwasonlywide

enoughforonevehicle.Alittlebitfurther,welosttheMSFvehicle,whichgotstuck

inthesnow.EventuallywelimpedintoSrebrenica,lateatnight[March11,1993].

GeneralMorillonwaswaitingattheoutercheckpointofSrebrenica.Weallwent

togetherintoSrebrenicalateatnight.Wewenttothereceptioncommittee,Ithink

Muhamed[Duraković]wasthere,intheroomatthetime.Wehadasmallbriefing

andthenIspentabouttwohoursoutonthestreetswanderingaround.Itwasminus

threedegreesatthetime,andthousandsofpeoplewereoutonthestreets.

Thefollowingday[March12,1993]wemetwiththemayorandwithOrić.All

seemedtobegoingwell.WehadtwoAmericanswithuswhoweredoing

communicationsforus.Afterdoingtherecces,theGeneraldecidedwewouldgo

backhome.Weallgotinourvehiclestosetoffandthoughtitwasrathernicethat

theentiretowncameoutforus.Wethoughttheywerewavingusoff,buttheywere

notwavingusoffatall.Theywerestoppingusfromleaving.Thegeneralsaid“Okay

that'sit,wecan'tmove.”Wehadpeoplesaying,“Ifwecan'tgetout,youcan'tget

out.”Thatwasthemessagethatwasgiventous.IthinkInowknowthebackground

toit.WewenttothePTTbuilding.Thegeneralwasobviouslyworried.Hisgreatest

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fearwasthathewouldbetakenhostageandherehewas,atleast"detained,"in

Srebrenica.

Weonlyhadonevehiclewithcommunications.CommunicationsintheAPC

didnotworksomylittlevehiclebecameakindofheadquarters.Irememberthe

general’schiefofstaff,PiersTucker,explainingwhathadhappenedtoBosnia-

HerzegovinaCommand.Thevoiceontheotherendsaid,"So,youareprisoners?

You'vebeentakenhostage."PiersTuckersaid,"No,no,no,we'vejustbeendetained,

we'rejustnotallowedtoleave.”Ithoughtitwasalittlesubtlewayofputtingit.

Thenextday,GeneralMorillonkepttohimself.Hecameupwithaplantoget

upat2:00inthemorningandwalkawayfromthebuilding.PiersTuckerandhis

bodyguardwouldpickhimupintheAPC,usingtheexcusethatwehadtomovethe

vehiclebecausewecouldnotgetgoodradioreception.Theplanfellapartbecause

peoplestoppedthemfrommovingthevehicle.Thegeneralhadtosneakbackinto

thePTTbuilding.Hehidintheroom,whichgavetheimpressionthatperhapshe

hadleft.Iwouldliketoaskyou[directsquestiontoMuhamedDuraković]whether

youthoughthehadleft,orwhetheryoudidnotknowwhetherhehadleft.Inany

case,fortwenty-fourhours,nobodycouldseehim.

Hefinallycameoutandsaid,“Lar-ry…[ImitatesFrenchaccent,withrolling

Rs]Ihaveaplan."HewassmokingDavidoffcigars[makesinhalingsound].

“Lar-ry,you‘avaflag?"Isaid,"Yes,General."Hesaid,"AUNflag?"[Makes

inhalingnoise]"Yes,General."Thenhesaid,"Lar-ry,you‘avatannoy?"Isaid,"I

thinksoGeneral,yesIthinkso."Andhesaid,"Good."Hesaid,"Getmethemayor."

SowegotthemayorandhetoldthemayorthathewantedeverybodyinSrebrenica

tobeoutsidethebuilding.Sosureenough,anenormouscrowdofpeopleappeared.

Hethensaidtome,"Lar-ry,whenInodmyhead,youputtheflagoutthewindow."I

said,"Okay."

Sowestoodonthisbalcony.Ihadnoideawhathewasgoingtosay,noidea

atall.Hestoodupandhesaidtothepeople,"Icame‘ere[inhales]voluntarily,"he

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said,"Icame‘ereto‘elpyou."Hesaid,"Iamnowputtingyouundertheprotectionof

theUnitedNations."Henoddedhishead.Flagout.19[Laughter]

Therewasthisenormouscheerfrombelow.Peoplewereclappingand

cheeringandshoutingandIthoughttomyself,“There’sonlyeightofushere.”I

rememberaCanadiansoldiersaidtome,"Doesthatmean,sirthatwecangoout

andwalkaroundthetown?"Isaidtohim,"Noitmeanswecangetoutofhereand

protectthetown."

ThenextincidentwasthatwehadtoinformBHCommand,whichwasfun.I

wentdownwiththeGeneralandwesatinthevehicle.Heexplainedwhatwas

happeningtoBrigadierRoddyCordy-Simpson,andexplainedthathehadput

SrebrenicaundertheprotectionoftheUnitedNations.IcouldhearBrigadierCordy-

Simpsonsuckinginhisbreath.Theydecidedtotalkagainfourhourslater.The

generalsaidtoCordy-Simpson,"Roddy,I‘aveaplan,Iwantthehelicopters‘erefor

theevacuationtomorrow."AndCordy-Simpsonsaidtohim,"Umthatisnot

consideredtobeagoodidea,sir."Morillonsaid,"Bywhom?"Cordy-Simpsonsaid,

"ByBHCommand,sir.""Roddy,”theGeneralsaid,"IamBHCommand."

Thefollowingdaytherewerenohelicopters.Wespentaboutthreedays

tryingtobringaconvoyin.Mytaskwastofindoutwheretoputthefood.Wehad

200tonsoffoodcominginandapopulationofmaybe30,000veryhungrypeople.

Whereareyougoingtoputthiswarehouse?Howareyougoingtoprotectit?How

areyougoingtohandoutthefood?Wealsohadthetaskoftryingtoevacuatethe

peopleinthehospitalwhichwastheworstthatanybodyhadeverseen.

TheGeneralmanagedtogetapprovalforhimselftogooutandorganize

anotherconvoytocomein.Whentheconvoyarrived,theyunloadedtheaidbutit

wasalsoagreedthattheywouldtakeoutwomenandchildrenandmalesover60.

MICHAELDOBBS:Letusreturntotheevacuationquestion,andwhetherthepeople

wouldbeevacuatedorprotectedinplace,alittlelater.Ialsowanttoaskyouabout

themediacoveragewhichwasveryimportant.Beforewedothat,wewouldliketo

19FootageavailableinclipofBBCDocumentary,TheDeathofYugoslavia,Part5(YouTube).

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hearfromMuhamed[Duraković],whowasinsidethetown.Couldyoudescribethe

situationinsideSrebrenicaatthistimeandtheimpactoftheMorillonvisitandthose

wordsofMorillon?Howdidyouinterpretthem?

MuhamedDurakovic,R,withLarryHollingworth

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Thankyouverymuch.Itisanhonorandaprivilegetosee

facesthatIhavenotseenfortwentyplusyears.WehavetoputGeneralMorillon’s

visitinthecontextofhowthepopulationinSrebrenicawassurvivingatthattime.

Thewinterof1992to1993wasthemostdifficultone.Manypeoplenotnativeto

Srebrenica,whomanagedtosurvivetheonslaughtandethniccleansingintheDrina

Valley,hadmovedintotheenclave.20Themostdifficultthingforuswasbeing

unabletocommunicateoursituationtothoseoutsideSrebrenica.Peoplelivingin

SarajevoortheBihaćpocket,andotherplacesaroundBosnia-Herzegovina,were

alsoinaverydifficultsituation,butwefeltlikewewereinhabitingthislonelyisland

inthemiddleofmurkywaters.Wehadverylittletohopefor.Thefirstsignthat

someonewasthinkingaboutthepopulationofSrebrenicaandtryingtoassistus 20AccordingtoaJanuary1994surveyconductedbytheSrebrenicamunicipality,morethan16,000peoplefromothermunicipalitieshadfledtoSrebrenica,bringingthetotalpopulationto37,000.Seealso“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993.

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camewiththeairdropsinFebruary1993.21IalwaysmentionLarryinmy

presentationsonSrebrenica.

Iwasseventeenyearsoldandinhighschoolwhenthewarstartedin1992.I

wouldwalkawayfromSrebrenicaupintothemountains,hopingthatIwouldbethe

luckyonetoseetheseairdrops.Thestrategywastodispersethefoodinmany

differentlocationssothatitwouldnotendupontheblackmarket,sothatmany

peoplewouldgetaccesstoit.Forthesafetyoftheaircraftandthepilots,thefood

wasusuallydroppedfromveryhighaltitudes.Wewouldlookupintotheskyand

heartheplanes,butnotbeabletoseethem.Wewouldstandinthemiddleofthe

forestincompletedarknessat2:00inthemorning.Thenwewouldsuddenlyhear

the"poof,poof,poof,"[makessuccessionofpoppingnoises]ofparachutesopening.

Theskywouldlightupwithbrightcolors,yellowishandgreenish.Theseweresmall

flareshangingonthecornersoftheseparachutes.ItwasasifChristmashad

returnedtoSrebrenica.ActuallyitlookedlikealargeChristmastreefallingfromthe

sky.MyimpressionwasconfirmedwhenImetMr.SantaClaushere[referringto

LarryHollingworth,photoabove]whenhecametoSrebrenica.

ThiswasthefirsttimeinmylifethatIhadmetforeigners.Iwasyoung,I

livedinaverysmall,isolatedcommunity,andIwasnotverywelltraveled.Itwasan

extraordinaryexperience.Herewerepeoplewillingtorisktheirlivestotravelto

Srebrenicaunderverydifficultcircumstances.Youmayhavegottheimpressionthat

youwerebeingdetained,butIthinkthelocalpopulationneverfeltlikeyouwere

beingdetained.YouwerealwaysverywelcometocometoSrebrenica.Toexplain

ourperspective,however,welearnedthroughthegrapevinethattheinternationals

hadmovedtoCerska,andCerskafalls.ThentheyareinKonjevićPoljeandKonjević

Poljeisquicklyrunover.WhentheyfinallycametoSrebrenica,thisseemedlikea

verybadpattern.Thelessonwetookfromthiswas:iftheygo,wewillalldie.There

weresomeattempts,asyoumentioned,topreventtheUNfromleaving,butitwas

notreallyorganized.Itwaspurelyaccidental.

21LaketoClinton,“PresidentialDecisionforHumanitarianAirDropsforBosnia,”TheWhiteHouse,February19,1993.

1-14

BythetimeyouarrivedfromKonjevićPolje[addressesHollingworth],

peoplewhosurvivedtheCerskaandtheKonjevićPoljeonslaughtswerearrivingon

footfromKonjevićPolje.IttakesatleastoneortwodaystowalkfromKonjević

PoljetoSrebrenica.Bythetimeyouweregettingreadytoleave,thesepeoplewere

comingintothetown.Theyhadnoplacetostay,sotheysatdownonthestreetsof

Srebrenica.Itwasverycold,itwassnowing.Therewerewomenandchildren

makingfiresinthemiddleoftheroad.Itmayhaveappearedtoyouthatsomeone

wastryingtoblockyou,butinreality,thesepeoplehadnoplacetogo,theydidnot

knowanyoneinSrebrenica.

Ofcourse,whenfinallyGeneralMorillonmadethatfamousstatementfrom

thePTTbuilding,wecitizensofSrebrenicafeltthatwehadsurvived.Wereally

thoughtthiswastheendofoursuffering,wehaveagainbecomepartofthecivilized

world,andwewillsurvivetheatrocitiestowhichwehavebeenexposedduringthe

previousyear.

MICHAELDOBBS:BeforeweaskhowthisinformationwasreceivedattheUN,could

Larrytellushowthenewsgotout.IfMorillonhadmadethatdeclarationwith

nobodytohearitexceptforthepeopleofSrebrenica,thatwouldhavehadacertain

impact.Buttherewerejournalistspresent.Thatchangedthenatureoftheevent,

right?

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ThereweretwojournalistsinsideSrebrenica,whohad

madetheirownwayin.OnewasaGermanphotographer,Phillippvon

Recklinghausen,andtheotherwasacameramancalledTonyBirtley,whowas

freelancingforABC.22Bothofthemweretherebeforewegotin.Theyhadtaken

someverygoodfilm,buthadneverbeenabletogetitout.Theyfilmedtheepisode

oftheflagcomingoutofthewindowandwhateverelse.Iwasleavingwiththe

convoy,becausemyfinaltaskwastogetpeopleontheconvoywhichwasan

absolutenightmarebecausethousandsofpeoplewentonthetrucks.AsIwasgoing 22VonRecklinghausenarrivedinSrebrenicaonFebruary8-9,1993,andwaswoundedinthearm,whenhesteppedonamine.Birtleyarrivedaroundthesametime.BothjournalistswereevacuatedfromSrebrenicabyhelicopter.

1-15

out,TonyBirtleysaidtome,“Willyoutakeoutallofmyfilm?”Itwasagamble

becauseIcouldhavebeensearchedandIcouldhavelostthem.ItoldhimthatI

wouldtakethemoutifhewaspreparedtotaketherisk.Itookthemandgavethem

toABC.Theywerearoundtheworldandineverynewspaperwithinhoursof

usgettingout.

MICHAELDOBBS:HowlongbetweentheMorillonspeech[declaringSrebrenicato

beundertheprotectionoftheUN]andthefilmappearingonthenews?

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Ithinkaboutfourdays.23

MICHAELDOBBS:Itwouldbealmostinstantaneoustoday.Inthiscase,ittookfour

daysandthefilmhadtobesmuggledout.

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ItwasasadstoryforVonRecklinghausen.Hegavehis

filmstosomebodywholostthem.Heshotabouttwelveweeks’worthoffilmwith

littletoshowforit.

VEREHAYES:Iwasat[UNPROFORBHCommand]atKiseljakonareccetotakeover

fromCordy-Simpsonwhenallofthiswasgoingon.Hewasextremelyconcernedby

whatwashappening.NotonlydidhehavetogetintouchwithNewYorkandthe

UN,butinthenextdoorofficeFrenchSpecialForceswereplanninganindependent

nationalcovertoperationtogoinandgetGeneralMorillonout.Idon'tknowhow

widelyknownthatis,butitwascertainlytakenprettyseriouslyatthetime.

TOMBLANTON:Ithinkatonepointyoudescribethesmokeofcigarettesleaking

underthedooroftheofficetheywereusing.

VEREHAYES:Yes,thedoorwaslocked.TherewerealotofGauloisesbeingsmoked,

alotofcoffeegoingin.Itcertainlyfilteredaroundtheheadquarters.

TOMBLANTON:MinisterMuratović.

23ThefootageairedonABC’sWorldNewsTonightwithPeterJenningsonMarch16,1993.

1-16

HASANMURATOVIĆ:WeheardthatthearrivalofMorillonchangedthingsin

SrebrenicabutIwouldliketoexplainwhyMorillonwenttoSrebrenica.Hewas

responsiblefortheSarajevosector.HewenttotheTuzlasectorbyhisowndecision,

withoutaskinganybody’sapprovalorevenopinion.Ourdeputyprimeminister,

HakijaTurajlić,hadbeenkilledonJanuary8inaFrenchAPC.TheAPCstoppedata

checkpointneartheairport,whereallnegotiationstookplaceandstayedtherefor

twohourswiththeSerbs.The[Frenchpeacekeepers]didnotaskforanysupportin

accordancewiththerules.Aftertwohourstheyopenedthedoorandthedeputy

primeministerwaskilled[bytheSerbs].

Laterintheevening,around1a.m.,wehadagovernmentmeetingto

organizetheburialanddiscussthewholematter.GeneralMorillonappearedatthis

meeting,eventhoughhehadnotbeeninvited.Hecameandsatontheside.Heasked

ifhecouldcontributesomethingtotheburialorarrangeformoresecurityforthe

burial.RusmirMahmutćehajić,theministerwhochairedthemeeting,accused

Morillonofresponsibilityforthedeathofourdeputyprimeminister.Hesaid,"We

suspectyouofhavingapartinit."Initially,Morillondidnotreact,butlatersaidit

wasuntrue,andtriedtoproveitwasuntrue.Mahmutćehajićthenaskedhimto

leavethemeetingandsaidthatwedidnotwanttodobusinesswithhimanymore.

Weneverpublicizedoursuspicions,anddidnothaveanyevidenceabout

Morillon’sinvolvement.24Butheprobablywantedtodosomethinggoodandprove

thathewasnotinanywayinvolvedinthecase.HewenttoSrebrenicaallofa

sudden,andthenwenttoBelgradeforseveraldaystonegotiatewithMilošević.This

wasoutsidehisareaofresponsibilityattheUN.Hesucceededinnegotiationswith

theSerbsandgothumanitarianconvoysintoSrebrenica,whichhadnotbeen

allowedtopassforseveralmonths.Inouropinion,thiswasarewardbytheSerbs

forhispartintheexecutionofHakijaTurajlić.

24SeeJohnBurns,“BosnianMuslimsCriticizeU.N.OverOfficial’sKilling,”NewYorkTimes,January10,1993.ABosniangovernmentstatementissuedonJanuary9,1993,accusedMorillonoffailingtoprotectTurajlićandcoveringupeventsthatledtothekilling.Morilloncalledtheincident“atragedyoferrors”andthe“theworstblowofmycareer.”MuratovićsaidthattheBosniangovernmentsuspectedthatMorillonwasinvolvedintheTurajlićexecutionandwenttoSrebrenicatogetawayfromSarajevo.

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TOMBLANTON:Thankyouverymuch.LetmeaskShashitodescribethereactionin

DPKOtotheMorillon"declaration”placingthepeopleofSrebrenica“underUN

protection.”

SHASHITHAROOR:AsIsaid,wehadanunclearmandate.The“protection”partof

UNPROFOR,asfarasBosniawasconcerned,essentiallymeantprotectionof

humanitarianconvoys.Fromourpointofview,thehumanitarianmissionwas

obviouslyextremelyimportant.Atthesametime,andthiswasverymuchGeneral

Wahlgren’sviewasthecommanderontheground,wewereanxiousnottobe

drawnintotheconflict.Wewerethereasapeacekeepingforce.Ourapproachwas

basedonacomplicatedsetofpremises.Weneededtoprotecthumanitarianaid

deliveriestoallsides.WeneededtoprotecttheUNpersonneldispersingthataid.

Wealsoneededtoensurethataiddeliverieswerenotusedbyonesideinthe

conflicttomakeusapartytotheconflict.

NoneofushadaproblemwiththeideaoftheUNsteppingasideandallowing

Westerngovernments,iftheywanted,totakesidesandendthewar,buttherewas

absolutelynoindicationofthenecessarypoliticalwillintheWesttodothat.

ThebandaidapproachthattheSecurityCouncilwaspushingwasinfacta

reflectionoftheabsenceofpoliticalwillforadefinitiveconclusionoftheconflict.

Wethereforefoundourselvesmanagingapeacekeepingoperationundertherules

ofpeacekeepingwithalltheusualconfigurationpatterns,includingwhitevehicles,

liaisonwithallpartiesandsoon.ThiswasatatimewhentheSerbswerereluctant

tolethumanitarianaidthroughbecausetheythoughtitbolsteredthemilitary

strengthoftheiropponents.TheBosnianshopedthatattacksonhumanitarian

convoyswouldirresistiblydragtheUNintotheconflictontheirside.Wewere

caughtinthemiddle.

ObviouslywehadnoproblemwiththeUNgoingtoSrebrenicaanddelivering

aid.ThatiswhattheUNwassupposedtobedoing.However,weweresomewhat

takenabackbythedramaticdeclarationbyMorillon.Wedidnotdisavowhimatany

pointbecausewealsorecognizedthatsignificantvoicesontheSecurityCouncil

welcomedhisstatement.Wewantedtoseehowwecouldinterpretthatinaway

1-18

thatwouldkeepusviableasapeacekeepingforcewhichiswhattheCouncilwanted

ustoremain.Iamsorrythatisnotaverycoherentreplybutnothingaboutthis

affairwascoherentatthetime.Thiswasthesetofballswithwhichwewere

jugglingaswetriedtodealwiththesituation.

TotakeupDavidHarland'spointabouttheearlierdiscussionsonSafeAreas:

thesediscussionswererelatedtoveryspecificideasofsafehavenswhichrequireda

numberofelementstobeviableininternationallaw.TheICRCconceptwasbased

ondemilitarization.Wewerehappytodothis,buthowdoyoudemilitarize

SrebrenicawhentheBosnianarmysaysitisdefendingitsownpeoplethere?You

don'tdemilitarize.Whentheyfireoutfromthisareaandarefiredbackupon,what

istheroleoftheUN?ArewejoiningtheBosnianArmy?Theseweresomeofthe

fundamentaldilemmasthatwefacedbecauseofthepeacekeepingnatureofour

mandate.

TOMBLANTON:AmbassadorWalker.

JENONNEWALKER:Ithinkseveralthemesareemerginghere.Thefirst,obviously,is

thefollyofcallingsomethinga“protectionforce,”orevena“peacekeepingforce,”

whenhasnointentionofprotectinganyone.Itisa“violationobservingforce”rather

thanapeacekeepingforce.Thenotionofbeingneutralbetweentheattackerandthe

victimoftheattackerputstheUNandparticipatingcountriesinanimpossible

position.Iamalsostruckbythenumberofthingsthatweredonetolookasifwe

weredoingsomethingwhen,infact,wewerenotwillingtodoanythingserious.

ThisverymuchincludesthegovernmentforwhichIworked.IwasintheClinton

administrationthefirstnineteenmonthsorso[from1993tomid-1994].We

believedverymuch—notthroughoutthegovernment,butatleastintheWhite

House—thattheWestoughttodothekindofthingsRupertSmithtalksaboutinThe

UtilityofForce,butwewerenotwillingtoparticipateinsuchaneffortourselves.

WethoughtourEuropeanalliesoughttobetakingalotmoreriskthanwe

werepreparedtoassumeourselves.Wethereforedidvariousperipheralthingsto

makeusfeelthatwewereorasifweweredoingsomethingandmakeitappearto

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theoutsideworldthatweweredoingsomething.Iamgratifiedtohearthatyou

thoughtthefooddropswereuseful.Itoothinktheywereuseful.Itwasthefirst

initiativewetookbutitwasperipheraltothebasicproblem.Itwasameliatory

ratherthantryingtosolvetheproblem.OurattitudetowardthecreationoftheSafe

Areaswasexactlythesame.WethoughtitwasfollytocallsomethingaSafeArea

thatwehadnomeansorintentofkeepingsafe.Butwehadzeropoliticalormoral

credibilitybecausewewerenotwillingtoparticipateourselves.Afteryearsof

blatheringinNATOaboutsharingrisksandresponsibilities,wewerenotwillingto

participate.

MICHAELDOBBS:Tofollowuponthat.PresidentClintontookofficeinJanuary

1993aftercriticizingthepreviousBushadministrationforditheringonBosnia.He

promisedamoreenergeticapproach.Soyoucomeintoofficeandthe“tarbaby,”as

SenatorMcCaincalledit,ishandedtoyou.25Whydidyounottakeamoreenergetic

approach,aswasadvocatedduringthecampaign?

JENONNEWALKER:Avarietyofunsatisfactoryreasons.PresidentClinton's

majoradvisersweredeeplydivided.[ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff]

ColinPowell,whospokewithgreatauthority,didnotwantusengagedatall.None

ofusfullyappreciatedtheimportanceofPresidentClinton'sdraftevasion.Colin

wouldhavetoldsomefavoritereporterthatthisdraft-dodgingPresidentwasrashly

riskingAmericanlives.Almostalltheprincipalschangedtheirminds,noonemore

oftenthan[SecretaryofState]WarrenChristopher.[NationalSecurityAdvisor]

TonyLakeconsistentlywantedamorerobustAmericanengagement.Buthedidnot

wanttoputthepresidentinthepositionofchoosingbetweenhisadvisers.Clinton

wasevenmoreneuroticthanmostpoliticiansaboutwantingtobelovedby

everybody.Sowedrifted.

Wedidsomeusefulperipheralthings.WedeliveredBosnianagreement

toVance-Owen,whichtheworldforgets.Wedidsobygettingridofaprovisionthat

25SeeMichaelWines,“ConflictintheBalkans;SenatorWhoSawWarUpCloseDoesn’tWanttoSeeAnother,”NewYorkTimes,May5,1993.

1-20

wouldhavemeantthedissolutionofBosniaunlesstheSerbsagreedotherwise.26

Butallofthesethingswereperipheraltothebasicproblem.“Liftandstrike”was

ourfirstseriousproposal.ThedebateinWashingtonduringthoseearlymonthswas

betweenanairstrikecommitmentonlyandairstrikeslinkedtoliftingthearms

embargo.27

Thereason“liftandstrike”waschosenwasbecausewebelieveditwould

giveusanendpointofthestrikecommitment.Wewouldhaveacertainnumberof

monthsduringwhichwewouldhelparmandtraintheBosnians.Theywouldthen

beontheirown.Ofcourse,thiswasnonsense:oncewehadgonethatfarin

supportingtheBosnians,wewouldhavebeencommittedtotheirdefenseifthey

continuedtobeattacked.Thiswasacarryoverfromthe“Vietnamsyndrome”:there

hadtobeanexitpoint.

WedidnotgetreallyseriousuntilAugust1993,whenweproposedtoNATO

aseriousairstrikethreatwithseriousintenttocarryitout.28Wegotboggeddown

inthe“dualkey”issue,whichwasanothermess.Weslowlygotmoreseriousastime

wenton,butalotofpeoplediedwhileweweredelaying.Thatisnotasatisfactory

answerbutit'sthebestonewehave.

SHASHITHAROOR:AmbassadorWalkermentionedtheVance-Owenplan.29Ithink

itisimportanttounderstandthatthiswasthelinchpinoftheinternational

community'sstrategyatthetime.Weshouldhavementionedthisearlier.TheUN

26TheVance-OwenPeacePlan[VOPP)dividedBosniainto10cantons,orsemi-autonomousregions,eachdominatedbyaseparateethnicgroup.TheplancalledforSarajevotobeadministeredjointly,underinternationalauthority.BosnianPresidentIzetbegovićagreedtothepeaceplaninaceremonyintheUNbuildinginNewYorkonMarch25,1993,onconditionthattheSerbsalsosign.BosnianSerbleaderRadovanKaradzićoriginallyagreedtotheplanonApril30,butitwasrejectedbytheRepublikaSrpskanationalassemblyonMay6.Inhisbook,BalkanOdyssey,OwenacknowledgesthatUSenvoyReginaldBartholomewwas“helpfulinnursingtheBosnia-Herzegovinagovernmentoverthefinalhurdle.”TheBosniangovernmentobjectedtotheplanonthegroundsthatthecentralgovernmentwouldlikelyhavebeentooweaktoruleovertheethnicallydividedcountry.27The“liftandstrike”policyenvisagedliftingthearmsembargoagainstBosnianMuslimsandCroatsaccompaniedbythethreatofairstrikesagainstBosnianSerbforcesiftheycontinuedshellingcivilians.28RogerGeorge&GeorgeKolttoDirectorofCentralIntelligence,“LikelyAlliedReactionstoUnilateralUSActionsinBosnia,”NIC1046/93,August5,1993.29SeeBoutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheActivitiesoftheICFY:PeaceTalksonBosniaandHerzegovina,”S/25479,March26,1993,foradetaileddescriptionofVance-Owenandthepositionsofthewarringparties.

1-21

wastryingtopush--andtheUSwasonboardatthetime--apeacesettlementthat

wouldhavebeendestroyedhadwebeenobligedtotakesideswithoneofthethree

parties.ThechancesofVance-Owenhappeningwouldhavebeenunderminedifwe

hadfoundourselvestakingthesideoftheBosnianarmy.WhiletheUSmayhave

beencaughtupinitsowninternaldeliberations,theUSbackedVance-Owenand

broughttheBosniangovernmentonboard,asAmbassadorWalkerhasmentioned.

JENONNEWALKER:Ourofficialpositionwasthatwewouldnotendorseanything

thatallthepartieshadnotacceptedbutquietlyRegBartholomew[Clinton’sspecial

envoyonBosnia]gottheBosnianagreement.I'mnotgoingtopretendthatthere

wasanythingcoherentaboutourpolicy.

DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncil’sconcernaboutthesituationinSrebrenicawas

promptedbythevideosHollingworthhastalkedaboutthatwereshownonTV[on

March16,1993].TherewasaTVscreenoutsidetheroomwhereinformalsessions

oftheSecurityCouncilwereheld.WesawvideoofeventsinSrebrenicathathadnot

beenbroughttoourattentionbytheUNSecretariatorbytheUNPROFORmedia

personnel,andevenlessbytheUKandFrancewhobothhadasignificantmilitary

presenceinBosnia.Thispromptedmetoconveneanurgentmeetingofthenon-

alignedmembersoftheUNSC:Pakistan,Morocco,CapeVerdeandVenezuela.We

tookadvantageofthefactthatthePakistanrepresentative,JamsheedMarker,was

presidingovertheCouncilatthistime.Acouncilmeetingwasheldthateveningat

ourrequest.ThatwashowSrebrenicaenteredtheagendaoftheSecurityCouncil:

viaajournalist’svideo,andnotbytheUNSecretary-Generalasshouldhavebeenthe

case.

IneverbelongedtoalesswellinformedgroupthantheUNSecurityCouncil.I

saythisnotasajoke.Itisatruefact,anditwasdonenotbyignorancebutbydesign.

Onlythepermanentmembersarefullyinformedaboutwhatishappeningonthe

ground.TheUNSecretariataccommodatesthesepowersbyhidinginformation,or

aswesawlater,evenbyhelpingtocoverupoperations,aswiththecaseofthe“slow

motiongenocide”thatoccurredbeforetheireyesinSrebrenica.Sucharealityhelps

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toexplainsomeofthepositionsoftheCouncilnotonlyinBosniabutlaterin

Rwanda.ThesamebehaviorappliestotheP5membersoftheCouncilwhichdonot

shareenoughinformationtotheothernon-permanentmembers.Theyputaside

theirobligationundertheChartertopreservepeaceandsecuritytoaccommodate

theirnationalinterest.

Acaseinpoint:thekillingofHakijaTurajlićinJanuary1993whileenrouteto

SarajevoairportinanUNPROFORAPC.Ipersonallytooktheinitiativetoinvestigate

hismurder.TheSerbsshothimafteraFrenchcolonel[PatriceSartre]openedthe

door.TheFrenchtroopsneitherreturnedfire,norcalledforreinforcements.

UNPROFOR,aswellastheUNSecretariat,carriedonaverymediocreevaluationof

thecase.Atthetime,Ievenrequestedtheadviceofaformerattorneygeneralin

CanadaaswellasanAmericanprosecutor.Theybothdeclaredthatjusticehadnot

beenservedinthecase.IfheSerbscouldmurdertheDeputyPrimeMinisterof

BosniawhileunderUNprotection,thatshowedtheycouldliterallygetawaywith

murder.

ColonelSartrewaslaterpromotedanddecoratedinFranceforhis“bravery.”

FormonthsIkeptaskingforareviewofthecase,butthisneverhappened.Itwasa

monumentalcrimethatwasshamefullycoveredupbyallparties.

DAVIDHANNAY:AlittlefromtheBritishpointofviewaboutthebackgroundtoall

this.BritishinvolvementinBosniawastransformedbackinAugust1992asaresult

oftheLondonConference.30Havinghadpracticallynomilitaryontheground,we

actuallysentasubstantialnumberforahumanitarianprotectionoperationthrough

theterriblewinterof1992-1993.31Intheautumnof1992,CyVancehadwarned

thattherecouldbemillionsofpeopledeadinBosniathatwinterunlesssomething

wasdone.32TheBritishgovernmentwasthereforeinthisuptoitsneck.

30TheUnitedNationsandtheEuropeanCommunityconvenedameetinginLondononAugust26-27,1992,thatchargedtheInternationalConferenceontheFormerYugoslavia[ICFY]withnegotiatingapeacesettlement.31AccordingtodatacollectedbytheUnitedNationsPeacekeepingwebsite,therewere2,874UKtroopsinUNPROFORasofDecember31,1992.32See,forexample,“VancetoUN:TroopsareneededinBosnia,”ChicagoTribune,October15,1992.

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WehadalotoftroopsdeployedbyMarch1993,buttheywereneither

deployednorequippedtofightawar.ShortlybeforeClintontookoffice[onJanuary

20,1993],JohnMajor,whowasthenprimeminister,goteverybodytogetherin

DowningStreet,includingalotofministers,military,andmyselfbackfromNew

York.Heasked,"Whatarewegoingtodo?"Theviewofthatgatheringwaswemust

telltheAmericansthatwemustdowhateverwedotogetherbecauseotherwiseit

wasnotgoingtowork.Thatmessagemayhavebeenpassed,butitcertainlydidnot

resonate.

MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdatewasthat?

DAVIDHANNAY:ItwouldhavebeenthefirstweekofJanuary1993,beforethe

presidenttookover.AfterthetransferofpowerintheUS,thefirstthingthat

emergedoutofwhatseemedtousfairlyconfuseddiscussionswas"LiftandStrike."

LiftandStrikewasanightmareforanyonewhohadtroopsonthegroundinBosnia.

Hadthatpolicybeenaccepted,thefirstthingyouwouldhavehadtodowasto

extractyourtroops.NoneoftheEuropeanswantedtodothatbuttheyalsodidnot

wanttobeputintoapositionwheretheSerbswouldconsidertheirtroopsthe

enemy.Thisiswhatpreoccupiedeveryoneduringthosethreeorfourmonthsatthe

beginningof1993.ItwastearingNATOapartuntiltheUnitedStatesdroppedthe

policywhichcausedacertainloweringoftension.

AtthesametimetherewasnorealalternativepolicytotheVance-Owen

peaceprocess.IagreeverymuchwithwhatJenonnesaid.TheUnitedStatesdid,

betweenclenchedteeth,givesomesupporttoitintheearlyweeks.Reg

BartholomewcertainlygottheBosniangovernmenttoagreetoit.33Butwhenwe

weredraftingoneoftheseresolutions[UNSC820]inApril,wetriedtogetthe

SecurityCounciltotelltheBosnianSerbsthattheinternationalcommunitywould

sticktotheVance-Owenplanuntilhellfrozeoverandtheyhadbetterrealizethat.

Thatwastherightdiplomaticmovetomake.AfteragreatdealofdebateinNew

Yorkwhich,alas,allcameoutinthepublicdomain,theUnitedStatesrefusedtoput

33SeeMarkTran,“IzetbegovicagreestodivideBosnia,”TheGuardian,March26,1993.

1-24

theword"endorse"intoaresolution.Afteralotoftoingandfroingwith

Washington,weweretoldthatthefurthestSecretaryofStateWarrenChristopher

wouldgowastoputtheword"commend"in.34ThatwastheendofVance-Owen.

Thepeaceplanwasdead.AsShashisaid,thiswasthebiggamethateveryonewas

playing.TheVance-Owenpeaceplanwasthestrategy,butitwaskilledinthemiddle

oftheaction.Srebrenica,ofcourse,wasgoingonallthistime.

JORISVOORHOEVE:Irememberthattheliftandstrikepolicy,evenwhenitwasn't

supportedanymorebytheUSadministration,lingeredoninCongressuntilthe

springof1995.IhadquiteanargumentatthetimewithSenatorMcCainwho

advocatedliftandstrike.ItwasalsostrikingattheMunichconference,inFebruary

1995thattheentireAmericandelegationwasstilltalkingaboutliftandstrike,

whichweinEuropethoughtwasthewrongpolicy.

MICHAELDOBBS:WeshouldexaminesomeofthesespecificUNResolutions.Let’s

beginwiththefirstone,UNSC819,adoptedonApril16,1993.35Itwasfollowedby

theSecurityCouncilvisittoSrebrenica,ledbyDiegoArria,onApril25.Howwasthis

resolutionpassed?Whatdiditactuallysay?Howwasitmeanttobeimplemented?

WehaveaninterestingdynamicaroundthetablebetweentheSecurityCouncil

memberswhopassedtheresolutionandthepeacekeepersonthegroundwhotried

toimplementtheresolutionasbestastheycould.PerhapsDiegoArriacouldtellus

whattheresolutionwasmeanttoachieve.ThenwewillaskGeneralHayesto

describehowUNPROFORattemptedtoimplementtheresolution.

34UNSC,“Resolution820(1993),”S/RES/820,April17,1993.U.S.policy-makersopposedtheVance-Owenpeaceplanonbothmoralandpragmaticgrounds.DuringaFebruary24,1993pressconference,AlbrightstatedthatVance-Owenplanamountedto“rewardingaggressionandpunishingthevictims.”Christopherearlierpubliclyexpresseddoubtsaboutthe“feasibility”and“practicality”oftheVance-Owenformula,tellingtheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteethattheUSshould“investigateotheroptions.”(SeeJohnGoshkoandJuliaPreston,“U.S.officialsresistpressuretoendorseBosniaPeacePlan,”WashingtonPost,February4,1993.)35UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.

1-25

DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncilapprovedamissiontoBosniaandSrebrenica,

[April23-26,1993],thatIhadtheprivilegetolead.36Tomysurprise,itwasthefirst

missioneversentbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltothetheaterofconflict.

AssoonaswelandedinSarajevoIfoundoutwhythiswasthecase.Therewasa

policyofkeepingnon-PermanentmembersoftheSecurityCounciluninformed.We

landedinSarajevothinkingweweregoingtonegotiatesomething,butitwas

alreadyfinished.Ademilitarizationagreementhadalreadybeensignedbythe

partiesonApril18,withtheassistanceofGeneralHayes.37

Wethoughtitwasveryimportant,andevenBoutros-Ghaliagreed,thatwe

shouldtakeacontingentofinternationaljournaliststoSrebrenicatoreinforcethe

resolution.ThejournalistswhotraveledwithusfromNewYorkwereprevented,by

UNPROFOR,fromtravelingwithustoSrebrenica.Eventhedelegationmembers

werealmostpreventedfromenteringSrebrenica.GeneralHayeswillrememberthat

therewerediscussionsthatmorninginZvornik,andthattheyalmostdidnotallow

theSecurityCouncilmemberstotraveltoSrebrenica.AndréErdöswasalsothere.

Youcanimagineourreactiontothesituation.

Intheend,weforcedourwaythrough.IwentwithGeneralHayesinoneof

thehelicopters.MycolleagueshadtowaitinZvornikwithaSerbcoloneluntilwe

gottotheotherside.UNPROFORevencooperatedindisarmingthemembersofthe

delegationofourcamerasduringthevisit.Irefusedtogiveupmycameraandtook

theonlyphotoswhichwerelaterusedbyReuters.UNPROFORhadaladyfilmingthe

wholethingbutIhaveneverbeenabletoseethatvideo.

MICHAELDOBBS:LetusrecallthelanguageofUNSC819,whichsays,"...acting

underChapterVIIoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,"i.e.thepeaceenforcement

provision,theSecurityCouncil"demandsthatallpartiesandothersconcernedtreat

SrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeAreawhichshouldbefreefromanyarmed

attackoranyotherhostileact."Howdidyouthinkthatresolutionwouldbe

enforced? 36UNSC,“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993.37SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.

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DIEGOARRIA:Wedidnothaveanyhopeofthathappening.Wewereaddressing

internationalpublicopinionratherthantheCouncilitself,describingthe

devastationofthepeopleofSrebrenica.ItwasnotdifficultfortheCounciltoagree

ontheresolution,becausetherewerenocommitmentsonthepartofanybody.It

waspourlagalerie[“forthepublicgallery”],astheFrenchwouldsay.Itwasa

resolutionwithoutanycostorconsequencesexcepttoaccommodatetheSerbs.

MICHAELDOBBS:Whenyoupassedthatresolution,didyouthinkthatUNPROFOR

hadthedutytoenforceitbyitself,orthatitshouldreachagreementwiththeparties

onhowtoenforceit?Howwastheresolutionmeanttobeenforced,inyourview?

DIEGOARRIA:WewerenotverywellinformedabouttherealitiesofUNPROFOR,

whichbythewayisamisnomer.Withsuchagrandiosename,UnitedNations

“ProtectionForce,”wethoughtsomethingwouldbedone.Afewdayslater,of

course,wediscoveredthatthiswasnotthecase.

Inproposingthetextoftheresolution,IhadwritteninSpanish,“Areas

Protegidas,”or“ProtectedAreas.”TheUSandUKtranslatedthisas“SafeAreas”and

theFrenchas“ZonesdeSecurité.”Thiswasmorethanjustsemantics.“Protected”

wouldhavemeantreallyenforcingtheresolution.“Safe”meantnothing,asweall

foundoutveryquickly.Therewerenoobligationsunderthe“SafeArea”concept.

SHASHITHAROOR:IfyoureadUNSC819carefully,youwillseethatitcallsonthe

partiestotreatSrebrenicaassafe.Itenjoinsnonewresponsibilitiesonthe

internationalcommunity,ifthepartiesfailtotreatSrebrenicaassafe,UNPROFOR

hastheresponsibilitytoactinself-defense.Oneofthefundamentalproblemswe

hadthroughoutthisoperationisthatdiplomaticdraftingconductedwith

greatfinesseandaplombbyveryskilleddiplomatsservedasanendinitself.Itwas

notlinkedtooperationalrealitiesontheground.

WhileweweretalkingintheSecurityCouncilaboutUNSC819,ontheground

unknowntous,GeneralWahlgren,GeneralHalilović(theBosniancommander),and

GeneralMladićhadnegotiatedandsignedademilitarizationagreementthatwasnot

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explicitlycalledforin819.38Wehadnotaskedforitbecauseitwouldlookasifwe

weretakingsidesagainsttheBosnians.Wehadnotaskedforitbecausewedidn't

thinkforGod'ssakethatitcouldbeviablyimplementedbyus.

IwanttodrawyourattentiontotheAnnancableofApril23,1993whichI

confessIwrote.39TheseareourinstructionstoWahlgrenfollowingaphonecallI

hadwithhimearlier.Withoneortwoexceptions,mostofthecablessignedbyKofi

Annanweredraftedbyme.InthiscablewetellWahlgrenthat"...the

demilitarizationofSrebrenicawasastepagreedbytheparties,notoneproposedby

theUnitedNations."WetellWahlgrenthatUNPROFORismerely"lendingitsgood

officestohelpbothpartiesfulfillthecommitmentstheyhavemadetoeachother."

Wewereextremelyconsciousthroughoutofthesevereoperationallimitations.

Ialsohaveasentenceheresaying,"...however,UNPROFORtakesonamoral

responsibilityforthesafetyofthedisarmedthatitclearlydoesnothavethemilitary

resourcestohonourbeyondapoint."Iwrotethesewordsinsomedistressbecause

thiswasnotanactionweinheadquartershadauthorizedorrecommended.

UNPROFORhadtakeniton.Ofcourse,theSerbsweregoingtousethisasawayto

disarmtheirrivals.40But,equallynow,itgotembeddedintotheconcept.Ifthe

BosnianMuslims,ortheBosnianArmyofficially,hadnotbeendisarmed,and

thereforecouldcontinuetofightoutofthepocket,didthepocketsuddenlystop

beingaSafeAreaintermsofwhattheCouncilintendedin819?

Ikeepharpingbacktothecentraldilemma:whatwasourrole?Thebestthing

wouldhavebeeniftheUShadmadeuptheirmindsearlyenough,talkedtotheBrits

andtheFrenchandsaid,“PulltheUNoutandlet'sgotowar.”Thatwouldhavebeen

thesimplest,clearestthing,buttheywerenotdoingthat.TheyhadtheUNdeployed

there,makingpeaceasanoperation,tryingtobeneutralamongtheparties,trying

toensurethattheUNpresencedidnotbecomeamilitaryadvantagetoanyoneof

theparties,whileatthesametimeallthiswasgoingoninthecapitals,withoutany

coherentconclusions.IwouldcommendthiscablenotbecauseIwroteitbut 38“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.39AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.40ThecableaddedthatDPKOsaw“noneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-searchesforweapons”givenWahlgren’spublicstatementsthatSrebrenicawas“fullydemilitarized.”

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becauseitencapsulatessomeoftheoperationaldilemmasthat819gaveusandthat

franklyweforesaw.David[Hannay]willprobablyrememberthatwehadalittle

meetingintheofficeofthePresidentoftheSecurityCouncilwhereIreadout

Wahlgren'scableadvisingagainsttheadoptionofsucharesolution.TheEuropeans

wereveryclearinanycasethattheyweregoingtogoaheadwiththis,andwedidgo

aheadwithit.Thiscablesummarizestheoperationalconsequencesthatwewere

tryingtoclarifytoUNPROFORwhichmeanwhilehadtakenonestepbeyondwhat

eithertheCouncilorweinDPKOhadanticipatedinactuallysigninga

demilitarizationagreement.

MICHAELDOBBS:LetusgotoGeneralHayes.YoureceivedUNSC819andhadthe

taskofimplementingit,togetherwithGeneralWahlgren.Canyoudescribehowyou

wentabouttryingtoputfleshontotheresolutionandapplyittowhatwasactually

happeningonthegroundinBosnia.

VEREHAYES:Yes,certainly.BeforeIdo,canIjustcomebacktosomethingthat

AmbassadorArriasaidaboutUNPROFORpreventinghimfromgettinginto

Srebrenica.Thatisactuallytotallyincorrectfrommypointofview.Wedid

everythingwecouldtogetyouin.Theproblemwasthatwecouldnotgetthe

journalistsin.SinceIknewthatwasgoingtohappen,Ihadtodecidewhetherwe

tookyouandothermembersofthedelegationinsothatyoucouldseetheplaceor

nobodywouldgetinatall.IalsofinditslightlystrangethatmembersoftheSecurity

CouncilthoughtthatwewereoperatingunderaChapterVII,asopposedtoa

ChapterVI,mandate.Iwouldhavethoughtthatwouldhavebeenobvious.

MICHAELDOBBS:Soyourunderstandingwasthatyouwereoperatingunder

ChapterVIoftheUNCharter,andthiswasnotaChapterVIIoperationatall?

VEREHAYES:WewereoperatingunderChapterVI.Forus,ChapterVIwasa“cook

andlook”operation,aswerathercheekilydescribedit.That'sallyoucoulddo,

“cookandlook.”ThewayChapterVIIwentwasthattheUNissuedthewarrantsand

theUnitedStatesmadethearrests.

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Tocomebacktowhatwashappening.TherewasameetingatSarajevoairport

onApril17-18,1993.AnagreementwassignedbetweenMladićandHalilović.41The

negotiationstartedatnoononSaturday,April17,andlasteduntil2a.m.onSunday,

April18.Thequestionarose,whowasgoingtoberesponsibleforthedetails?I

lookeddownthetableatGeneralsWahlgrenandMorillon,wholookedbackdown

thetableatme,andItookiton.Weneededtogetsomeclarificationonthephrase,

"allparties…treatSrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeArea."42Obviously,that

phrasemeantdifferentthingstodifferentparties.

Tocutalongstoryshort,wenegotiatedalldaySundayandalldayMonday.

Wehadseventy-twohoursinwhichtogettheagreementimplemented.43Otherwise

itwouldhavefallenapart.WealsohadtogetorderstotheCanadians,whohad

movedintoSrebrenica,onwhattheyweremeanttodo.Asacommanderonthe

ground,youlooktoyourhigherheadquarterstotellyouwhattodo.Youdonottry

tomakeitupasyougoalong.Wehadtogivethe145-manCanadiancontingentled

byLt.ColTomGeburtsomeorders,sohecouldactuallydosomething.44Ieventually

decidedonmyowninitiativethattheSrebrenica"SafeArea"hadtobeextendedout

fromthetownitself.Welookedatthemapsanddidaquicksurveyofthehigh

pointsaroundthetown.Thereisamaphere.45WewentanddrewtheSafeAreaon

themap,extendingouttothepointsfromwhichyouhadadirectlineofsight,with

theabilityfordirectfireintothetownitself.Thatwaswherewedrewtheareatobe

definedasaSafeArea.Itwasverysmall,about4.5kilometersbyabout1.5

kilometers.Tome,itwasthekernelofanutwhichwouldbeextended.

WedidnotdisarmtheBosniansinthepocket.Weaskedthemeithertoleave

theareawehaddesignatedtobedemilitarizedastheSafeAreaor,iftheywere 41SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.42UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.43TheagreementsignedatSarajevoairportbetweenMladićandHalilović(Point4)specifiedthat“thedemilitarizationofSrebrenicawillbecompletewithin72hoursofthearrivaloftheUNPROFORCompanyinSrebrenica.”Theagreementalsoprovidedfortheevacuationof500seriouslywoundedandsickcivilians.44AnApril22,1993NYTarticlebyJohnBurnsreportedthatUNPROFORhad“nocontingencyplans”intheeventofaSerbattackonSrebrenica.ColonelTomGeburt,oftheRoyalCanadianRegiment,wasreportedtobe“tearingouthishair”attheprospectofhavingtodefendthecity,orevenhisownmen.Therulesofengagementwereunclear.45HayestoUNPF-HQ,“ReportontheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”HQBHCommand,April21,1993.

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goingtostay,handtheirweaponsin.ThisbecameadebatewiththeSerbswhen

theywerecominginwithadelegationtosigntheagreementandhadtoleavetheir

weaponsbehind.ItalsobecameadebatewithNaserOrić,whowasintheareawith

hisbodyguardscarryinghisweapons.WhenIgotinthere[onApril21,1993]with

theBosniangovernmentandBosnianSerbdelegations,wegotoutatthecompound

wheretheweaponshadbeengathered.NaserOrićwasstandingthere.Ihadtosay

tohim,"You'rearmedinthisarea.It'snotintheagreement."Hesaidthatnobody

hadtoldhimverymuchabouttheagreement,andhedidnotknowwhatwasgoing

on.Isaid,"You'renotmeanttobeinthisareawithaweapon.I'mgoingtogetthe

delegationsoutofthevehicle.WhenIturnaround,ifyou'restillherearmedinthe

area,Iwillhavetoarrestyou."I'mnotsurewewouldhavehadmuchsuccess

arrestingNaserOrićbutwhenweturnedaroundhehadgone.

Wethenputthetwopartiestogetherinvehiclesanddrovearoundthearea.

Wehadagreedthattheareahadtobemarkedonthemapwhichthenhadtobe

confirmedandmarkedontheground.Soyouactuallyhadmapandground

markingssoyouknewwheretheareawas.Wewentaroundthatarea,cameback

andsignedanagreement.Neithersidewasparticularlyhappywithit.Ourintention

wasthattherewouldbeabufferzone,controlledbytheBosnians,extendingout

fromtheareadecreedtobesafetothefrontlines,whichwerealotfurtheroutat

thattime.Wewentbackseveraltimestotryandextendtheareabutwerenever

abletodoso.Neithersidewaspreparedtomakeanyconcessions.Thatishowit

endedup,asjustthatverysmallareaaroundthetownitself.

WhenAmbassadorArriacamewithhisdelegation,Imadeanerrorwitha

journalistforwhichIapologize.IhadheardtheAmbassadortalkingonBBCRadio4

abouttheUNdisarmingBosnians[inSrebrenica].Inowthinkhewasunawarewhat

washappeningontheground.ImadethemistakeofsayingthatIwasn'tquitesure

thattheAmbassadorknewwhathewastalkingaboutwhichcauseda

furorunderstandablywiththeAmbassador.Thatcoloredour

subsequentdiscussions.[Laughter]

IfwehadnotleftthejournalistsbehindinZvornik,you,Ambassador,would

nothavebeenabletogetintoSrebrenicaandseeit,eveninthelimitedwaythatyou

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didseeit.Atthetime,asfarastheSerbsonthegroundwereconcerned,theUNand

yourdelegationactuallyhadnoauthoritytogoinwithouttheirpermission.There

wasnothingwecoulddoaboutit.

DIEGOARRIA:ThesmallercountriesintheSecurityCouncildonothavearmies.My

friendDavid[Hannay]onceremarkedthattheAmbassadorfromVenezuelawasnot

goingtomarchintoSrebrenicawithVenezuelansoldiers.Isaid“Heisright,butwe

donothavetheprivilegeofsittingpermanentlyintheSecurityCouncil,either.”

Publicopinionwasfundamentalinthisissue.Weknewtheimportanceofbringing

thejournalists.General[Hayes],yousaidsomethingatthetimeaboutUnited

NationsSecurityCouncilResolutionsbeing“woolly-headed.”46Thiswasthefirst

timeIheardthatexpression.Isaid,“Howcanageneralwhoisnottheforce

commanderaddresstheSecurityCouncilinthatway?”Thesearepoliticalmatters.I

thoughtthatyouweregettinginvolvedinpoliticalnegotiations.Youtalkedjustnow

aboutwantingtoarresttheBosniancommanderinSrebrenica[NaserOrić].Ithink

thatwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerwhichwouldhavehadconsequences.

VEREHAYES:Idonotthinkitwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerbecausethe

agreementbetweenthetwopartiessaidthattherewouldbenoarmedpeoplein

thatarea.Itwouldsimplyhavebeenimplementinganagreementthathadbeen

madebetweentheparties.

ANDRÉERDÖS:InHungary,wewerelookingtotheUnitedStatestoplayan

importantrole.InJanuary1993,wereceivedinformationfromUSsources,whichis

notincludedinthisbooklet.USofficialsmetwithnon-permanentmembersofthe

SecurityCouncil,andsaidthattheUSwasreadyformoreradicalsteps,includinga

moreactivemilitaryrole.Itseemstheywereunabletotakethesestepsbecauseof

oppositionfromtheUnitedKingdom,FranceandRussia.Theyaddedthattheyalso

hadtotakeintoconsiderationYeltsin’sinternalpoliticalproblems.InMay1993,we

46SeeJohnPomfret,“UNdelegationvisitsshell-scarredBosnianEnclave,”WashingtonPost,April26,1993quotedanonymousUNpeacekeeperscallingrecentSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosniaas“woolly-headed”and“sovaguetheywerealmostimpossibletoenforce.”

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heardthesamething.USdelegationsourcessaidthattheUnitedStateswasreadyto

conductairstrikesaslongastheywerenotopposedbythemajoralliesandthe

SecurityCouncil.Thisshowsthat,quiteapartfromalltheinternalYugoslav

problems,suchasnationalismandsoon,amajorprobleminvolvedrelations

betweenwesterncountries.Thiswasoneofthereasonswhythewardraggedon

until1995.

OBRADKESIC:TheGenevaConventionsdiscusstheprotectionofciviliansandthe

organizationofsafeareas.47AsfarasSafeAreasareconcerned,therearetwo

elementsthatareequallyimportant.Thefirstisthattheydependonthewillofthe

belligerents.Combatantforcesmusthavethewilltoconcludeanagreementand

defineaSafeArea.Thesecondpartisdemilitarization.Wasthiswhatwasinthe

mindofthepeopledraftingtheUNSecurityCouncilResolutionorwasitmorea

case,asAmbassadorWalkersuggested,creatingtheperceptionof“doing

something”withoutactuallyunderstandingwhatyouweredoing?

MICHAELDOBBS:Justtoaddtothat,therewasnomentionof“demilitarization”in

theUNSecurityCouncilResolution.Itwassomethingthatwasaddedbythepeople

ontheground.ShashimentionedhisApril23cablewhichstatesexplicitlythat“we

seenoneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-housesearchesforweapons.”

Inotherwords,DPKOwasbackingoffsomeofthecommitmentsthathadbeen

madeontheground.

SHASHITHAROOR:Yes,wewerecaughtinacleftstick.Wehadnotproposedthis

thingtobeginwith.Wedidnotthinkwehadthecapacitytoenforceitand

implementit.Atthesametimewewereunderthetremendousmoralpressurein

theSecurityCouncilandinthemediathatweweregivingaidandcomforttoethnic

47“Safetyzones”werecreatedundertheGenevaConventionsinMadridin1936duringtheSpanishCivilWarandinShanghaiin1937duringtheJapanesebombardment.Article15oftheFourthGenevaConvention(1949)on“TheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWar”providesfor“neutralizedzones”intendedtoshelter“woundedandsickcombatantsornon-combatants”and“civilianpersonswhotakenopartinhostilities.”Protocol1Article60on“Demilitarizedzones”prohibitswarringpartiesfromextendingmilitaryoperationstodemilitarizedzones.

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cleansersandkillersandsoon.Thelastthingwewantedwastobeseenasaiding

andabettingtheSerbs.WecouldnotaffordtotaketheBosnianside"militarily,"but

wecouldmorally.WedidhaveaproblemtakingtheSerbsidesincetheywere

besiegingatownwithcivilians.Itwascomplicatedbythefactthatthisagreement

hadalreadybeensignedbyallpartiesincludingtheBosnianArmy.Sowesaid,“Let

thepartiesfulfilltheirobligationstoeachotherbutdon'tgoaroundbeingthe

enforcersofthisagreement.”Thatwasourguidance.

TOMBLANTON:YouhaveasentenceinyourApril23cable,mentioningthe

"...strongfeelingamongstseveralMemberStatesthatUNPROFORshouldnot

participatetooactivelyin'disarmingthevictims.'"48

SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.IknewthatpeoplelikeDiegoArriaandAndré

ErdöswerecertainlysayingthatsortofthingintheCouncil,aswerethePakistanis

andothers.Therewerealotofverystrongvoicesonthissubject.Iwouldsaythe

principalauthorsofUNSC819weretheBrits.DavidHannaycanspeaktothe

thinkingbehindit.Atthetime,Davidassuredusthatthepartieswerebeing

enjoinedtotreattheSafeAreaassafeandtherewerenonewobligationsfor

UNPROFOR.Thedemilitarizationagreementlookedverymuchlikeanewobligation

whichiswhywe[inDPKO]triedtopushitbackandsay,“Don'tdomorethanyou

absolutelyhaveto.”Letthemkeeptheirwordtoeachother.

VEREHAYES:Tobeclearonthedemilitarization,whatweweresayingwas,“you

eitherhandinyourweaponsandstayintheareaoryouleavethearea.“Those

peoplewhowantedtostayintheareaweredisarmedbyvoluntarilyhandingin

theirweapons.Iftheydidnotwanttohandintheirweapons,theyhadtomoveout

oftheSafeArea.We,theUN,didnotactuallydisarmanybody.

SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.Ourguidancefittedinverymuchwiththewayyou

sawit.IhaveasentencetheretellingGeneralWahlgren,"...givenyourownpublic

statementsthatSrebrenicaisfullydemilitarized..."Frankly,wetookthiswith 48AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.

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severalpinchesofsalt,butthatiswhatWahlgrenwassayingofficially,inpublic.

Thatwasanotherreasonwhyweshouldnotgoarounddoinghousetohouse

searches.Iseefromaseparatedocumentthat[onApril8]30,000roundsof

ammunitionwerefoundinSrebrenicasoitwasnotinfactdemilitarized.49

VEREHAYES:ThatammunitionwasfoundinaUNHCRconvoygoingtoSarajevo

acrosstheairport.IthadnothingtodowithSrebrenica.Thatwasbeforeanything

happenedwiththeSrebrenicaagreementandwasoneofthereasonswhytheSerbs

becamesoinsistentonsearchingUNHCRconvoys.50

ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:Ifeellikeaguineapigwhosurvivedanexperiment.Iam

honoredtobeherewiththescientistswho,let'ssay,“helpedussurvive.”Ithinkthat

HasanMuratovićmadeanimportantpoint.ThekillingofDeputyPrimeMinister

HakijaTurajlićwasaclearsignalthatyoucandoanythingyouwantandnotbe

49WahlgrentoAnnan,“High-LevelMilitaryMeetinginBelgradeof9April1993,”UNPF-HQ,Z-495,April11,1993.ThedocumentsupportsHayes’memorythattheammunitionwasdiscoveredinaUNHCRconvoyinSarajevo.50ForMladic’saccountofhistalkswithWahlgrenandMorilloninBelgrade,seehisdiaryentry,“MeetingwithGeneralsWalgren(sic)andMorillon,”April9,1993.

ZlatkoLagumdžija,left,withHasanMuratović

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punished.Afewweeksafterhismurder,Iwasresponsibleforthenegotiationswith

MorillonandSadakoOgataonhumanitarianactivitiesasactingprimeminister.We

triedforweekstoevacuatewoundedkidsfromSarajevoontheemptyplanesthat

weredeliveringthefood.Itprovedimpossible.Theytoldusthatthepeoplewho

killedTurajlićwouldnotallowit.

Atonepointthingsgotsodesperatethatwerefusedtoacceptfoodin

Sarajevountilfoodwasdeliveredtotheenclaves,firstwithparachutes(those

“Christmastrees”)andthenwithconvoys.WegreetedUNSCResolution819with

enthusiasm,notbecauseoftheresolutionbutbecauseofthementionofChapterVII

oftheUNCharter.51

Weheardmanytimes,andagaintoday,thatUNPROFORdidnotwanttobe

draggedintotheconflict.IdebatedthisquestionmanytimeswithLarry

Hollingworth,bothbeforeandafterIwasseriouslywoundedonMay22,1993.What

does“beingneutral”mean?Doesitmeanoccupyingthemiddlegroundbetweentwo

warringsides?Isitgeometric?Oristheresomeotherlogictoit?Ifyoudemonstrate

neutralitybytakingthemiddlegroundbetweenakillerandhisvictim,thenyou

betrayyourownvalues,inwhichcaseweshouldrethinkeverythingwearedoing.

DAVIDHANNAY:ItisperfectlyclearfromwhatLarryHollingworthsaidthat

MorillonactedonhisownwhenhemadehisspeechfromthebalconyofthePTT

buildinginSrebrenicawiththeflag.Oncethatbecamepublic,thechoice[wefacedin

theSecurityCouncil]waswhethertodisownhimortosupporthim.Itwasassimple

asthat.YouaskedhowUNSC819cametobewritten.Themainpeoplebehindthe

resolutionweretheEuropeans,whowerenotpreparedtodropMorillondespitethe

factthathehadactedwithoutanyauthoritywhatsoever.Therewasabsolutelyzero

enthusiasmfortheSafeArea,asdescribedinUNSC819,certainlyinmygovernment.

OurviewwasmuchclosertotheviewsofMrs.OgataandtheICRCaboutSafeAreas

thanitwastothosewhowantedamilitarizedSafeArea.IneversawfromLondon

anycriticismoftheSafeAreaagreement,asitwasnegotiatedbyUNPROFOR

betweentheBosniansandtheBosnianSerbs.Ithinktherewasafeelingthatitwas 51UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.

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notideal,toputitmildly,buttheagreementmadeitslightlymoresustainable.The

stormofprotestthateruptedovertheagreementmeantthatitwasneverrepeated

inanyoftheotherSafeAreas.

[BREAK]

TOMBLANTON:Oneofthepolicyquestionsthatwehavenotyetdiscussedisthe

dilemmaoverwhethertoprotectrefugeesinplace,intheSrebrenicaSafeArea,or

evacuatethem.Ifyouorganizedevacuations,youcouldbeaccusedofsanctioning

ethniccleansing.Butwealsoknowthattheword“protection”inthetitleof

UNPROFORwasanaspiration,notareality.Larry,canyouaddressthechallenge

youfaced?

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thefirstpointistoask,whatdothelocalpeoplewant?

Whataretheirwishes?Iftheywanttoleave,areyouimprisoningthembykeeping

themin?Itisagreatdilemma.Wedidnotwanttoaidethniccleansing,butwealso

didnotwanttokeepthemasprisoners.Myopinionalwaysis,whatistheviewof

thepeoplethemselves?Ifpeoplegenuinelywanttoleave,weshouldletthemgo.

MICHAELDOBBS:Thefirstevacuationswerelimitedtothesickandtheveryelderly.

AnumberofevacuationconvoyswereorganizedbutatacertainpointtheBosnian

governmentcalledahalt.Whatwasyourperceptionofwhatthelocalpopulationin

Srebrenicawantedtodo?

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thepeoplewereinthemostdirestraitsyoucanimagine.

Therewasnowayintheworldthatwewereabletosustainthemtoanythinglikea

minimumstandard.Iamnotsurprisedthattheywantedtogo.Theyknewfullwell

thatwiththeconditionsthatwereimposedonus,theywerenevergoingtobe

sustained.Iamnotsurprisedthateverysinglepersonwantedtogo.

Theywereallfrightenedthattheirfamilieswouldbeseparated.Thewomen

andchildrenthoughtthat,iftheygotout,theSerbswouldshellthecitywithallthe

meninsideit.

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MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdidyourfriendswanttodo,Muhamed?

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:InSrebrenicain1993,itwasobviousthatstayinginareas

thatweremeanttobeethnicallycleansedmeantcertaindeath.Everyonewastrying

tosustainlifeasmuchaspossible.Themenwantedtoatleastgettheirwivesand

childrenoutassoonaspossibletogivethemachanceofsurvival.Mostciviliansin

Srebrenicawantedtogetoutassoonaspossible.I'mtalkingfrommyownpersonal,

privateexperience.Yourmainobjective—today,too,incertainpartsoftheworld—

isthepreservationoflife.Youhavetosavethosewhoarecaughtinthemiddle

betweentwowarringpartiesandaredirectvictimsoftheatrocities.Thatdidnot

reflecttheview,perhaps,ofthepoliticalstructureofSrebrenica.Theyfeltthat

ifthewomenandchildrenleftSrebrenica,itwouldbecomeamucheasierterritory

tooccupy.

Ifyouhaveonlyonebulletinyourgun,andyouknowthatyourwifeandkids

areamileawaybehindyoufacingcertaindeath,youwillstandyourgroundno

matterwhat.Youwillfighttothelastdropofyourblood.Butifyourwifeandkids

arenolongerinSrebrenica,thenyouwilldowhateveryoucantojointhem,evenif

thatmeansthatfightingyourwayoutthroughalmostonehundredmilesofNo

Man’sLand.FromthepointofviewoftheBosnianmilitaryleadership,evacuating

civiliansfromSrebrenicameantweakeningthemoraleofthefightingforcein

Srebrenica.Theydidnotrepresentthefeelingofthemajorityofthepeoplewhoonly

wantedtosurvive,tolivesomewhereelseifSrebrenicawasnolongeraviable

option.

AsfarasthedemilitarizationofSrebrenicaisconcerned,mypersonalview

andtheviewoftheBosnianauthoritiesatthatparticulartimewasthattheCanadian

troopswerehighlyprofessional.Theycameinanderectedcheckpoints.One

ofthecheckpoints,onthesouthsideofthetown,wasonehundredmetersaway

frommyhouse.Iwasabletoaidthesecheckpointsasamemberofthelocalpolice.

Wewouldsearchanyoneenteringorleavingtheenclave.Thiswasajointeffortby

UNPROFORandthelocalpolicewhoweretheretoensurethattheagreementwas

followed.

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IfthelocalpoliceorUNPROFORfoundanyonewithweaponsatthese

checkpoints,theweaponswereseizedanddestroyedonthespot.Ifsomeonewas

foundcarryingaconcealedhandgun,thepeacekeeperwouldtakethemagazineout

ofthepistolanddestroythepistolbythrowingitunderanAPC.Thiswasatthe

beginningwhenthedemilitarizedzonewasconfinedtoSrebrenicaanditssuburbs.

LateronthiswasextendedsouthwardstoOP[ObservationPost]Echo,OPFoxtrot

andtheotherobservationpoints.

LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Wemustrememberthatatleast50percent,ifnotmore,

ofthepopulationofSrebrenicawerefromoutsideSrebrenica.Theyhadfledtheir

ownvillagesforwhattheythoughtwasabetterplace.Whentheyfoundthatitwas

actuallytheworstplaceonGod'searth,it'snotsurprisingthattheywantedtoleave.

MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Iagree.

HASANMURATOVIĆ:Whethertoleaveorbeprotectedinsideasafezoneisan

immoraldilemma.Whenthe[Srebrenica]safezonewascreated,therewasno

clearlydefinedfinalgoal.Whatwasthefinalintentionwiththissafezone?Howlong

wasitmeanttostayinplace?Whathadtobedonetoenablepeopletoleavethe

areaortodefendthemselves?Wasthereanyothersolution?Wesawwhatthe

bettersolutionwas,bothinBosniaandlaterinKosovo:equipanarmytoprotectthe

place,withtheassistanceofairstrikes.Letthearmyfight,andgivesupportfromthe

air.Orevenreprimandseriously.WhentheSerbswereorderedtosurrender

weaponsinSarajevo,theysurrenderedtheirweaponsbecauseitwasanultimatum.

ButtheywerenotreprimandedseriouslyinSrebrenica.Instead,therewere

negotiationswiththem.

EverypeacekeepingforceinBosniaandevery[foreign]civilianorganization

wassupposedtofollowtheoveralllineoftheUN,buttheyalsoworkedandfollowed

thelineoftheirowngovernments.DeploymentsofUNpeacekeepersreflected

politicalinterestsofdifferentcountriesfromwhichtheycome:TurksandEgyptians

inSarajevo,FrenchbetweenPaleandSarajevo,andbetweenBanjaLukaandBihać,

theSpanishinMostar.

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Wemustbearinmindthesedualroleswhenexaminethedecisionsthatwere

taken.TherewasnoconsensusbetweenEuropeancountriesonwhattodo.There

weredifferentpoliciesanddifferentviews.ThecreationoftheSafeArea,asMadam

Ogatasaid,wasdubiousfromallpointsofview.52Youcanprotectahospital,youcan

protectthepopulation,onlyifyouhelpthemtodefendthemselvesandhavean

overallgoalinmind.TheUNmissionneverhadclearlydefinedgoalsinBosnia.They

livedfromtodaytotomorrow,attemptingtosolveday-to-dayproblems.

CARLBILDT:IwasnotaroundatthetimebutIwasinvolvedinasimilarsituationin

Žepain1995.Thequestionis:ifyouassistinbringingpeopleoutofadifficult

situation,areyouanaccompliceinethniccleansingorgenocide,ornot?Thisisboth

amoralandpoliticaldilemmaforinternationalorganizations,whenfacedwith

situationslikethis.Thewarcrimestribunal,ICTY,dealtwiththisintheZdravko

Tolimircasebutwasunabletomakeupitsmind.Firstthetribunalsaid:yes,youare

anaccompliceinacrime.Thentheychangedtheirpositionandsaid:no,youcannot

reallysaythat.53Thefactthattheygobackandforthonthisissueillustrateshow

difficultthisis.Ofcourse,ithasvastimplicationsforotheroperationsaroundthe

world.

MICHAELDOBBS:Whatisyourpersonalview?

CARLBILDT:Myviewisthatyouhavetolookateachsituationasitis.Itis

difficulttohaveanoverridingprinciple.Youarenormallyinterestedinsavinglives.

Thehumanitarianimperativeisoftenwhatdrivespeopleinsituationslikethis.

52See,forexample,HannaytoFCO,“Bosnia:MrsOgata’sviewsonSafeAreas,”Telno1903,May29,1993.Ogatawarnedthatsafeareascouldturninto“largescalerefugeecamps…closedinbythesurroundingmilitaryforces.”53ThisissuerelatestoArticle42(b)oftheICTYStatute,whichgivesthetribunalauthoritytoprosecutethecrimeofgenocide,specifically“causingseriousbodilyormentalharm”with“intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,ethnical,racial,orreligiousgroup.”TheICTYAppealsChamberruledinApril2015thattheTrialChamberhadfailedtoestablishthattheMuslimsexpelledfromŽepa(incontrasttotheMuslimsexpelledfromSrebrenica)hadsuffered“seriousmentalharm”risingtothelevelofgenocide.Seeparagraphs216-217,AppealJudgment.ThisreversedthefindingcontainedinParagraph758ofthe2012TrialChamberjudgment.

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JORISVOORHOEVE:Ientirelyagreewiththeoverridingprincipleofsavinglives.

Thattakespriorityovernotcooperatingwithethniccleansing.

IwouldputSecurityCouncilResolution819,whichwediscussedthis

morning,inthecategoryof"fake"actions.Fakeactionscreatetheimpressionthat

somethinghasbeendecidedandisbeingdonewheninactualfactnothingwas

decidedordone.TheonlyoperationalpartoftheresolutionwasthattheSecretary-

Generalshould"increasethepresenceofUNPROFOR."54Theresolutiondoesnotsay

whatUNPROFORshoulddo.ThereismentionofChapterVII,butthatismeaningless

becauseitdoesnotsaywhatpartisunderChapterVII.MembersoftheSecurity

Councilwoulddobetternottovoteforsuchfakeresolutions.Thereareother

resolutionsthatweremuchstronger:forexample,UNSCresolution836,whichalso

invokedChapterVIIandallowedtheSecretary-Generaltouse"airpowerinand

aroundthesafeareas...tosupportUNPROFORintheperformanceofitsmandate."55

ThatwasaverysignificantresolutionthatmadeuseofChapterVII.

ThesecondpointIwanttomakeisverysimilartotheoneraisedbyMr.Bildt.

IdrawattentiontotheproposalsmadebyMrs.Ogatain1992.Shefavored

evacuationofthepopulationofSrebrenicaandnegotiationsbetweentheBosnian

governmentandtheBosnianSerbs[onalandswap].56TheBosnianswouldhave

receivedapieceoflandnearSarajevothatwouldhaveimprovedthedefensibilityof

SarajevoandmadeitpossibletorelocatethepopulationofSrebrenicapreventively.

IunderstandthedilemmafacedbytheBosniangovernment.Iknowtherewere

discussionsintheBosniangovernmentonapreventiveevacuation.Therewere

ministersinfavorofpreventiveevacuation,butintheendtheydecidedagainst.

Politicalandethicalquestionswereconfused,notonlyintheUnitedNations,but

alsoinBosnia.

TOMBLANTON:LetmeaskDavidHannaytorespond.Ithinkthatyouhaveargued

thattheso-called“fakeresolution,”819,didactuallyachievesomething,namely

54UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.55UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993.56SadakoOgata,“StatementtotheInternationalMeetingonHumanitarianAidforVictimsoftheConflictintheformerYugoslavia,”July29,1992.

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headingoffaSerbianoffensiveagainstSrebrenica.HadtheVance-Owenplan

actuallybeenadopted,wemightbelookingbackattheestablishmentoftheseSafe

Areasasatriumphforinternationaldiplomacy.Isthatanaccuratereflectionofyour

view?

DAVIDHANNAY:TheseSafeAreasresolutions—819inthecaseofSrebrenica,and

836settingouttheoverallpolicy—wereneverdesignedasanythingotherthana

shorttermexpedient.Theyhadtobefittedintoawiderpoliticalstrategywhichhad

toinvolvepeacenegotiationsandasettlement.ThedestructionofVance-Owenin

thespringof1993wasdisastrousbecauseitknockedawaythatoption.Ittookthree

yearstoreconstructthe[peacenegotiation]optionwhichcametobeknownas

Dayton.TheSafeAreasshouldneverhavebeenseenasalong-termsolutionto

anything.Theywereashort-termexpedientthatneededtobefittedintoaproper

politicalandmilitarystrategybutneverwas.

As1993and1994woreon,theexpedientbecamemoreandmore

threadbare,aswewillseewhenwetalkaboutGoraždeandBihać.Bythetimeofthe

Srebrenicamassacre,itwascompletelyworthless.Thereasonitwasworthlesswas

becausenoonedidanythingaboutthepoliticalframework.Tomymind,the

destructionofVance-Owenwasadisaster.IfyoureadtheJointActionProgram,you

canseewhatthesignatoriesthoughtaboutpreservingVance-Owen.Theymakea

vaguereferenceto“buildingontheVance-Owenprocess,”butitwasbasically

dead.57Thatwasarealdisaster.TheSafeAreaswereanexpedientthatbecamea

policy.

TOMBLANTON:Jenonne,canyouaddressthat?

JENONNEWALKER:IagreewithmostofwhatDavidhassaid.Iplaceless

importancethanhedoesonVance-Owen.Obviouslyifthereisapeaceagreement,

thereisapeaceagreement,whetherit'stheVance-Owenplanoranyother.What

waslackinginalltheUNResolutions,andcertainlyinAmericanpolicyandinthe

57PermanentRepresentativesofFrance,Spain,theRussianFederation,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates,“Jointactionprogramme,”S/25829,May24,1993.

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JointActionProgram,wasanywillingnesstomaketheSerbsstoptheiraggression.

ThefirstseriousthingthatwasdoneintheWestwastheNATOdecisioninAugust

1993totakeseriousmilitaryaction,airaction,againstanyonewhocontinued

shellingciviliansettlements,whichofcoursemeanttheBosnianSerbsandtheir

Serbbackers.58ItworkedinFebruary1994,thefirsttimeitwastested,whenwe

issuedanultimatumtotheSerbsaboutpullingtheirweapons20kilometersbeyond

Sarajevo.59Atthelastminute,withRussianhelp,theycompliedbecausetheyreally

believedNATOairstrikeswerecoming.Hadthatpolicybeencontinued,things

mighthavebeenbettersooner.

TheJointActionProgramtookmostofusinWashingtonbysurprise.Icannot

rememberwhytheseniorEuropeanofficialswereintown.Therehadbeensome

otherevent.Thenextday,Igotaphonecallfromsomeonequiteseniorinthe

DefenseDepartmentsaying,issomethinghappeningattheStateDepartmentthat

wearebeingcutoutof?Isaid,noofcoursenot,Iwouldknowaboutit.Allofuswere

takenbysurprisewhenWarrenChristopherandhiscolleaguescameoutwiththe

JointActionProgram,whichwasfakepolicy.Itgavenobonestoanything.Ihaveno

ideawhyChrisandhiscolleaguessigneduptothat.Mostofusthoughtitwasan

embarrassment.IaskedTonyLakeafterwardifhehadknownthiswasgoingon.He

wasevasive.ItwasmaybetheonlytimeIfailedtogetastraightanswerfromTony.I

don'tknowifhewasalsotakenbysurprise.Itwasonlythewillingnesstomove

fromneutralitytousingforcetostopaggressionthatmadeitpossibletoimplement

Vance-Owen,Dayton,oranyotherpeaceplan.

Washingtonfinallycametoawillingnesstoseriouslygetbehindapeaceplan

inthespringandearlysummerof1994.WeagreedthenwiththeWestEuropeans,

theEU,thatwewouldjointheminendorsingaplan,includingamap,iftheywould

agreethatanyonewhodidnotaccepttheplanwithinacertainperiodoftimewould

58Secretary-GeneralofNATO,“PressStatementbytheSecretary-General,”August2,1993.59“DecisionstakenattheMeetingoftheNorthAtlanticCouncilinPermanentSession,”February9,1994.“SummaryofConclusionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”USNationalSecurityCouncil,February18,1994.

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faceseriousNATOairstrikes.60Afterthat,therewasaperiodofpinprickairstrikes

untilthingsfinallybecamesobadthatWashingtonsaiditwouldactaloneif

necessary.Itwastheenforcementthatmattered,nottheVance-Owenmaporthe

Daytonmaporanyothermap.

TOMBLANTON:Peter,youhadjustarrivedinCroatiainJune1993,andinheriteda

SafeAreaortwo?

PETERGALBRAITH:I'mstruckbythedisconnectbetweentheincoherentpolicyin

Washingtonandthingsactuallygoingontheground,eventhoughtheywerewell

reportedatthetime.FirstawordabouttheVance-Owenpeaceplan.Ifyoulookatit,

youwillseealotofblue.

Farfrombeingapeaceplan,thatmapacceleratedtheconflictbetween

BosniaksandBosnianCroatsastheBosnianCroatstriedtoseizetheterritory

offeredthembythemap.61Bythesummerof1993,therewaslittletheClinton

administrationcoulddotofollowthroughonthepresident’scampaignpledgesto

helptheBosniangovernment.ThiswasbecauseofthewarbetweentheMuslims

andtheCroats.Ifyoulookatthemap,youseeCroatiatothewestofBosniaand

Serbiatotheeast.TherewasnoaccesstotheBosniangovernmentareasaslongas

theMuslim-Croatwarwasgoingon.

WithoutmuchpolicyguidancefromWashington,theUSembassyinZagreb

inthesummerof1993beganpressuringtheCroatiangovernmenttoendthe

atrocitiestheBosnianCroatswerecommittinginBosnia.62ThroughForeign

MinisterMateGranicandDefenseMinisterGojkoSusak,Igotembassyofficersinto

theheliportnearMostarwherethousandsofBosnianswerebeingheldinappalling

conditions.InJuly,IhadaverycontentiousmeetingwithMateBobaninwhichI

60InJuly1994,aContactGroupmadeupoftheUnitedStates,Russia,Britain,France,andGermanyproposedamapwitha51/49percentterritorialcompromisebetweentheMuslim-CroatFederationandtheBosnianSerbs.ThebasicprinciplesoftheContactGroupproposalwereacceptedatDayton.ForU.S.strategyduringthisperiod,seeLaketoClinton,“Bosnia–NextSteps,”TheWhiteHouse,July19,1994.61FightingflaredbetweenBosnianCroatsandMuslimsaftertheCroatianDefenseCouncilgavetheBosnianarmyadeadlineofApril15,1993towithdrawfromareasdesignatedasCroat-dominatedcantonsundertheVance-OwenPeacePlan.62“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”May17,1993.

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pressedhimtoreleasethedetainees.Bytheendofthesummer,wesecuredthe

releaseofabout5,000Bosniakprisoners.Wegotaccesstotheheliportinspiteof

theoppositionoftheUSambassadortoBosnia[VictorJackovich]whowasbasedin

Vienna.Butthat’sanotherstory.

ProposedVance-Owenpeaceplan,1993

TOMBLANTON:SothereweredivisionsevenwithintheStateDepartmentandeven

betweenUSambassadors?

1-45

PETERGALBRAITH:Evenwithinthebureaus.IusedtorefertotheEuropean

BureauunderSteveOxmanasthe“HomeAlone”Bureau.63

JENONNEWALKER:Don'tgetintoit.

PETERGALBRAITH:Whynot?It'stwenty-twoyearslater.

Anyhow,inthefallof1993webegantoputpressureonTudjman,Šušakand

Granićtochangethe[BosnianCroat]leadership.TheygotridofBosnianCroat

leaderMateBobanbytheendoftheyear.Thatsetthestageforthealliancebetween

theMuslimsandCroatsthatwasexpressedintheFederationofBosnia-Herzegovina

[establishedbytheWashingtonAgreementofMarch1994].64Thiswasadifferent

constructfromVance-Owen.ItdidnotofferallthisterritorytotheBosnianCroats

andwasasignalthattheUSstronglydiscouragedTudjmanfromdoingwhathe

wantedtodo,whichwastograbagoodpartofBosnia.Thatalliancethensetthe

stageforustotelltheCroatiansthatweweregoingtolooktheotherwayasarms

wentthroughCroatiatoBosnia.Wedidnotneedtodotheliftpart[oflifeandstrike]

becausearmsdeliveriesweretakingplace.Thischangedthemilitarybalance.

Beforehedied,IzetbegovićtoldmethatmymessagetoTudjmanthattheUSdidnot

objecttoarmstransitingCroatiaforBosniawasthesinglemostimportantthingthat

theUnitedStatesdidforBosnia.Thisisadifferentperspectiveonhowthisevolved

thantheNewYork,andperhapstheNSC,perspective.

ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:SeveralspeakersmentionedtheVance-Owenplan.Justto

remindyouaboutthemeetingbetweenIzetbegovićandVicePresidentGoreon

March26,1993[thedayafterIzetbegovićsignedtheVance-Owenplan.]65US

63StephenA.OxmanwasAssistantSecretaryofStateforEuropeanandCanadianAffairsbetweenApril1993andAugust1994whenhewassucceededbyRichardHolbrooke.AWashingtonPostarticleonMay21,1996byJohnPomfretandDavidOttaway(“U.S.Envoy’sBalkanRoleCriticizedonCapitolHill”)notedfrictionbetweenGalbraithandotherUSenvoysintheregion.64TheWashingtonagreementreducedtheamountofBosnianterritorycontrolledbyBosnianCroatsfromaround20percentto10percent,moreinlinewithpre-warethnicdivisions.65FuerthtoLake,“MeetingbetweenVicePresidentGoreandPresidentAlijaIzetbegovićofBosniaandHerzegovina,”OfficeoftheVicePresident,April14,1993.GorereceivedIzetbegovićinWashingtonthedayafterIzetbegovićsignedtheVance-OwenpeaceplanattheUnitedNationsheadquartersinNewYork.

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officialstoldIzetbegovićthattheUSwouldconsiderliftingthearmsembargoif

Serbsrefusedtosign.WeheldaparliamentsessioninthebesiegedcityofSarajevo

atwhichthemajorityadoptedtheVance-OwenplanafteritwassignedinAthens

[onMay3,1993]byIzetbegovićandKaradzić.Weacceptedthatplan.Itwasavery

toughdecision.Thiswasoneofthosedecisionswhenthepresidentisaskingyou,

whatismoreimportant,thepeopleorthecountry.

TheBosnianSerbsrejectedtheVance-OwenplanonMay6[atameetingof

theRepublikaSrpskaassemblyinPale].TheVance-Owenplanwasnotadream

scenario,butwhenyoucomparetheVance-OwenmapwiththeDaytonmap

BosniaafterDayton

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[below],itisDisneyland.ThereisnoRepublikaSrpska,therearenoethnically

definedterritories.

IntheVance-Owenmap[seepage1-44oftranscript]thereisayellowline

representingtheDaytonpeaceagreementboundarybetweenRepublikaSrpskaand

theFederation.HadtheVance-Owenplanbeenadopted,notonlywouldthewar

havebeenstopped,butwewouldbeamorefunctioningcountrythanwearetoday.

Weacceptedtheplanbecauseweweretoldthattheinternationalcommunitywas

fullybehindit.IfKaradzićacceptedit,wewouldproceedwithpeace

implementation.IfweacceptedandtheSerbsrefused,thearmsembargowouldbe

lifted.Thatwasaclearunderstanding.Whathappenedwas:weaccepted,Karadzić

refused,andthearmsembargoremained.TheBosnianSerbswereafraidofthe

armsembargobeinglifted,buttheyknewthatthiswasafalsethreatbythe

internationalcommunity.MypointisthatwhathappenedinJuly1995wasthe

consequenceoftheinternationalcommunitynotcarryingthroughonitsthreatsand

commitments.

TOMBLANTON:CanIaskJohnShattucktospeaktoapointthatJenonnewas

makingabouttheJointActionProgramandSecretaryChristopher.Whatwas

SecretaryChristopherthinking,ifthisoccursreallyoutsideofaprocessthattheNSC

andothersknew,andmaybeLakeknew,butwhathappened?Whatwasthat

dynamiclikeinsidetheClintonadministration?

JOHNSHATTUCK:SecretaryChristopherwentonatourofEuropeancapitalsinMay

1993.66Theexpectationwasthathewouldarrivewithsomenewpoliciesandthere

wouldbeanopportunityfordiscussion.Infact,itwasasortof"listeningtour."Not

onlywastherenodialoguebuttherewasreallynotmuchspeech.Thisreflectedthe

completedisarrayinsidetheUSGovernmentwithrespecttoformulatingapolicy

implementingClinton'scampaignpromises.

Myjob[asAssistantSecretaryofStateforHumanRights]wastogather

humanrightsinformation.Wewereconstantlysidetracked.Wewouldbebroughtin

66SeeElaineSciolino,“ChristopherFailstoWinConsensus,”NewYorkTimes,May7,1993.

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fromtimetotime,andthenpushedbackwhenitwasfeltthatwhatmybureauwas

spotlightingwasnotgoingtobehelpfultothepoliticalnegotiations.Iremember

goingwithPeterGalbraithandMadeleineAlbrighttoVukovarinJanuary1994toa

massgravesite[believedtocontainthebodiesofsome200Croatpatientswhohad

disappearedfromVukovarhospitalonNovember20,1991.]Ourvisitwasseenas

toohighprofileforWashingtonsoIwasthenbasicallyputunderwrapsandnot

allowedtotravelbacktoBosniauntilJuly1995[followingtheSrebrenicamassacre].

Igivethisasanexampleofthehighdegreeofbothconfusionandhesitancyonthe

partoftheUnitedStatestodothekindofspotlightingthatneededtobedonein

ordertochangethepolicy.

JENONNEWALKER:Iwasonthe“liftandstrike”salestrip,duringthefirstweekof

May1993.WarrenChristopherhadsupportedthatpolicywithintheadministration

asopposedto“strikeonly.”Ithinkhereallybelievedinit.Hispresentationmight

haveconvincedajudgebuttherewasnopolitical“umph”toitatall.Incapitalafter

capital,lookingathisbriefingbookandnevermakingeyecontactwithanyone,he

wouldgothroughalltheotheroptionswehadconsideredandexplainwhywehad

rejectedthem.Finally,wheneveryonewassoundasleepordaydreaming,hewould

getto“liftandstrike”andexplainwhythatwastheleastbadoftheavailable

options.Idon'tunderstandwhetherhechangedhismind.Whenwegotoffthe

airplaneinLondon,ourfirststop,onSunday,May2,weweregreetedwithahuge

headlineintheSundayTimessaying,"BritainwillvetoUSplantoarmBosnian

Muslims,"beforetheconversationshadevenbegan.67Thatdidn'thelpthe

atmosphere.ItwasadisasterofAmericandiplomacy.Weneveractuallydropped

thepolicybutwedidn'tdoanythingtopushitafterthat.Itwaspartofourgradual,

muchtooslow,movementtobeingwillingtotakemoreseriousaction.

Wewerekeenlyawarethatourallieswereonthegroundtakingrisksthat

wewerenotsharing.IfwereallystooduptoSerbianaggression,their

peacekeepers,the"peaceobservers"or"violenceobservers,"wouldbeputin 67SeeJamesAdams&AndrewGrice,“BritainwillvetoUSplantoarmBosnianMuslims,”SundayTimes(UK),May2,1993.

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seriousdangerthatwewerenotpreparedtoshare.Wewereverydeferentialto

theirviewsforalongtime.WethoughtinAugust1993thatwehadanagreementon

aseriousNATOairthreat.Thatfellapartwiththedualkeyarrangement.Thefirst

testwasinSarajevoafterthemarketplacebombinginFebruary1994whichshowed

thatthecrediblethreatofforcewouldmakeadifference.Bythespring,orearly

summerof1994,wewerewillingtoendorseapeaceplaninreturnforEuropeans’

commitmenttoseriousairstrikes.IrememberTonyLake’sworkinghardtogeta

consensusamongClinton'stopadvisers.Hekeptsayingtome,"Justtrustme,I'llget

usthere."Meanwhile,lotsofpeopleweredying.LakefinallygotClinton'sagreement

toaplanbeforesurfacingittoothermembersofthePrincipalsCommittee.

TOMBLANTON:Let'sgobacktoUNSCResolution836ofJune4,1993.68Joris

Voorhoeve,amongothers,compared836favorablywith819.Thedocuments,

however,recordseverecriticismfromtheSecretariatandahugegapbetweenthe

toughlanguageoftheresolutionandwhatwashappeningontheground.Thereisa

wonderfulexchangebetweentheSecretariatworkingpaperofMay28andaDavid

HannaycablebacktoLondonthefollowingdaythatillustratesthisdifferenceof

opinion.69Hannaycomplainsabout"thescandalouslyslantedSecretariatpaper”

thatwas“almostcertainlytheworkofTharoor.”David,youseemtobeconcerned

thattheworkingpaperisadvocatingaheavyoptionrequiringatleast15,000more

troopswhileyouarearguingfora"light"option.70Willyouexplainthisdebatefor

us?

68UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993.69AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.HannytoFCO,“MyTelno1881:Bosnia:SafeAreasResolution,”UKMissiontotheUN,Telno1911,May29,1993.70TheMay28WorkingPapercoveredtheproposedsafeareasofSarajevo,Bihac,Tuzla,Goražde,Srebrenica,andŽepa.TheSecretariatinitiallybelievedthat15,000extratroopswouldbeneededtodeterpossibleaggressionagainstthesafeareas,butlaterincreaseditsestimateto“32,000additionalgroundtroops.”[SeeUNSrebrenicareport,paragraph94].AJune14reportbytheUNSecretaryGeneral[S/25939]quotedGeneralWahlgrenassayingthathewouldneed34,000additionaltroops,inadditiontothe24,000alreadyintheater,inorder“toobtaindeterrencethroughstrength.”Wahlgrenstated,however,thatitwouldbepossibleto“startimplementing”UNSCResolution836witha“lightoption”ofaround7,600moretroops,relyingprimarily“onthethreatofairaction”todeterattacksonthesafeareas.[Seealso:UNSrebrenicareport,paragraph96].The7,600extratroopswereauthorizedbyUNSC

1-50

DAVIDHANNAY:ByMay1993,IandothermembersoftheSecurityCouncil

(principallyFrance,theRussianFederation,Spain,theUnitedKingdomandthe

UnitedStatesofAmerica,i.e.asignificantportion),wereoperatingonthebasisof

theJointActionProgram.Personally,IthoughttheJointActionProgramwas

anappallingidea,butyouarepaidtocarryouttheinstructionsofyourgovernment.

ThegovernmentshadsigneduptotheJointActionProgram.TheJointAction

Programsaid[inParagraph4]that“wewillworktosecureearlyadoptionofthe

newUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutionnowunderdiscussion.”71The

reasonwhywereactedverynegativelytotheSecretariatpaperwasbecauseitwas

quiteclearlydesignedtofrustratethat.Ithinkhistorywillbequitekindtothe

UnitedNationsSecretariatwhentheysaid,“It'snotgoingtowork.”Butthatisnot

wherewewerethen,andthatwaswhywecouldnotaccepttheworkingpaper.

Onthedifferencebetweenthelightandtheheavyoptions.Tobehonest,the

heavyoptionwasajoke.Theheavyoptionwaswhatwecallinthejargon:"Giveme

halfamillionmenandIwillmarchtoMoscow."Absolutely,halfamillionmen,

marchtoMoscow.That'sprobablynotaverygoodidea,butOK.Thelightoption

wasarealisticallyfeasibleone.72Itwasconceivablethatwecouldget7,600more

troops.ItwasconceivablethattheycouldprotecttheSafeAreasforaperiodoftime.

Thatiswhywefavoredthatoption,alongwithalltheothersignatoriesoftheJoint

ActionProgram.

TOMBLANTON:Shashi?

SHASHITHAROOR:Thisallhappenedin"ahundredhurries,"whichwasalltoo

oftenthecaseatthistime.TheSecurityCouncilaskedforapaper.IthinkDavid,in

allfairness,wasplayingaverycomplicatedgame.Ontheonehand,hehadtoward

offdemandsfromDiegoandthenon-aligned,whowerecallingformuchmore

resolution844ofJune18,1993,butittookmorethanayeartodeploythemtoBosnia.[S/1994/1389].Fewerthan3,000hadarrivedintheatrebyJanuary1994.[A/48/847].71PermanentRepresentativesofFrance,Spain,theRussianFederation,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates,“Jointactionprogramme,”S/25829,May24,1993.72Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution836(1993),”S/25939,June14,1993.

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explicitlypro-Bosniakaction.Ontheotherhand,therewasbackgroundpressure

fromtheAmericanstopreserveanappearanceofactionwhilemaintainingthe

viabilityofUNPROFOR.TheBritishandFrench,meanwhile,werefartoodeeply

committedonthegroundtosuddenlychangetheentirestrategyonadime.Wein

theSecretariathadtheimpossibletaskofbeingaskedtoproduceapaperatless

thantwenty-fourhours’notice.Ithinkwewentonuntil4a.m.puttingthisblessed

thingtogether.Asisprobablyapparentfromthequalityofthewriting,itwasa

productofmanyhandsandmanyheads.Icertainlybearresponsibilityforitasthe

leaderoftheteam.AsIunkindlypointedouttoDavidwhenhegotangrywithme,

themilitaryinputactuallycamefromaBritishofficer,MajorAdrianFoster,whohad

beendetailedtomefromtheBritishArmy.Thepoorfellowgotpulledout[oftheUN

Secretariat]forhiscontributiontothispaper.73

Itistruethat34,000wasanunrealisticfigure.Wehadnoexpectationofever

gettingthosenumbers.Thereasonwhywegavethosenumbers,whichcamefrom

seriousmilitaryplanners,wastolettheSecurityCouncilknowthatthiswasthe

kindofnumbertheyneededtobetalkingaboutthatiftheywantedtohaveSafe

Areasthatweredefendable.Ifnot,theyoughttoaltertheirmandateaccordingly.

Thatwasthepurposeofprovidingthemtheheavyoption.WeinDPKOcameunder

veryheavypressure,rightfromBoutros'office,toalsoprovidealightoption.We

hadnointentionofcomingupwithalightoptiononourown.Itwasdonebecauseof

politicalpressurefromkeygovernmentswholearnedearlyonthatthiswasgoingto

beaveryheavything,perhapsfromtheirownpeopleonourteam.

IhadtwopeoplewhowerefulltimeUNofficialsonmyteam.Everybodyelse

wassecondedfromgovernments:themilitarypeople,thepolice,andthewholelot.

Again,thisisnormal.IalwaysusedtojoketotheUSMissionthatIhadmorepeople

followingmyworkthanIhadtodoit.Thatwaschronicallythecase.Theycertainly

hadtheirownsourcesofinformation.Whilewewerestillputtingtogetherthis

blessedthingintwenty-fourhours,wordcamethatwehadtoproducea“light

73InanAugust15,2015emailcommunicationtotheorganizers,retiredGeneralAdrianFosterdisputedTharoor’srecollectionofevents.Hesaidhe“completed”afulltourinNewYorkanddeniedbeing“pulledout”byLondon.

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option.”Sowecameupveryreluctantlywithalightoption.Asyoucanseefromthe

May28cable,IcouldonlysendthepapertoGeneralWahlgreninthefieldafterwe

hadsubmittedittotheCouncil.74Wehadnotime.Therewassimplynoquestionof

beingabletoconsult.Sowesentitoffandindeeditgotaveryfrostyreception.

Davidshoutedatmeafewtimes.Iflookscouldkill,Iwouldnotbeheretoday.Atthe

endofit,theCouncilwasdeterminedtogoaheadwitharesolution.

Inadditiontotheworkingpaper,wealsosentacabletoWahlgrenonJune2,

askingforhiscomments.75Atthispoint,someofthekeyquestionshavealready

comeupveryclearly.Davidtalkedaboutwhathewaspaidtodo.Weinthe

Secretariatwerepaidtoupholdourmandatesandprinciples,oneofwhichis

outlinedinparagraph3,"...aSafeAreacannotbe'safe'ifonepartywithinitremains

armedandabletoattackthoseoutsideit.Thereshouldthereforebeanobligation

fortheBHArmyalsototreattheSafeAreasassafe,thatis,todesistfromanyhostile

activitytherein,eventhoughtheCouncilresolutiondoesnotrequireittodisarmor

withdraw."76Thiswasanimpossiblecontradictiontosquaresincethenon-aligned

wantedustotakethesideoftheBosniaks.TheBritishandtheFrenchdidnot

becausetheirowntroopswereontheground.Theywantedtogivetheappearance

ofrespondingtoallthemoraloutrageontelevisionandcomingoutofWashington.

Wehadtoconcoctanoperationalmandatethatmadesenseoutofallthisand

workedontheground,whichwasimpossible.Igooninthenextparagraphtotalk

aboutthequestionofSerbcooperationwiththesearrangements.TheFrenchhad

toldus,I'mquotinghere,"...France(onbehalfofthesponsors)hasstated,in

informalconsultationsoftheSecurityCouncil,thatthedraftresolutionassumesthe

consentandco-operationofthepartiesbutthatnon-cooperationwouldinvolve

consequencesunderchapterVII."77TheassumptionhereisthattheSerbsagreeto

bebombedbyNATOiftheBosniaksshootandtheyshootback.Imean,comeon.

Obviouslythishascertainimplicationsforthemission.Iputtheonusonthe

74AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.75AnnantoStoltenberg/Wahlgren,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson“safeareas,”MSC-896,June2,1993.76Seeparagraph3,MSC-896,op.cit.77Seeparagraph4,MSC-896,op.cit.

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Generalsbysayingthereportcalledforinparagraphtwelve[ofUNSCresolution

836]wouldhavetocomeverylargelyfromUNPROFOR.78Wewerenotgoingtosit

anddoarepetitionoftheworkingpaperexercise,havingbeenburnedbyit.We

said,“Youchaps[UNPROFORcommanders]tellushowyouwanttooperationalize

this.”Itwasnotjustpassingthebuck,itwasbeingrealistic.Theyweretheoneswho

wouldhavetoimplementitontheground.Letthemcomeupwiththeoperational

concept.Theyweren'thappy,asyoucanseefromsubsequentcontext.Thereis

anothercableonJune3[Z-703],wherewespelloutcertainspecificchallenges.79

Thentheresolutionisadopted.Sothemandatewasbecomingmoreandmore

operationallyimpossibletodefine.

Bytheway,Jenonne,theAmericanpressureonairstrikeswasnothelpful.

ProfessorEliotCohencameupwithawonderfullineaboutairpowerbeingan

“unusuallyseductiveformofmilitarystrength”inWashington.Hewrotethatair

power,“likemoderncourtship…appearstooffergratificationwithout

commitment."80ThatispreciselywhattheAmericansseemedtobewantingtodo.

Theyweregoingtobeflyingfromagreatheight,dropbombs,andflyaway,while

therestofuswouldwakeuponthegroundthenextmorningandlivewiththe

consequences.Thiswasthefundamentaldilemmathatboththetroopcontributors

andtheSecretariatweregrapplingwith.

HASANMURATOVIĆ:Inmyview,UNSCResolution836wasagoodresolution.It

providedthegroundsforcallinginairstrikes,andforNATOtoact.Itwasuptothe

decision-makerslatertodecidewhethertheywantedtostrikeornot,toprevent

attacksanddisaster.Thereisnothingintheresolutionthatsays,“Don’tactinthis

case,orthatcase.”

MICHAELDOBBS:WedonothaveGeneralWahlgrenwithusasheisnolongeralive,

butwedohavehisJune3cablereactingtowhatwashappeninginNewYork.He 78UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993,paragraph12.79WahlgrentoAnnan,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson‘SafeArea’,”UNPF-HQ,Z-703,June3,1993.80SeeEliotA.Cohen,“TheMystiqueofU.S.AirPower”,ForeignPolicy,January/February1994,arguesthatUSmilitarystrategistsintheBalkansdrewthewrongconclusionsfromtheJanuary1991bombingofIraqatthestartofthePersianGulfWar.

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statesveryclearlyhisoppositiontoairstrikes.Inparagraphfive,hestates"Wehave

indicatedinourcorrespondenceoverthemonthsthatairstrikeswouldsimply

bringUNPROFORandUNHCRoperationstoanend."Inparagrapheight,hegoeson:

"Inconclusion,IdoubtifthecurrentTroopContributingNationswouldagreeto

leavetheircontingentsinUNPROFORundertheproposedmandate.Onesimply

cannotmakepeaceandwaratthesametime."81InWahlgren’sabsence,perhaps

RupertSmithcouldgiveushistakeonWahlgren’scritiqueandtheextenttowhich

heandotherssharedit.Rupert,youwerecoordinatingUKpolicyattheMinistryof

DefenseastheAssistantChiefofDefenseOperationsatthetime?

RUPERTSMITH:IwasattheMinistryofDefense,butIhadnosenseofcoordinating

anything.Itwasaveryconfusedperiodforallthereasonsthathavebeenexplained.

Idon'trememberthisdocument.Iwouldliketomakeapointabouttheforce

numbersbeingquoted,whichgoesbacktotherelationshipbetweenmilitaryadvice

andmilitaryactionandpoliticaldirection.Irememberthosenumbersbeing

bandiedabout.MajorFosterwascertainlycommunicatingbacktoLondon,asking

questionsaboutwhatwethoughtandwhatwaspossible.Thequestionwekept

askingwas:arewetodefendthisterritoryasapieceofground?Orarewetodefeat

anddestroythoseattackingthisterritory?Itcompletelyaltersthemethodandthe

numbersinvolved.

WeeventuallyweretoldbytheothersideofWhitehall[referencetothe

ForeignOffice]:youaredefendingterritory.Themomentyousaythattheseblobs

onthemaparetobedefended,yougetthesehighnumbers.Youhavetoputmenon

theground,feedthem,andsoon.Therewasnodesiretoconsidertheideaof

destroyingordefeatingtheattacker.Youarenottobeoffensiveatall.That,Ithink,

reflectsthegeneralatmosphereoftheUNforceasawhole.Iwasnotpartofthat,but

IthinkIcouldeasilyhavewrittensomethinglikeWahlgren'smemoifIwassittingin

hischairatthattime.

TOMBLANTON:DavidHarland.

81WahlgrentoAnnan,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson‘SafeArea’,”UNPF-HQ,Z-703,June3,1993.

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DAVIDHARLAND:Mycommentisaveryancientonefromanhourago.On

evacuationversusethniccleansing,Ithinkthisgoestotheheartofhowthewarwas

fought.IputthisquestiontoPresidentIzetbegovićwhenIwaswritingtheUN

Srebrenicareport.IsaidthattheSerbshadaccusedhimofblockingevacuations

withUNassistancefromSrebrenicaandinSarajevoandwagingwarbyusing

civiliansasshields.Hetoldme,"Wehaveachoice,sometimes,betweenaterritory

andthepeople.Ofcourse,bothareimportant,butwewillnotallowtheBosniak

peopletobeputintoghettos."Inotherwords,thepolicywas:humanshields.The

policywastophysicallyblockpeoplefromtryingtoescapeembattledareasand

thereforemakeitharderfortheenemytoattackwithoutinflictingcivilian

casualties.

DavidHarland,center,nexttoMuhamedDurakovicandLarryHollingworth

[TurnstothedebateaboutUNSC836].Thoseofuswhowereonthe

receivingendofallthisguidance,includingtheguidancefromUNPROFOR

Headquarters,feltadeepfrustration.IwasinPaleeverydaywiththeBosnian

leadershipandwasoftenatSarajevoairportwithHasanMuratović.AsHasansays,

theSerbswerevery,veryresponsivetotheperceivedlevelofthreatcomingfrom

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NATO,andlaterfromtheRapidReactionForce.Wheneveritseemedtothemthat

themandatewasnotclearenoughtoallowanyseriousthreattobeusedagainst

them,theywouldprobefurther.Itistruethattherewerepoliticalcompromises

involved[indraftingUNresolutions]anditwasuglyandmuddledandmorally

wrongandabsentinstrategy.Nevertheless,asHasansaid,thoseofusonthe

receivingendfelttherewasplentyoflanguage,particularlyinResolution836,that

wouldhaveallowedfortheapplicationofforce.Itwasfrustratingafterthese

debatestookplace[inNewYork]toreceiveguidancesayingyoushoulddoevenless

thantheresolutionsays.

ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:YoumentionedWahlgren’scableofJune3,1993,inwhichhe

says“Onesimplycannotmakepeaceandwaratthesametime.”82Endofcable.I

thinkthisgoestothecoreofthemisunderstanding[overthenatureof

peacekeeping].InOctober1991,PresidentIzetbegovićmadeaveryfamouspublic

statementsaying,"Sleeppeacefully,thereisnoneedtofear,becauseittakestwoto

tango."83Actually,forwar,youneedone.Whenyouhavetwo,thereisnowar.

Someonedecidestogotowarifhefeelsheisinastrongerposition.Thatiswhen

youhaveawar.Atthesametime,youcannotmakepeace,especiallyunderChapter

VIIoftheUNCharterwithoutbeingreadytogotowar.Otherwiseyouendup

sendingalotofreligiousleadersoverthere.Thisisthefundamental

misunderstandingbetweenus.

JORISVOORHOEVE:SecurityCouncilResolution836isanexampleofclarity.It's

verygood.ItsaysthatMemberStatesmaytake“allnecessarymeasures,throughthe

useofairpower”to“supportUNPROFORintheperformanceofitsmandate.”84The

problemisnotthelightorheavyoption,butthefactthatthisresolutionwasnot

used.Therewasanenormousgapbetweenthelanguageoftheresolutionandthe

actualapplicationupuntilAugust1995.AfterthefallofSrebrenica,thisresolution

82WahlgrentoAnnan,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson‘SafeArea’,”UNPF-HQ,Z-703,June3,1993.83SeeStevenBurg&PaulShoup,EthnicConflictandInternationalIntervention:CrisisinBosnia-Herzegovina,1990-93,page78.84UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993.

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becamethelegalbasisfortheuseofairpoweranddeterrence.Whatisoften

forgotteninthediscussionintheUnitedNationsandthememberstates,becauseof

theconfusionwetalkedabout,isthetremendousimportanceofdeterrence.Youtell

awarringparty,"Ifyoudothis,therewillbeveryseriousconsequences.Wehave

escalationdominanceandyoucannotchallengeus."Therewasnoescalation

dominancein1993forthereasonsthatJenonneWalkerandJohnShattuck

explained.TherewasconfusioninWashingtonaboutwhattodointhisterrible

situation.

AfterthefallofSrebrenica,everythingbecameclear.Airpowerwasusedina

veryadequatefashion.Iwouldliketodrawattentiontothisbecausetheuseof

deterrencewasdiscreditedaftertheendoftheColdWar.Itwasseenassomething

relatedtonuclearweapons,butitisanageoldprincipleofusingmilitarypower.

Youshowbeforehandthatiftheoppositesidegoestoofar,therewillbeveryserious

consequences.TheSerbsunderstoodthismessage.Thiswasthemessagethatwas

deliveredattheLondonConferenceonJuly21,1995.85Iwish,ofcourse,thatthis

changeofcoursehadtakenplaceseveralweeksearlier,inwhichcaseitwouldhave

savedthelivesof8,000peopleinSrebrenica.

JOHNSHATTUCK:ApartfromtheorganizersandDavidHannay,Iamtheonly

personaroundthetablewhoattendedtheRwandaconferenceayearago.86Inboth

BosniaandRwanda,youhaveaverycomplexsetofmessages,whichessentially

serveasgreenlightstoaggressors.EventsinRwandawereshapedinpartby

decisionstakeninSomalia,asaresultoftheBlackhawkDownincident[October3-4,

1993]when18USRangerslosttheirlives.87ThedecisiontowithdrawthewholeUS

forceinSomalia[inMarch1994]served,insomerespects,asagreenlightforwhat 85SeeJohnDarnton,“AccordinLondon,”NewYorkTimes,July22,1995.TheLondonconferenceof16countriesinvolvedintheBosniawar,includingtheUnitedStates,Britain,andFrance,threatenedtheBosnianSerbswiththeuseof“substantialanddecisiveairpower”intheeventofanattackontheGoraždeandothersafeareas.NATObeganlarge-scalebombingofBosnianSerbtargetsonAugust30,twodaysaftertheshellingoftheMarkalemarketplaceinSarajevo,killing37people.86“InternationalDecision-MakingintheAgeofGenocide:Rwanda1990-1994,”Rapporteur’sReport,April6,2015.87ColinKeatingtoWellington,“SecurityCouncil:Rwanda,”NewZealandMissiontotheUN,C04408/NYK,May3,1994.

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happenedlaterinRwanda.ThereweremanyelementstotheRwandangenocide,

butunderneathitallitwasthedangerthattheinternationalcommunitywas

essentiallysendingagreenlighttotheaggressors.Ithinkweseeasimilardynamic

inBosniawithrespecttotheseeventsin1993and1994.

Bytheway,alltheseeventsaretakingplaceinthesametimeframe.The

RwandagenocidebeganinApril1994(followingtheassassinationofRwandan

presidentJuvenalHabyarimanaonApril6).Weareinthissamepost-ColdWar

framework.Deterrenceisnolongeronthetableandnegotiationanddiscussion

appeartobethemoreappropriatetoolsfordealingwiththesecasesofsmallfire

aggressionoccurringinplaceswheretheworldisfallingapartaftertheendofthe

ColdWar.Itisnotuntillaterthatweadopttheconceptofdiplomacybackedby

force.Therecognitionthatacrediblethreatofforce,orsometimestheactualuseof

force,isnecessarytoachievediplomaticobjectivesunderpinsthewholeDayton

process.Duringthis1993-1994period,Idonotthinkthethreatofforcewas

credible.GeneralSmithhasmadethatpointveryeloquently,butIwantedtoaddthe

comparativeelement.Wearedealingwithalargergeopoliticalframework

characterizedbyfailedstates,massatrocities,andevengenocide.

Theonlywaytoengageontheseissuesistoputaspotlightonthemby

gatheringtheevidencethatisneededforpeopletounderstandwhatisgoingon.I

thoughtitwasabigmistakefortheUStosidetrackitshumanrightsreportingprior

tothehorrificeventsofJuly1995.Ourembassies,particularlytheembassyin

Croatia,certainlykeptthespotlighton[humanrightsviolations],butwithalldue

respectitwasnotsufficient.USpolicymakingwasnotunderpinnedbythedaily

reportingofwhatwasactuallyhappeningonthegroundthatwouldhavebeen

neededtomobilizepublicopinionaroundtheconceptofdiplomacybackedby

force.

DIEGOARRIA:UNSCResolution836wasoneofthemostdebated.Itwasvery

controversial.AstherepresentativeofVenezuela,Iabstainedtogetherwith

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Pakistan.88Thenon-alignedgrouphadbeenthemoreenthusiasticsupportersofthe

SafeAreaconcept,butthisresolutiondidnotrespondatalltotheneedsofthe

situation.IbelievedthatwewouldhaveachievedmorebyarmingtheBosniansthan

byexpectingtheUnitedNationstodosomethingfortheBosnians.Ireadtoday

PresidentClinton’sconversationwithFrenchPresidentChirac[onJuly13,1995,

afterSrebrenicafell]inwhichheharshlycriticizestheBosniansforleaving

Srebrenicawithout“puttingupafight.”89Atthesametime,hesayswecannotarm

theBosnians.Thisexplainswhywewereagainsttheresolution.IrememberIhad

theBritishambassadorandtheFrenchambassadorinVenezuelapressingmy

ForeignMinistertoaskmetochangemyvote.Ididnotpickupthephone.Whenit

cametothevoteon836,Iabstained.

HadtheSecretariatWorkingpaperbeenadopted,weprobablywouldnot

havehadtheoutcomewedidinSrebrenica.90Thatpaperwasexactlywhatwe

wanted.IrememberenteringtheSecurityCouncilreadingthepaperandsaying,“My

god,finallywehavesomethingofsomesubstanceandimportance.”Then,allofa

sudden,itdisappeared.IthinkthatDavidHannayorJean-BernardMériméemust

havecalledBoutros-Ghaliandgothimtowithdrawthedocument,becauseit

suddenlyvanishedfromthetable.IhadalsopersonallywrittentoMadamOgata,

askinghertooutlinetherequirementsofarealSafeArea.Sheproducedadocument

alongthesamelinesastheSecretariat.Unfortunatelythiscourseofactionwasnot

adopted,whichiswhyweabstainedontheresolution.

ANDRÉERDÖS:WhenaCouncilresolutionispassedunderChapterVII,with

wordinglike"takeallnecessarymeasures,"thatwastheequivalentofthenuclear

option.Itgivesagreenlighttostrong,concreteenforcementmeasures.Wedonot

88UNGA,“ThefallofSrebrenica,”A/54/549,November15,1999.UNSCUNSCresolution836wasadoptedonJune4,1993,by13votestonone,withabstentionsfromPakistanandVenezuela.Arriaexplainedhisabstentionbypointingtoalackof“necessarymeansandresources”forimplementingtheresolutionandlackofclarityabouttheuseofforce.Hesaidthatuntilthesequestionsweresatisfactorilyanswered“thesafeareaswouldnotbesafeatall.”89AnthonyGardner&AlexanderVershbow,“TelconwithFrenchPresidentJacquesChirac,”TheWhiteHouse,July13,1995.90AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.

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alwayshavethislanguageinCouncilresolutions.Thefactthatwedidnotfollowup

onthislanguageunderminedtheimageoftheUnitedNations.

Iwasrepresentinganon-permanentmembercountry.Wewerenotevena

non-alignedcountry.Wehadjustexperiencedatransitiontowardsdemocracy,and

wereknockingonthedoorsoftheEuropeanUnionandNATO.Wewerelookingat

theseguysasourfriendsandfutureallies.Wewereinaverydifficultsituation

becauseweweretheonlycountryontheCouncil[in1993]thatreallyunderstood

Yugoslavia.LookatthemapandyouwillseehowfarHungaryisfromBosnia.We

wereveryclosetotheAustrianposition,whowerealsoontheCouncilin1992,as

partofthewesterngroup.OtherCouncilmembersreferredusas“theHapsburgs.”It

wasveryfunny.WecouldhaveimaginedtheemperorFranzJosefsaying,“Mysons,

thisiswonderful,butwhydoyouneedtwoambassadors?“

IwasfrustratedbythelackofknowledgeaboutYugoslavia,notsomuchon

thepartofVenezuela,CapeVerdeorMorocco,butonthepartofthepermanent

members.Oneofthepermanentrepresentativestoldmeinaprivateconversation

thatBosniawasa“Titoistinvention.”Another,ratherdramaticexample:In2000,

Newsweekmagazinepublishedachronologyofimportant20thcenturyevents.The

entryfor1914wasasfollows:"YugoslavarchdukeFranzFerdinandassassinatedin

Sarajevo."WeweretheonlycountryontheCouncil—Isaythisinallmodesty—who

knewwhatBosniawas,geographicallyandhistorically.91

WhentheAustro-HungarianmonarchyoccupiedandlaterannexedBosnia,it

waspartofthemonarchy.TherewerethreegovernorgeneralsinBosnia,twoof

whomwereHungarians.WhenIwenttoSrebrenicainApril1993[aspartofthe

Arriadelegation],therewasanimmediatereactionfromtherefugeeswhenIsaidI

wasfromHungary.TheyknewwhatHungarywas.Forme,itwasagiftoflifethat

91BosniaandHerzegovinabecameaProtectorateofAustria-HungaryattheCongressofBerlininJuly1878followingtheRusso-Turkishwar.IthadpreviouslybeenunderOttomanruleformorethan300years,since1463,andremainedtechnicallyundertheadministrationoftheSultan.Austria-Hungaryannexedtheterritoryoutrightin1908,enragingpan-Slavicnationalists.AfterAustria-Hungary’sdefeatinWorldWarI,BosniajoinedtheSouthSlavKingdomofSerbs,Croats,andSlovenes,whichwaslaternamedYugoslavia.AfterthevictoryofMarshalTito’sCommunistPartisansinWorldWarII,BosniaandHerzegovinabecameoneofsixrepublicsofSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia.

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wehappenedtobeontheSecurityCouncilwhenwehadthisnumberoneissueof

Yugoslaviaaroundournecks.

Thewholeissueofforciblepopulationtransfers,andtheestablishmentof

ethnicallypurehomogeneouscountries,isalethaloneforcentralandEastern

Europeeventoday,despitethefactthattwodecadeshavepassedsincethese

events.ItisapoisonousPandora’sbox.Wewerefollowingwhatwashappeningand

wereafraidoftheimplications,whichwentwaybeyondtheunfortunatecountryof

BosniatotheentireareafromtheBalticstotheMediterranean.Wecommitteda

graveerrorinnottakingtheappropriatepreventivemeasures,withthenecessary

mandatesandfinancialresources.

Atthesametime,wewerenotabigplayer.Wewerenotapermanent

memberoftheSecurityCouncil,andhadnobluehelmetsontheground,unlikethe

British,theFrench,andothers.Wedidn'twanttogointoaneighboringcountry.

Thisdidnotpreventusfromexpressingourcriticismsoutloudastothe

mismanagementoftheconflict.Wewerenotalwaysprivytothebehindthedoor

consultations.

ObradKesic,right,withDavidRohde

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OBRADKESIC:Somebodymentionedtheeffectivenessofthethreatofairstrikeson

theSerbleadershipinPale.Aswitheveryissuethatwearediscussing,thisisvery

complex.Itplayedoutindifferentwayswiththepoliticalleadershipandthe

militaryleadership.Thepoliticalleadershipwasconvincedthatthewarwouldend

throughnegotiations.Theythoughtthatany[foreign]interventionwouldupset

whattheysawasprogresstowardsasettlementtotheconflict.Asettlementof

courseinlinewithwhattheyweretryingtoachieve.

Themilitaryleadership,ontheotherhand,sawpossibleairstrikesasa

threattotheirabilitytoconductthewarsuccessfully.Theywouldtellthepolitical

leadership,“Yourindecisivenessisthreateningourtroopsandourabilitytohold

thisterritory.Weneedtotakeaction.”Thisculminateswhenthemilitary,andRatko

Mladić,askforadeclarationofwar.Theytriedtodothatseveraltimes.Thepolitical

leadershipalwaysturnedthemdown.

WespeculateabouttheBosnianarmysuccessfullylaunchingmilitary

operations[asaconsequenceofa“liftandstrike”policy],butthatisnotnecessarily

thecase.Thereisadisconnectbetweenadecisiontoarmoneofthepartiesand

theirabilitytousetheweapons.Firstofall,youwouldhaveupsethumanitarian

operations:youwouldnotbefeedingpeople.Second,theothersideisnotgoingto

passivelysitandwatchtheirenemiesbeingarmed.Suchastepwouldhaveforced

theRepublikaSrpskaleadershiptotakedecisivemilitaryaction.Itwouldhavealso

putpressureonSerbiatotakeactionaswell.“Liftandstrike”wasalittlebitofared

herring.Intheendtheonlydecisivechangetothemilitarybalanceofpowerwas

directinterventionbyNATOonthesideoftheBosnians.Nothingshortofthatwould

havechangedthemilitarybalance.Itcouldactuallyhaveledtosomethingtotally

differentthanpeoplehereareassuming.

CARLBILDT:IwasPrimeMinisterofSwedenin1993.Swedenwasnotheavily

involvedinthepoliticsofthewarinYugoslavia,butweweredeeplyaffected.We

tookroughly3,000refugeesaweekattheheightofthewar,roughlytheperiodthat

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wearespeakingaboutatthemoment.92Wehadadeepinterestinsavingpeople

downtherebecauseweknewthatwewouldhavetohelpthemelsewhere.Itwasus

andtheAustriansandtheSwiss,andtosomeextenttheGermans,thatborethe

bruntoftherefugeeinflux.Thatwasoneofthereasonswhywedecidedtocommita

mechanizedbattalion.93

WehadatraditionofUNpeacekeeping,butwehadnotbeeninsucha

complicatedsituationsincetheCongo.Wesentinamechanizedbattaliontogether

withtheDanesandNorwegians,includingLeopardtanks,whichwasvery

controversialatthetime.WeendedupinthemiddleoftheCroat-Muslimfight[in

centralBosnia]theautumnof1993.Wewereappalledbytheabsenceofany

politicalstrategy,butwefeltahumanitarianimperativedriventoacertainextentby

pressurehometodowhateverwecouldabouttherefugeesituation.

TherehassubsequentlybeenadiscussioninSweden:didwedoanygood?I

thinkwedidanawfulamountofgoodinthesensethatwesaved"x"numberof

people.Whetherwecontributedtoapoliticalsolutionisdebatablebecausethatwas

wellaboveus.Welostlivesdownthereandsavedquitealotofpeople.Wehelpedto

stabilizeTuzlaregionforthedurationofthewar.

PETERGALBRAITH:WhatObraddescribedismoreorlessmyunderstandingof

whatactuallyhappened.Bythesummerof1995,thebalanceofpowerwasshifting.

AllowingarmstogettoBosniaviaCroatiawasabetteroptionthanhavingtheUS

unilaterallylifttheembargo.IftheUShaditselfliftedtheembargoUNPROFOR

wouldhavewithdrawn.InsteadofAmericanarms,theBosniansgotRussian

weapons,whichwereweaponstheyalreadyknewhowtouse.WhiletheRussian

governmentopposedliftingthearmsembargo,thefreemarketsystemmade

RussianweaponsreadilyavailabletoBosnians.However,BosnianSerbssawtheUS

Congressmovingtowardliftingthearmsembargo.Itwasatthatpointthatthey

decidedtheyneededcleanuptheirinternallines,eliminatetheenclaves,Srebrenica,

92See“Generosityof‘BigHearted’DanesisTestedbyInfluxofRefugees,”ChristianScienceMonitor,May18,1993.93Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoResolution871(1993),”S/1994/300,March16,1994,page21.

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Žepa,GoraždeandBihać.Obradisrightthatthewaywarendedwasthroughdirect

militaryintervention,butitwasinterventionbyCroatia,notbyNATO.

DAVIDHANNAY:BeforeweendthediscussionofUNSC836,Iwantedtoecho

MinisterMuratovićinsayingthatitwasverycomprehensive.Itprovidedthelegal

basisforBoutros-GhalitoaskNATOtoissueasuccessfulultimatumoverSarajevoin

February1994.ItwasalsothebasisforthemilitaryactionagainsttheBosnian

SerbsinAugustandSeptember1995afterSrebrenicafell.Therewasneveranew

mandate.Thereneverneededtobeanewmandate.The836mandatecoveredboth

thosemilitaryoptions.Therealquestionisnotwhatwaswrongwiththe836

mandatebutwhythemandatewasnotappliedmoreforcefullyandeffectively.

Therewasnothingwrongwiththemandate.

[EndofSession1]