coping with injustice - wur edepot
TRANSCRIPT
CO
PIN
G W
ITH
IN
JUS
TIC
E
Perspectives of victims
of Hindu-Muslim violence
in Gujarat, India
GERBEN DE WITTE
Photo front page: Amit Dave / Reuters
CO
PIN
G W
ITH
IN
JUS
TIC
E
Perspectives of victims
of Hindu-Muslim violence
in Gujarat, India
MSc thesis
GERBEN DE WITTE
October 2013
Registration number 880406-967-050
Study programme MSc International Development Studies
Specialization Communication, Technology and Policy
Chair group Knowledge, Technology and Innovation
Thesis code TAD-80433
Supervisor dr. ir. Kees Jansen
[ I ]
Abstract
This thesis presents the perspectives of riot victims on the justice process after the 2002
riots in Gujarat, a state in western India. These riots, organized by Hindu right-wing forces
with complicity of the state government, were mainly one-sided attacks on Muslims. The
justice process after the riots has been protracted: judicial systems have failed to bring
justice, and Muslims have experienced increasing discrimination and segregation.
This study – based on interviews and observations in Ahmedabad, Gujarat’s largest city –
looks at the way Muslim riot victims deal with this situation of injustice, and what their
perspective on the concept of justice is. Findings suggest that riot victims often associate
the concept of justice with rectificatory justice. Although they are aware of other types of
justice that might be relevant to them, they have only pursued justice through the judicial
system. This has a lot to do with their limited ability to pursue justice, due to the
circumstances they live in. Being dependent on the Hindu majority for their position in
society, Muslims fear that pursuing justice might negatively affect their living situation.
Additionally, they often experience other pressing issues that need their attention, and
therefore pursuing justice is not their main priority. Both this fear and pressing current
issues lead riot victims to accept the status quo: a society in which they have
disadvantaged position.
Furthermore, this research has identified three coping strategies that riot victims use to
deal with the situation of injustice they live in: turning to religion, maintaining relations
with Hindu neighbours out of self-protection, and seeking safety in numbers. The latter
two strategies are specifically employed in different neighbourhoods, due to the different
social and political contexts in those areas that shape the way riot victims deal with
injustice.
[ II ]
[ III ]
“India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different religions live in it.
The introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the nation, they merge in it. A
country is one nation only when such a condition obtains in it. That country must have a
faculty for assimilation, India has ever been such a country. In reality there are as many
religions as there are individuals, but those who are conscious of the spirit of nationality do
not interfere with one another's religion. If they do, they are not fit to be considered a nation.
If the Hindus believe that India should be peopled only by Hindus, they are living in
dreamland. The Hindus, the Mohammedans, the Parsees and the Christians who have made
India their country are fellow countrymen, and they will have to live in unity, if only for their
own interest. In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous terms;
nor has it ever been so in India.”
Mahatma Gandhi, 1909
cited from Parel (1997, pp. 52-53)
[ IV ]
[ V ]
Contents
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... I
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................... VII
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 The 2002 riots ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Current situation ............................................................................................................................ 3
1.3 This research ................................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 Thesis structure ............................................................................................................................. 4
2 HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ............................................... 7
2.1 History of riots in Gujarat ........................................................................................................... 7
2.1.1 Communalism ................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1.2 Communal violence in Gujarat ................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Theories of justice ....................................................................................................................... 13
2.2.1 Transitional justice ...................................................................................................................... 13
2.2.2 Categorizations of justice .......................................................................................................... 14
2.2.3 Application of theory .................................................................................................................. 15
3 METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 17
3.1 Background of the research ..................................................................................................... 17
3.2 Ahmedabad, a divided city ....................................................................................................... 18
3.3 Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 19
3.3.1 Interviews ........................................................................................................................................ 20
3.3.2 Participant observation ............................................................................................................. 21
3.3.3 Triangulation and reflection .................................................................................................... 21
3.3.4 Data analysis ................................................................................................................................... 21
3.4 Ethics ................................................................................................................................................ 22
3.5 Problems ......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.5.1 Language .......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.5.2 Access ................................................................................................................................................ 25
[ VI ]
4 TALKING ABOUT JUSTICE ....................................................................................... 27
4.1 Facts and opinions ....................................................................................................................... 27
4.1.1 Fear of expressing opinions ..................................................................................................... 28
4.1.2 Not able to express opinions .................................................................................................... 30
4.2 Daily survival ................................................................................................................................. 30
4.3 Meaning of justice ........................................................................................................................ 32
4.3.1 Naroda Patiya judgment ............................................................................................................ 34
4.3.2 Jamalpuri Peace Committee ..................................................................................................... 35
5 COPING WITH INJUSTICE......................................................................................... 37
5.1 Coping strategies .......................................................................................................................... 37
5.2 Gomtipur and Jamalpur: self-protection ............................................................................. 39
5.3 Juhapura: safety in numbers .................................................................................................... 42
5.4 Religion as a coping strategy ................................................................................................... 45
5.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 46
6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 49
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 53
APPENDIX – LIST OF FIELD NOTES .............................................................................. 57
[ VII ]
Glossary of terms and
abbreviations
Bajrang Dal The militant youth wing of the VHP.
Bandh A strike whereby businesses and industry are forced to close to
protest a certain issue.
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (lit.: Indian People’s Party), a right-wing
Hindu nationalist party.
FIR First Information Report, a written document prepared by the
police after someone files a complaint.
Hindutva Lit.: ‘Hinduness’, a right-wing political ideology that promotes
Hindu nationalism. It seeks to define Indian culture in Hindu
values, and strongly propagates a Hindu Rashtra, a Hindu state.
KHAM An abbreviation for Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and Muslims,
four social groups defined by their position in and in relation to
the Indian caste system. The KHAM groups are considered to be
an important electoral vote bank in Gujarat.
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (lit.: National Volunteer Corps),
an Indian right-wing organization that strives towards a Hindu
Rashtra (Hindu Nation) in India.
Sangh Parivar Lit.: ‘Family of Associations’, the umbrella organization of all
Hindu nationalist organizations, among which the RSS, VHP and
BJP.
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad (lit.: World Hindu Council) is an
organization that promotes Hinduism throughout the world,
through religious and social programmes.
[ VIII ]
[ 1 ]
chapter 1
1 Introduction
When riot victims memorize their experiences of the 2002 riots that swept through
Gujarat, a state in western India, you can see the pain and grieve in their eyes. The violence
of that period is deeply engraved in people’s minds and still shapes daily life of many. To
better understand the events of 2002 and its aftermath, this chapter introduces the topic.
1.1 THE 2002 RIOTS
On February 27, 2002 the Sabermati Express left Godhra railway station. Just minutes
after departure, one of the carriages caught fire and was burned to ashes, taking the lives
of 58 passengers. The train carried a large group of activists of the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh1 (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad2 (VHP), two right-wing Hindu
organizations which had been in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh to campaign for the construction
1 The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (lit.: National Volunteer Corps) is an Indian right-wing organization that strives towards a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu Nation) in India (Berenschot, 2011a). 2 The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (lit.: World Hindu Council) is an organization that promotes Hinduism throughout the world, through religious and social programmes (Berenschot, 2011a).
[ 2 ]
of a Hindu temple on the site of an old Muslim mosque, the Babri Masjid. Of the victims of
the Godhra train burning, over 30 have been identified as Hindu activists (Varadarajan,
2002a).
It remains unclear whether the train carriage caught fire from the inside, or whether it
was lit from the outside (Berenschot, 2011a). Gujarat’s ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, promoted the latter interpretation, as Gujarat’s
Chief Minister Narendra Modi stated that the Godhra train burning was a pre-planned act
of terrorism performed by Muslims under direct orders of Pakistan and the ‘jihadi
mentality’. Quoting Newton’s law of physics – every action has an equal and opposite
reaction – Modi stated that the action of Muslims at Godhra provoked a reaction from
Hindus (Berenschot, 2011a; Jaffrelot, 2003; Varadarajan, 2002a).
In the subsequent days, weeks and months, communal violence swept through the state of
Gujarat. Starting in Ahmedabad and Godhra, the rioting soon spread to other cities like
Ghandinagar, Vadodara and Baruch, as well as rural areas, and continued for four months
(Berenschot, 2011a; Jaffrelot, 2003). This outbreak of communal violence has been one of
the most deadly of post-partition India. Berenschot (2011a) argues that the 2002 riots are
exceptional in their nature, because of five aspects: the scale of the violence (in number of
casualties and injured, as well as geographical spread), the one-sidedness of the violence
(mainly Hindu mobs raiding against Muslims), the open complicity of the state, the
extreme cruelty of the perpetrated acts, and the absence of remorse.
Official figures suggest that 1,054 people have been killed during the riots, and around
2,500 have been injured (Berenschot, 2011b). However, some accounts state that around
2,000 people have been killed, based on the number of people reported missing and likely
underestimations of the government (Berenschot, 2011a; Human Rights Watch, 2002;
Yagnik & Sheth, 2005). Over 200,000 people fled to refugee camps, and a recent survey by
the NGO Janvikas (2012) shows that still over 16,000 people are living in these camps.
Words like ‘carnage’, ‘massacre’, ‘pogrom’ and ‘genocide’ have been used to describe the
violence that swept through Gujarat in 2002 (Berenschot, 2011a; Varadarajan, 2002b).
These words all describe the events in their own way, highlighting certain parts of what
happened. Social activists as well as scholars have argued that the term riots does not
cover the nature of the violence, as it implies a more or less spontaneous outburst of
violence. As the 2002 Gujarat violence was pre-planned and coordinated, terms like
[ 3 ]
pogrom or genocide would be more suitable (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012). However, as the
2002 violence is commonly referred to as riots and because they are a part of a history of
communal violence throughout South Asia, I will continue the word ‘riot(s)’ throughout
this thesis.
1.2 CURRENT SITUATION
Today, ten years after ‘Gujarat 2002’, the communal tensions remain present, especially in
the poorer and underdeveloped areas of the state. The fighting has stopped, but the
underlying structures of inequality are still present. Next to that, none or only little justice
has been done to the victims of the riots. Of the large number of cases brought before
court, only few have been closed, and most of these are cases in which Hindus were the
victims (Jaffrelot, 2012). As Berenschot (2011a, p. 21) puts it, “It seems that riot cases are
still only adequately pursued once they are moved to courts outside Gujarat”, on the basis of
Supreme Court intervention. Official inquiries after the 2002 Gujarat violence – the
Supreme Court’s Special Investigation and the state-appointed Nanavati Commission –
have not finished any of the reports filed (as of 2010; Berenschot, 2011a).
Additionally, victims of the 2002 violence have become reluctant to pursue their struggle
for justice, as this endangers their own safety. Stories of the intimidation and harassment
of witnesses in trials are not uncommon, e.g. in the Best Bakery Case, where the only
survivor of a mob attack is repeatedly intimidated and bribed to conceal the truth (c.f.
Kapur, 2006). Such examples show that the struggle for justice in Gujarat has been, and
still is a long and arduous process.
1.3 THIS RESEARCH
This short introduction shows that the 2002 Gujarat riots have left many people
victimized and without proper justice. The difficult and protracted justice process in
Gujarat is the focus of this research. It is interesting to see how people deal with this: do
people seek justice? Why do they (not) seek justice? How do they do this? What motivates
them to seek justice, ten years after the riots? And how does the slow justice process
influence their motivation and actions? These are aspects of the daily life of riot victims
that have hardly been researched up to now. In this research, the concept of ‘justice
process’ not only refers to processes of criminal justice or legal justice, but also other types
of justice that have to do with reconciliation and distributive issues, as will be further
[ 4 ]
explained in the theoretical framework (Chapter 2). This research will deal with these
issues using the following research question:
How do riot victims in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, deal with the protracted justice process
after the 2002 riots?
This research question will be answered by looking at the experiences, perspectives and
motivations of riot victims in seeking justice. This is done through interviewing them as
well as gathering other information during fieldwork in Ahmedabad – with nearly six
million people the largest city of Gujarat, and fifth largest city of India.
The nature of the topic of this research is very interdisciplinary, and as such the research
borrows from a variety of scientific disciplines, like history, law, conflict studies, religious
studies and psychology. Although all these disciplines provided input for this research, the
study is mainly based on anthropological and ethnographical methods. Through these
methods, this research is able to provide a bottom-up view on the justice process that has
taken place in Gujarat.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
The next chapter will present a historical and conceptual framework. The 2002 riots are
parts of a larger history of Hindu-Muslim conflict, and the overview presented will help
put these events into context. The second part of this chapter will present theoretical
perspectives on the concept of justice, which will be used in the analysis of the gathered
field data.
Chapter 3 will go into detail on the methodological issues related to the research done for
this thesis. It will describe the research field and the informants, discusses the research
methods that have been used, and deals with problems that have occurred during the
fieldwork period. As this research focuses on highly contentious issues in a setting
previously unknown to the researcher, the role of the researcher will also be reflected
upon.
The fourth chapter will start with describing the data gathered during the fieldwork
period and will elaborate on the way people talk about justice, and how this relates to
their actions. The slow and complex nature of the justice process in Gujarat is strongly
reflected in people’s opinions and perspectives. This chapter argues that the way people
[ 5 ]
talk about justice is influenced by their social and economic status, and elaborates on the
meaning people give to the concept of justice.
Following up on the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter goes in to detail on how people cope
with injustice and the aftermath of the 2002 riots. Stories from two different
neighbourhoods of Ahmedabad will be discussed, which reveal different coping strategies
that people use to deal with injustices. Additionally, a third, common, coping strategy of
riot victims is presented.
A final chapter will combine all findings discussed in previous chapters to present some
conclusions regarding the research question.
[ 6 ]
[ 7 ]
chapter 2
2 Historical and conceptual
frameworks
To put the research question more into context and to develop a starting point for the
research on the justice process, a guiding framework has been developed. This framework
consists of two parts. The first is a historical overview of riots in Gujarat, which deals with
topics as communalism and the politicization of riots. The second framework will
elaborate on the concept of justice, and present theoretical notions that will be used in the
coming chapters.
2.1 HISTORY OF RIOTS IN GUJARAT
The 2002 Gujarat riots cannot be seen in isolation. It is not a stand-alone incident, but part
of a history of communal violence, in Gujarat as well as in the whole of India. To better
understand the events that took place in 2002, we need to look into this history.
[ 8 ]
2.1.1 COMMUNALISM
Although violence between ethnic and religious groups took place in the Indian
subcontinent long before the Partition of India in 1947, its nature has changed due to the
independence of India. As British India was divided among religious lines into India and
Pakistan (the latter later split into Pakistan and Bangladesh), these newly created borders
also created a Muslim minority in Hindu-dominated India, as well as a Hindu minority in
Muslim-dominated Pakistan. On both sides of the borders, minorities have been the victim
of ‘communal’ violence ever since (Berenschot, 2011a; Tambiah, 1996).
The term ‘communalism’ has a specific connotation in the context of South Asia. During the
time of the British Raj, the term was introduced and used with regard to all kinds of
tensions between religious, linguistic, regional or racial groups. It has been argued that the
British used the communal divisions (mainly the Hindu-Muslim divide) as a narrative to
explain all incidents of violence in the Raj, regardless of whether or not communalism was
part of the issue (Tambiah, 1996). This practice did not only take place in India, but also in
other British colonies, for example in Africa (cf. Christopher, 1988; Flint & Taylor, 2007).
As such, they kept the Indian people divided in their own communities, and were able to
effectively govern the subcontinent. This ‘divide-and-rule’ tactic has brought a mindset to
the subcontinent that remained long after the British left India.
After Indian Independence, this instrumental use of communal divides continued in
politics. As Tambiah (1996, p. 25) states it: “communalist politics, which involves political
parties and organizations, especially espousing religious and caste and linguistic claims
allegedly on behalf of their respective masses, is best understood as the instrumental and self-
serving pastime of upper-middle-class and mobile entrepreneurial elites, who stand most to
gain by riding to power on this electoral platform”. Looking into the instances of communal
violence in India, and especially in Gujarat, they can all be linked to certain political
struggles and often a political party has had benefit from the violence. Using examples of
communal violence in Gujarat, section 2.1.2 will elaborate on this by showing that riots
were often a result of political struggles, as much as an instrument in these struggles.
Although the political aspect of communal violence is a very important one, there are
certainly other processes (such as communicational, mobilizational, and semiotic) that
need to be taken into account that explain how and why a collective identity (e.g. religion,
ethnicity, language) appeals to and mobilizes the masses to participate in collective
actions, and – in the extreme case – collective violence (Tambiah, 1996). These are
[ 9 ]
complex processes that have to do with social, economic and political issues, and they
differ per instance of communal violence. This will also be explained in detail in the next
paragraph, by looking at various instances of communal violence in Gujarat.
2.1.2 COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN GUJARAT
The communal violence of 2002 was not something new for Gujarat. The state has seen
major outbreaks of violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002, with various incidents in between
these events. An overview of these events will be given below, as to show the nature of
communal violence, the relevant underlying social and economic processes, and the way
the violence has been politicized.
1969 riots
The first major outbreak of communal violence in Gujarat took place in September and
October 1969. Before that time Ahmedabad was not known to be a communally sensitive
city. This changed during the 1960s, when the textile industry attracted many immigrants
from other states. These immigrants mainly settled in slum areas in eastern Ahmedabad.
However, during the same period, the growth of the textile industry stagnated, and many
mill workers became unemployed. The largest group of workers that were laid off were
Dalits (outcastes, will be explained in the following section), while many Muslims kept
their jobs as they were considered more skilled in the craft of weaving. This led to clashes
between Dalits and Muslims in Ahmedabad’s slums (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012; Shani, 2007).
But it is not just socio-economic factors that caused the 1969 riots. The RSS had
established local strongholds in the industrial areas of Ahmedabad, and targeted mainly
the Dalit population with their Hindu nationalist propaganda. Furthermore, two relatively
small incidents almost triggered a wave of communal violence. The first, in March 1969,
was a Hindu policeman who made a copy of the Quran fall on the ground, while moving a
handcart stacked with books that had been obstructing traffic. The second, in September
1969, was a Muslim policeman who accidentally dropped a copy of the Ramayana in a
crowd watching a re-enactment of Lord Ram. Both incidents let to protests from the
respective communities, and RSS responded to the latter by forming the Hindu Dharma
Raksha Samiti, meaning ‘Committee for the protection of the Hindu religion’. This
committee organized anti-Muslim protests and rallies. A final spark came when a cow
belonging to a Hindu temple obstructed a Muslim procession. Muslims started protests at
the Hindu temple and soon the fighting started. Hindu nationalist forces orchestrated
attacks on Muslim-dominated localities in the Old City and the industrial areas of eastern
[ 10 ]
Ahmedabad. The atrocities included massacre, arson and looting. In subsequent weeks,
660 people were killed, more than a thousand were injured and over 48,000 lost their
property. It was the largest incident of Hindu-Muslim violence since Partition (Gayer &
Jaffrelot, 2012).
The history of the 1969 riots shows that in a tense environment, created by socio-
economic (unemployment) and political (propagation of Hindu nationalism) factors, small
incidents such as a holy book falling on the ground can cause major violent outbreaks.
What is remarkable is that Hindu nationalist forces managed to set Dalits up against
Muslims. These two groups had previously lived and worked together in harmony, due to
their common low social status. This process of separating the Dalits and Muslims is
continued after the 1969, and eventually led to the 1981 and 1985 riots.
The 1981 and 1985 anti-reservation agitations
In the early eighties of the previous century, two
large periods of riots took place in Gujarat. The
origins of these riots lie in the so-called anti-
reservation protests. During the 1970s, the Congress
government in Gujarat adopted the KHAM policy.
KHAM stands for Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis and
Muslims, four social groups defined by their position
in and in relation to the Indian caste system (see
Figure 1). Kshatriyas are the warrior caste, which is a
higher caste, but in Gujarat not considered that
prominent due to the influence of the Patels, which is an influential farmer’s and landlord’s
group part of the Vaisyas caste. Harijans, literally ‘Children of God’, is the name Mahatma
Gandhi gave to the Dalits: Hindus outside of the caste system. The last two groups are also
outside of the caste system: Adivasis, the tribal people from various religious backgrounds
living in the countryside, and the Muslims. This KHAM ´block´ makes up the majority of the
Gujarati votes and was therefore used as an electoral strategy by the Congress Party. They
implemented various kinds of benefits for these social groups, such as reservations: a
policy of affirmative action in which a percentage of government jobs and resources are
reserved for people from certain castes, religious or other social groups (Gayer & Jaffrelot,
2012).
Dalits or Harijans
Adivasis or Tribals
Religious minorities
Vaisyas
Sudras
Brahmins
Kshatriyas
CA
STES
O
UT-
CA
STES
Figure 1: Indian caste system (the Patel group is not in this figure, as it is part of the Vaisyas caste)
[ 11 ]
The growing number of reservations for the KHAM block was met with opposition from
higher caste Hindus, amongst others the historically dominant Patel group. When in 1981
Solanki, then Chief Minister of Gujarat, proposed new quotas in favour of Dalits, upper
caste Hindus protested in the streets, which led to clashes between them and Dalits.
Muslims aided the Dalits during these riots as their social allies (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012;
Yagnik & Sheth, 2005).
In 1985, the same events were somewhat repeated. Weeks before state elections, Solanki
announced new quotas for the KHAM block. And again, upper caste Hindus attacked Dalits
in response. But this time the events took a different course. Solanki bowed to social
pressure and denounced the reservations, but instead of stopping the rioting, the Sangh
Parivar3 launched new attacks but this time on Muslims. As the earlier anti-reservation
riots had damaged Hindu unity, the RSS created a common enemy for both upper castes
and Dalits: the Muslim community. The planned nature of the riots was clearly shown as
the police fought side by side with Hindu forces, and only Muslim houses were attacked
and burned (Hindu houses were marked ‘Hindu’ in white). Rioting again limited itself to
Muslim localities in the Old City and eastern Ahmedabad. Official reports state that 220
people were killed, and over 12,000 became homeless (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012).
After the 1985 riots, Muslims have been socially totally isolated, specifically because they
lost their only ally, the Dalits. This is the result of an effective strategy of the RSS and other
Hindu right-wing forces. They successfully managed to turn the anti-reservation
agitations, which were essentially a Hindu intra-caste issue, into a communal issue
between Hindus and Muslims. In this way, Hindu unity was restored, and the Hindu right-
wing forces effectively marginalized Muslims socially, economically and politically.
2002 riots
As the descriptions of previous riots have shown, political motives have shaped communal
violence in such a way that Muslims are marginalized in Gujarati society. Taking this as a
starting point, the 2002 riots can be seen as an act to finish what the previous riots started.
Or as Gayer and Jaffrelot (2012, p. 57) state it: “a state sponsored pogrom to ‘clean’ the
Hindu Rashtra”.
The violence in 2002 started after the train burning at Godhra station on February 27th, as
explained in the previous chapter. One day after the incident in Godhra, various Hindu
3 The Sangh Parivar (Family of Associations) is the umbrella organization of all Hindu nationalist organizations, among which the RSS, VHP and BJP.
[ 12 ]
right-wing organizations had already alleged Muslims were to blame, and the VHP called
for a bandh (strike). This bandh turned into the worst incident of communal violence ever
seen in Gujarat, which was explained by the Sangh Parivar as a retaliation by the Hindu
masses for the Godhra incident. The violence lased for a period of four months, although
the most intense rioting took place during the first week (Berenschot, 2011a; Yagnik &
Sheth, 2005).
Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat and leader of the BJP, advocated the notion that
the violence in Gujarat was a logical reaction to the events at Godhra and that people
started fighting due to the general sentiment that Muslims were behind the attack. While
he and other politicians promoted this view, all evidence shows that the violence was not
that random, but rather a pre-planned and organized event that was coordinated by Hindu
nationalist forces, among which the BJP that governed the state (Berenschot, 2011a). Mobs
of up to 10,000 men systematically attacked Muslim shops and houses, and were
transported between neighbourhoods by trucks, carrying weapons and bottles of water
for the rioters. The mobs were often led by activists from the RSS, which had lists of the
names and places of Muslim properties. This shows the pre-planned nature of the
violence, as thorough investigation would be needed to create such lists (Gayer & Jaffrelot,
2012; Human Rights Watch, 2002).
Evidence that the state was involved in the organization and execution of the 2002 riots is
also shown by many sources. A report of the Human Rights Watch (2002) goes into detail
on the role of the police and military forces in the riots. When Muslims appealed to the
police forces for help, they were often rejected with responses like: “We don’t have any
orders to save you” or “We cannot help you, we have orders from above” (Human Rights
Watch, 2002, p. 5). The state government undertook no actions to intervene in the rioting.
Several army divisions were stationed in Ahmedabad during the riots, but none of them
were deployed to intervene and stop the rioting (Jaffrelot, 2003). All this evidence points
to the state involvement in the 2002 riots and the state’s failure to protect the Muslim
minority during this period. However, up till now no high level officials – let alone
Narendra Modi himself – has been held accountable for the riots, for a large part due to the
influence of Hindu right-wing forces on the judicial system in Gujarat (Jaffrelot, 2012).
[ 13 ]
2.2 THEORIES OF JUSTICE
As this research deals with the justice process after the 2002 riots, the concept of justice
needs to be further defined. The United Nations defines justice as “an ideal of
accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention
and punishment of wrongs” (United Nations, 2004, p. 4). This definition shows the many
facets of justice: accountability, equality, protection, punishment, etc. The concept deals
not only with a situation in which justice needs to be done after wrongdoings, but also
with the prevention of such wrongdoings, and with the protection of equal rights for all.
Although this broad view on justice forms the basis of this research, specific attention will
be given to ‘justice after wrongs’. In the case of conflicts, this is often dubbed transitional
justice.
2.2.1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Transitional justice can be defined as “the full range of processes and mechanisms
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United
Nations, 2004, p. 4). According to the United Nations, it can have several components, e.g.
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, differing levels of international involvement,
individual prosecutions, truth-seeking, and institutional reform. While this definition of
transitional justice is comprehensive, actual justice processes need to be adapted to the
specific circumstances in each case.
Justice processes in post-conflict settings are often being defined in a top-down manner,
based on the views of governments, the international communities or NGOs. In recent
years, a growing number of scholars have argued that transitional justice should not be
defined top-down, but rather bottom-up (cf. Lundy & McGovern, 2008; Robins, 2012; Uvin,
2009; Waldorf, 2006). As Lundy and McGovern (2008) argue, international views on
transitional justice are often not shared by the community in which they are implemented.
Therefore, “the values and ideas informing justice may need to be articulated within and by
each community, based on its specific realities and needs” (Lundy & McGovern, 2008, p.
274). This implies that a bottom-up view of what defines justice is needed, which is one of
the focus points of this research as well.
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2.2.2 CATEGORIZATIONS OF JUSTICE
While developing a bottom-up view of justice, it is important to have a guiding framework
on the various components that might constitute justice for riot victims. This research
uses the categorizations of Rama Mani and Nancy Fraser as a contextual framework with
which riot victim’s view can be interpreted.
Rama Mani (2005) describes three components of social justice: rectificatory justice, legal
justice and distributive justice. Rectificatory justice refers to the rectification of the direct
consequences of conflict, i.e. the abuses committed. Legal justice refers to the restoration
of the rule of law, as the absence of the rule of law is often a symptom of conflict. The third
component, distributive justice refers to the “structural and systemic injustices and
distributive inequalities that frequently underlie the causes of conflict” (Mani, 2005, p. 26).
Mani argues that this last component is often overlooked in the transitional justice debate,
but is essential in creating sustainable peace. This means a shift from focusing on the
consequences of conflict (rectificatory justice), to a more holistic view on justice, including
also the causes of conflict (distributive justice).
Another way of defining types of (in)justice is proposed by Nancy Fraser. She defines the
concept of justice as parity of participation, meaning that “justice requires social
arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser, 2007, p. 20). She
identifies three obstacles for participation, which represent the three dimensions of
justice: maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation. Maldistribution, the
economic dimension, refers to economic structures that deny people the resources to fully
participate in social life, including exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation.
It can also be named distributive injustice. Misrecognition refers to the cultural dimension.
This is the case when people are denied participation on the basis of cultural values, e.g.
through cultural domination, disrespect and non-recognition. While the first dimension
refers to class structures, the second concerns the status order in society, and therefore
can also be called status inequality. The last dimension, misrepresentation, is a political
one, referring to issues of membership and procedures. It concerns who is allowed in
(political) decision making processes, and is in fact about inclusion and exclusion. Fraser
defines it as “when political boundaries and/or decision rules function to wrongly deny some
people the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction – including,
but not only, in political arenas” (2007, p. 21). The political dimension of misrepresentation
is often intertwined with the other types of injustice. Fraser also argues that the other
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types of injustices cannot be overcome without overcoming the political injustice, thus:
“no redistribution or recognition without representation” (2007, p. 23).
2.2.3 APPLICATION OF THEORY
The frameworks of Mani and Fraser presented above will be guiding in analysing the
perspectives of riot victims on the concept of justice. The statements riot victims make on
issues of justice and what the concept means to them, will give insight in how they define
justice. Such statements will be classified using the categorizations of Mani and Fraser, as
to identify specific aspects of justice that riot victims deem important. Chapter 4 will deal
with this application of theory to the gathered data.
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[ 17 ]
chapter 3
3 Methodology
This chapter will explain the background of the research, how it was set up, what methods
have been used, and what problems have occurred during the research.
3.1 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH
This research has been set up in cooperation with six NGOs working in Gujarat. I came into
contact with these NGOs through an internship I did at Mensen met een Missie, a Dutch co-
funding agency working (amongst others) on peace and reconciliation issues. The NGOs in
Gujarat are all partner organizations of Mensen met een Missie, which means they are
supported (financially and substantively) by this organization. The names of the six NGOs
are: Centre for Development, Darshan, IPSCR, SAFAR, SXSSS, and Utthan. The NGOs all
work with riot victims from different perspectives and backgrounds.
The topic and set up of the research were designed by myself, with limited feedback from
some of the NGOs in Gujarat. During the first week of the fieldwork period, I visited all the
NGOs to explain my research to them and ask them for more feedback. This helped me in
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materializing the research activities, as they gave me suggestions of people to talk to and
places to visit, as well as practical help. In the end, I mainly used the contacts of three
NGOs to gain access to the field, as will be explained in section 3.5.2.
The research was set up mainly with the goal of writing a thesis about it, which would
allow me to graduate. Additionally, I tried to make this research practical in the sense that
the findings should be useful for the NGOs working on issues of justice and reconciliation
in Gujarat, and maybe elsewhere.
3.2 AHMEDABAD, A DIVIDED CITY
The fieldwork for this research has been performed in the months August and September
of 2012 in the city of Ahmedabad. Ahmedabad is the largest city of Gujarat and its
economical capital (Gandhinagar being its official political capital). It has a population of
nearly six million people, which makes it the fifth largest city of India (Census of India,
2011). Ahmedabad is a city with a relatively large Muslim minority: 12 per cent of the
population (Sachar et al., 2006). This minority is very much present in the city’s culture
and street life, although this is also specifically concentrated in certain areas. The city of
Ahmedabad is sometimes described as two separate cities, divided by the Sabermati River.
The Old Walled City is located on the eastern bank of the river and consists of a mixed
Hindu-Muslim population. Around the Old City are numerous small neighbourhoods each
with their own specific social group (caste, class, religion). On the western side of the
Sabermati River lies the New City, a more modern city with broad tree-lined streets and
high-rise buildings. This area is mainly inhabited by (middle and higher class) Hindus.
Muslims are often excluded from these neighbourhoods by either the government and
politicians or project developers and landlords (Janmohamed, 2012). Next to the divide
between eastern and western Ahmedabad, there is a third entity: Juhapura, or ‘Mini
Pakistan’. This area on the south-western outskirts of the city consists almost totally of
Muslims, who moved there after one of the episodes of riots that Ahmedabad experienced
during the last century.
The divisions between the eastern and western parts of the city shape all social life of the
Ahmedabadis, as Muslims live, work, go to school and shop in Muslim localities, while
Hindus reside and go to Hindu localities. Even in the so-called mixed neighbourhoods of
eastern Ahmedabad, one can see the patterns of segregation: separate Muslim and Hindu
housing blocks make up a ‘mixed’ neighbourhood.
[ 19 ]
During the fieldwork I experienced this strong segregation as I moved around the city for
field visits and interviews. While the campus I stayed at was located in Navrangpura, a
modern neighbourhood in the western part of Ahmedabad, many of my field visits were in
areas which were either mixed Hindu-Muslim, or largely Muslim dominated areas. The
dividing lines were easily recognizable: sometimes a physical structure like a large road or
an old gate, but always a difference in appearance such as housing structures or people’s
clothing. Apart from these visible boundaries, I also experienced the divisions for example
when trying getting a rickshaw ride to a certain neighbourhood. One time I wanted to go
to Juhapura, it took me over 20 minutes to fetch a ride. Hindu rickshaw drivers who work
in the Navrangpura area are reluctant to take someone to Juhapura, not necessarily out of
fear, but because for them it might be hard to find a customer who wants to take a ride
with them back to Navrangpura. As one can understand, research in a society as divided as
Ahmedabad’s is not easy, if only because of practical considerations. When it comes to
content and methods of the research, there were even more hurdles to take.
3.3 METHODS
As this research is done to gain insight into the perspectives of riot victims and the way
they deal with the protracted justice process, the methods used in this study are
qualitative in nature. The research strategy is largely based on ethnography, as it offers a
methodology for research that can describe and interpret the perspectives of riot victims
on the concept of justice. This study specifically aimed to better understand the meaning
and function of the actions of riot victims, as well as the limitations they experience as part
of their institutional environment. This is done by studying riot victims´ actions and the
beliefs and values that are central to these actions – basic principles of ethnographic
research (Green & Thorogood, 2009; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). During my stay in
Ahmedabad, I have participated as much as possible in the lives of riot victims, and
gathered all kinds of information that might be relevant for answering the research
question. During the fieldwork period, I kept in mind the way O'Reilly (2005) describes
ethnographic methods: they are similar to the way we make sense of the world around us
in our daily lives, although treated systematically and with scientific rigor.
The following sections will elaborate further on the specific methods used during this
research, and explain how the gathered data has been analysed.
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3.3.1 INTERVIEWS
The most logical method for data collection for this research was interviews. It is a method
which can elicit a lot of background information on the studied topic, and gives room for
the interviewee to elaborate on their accounts of the issue (Green & Thorogood, 2009).
The interviews that I have performed were semi-structured: I had a list of questions and
topics which I wanted to discuss with the respondents. This way of interviewing offered
sufficient structure to the conversations, but also a lot of flexibility to discuss interesting
topics that came up while talking. I have tried to conduct the interviews in a largely
informal manner, which means that most of the interviews looked more like casual
conversations than formal question-answer interviews. One of the main reasons for me to
take this approach was that the topic of conversation can be a sensitive one, which can
make people reluctant to talk about their experiences, perceptions and opinions. As
Druckman (2005) suggests, the only way to elicit such sensitive information is by gaining
trust and building rapport. Setting an informal atmosphere helped in gaining trust from
the respondents. This is also why I always presented myself as ‘someone who is interested
in their stories as a researcher and as a person’. This humble attitude made people more
open to tell their stories.
During the fieldwork, I have performed different types of interviews. First of all, I
interviewed ‘experts’ on the 2002 riots. Examples of respondents of this type of interview
are the directors and/or social workers of the NGOs I was working with, as well as two
researchers who have been studying this topic. These interviews were mainly at the
beginning of my fieldwork period. I used these interviews to get familiar with the context
and gain a lot of background information, as well as to find possibilities to gain access to
the subjects of my research: riot victims. Towards the end of my research, I also discussed
my findings with several of the people I had interviewed before, as to put the findings into
context. This has been very useful, as it shaped the arguments I will present in this thesis.
The second type of interviews is the interviews with riot victims. I have held 14 individual
interviews and five group interviews. The group interviews were not always planned, as in
some cases a women’s group was gathering in a field office where I happened to be. These
opportunistic interviews often offered a lot of interesting information, as the group
members would not just answer my question, but they also discussed amongst each other.
The individual interviews were mostly one-on-one conversations, but in some cases a
family member joined in during the conversation. The information gathered in the
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interviews with riot victims were used to answer the research question, and to develop
the arguments presented in this thesis.
The sample of interviewed riot victims is based on convenience sampling. As it was often
difficult to arrange field visits, I took every opportunity to interview riot victims. As such, I
cannot assume that this sample is representative for all riot victims in Ahmedabad.
However, the discussions with experts on my findings have asserted that the arguments I
make in this thesis are relevant for the discussion on justice after the 2002 riots.
Furthermore, as the aim of this research is to detect processes, relationships and patterns
regarding riot victims and the way they deal with justice, the outcomes of this case study
might provide relevant information for other cases as well.
3.3.2 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
Another method used in this research is participant observation. During the fieldwork in
Ahmedabad, I have visited several meetings of riot victims. Although I planned to visit
these kinds of meetings as a way to gain more information by involving with the
participants, this proved to be more difficult than expected. In most cases, I was not more
than a bystander. With the help of a translator I could gather information during these
meetings. Whether this can be seen as participant observation is dubious, as I did not
really participate in the activities, but it did give me better understanding of the life worlds
and perspectives of the riot victims.
3.3.3 TRIANGULATION AND REFLECTION
During the fieldwork period I have often reflected on the gathered data with various
people. In some cases, I have used gathered data as input for new interviews, and in this
way my respondents helped me to reflect on the data and to put it into context. Next to
this ‘cross-examination’ of data, I also often reflected on findings with fellow researchers
and people from the NGOs I worked with. A big advantage of this was that many of these
people had a lot of experience in working with riot victims and could therefore often
answer questions I had about the gathered information. Sometimes these discussions also
gave me suggestions for things to discuss with respondents, or for people who might be
interesting for me to interview.
3.3.4 DATA ANALYSIS
The information gathered during the fieldwork consists of interview notes, observations
and reflections on field visits. After a field visit, I transcribed my notes the same day or
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sometimes the day after. As I did not record the interviews with a voice recorder, the
transcriptions of the interviews are not verbatim. Sometimes I was able to jot down the
exact words people used, sometimes only the sentiment of what they were saying. As a
result, the quotes used in this thesis may not always represent the exact words people
used, but give a general idea of their opinion or experience.
The gathered information was inserted into a data analysis software package, called Weft
QDA. This software allowed me to assign codes to parts of the data, and later easily find
this information. The data was analysed using basic principles of grounded theory: open
coding and axial coding (Green & Thorogood, 2009). At first the data was read and (parts
of) sentences were assigned a basic code, such as ‘fear’ or ‘religion’ or ‘police violence’. As
a result of the open coding, I had a long and unstructured list of codes. As a second step, I
analysed the codes, looking for relationship between them. During this process of axial
coding, several main themes arose which would form the basis for my thesis, such as
´coping mechanisms´ or ´meaning of justice´. On the basis of these themes, the data was
put back together and used as the basis for the arguments presented in this thesis.
All field notes have been numbered for referencing in this thesis. An overview of the field
notes can be found in the Appendix.
3.4 ETHICS
By focusing on a sensitive topic like this, the research has some inherent ethical issues to
reflect upon. First and foremost, the issue of ‘do no harm’ was extremely relevant in the
research. Neither the research activities, nor the outcomes of the research should do harm
to the informants. As such, when riot victims did not want to talk about the events of 2002
or any other topic, I respected this decision and did not probe any further. The findings
and conclusions of this research also do not bring harm to the respondents of the research,
as none of the statements in this thesis can be traced to the person who made the
statement. The conclusions of this research are also unlikely to influence the situation of
riot victims negatively. Rather, this research will provide new insights to the NGOs in
Ahmedabad, to be better able to work with riot victims.
Openness towards the respondents was also an important issue. I set out to do this
research in an overt manner and be open to the informants about my intentions. As I
worked with local social workers, they were able to explain my research intentions to the
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respondents. The presence of a familiar person – the social worker – had a positive
influence on the interviews, as respondents were able to trust me easier and quicker.
As a person, I also influenced the research by being present. As most of the field work was
performed through interviews, the data I gathered is shaped not only by the answers
respondents gave, but also by the questions I have asked them. Additionally, in
interpreting and analysing the data my own perspective also played a role. This does not
mean that the quality of this research needs to be questioned, but rather that the role of
the researcher should be kept in mind when reading this thesis.
3.5 PROBLEMS
During the fieldwork, various problems came up that shaped the research. This section
will explain these problems and how I dealt with it, as well as the way it influenced the
findings of this research.
3.5.1 LANGUAGE
Although I had foreseen difficulties concerning language, it proved to be harder to deal
with it than I thought. The language spoken in Ahmedabad is Gujarati, which is an Indo-
Aryan language (as is Hindi) with its own script, but can also be written in Persian or Arab
scripts, which is done by Muslim people in western regions of Gujarat. During my stay in
Ahmedabad I learned a bit of Gujarati, but my knowledge of it didn’t get any further than
some basic words as ‘namaste’, ‘kemcho’ and ‘maru naam Gerben che’4. Such phrases
helped me to get a conversation started when doing interviews, and showed to the
respondents that I was genuinely interested in them, which made them more willing to
talk about the issues I wanted to discuss.
For the interviews I needed a translator to help me talk to the respondents. This proved to
be a difficult thing to arrange. It was not possible for me to arrange a fixed translator that
helped me in all field visits, so instead I had to arrange a translator each time I wanted to
plan a field visit or interview. This was a major drawback for the research, for multiple
reasons. Firstly, as I didn’t have my own translator, I was completely dependent on other
people for going on field visits. I often went with social workers to the areas they worked
in, to talk with people they worked with. This meant that I could only go when the social
4 ‘Namaste’ means ‘hello’, ‘kemcho’ is ‘how are you’, and ‘maru naam Gerben che’ is ‘my name is Gerben’.
[ 24 ]
workers were going themselves, and when they would have time to actually translate for
me. As I result, the days in which I could actually do field visits and interviews were
limited.
Second, due to the fact that I did not have a fixed translator, I had to explain the goal of my
research to different people. To be able to translate properly in an interview, the
translator needs to have a good understanding of the questions I want to ask, and of what
the goal of the research is. As I was using different translators, I had to explain my
research multiple times, and every translator had to familiarize with the research, which
took extra time. In some cases, I did not get that much relevant information during an
interview, because the translator did not understand what I wanted to know. If I would
have had one translator, that person would have a better understanding of the research as
the fieldwork progressed, and this would result in more focused and relevant data. It was
sometimes very frustrating that the research did not get any further due to such a
practical issue.
Another issue concerning language is that not all the translators had a sufficient level of
mastering English, which made it hard for me to work with them. They did not always
understand my questions, and thus could not translate them or translated them
incorrectly in Gujarati. The same happened when they translated the answers people gave
to my questions back to English. Fortunately, it was often quite clear when translators did
not correctly translate questions and answers, so I could try to clarify issues more.
The last issue concerning language to reflect upon is the way in which meaning can be
changed through translation. At various instances during interviews, I got answers that
did not fit with the questions I asked. For example, when I asked a person a question about
his opinion, like ‘what do you think of the recent judgement in the Naroda Patiya case’, I
would sometimes get the answer ‘yes’. In such a case, the issue was mostly a problem of
proper translation. The multiple steps of formulation and interpretation through the
different persons and languages made it difficult to get the proper answers to the
questions posed. In most cases, this problem was solved by asking the same question in a
different way and explaining the nature of the question. Next to this being an issue of
translation, in some cases there also were problems with respondents not understanding
the complexity of the questions. This will be dealt with in Chapter 4.
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3.5.2 ACCESS
As discussed in the section on language, my access depended completely on the
availability of people of the NGOs I worked with to take me to the field and translate for
me. This limited my possibilities to do field interviews, as many of the organizations and
people I worked with were quite busy and did not always have time to help me. On the
other hand, due to the fact that I was always introduced to people by social workers – who
had a relationship of trust with them – it gave me quite easy access to the informants.
[ 26 ]
[ 27 ]
chapter 4
4 Talking about justice
As the previous chapter explained the way the research was performed, this chapter will
go into the findings by presenting the data that has been gathered. I will explain how
people talk about their experiences of the riots and its aftermath, and go into detail on
what they do (and do not) tell and their perspectives on justice. As such the chapter tries
to give an overview of the lives of riot victims ten years after Gujarat 2002.
4.1 FACTS AND OPINIONS
Talking about justice is not an easy thing to do. Next to the language problems discussed in
the previous chapter, other issues concerning the victims of riots played a role: distrust
and fear, as well as not being familiar with or not knowing how to talk about this topic.
These issues will be discussed in this section.
Quickly after the start of the fieldwork, it became clear that riot victims often talk about
the riots and justice in terms of facts. In conversations with respondents, they could tell
me exactly what has happened during the riots, how many days they lived in a relief camp,
[ 28 ]
how much they had to pay for a bag of rice, etc. But when it came to talking about the way
they experienced these things, or what their opinion is on these topics, they are often not
able to give an answer. Based on my experiences, discussions with other researchers, and
literature, I formulated two possible explanations for this observation. The first is that riot
victims fear that giving their opinion might bring them in danger. The second is that they
do not know how to talk about these issues. These two explanations will be discussed in
the following sections.
4.1.1 FEAR OF EXPRESSING OPINIONS
Fear is something that is deeply engraved in the hearts and minds of Gujarati Muslims. In
almost every interview with a riot victim, the respondent states – directly or indirectly –
that there is still fear for new rioting. Whether it is a religious celebration, the annual kite
festival or an incident between school kids; such events could all spark new violence, so
they say. During my stay in Ahmedabad, the verdict in the Naroda Patiya case was to be
announced. This case dealt with the massacre that took place in Naroda Patiya, a Muslim
neighbourhood of Ahmedabad. Anticipating on the judgment and what might follow, some
respondents had taken precautionary measures, like hiding their valuable goods in a safe
place, and relocating their children to family in a safer neighbourhood. Eventually, the
judgement in the Naroda Patiya case did not spark any new violence, but these actions
show how fear is still a part of the daily life of riot victims [field notes: 11, 12, 14-16, 19,
22-24].
This fear is also shown in the way in which people talk about the riots and about justice. A
possible explanation for why people only talk about the facts and not about their opinions,
is fear for the consequences their opinions might have. Especially in areas where Muslims
live together with Hindus, there is a lot of distrust between the two communities. This
distrust is exemplified by Sen and Wagner (2005) in a research on how Hindutva5 politics
impacts the thinking of people in a communally sensitive area: the Dharavi slum in
Mumbai. When showed various images related to previous tensions between Hindus and
Muslims, the reactions were quite typical. People from both communities showed anger
towards each other, but for Hindus this was combined with an aggressive tone, while for
Muslims fear was an eminent part of their anger. This typifies the uneven relationship
between the two communities.
5 Hindutva (lit.: Hinduness) is a right-wing political ideology that promotes Hindu nationalism. It seeks to define Indian culture in Hindu values, and strongly propagates a Hindu Rashtra, a Hindu state.
[ 29 ]
This relationship is also reflected in the gathered data of this research. A few days after the
Muslim celebration of Eid ul-Fitr, I visited a woman living in a mixed Hindu-Muslim
neighbourhood. She told me that Muslims in her area are often afraid to celebrate their
festivals openly. This year, because of the upcoming Naroda Patiya judgment, her family
celebrated Eid ul-Fitr very modestly: they did not buy any new clothes, nor did they spend
a lot of money on food (normally Eid is celebrated with a large meal with various special
Eid dishes). They were afraid they needed the money if new riots would start over the
judgment [field notes: 11]. This example shows that there is fear among Muslims to live
the lives they want to live. They are not able to celebrate their festivals, while Hindu
festival are often celebrated abundantly in the streets, sometimes with provoking slogans
and symbols, such as saffron6 flags [field notes: 2, 4]. This again shows the uneven
relationship: both Hindus and Muslims have feelings of anger towards the other group, but
for Hindus this anger is combined with aggression, while for Muslims it is combined with
fear.
Another family living on the Muslim graveyard in Gomtipur explained that fear is part of
their everyday live now. A woman from the family stated: “The fear is always there. Fear
that fighting might start again. Fear that we have to flee from our house again” [field notes:
24]. When further discussing the events of 2002, what happened to them afterwards and
how they experienced the justice process, none of the family members were able to give
opinionated answers. Apart from restating certain facts about what has happened, they
remained silent. This silence is also recognized in other research about fear in post-
conflict settings. For example, based on research in Northern Ireland, Lawther (2012)
argues that being silent can both be grounded in fear as well as a strategic move by which
it protects the interests of the victims. In line with this, Eastmond and Selimovic (2012, p.
504) state that “social strategies of silencing may reveal interdependency between people in
many communities and the need to maintain and nurture social relations and reciprocal
arrangements, sometimes as a means of survival.” This might also be the case in Gujarat,
where riot victims sometimes use silence as a strategy to maintain the status quo and as
such protect their own interests. This issue will be further elaborated on in the following
chapter, dealing with coping strategies of riot victims.
6 Saffron is the colour that symbolizes Hinduism and is often used by Hindu nationalist organizations.
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4.1.2 NOT ABLE TO EXPRESS OPINIONS
During some of the interviews with riot victims, it appeared that the level of education is
an important factor that influences the way people talk about justice. When asking
questions like ´What is your opinion on the Naroda Patiya judgement?´ or ´Do you think
enough is done to pursue justice?’, people sometimes responded that they did not know
how to answer a question like that, even when I broke down such questions into smaller
and ‘easier’ questions [field notes: 19, 20, 22, 23]. Justice after the 2002 riots is a complex
issue and requires intellectual skills to comprehend. Most of the people I have interviewed
were not or only slightly educated, and as such their intellectual capacity is less developed,
which limits them in their understanding of the issue. A conversation I had with another
riot victim underlines this finding. This man, living on the Muslim graveyard in Gomtipur,
had pursued higher education, and was perfectly able to answer questions about his
opinions and ideas about the justice process [field notes: 21]. The difference in the way
these people answered my questions showed clearly that intellectual capacity shapes the
way people talk about justice, and subsequently also guides the actions people take to
pursue justice.
4.2 DAILY SURVIVAL
Another notable feature of how people talk about justice is the way they relate justice to
their daily lives. The place that justice takes in their lives is currently a minor one; they
have more urgent problems to deal with.
An example of this is the story of a woman living on Chartoda Kabristan, a Muslim
graveyard in eastern Ahmedabad. During the 1969 riots, Muslims fled to this graveyard as
they considered it to be a safe place. The woman and her family lived on the graveyard
since 1969. They first lived in a make-shift house, but in time they build themselves a
concrete house. Their house was located on the eastern side of the graveyard, against the
wall that separated the graveyard from the Gomtipur Police Lines, a Hindu housing society
near a police station. During the 2002 riots, the graveyard was attacked by people from
the Gomtipur Police Lines, and the people living on that side of the graveyard had to flee to
the other side, where a relief camp was set up. The woman and her family had to leave
their house and lived in the relief camp for about four months. When they came back to
their house, it was looted and demolished. They had to rebuild their house, as well as their
lives after the riots. To pursue justice, they filed a first information report (FIR) at the
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police. They did not hear anything after this anymore, the woman states that their
complaint was not properly considered by the police [field notes: 23].
Currently, the woman thinks that getting justice in Gujarat is not possible anymore. They
have tried, but fighting against a system that is against you is impossible. Besides, their
main concern at the moment is a conviction order they have received from the
government. The government does not want them to live at the graveyard, as the area is
not designated to live on. Instead, they have offered the people a plot of land in another
part of the city, which they can buy. But these people don’t have the money to buy that
land, nor do they want to live in another part of the city; they would rather live on the
graveyard [field notes: 23, 24].
This example shows that, while people may have tried to pursue justice in the past, their
focus is nowadays on current issues that threaten their livelihoods. In this light, the
attitude of people towards pursuing justice is quite logical. Although justice might still be
the ideal, it is seen as something very hard – if not impossible – to reach. Thus, as there are
more important and urgent things in their lives that they have to deal with, their focus
shifts away from justice. Talking about pursuing justice might therefore be not very
relevant to them, ten years after the riots.
Current issues, in combination with a disadvantageous system, lead to the point where riot
victims come to the realization that it is better for them to just move on and leave the past
behind. Pursuing justice is often seen by riot victims as a futile activity. Of course there are
differences in this. Although most of the people I have interviewed in the field presented
the view of moving on, I also talked to people who I met at a meeting for riot victims.
These people had all been active in the Naroda Patiya legal case, and therefore actively
pursued justice, even ten years after the riots. In their opinion, riot victims need to
continue fighting for justice, because in the end justice will always prevail [field notes: 9,
10]. These people often live under the same circumstances as the other people I have
interviewed. Apart from the active support they get from various NGOs, there is no
explanation for why these people are still actively pursuing justice, and the others are not.
As literature suggests, the performance of leaving the past behind and moving on is
prevailing in many conflicts. Peter Uvin (2009) suggests, based on his and others’ research
in Burundi during and after the civil war, that people tend to ignore and be silent about the
wrongdoings. His findings show that most Burundians do not seek impartial prosecutions
[ 32 ]
of perpetrators, nor do they feel the need to uncover the full truth about the events
happened. The main reason for this identified by Uvin is that Burundians fear that formal
trials and truth commissions would break the relative peace that has come, and that the
justice it would bring would not really be just. Their eyes are focused on looking forward
and hoping for better days, instead of focusing on the past. This is in line with the findings
of this research, as riot victims try to make the best of the present. As one woman said it:
“Justice has not come, and it will not come. We’d better move on and try to live a good life”
[field notes: 26]. The way people cope with these injustices will be discussed further in
Chapter 5.
The findings in the previous sections reveal an important mechanism in how riot victims
deal with the aftermath of the 2002 riots. The fear riot victims have for new riots, as well
as for changes in their fragile position in society, combined with current pressing issues,
lead to a situation where riot victims tend to accept the status quo. However bad their
situation currently is, for them there is no use in pursuing justice and fighting against an
unjust system.
4.3 MEANING OF JUSTICE
After looking into the different ways people talk about their experiences of the riots and
the subsequent justice process, there are some conclusions to be drawn on the meaning of
the concept of justice from the eyes of the riot victims. A theoretical framework on the
concept of justice has been given in Chapter 2. This section will elaborate on these
frameworks of justice by combining them with the meaning riot victims give to the
concept.
A typical response of riot victims when asked how they have tried to pursue justice, is the
following: “Directly after the riots, I have filed an FIR at the police for the burning of our
house. We got some compensation for it: 50,000 Rupees. This is all we have seen from the
government. It’s not much, but what can you do about it? That’s just the way it is…” [field
notes: 11]. Such a response shows how riot victims see the concept of justice: they refer to
rectificatory justice – i.e. the rectification of the direct consequences of conflict, such as the
prosecution of perpetrators and compensations for damage – as the one way to pursue
justice. Almost all riot victims interviewed stated that they have filed FIRs, some of them
subsequently received financial compensation for the acts of violence done to them.
Additionally, this is often seen as the only way of pursuing justice. When asked about other
[ 33 ]
measures to pursue justice, they state that they do not know what else there can be done.
Their ideal of justice is the conviction of the perpetrators, not only those who have done
wrong to them personally, but also the ones that have organized the 2002 riots.
Some reference is also made to legal justice, i.e. the restoration of the rule of law. Riot
victims often state that the judicial system is influenced by the government and Hindu
right-wing forces, and as such extremely biased in treating riot cases. While they
acknowledge this ‘legal injustice’, riot victims themselves are not actively seeking justice in
this regard. A man in Gomtipur told me that his house was looted during the riots, and
they filed an FIR at the police. This resulted in nothing: they did not get a compensation or
any other kind of retribution for their losses. He stated: “No justice has been done to us. We
didn’t get anything. It feels really bad, but what can we do?” [field notes: 24]. Many
respondents argued similarly, stating that they just have to accept that the legal system is
biased, based on their inability to change this system.
Riot victims also often make references to issues of distributive justice, as identified by
Mani (2005). For example, they state that their economic and social position in society is
based on injustice. However, when they talk about seeking justice after the 2002 riots,
there is no reference made to ways of pursuing distributive justice. Regarding Fraser´s
(2007) dimensions of justice, riot victims refer to all three obstacles for equal
participation in society. A women in Gomtipur told me that after the 2002 riots, Muslim
shop owners have changed the names of their shops to generic names (e.g. Lucky Shop or
Star Shop), instead of previous names with a reference to their Muslim identity. They did
this because otherwise they would be an easy target for Hindu activists. Additionally, she
said that Hindu fundamentalist forces encouraged other Hindus not to buy at Muslim
shops, as to put Muslims out of business and increase the economical gap between Hindus
and Muslims [field notes: 11]. This is a clear example of maldistribution which hinders
Muslims to equally participate in social life. Examples of misrecognition have been given
throughout this thesis, as it shows the discrimination of Muslims based on cultural values.
The issue of misrepresentation will be further discussed in section 5.3, where absence of
government and the exclusion of Muslims will be elaborated on.
In sum, when discussing the concept of justice with riot victims, their first response deals
with rectificatory justice. Although other aspects of (in)justice are present in the lives of
riot victims, these are not issues riot victims have in mind when dealing with justice. The
following sections will elaborate further on two cases. The first being the Naroda Patiya
[ 34 ]
judgment and the perceptions of justice that people have regarding that case. The second
is the case of a Peace Committee in Jamalpur, which has been successful in keeping peace
between Hindus and Muslims in one chawl through reconciliatory activities.
4.3.1 NARODA PATIYA JUDGMENT
To make people’s opinions on justice more insightful and to elicit more information, I have
asked them to specifically respond to the Naroda Patiya judgment. This verdict came
during my stay in Ahmedabad and it was one of the major judicial cases concerning the
riots. Naroda Patiya was a neighbourhood in the Naroda area in the northeast of
Ahmedabad. This area was one of the first in the city to be attacked. On February 28th,
2002, one day after the Godhra train burning, a mob of more than 5,000 people attacked
the neighbourhood, looting and burning the houses and killing 97 people. Women were
raped and mutilated, and men were burned alive in their houses.
After the riots, survivors of the Naroda Patiya massacre were supported by various NGOs,
amongst others Citizens for Peace and Justice and the legal cell of the Behavioural Science
Centre. These parties have fought with the victims for justice on all levels: from filing FIRs
at the police to appealing the Indian Supreme Court, from arranging security protection
for victims to giving them emotional support. After ten years, the first actual judgment in
the case came on August 29, 2013. As the Naroda Patiya case is a very large one, it is a
good indicator for the general justice process in Gujarat. 32 people were sentenced with
live long imprisonment for their involvement in the riots, including two high level
politicians: former MLA Maya Kodnani and Babu Bajrangi, leader of the Gujarati Bajrang
Dal7. In the NGO community of Ahmedabad, this judgment was received with joy as well as
disappointment. People were glad that for the first time, high level politicians close to
Modi were convicted. But at the same time, these people also were still the puppets of the
Modi government. The Naroda Patiya court case tried to prove the ‘greater conspiracy’,
which implies that Modi and the upper echelons of the BJP were aware of and/or involved
in setting up the 2002 riots. The fact that the court did not include the greater conspiracy
in the verdict was disappointing for all the parties involved in this case [field notes: 9, 10].
After the Naroda Patiya judgment, I attended the press conference of Citizens for Justice
and Peace (the main party handling the court case), and a meeting of victims of the Naroda
Patiya massacre. At both these events, I talked with riot victims about their opinions on
the judgment. Subsequently, I also asked respondents during field visits on their opinions
7 Bajrang Dal is the militant youth wing of the VHP.
[ 35 ]
on the judgment. In this way, I tried to gain more insight into opinions about the general
justice process in Gujarat, as well as what meaning people give to the concept of justice.
The riot victims I have interviewed in Gomtipur, Jamalpur and Juhapura were not involved
in the Naroda Patiya case in any way. This was reflected in their answers: all people knew
about the judgment, but most of them did not have a clear grasp of the content of the
verdict. Some riot victims stated that they did not have an opinion on the Naroda Patiya
judgment, as it did not concern them personally. This shows that they deem their own
lives and struggles more important than the general justice process in Gujarat. As such,
probing into opinions on the Naroda Patiya judgment revealed that riot victims often have
given up on justice.
When looking at the people that did have an opinion on the Naroda Patiya judgment, the
statements they give are quite clear. Both the respondents in the field, as well as riot
victims I talked to during the press conference and the victims meeting stated that the
verdict was positive, but that more should be done to bring justice. Not all the accused had
been convicted, and mainly high-level officials of the government and Hindu right-wing
parties have not been prosecuted properly. However, the judgment also has a large impact
on the perspectives of riot victims on justice. During the meeting for Naroda Patiya
victims, a woman stated: “This is the first time in ten years my faith in the system is restored”
[field notes: 10]. Where previous sections have shown that riot victims often tend to give
up on the justice process in Gujarat, this example illustrates that hope for a more just
future can be restored by such judicial successes. Thus pursuing rectificatory justice can
contribute to a more just system, which might eventually lead to legal and distributive
justice as well.
4.3.2 JAMALPURI PEACE COMMITTEE
As said, when talking about justice, riot victims mainly refer to rectificatory justice. During
my fieldwork, I came across a case which is quite different: a chawl in the neighbourhood
of Jamalpur. This chawl consists of a mixed Hindu-Muslim population living closely
together. Directly after the 2002 riots, the community leaders came together and formed a
‘Shanti Samiti’, a neighbourhood Peace Committee. This committee was set up to protect
the peaceful relations within the community, prevent outbreaks of violence and mediate in
problems between community members.
[ 36 ]
An example of the work of the Peace Committee concerns the annual kite festival that
takes place in Ahmedabad. In previous years, there had been instances during the festival
when people would start a fight over a kite battle. To prevent such fights in the future, the
Peace Committee now organizes community meetings before the start of the festival to
discuss this issue with everyone, and to develop strategies to prevent future fights. The
Peace Committee also works in close cooperation with the police during festivals and
religious celebrations. For example, during the Rath Yatra – a Hindu procession of idols
through the city – when clashes between Hindus and Muslims often take place. The Peace
Committee assisted the police in preventing such clashes, and the police also informed
members of the community about safety measures during the Rath Yatra [field notes: 13].
The Peace Committee has also set up various interreligious groups within the community,
in which people learn from each other and work together on issues. I have talked with
members of such a youth group and they told me they have learned a lot from each other´s
faiths and as such gained more respect for each other. Such information and mutual
experiences are very relevant to counter the prejudices they come across in their daily
lives outside the neighbourhood [field notes: 12].
The Peace Committee in Jamalpur is an effective mediating force for communal conflict.
They signal tensions within the community and are able to protect the peace in the
neighbourhood. This shows a different kind of justice that the people in this chawl are
dealing with: reconciliation. The inhabitants of this chawl do not focus on the prosecution
of perpetrators, but rather on creating an environment in which Hindus and Muslims can
live together in peace. As such, this example shows an alternative way of dealing with the
aftermath of the 2002 riots.
[ 37 ]
chapter 5
5 Coping with injustice
The previous chapters have shown the situation of Muslims in Ahmedabad, which consists
of continuous injustice, state discrimination and a protracted justice process. During the
fieldwork, I have observed several ways in which people deal with this situation. These
ways can be called ‘coping strategies’. This chapter will discuss these coping strategies
based on theory and examples from Ahmedabadi Muslims.
5.1 COPING STRATEGIES
Coping strategies – or coping mechanisms – is a term derived from the field of psychology,
which has been used in development studies in recent decades, for example related to
poverty risks or dealing with (the risk of) natural disasters (Dercon, 2002; Justino, 2012;
Skoufias, 2003). It is a term which is also highly relevant for this study, as it is looking at
how people deal with the aftermath of violent conflict.
The psychological term coping strategies can be defined as “specific efforts, both behavioral
and psychological, that people employ to master, tolerate, reduce, or minimize stressful
[ 38 ]
events” (Taylor, 1998). As this definition shows, a coping strategy can have different goals
and results. In some cases, the strategy might lead to a mastering certain stressful events,
but in others it might only mean that the effect it has on the person is minimized. The
outcomes of a coping strategy can thus differ. Related to this, a coping strategy is an effort,
which implies that it is an attempt to deal with stressful events, and thus not necessarily
be successful in it. While trying to cope with a ‘stressor’, the situation might become even
more stressful. Another issue is that a coping strategy can both be behavioural and
psychological in nature: it can consist of actions in behaviour, such as seeking assistance
from someone, or of a mental choice that is made, such as acceptance or denial of the
stressor.
What is important to keep in mind, is that coping is a verb and thus implies an activity, a
process in play. Therefore, coping should not be seen as fixed choice people have made in
the past, but more like a constant process of negotiation with the stressor. As such, people
can change coping strategies over time (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).
Next to the dichotomy of behavioural and psychological coping, there is another common
distinction often made in coping strategies. This second distinction is between problem-
focused coping, which is aimed at solving or altering the stressor, and emotion-focused
coping, which means reducing or managing emotional distress. Both types of coping can
be used in every situation, but research has shown that problem-focused coping is more
often used in situations where people feel something constructive can be done, while
emotion-focused coping dominates when people feel that there is not much that can be
done about the stressor (Carver et al., 1989). There is some overlap between the two
dichotomies presented here: emotion-focused coping is closer to psychological coping, and
problem-focused coping is closer to behavioural coping. However, behavioural coping
does not necessarily work towards tackling the stressor, while problem-focused coping
does. As such, there are also differences between the dichotomies. In the following
sections, the two dichotomies will be used to explained the coping strategies observed in
Ahmedabad.
During my research in Ahmedabad, I noticed that people deal with the events of 2002, the
subsequent justice process, and the on-going tensions between Hindus and Muslims in
different ways. The respondents had each developed their own coping strategy, depending
on the exact situation they were in. However, there were also some similarities that could
be noticed amongst them. In general, respondents from the same neighbourhood
[ 39 ]
portrayed similar coping strategies. This difference between neighbourhoods will be
elaborated in the following sections, where I will first deal with the situation in Gomtipur
and Jamalpur, and thereafter Juhapura. A description of the characteristics of the
neighbourhoods will be given, after which an account of the coping strategies identified by
respondents from these neighbourhoods will be presented.
After covering the difference between Gomtipur/Jamalpur and Juhapura concerning
observed coping strategies, a last section will deal with a specific coping strategy observed
throughout the research population: turning to religion.
5.2 GOMTIPUR AND JAMALPUR: SELF-PROTECTION
Gomtipur and Jamalpur are two
neighbourhoods in Eastern Ahmedabad,
just outside the walled Old City, in an area
that is often called the Industrial Belt of
the city. In this area, the first textile mill
opened in 1861, starting a period of
strong industrialization which made
Ahmedabad the ‘Manchester of the East’.
From the 1920s onwards, the owners of
the textile mills started to build housing
facilities for their employees, which are
called ‘chawls’. Chawls are rows of small
one-room houses, often with common
sanitary facilities. This pattern of housing
became predominant in eastern
Ahmedabad (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012). The
people that started to live here during the
industrial revolution were mainly lower caste Hindus, Dalits or Muslims who moved to
Ahmedabad from other parts of Gujarat.
The textile industry reached its peak during the end of the 1960s, with 60-80% of
Ahmedabad’s population employed in the industry. During that period, the Industrial Belt
in eastern Ahmedabad was a thriving area. However, the collapse of the textile industry in
the 1970s also caused decay in this part of the city. The industrial areas, including
Figure 2: Typical chawl in Gomtipur
[ 40 ]
Gomtipur and Jamalpur, became impoverished, deprived and slowly turned into inner city
slums. People who were able to get away moved to other parts of the city, but the less
fortunate, mainly Dalits and Muslims, still live in these areas (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012).
The industrial areas in eastern Ahmedabad have always been prone to (religious) riots, in
part because of their high population density and the coexistence of various caste and
religious groups. All the riots mentioned in Chapter 2 have started either in the Old City or
in the Industrial Belt. The same goes for the 2002 riots. The violence started in Naroda
Patiya and Naroda Gaon, and soon spread all over the Industrial Belt as well as in Muslim-
dominated parts of the Old City. One day after the Godhra train burning, mobs throughout
eastern Ahmedabad started attacking Muslim neighbourhoods, including parts of
Gomtipur and Jamalpur.
When asked about their experiences of the 2002 riots, the people in Gomtipur and
Jamalpur all start by telling that mobs from outside the area came to their neighbourhood
and attacked them. These mobs attacked people, looted and burned down houses, raped
women, burned people alive, etc. The people I talked to all told these stories. Sometimes
they had experienced these things themselves, sometimes it was done to their family
members, and sometimes they saw it happen around them. What is striking in these
accounts is that they all mention ‘outside forces’ as the ones doing the harm. It became
even more striking when almost all respondents said that the Hindus living in their
neighbourhood were not part of the fighting. As from the accounts of the people I have
talked to, is seems likely that the 2002 riots were not so much random Hindus attacking
the Muslims around them, but rather organized groups that came from other places to
attack Muslims.
This statement can indeed be supported by other accounts, for example those of the
Concerned Citizens Tribunal (2002a, 2002b). Many accounts of the events of the 2002
riots show that large mobs were organized and rode around the city in trucks, attacking
Muslim populations in different localities throughout the city. The Concerned Citizens
Tribunal (2002a, p. 52) reports that “several mobs of around 10,000 persons each,
amounting to a total of 3–4 lakh persons launched simultaneous attacks on these areas of
Ahmedabad [GW: Gomtipur and surrounding areas]. (…) In these parts of Ahmedabad,
known to be minority strongholds or ghettos, sustained attacks continued unabated for a
period of 36 hours”. Such mobs were organized by Hindu right-wing forces such as the RSS
[ 41 ]
and the Bajrang Dal, as well as by the police forces, that were in total control of the
government.
Another issue that also underlines the statement that outside forces attacked Muslim
areas is an observation that the Concerned Citizens Tribunal makes about the involvement
of the police forces: “Witnesses stated that the personnel of different police stations stepped
outside their jurisdictions and committed atrocities. The Bapunagar police went to
Amraiwadi and the Amraiwadi police came to Bapunagar” (Concerned Citizens Tribunal,
2002a, p. 57). This has been explained as a strategy of the Hindu right-wing organizations
to make it less easy for the victims to be able to identify the rioters, as it weren’t the police
men they were familiar with.
While these observations underline the findings of this research, there is more to it than
meets the eye. The response that it were outside mobs that attacked them, is very likely to
be the case. But the second part of the response – that the Hindu people living in their
neighbourhood were not part of the rioting – is something that deserves further attention
here. When discussing this with other researchers and people from NGOs in Ahmedabad, it
was suggested that responses of riot victims in these areas of Ahmedabad are very likely
to be influenced by the environment they live in. They live in neighbourhoods that have a
mixed Hindu-Muslim population. In these neighbourhoods, the Muslims are often
dependent on their Hindu neighbours, socially and economically. The hypothesis here is
that this relationship of dependency makes that Muslim riot victims say that their Hindu
neighbours have not been part of the rioting. Giving negative images about their Hindu
neighbours might disturb the relationship between them, and subsequently threaten their
living in the neighbourhood. Thus, by not blaming their Hindu neighbours, they try to
preserve the status quo in order to protect themselves.
This hypothesis is hard to prove, and it was not possible for me to verify it completely due
to the limited time and research opportunities I had. However, I did take this hypothesis
into account in many of the interviews, in which I tried to probe into the relationships of
Muslims with their Hindu neighbours. The gathered data suggests that the Hindu-Muslim
relations in these areas of Ahmedabad have improved in recent years, and most things are
back to ‘normal’. A woman from a Muslim dominated chawl states: “I have one Hindu
neighbour, the rest is Muslim. More Hindus live in the next chawl. We live like brothers and
sisters now. The relationship is good, but this is a Muslim chawl” [field notes: 11]. This
woman mentioned that being in a Muslim majority neighbourhood makes the relation
[ 42 ]
with their Hindu neighbour easier. Being in the majority makes them less dependent on
others.
When discussing the position of Muslims after the 2002 riots with a group of women from
different chawls of Gomtipur, they say that the Hindu-Muslim relations are good. As one
woman puts it: “Hindus and Muslims live side by side now, it is good, there are no problems.
But if one spark from politics comes, this might be totally different” [field notes: 15]. This is
something that almost all respondents from Gomtipur and Jamalpur stress: as long as the
circumstances are good, the relation is good. But one trigger from the outside – be it a
political rally or a provoking comment from a religious leader – can destroy the
relationship and cause new violence.
These statements show that Hindu-Muslim relations remain fragile, and the smallest
things can disturb them, which causes negative effects, mainly for Muslims. This makes the
hypothesis that the ‘good neighbours, bad outsiders’ storyline is a narrative used for self-
protection very plausible. However, this hypothesis cannot be verified nor falsified based
on the gathered data in this research. Further research into this phenomenon is needed.
5.3 JUHAPURA: SAFETY IN NUMBERS
Juhapura is a totally different story. It is located on the south western outskirts of
Ahmedabad, about seven kilometres from the Old City along the National Highway
towards western Gujarat. Although it is located in western Ahmedabad, the modern and
Hindu dominated part of the city, Juhapura is nothing like that. It is often referred to as
‘Mini Pakistan’ or ‘the Muslim ghetto’, because of the large population of Muslims living in
this area.
The first development in the area of Juhapura was in 1973, when houses were built for
victims of the floods of the Sabarmati River – both Muslims and Hindus. In subsequent
years, this area of Ahmedabad has been a place where refugees have been resettled after
natural disasters, as well as after violent outbreaks in the city. After the 1985 riots, many
Muslims who lost their homes moved to Juhapura, while Hindus already living there
moved away to other parts of the city. As such, Juhapura became a Muslim majority
neighbourhood. Nowadays, inhabitants of Juhapura number almost 400,000. A large part
of Juhapura consists of relief colonies, build by either government authorities or NGOs.
Some of the colonies were built as a temporary housing facility, others for permanent
[ 43 ]
resettlement. The provision of services by the municipal government is lacking in
Juhapura. The municipal government does not adequately supply water and electricity to
all parts of the neighbourhood. In some cases, water is available for one hour a day
through public taps. Next to lacking service delivery, other public facilities are not
properly provided by the government: there are no public high schools or hospitals in
Juhapura (Gayer & Jaffrelot, 2012). These figures clearly show the absence of the
municipal government in Juhapura, which furthers the alienation of the people living
there.
The field research in Juhapura concentrated on the relief colony of Siddiqabad, a housing
colony consisting of 200 homes in five three-story buildings, build by an Islamic NGO for
survivors of the Gulbarg massacre. The Gulbarg massacre took part on February 28, 2002,
when a Hindu mob attacked Gulbarg Society. This was a Muslim neighbourhood in Hindu-
dominated Chamanpura, Ahmedabad. During the attack, which lasted for nine hours, 35
people were killed, including Ehsan Jafri, a prominent Muslim politician and writer
(Concerned Citizens Tribunal, 2002a; Janmohamed, 2013).
When first visiting Siddiqabad, I was told by a social worker that this neighbourhood was
one of the most “posh” relief colonies of Juhapura. But upon arrival, I realized that this
description was more telling of the rest of Juhapura, then of Siddiqabad. The Siddiqabad
Relief Colony was meant to be a temporary resettlement facility, but people have been
living here for ten years now. Water and electricity are not always available, there is no
drainage system, and the one bedroom houses are filled with large families. The municipal
government, as well as the NGO who was supposed to develop this colony, are not
providing proper services to the people in Siddiqabad. A women’s group I met told me that
they have been petitioning for a proper water supply with the government, but every time
the government denies their claims and demands [field notes: 18, 19]. The situation in
Siddiqabad is characteristic of many other parts of Juhapura, as I have been told by NGO
workers and researchers known to the area.
Due to the absence of a functioning government in large parts of Juhapura, the area is de
facto ruled by NGOs and religious organizations. In this situation, hard-line Islamic
movements have gained ground. Many scholars have reported the increase of orthodox
Islamic rule in Juhapura, and this has had big impact on the prevailing norms and values
(Jasani, 2008; Thapan, 2010). The people from Siddiqabad, as well as the social workers in
the area I have talked to, told me that due to these developments, especially women’s
[ 44 ]
rights are under pressure. Women are often forced to stay inside and wear burqas, which
is opposite from the free and open Muslim culture in Ahmedabad two decades ago [field
notes: 18, 20, 29]. Such developments make the lives of Muslim women in Juhapura even
more difficult.
The inhabitants of Siddiqabad feel left behind by the government, and this has caused
further segregation – not only physically but also emotionally. The gap between Hindus
and Muslims has been growing, and there is a prevailing practice of ‘othering’. As
Janmohamed (2013) describes in an essay on Siddiqabad after recent elections in Gujarat,
“I have become used to the use of abstract pronouns in Juhapura: “them” is Hindus, “those
days” are the riots, and “he” is Modi”. This practice of othering increased the distance
between Hindus and Muslims. When discussing the separation between the two
communities in Ahmedabad with a group of adolescent girls in Siddiqabad, they tell me
that they do not really have contact with Hindus. They go to Muslim schools, have Muslim
friends, and live in a Muslim neighbourhood. Many of them almost never go outside
Juhapura. One of the girls stated that “the relationships between Hindus and Muslims are
good now, because there is not really any contact between them. And it is best to just stay
away from each other, that way there will not be trouble at least” [field notes: 19]. This
quote shows the general consensus in Juhapura: it is easier to just live separated from
Hindus in a deprived Muslim ghetto, then to have a heterogeneous society where they are
constantly reminded of their ‘second-class citizenship’. Although segregation is a
consequence of the riots, and partly a planned effort of Hindu right-wing forces, it is also a
solution for the Muslims, as they feel this offers them ‘safety in numbers’.
Another interesting observation that is specific for respondents in Juhapura is the
articulate way they speak about the perpetrators of the 2002 riots, as well as the Hindu-
Muslim divide that runs through Gujarati society. People in Juhapura are more vocal on
these issues in relation to the people in Gomtipur and Jamalpur. My assumption is that the
people in Juhapura are able to make these kinds of comments because they live in a
Muslim dominated area. Here, they are not dependent on Hindu neighbours and their
comments do not influence their own safety. In addition, the circumstances in Juhapura –
living totally separated and the increasing influences of Islamic fundamentalist
movements – create an environment where radical opinions are more easily voiced.
[ 45 ]
5.4 RELIGION AS A COPING STRATEGY
Next to the differences between the two neighbourhoods in coping with the aftermath of
the 2002 riots, there is another coping strategy that was observed throughout the total
researched population: turning to religion. Religion is an important part of the lives of the
people I have interviewed, as many of them are devout Muslims. A common heard phrase
in the interviews I have conducted was “Allah will provide”, as over half of the respondents
referenced to Allah – or religion in general – when talking about ways of dealing with the
aftermath of the riots.
Illustrative in this respect is the case of a woman in her 50s, who lives on the Chartoda
Kabristan, a Muslim graveyard in Gomtipur. When I spoke to her, she was sitting with four
of her five daughters on a bedframe in front of their house. The house was on the ‘Hindu
side’ of the graveyard, right next to the Hindu Gomtipur Police Lines. During the 2002
riots, a large mob came from the Police Lines and attacked, looted and burned the houses
on this side of the graveyard. When the attack started, the woman was in her house with
her family: her husband and children, and a sister-in-law. Her husband and the sister-in-
law were both handicapped. When the mob came, she fled from the house taking her
children with her. Her husband was helped to get away, but before they could help the
sister-in-law to get away, the mob had set the house on fire. She was burned alive inside
the house.
At that time they fled to the relief camp that was being set up on the other (safe) side of
the graveyard. They lived there for about four months, after that they moved back to the
place where there old house was. With some corrugated sheets they rebuild the house.
When the riots were over, the woman filed an FIR for the burning of her house, as well as
for the killing of her sister-in-law. Through a court case, she received a financial
compensation, but this was hardly enough to cover the costs of the court case. When asked
whether she thinks justice is done to her, she responds: “All is done now, there is nothing
more I can do. We just need to move on and live. Why fight any longer, our lives are okay
now. Allah will provide”. She states there is still fear for new violence, and prays that her
children don’t have to live through what she experienced again [field notes: 22].
This example shows that in a first stadium, riot victims turn to actions they know to
pursue justice – the FIR, as discussed in Chapter 4. But after that, and possible other
actions, fail, they often come to a point where they use their religion as a way to cope with
their situation. This is a well-known coping strategy, as many psychological studies on
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coping behaviour have shown (cf. Pargament, 2001). Patel and Nath (2013), in their
research on perceptions on the 2002 riots of Hindu and Muslim Gujarati immigrants in the
United States, also found that for Muslims, religion is a common way of coping with the
events. In their findings, they distinguish between passive and active religious coping. The
first is using faith in such a way that they do not act themselves: “Allah will take care of
punishing the wrong-doers, you do not have to take that responsibility upon you” (Patel &
Nath, 2013, p. 37). The latter is using faith in a way that it motivates them to make a
change, for example to spread more awareness about Islam.
The story of the woman living in the graveyard in Gomtipur is an example of passive
religious coping. Some respondents in Juhapura also used passive religious coping, almost
exactly like the example from Patel & Nath. When asked about the Naroda Patiya
judgment, a woman stated: “It is okay, not more can be done. In the end, Allah will judge the
perpetrators” [field notes: 18]. During my fieldwork, I did not come across the active way
of religious coping.
One of my informants, an NGO worker who also did research in Ahmedabad explained that
there are different ways of using religion as a coping strategy, in line with the distinction
made by Patel & Nath. He argued that most riot victims indeed show passive religious
coping and conceded to live a life without justice. In his opinion, this is for a large part the
result of the increasing influence of hard-line Islamic organizations, especially in Juhapura.
In orthodox mosques and madrassas, people are often not encouraged to pursue justice,
nor taught how to do this, but rather to accept their fate and leave the rest to Allah [field
notes: 30]. This trend, which he noticed in Juhapura, but also in other Muslim localities of
Ahmedabad, hinders an effective struggle for justice in Gujarat.
5.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown different ways riot victims deal with the atrocities done to them,
as well as the continuing injustices they face in their daily lives. The differences in coping
strategies between people living in Gomtipur/Jamalpur and those in Juhapura is striking.
As shown, this has a lot to do with the social environment people live in. In mixed Hindu-
Muslim neighbourhoods like Gomtipur and Jamalpur, riot victims are cautious while
talking about the events of 2002 and the subsequent justice process. In contrary, people
from the Muslim-dominated Juhapura were far more articulate in voicing their concern
and were not afraid to distance themselves from Hindus – physically as well as socially. In
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general, it is not the geographic location that is the determining factor for people’s coping
strategies, but more the political, social and cultural environment that comes with these
specific locations. As the previous sections have shown, the history and current
developments of the neighbourhoods of Gomtipur/Jamalpur and Juhapura shaped the
environments to which people adapt their way of living and their strategies of coping with
the injustices resulting from the 2002 riots.
Looking back at the theory on coping strategies, both strategies employed by the people in
Gomtipur/Jamalpur and Juhapura can be seen as psychological and emotion-focused
coping: they do not undertake behavioural actions towards solving the stressor, but rather
find a way to manage their lives with the presence of this stressor.
Additionally, another coping strategy has been identified based on the findings of the
research: turning to religion. Religion plays an important role in the lives of the Muslims I
have interviewed, and their religion offers them a way to move on with their lives. Turning
to religion is a clear example of psychological and emotion focused coping. Such a mental
choice offers riot victims comfort and reduces emotional distress. While this has certain
positive benefits for the riot victims themselves, religion can also hinder the general
justice process in Gujarat.
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chapter 6
6 Conclusion
This research was set out to look into the perspectives and opinions of riot victims on the
justice process in Gujarat after the 2002 riots. As such, it has explained how riot victims
talk about justice, how they define justice, and what role the struggle for justice takes in
their daily lives. Based on the analysis of riot victims´ perspectives and opinions, three
distinct coping strategies have been identified that illustrate how they deal with their
situation after the riots.
The research question that guided this research was: How do riot victims in Ahmedabad,
Gujarat, deal with the protracted justice process after the 2002 riots? To answer this
question, the main findings of this research will be reiterated here.
When riot victims in Ahmedabad talk about the aftermath of the 2002 riots and the related
justice process, there is one inherent aspect that shapes their statements: fear. They fear
that on-going tensions might result in new outbreaks of violence, and they fear the
disrupting consequences such violence might have for their own lives and livelihood. This
fear is reflected in the way riot victims talk about justice. When talking about issues
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related to the 2002 riots, they often speak in terms of facts (how long they had to live in a
relief camp, what actions they undertook, what kind of compensation they got, etc.).
Speaking in terms of opinions is difficult for riot victims, as they fear their opinion might
not be accepted by the Hindu majority, and as such jeopardize their position in society.
Next to the issue of fear, current issues are influencing the way riot victims deal with
justice. The riot victims interviewed in this research are all living in the margins of society
and often have to struggle for their survival. As such, many of them face current problems
that need their attention more than pursuing justice. Together with fear, such pressing
current issues lead riot victims to accept the status quo, and not fight for justice for the
riots, nor for a more just society.
From the way riot victims talk about justice and their actions, a bottom-up definition of
justice has been developed. Looking at Rama Mani’s categorization of justice, riot victims
see justice mainly as rectificatory justice: the prosecution of perpetrators and
compensation for the violence done to them. While other issues of injustice have been
defined by riot victims – including Nancy Fraser’s three dimensions of justice – they are
not actively pursuing justice on those issues. This has a lot to do with the fear and current
other issues that riot victims have to deal with. However, to effectively pursue justice,
issues of distributive justice
Based on the way people talk about the justice process after the 2002 riots, as well as their
related actions, three coping strategies have been identified. The most common way to
deal with the injustices people experience is by using religion as a coping strategy. As riot
victims are not able to effectively seek justice themselves, they find comfort in turning to
their God.
Next to this common coping strategy, riot victims in Ahmedabad use two different coping
strategies to deal with injustice, based on the political and social environment they live in.
In areas where Muslims live together with Hindus (e.g. Gomtipur and Jamalpur), they use
the narrative of ´good neighbours, bad outsiders´ as self-protection. Their social position
depends on their Hindu neighbours, and therefore they are not blaming their neighbours
for the violence done to them. This is in line with the finding that riot victims tend to
accept the status quo out of fear.
The last identified coping strategy is a strategy used by riot victims that live in a
homogenous Muslim environment (e.g. Juhapura). These riot victims use their segregation
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from the Hindu community as a solution to the problem of their disadvantaged position in
society. In their opinion, not having to deal with Hindus makes their lives easier and safer.
Thus, they feel the segregation offers them safety in numbers.
In sum, this research has shown different ways of how riot victims in Ahmedabad deal
with the injustices of the 2002 riots and the protracted justice process that followed. The
perspectives of riot victims and the way they cope with the injustices show that for most
of them, justice – both for the atrocities of 2002, as for the systematic injustices in society
– is still far out of reach.
With these findings, this research was able to explore the perspectives of riot victims on
the justice process in Gujarat. To go beyond these exploratory findings, further in-depth
research is needed to better understand the mechanisms behind the actions and
narratives of riot victims. The influence of both structure (circumstances and context) and
agency (people’s ability to make individual choice) on the workings of these coping
mechanisms could be an interesting topic for follow-up research. Such research would
increase the knowledge on coping strategies of people dealing with injustice, and might
generate insights for practical application for NGOs and others working on this issue.
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Appendix – List of field notes
Nr. Type Date Location Details
1 I 08-08-2012 Ahmedabad Director Utthan 2 I 10-08-2012 Ahmedabad Directors Darshan 3 O 12-08-2012 Shah-e-Alam Visit to former relief
camp in mosque 4 I 13-08-2012 Ahmedabad Director SXSSS 5 I 14-08-2012 Ahmedabad Director CfD 6 I 16-08-2012 Ahmedabad Director SAFAR 7 I 16-08-2012 Ahmedabad Director IPSCR 8 I 24-08-2012 Ahmedabad Social worker CfD 9 O 29-08-2012 Ahmedabad Press conference on
Naroda Patiya judgment 10 O 04-09-2012 Ahmedabad Victims meeting Naroda
Patiya 11 I 07-09-2012 Gomtipur Woman 12 I 07-09-2012 Jamalpur Youth group 13 I 07-09-2012 Jamalpur Peace committee 14 I 08-09-2012 Gomtipur Man and woman 15 I 08-09-2012 Gomtipur Women’s group 16 O 08-09-2012 Gomtipur Observations of two days
in Gomtipur/Jamalpur 17 I 11-09-2012 Juhapura Man, teacher in relief
colony 18 I 11-09-2012 Juhapura Women’s group 19 I 11-09-2012 Juhapura Adolescent girls group 20 O 11-09-2012 Juhapura Observations in relief
colony Juhapura 21 I 18-09-2012 Gomtipur Man living in graveyard 22 I 18-09-2012 Gomtipur Women living in
graveyard 23 I 18-09-2012 Gomtipur Women and her sister
living in graveyard 24 I 18-09-2012 Gomtipur Family living in
graveyard 25 O 18-09-2012 Gomtipur Observations graveyard 26 I 19-09-2012 Gomtipur Three women 27 I 19-09-2012 Gomtipur Family 28 I 24-09-2012 Juhapura Man and women 29 I 24-09-2012 Juhapura Woman 30 I 28-09-2012 Ahmedabad Discussing findings with
directors of NGOs
I = interview
O = observations