darfur and the limits of legal deterrence

Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence Kenneth A. Rodman

Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 3, August 2008, pp. 529-560(Article)

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

* Kenneth A. RodmanistheWilliamR.CotterDistinguishedTeachingProfessorofGovernmentatColbyCollegeinWaterville,Maine,wherehealsoservedasthefoundingdirectoroftheOakInstitutefortheStudyofInternationalHumanRights.Heistheauthorof Sanctity versus Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments(1988)and Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft(2001).Hisearlierworkoneconomicsanctionshasappearedin International Organization, Political Science Quarterly,and Ethics & International Affairs.Heiscurrentlyworkingonaprojectontherelationshipbetweeninternationalcriminaljusticeandnegotiatingstrategiesininternationalconflicts.

1. Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58(7) of the Rome Statute,27Feb.2007.

Human Rights Quarterly30(2008)529–560©2008byTheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress

Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence

Kenneth A. Rodman*

AbSTRAcT

TheDarfurreferraltotheInternationalCriminalCourtdemonstratesthelimitsofinternationalcriminaljusticeasanagentofwartimedeterrenceevidentintheexperienceoftheICTYinBosnia.First,internationaltribunalscannotdetercriminalviolenceaslongasstatesandinternationalinstitutionsareunwillingtotakeenforcementactionsagainstperpetrators.Second,thekeytoendingimpunityinanongoingwarlieslessinlegaldeterrencethaninpoliticalstrategiesofdiplomacy,coercion,orforce.Third,thecontributionof criminal justice in aftermath of mass atrocity is dependent on whichstrategiesareusedtoputittoanend.

I. INTRoDUcTIoN

On 27 February 2007, the chief prosecutor at the International CriminalCourt(ICC)identifiedaformerinteriorministerandamilitialeaderasthefirsttwoindividualsheplannedtotryforatrocitycrimescommittedintheDarfur regionofwesternSudan.1Thecasehadbeenreferred to thecourtby theUNSecurityCouncilalmost twoyearsearlier,due in largepart to

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Vol. 30530

2. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United NationsSecretaryGeneral,PursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution1564of18Sept.2004,25Jan.2005,¶569.

3. PressRelease,HumanRightsWatch,U.N.SecurityCouncilRefersDarfur to the ICCHistoricStepTowardJustice;FurtherProtectionMeasuresNeeded(31Mar.2005),avail-able athttp://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/31/sudan10408.htm.

4. DavidMozersky,Accountability in Darfur, InstItute of War & Peace rePortIng (27Feb.2007),available athttp://www.iwpr.net.

5. See thomas c. schellIng, arms and Influence (1966); alexander l. george, davId K. hall & WIllIam e. sImons, the lImIts of coercIve dIPlomacy (1971); alexander l. george, forceful PersuasIon: coercIve dIPlomacy as an alternatIve to War (1991).

intenselobbyingfromthehumanrightscommunity.Amongtheargumentsmadeonbehalfofthereferralwastheabilityofthecourttodeterviolenceagainst civilians in an ongoing war.This was the conclusion of the UNInternationalCommissionof InquiryonDarfur,whichhad recommendedthereferralto“takeontheresponsibilityto...endtherampantimpunityprevailingthere.”2Followingthereferral,RichardDickerofHumanRightsWatchapplaudeditasa“historicstep”that“offersrealhopeofprotectionforpeopleinDarfur.”3Whentheprosecutorannouncedhisfirsttwocases,DavidMozerskyoftheInternationalCrisisGroupexpressedthehopethatthismightprovetobeaturningpointintheconflict:“theICCmaybeabletosucceedinDarfur,wherethereislittleinternationalpoliticalwillfortoughactionandtheUNSecurityCouncilisdeadlocked.”4

Despitethesepredictions,subjectingtheSudanesegovernmenttocrimi-nalscrutinyhashadnodiscernibleimpactonthelevelofviolenceagainstcivilians in Darfur and, if the past is any indication, is unlikely to do sounlessthereisinternationalpoliticalwillfortoughaction,eitherwithinoroutsidetheSecurityCouncil.ThiswastheexperienceinBosniawhere,asinDarfur,acriminaljusticemechanism—theInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia(ICTY)—wasestablishedwiththegoalofcombat-ingimpunitybeforethewarhadended.However,itwasonlyabletoplayameaningful role afterWesternpowers took coercive actions to end thewar.This article draws on the strategic studies scholarship on deterrenceand coercionbyThomas Schelling andAlexanderGeorge5 to distill fromtheBosnianexperiencethreelessonsastotherelationshipbetweeninter-nationalcriminaljusticeandwartimeimpunity,whicharethenappliedtothecurrentsituationinDarfur.

First,internationalcriminaljusticecannotendimpunityinanongoingwaraslongasstatesandintergovernmentalorganizationsareunwillingtotakeenforcementactions.InBosnia,theICTYhadlittleimpactonthemurderandforceddisplacementofcivilianswhentheUNandNATOwereunwill-ingtomovebeyondneutralpeacekeepingandmediation—aconditionthatcharacterizesinternationalinvolvementinDarfurtoday,notwithstandingthereferraltotheICC.ItwasonlywhenNATOwaswillingtouseforce,both

2008 Darfur and the Limits of Legal Deterrence 531

6. SeeschellIng,supranote5,at69–86. 7. Id. atch.1. 8. Id. at 4 9. george, hall & sImons,supranote5,at288.

directlyandviaproxy,thattheattacksonciviliansendedandtheICTYwasabletoprosecuteanyoneofsignificance.

Second,thekeytoendingcriminalviolenceinanongoingwarisnotdeterrence,whichisaimedatdissuadingsomeonefrominitiatingproscribedbehavior,butrathercompellence,theactofpreventingsomeonefromcon-tinuingactionsonwhichhehasalreadyembarked.6Thethreatofprosecu-tionisunlikelytodeterbecause,bythetimeatribunalassertsjurisdiction,large-scalecrimeshavealreadytakenplaceandinmostcases,aswasthecaseinBosniaandisthecaseinDarfur,responsibilitylieswithtoppoliti-calandmilitaryleaders.Asaresult,attachinglegalliabilitydoesnotcreatean incentive to refrain from criminal activity.The challenge is to preventthecontinuationofcrimes thathavealreadybeenset inmotion,andthatrequirescompellingthetargettochangeitsbehavior.

AccordingtoSchelling,compellencecantakeoneoftwoforms.7First,it can involve brute force to defeat the perpetrators.This can take placethrough internal forces, as when the Rwandan Patriotic Front ousted thegenocidalHutu regime,or throughexternal intervention, aswhenBritishtroopsassistedaUNforceindefeatingtheRevolutionaryUnitedFront(RUF)inSierraLeone.Second, itcan involvecoercionwhere thegoal isnot todefeattheperpetrators,buttousethethreatorthedemonstrativeinflictionofpunishmenttochangetheirbehaviorbyconvincingthemthatitisintheirinteresttocomplywiththecoercer’sdemands.8ThepurposeoftheNATObombingcampaignagainsttheBosnianSerbs,initiatedinlateAugust1995,wastoraisethecostsandrisksofcontinuedcriminalviolenceforMiloševictoapointwherehebelieved thatmaintaininghispower requiredhim toreininhisalliesandtoputanendtothewar.Comparableargumentsaremadetodayvis-à-visSudan,wherebyoilsanctionsortheenforcementofano-flyzoneareproposedasleverstogetKhartoumtodisarmthemilitiasandacceptdeploymentofarobustUNforcetoprotectciviliansinDarfur.

Third,thekindofcriminaljusticeapproachthatisfeasibleintheaftermathofmassatrocityisdependentonthestrategiesthatareusedtoputittoanend.Iftheperpetratorshavebeenphysicallydefeated,theirleaderscanbeputontrialbecausetheylackthepowertopreventit.Ifonereliesinsteadon coercion, this ismoreproblematicbecause success involvespersuad-ingleaderstoputanendtocriminalviolenceforwhichtheyareprobablycomplicit.Thestrategicstudiesliteratureindicatesthatcoercionislikelytobesuccessfulifthreatsareaccompaniedbyreassurancesandifthecoercer’sdemands do not impinge on the vital security or survival interests of theregime.9Thismeansthatastrategyofcoerciveconflictresolutionwouldhave


10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9(1998).

11. Onthedistinctionbetweengeneralandspecificdeterrence,seePayamAkhavan,Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,20hum. rts. Q.746(1998).

12. SeeCitizens forGlobalSolutions, Darfur and the ICC: Justice is the Key to Recovery, global solutIons Q. 4 (2006),available athttp://www.globalsolutions.org/publications/publications_darfur_and_icc;see generallyCitizensforGlobalSolutions, In Uncharted Waters: Seeking Justice Before The Atrocities Have Stopped, The International Criminal Court in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, global solutIons Q.9(2004),available at http://www.globalsolutions.org/files/general/press/pdfs/uncharted_waters.pdf.

torefrainfromtheprosecutionofleaderswhosecooperationisneededtomakethestrategywork—atleastuntilconditionschange.InBosnia,indict-ingMiloševicin1995,assomeinternationallawyersrecommended,wouldhavebeencounterproductive toending thewarbecauseNATO’s strategywaspremisedonMiloševic’scooperationinsigningandmaintainingapeaceagreement.IndictingMiloševicduringtheKosovowardidnotcreatecom-parableproblemsbecauseNATO’s strategywas to coerce thewithdrawaloftheYugoslavarmyanddidnotanticipateacontinuingrelationshipwithMiloševic.ThelessonthatshouldbedrawnfromtheseepisodesisthatiftheinternationalcommunitymovestowardapolicyofhumanitariancoerciontostopthepoliticalviolenceinDarfur,whocanbeprosecutedwilldependonwhosecooperationisneededforapoliticalsettlement.

II. LEGAL DETERRENcE VERSUS coERcIVE DIpLoMAcY: THE LESSoNS of boSNIA

Oneof thecentralgoalsof theICCis thedeterrenceof“themostseriouscrimesofconcerntotheinternationalcommunity.”Thismissionislaidoutin thepreamble to its foundingRomeStatute:“toputanendto impunityforperpetratorsofthesecrimesandthustocontributetothepreventionofsuchcrimes.”10CentraltoitsdeterrentpotentialisthefactthattheICCisapermanentinstitution,independentofthewarringparties,andnotsubjecttothechangingnationalinterestsofthestatesthatcreatedit.Intheory,thisenhancesnotonly itsgeneraldeterrencevis-à-vis international societyasawhole,but also specificdeterrenceon theparties toanexistingarmedconflict,suchastheoneinDarfur.11Asonenon-governmentalorganization(NGO)studyputit,theICCis“intheuniquepositiontoserveasapotentialdeterrent for future incidentsofwarcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,andgenocideinDarfur.Becauseitisapermanentinternationalcriminalcourtandcaninvestigateongoingincidents,anindictmentorconvictionfromtheICCcansendaclearmessagetohumanrightsviolatorsthatsuchactswillbemetwithswiftjustice.”12ThisisalsowhymanyNGOsopposeproposals


13. Human Rights Watch Policy Paper: The Meaning of “The Interests of Justice” in Article 53 of the Rome Statute,15(June2005),available atwww.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf.

14. SeeRutiTeitel,Bringing the Messiah Through the Law, inhuman rIghts In PolItIcal transI-tIons: gettysburg to bosnIa 177–80(CarlaHesse&RobertPosteds.,1999).

15. Cited inPaul r. WIllIams & mIchael P. scharf, Peace WIth JustIce? War crImes and accountabIlIty In the former yugoslavIa99(2002).ThisfollowedwarningsfromtheSecurityCouncilofcriminalprosecutionforcriminalactsgoingbacktoJuly1992.rachel Kerr, the Interna-tIonal crImInal trIbunal for the former yugoslavIa: an exercIse In laW, PolItIcs, and dIPlomacy 33 (2004).

16. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23fordham Int’l l. J. 479–80(1999).

17. gary Jonathan bass, stay the hand of vengeance: the PolItIcs of War crImes trIbunals229–31(2000).

tosuspendcriminalproceedingsduringpeacenegotiations,eitherthroughSecurityCouncilinterventionorthroughtheprosecutorexercisingdiscretion.According toHumanRightsWatch, suchanapproachwould “mean thatprosecutions shouldonlyoccurwell after the crimeshavebeencommit-ted,longafterinstabilityhasceased.Thiswouldcompletelyundermineanyshort-termdeterrentvalue that thecourtmighthave through investigatingcurrentcrimes.”13

Theassumptionthatinvestigatingcrimesinanongoingwarcouldplayadeterrent rolewas alsooneof theofficial rationales for thecreationoftheICTY.Inthepast,warcrimestribunalshadbeenestablishedattheendofarmedconflicts,buttheICTYwascreatedon25May1993,roughlyoneyearaftertheoutbreakofthewarinBosnia.Amongitsgoals,asspelledoutinSecurityCouncilResolution827,was“themaintenanceandtherestora-tionofpeace,”anovelobjectiveforsuchatribunal.14Oneofthewaysinwhichitwoulddosowasthroughitsdeterrentimpactonthecommissionoffutureatrocities.ThisgoalwasexpressedinthepublicdiplomacyofseveralmembersoftheSecurityCouncil,includingtheFrenchambassador,whoas-sertedthatit“wouldsendaclearmessagetothosewhocontinuetocommitthesecrimesthattheywillbeheldaccountablefortheiracts.”15

AsaninstrumentfordeterringatrocitiesduringtheBosnianWar,theICTYhadnomeaningful impact. Ethnic cleansing, ledprincipallyby Serb andCroatforceswhoseleaderswereunderinvestigation,continuedunabated,asdidinterferencewithhumanitarianreliefoperationsandattacksonUNpeacekeepers.16Infact,on7July1995,morethantwoyearsafterthecre-ationoftheICTY,GeneralRatkoMladic’sforcesperpetratedtheworstsingleatrocityoftheBosnianwarwhentheyoverranandethnicallycleansedtheUN-protectedsafeareaofSrebrenica,murderingmorethan7,000Muslimmen and boys, despite the fact that less than three months earlier, ICTYprosecutorRichardGoldstonehadaskedtheBosniangovernmenttodefertohisinvestigationofMladic.OnthedayofMladic’sindictmenttwoweekslater,hisforcesinvadedZepa,anotherUN-protectedsafearea,andshortlythereafter,theyresumedtheshellingofSarajevo.17


18. Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55Int’l org.655,684(2001).

19. Teitel,supranote14,at178. 20. Forananalysisof thepoliticalmotivesofWesterngovernments increating the ICTY,

seeDavidP.Forsythe,International Criminal Courts: A Political View,15neth. Q. hum. rts.5(1997).

21. Anonymous,Human Rights in Peace Negotiations,18hum. rts. Q.249(1996). 22. James goW, trIumPh of the lacK of WIll: InternatIonal dIPlomacy and the yugoslav War37–38

(1997). 23. Id.at145–55. 24. Teitel,supranote14,at180.

Oneof the reasonswhy the threatofprosecutionhad little influenceduringtheBosnianwarwasthefailuretomeettheformalrequirementsforeffectivedeterrence.Inastudyoftheimpactofwarcrimestribunalsonstatebehavior,ChristopherRudolphidentifiedthoserequirementsascapability,commitment,andcredibility.18TheICTYlackedthecapabilitytoenforceitsowndecisionsbecauseithadnopoliceforcetostopandarrestthoseindicted.TheNATOforcesworkingwiththeUNinBosniadidhavethatcapability,though theywereunder thecontrolof theUNandnationalgovernmentswhichwouldhavehadtoconsenttotheiruseasanenforcementarmofthecourt.Intheory,theyshouldhavebeenobligatedtoenforcethelawsincetheSecurityCouncilhadinvokedChapterVII,bothindeclaringtheethniccleansingtobeathreattointernationalpeaceandsecurityandinsubject-ingitsarchitectstocriminalscrutiny.19Whatfollowed,however,indicatedthatthecreationoftheICTYwasmoreameansofdeflectingpressurefortoughactionthanitwasacommitmenttostoppingcriminalviolence.20 Ifthat commitment were genuine, one should have expected enforcementactionsagainstperpetratorsandindefenseofvictims.Instead,theprincipalconflict resolution strategywas impartialmediation, andmanydiplomatswereeitherdismissiveoftheICTYorbelievedthatitwouldcomplicatethepeaceprocess.21Thesameeven-handednessinformedtheimpositionofanarms embargo on all the parties in Bosnia, effectively favoring the SerbsbecausetheyweresupportedbytheYugoslavNationalArmy.22TheSecurityCouncilauthorizedthedeploymentofaUNProtectionForce(UNPROFOR)inBosnia,butitsinitialmandatewastheneutralprotectionofhumanitarianreliefoperations—i.e.,addressingthesymptomsofethniccleansingratherthan its causes. Even when that mandate was augmented to include theprotectionof safeareas,member stateswereunwilling todeployenoughtroopstomakeitcredible,andUNandNATOofficialswereoftenreluctanttomakegoodon thosecommitmentsbecauseof the risks topeacekeep-ers.23ThiswaswellunderstoodinPaleandBelgrade,whichmeantthatUNandNATOthreatslackedcredibility.AsRutiTeitelobserved,theICTYwas“forcedtoseekcriminalpunishmentwithinapoliticalvacuum.”24


25. TheodorMeron,From Nuremberg to The Hague,149mIlItary l. rev.107,111(1995). 26. RichardGoldstone,Bringing War Criminals to Justice during an Ongoing War inhard

choIces: moral dIlemmas In humanItarIan InterventIon 202(JonathanMooreed.,1998). 27. schellIng,supranote5,at69. 28. Onthedistinctionbetweenbruteforceandcoercion,seeid.ch.1.

SomeproponentsofinternationalcriminaljusticeacknowledgethattheICTYhad limiteddeterrent impactduring theBosnianwar,but attributedthattotheexceptionalnatureofwarcrimestribunalsatthattime—aprob-lemthatcouldberemediediftherewasastrongercommitmenttonationalandinternationalprosecutions.25Others,suchasGoldstone,pointedtothe“lackofpoliticalwillonthepartofleadingWesternnationstosupportandenforcetheordersofthetribunal.”26Asameansofpreventingmassatrocityinanongoingwar,theseargumentsconflatethestrategicconceptsofdeter-renceandcompellence.Deterrenceisdesignedtopreventsomeonefrominitiatingcriminalactivity.Yet,bythetimeaninternationalcriminaltribunalassertsjurisdictioninanongoingconflict,large-scaleatrocitieshavealreadyoccurredandresponsibilityalmostcertainlyresidesinthetopleadershipofgovernmentsandrebelgroups.Inotherwords,thoseonewouldliketodeter,suchasGeneralMladic,havealreadycommittedthecrimesthatwouldgetthem“senttoTheHague.”Judicialscrutinydoesnotcreateanynewincen-tive todesist. In thesecircumstances,what is required toend impunity isnotdeterrence,butcompellence—i.e.,stoppingorreversingactionsalreadytaken.27ThisisbecausetherealsourceofimpunityinplaceslikeBosnia(orDarfur)isthattheperpetratorsbelievethattheinternalbalanceofforcesonthegroundenablesthemtoimposetheirwillwithoutmeaningfulresistance,andthelackofinternationalpoliticalwilltostopthemmeansthattheycandosowithoutincurringsignificantexternalcosts.

Astrategyofcompellencecanchangethesecalculationseitherthrough:(1)bruteforce,tophysicallydefeatthetargetor(2)coercion,toconvincethetargettochangeitsbehaviorthroughthethreatofpunishment.Thesecondstrategycouldinvolvebothnon-militarymeasures,suchaseconomicsanc-tions,ormilitaryforce.Ifforceisused,thedistinctionfromthefirststrategyisitspurpose.Bruteforceisdesignedtodefeattheadversaryorreduceitscapabilitytoapointwhereitscooperationisunnecessary.Coercionseekstoelicititscooperationthroughthethreatorlimiteduseofviolence.28

Arecentillustrationoftheroleofbruteforceinendingimpunity—andthelimitsoflegalmechanismsinitsabsence—istheBritishinterventioninSierra Leone in the summerof 2000 to assistUN forces in defeating theRUF,arebelgroupthathadabductedthousandsofchildrenassoldiersandhadterrorizedciviliansthroughacampaignofmutilation,rape,andmurder.ThisfollowedtheRUF’sviolationofthe1999LoméPeaceAccord,whenitreturnedtopoliticalviolenceandtookUNpeacekeepershostage.Somein


29. SeeHumanRightsWatch,UNRoleinSierraLeonePeaceDealCondemned(8July1999);ConfrontingWarCrimesinAfrica,Subcomm.onAfrica,H.Comm.onInt’lRelations,108thCong.22–24 (2004) (statementofCorinneDufka,SeniorResearcherandWestAfricaTeamLeader,HumanRightsWatch).

30. James traub, the best IntentIons: KofI annan and the un In the era of amerIcan World PoWer117–22(2006).

31. george, forceful PersuasIon, supranote5,at11. 32. NicholasJ.Wheeler&TimDunne,East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention-

ism,77Int’l aff.818–20(2001). 33. traub,supranote30,at103–08. 34. george, forceful PersuasIon, supranote5,at5.

thehumanrightscommunityattributedthebreakdownofLométoitsblanketamnesty,adecisionthatreinforcedtheRUF’sbeliefinitsownimpunitybyignoringthedeterrentcontributionofprosecution.29Thisargumentmistakessymptoms forcauses.Whatmade for theRUF’s impunityafterLoméwasthefactthatithadnotbeendefeatedmilitarily,thatNigeria,whichledtheWestAfricanpeacekeepingforcethathadkeptitatbay,wantedtopulloutofSierraLeone,andthattheUNwasonlywillingtoreplacethatforcewithneutralpeacekeepers.ThatimpunityonlyendedwiththeBritishintervention,withoutwhichtheRUFwouldnothavebeendefeatedandtherewouldneverhavebeenaSpecialCourtforSierraLeonetotrythosemostresponsibleforatrocitiesduringthatcountry’sbrutalcivilwar.30

Strategiesofcoercion,bycontrast,seeknottoincapacitateanopponent,but rather to “erodehismotivation to continuewhathe isdoing”by the“expectationofcostsofsufficientmagnitude.”31Suchstrategiescaninvolvetheuseof non-forciblemeasures, such as economic sanctions.After EastTimor’svotefor independencefromIndonesiain1999,militiassupportedbytheIndonesianarmywentonarampageoflootingandlarge-scalevio-lenceagainstcivilians. In response, theClintonadministration threatenedtolinkfutureIMFandWorldBankloanstoIndonesia’swillingnesstostopthe violence.32 Given Jakarta’s vulnerability to such sanctions during theAsianFinancialCrisis,itagreedtowithdrawitsforcesandenditssupportforthemilitias,creatingapermissiveenvironmentforthedeploymentofanAustralian-ledpeacekeepingforce.33

Inthestrategicstudiesliterature,themilitaryvariantofthisstrategyisreferredtoas“coercivediplomacy,”whichisdefinedasthethreator“exem-plaryuseofquitelimitedforcetopersuadetheopponenttobackdown.”34ThiswastheUnitedStates-ledNATOstrategyfrom28Augustto14September1995,when it initiatedOperationDeliberateForce,abombingcampaignagainstBosnianSerbmilitarytargets,pursuedincombinationwithaCroa-tianoffensivetoretaketheKrajina,whichSerbiahadconqueredin1991,andajointCroat-BosnianoffensiveinWesternBosnia.ThepurposeofforcewasnottodefeattheSerbsmilitarily,buttoconvinceMiloševicthathewasoverextended,thattimewasnotonthesideoftheBosnianSerbs,andthat


35. StevenL.Burg,Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans: The U.S. Use of Force in Bosnia and Kosovo, in the unIted states and coercIve dIPlomacy65–66 (Robert J.Art&PatrickM.Cronineds.,2003).

36. george, forceful PersuasIon, supranote5,at13. 37. Duringthepeacenegotiations,HobrookeshowedMiloševictheCIAfiledocumenting

his communications with Arkan, one of the most vicious Serb paramilitary leaders,inorder topresshim tocrackdownon theBosnianSerbs,overwhomhehadmorecontrolthanheclaimed.ThisevidencewasnotsharedwithGoldstonetobuildalegalcaseagainstMiloševic forhiscomplicitywithcriminalviolence inBosnia.SeePIerre hazan, JustIce In a tIme of War: the true story behInd the InternatIonal crImInal trIbunal for the former yugoslavIa192(2004);bass,supranote17,at236–37.

38. KennethRoth,Sidelined on Human Rights,77foreIgn aff.5(1998). 39. SeeAkhavan,supranote11,at738–39;commentsbyRichardGoldstoneinAmnesty

International,OpenLettertotheChiefProsecutoroftheInternationalCriminalCourt:CommentsontheConceptoftheInterestsofJustice7–8(17June2005).

40. HumanRightsWatchPolicyPaper:TheMeaningof“TheInterestsofJustice”inArticle53oftheRomeStatute(June2005),available athttp://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ij070505.pdf.

itwasinhisinteresttocompromiseandendthewar.35This,inturn,wasaprerequisitetogainingtheconsentofallthreewarringpartiestotheDaytonPeaceAgreementandthedeploymentofaNATOpeacekeepingoperation.

Coercive diplomacy, however, is problematic from the standpoint ofinternationalcriminaljusticebecauseitspurposeistoalterthewayatargetcalculatesitsinterests.Thescholarlyliteratureoncoercivediplomacyindi-catesthatthisismostlikelytobeachievedif“theobjectiveselected—andthedemandmade—bythecoercingpowerreflectsonlythemostimportantofitsinterests”ratherthanthosethat“infringeonthevitalorveryimportantinterestsoftheadversary.”36Ifthecentralgoalofcoercivebargainingwithanabusivegovernment is toendawarwhoseprincipalvictimsarecivil-ians,successdependsonwhetherthreatsandpunishmentscanconvincethetargetthatcomplianceisnecessaryforitslong-termsecurity.Ifthosegoalsareexpanded to include thecriminalprosecutionof its leaders, then thisamountstoademandforregimechange,makingthetarget’scomplianceallbutimpossible.Thecoerceristhenconfrontedwiththechoiceofacquiescingtoamorallyintolerablestatusquoorescalatingtheuseofforcetoapointwherethetargetisdefeatedanditscooperationisnolongernecessary.Bythesummerof1995,neitheroftheseoptionswaspalatabletotheUSandNATO inBosnia.Hence, atDayton, theydealtwithMiloševic through abargainingparadigmratherthanacriminaljusticeparadigm.37

ManyNGOsandhumanrightslawyersopposedthesecompromiseswithcriminaljustice.Onelineofargumentisthattheconflictbetweenjusticeandpeacehasbeenexaggerated.38Despite thewarningsofsomeUNofficialsandinternationalmediators,theindictmentsofKaradžicandMladicdidnotderailtheDaytonpeaceprocess.Nordidthe1999indictmentofMiloševicpreventaresolutionoftheKosovowarthatenabledtherefugeestoreturntotheirhomes.39Infact,theindictmentshelpedmarginalizedisruptiveactorswhowouldlikelyhavethreatenedthepostwarpeaceprocesses.40


41. Seegeorge, forceful PersuasIon, supranote5,at71. 42. SeedereK h. chollet, the road to the dayton accords: a study of amerIcan statecraft 59,

198–200(2005);bass,supranote17,at232–39. 43. Burg,supranote35,at94–96. 44. WIllIams & scharf,supranote15,at151–69. 45. schellIng,supranote5,at74. 46. WIllIams & scharf,supranote15,at161–66. 47. Id.at26,160–61.

Theproblemwith thisargument is that it generalizes from individualcaseswithoutaccountingforthepolitical(i.e.,bargaining)contextsinwhichtheindictmentswereissued.AlexanderGeorgeobservedthat“theobjectiveofcoercivediplomacyandthemeansemployedonitsbehalfarelikelytobe sensitive to the typeof relationship the coercingpowerplans tohavewiththeopponentafter thecrisis isover.”41Thismeansthat theimpactofcriminal justiceonpeaceprocessesdependsonwhether thecooperationofthosewhomightbetargetsofprosecutionisnecessarytonegotiateandmaintainapoliticalsettlement.In1995,UnitedStatesenvoyRichardHol-brookeconcludedthatitwasfutiletonegotiatewithKaradžicandMladicsincetheywerespoilerswhohadrenegedonvirtuallyeverycommitmenttheyhadmade to internationalmediators.He therefore sought tobypassthem and concentrate his pressure on Miloševic to both speak for themand to rein them in. Indicting Karadžic and Mladic assisted this strategy.Indicting Miloševic would have undermined it because his cooperationwas seen as necessary to negotiate and implement Dayton.42The actualindictment of Miloševic during the KosovoWar took place in a differentbargaining context, in which Miloševic was seen as the principal sourceof instability in the region rather than thekey to thepeaceprocess.Asaresult, Miloševic’s continuing cooperation was not necessary for NATO’swar termination strategy.All thatwas requiredwas thewithdrawalof theYugoslavThirdArmyfromKosovo.43

Anothercritique,put forwardby some international lawyers, rejectedpeacenegotiationswithMiloševicbecausetheyaccommodatedawarcrimi-nal.44 Indeed, as Schelling notes, successful coercive diplomacy requiresaccommodation as well as confrontation: “threats require correspondingassurances; the objective of a threat is to give somebody a choice.”45AtDayton,thoseassurancesincludedanautonomousRepublikaSrpskacom-prising49percentofthecountry,nomandatorysurrenderofindictedwarcriminalsonpainofsanctions,andapromisetomovetowardnormalizedeconomicrelations.46PaulWilliamsandMichaelScharfcondemnthisasastrategyof“coerciveappeasement”whichsacrificedjusticebyratifyingthegainsmade throughethniccleansingand legitimizingamanwhoshouldhavebeenprosecuted.47 Instead, theyadvocateapolicyof legal rectitudethatrejectsnegotiationswithwarcriminals.Inthis,theycriticizenotonly


48. PaulR.Williams&PatriciaTaft,The Role of Justice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement,35case Western reserve l. rev.219,232(2003).

49. WIllIams & scharf,supranote15,at126–27,159. 50. Id.at156;See alsoWilliams&Taft,supranote48,at222. 51. DavidRohdesuggeststhatallowingthewartocontinuemighthaveweakenedMiloševic’s

griponpowerindavId rohde, endgame: the betrayal and fall of srebrenIca, euroPe’s Worst massacre sInce World War II340(1997).

52. WIllIams & scharf,supranote15,at120–21. 53. chollet,supranote42,at97–98.

Holbrooke,butalsoGoldstonefornotindictingMiloševicin1995underthetheoryofcommandresponsibility,eveniftherewasnotyetsufficientdirectevidenceofhiscomplicityinthecrimeshesetinmotion.Bynotpursuingamoreaggressiveprosecutorialstrategy,theICTYfailedin“itsproperroleininfluencingthepeaceprocessbyprecludingnegotiationswiththoserespon-sibleforinternationalcrimes.”48Italsounderminedthecourt’sdeterrentrole,convincingMiloševicthathecouldreturntothepracticeofethniccleansinginKosovothreeyearslaterwithoutanylegalconsequence.49

Ifonerefusestoengagecriminalleadersinanongoingwar,thepremiseunderlyingthatchoiceisthebeliefthatthecontinuationofthewarislikelyto lead toabetteroutcome thananegotiatedcompromise.WilliamsandScharfacknowledgethisinassertingthatjusticecanprovidemoralbackingforamorerobustuseofforceonbehalfofthevictims,thoughtheydonotexplicitly layout thespecificstrategythatshouldhavebeenpursued.Theclosesttheycometodoingsoisintheircritiqueofthedecisiontopressurethe Croatian and Bosnian forces to accept a cease-fire in October 1995,notingthat“iftheoffensivecontinued,theCroatiansandBosniansmaywellhavebeenabletodefeattheSerbianforcesandtherebyreunifyBosnia.”50

Acasecanbemade that thecontinuationof thewarmighthave ledtoamore justandstablepeace than thecompromisesatDayton.51Thereisalsoreasontobeskepticalofthatcase,givenCroatia’sexpulsionofSerbciviliansfollowingitsreconquestoftheKrajinaandthefactthatitsleader,FranjoTudjman,wasasguiltyasMiloševic inseeking theethnicpartitionofBosnia,whichincludedthebrutaldeportationoftheMuslimpopulationofMostarinMay1993.Indeed,WilliamsandScharfacknowledgethisandassertthatTudjmanshouldhavebeenindictedsimultaneouslywithMiloševicin1995.52Thisraises thequestionofwhether itwaspossible toreconcilelegalrectitudewiththelegitimateuseofforce.

Whateverthemeritsoftheargumentforallowingthewartocontinue,whatwasmoreimportantwasthatboththeUnitedStatesandtheEuropewerecommittedtoanegotiatedsolution.Bothfearedthatcontinuedfightingcouldhave triggereddirect Serbian interventionandawiderwar.53WereGoldstonetohaveindictedMiloševic,inordertoexcludehimfrompeacetalks, the negotiations would likely have taken place anyway and there


54. One ICTYofficial interviewedbyBass, acknowledged thisconstraint: “Youhave twooptions...A,youcanindictMiloševicandbeshutdown.B,oryoucandolow-level[indictments]anddoafewtrials,likeMladicandKaradžic.”Cited inbass,supranote17,at229.

55. hazan,supranote37,at192. 56. Id. 57. On the failureofdeterrenceandcoercivediplomacy in theperiod leadingup to the

Kosovowar,seeBurg,supranote35,at70–84. 58. Foranoverview,seegérard PrunIer, darfur: the ambIguous genocIde61–88(2007).

wouldhavebeenaseriousriskthattheICTYwouldnothavebeenpartofthe Dayton accords.54 Moreover, it is unclear how indicting Miloševic in1995wouldhavedissuadedhiminKosovosincehewouldhaveremainedacriminalsubjecttoanarrestwarrantregardlessofwhathedid.TheactualapproachtojusticeemployedatDayton—maintainingtheICTYandnotgrant-inganyamnesties—wasbetterpositionedtoinfluenceMiloševic’sbehaviorsince,inPierreHazan’swords,ithelda“swordofDamocles”overhimthatmight fall in response to futurebehavior.55Hazan iscriticalofpoliticiansusingthecourtasa“meansofpressure, inthesamewaytheywouldusethreatsofsanctionsorairstrikes.”56Whileinstrumentalizingjusticeinthisway iscontrary to thekindof legal rectitudeadvocatedbyproponentsofinternationalcriminaljustice,it ismoreconsistentwiththelogicofdeter-rence.ThefactthatitdidnotdeterMiloševicinKosovoindicatesthatthethreatofprosecution—andmoreimportantly,thethreatofusingforce—wasnotseenassufficientlycredibletoMiloševictoinfluencehisaims.57

III. THE DARfUR REfERRAL To THE INTERNATIoNAL cRIMINAL coURT

A. The Road to the Icc

TheDarfurcasewas referred to the ICCon31March2005, roughly twoyears after theoutbreakof thewar.Thiswarwas the latest in a series ofviolentconflictsthathavetheiroriginsinthecompetitionbetweenAfricanfarmersandArabherdersforcontroloverarablelandthathasbeenreced-ingastheresultofdroughtanddesertification.TheconflicthasalsobeenexacerbatedbyKhartoum’sneglectoftheregionintermsofitsdevelopmentpriorities,andits“divideandrule”policiesthathavefavoredDarfur’sArabinhabitants,fromwhomtheyhaverecruitedmilitiaswhohavetargetedtheregion’snon-Arabpopulation.58

ThecatalystforthemostrecentviolencewastheNaivashapeaceprocess,whichprovidedtheblueprintforendingtheSudanesecivilwarbetweenthe


59. JulIe flInt & alex de Waal, darfur: a short hIstory of a long War99–100(2005). 60. PrunIer,supranote58,at97. 61. Id.at103. 62. flInt & de Waal,supranote59,at39. 63. adam lebor, “comPlIcIty WIth evIl”: the unIted natIons In the age of modern genocIde141

(2006). 64. cheryl o. IgIrI & PrInceton n. lyman, gIvIng meanIng to “never agaIn”: seeKIng an effec-

tIve resPonse to the crIsIs In darfur and beyond 5–6 (2004),available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7402/giving_meaning_to_never_again.html.

IslamistArabgovernment inKhartoumand JohnGarang’sSudanPeople’sLiberationArmy(SPLA),whichrepresentsthepredominantlyChristianandanimistpopulationinthesouth.InFebruary2003,justoneweekafterthefirstroundofpeacenegotiations,tworebelgroups,theSudaneseLiberationArmy(SLA)andtheJusticeandEqualityMovement(JEM),attackedgovern-mentinstallationsinordertoprotestDarfur’sexclusionfromthepowerandresource-sharingarrangementsthatwerepartofthenorth-southagreement.The government largely ignored these attacks until a joint SLA-JEM forceoverrantheElFasherairbaseon25April2003.59

TheElFasherattackalarmedKharotum,whichsawinittheriskofseces-sionandpoliticaldisintegrationatatimewhenitwascommittingitselftoregionalautonomy,andpossibleindependence, in thesouth.Thegovern-mentwasthereforedeterminedtodefeattherebelsmilitarily,bothdirectlythroughtheSudanesearmyandairforce,andbyproxy,throughrecruitingArab tribal militias who became known as the janjaweed.60 Its counter-insurgencystrategywasnottoengagetheSLAandJEMdirectly.Rather,itwastoattacktheregion’sAfricanpopulationfromwhomtherebelsderivedtheirsupport,orasGérardPrunierputit,usingMao’sfamousmetaphor,to“drainthepondinwhichtheguerrillasswim.”61Thisinvolvedstrafingvil-lageswithhelicoptergunshipsandbombingwithimprovisedAntonovsupplyplanes.Thejanjaweedwouldfollowupbyattackingthevillages,engaginginmurder, rape, torture, looting, theburningofhomes, thedestructionoflivestock,andthepoisoningofwells.Theunderlyingstrategy,asputforthinadirectivefrom janjaweedleaderMusaHilaltogovernmentintelligenceservices,wasto“changethedemographyofDarfurandemptyitofAfricantribes.”62AsAdamLeborobserved,thiswas“theMiloševicmodel,adjustedforAfrica.”63

In 2003, Darfur was not a human rights priority of the internationalcommunity.TherewerewarningsofanimpendingcatastrophefromsomeNGOs,suchasAmnesty International,andfromJanEgeland, theUNun-dersecretaryforhumanitarianaffairs.64Nonetheless, theprincipalconcernof theUNSecretariat, andmostof the international community, vis-à-visSudanwastheNaivashapeaceprocess—therewasareluctancetoaddressDarfurinawaythatmightcomplicateNaivasha’scompletion.Asaresult,


65. PrunIer,supranote58,at107. 66. traub, supranote30,at219. 67. Id. at220–21. 68. lebor,supranote63,at195. 69. PrunIer,supranote58,at139. 70. S.C.Res.1547,U.N.SCOR,4988thmtg.,¶7,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1547(2004). 71. NsonguruaJ.Udombana,When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of

Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan,27hum. rts. Q.1149,1181–82(2005).

theUnitedNationsinitialresponsewassimilartothatinBosnia;namely,totreatDarfurasahumanitarianproblembyaddressingthesymptomsoftheviolenceratherthanitscauses,andasadiplomaticproblem,byassistinganegotiatingprocesscomparabletotheonethatwasendingthewarbetweenKhartoumandtheSPLA.65

Darfurbegantoemergeasahumanrightspriorityinthespringof2004.On21March,MukeshKapila, theUNCoordinator inSudan,gaveanin-terviewwiththeBBC—withouthissuperiors’authorization—accusingthegovernmentandthe janjaweedof“anorganizedattempttodoawaywithagroupofpeople”andanalogizingthesituationtotheearlyphasesoftheRwandan genocide.66 Kapila’s interview generated considerable publicityandwasfollowedbyJanEgeland’stestimonybeforetheSecurityCouncilongovernmentandjanjaweedresponsibilityforethniccleansing,aspeechbyKofiAnnantotheUNHumanRightsCommissioninwhichhesuggestedthepossibilityofhumanitarianintervention,andareportbytheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerofHumanRightsconfirmingmassiveandcriminalviolationsofhumanrights.67ThepublicityalsogalvanizedseveralNGOstoraisetheprofileoftheDarfurcase.WithintheUnitedStates,itcatalyzedthecreationoftheSaveDarfurCoalitionanallianceofliberalhumanrightsgroupsandreligiousconservatives,whosecooperationinopposingKhartoum’shumanrightsabuses in the southwasextended toDarfur.68This, in turn,got theattentionoftheBushadministration.WhileitdidnotwanttorocktheboatonNaivasha, forwhichitplayedakeymediatingrole,oronthegrowingcounter-terrorismcooperationwithSudan,itspublicdiplomacyonDarfurbecameincreasinglyoutspoken.69

TheSecurityCouncil’sfirst reference toDarfurwasashortparagraphin Resolution 1547 (11 June 2004), whose purpose was to endorse andpledgesupportforthenorth-southpeaceprocess.70Withinthatcontext,itdidcallonthe“partiestousetheirinfluencetobringanimmediatehalttothefightingintheDarfurregion.”Italsowelcomedthecease-firethatwasnegotiatedinN’djamenainApril,andendorseditsmonitoringbytheAfricanUnionMissioninSudan(AMIS).71ThiswasthefirstofficialstatementoftheUnitedNationsthen-existingpolicyofapplyingtoDarfurthesamekindofimpartialChapterVImodelusedinNaivasha.


72. S.C.Res.1556,U.N.SCOR,5015thmtg.,¶6,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1556(2004). 73. AlexBellamy,Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Hu-

manitarian Intervention after Iraq,19Ethics & int’l Aff. 31,43(2005). 74. S.C.Res.1556,supranote72,¶7. 75. Bellamy,supranote73,at41. 76. igiri & lymAn,supranote64,at16. 77. Bellamy,supranote73,at45. 78. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D.Williams, The UN Security Council and the Question of

Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur,5J. mil. Ethics153–54(2006). 79. igiri & lymAn,supranote64,at17.

SecurityCouncilResolution1556(30July2004)—thefirstspecificallyonDarfur—superficiallychangedthisapproachbycallingonKhartoumtodisarmthejanjaweedwithinthirtydaysandbringitsleaderstojustice.72AlexBellamycharacterizeditasa“Janus-facedresolution,”becauseit invokedChapterVII,indicatingathreattointernationalpeacethatrequiredenforce-ment,butneithercriticized thegovernmentnorspelledoutwhat specificsanctionswouldbeimposedshouldthegovernmentfail tocomply.73Andwhile it imposedanarmsembargoon“allnon-governmentalentitiesandindividuals” in theDarfur region, thatdidnot extend to thegovernment,whichwasarmingandsupportingthejanjaweed.74AswiththeBosnianarmsembargo,thiswasanostensiblyneutralactionthatworkedtotheadvantageofthestrongerparty.

Thereasonfortheweakenforcementprovisionswastheconfigurationof state interests in theSecurityCouncil.TheUnitedStates took themostforceful stand, both rhetorically and in its advocacy of an explicit threatof sanctions. Sudan was very skillful in countering this by characterizingtheUnited States’ position as a formof neocolonial interference, andbyanalogizing it to some of the rationales the Bush administration had putforwardtojustifythewarinIraq.ThisargumenthadstrongresonancewithmanygovernmentsfromtheSouth,particularlytheArabLeague,whowereskepticalofhumanitarianargumentsthatcouldbeusedasencroachmentsonnationalsovereignty.75ChinaandRussiaalsoopposedsanctions,inpartonsovereigntygrounds,butalsoduetoeconomicself-interest,sinceChinaisthelargestinvestorinSudan’soilproductionandRussiaisamajorsup-plierofarms.76Othercountries,suchasGreatBritain,wereconcernedthataconfrontationalpolicymightcomplicatetheNaivashaprocess,aconcernsharedbymanywithintheUNSecretariat.77NordidtheUnitedStatesex-pendmuchdiplomaticcapitalinbuildingastrongerconsensussinceDarfurwasnotapriorityissue.78

Calls for tougher action against the Sudanese government intensifiedafter theSecretaryGeneral’sreport foundsubstantialnoncompliancewithSecurity Council directives.79 The United States also adopted a strongerrhetorical position when Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to theUSSenateForeignRelationsCommittee that “genocidehasoccurredand


80. The Current Situation in Sudan and the Prospects for Peace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 9 (2004) (statement of Colin Powell, Secretary ofStateoftheUnitedStates).

81. Id. 82. Bellamy,supranote73,at46. 83. S.C.Res.1565,U.N.SCOR,5040thmtg.,¶¶2,7,9,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1565(2004). 84. flInt & de Waal,supranote59,at128. 85. S.C.Res.1565,supra note83,¶12. 86. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations

Secretary General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September2004,supranote2,at¶¶507–18.The reportacknowledged that somegovernmentofficialsandmilitialeadersmayhaveactedwithgenocidalintent,butthatcouldonlybedeterminedbyacompetentcourt.Id.¶520.

maystillbeoccurringinDarfur.”80Powelldidaddthat“nonewactionisdictatedbythisdesignation,”meaningthattheUnitedStateswasnotgoingto try tostop theviolenceon itsown. Instead, itwouldpush forstrongermultilateral actions, citing Article 8 of the Genocide Convention, whichrequires stateparties tocallon the“competentorgansof theUnitedNa-tions” to take action to prevent and suppress genocide.81At the SecurityCouncil,theUnitedStatescirculatedadraftresolutionthatdeclaredSudantobeinmaterialbreachofResolution1556,expandedtheAfricanUnion(AU)force,imposedtargetedsanctions,andinitiatedaninvestigationasafirststeptowardestablishingaccountability.82

SecurityCouncilResolution1564 (18September2004) fell consider-ably short of themore forceful approach advocated by theUnited Statesand several activist groups, largelybecauseof the samecoalitionsofna-tional interest thatblocked toughaction in July. Itdid reiterate itscallontheSudanesegovernmenttodisarmandprosecutethejanjaweed,andfortheaugmentationoftheAUpeacekeepingforce.83Therewas,however,noexplicitcriticismof theSudanesegovernment,no impositionofsanctionsfornoncompliance,northeirexplicitlinkagetofuturecompliancebeyondthe possible future consideration of sanctions against Sudan’s oil sectororgovernmentofficials.AsJulieFlintandAlexdeWaalputit,“KhartoumcrossedtheSecurityCouncil’sredline.Nothinghappened.”84

TheresolutiondidtakethefirststepstowardtheICCwhenitcalledontheSecretaryGeneraltosetupanInternationalCommissionofInquiry(ICI),whosemandatewastoinvestigateviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlawandhumanrightslaw,todeterminewhethergenocidehastakenplace,and“toidentifytheperpetratorsofsuchviolationswithaviewtoensuringthat those responsible are held accountable.”85The Commission’s report,whichwas releasedon25 January2005, found that thegovernment andthemilitiaswereresponsibleforwidespreadandsystematicattacksonthecivilianpopulationthatconstitutedwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity,butnotgenocide,asPowellhadalleged,becausethegovernment’sintentinattackingcivilianswastofightacounter-insurgencywar,nottoexterminateaprotectedgroup.86Eventhoughitcouldnotsubstantiatethegenocidecharge,


87. Id. ¶522. 88 Id.¶¶571–72. 89. Bellamy&Williams,supranote78,at155. 90. WarrenHoge,US Lobbies UN on Darfur and International Court,n.y. tImes,29 Jan.

2005,atA8. 91. ColumLynch,U.S. Urges War Crimes Tribunal for Wartime Atrocities,WASH.POST,28

Jan.2005,atA23. 92. JuanMendez,Action is Needed to Resolve Darfur Crisis,fInancIal tImes,7Mar.2005,

at15. 93. Bellamy&Williams,supranote78,at155. 94. AdeleWaugaman,The United States in Darfur: Trapped by “Genocide,”Int’l Just. trIbune,

N.36,21Nov.2005.

thatdidnotdiminishitsassessmentofthegravityofcrimesinDarfurbecause“thecrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimesmaybenolessseriousandheinousthangenocide.”87ResponsibilityforthesecrimeswasattributedtothemostseniorofficialsintheSudanesemilitaryandgovernment,andthecommissioncompiledaconfidentiallistoffifty-onenamesthatshouldbeinvestigatedbyacompetentprosecutor.TheSecurityCouncilwasurgedtoreferthecasetotheICC,thelegalbodybestequippedtorenderexpeditiousandimpartialjustice.88

Thislastrecommendationtriggeredatwo-monthcontroversyoverthepropervenueforprosecution.89TothesupportersoftheICCintheUNandtheNGOcommunity, theCommission’s recommendationwas the logicalchoice.However,sinceSudanisanon-partytotheRomeStatute,theDarfurcasecouldonlybereferredtotheICCthroughaSecurityCouncilresolu-tion, which meant overcoming potential vetoes from China, Russia, andalso, from the foremost advocateof toughermeasures, theUnitedStates.Thiswasbecause theBushadministration,whichsawthe ICCasa threatto its freedom of action to use military force and to US sovereignty, hadbeenwagingacampaignbothtodelegitimizethecourtandtoimmunizeAmericanseverywhere from its reach.Asa result, it initiallyopposed thereferral because, as the US Ambassador for War Crimes, Pierre RichardProsperstated,“Wedon’twanttobepartytolegitimizingtheI.C.C.”90Initsstead,theUnitedStatesproposedanAfricancourt,eitherusingtheexistingRwandan tribunal inArusha,Tanzania,orcreatinganewadhoc tribunalthroughtheAU.91TheUSpositionwassharplycriticizedbyNGOsupportersoftheICCandbytheUNSpecialRapporteurforGenocide,JuanMendez,whowrotethatsincetheICCwasalreadyinplace,itwas“thequickestandmosteffectivewaytoinitiatejudicialproceedings.”92ThepositionwasalsorejectedbytheEuropeanUnion,includingtheUnitedKingdom,forwhomtheICCreferralwasnon-negotiable.93GiventheUnitedStatesisolationonthisissue,andthedissonancebetweenitspublicdiplomacyonDarfuranditsanti-ICCstance,itspositionwaspoliticallyunsustainable.Asaresult,itsoughtacompromisethatwouldallowittomaintainitsoppositiontotheICCwhileacquiescingtothereferral.94


95. RobertCryer,Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice,19leIden J. Int’l l. 195, 222(2006).

96. EliseKeppler&YolandaJ.Revilla,Council Makes Historic Referral on Darfur to ICC,29Icc monItor 1(2005).

97. First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 5 (29 June2005).

98. Mendez,supranote92.See alsoPressRelease,HumanRightsWatch,UN:PassResolutiontoReferDarfurtoICC,25Mar.2005,available athrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/25/su-dan10371.htm.

99. See SamanthaPower,Court of First Resort,n.y. tImes, 10 Feb. 2005, atA1;KennethRoth,Bring the Darfur Killers to the World Court,fInancIal tImes,18Nov.2004,at15.

100. Quoted inNicholasKristof,Why Should We Shield the Killers?n.y. tImes, 2 Feb.2005,atA21.

101. Roth,Bring the Darfur Killers,supranote99.

TheDarfurcasewassenttotheICCthroughSecurityCouncilResolution1593on31March2005,withelevenaffirmativevotesandfourabstentions,includingChinaand theUnitedStates.95TheUSabstentionwasobtainedinexchangeforanexemptionfromICCjurisdictionforallnon-partystatesinvolvedinUNorAUauthorizedoperationsintheSudan.ThisconcessiontotheBushadministrationwassharplycriticizedbythecourt’ssupportersintheNGOcommunity,whononethelesswelcomedthereferralasanimpor-tantsteptowardendingimpunityinDarfur.96TheSecretaryGeneralthenputtheprocessinmotionbyhandingtheprosecutorthelistoffifty-onenamesthathadbeencompiledbytheCommissionofInquiry.On1June2005,theProsecutoracceptedthecaseandinitiatedaformalinvestigation.97

b. The Impact of the Icc on Impunity in Darfur

Oneof thecentralargumentsdeployedbyproponentsof the ICCreferralwas that prosecution would deter criminal violence, and hence, provideprotectiontocivilians.98Asevidenceofthis,somehumanrightsadvocateswho visited Sudan observed that several government officials and militialeadersexpressedconcernaboutbecominginternationalfugitiveswhomightget “sent toTheHague.”99Thatwasoneof the reasonswhymanyNGOsexpressedasenseofurgencyinusingacourtthatwasalreadyoperationalrather than waiting, as the United States had proposed, to create a new,Africantribunal.AsHumanRightsWatchExecutiveDirector,KennethRothstated,“TheI.C.C.couldstartsavinglivesnow.”100Rothalsoanalogizedthepotential contributionof the ICC inDarfur to thatof the ICTY inBosnia:“IftheICCtakesupDarfur,thegovernmentwouldhavetobeginhigh-levelprosecutionsor, as inBosniawhenan international tribunal launched itsownprosecution,abusive leaderswouldbemarginalizedas they tried toevadearrest.Eitherresultwouldhelpcurbtheviolence.”101


102. S.C.Res.1591,SCOR,5153rdmtg.,U.N.Doc.S/RES/1591(2005).103. David Zweig & Bi Jianhi, China’s Global Hunt for Energy, 84 foreIgn aff. 25, 32

(Sept.–Oct.2005).104. IgIrI & lyman,supranote64,at24.105. S.C.Res.1591,supranote102,¶3.106. InternatIonal crIsIs grouP, gettIng the un Into darfur6–7(12Oct.2006).

The reasonwhy the ICCreferralhashadno impacton“saving lives”inDarfurliesintheproblemwiththeBosniananalogy.TheICTY’sindict-mentsofMladicandKaradžicdidindeedcontributetothecurbingethnicviolencebyisolatingthemostvirulentethnicextremists,butonlyafterthewarhadended,andthatrequiredNATO’suseofairpowerandarangeofothercoercivemeasuresagainstPaleandBelgrade.Bycontrast,whenNATOandtheUNissuedemptythreatstheywereunwillingtoenforce,andwerereluctant tomovebeyondneutralpeacekeepingand impartialmediation,those under investigation or indictment were hardly marginalized. It wasonly when the purported commitment to punish criminal behavior wascomplementedbyadeterminationtostopandpreventitthatimpunityonthe ground ended, and the ICTY was able to play a constructive role inremovingcriminalspoilersfromthepoliticalscene.

Theproblemwith theDarfur referral is that itwas issued inan inter-nationalpoliticalcontextcomparabletoBosniapriortoAugust1995.First,thereferralwasnotaccompaniedbyanymeaningfulchangeinthepenal-tiesthreatened,orimposed,onKhartoumfornoncompliancewithpreviousresolutions.TheSecurityCouncildidpassasanctionsresolution(1591)twodaysbeforetheICCreferral,butitsprovisionswereincommensuratewithacommitmenttosubjectthegovernmenttocriminalscrutiny.102Thosesanctionsdidnotincludeoil,whichrepresents90percentofthegovernment’sexportearnings,becauseof thethreatofaChineseveto.103 Inaddition, thearmsembargowasnotextended from theDarfur region to thegovernment. Infact,RussiawascompletingasaleofAntonovsupplyplanesastheSecurityCouncilwasdeliberating.104 Smart sanctions, such as travel bansor assetfreezes, were neither imposed on the Sudanese leadership nor explicitlylinkedtocompliancewithpreviousSecurityCouncilresolutions.Instead,theSecurityCouncilestablishedacommitteetorecommendtargetedsanctionsagainstthosepersonsfoundtobemostresponsibleforcease-fireviolationsandatrocities against civilians.105On25April 2006,more thanoneyearlater,theSecurityCouncilacceptedthecommittee’srecommendation,ap-plyingsanctionseven-handedlyonaSudanesemilitaryofficial,janjaweedleaderMusaHilal,andtworebelcommanders.106

AsecondparallelwiththeICTYduringtheBosnianwaristheunwill-ingnessoftheUNorregionalactorstomovebeyondneutralpeacekeepingandmediation.TheSecurityCouncildidauthorizeapeacekeeping force,theUnitedNationsMission inSudan (UNMIS) threedaysbefore the ICC


107. Paul D.Williams, Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,13Int’l PeaceKeePIng174(2006).

108. LydiaPolgreen,U.N. Council Votes to Send Troops to Darfur; Sudan Objects,n.y. tImes,1Sept.2006,atA3.

109 center on InternatIonal cooPeratIon,ANNUALREVIEWOFGLOBALPEACEOPERATIONS77–78 (2008),available athttp://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/internationalsecurity/docs/Fi-nal2008briefingreport.pdf.

110. LydiaPolgreen,Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles,N.Y.TIMES,24Mar.2008,atA1;WarrenHoge,U.N. Officials Tell of Impasse in Darfur Peacekeeping Task,N.Y.TIMES,9Feb.2008,atA5.

referral(Resolution1590).ItsmissionwastosupervisetheComprehensivePeaceAgreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the SPLA that was final-izedinJanuary2005.NoneofthoseforceswerededicatedtoDarfur.ThismeanttheonlypeacekeepingpresenceinDarfurwasanunderstaffedandunderfundedAUmissionthathadbeendeployedtomonitoranon-existentcease-fire.107 In other words, civilian protection was entrusted to a forcewith fewer resources, and a more limited mandate, than UNPROFOR inBosnia.As inBosnia, this reinforced thecultureof impunity inDarfurbytellingKhartoum,andthejanjaweed,thattheywouldnothavetocontendwithaseriousmilitarypresence.

The Security Council attempted to remedy this through Resolution1706(31August2006),authorizingamorerobustUNforceof20,600toaugmenttheAUforcewithastrongermandateforcivilianprotection.Theresolution“invited”Sudaneseconsent,whichwasdeclined.108AnapparentcompromisewasreachedinAddisAbabainNovembertocreateahybridAU-UNforce,whichwouldbemoreacceptabletoSudanesesensitivities,butPresidentBashirsubsequentlybackedoutoftheagreement.Sincethen,Sudanhas agreed to thedeployment of 3000UNpersonnel as part of aheavysupportpackageworkingwiththeAU,andlater,tothedeploymentof a 26,000 United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)withamandate toprotectcivilians.109Nonetheless,onlya fractionof theforcehasbeendeployedandKhartoumhassetlimitsonitsautonomyandcomposition,blockingtheparticipationofspecializednon-Africanpersonnelwhosecontributionisconsideredvitaltothemission.110DespitethefactthatboththeICCreferralandUNAMIDwereauthorizedunderChapterVII,theSecurityCouncilhasnevermovedbeyondwhatwas inpracticeapacificsettlementapproachinwhichthetermsofanypeacekeepingmissionwoulddependuponSudaneseconsentandtherewouldbenopenaltiesforwith-holdingitorforimposingconditionsthatamountedtoobstruction.

Nordid the invocationofChapterVIImoveeither theUNor theAUawayfromneutralmediationastheprincipalinstrumentofconflictresolu-tion anymore than the creationof the ICTYaltered internationalmedia-tioneffortspriortoOperationDeliberateForce.Itistellingthatonthedayof the ICCreferral,SecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanasserted that thewar in


111. Security Council Refers Darfur Crimes to the ICC,IrIn neWs,1Apr.2005,available athttp://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=53691.

112. SeeInternationalCrisisGroup,Darfur:RevitalizingthePeaceProcess,AfricaReportNo.125,30Apr.2007,at3–4;PrunIer,supranote58,at179–80.

113. After Darfur’s Deal,afrIca confIdentIal, 4Aug.2006,at5.114. SeeReportoftheInternationalCommissionofInquiryonDarfurtotheUnitedNations

SecretaryGeneral,PursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution1564of18September2004,supranote2,¶¶533–63;HumanRightsWatch,DarfurDocumentsConfirmGovernmentPolicyofMilitiaSupport,BriefingPaper,19July2004;human rIghts Watch, entrenchIng ImPunIty: government resPonsIbIlIty for InternatIonal crImes In darfur48–63(Dec.2005).

Darfurcouldonlybeaddressedthrougha“returntonegotiationsinAbujatobringittoaspeedyend.”111Thesenegotiationshaveproducedanumberofcease-firesandgovernmentcommitmentstodisarmthemilitias,noneofwhichhavebeenhonored.TheirmostsignificantresultwastheDarfurPeaceAgreement,negotiatedon5May2006,betweenthegovernmentandonefactionofthetwomainrebelgroups.112Theagreementdidhaveanumberof positive features regarding power-sharing, revenues, and disarmament,but its principal weakness was its reliance on the Sudanese government,ratherthananinternationalforce,forthedisarmamentofthejanjaweed—acommitmentitfailedtoimplementsixprevioustimes—andformaintainingasecureenvironmentforrefugeestoreturntotheirhomes.NopressurewasplacedonSudan toacceptan international force tosupervise theaccordnorwasanypenaltyimposedwhenthegovernmentescalateditsattacksontherebelsinAugust.113

Thisisnottoargueagainsteffortstomediateapoliticalsettlement,whichisprobablythemostrealisticwaytoendviolenceagainstcivilians.Itistoarguethatthereisaninherenttensioninsimultaneouslypursuingajudicialstrategythatsubjectsthegovernmenttocriminalscrutinyandanimpartial,non-coercivemediatingstrategythattriestoelicititscooperation—particu-larlywhenmajorUNandNGOstudieshaveattributedresponsibilitytothevery seniorpolitical andmilitaryofficialswithwhomonewouldhave tonegotiateapeaceagreement.114Ifoneiscommittedtocriminaljustice,thesearenotlegitimateinterlocutors,butifoneisseriousaboutdiplomacy,thiswillrequireatleastthetemporarysubordinationofcriminaljusticetotheexigenciesofconflictresolution.Itwillalsorequireamovementawayfromaneutraltoacoercivestrategyofconflictresolution.InacaselikeDarfurorBosniainwhichthegovernmentbelievesthatthewarservesitsinterestsbetterthananegotiatedcompromise,impartialmediationdoeslittlemorethanprovidecoverforamilitarysolution.AsinBosnia,thekeytochangingthisliesnotindeployinglegalinstruments—thoseinpowerareunlikelytobedeterredsincetheyarealreadycomplicitincrimesforwhichtheyshouldbeprosecuted—but rathercoercivemilitaryandeconomic instruments toincrease thecostsand risks toKhartoumso that its self-interestcoincideswithendingcriminalviolence.


115. InternatIonal CrIsIs Group, GettInG the un Into Darfur,supranote106,at7–9.116. Id.at9–10.117. eConomIst IntellIGenCe unIt (eIu), suDan, Country report8(Feb.2008).118. eIu, suDan, Country report4(Feb.2007).119. eIu, suDan, Country report22(Dec.2006).

CoercivestrategieswillbedifficultandcontentiousbecausetheywillhavetobeemployedoutsidetheUNmultilateralframeworkunlessalign-mentsintheSecurityCouncilchange.Someproponentsoftougheractionshaverecommendedeconomicmeasures thatwouldbeuncontroversial interms of international law.The International Crisis Group has called forconcentratingeconomicpressureontheregimethroughassetfreezesandtravelbansonseniorofficialsimplicatedbyUNreports,theidentificationoffrontcompaniesforfinancingthemilitiasinordertofreezetheiraccounts,andfortheaugmentationofEUsanctions,currentlylimitedtothedefensesector,tocoverallassistancetoSudan’soilindustry.115Inaddition,citizensgroupshave initiatedgrassrootscampaignscallingonuniversities, institu-tional investors,andstateand localgovernments todivest theirportfoliosofstocksfromcompaniesthatdobusinessinSudan.116

SanctionsonSudan,however,areunlikely tohaveacoercive impactcomparabletothoseimposedonSerbiaduringtheBosnianwarorIndone-siaoverEastTimor.UnlikeBelgradeandJakarta,whoseeconomieswereincrisis,Sudan’seconomyhasbeengrowingatalmost10percentperyearastheresultofexpandingoilproductionatatimeofrecordprices.117Whiletightenedsanctions,andpublicpressures,couldimposesomecostsandin-conveniencesontheregime,theEconomicIntelligenceUnitconcludesthat“this isnot likely to jeopardizeSudan’seconomicdevelopment[because]Asianpartners,suchasChina,MalaysiaandIndiaareunwillingtoriskthehugesumstheyhaveinvestedintheenergysector.”118Similarly,whilecivilsocietypressuresmayleadsomeofthefewremainingWesterncompaniesdoingbusinessinSudantowithdraw,thisisunlikelytoextendtotheirAsiancounterpartsgiventhecommitmentoftheirgovernmentstooverseasenergydevelopmentandtheabsenceofcomparablepressuresathome.119

Anotheroptionwouldbetothreaten,oruse,forceoutsideoftheSecu-rityCouncil,aswasdoneduring theKosovoWar in1999.ThiswouldbelegallycontroversialsinceastrictreadingoftheUNCharterwouldprohibitintervention ina state’s internalaffairsunlessexplicitlyauthorizedby theSecurityCouncilaspartofitsChapterVIIobligationtorespondtoathreattothepeace.Proponentsofinterventionpointtotheemergenceofanewnormininternationalpolitics,theResponsibilitytoProtect,whichwasdevelopedbytheInternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSecurity(ICISS),anindependentbodyofexpertsestablishedbytheCanadiangovernmentinresponsetoachallengefromtheSecretaryGeneralafterthelegalcontroversy


120. SeeBellamy,supranote73,at34–36.121. SeeDaviD C. Gompert, Courtney riCharDson, riCharD L. KuGLer, & CLifforD h. Bernath, Center

for teChnoLoGy anD nationaL seCurity poLiCy. LearninG from Darfur: BuiLDinG a net-CapaBLe afriCan forCe to stop mass KiLLinG(July2005),available atwww.ndu.edu/CTNSP/Def_Tech/DTP%2015%20Darfur.pdf.

122. FormerUndersecretaryofStateforAfricanAffairs,SusanE.Rice,InterviewedontheJimLehrerNewsHour,17Nov.2006.

123. SusanE.Rice,AnthonyLake&DonaldM.Payne,We Saved Europeans. Why Not Afri-cans?,Wash. post,2Oct.2006,atA19.

124. internationaL Crisis Group, GettinG the un into Darfur,supranote106,at11.125. LeeFeinstein,Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities,inBeyonD

humanitarianism: What you neeD to KnoW aBout afriCa anD Why it matters100,109–10(PrincetonN.Lyman&PatriciaDorffeds.,2007).

followingtheKosovowarandinlightoftheinternationalcommunity’sfailuretoactagainstgenocideinRwanda.TheResponsibilitytoProtectholdsthatsovereigntyisnotanabsolutelicensetodoanythingwithinone’sborders.Italsoentailsaresponsibilitytoprotectone’scitizensandifastatedefaultsonthatduty,thatresponsibilityfallstotheinternationalcommunity.Inextremecasesofgenocideorcrimesagainsthumanity,thiscouldalsoincludeforciblehumanitarianintervention.Whilethereportargueshumanitarianinterven-tion should ideally be authorized by the Security Council—and calls onthepermanentmemberstorefrainfromusingthevetoduringhumanitarianemergencies—itdoeslayoutexceptionalcircumstanceswhereforcemightbeusedlegitimatelywithoutexplicitSecurityCouncilapproval.120

Fromthisperspective,Khartoum’scomplicityinmassatrocityinDarfur,anditsobstructionofhumanitarianandpeacekeepingefforts,constitutesthekindof radicaldefaulton its responsibilities thatwouldmerit interventionevenwithoutUNauthorization.Intheory,thiscouldinvolvenonconsensualhumanitarian intervention to forcibly stop the killing.121 Most proposals,however,advocatethethreatoruseofforceaspartofastrategyofcoercivediplomacyto“changethecalculusinKhartoumandpersuadethemtolettheU.N.in.”122Themostaggressiveproposal,advocatedbytwoformerClintonadministrationofficialsandamemberof theCongressionalBlackCaucus,arguesforgivingSudananultimatumforunconditionaldeployment;failuretocomplywouldbe followedbyenforcementofano-flyzone,air strikesonmilitaryassets,andanavalblockadeofPortSudan,whichwouldhavethe effect of enforcing an oil boycott that could not be achieved throughtheSecurityCouncil.123TheInternationalCrisisGroupismorereluctanttoendorsemilitaryactionoutsidetheUNframework,butnonethelessadvocatesNATOenforcementoftheno-flyzoneinDarfuralreadydemandedinReso-lution1591shouldtheSecurityCouncilfailtoact.124ACouncilonForeignRelations study recommends air strikes against military bases as the mosteffectiveway to concentrate pressureonKhartoum,noting the logistic[al]problems with the no-fly zone and the harm a blockade could inflict onthegovernment in southernSudan.125 Ineachproposal, thegoal isnot to


126. AlexJ.Bellamy,Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit,20ethIcs & Int’l aff.143,144(2006).

127. Foranoverviewofthe“restrictionistapproach,”seenIcholas J. Wheeler, savIng strangers: humanItarIan InterventIon In InternatIonal socIety41(2000).

128. WilliamA. Schabas, Darfur and the ‘Odious Scourge’: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 18leIden J. Int’l l.871,883(2005).

129. Id.at882,883.

stop the killing directly.As in Bosnia and Kosovo, it is to raise the costsandrisksof thestatusquotoapointwheretheregimeconcludesthat itssecurity requires it to create a permissive environment for a multilateralpeacekeepingforce.

Theargumentthatthe“responsibilitytoprotect”allowstheunauthor-izeduseofforce,bothgenerallyandinDarfur,hasgeneratedconsiderableopposition.ManyUNmembers,particularly from theSouth,view thisasalicenseforpowerfulstatestoappropriatehumanitarianlanguageforself-serving interventions, particularly after the Iraq war.This partly explainsSudan’s success in generatingablockingcoalitionagainst tougher actionand the decision at the UN 2005World Summit to accept the principleof the Responsibility to Protect, but to limit authorization to the SecurityCouncil.126

Thisisalsotheviewofmostinternationallawyers,includingmanysup-portersof the ICCand theDarfur referral—whoadopta “restrictionist”127view that the only exception to the UN Charter’s prohibition on the useof force outside of the Security Council is self-defense against an armedattack—something that applies to humanitarian intervention no less thanitdoestopreventivewar.WilliamSchabastakesthispositioninanarticledefending the ICI’s inability to substantiate Powell’s genocide charge, inwhichhealleges that theUnitedStateshasusedthetermbecauseof“animportant school of thought within the US government that considers afinding of genocide to authorize ‘humanitarian intervention,’ even in theabsenceofSecurityCouncilauthorization.”128AplainreadingoftheGeno-cideConventionindicatesnosuchright.Article8onlyreinforceswhattheCharteralreadyallowsbyobligingthecontractingpartiesto“calluponthecompetent organs of the United Nations to take such actions under theCharteroftheUnitedNationsastheyconsiderappropriateforthepreven-tionandsuppressionofgenocide.”SchabasgoesontocharacterizetheBushadministration’suseofthegenocidechargeas“humanitariansabre-rattling”to“tarnishSudan,whichmustbeon[the]short-listforthevacantIraqiseatasamemberofthe‘axisofevil.’”129

Yet,whenPowellcharacterizedtheconflictinDarfurasgenocide,heexplicitly citedArticle8 in asserting that theUnitedStateswouldappealto the UN rather than act unilaterally.The reason lies less in respect forthelawthaninthepoliticsofUS-Sudaneserelations.Prunierdocumented


130. PrunIer,supranote58,at88.131. Id.at89–91.132 Id. at138–40; see alsolebor, supra note63, at185,on the initialUS reluctance to

raisetheDarfurissueintheUnitedNations.133. SeeMaggieFarley,UN Sanctions Four in Darfur Case, l. a. tImes, 26Apr.2006,atA17;

ElizabethRubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice,n. y. tImes mag.,2Apr.2006,at42.134. Forcontrastingviewsonthis,seechrIstIne gray, InternatIonal laW and the use of force

26–35,191–95(2000);butseeWheeler,supranote127,at154–69,265–67.

tactical changes inSudan’spoliticalorientation, in the late1990s,whichwere intended to end its political isolation and build political bridges totheUnitedStates.130ForKhartoum,9-11wasanopportunitytoexpandthisstrategytoincludecounter-terrorismcooperation,particularlysinceSudanwastheformerbaseofAlQaeda.TheBushadministrationwelcomedthiscooperationandsoughttostrengthenitbyexpendingconsiderablediplomaticcapitalontheNaivashaprocess,designedtoendawarthathadbecomealightningrodformanyofitsconservativeChristianallies.131

Theemergenceof theDarfurcrisis, justas theNaivashaprocesswasconcluding,cameataninopportunetimefortheadministration.Italsogen-eratedconflictingdomesticpressuresfrom,ontheonehand,whatPruniercallsthepro-Garanglobby,whosemobilizationonthenorth-southcivilwarhadshiftedtoDarfur,andthe“realists,”whowantedtoinsulateNaivashaandintelligencecooperationfromhumanrightsconsiderations.132Thead-ministrationparriedthesepressureswithastrategyofstrongrhetoricalcon-demnationandadvocacy,unaccompaniedbytheexpenditureofsignificantdiplomaticcapital.TheseemingcontradictionsinPowell’stestimonybeforetheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteeareperfectlyconsistentwiththesepriorities, as were reports that the United States interceded with the UNSanctionsCommitteetodissuadeitfromnamingSudan’sNationalSecurityMinister,SalahAbdallahGosh.HehasbeenoneofthemainarchitectsofKhartoum’sDarfurpolicy,butalsoamajorintelligenceassetwhohasbeenflownbyprivatejettoCIAheadquartersinLangley,Virginia.133

Moreover, most serious proposals for humanitarian intervention inDarfurdonotusetheBushDoctrineinIraqastheirtemplate.Theyarenotpushingforaninvasiontoimplementaregime-changeagendathathasnotbeen ratified multilaterally, but rather for the use of military coercion toenforce compliance with disarmament and civilian protection provisionsthattheSecurityCouncilhasdemandedbutwhoseenforcementithasnotexplicitlyauthorized.Thisnotionof impliedauthorizationhadbeenusedtodeployOperationProvideComforttoprotecttheKurdsinnorthernIraq,and,morecontroversially,asthelegalrationalefortheauthorizationoftheKosovowar throughNATOrather than theSecurityCouncil.134Moreover,theseinterventions—liketheproposalsforDarfur—areconsistentwiththenormsofthe“responsibilitytoprotect”inawaythattheIraqwarisnot.In


135. MichaelWalzer,The Politics of Rescue, 62SOCIALRESEARCH53–66 (1995); For amoresystematicanalysisofthedifferencebetweenDarfurandIraqintermsofcriteriaforhumanitarianintervention,seeAlex J. BellAmy, Just WArs: From CiCero to irAq219–26(2006).

136. GarethEvans,From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,24WisC. int’l l. J.703,717(2006).

137. Schabas,supranote128,at885.138. TheirargumentsaresummarizedinHeikelinaVerrijnStuart,Arbour and Cassese Criticize

the ICC in Darfur,int’l Just. triB.,N.55,23Oct.2006.

theformercases,interventionsweredesignedtorescuethreatenedpopula-tions thatwereunderattack. In Iraq,wherehumanitarian rationaleswerepresented post-hoc, no such threat existed in 2003, even though Iraq’sAnfalcampaignagainst theKurds in1988,and itsattackson theKurdishand Shi’ite populations in 1991, provided more legitimate opportunitiesfor“thepoliticsofrescue.”135AsGarethEvansobserved,“Therationaleforcoercivehumanitarianinterventionisnotpunishmentforpastsins,howevergrotesque,buttoavert,hereandnow,thethreattolargenumbersofpeople,whichareactuallyoccurringorimminentlyabouttooccur.”136

ThesepoliticalandmoraldistinctionsmaynotmatterfromalegalpointofviewiftheframeofreferenceisarestrictionistreadingoftheUNCharter.Thevirtueofsuchanapproachisthatiterectsahigherbarrieragainsttheabuseofpowerbystatesthatusehumanitarianlanguagetojustifyself-serv-inginterventions.ButwhatimpactwouldsuchanapproachhaveonSudan’simpunityforabusesagainstciviliansundercurrentcircumstances?Schabasconcludes his article by asserting that the ICC could make a difference:“[W]hether it is forgenocideorcrimesagainsthumanity, theperpetratorsnowstandareasonablechanceofbeingbroughttojustice,andtheyknowit.”137Yet,isthatreallythecase?AllthatperpetratorshavewitnessedforthelastfouryearsistheUnitedNationsunwillingnesstoact.TheUnitedNationsinactioncontinues,despiteSudan’srenegingonrepeatedstatementscommit-tingitselftoendsuchviolations.ItisKhartoum’sconfidencethatitwillnotbepenalizedforitsactionsthatistherealsourceofimpunityinDarfur.Untilthatchanges,theDarfurreferraltotheICCisnoless“criminaljusticeinapoliticalvacuum”thanwastheICTYforitsfirsttwo-and-one-halfyears.

Someinternational lawyersandNGOshaveargued thatanotherpos-siblechangethatcouldmakeadifferenceisamoreaggressiveprosecutorialstrategy. In2006,AntonioCassese andLouiseArbour submittedbriefs tothepre-trialchamberquestioningtheprosecutor’sdecisionnottodemandthattheSudanesegovernmentallowinvestigationsinsideDarfurbecauseofthecourt’sinabilitytoprovideprotectiontowitnessesandvictims.Amorevisiblepresenceon theground, theyargued,wouldbe themosteffectivewayofreducingviolenceandprotectingpresentandprospectivevictims.138

Cassesehasalsowrittencriticallyoftheprosecutor’s“smallsteps”strategy,focusing initially on mid-level perpetrators.A better strategy would have


139. AntonioCassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?,4 J. Int’l crIm. Just.434,439(2006);see alsoFranckPetit,The “Small Steps” Strategy of the ICC in Darfur, Int’l Just. trIb., n. 63, 5Mar.2007(interviewingCasseseabouttheICCprosecutions).

140. Cassese,supranote139,at439.141. JohnPrendergast&ColinThomas-Jenson,Blowing the Horn,86foreIgn aff.59,72–73

(2007).142. RobertS.Litwak,REGIMECHANGE:U.S.STRATEGYTHROUGHTHEPRISMOF9/11

181(2007).

beentomoveexpeditiouslytoindictmentsofseniorofficials,which“mighthavedramatizedtheongoingconflictinDarfur,evenifthosearrestwarrantswere to remainun-executed.”139Casseseacknowledges that theSudanesegovernmentwouldalmostcertainlyrefusetheprosecutor’srequesttohandoverhigh-level indicteesorconduct investigations inDarfur.That refusal,however,couldbeusedbytheprosecutortoasktheSecurityCouncilto“takeintoaccountsuchrefusaltocooperateandenvisageappropriatemeasuresdesignedtosecurecooperation.”140

Itiscertainlypossiblethatthiskindofprosecutorialbrinksmanshipcouldbreak thedeadlock in the SecurityCouncil by shaming itsmembers intosupportingaprocessforwhichtheyhadvoted—particularlyifthepublicitysurroundingtheindictmentsmobilizescivilsocietypressureongovernments.ThekeyiswhetherthatwouldinfluenceChina,whichhadabstainedontheICCreferralandhadbeenthestrongestdefenderofSudanintheSecurityCouncil. JohnPrendergastandColinThomas-Jensen suggest thatBeijing’sthreattovetoresolutionspunishingSudanmaybehollow,becausethe“grow-ing perception that Beijing is turning a blind eye to continuing atrocitiesinDarfurcouldmaritsinternationalimageasitpreparestohostthe2008Olympics.”141Iftheyarecorrect,indictingseniorofficialsmayincreasethereputationalcoststoChinatothepointwheretheyeitherleanonKhartoum,orsupportenforcementactionsintheSecurityCouncil.

Ifamoreaggressiveprosecutorialapproachputspressureongovernmentstotakemoreforcefulaction,thequestionis:actiontodowhat?ManyNGOsandinternationallawyersbelievetheprimaryfocusshouldbeonthearrestandextraditionofthoseindictedbythecourt.However,Khartoumisunlikelytocooperate inaway that threatens thosemost responsible—namely, theregime’sleadership.Atmost,anyjudicialcooperationwouldlikelyresemblethat of Libya in the Lockerbie trial, where those directly involved wereextraditedwiththeunderstandingthattheynotimplicatetheirsuperiors.142Ifahigherprofileprosecutorial strategydoeshelpgalvanize internationalpolitical will, or creates a more credible fear of prosecution on the partof Sudan’s leaders, thefirst priority shouldbeprotection andprevention,notpunishment.Thismeanspushing theparties towards a cease-fire andsecuringSudan’sconsenttoarobustUNpeacekeepingmandatethatwouldprotect civiliansanddisarm themilitias.Pressure should thenbeapplied


143. FredericBichon,ICC Vows to Bring Darfur War Criminals to Justice,Agence FrAnce Presse,24Feb.2008;see also MarliseSimons,Sudan Poses First Big Trial for World Criminal Court,n.Y.Times,29Apr.2005,atA12;MarliseSimons,Two Face Trials at The Hague over Atrocities in DarfurN.Y.TIMES,28Feb.2007,atA3.

144. Current Situation in Darfur: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,110thCong.25–26(2007)(statementofAlexdeWaal,Director,SocialScienceResearchCouncil).

145. Id.at33;see alsoAlexdeWaal,The Wars of Sudan,nATion,19Mar.2007,at16.146. PabloCastillo,Rethinking Deterrence: The International Criminal Court in Sudan,Unisci

DiscUssion PAPers, Jan.2007,at167,170.

forabroaderpoliticalsettlement thataddresses theunderlyingsourcesoftheconflictthroughamoreequitablesharingofpowerandresources,andthroughendingKhartoum’spracticeofarmingtribalmilitias.Inotherwords,thethreatofprosecutioncanmosteffectivelyprotectciviliansif it isusedaspartofastrategyofcoercivediplomacythat,incombinationwithothereconomic or military threats, alters Khartoum’s calculation that the warservesitsinterests.

AswasthecaseinBosnia,however,thereisapotentialconflictbetweencriminal justiceandthekindofcoercivediplomacydescribedabove.Theformerwoulddemandprosecutionnotonlyof the janjaweed leadersandmilitarycommanderswhooversawthem,butalsoofPresidentBashirandhisinnercircle.Indeed,Moreno-Ocampohassuggestedthatthelong-termgoalof his strategy is tomoveup the chainof command frommid-levelperpetratorsagainstwhomhehasthebestevidencetotheirsuperiorswhoborethegreatestresponsibilityfortheircrimes.143

YetthiswouldbedifficultifthethreatofprosecutionisanotherarrowinthequiverofcoerciveinstrumentstoleverageKhartoum’sbehavior.AsinthecaseofbargainingwithMiloševic,thegoalofpressureistoinduceconsenttothedeploymentofpeacekeepersorthenegotiationandimplementationofacease-fire,ifnotapeaceagreement.Thisislikelytorequiretheactivecooperation of parties subjected to criminal scrutiny. In testimony beforetheUSCongress,AlexdeWaalnotedthatanyeffectiveUNpeacekeepingforcewouldmonitor,ratherthanenforce,demilitarizationandwouldrequireacomprehensiveandrobustcease-fire,144bothofwhicharedependentontheconsentnotonlyofthegovernment,butalsoofrebelleaderswhohavealsobeenimplicatedincriminalviolenceandmaybeunderinvestigationbytheICC.Thesamecooperationwouldalmostcertainlybenecessaryforabroaderpoliticalsettlement.DeWaalalsocautionedagainstpoliciesthatKhartoumcouldinterpretasthefirststepstowardregimechange:“[P]ressureonlyworksifthereisanoutcomethatisultimatelyacceptabletothepersonwhomyouareputtingpressureon.”145TheICCposesapotentialimpedimentto suchanapproachbecause,asonestudynoted,aprincipledapproachtoprosecutingthosemostresponsibleforatrocitycrimesinDarfurshould“includethemostimportantplayersoftherulingeliteofSudan.”146

EndingcriminalviolenceinDarfurwillthereforerequiresomecompro-miseswithinternationalcriminaljusticesimilartothoseinBosnia,atleastin


147. hazan,supranote37,at191.148. davId Kennedy, the darK sIdes of vIrtue: reassessIng InternatIonal humanItarIanIsm 31

(2004).

theshort-to-mediumterm.Thiscouldinvolve:theprosecutorexercisinghisdiscretionandmaintainingalowprofileduringthenegotiationsandpost-conflictstabilizationprocess,restrictionsontheUNpeacekeepingmandateregardingthearrestofthoseunderindictment,orinvocationbytheSecurityCouncilofArticle16of theRomeStatute,whichallows it to suspendanICCinvestigationforrenewabletwelvemonthperiodsifitinterfereswithitsmandatetomaintainorrestoreinternationalpeaceandsecurity.ThisdoesnotnecessarilymeantheabandonmentofjusticeanymorethanDaytonmeantthe dismantling of the ICTY or amnesty for Miloševic. Criminal proceed-ings couldcontinueagainst spoilersorparticularlyheinous actorswhosecooperationisnotcrucial for thepeaceprocessandwhoseremoval fromthe political scene could contribute to postwar reconciliation. Moreover,maintaining the activeprospect of prosecution could alsodeter powerfulactorsfrombecomingspoilers.However,aslongasthetransitionalprocessisdependentonthecontinuingcooperationoftheseactors,criminalcasesagainstthemwillhavetobeheldinabeyance.

ManyinternationallawyersandNGOswouldobjecttothisuseoftheICCasleverageinthesamewaythatPierreHazancriticizedtheuseoftheICTYasapoliticalinstrumentbyWesterngovernments.147However,aswesawinBosnia,thelawcannotbeenforcedwhileawarisragingandwasonlyabletoplayasignificantroleaftertherewassufficientpoliticalwilltoendtheconflict.Giventhedependenceoflawonpolitics,itisincumbentontheprosecutortoadopta“donoharm”approachtoanypoliticalprocessesthatmightputanendtocriminalviolenceandestablishtheconditionsun-derwhichinternationalcriminaljusticecanplayarole—evenifthatroleiscircumscribedbypowerrealities.Thoughcoercivediplomacymaydifferfrompacificsettlementstrategies,whichwereemployedforthefirst threeyearsoftheBosnianwarandthedurationofthewarinDarfur,itisstillabargainingrelationshiptowhichinternationalcriminaljusticemustadapt.

IV. coNcLUSIoN

One of the themes of David Kennedy’s, The Dark Sides of Virtue, is thetendencyofmanyinthehumanrightscommunitytooverpromisewhatthelawcandeliver.Heattributesthistotheirassumptionthatinternationalgov-ernancecan“dogloballywhatwefantasizeorexpectnationalgovernmentstodolocally.”148TheiradvocacyoftheICCisbasedonthesamepremise,that“thepoliticalandmilitarycontextsinwhichwarcrimeswerelikelytooccurwere somehowanalogous to the social forces surroundingothercriminal


149. Id.at129.150. Human RigHts WatcH, EntREncHing impunity,supranote114,at52.151. Human RigHts WatcH, Lack of conviction: tHE spEciaL cRiminaL couRt on tHE EvEnts in DaRfuR

4(2006).ThissameattributionofimpunitytothefailuretoprosecuteinformsSchabas’streatmentofthecase,thoughheislessdefinitiveindismissingSudan’seffortstoestablishaccountabilitymechanisms than isHumanRightsWatchor the ICCProsecutor.AftercitingSudan’sassertionthatitwasprosecutingcrimesinDarfurinresponsetoMoreno-Ocampo’sJune2006reporttotheSecurityCouncil,hesuggests:“Itmaywellbethat,spurredbytheSecurityCouncilreferral,Sudanisdoinganadequatejobofaddressingimpunity.Ifthatisthecase,thentheCourtwillhavesucceeded.”WiLLiam a. scHabas,ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHEINTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT,178(3ded.2007).

152. SeepRuniER,supranote58,at105;fLint & DE WaaL, supranote59,at24–25.153. Human RigHts WatcH, EntREncHing impunity,supranote114,at5,58–63.154. Id.at3.

behavior.”149Thisisevidentinthelawenforcementlanguage,usedbymanylawyersandNGOs,emphasizingthat“notasinglemid-orhigh-levelcivil-ianofficial,militarycommanderormilitialeaderhasbeensuspendedfromduty,investigatedorprosecuted”foratrocitiesinDarfur.150Theimplicationisthatcontinuedcriminalviolencecanbeattributedto“theclimateofim-punityfosteredbythefailuretoprosecute.”151Sincetheproblemhasbeendiagnosedastheinadequacyofnationallawenforcement,thesolutionliesinapoliticallydeployinginternationallegalinstruments,suchasexpandingthescopeofinvestigationsorexecutingarrestwarrants,tofillthegap.

In order to understand the problems with the domestic criminal lawanalogy,imaginesomeonesayinginNovember1941thatithasbeentwoyearssinceGermanyinvadedPoland,itsarmamentsindustrywasexploitinghundredsofthousandsofPolishcitizensasslavelaborers,anditseinsatzgrup-pen hadmachine-gunnedtodeathhundredsofthousandsofJews—andnotasingleGermanmilitarycommanderorhigh-levelNazipartyofficialhadbeen investigatedorprosecuted for thesecrimes.While sucha statementis factually correct, it obscures the fact that Nazi atrocities were deliber-ate acts of state policy for which the absence of judicial scrutiny was asymptom,notacause.Similarly,atrocitycrimesinDarfurarenottheresultofmilitaryexcessesthat thestatehasfailedtoprosecute.Rather, theyarepartofasystematicandwell-plannedgovernmentstrategy,consistentwiththe regime’shistoricalpracticeofarming tribalmilitias for scorched-earthcampaignsagainstpopulationsseenassympathetic to insurgencies in thesouthandintheNubaMountains.152Infact,adetailedanalysisbyHumanRights Watch came to the same conclusion, attributing responsibility to“thehighestlevelsofthegovernment”andcallingfortheICCProsecutortoinvestigatePresidentBashirandhisinnercircle.153Yetitisdifficulttorecon-cilethisanalysiswiththerecommendationthattheSudanesegovernment“investigateandfullyprosecuteallcivilianandmilitarypersonnel”involvedin atrocities and “[f]ully cooperatewith and facilitate” the ICC investiga-tion.154IftheatrocitiesareindeedactsofstatepolicyforwhichSudan’stop


155. Quoted in Eric Reeves, The ICC “Application” Concerning International Crimes in Darfur, suDan tRib., 27 Feb. 2007, available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20496.FormoreonthecontradictionsinHumanRightsWatch’sadvocacyandanalysis,seeEricReeves,Khartoum Triumphant: Intl community has failed to pre-vent, punish genocide,suDan tRib.,17Dec.2005,available athttp://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article13092.

156. Cryer,supranote95,at195, 222.157. Akhavan,supranote11,at746.

leadersarecriminallyresponsible,whatincentivedotheyhavetocooper-atewiththeCourt,oralter theirpolicies,astheresultof itsscrutiny?EricReevescaptures thiscontradictionbetweenanalysisandadvocacywithaquotefromDarfurileaderinanIDPcamp:“Thegovernmentispartoftheproblem.Youcannotcatchyourself.”155

Insituations likeDarfur,where thegovernment is themost importantpartof theproblem,thesolutionlies inpolitics,not law.Someadvocatesofinternationalcriminaljusticeacknowledgethis.Inasympatheticallycriti-cal analysis of the Security Council’s Darfur referral, Robert Cryer wrote:“Sending the matter to the ICC does mean that the Security Council isdoingsomething,butotherwaysof limitingtheconflict inDarfurarenotbeingpursuedas vigorouslyas theyought tobe.”156Which “otherways”arechosen,however,willsettheparametersofinternationalcriminaljus-tice. If that involves a negotiated settlement, even one achieved throughforcible coercion, aswas the case inBosnia, the courtwill have toholdback fromcriminalproceedings,at least temporarily,against thosewhosecooperationisneededtonegotiateandmaintainapeaceprocess.Suchanapproachwould,toadegree,condoneimpunityandmakeforinconsistencyinenforcingthe law,but thealternative iseitherregimechange—throughinternalforcesoranexternalintervention—oraninterventioncomparabletotheoneinKosovo,inwhichcivilianprotectiondoesnotdependonthecontinuingcooperationof theSudanesegovernment.Thekindsof justiceandaccountabilitymechanismsthatarepossibleinwar’saftermathcannotbedivorcedfromthepoliticalstrategiesdesignedtobringawartoanendbecausethekeytoendingimpunityinanongoingwarliesinthedeploy-mentofpoliticalinstrumentssuchasdiplomacy,sanctions,orforce,ratherthanindeterrentpowerofthelaw.

TheICC’sweaknessesasanagentofwar-timedeterrenceinDarfur—whatPayam Akhavan calls specific deterrence—does not necessarily rule outitspromise topromotegeneral deterrencevis-à-vis theworldcommunity.Writing about the ICTY,Akhavan noted that focusing on the weaknessesof the former, such as the limited impact of indictments on the behaviorofKaradžicandMladicinBosnia,overlookstheICTY’scontributiontothelatter, its “long-term impact on the transformation of the political cultureofboththeformerYugoslaviaandinternationalsocietyasawhole.”157Yet


these broader deterrent ambitions are dependent upon the capability and willingness of powerful states to back them up. The ICTY’s contribution to stigmatizing extremists, and deterring ethnic violence, in post-Dayton Bosnia only became possible because of the NATO air campaign and the US support for the Croatian and Bosnian ground offensives, as well US and EU policies of linking normalized economic relations to cooperation with the tribunal. Similarly, the ability of international criminal tribunals to have a broader deterrent impact, beyond the country in question, is dependent upon whether states and intergovernmental organizations are committed to a “no business as usual” policy with criminal regimes and movements, and to enforcement actions against perpetrators, or in defense of victims, even at some cost to themselves. What Darfur tells us about this commitment is not a cause for optimism.

The Darfur experience also points to one of the contradictions built into the preamble of the Rome Statute. After the first six phrases, which lay out the Court’s mission to root out impunity, the next two phrases attempt to reconcile this with the traditional principles of non-interference, reaffirm-ing “that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” and emphasizing “that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State.” Yet, in cases like Darfur where the government is directly complicit in criminal activity, strict adherence to non-interference effectively shields the perpe-trators from accountability. In such cases, ending impunity may require overriding the sovereignty of criminal governments, even without Security Council authorization. International tribunals can be important complements to humanitarian interventions. They are poor substitutes for them.