al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-138-caliphate-the state of...

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-138-Caliphate-The State of al-Qaida-53-ISIS

New jackets but Old story, and AQ story it is.The success of the Islamic State, is crucial to the revival of a global, pan-Islamic caliphate. Al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman Zawahiri urged Muslims to unite behind the movement's global jihad - and called for the violent overthrow of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Zawahiri underlines the need for unity in Iraq - an implicit acknowledgement that splits have opened up in Sunni ranks. The short-term aim, says Zawahiri, is to attack the interests of the "Crusaders and Jews" (the United States, its Western allies and Israel). The long-term aim is to topple what he calls corrupt Muslim regimes - and to use Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia as training grounds for militants. Zawahiri 5 Jul 2007 1

As the Islamic State continues to vie for power against al-Qaeda in North Africa, ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts have announced an online “Maghreb” campaign

C; remember: Maghreb Sep 2013 North Africa: Al-Zawahiri Unveils Maghreb Strategy

After its battlefield successes in Syria and Iraq and some recent reverses, ISIS seems to have now set its sights on Kashmir.

Jan 22 2016, We ISIS will expand to Kashmir and kill cow-worshipping Hindus: Islamic State in Dabiq

C remember Sep 2013, The Al-Qaeda leader also encouraged the right of terrorists to fight Russians in Caucasus, Indians in Kashmir and the Chinese in Xinjiang and even in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia.

The borders of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria are steadily eroding, but it will likely be months before U.S. and coalition-backed forces are ready to take on the terror group’s strongholds in Mosul or Raqqa

The Islamic State and the Taliban won’t get along–and that’s a good thing for South Asia.

Jan 20, As the Islamic

State continues to vie for power against al-Qaeda in North Africa, ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts have announced an online “Maghreb” campaign 2. Above is the alleged “official” announcement by ISIS. Yesterday, the Islamic State released three videos directed at the Maghreb, an Arabic word that means “sunset” and includes portions of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. C; remember: Maghreb Sep 2013 North Africa: Al-Zawahiri Unveils Maghreb Strategy; Al-Zawahiri called for followers to implant themselves in Algeria and spread al-Qaeda ideology throughout the Maghreb and West Africa. . al-Zawahri is of the opinion that al-

1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6274116.stm

2 Remember: MALI-AL-QAIDA’S SAHARA PLAYBOOK This document lays out a con dential letter from Abdel- malek Droukdel, the emir of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, to his ghters in Mali.

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 10 03/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6274116.stm


Qaeda should try to establish safe bases in these countries for promoting its ideas. The Al-Qaeda leader also encouraged the right of terrorists to fight

Russians in Caucasus, Indians in Kashmir and the Chinese in Xinjiang and even in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia. He certainly has a long-tern plan for Pakistan. - BY JEMAL OUMAR, 18 SEPTEMBER 2013. Al-Zawahri also called on his followers to refrain from targeting enemies at mosques and markets. The Maghreb, however, is an exception to the rule. Al-Zawahiri gave direct instructions to step up armed action there. "Al-Qaeda usually divides regions into areas for current jihad and areas not qualified for jihad, and sets its priorities accordingly," analyst Sid Ahmed Ould Tfeil told Magharebia. In the Maghreb region, he added, al-Qaeda "deems itself to have taken advanced steps and wouldn't want to abandon the jihadist work that has been achieved". After all, he said, Maghreb countries are the cradle of the Arab Spring revolutions.Cees: remember to know your enemy, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Strategy is the implementation of an operational plan (or plans) in the pursuit of specific goals. One voice worth considering is Abu Musab al Suri, who viewed the loss of a true Salafist state, Afghanistan, as the most significant setback for the movement. In response to this and the great strategic error in Iraq, he advocated a different interpretation of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was to act as a “call” or a “methodology” for global revolution. Groups should focus on failing states in the Islamic world. After a long period of conflict, Salafism could reassert itself as the center of a state’s identity. This would set the stage for open warfare waged against the modern world

Islamic State Caliphate Crunched by U.S.-Backed ForcesJeff Seldin, Voice of America. The borders of the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria are steadily eroding, but it will likely be months before U.S. and coalition-backed forces are ready to take on the terror group’s strongholds in Mosul or





Raqqa. New estimates from U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) show Islamic State (IS) fighters have lost 40 percent of the territory they once held

in Iraq and five percent of the territory they once held in Syria.“We’ve seen small dust-ups in both the Euphrates and Tigris River valleys but no significant tactical action,” OIR spokesman Col. Steve Warren told Pentagon reporters from Baghdad regarding IS activity in Iraq. Warren said in Syria, IS fighters were carrying out limited offensive operations along the so-called Mara line in the country’s northwest, making some small gains against regime forces in Aleppo.The U.S.-led coalition has also been pressuring IS from the air, focusing the majority of its airstrikes in and around Ramadi and Mosul in Iraq and around the terror group’s de facto capital of Raqqa in Syria.Waiting for Mosul, Since Iraqi forces retook Ramadi from Islamic State fighters last month, there have been growing expectations that Mosul would be next, with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters moving on the city from the north while Iraqi forces attacked from the south.Yet despite the progress, Col. Warren cautioned a move on Mosul is not imminent.

“Nobody’s ready to really slap the table yet and say, ‘This is it. We’re moving out,’” he said. “This is going to be many months before we’re going to see actual operations for Mosul begin.”

The Pentagon estimates it will need 10 brigades with 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers each to retake Mosul from Islamic State.

Two of the brigades are likely to be Kurdish Peshmerga and some will come from the force used to recapture Ramadi. But the others need to be built from scratch, with soldiers going through an average of eight weeks of training before they would be ready for combat. Another factor behind the wait to retake Mosul: U.S. military officials have recommended that the brigades that helped retake Ramadi go through another cycle of training before taking part in what is expected to be a bigger and more complex battle. In the meantime, U.S. officials say they are ramping up efforts to degrade Islamic State’s capabilities by continuing to target the terror group’s oil facilities, its cash reserves and also key officials, especially in and around Raqqa.Slow Approach to Raqqa, Col. Warren said U.S. and coalition-backed forces have also slowly been moving on Raqqa, taking key points to the west and east of the city, forcing Islamic State fighters to expose themselves to airstrikes.

“It’s a process right now of isolation and degradation,” Warren said. “It is certainly feasible that Raqqa can be pressured or even assaulted in the next year.”

But Warren cautioned a lot still depends on the ability to build relationships with anti-Islamic State forces on the ground.

“We have to see how rapidly we can develop some of these partner forces, some of these moderate Syrian opposition forces."

Pentagon officials say the U.S. currently has 3,700 troops in Iraq as part of the ongoing train, advise and assist mission. U.S. special forces, including a specialized expeditionary targeting force, are also on the ground in Iraq and Syria, helping to gather intelligence and to target high ranking Islamic State leaders.U.S. President Barack Obama recently instructed his national security team to intensify efforts to destroy Islamic Sate cells no matter where they are.

Competing Visions for Syria and Iraq: The Myth of an Anti-ISIS Grand Coalition by The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute conducted an intensive multi-week planning exercise to





frame, design, and evaluate potential courses of action that the United States could pursue to defeat the threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham

(ISIS) and al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. ISW and CTP will publish the findings of this exercise in multiple reports. The first report examined America’s global grand strategic objectives as they relate to the threat from ISIS and al Qaeda.[1] This second report defines American strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria, identify the minimum necessary conditions for ending the conflicts there, and compare U.S. objectives with those of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in order to understand actual convergences and divergences. The differences mean that the U.S. cannot rely heavily on international partners to achieve its objectives. Subsequent reports will provide a detailed assessment of the situation on the ground in Syria and present the planning group’s evaluation of several courses of action.The key findings of this second report are:The U.S. must accomplish four strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria to achieve vital

national interests and secure its people: 1) destroy enemy groups; 2) end the communal, sectarian civil wars; 3) set conditions to prevent the reconstitution of enemy groups; and 4) extricate Iraq and Syria from regional and global conflicts.

Any American strategy must take urgent measures to strengthen Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi and prepare contingency efforts for his fall. The collapse of the Abadi government and return of his predecessor Nuri al Maliki would be disastrous for the fight against ISIS.

Ongoing international negotiations within the Vienna Framework are bypassing essential requirements for long-term success in Syria. Re-establishing a stable, unitary Syrian state that secures American interests requires the U.S. and its partners to 1) destroy ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra, and foreign Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria; 2) identify and strengthen interlocutors representing the Syrian opposition; 3) facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Syrian regime and opposition; 4) obtain regional acceptance of that settlement; 5) establish peace-enforcement mechanisms; and 6) reconstruct state institutions.

The Salafi-jihadi militant base in Syria poses a threat to the U.S., but the U.S. must not simply attack it because that would put the U.S. at war with many Sunnis who must be incorporated into a future, post-Assad inclusive government. The U.S. must separate reconcilable from irreconcilable elements. These other Salafi-jihadi groups must meet the following conditions essential for core U.S. security objectives in order to participate: break with Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS; accept the principle of a future pluralistic and unitary Syrian state; reject violent jihad; commit to disarming to a policing and defensive level; and commit to the elimination of the current shari’a court system and the establishment of political institution-based governance.

The superficial convergence of Iranian, Russian, Turkish, and Saudi strategic objectives with those of the U.S. on ISIS as a threat masks significant divergences that will undermine U.S. security requirements. Iran and Russia both seek to reduce and eliminate U.S. influence in the Middle East and are not pursuing strategies that will ultimately defeat al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, some linked to al Qaeda, stem from the ruling party’s intent to reestablish itself as an independent, Muslim, regional power. Finally, Saudi Arabia’s objectives remain shaped by perceived existential threats from Iran and a growing succession crisis, causing key divergences, especially over support to Salafi-jihadi groups. The U.S. must lead efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria and cannot outsource





them to partners.http://post.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report

%202%20FINALFINAL.pdf

Jan 2016, A top Army commander on Sunday said that there are no large footprints of Islamic State (ISIS) in Jammu and Kashmir but the outfit was “creeping towards this side” and the security grid has to stop the “terrible” organisation from getting a foothold in the country. Northern Army Commander Lt General D S Hooda also expressed concern over a number of youth joining militancy, but said the numbers were not large to transform the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir. The media and military’s focus on growing tendency among young boys joining militant ranks has given rise to a shoehorning perception about Kashmiri youth. They are being associated with global narrative of Islamic threat and culture clash.Jan 22 2016, We ISIS will expand to Kashmir and kill cow-worshipping Hindus: Islamic State in Dabiq The Islamic State has claimed to have a big opportunity to establish and expand its presence in the Kashmir region of India and fight 'the cow-worshiping Hindus'. The assertion of 're-conquering the land once ruled by the Muslims' was made by Hafiz Saeed Khan, the emir of 'Khorasan', in an interview published in the latest issue of group's mouthpiece Dabiq on Wednesday. The 13th issue of IS' propaganda magazine features a long interview of Saeed, also known as Mulla Saeed Orakzai. Saeed is a former Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander who defected to join the IS and now heads the group's military and administrative operations of Khorasan, currently active in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. IS aspires to expand its territorial control on the Khorasan region which historically extends from present day Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan to India and China.

C Remember: Al-Qaeda’s new chief Zawahiri endorses war on Kashmir . By Niticentral Staff on September 17, 2013 "The formula of sponsoring all terrorist groups in North and West Africa without preference to any group is some sort of diplomatic move in containing the conflict among those various groups," he added. Still, this may encourage further defections within AQIM, as any group can break away in the hopes of being recognised by the parent organisation, Wali noted. "I think that al-Zawahiri appeared just to say to the world 'I'm still here, and if I can't repeat the 9/11 scenario, I still can threaten the world'," writer Ali Ould Zidan said. In an effort to promote the ideas of Jihad, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has published his very first guidelines urging restraint in attacking other Muslim sects and non-Muslims and on how to conduct jihad or war in countries. According to Reuters report, almost 12 years post 9/11, the document published by the SITE monitoring service provides Al-Qaeda’s strategy and global plans from North Africa to Caucasus to Kashmir. In the document published Zawahiri said fighting “aims at creating a safe haven…, which can… be used as a launching pad for the struggle of establishing an Islamic system…” “Our struggle is a long one, and jihad is in need of safe bases,” Zawahiri said in his ‘general rules for jihad’ posted by SITE. “As far as targeting the proxies of America is concerned, it differs from place to place. The basic principle is to avoid entering into any conflict with them, except in the countries where confronting them becomes inevitable,” he further added in the guidelines. The Al-Qaeda leader also encouraged the right of terrorists to fight Russians in Caucasus, Indians in Kashmir and the Chinese in Xinjiang and even in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia.




http://post.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%202%20FINALFINAL.pdf

http://post.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/PLANEX%20Report%202%20FINALFINAL.pdf


Jan 2015, The statement also announces the Islamic State’s expansion to “Khorasan,” an area encompassing Afghanistan and Pakistan, and celebrates

the death of the Saudi King Abdullah, calling on Allah to “cast him into hell.” We bring the mujahideen the good news of the Islamic State’s expansion to Khorasan (a region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other nearby lands). Therefore, we call upon all the mujahideen in Khorasan to join the caravan of the Khilafah [caliphate] and abandon disunity and factionalism.Jun 2015, The Islamic State’s so-called “Khorasan province” threatened the Taliban in a video released late last month. The video, which is more than 15 minutes long, features a lengthy speech by an unnamed jihadist (see image above) in front of armed fighters and local villagers. The speaker, citing the Prophet Mohammed, warns that there cannot be two caliphs. If one of the caliphs fulfills the appropriate criteria for being the ummah’s supposed leader — that is, the head of the worldwide community of Muslims — then the other must be vanquished, the speaker says. In late May, the new Pakistani Taliban coalition issued a nearly 60-page statement rejecting the Islamic State’s “self-professed caliphate.” The group praised the leadership of Mullah Omar, deceased al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al Zawahiri. The statement shows that al Qaeda and the Taliban continue to exercise a great deal of influence over the Pakistani Taliban.

Cees remember, 2014, 2015, According to analysts, Khorasan is believed to be an elite, militant al-Qaeda cell made up of seasoned fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen who were dispatched by the core leadership to form a base of operations in Syria. Intelligence analysts say Khorasan refers to battle-hardened al Qaeda fighters who have travelled from Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere to Syria. Beyond that, accounts differ. Talking to reporters last Sep 2014, Lt.-Gen. William Mayville, director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the cell was not embedded to fight Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime or work towards an Islamic state, but is "establishing roots in Syria in order to advance attacks against the West and the homeland. U.S. Central Command said the group was using civil war-ravaged Syria as a haven from which to plot attacks, build and test roadside bombs and recruit Westerners to carry out operations. While Khorasan has been in operating in Syria for over a year, their attention has been focused beyond that country’s borders. “They’re in Syria but they’re not really fighting in Syria,” said Michael Leiter, the former director of the National Counterterrorism Center and now an NBC News analyst. “They’re using it as a place to find Western recruits.” -- The Al-Qaeda leader also encouraged the right of terrorists to fight Russians in Caucasus, Indians in Kashmir and the Chinese in Xinjiang and even in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Somalia.

Regards Cees***In April 2008 in response to questions posed by jihadists all over the world regarding al-Qaeda’s strategy, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri pointed to Abu Musab al-Suri and the ideas presented in his 1600-page book, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. “The suggestions of Abu Musab al-Suri - may Allah release him - present rich thoughts from which the mujahideen can benefit…the intellectual treasure of Sheikh Abu Musab… is a rich river for the mujahideen,” Zawahiri stated. Since its publication in December 2004, Zawahiri’s praise for The Call to Global Islamic Resistance has instilled a newfound interest among the jihadist community. Jihadist forum members are now uploading, downloading, distributing, and discussing the book with great fervor. According to al-Suri, jihadi military theory is based on two key facets: (1) solo or cellular jihad, the act of individual jihadists organizing and carrying out attacks without any





connection to or support from an established jihadist group, and (2) travel to and establishment of open jihadi fronts, areas of the world with conditions

suitable for sustained urban and guerilla warfare. I – Suri - wrote the Call to Resistance’s primary idea in the first statement at the end of 1990 and published it in the beginning of 1991.We must concentrate on analyzing the strategy of open fronts and solo jihadi work as a resistance style that should be developed, so as to extract the appropriate military and mobility theory for the coming phase through techniques that have proven their worth.And they are; working in open fronts, and covert resistance through solo jhadi work and small cells. Our new way of doing jihadi work in the Call to Global Islamic Resistance, is the way and a global call. Also our military theory that we are in the midst of depends on mobilizing in the global horizon. It is the basis of military movement, as opposed to being a political, doctrinal, or religious strategy. http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/21-suri-a-mili

Khorasan: Not Quite Out of NowhereBy Cody M. Poplin Monday, September 29, 2014, 9:31 PM

In a post this weekend, to which both Jack and Ben have already written responses, Glenn Greenwald suggests the Khorasan group is a "wholesale concoction" that appeared "seemingly out of nowhere" in the press in the run-up to the current campaign.In contrast to Greenwald's claim, the Long War Journal has a series of posts dating back to mid-2013 detailing the existence of the cell now labeled the Khorasan Group, naming its key operative, and describing its ambitions. In fact, everything about the group is there except the name Khorasan.LWJ's coverage of the group began when the State Department noted that an Al Qaeda cell inside Iran had begun funneling fighters to the battlefields of Syria. Importantly, Muhsin Al Fadhli, now identified as the leader of Khorasan, was then that group's leader in Iran. LWJ's posts explain that Al Fadhli took over operations in Iran from Yasin Al Suri after the Iranian government, under pressure following a US Treasury Department report detailing his activities, detained Al Suri. Once released, Al Suri moved operations to Syria, "assisting in the movement of Al Qaeda external operatives to the West." In March of this year, LWJ reported that Al Fadhli had also moved to Syria sometime in mid-2013, and there began "recruit[ing] European Muslims to join the jihad in Syria" and "train[ing] them on how to execute terror operations in the western countries, focusing mostly on means of public transportation such as trains and airplanes." In the same report, LWJ continued, "Al Fadhli's presence inside Syria, where he is training recruits to attack the West, is a significant cause for concern among counterterrorism authorities."All of this was written and published as of March 2014, more than six months ago."State Department Highlights Iran's 'Marked Resurgence' of State-sponsored Terrorism," May 31, 2013: With respect to Syria, there is an interesting twist in the State Department's report. The al Qaeda network inside Iran, which operates as part of an agreement between al Qaeda and the Iranian regime, is sending fighters to Syria. It is not clear why Iran has allowed al Qaeda to facilitate these fighters' travel to Syria, where al Qaeda's Al Nusrah Front opposes the Assad regime, Iran, and Hezbollah.The report continues: "Iran allowed AQ facilitators Muhsin al Fadhli and Adel Radi Saqr al Wahabi al Harbi to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and to Syria." "Al Fadhli is a veteran AQ operative who has been active for years," State explains, and "began working with the Iran-based





AQ facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by Iranian authorities." Al Fadhli "was released in 2011 and assumed leadership of the Iran-based

AQ facilitation network.""Senior al Qaeda facilitator 'back on the street' in Iran," January 13, 2014:Yasin al Suri's role as al Qaeda's point man inside Iran was first exposed by the US Treasury and State Departments in 2011. In December of that year, the US government began offering a $10 million reward for information leading to al Suri's capture.After the US government's revelations, the Iranian government detained al Suri. This led al Qaeda to replace him with another seasoned terrorist, Muhsin al Fadhli, who took over as leader of the Iran-based network.

But now, according to US government officials who spoke with Al Jazeera, al Suri is back in the game and even facilitating al Qaeda's operations inside Syria. "As head al Qaeda facilitator in Iran, al Suri is responsible for overseeing al Qaeda efforts to transfer experienced operatives and leaders from Pakistan to Syria, organizing and maintaining routes by which new recruits can travel to Syria via Turkey and assisting in the movement of al Qaeda external operatives to the West," an unnamed State Department official told Al Jazeera. A US Treasury Department official confirmed the revelation, according to Al Jazeera. "He's an al Qaeda operative, Al Nusrah is an al Qaeda affiliate, and we know he's moving money and extremists into Syria for al Qaeda elements there, so I think you can draw that conclusion," the Treasury official said."Former head of al Qaeda's network in Iran now operates in Syria," March 25, 2014Muhsin al Fadhli, a senior al Qaeda leader who once headed the organization's network in Iran, relocated to Syria in mid-2013, according to a report in The Arab Times on March 21. Citing anonymous sources, the publication reports that al Fadhli has joined the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria. He was apparently sent to the country after a dispute broke out between Al Nusrah and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS).Al Fadhli was one of the trusted operatives who reported back to Ayman al Zawahiri on the dispute, according to the Arab Times, and he influenced al Qaeda's decision to eventually disown ISIS. Today, al Fadhli reportedly recruits European Muslims to join the jihad in Syria and "trains them on how to execute terror operations in the western countries, focusing mostly on means of public transportation such as trains and airplanes." Later, the story notes: "Al Fadhli's presence inside Syria, where he is training recruits to attack the West, is a significant cause for concern among counterterrorism authorities." "Senior al Qaeda Strategist part of so-called 'Khorasan Group,'" September 24, 2014 One member of the group, a veteran al Qaeda operative named Muhsin al Fadhli, has been publicly identified.But several US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal have confirmed that another well-known al Qaeda bigwig, a Saudi known as Sanafi al Nasr, is also a leader in the group. And, like al Fadhli, Nasr once served as the head of al Qaeda's Iran-based network. In tweets posted since early 2013, Nasr has revealed a number of details concerning al Qaeda's operations. In one tweet, for instance, he explained that al Qaeda's senior leadership decided to deploy trusted veterans to Syria, where they were embedded within both the Al Nusrah Front and Ahrar al Sham.

Revealed: Why ISIS Hates the TalibanThe Islamic State and the Taliban won’t get along–and that’s a good thing for South Asia.By Akhilesh Pillalamarri January 29, 2016Is the Islamic State (IS, also commonly known as ISIS) obsessed with the Taliban? And if so, why? A new issue of the group’s self-published magazine, Dabiq, offers some hints as





to why this is the case. Dabiq’s pages are filled with refutations of the Taliban’s ideology.

Thomas Joscelyn, in the Long Wars Journal, describes how the hostility that ISIS bears toward the Taliban stems from the fact that the Taliban draws its legitimacy not from a universal Islamic creed, but from a narrow ethnic and nationalistic base. In other words, while ISIS fights to establish a Caliphate encompassing the entire ummah (Muslim community), the Taliban merely seeks to establish an Afghan state that they claim is ruled ruled by Islamic Law.

However, in an interview with the ISIS Wali (custodian) of Khorasan, a self-declared ISIS province that includes Afghanistan, the group denies that the Taliban even rule by Islamic Law at all: Does the nationalist Taliban movement have areas of consolidation in Khurāsān? And do they rule them by Allah’s law?The Wālī: The nationalist Taliban movement only has control of some regions of “Afghanistan,” nowhere else. As for ruling them by Allah’s law, then it does not do that. Rather, they rule by tribal customs and judge affairs in accordance with the desires and traditions of the people, traditions opposing the Islamic Sharī’ah.Ironically, the Taliban claimed to rule by Islamic law and made much of sweeping away the tribal traditions it claimed were practiced by Afghan warlords. The 13th issue of Dabiq frequently uses the adjective “nationalist” to describe the Taliban, brandishing it as an insult. Despite its characterization of its mission as universal, this is evidence that ISIS retains a reputation of advancing Arab interests and the unlikeliness of it gaining much ground in South, Southeast, or Central Asia, despite the spread of Islamist activities in those regions.The list of the Islamic States’ grievances against the “nationalist” Taliban are long, and most of it involves criticizing its alliances towards groups that ISIS also loathes, such as Shias and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. ISIS reserves the greatest loathing for the Shia, whom it labels as the Rafidah, or rejectors, a term considered incredibly derogatory. The 13th issue of Dabiq dedicates dozens of pages to attacking and explaining the necessity of killing Shia, going through the history of how Persia became Shia before concluding:Initiated by a sly Jew, [the Shia] are an apostate sect drowning in worship of the dead, cursing the best companions and wives of the Prophet , spreading doubt on the very basis of the religion (the Qur’ān and the Sunnah), defaming the very honor of the Prophet , and preferring their “twelve” imāms to the prophets and even to Allah! …Thus, the Rāfidah are mushrik [polytheist] apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found, until no Rāfidī walks on the face of earth, even if the jihād claimants despise such…Not surprisingly, then, the Taliban are roundly condemned for believing otherwise, and the Taliban have historically not have had the best relations with the Shia minorities in Afghanistan or with the state of Iran. Afghanistan’s Taliban government nearly went to war with Iran in 1998. Dabiq attacked the Taliban for “considering the Rāfidah to be their brothers and publicly denouncing those who target the Rāfidah:”Abdullāh al-Wazīr, the official correspondent of the nationalist Taliban media committee, said, “The Shī’ah are Muslims … Everyone who says there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is Allah’s Messenger is a Muslim. The sects are many and Allah will decide between them on Judgment Day.

Dabiq goes on to criticize the “nationalist Taliban” for “defend[ing] the Rāfidī state of Iran – both its government and public,” and “condemn[ing] attacks [in Afghanistan] against their Rāfidī brothers.” ISIS also condemned the Taliban’s alliance with Pakistan, whose forces are referred to as “armies of apostasy”





because they are allied with “Crusaders.” Thus, the Dabiq argument concludes: the war between us and the Taliban carries on…

the jihād against the Pakistani and Afghan armies of apostasy is continuing and is proceeding with force, by Allah’s grace, power, and strength. The mujāhidīn bravely carry on in fighting the armies of both apostate governments and their forces who have betrayed Allah, His Messenger, and the Muslims…It is upon every Muslim who wants to support the Sharī’ah to hasten in making hijrah [migration] to this wilāyah [Khorasan] or to one of the other wilāyāt of the Khilāfah, for it is their land, the land of Islam.

Though this may seem like petty factional infighting to outsiders, it cannot but be a good thing that the Islamist terror groups of much of the eastern part of the Islamic world are at odds with each other. This prevents the strengthening or consolidation of extremist ideology in Afghanistan and Pakistan since Islamist extremism discredits itself with such infighting. Moreover, it makes it possible for the Taliban to have cause to reign in their its excesses and continue to speak with the Afghan government. Additionally, Pakistan’s intelligence services may be incentivized to refrain from further entrenching extremism in the country’s northwestern regions, especially after some Islamist groups there allied with ISIS.Finally, ISIS will have a difficult time gaining a foothold in Khorasan and subsequently other parts of Central and South Asia. In a strange way, they have brought together groups and nations as disparate as the United States, Iran, and the Taliban in the fight against them. They may be entrenched in Iraq and Syria for a while, but they certainly won’t be growing in Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the enemies they have made there with their hate for the “nationalism” of the Taliban in those countries.




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