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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-138-Caliphate-The State of al-Qaida-57-Comeback-1

It is widely believed that al Qaeda is a terrorist organization myopically focused on high-profile attacks in the West. But al Qaeda, like the Islamic State, is more than a terrorist group. Al Qaeda’s regional branches focus most of their efforts on waging insurgencies throughout Africa and the Middle East. And they need to build at least some popular support to be successful.- Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

"Why is there no storm in your ocean? The alleged 42-page booklet “Jihad in Pakistan” was declassified by US intelligence agencies on March 1. According to the booklet, Bin Laden predicted India was planning to carryout a decisive attack on Pakistan [after the 2008 Mumbai attacks], suggesting his followers to seize the opportunity.

Terror outfit Al Qaeda on Tuesday allegedly hacked a microsite belonging to the Indian Railways on Tuesday.Al Qaeda hacked the page of Bhusawal division of Personnel Department of the Central Railway which was created for the department's administrative needs. After the attack, it showed a message by Maulana Aasim Umar, Al Qaeda chief in south Asia, addressing all Muslims.The message read as "Why is there no storm in your ocean? A message for Muslims of India from Maulana Aasim Umar (May Allah protect him)." There was also an 11-page document on the hacked page. It read, ""Will the land of Delhi not give birth to a Shah Muhadith Delhvi who may once again teach the Muslims of India the forgotten lesson of Jihad and inspire them to take to the battlefields of Jihad? Is there no successor left of the group that drenched itself in blood at Balakot, who possesses the spirit of rising in rebellion against a system based on disbelief and offering one's life for Allah?." It also asked Muslims to unite and conduct jihad against United States and its allies.It has been reported that Umar aka Sanaul Haq has been appointed as the Al Qaeda in the Indian sub-continent (AQIS) last year.He joined the jihadist group following the Babri Masjid demolition in December 1992. He is an alumnus of Dar-ul-Uloom seminary at Deoband from where he graduated in 1991. He disappeared from Sambhal in 1995.

The late al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden wanted militants to wage a ‘holy war’ in Pakistan, destabilise its military and take control of the region, a new booklet has revealed.The alleged 42-page booklet “Jihad in Pakistan” was declassified by US intelligence agencies on March 1. According to the booklet, Bin Laden predicted India was planning to carryout a decisive attack on Pakistan [after the 2008 Mumbai attacks], suggesting his followers to seize the opportunity. The former global terror kingpin said dividing the nuclear-armed nation into five to six regions was a larger part of the United States’ plan and Indian forces would independently or with assistance from the US carryout the attack. While he pointed out India was purchasing 134 fighter aircraft, which “will be largest military deal in the history of the world,” he claimed New Delhi’s participation in joint naval exercises in the Arabian sea with America, Australia, Japan and other countries and its military training with Britain in Siachen were indicative of the plan.Other steps India had taken included nuclear cooperation with US, launch of an Israeli

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

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satellite to spy on Islamabad, increasing its force size by a million and allocation of $40 billion to purchase new weaponry, Bin Laden claimed.

“These giant steps predict an incoming storm. India has focused its attention on Pakistan’s internal situation,” the booklet said.Unfolding his strategy of taking over Islamabad, the ex-al Qaeda chief told his followers to devise a strategy to control parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Balochistan provinces to weaken the government. “We have to launch raids against Pakistani Army deployed on the Indian border. The border armies will not come to the rescue of armies in K-P and Balochistan, and will focus their efforts on strengthening their positions in their areas, as they are sensitive areas from the point of view of Pakistan’s war with India,” the former al Qaeda chief is quoted in the booklet as saying.This article originally appeared on The Times of India.

AQIM’s Resurgence: Responding to Islamic StatePublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 5March 3, 2016 By: Jacob Zenn, Dario Cristiani Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allied militant groups have undergone something of an operational revival since late 2015, expanding their area of operations and mounting high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali. Local and regional concerns play a role in these, but a more significant factor is the growing rivalry with Islamic State in northwest Africa and further afield.Ouagadougou and Bamako Hotel AttacksRecent high-profile attacks by AQIM and their affiliates in Burkina Faso and have shifted the threat level in the Sahel region to bear more similarities with the security situation in littoral West Africa. On January 15, 2016, at least three heavily armed gunmen stormed the Cappuccino Cafe and Splendid Hotel in the heart of Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, killing around 30 people, most of whom were foreigners. Burkinabe and international security forces finally intervened to end the siege, freeing about 176 hostages. Just two days later, on January 17, AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack and released a list of those involved, one of whom was named Ahmed al-Fulani. The fighter’s name suggests he comes from West Africa’s most transnational ethnic group, the Fulani, a group AQIM has been courting in order to expand its influence across the region. (Sidwaya [Ouagadougou], January 16, 2016, Jeune Afrique, January 19). A few weeks later, AQIM also claimed responsibility for an attack against the UN MISMUNA forces in Timbuktu. On February, 5, militants launched an attack against the old La Palmeraie Hotel, located between the airport and the administrative area of the city in the south, which is home to Nigerian policemen working with MINUSMA (Studio Tamani, February 7).Two months prior to these attacks, on November 20, 2015, gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu Hotel in the Malian capital, Bamako. As with the Ouagadougou attack, the operation was carried out by a relatively small group – just three gunmen armed with assault rifles and grenades. The attackers broke through a security barrier at dawn and opened fire, shouting Allahu Akbar (Jeune Afrique, November 20, 2015; Reuters, November 20, 2015). The attack reportedly killed 27 people. The target, the Radisson Blu Hotel, was considered one of the safest places in Bamako. Indeed, the Malian capital as a whole had been considered safe from the types of attacks that have struck the country’s north (Timbuktu and Kidal), and other West African cities in Niger (Arlit and Agadez), Nigeria (Kano and Abuja), and Chad (N’djamena).





Bolstering Local AlliancesMalian authorities have highlighted the role played in the Bamako attack by

local accomplices (Journal Du Mali, November 24, 2015), raising fears that sleeper cells remain present in the Malian capital (Jeune Afrique, November 20, 2015). Al-Mourabitun – the group supposedly led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, though his status following an air strike last year remains unclear (see Militant Leadership Monitor’s August 2015 issue) – claimed responsibility for the Bamako attack on November 22. It also condemned France for its role in the region.Two weeks later on December 4, AQIM leader Abdel Malek Droukdel also claimed the Bamako attack, calling it the first “joint act” between al-Mourabitun and AQIM. A second statement from al-Mourabitun later that day day confirmed the group was “united” with AQIM, an unexpected claim as Belmokhtar had previously feuded with Droukdel (Al-Akhbar, [Nouakchott], November 20); however, possible evidence that the al-Mourabitun leader was indeed killed in an airstrike in Libya.The AQIM-Sahara Branch, the Fulani-led Macina Liberation Front (FLM), and Ansar Dine also all claimed the Bamako attack, suggesting multiple allied local groups are integrated within AQIM. Further, when AQIM named the three militants “martyred” in the attack, the list included two brothers with the name “al-Fulani,” just like the Ouagadogou attacker.In August 2015, a smaller-scale hotel attack in Mali, saw militants target the Byblos hotel in Sévaré, central Mali. Twelve people (five soldiers, five militants, and two foreigners) were killed after Malian troops intervened (AFP, August 11, 2015). Although the targets, which were UN personnel staying at the hotel, are more consistent with AQIM-Sahara Branch and Ansar Dine operations, al-Mourabitun claimed responsibility, saying the attack’s “executor” was from the Songhai tribe of southern Mali. The Malian government, however, believed the FLM was behind the attack (L'Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], August 13, 2015).Earlier still, in March 2015 in the first major terrorist attack in Bamako, militants killed five people at a nightclub, including two foreigners. Nine other people were wounded in the attack, which was claimed by al-Mourabitun. Again, the network behind the operation appears to have been made up of AQIM and AQIM-Sahara Branch, al-Mourabitun, and more local elements, such as Ansar Dine and FLM.Wider Strategic ImperativesThe AQIM affiliates behind the recent wave of attacks in West Africa likely have multiple motivations ranging from the local to the global, but the incidents come at a time of high-profile Islamic State attacks on several cities around the world, both of sophisticated (Paris in November 2015) and unsophisticated (Jakarta and Istanbul in January 2016) nature.The Radisson Blu attack in Bamako, for example, came just 10 days after the Islamic State attack in Paris and, whether intended or not, shifted the focus from Paris back to the threat of AQIM in northwest Africa and the Francophone space; Air France staff at the Radisson Blu were reportedly among the attackers’ primary targets (ICG, November 20). In addition, the attack on the Radisson Blu coincided with an ongoing and regionally supported peace process between the Malian government and the secular Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which Ansar Dine leader Ag Ghaly labeled a “platter of shame” in a October 29, 2015, video. Other local-level operations carried out by AQIM include the killing of tribal leaders labeled “traitors” by the group for cooperating with Malian security forces. AQIM has also released videos of its militants intervening in tribal meetings near Timbuktu to encourage opposition to France.Similarly, the attack at the Cappuccino Cafe and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou on





January 15, 2016, coincided with the end of a “tacit peace” that the regime of Burkina Faso’s deposed president Blaise Compaoré had achieved with AQIM

(Limes [Rome] January 20). It also occurred two days after the Islamic State attack in Jakarta and thereby stole the media limelight away from the group’s first ever attack in southeast Asia.It is unlikely that AQIM’s attacks in Bamako and Ouagadogou are timed to respond directly to the Islamic State's attacks in Paris and Jakarta, especially considering the amount of preparation AQIM would have needed to execute the operations. However, AQIM and other al-Qaeda affiliates are conscious that Islamic State intentionally carries out attention-grabbing attacks in multiple regions of the world. This prompts al-Qaeda affiliates to match Islamic State with high-profile attacks of their own, as seen in Bamako and Ougadougou.This ideological and political rivalry with Islamic State is an important influence on the recent AQIM attacks in northwest Africa, a region characterized by weak states incapable of adequately tackling the security challenges they face. The targeting of luxury hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners – as well as the targeting of the foreigners – damages the economies of the countries in the region, reducing tourism and spooking potential investors.Rivalry with Islamic StateIn recent months AQIM-Sahara Branch released videos of two hostages, a South African and a Swedish citizen kidnapped in 2012, while AQIM and al-Mourabitun announced the kidnappings in Timbuktu of a Swiss citizen and an Australian couple (both in January 2016), as well as a Romanian laborer (kidnapped in April 2015) in northern Burkina Faso (20min.ch [Zurich], January 10, ABC, January 17, Jurnalul [Bucharest], August 30, 2015). These kidnappings are unlike AQIM’s past abductions, however. The group is moving southwards in search of operations that score propaganda victories. The value of such kidnappings is in the additional international attention they provide to AQIM in its rivalry with Islamic State, as opposed to the millions of dollars earned through earlier operations.The shift comes as a result of AQIM's relatively newfound competion against a powerful brand. An affiliation with Islamic State can benefit local, smaller groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in search of jihadist legitimacy. MUJAO’s leaders, Walid Abou Adnan Sahraoui and Hamadou Kehiry, pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi last year (Al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], May 13; Jeune Afrique, May 14). Similarly, Abubakr Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram (now Islamic State in West Africa Province), pledged his allegiance to al-Baghdadi in March 2015 to much fanfare from Islamic State supporters in Africa and the Middle East. This move by militant groups towards Islamic State loyalty has impacted regional recruitment dynamics. AQIM and allied militants fear a rising and unfettered Islamic State can attract more young militants via the ideological pull of al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the Caliphate and the Islamic State social media recruitment campaign that comes with it.Another development worth noting is AQIM’s adoption of themes and stylistic features popular in Islamic State videos that had been previously absent from AQIM’s past propaganda material. This includes AQIM-Sahara Branch’s newfound focus on conquering Rome, the casting of a British-accented “Jihadi John”-style militant in videos, and the use of distinctive Islamic State production techniques, such as the nasheed (Islamic chants) overlaying its films (Le Monde [Paris], January 18). However, Islamic State also follows AQIM’s operations and propaganda in Northwest Africa. Following the attacks in Bamako and Ougadougou, Islamic State heavily promoted its own video series focusing on the Maghreb region and calling on Muslims in the area to join the organization's ranks.





Organizational differences remain between the two groups. Consistent with its vertical organizational structure, key decisions by Islamic State affiliates

are directed from Raqqa by Islamic State's “core” that dictates strategic priorities. In contrast, al-Qaeda is organized more horizontally, allowing its affiliates like AQIM and AQIM-Sahara Branch, allies such as al-Mourabitun, and local franchises such as Ansar Dine and FLM considerable freedom to set their own agendas. Islamic State meanwhile avoids relying on local fighters to guide its operations, but encourages militants to migrate to Syria and Iraq; Libya and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria, now also feature as “migration” destinations in Islamic State propaganda. Islamic State also appoints emirs from the Middle East to oversee local operations in West Africa - among them, the unnamed Libyan emir for Boko Haram who Abdulbakar Shekau, the local Boko Haram leader, refers to only as the wali, or governor. (See Militant Leadership Monitor's December 2015 issue). All things considered, the two strains of militancy maintain significant cultural and ideological influences and similar long-term strategic aims.ConclusionAQIM’s process of adapting and responding to Islamic State should be seen as a “normalization" of AQIM of sorts. Since the rise of Islamic State, AQIM has become more sensitive to what happens on the global stage. This indicates a significant change, as AQIM had been peculiarly localized in its priorities, even after its 2007 rebranding as a part of al-Qaeda.AQIM’s recent operational revival comes in response to a number of factors. While local priorities play a role, increasing competition with Islamic State is the key driver behind AQIM’s adapted rhetoric and operations and the group has consequently translated its strategic communications and resources into high-profile attacks on international targets in cities where it had previously lain dormant.Jacob Zenn is a Fellow on African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation. Dario Cristiani is an adjunct professor in international affairs at Vesalius College in Brussels and a senior analyst at the Global Governance Institute.

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As The Long War Journal previously reported, AQAP opened a new Twitter feed for Al Ather “news” agency in January. The feed is intended to advertise Ansar al Sharia’s governance, enforcement of sharia law, and other activities in the populated areas that have fallen under the jihadists’ control since last year. Ansar al Sharia is simply a brand used by AQAP to market itself to the local population. By portraying themselves as the defenders of sharia law, AQAP’s leaders and members hope to woo more Muslims to their cause.

Capitalizing on Chaos: AQAP Advances in YemenPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 4February 19, 2016 11:08 AM Age: 15 daysBy: Michael Horton Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has more men, is better equipped and funded, and holds more territory than at any time in its history. The only point at which the organization has enjoyed comparable strength was in the aftermath of the popular uprising against former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011.





However, the conditions that allowed AQAP to seize and hold territory after the 2011 uprising are far more pronounced now than they were then. These

include: disarray within the Yemeni Armed Forces, severe and increased poverty, economic turmoil, an absence of governmental authority, and widening sectarian divisions. All of these factors make Yemen — particularly southern and eastern Yemen — fertile ground for the expansion of AQAP.In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” a campaign that ostensibly aimed at restoring the internationally-recognized but exiled government of Yemeni president Abd Raboo Mansur al-Hadi. Hadi and his government had fled the Yemeni port city of Aden for the safety of Saudi Arabia as Yemen’s Houthi rebels advanced. The Houthis — who refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah) — are a Zaidi Shi’a movement that has deep roots in northwest Yemen. They are now nominally allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and military forces loyal to him, but are believed by Saudi Arabia to be backed by Iran.The resulting ten month-long naval blockade by Saudi and its allies and their thousands of airstrikes on civilian and military targets across the country have failed to dislodge the Houthis, who remain in control of the capital, Sana’a, and much of northwest Yemen. The airstrikes and the naval blockade have, however, succeeded in ravaging the poorest country in the Middle East. The United Nations estimates that more than eighty percent of Yemen’s population of 26 million are now in need of humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA, January 2016). Yemen’s already limited infrastructure has been decimated and what little central government control there was before the war no longer exists. Perhaps most seriously, the months of war are dismantling the social structures that have long provided Yemen with a measure of at least localized stability. This multi-front war in Yemen is a gift to groups like AQAP and the Islamic State. Both organizations thrive in areas where poverty and sectarian tensions are pronounced. AQAP, and, to a lesser degree the Islamic State, have consequently lost no time in capitalizing on the chaos in Yemen.Filling the VoidThe Saudi-led coalition succeeded in forcing the Houthis and allied forces to vacate Aden and the parts of southern Yemen that they briefly occupied. However, the coalition, and the exiled Yemeni government that it supports, failed to secure these areas, including the temporary capital of Aden. The Saudi-led campaign relies heavily on airstrikes and thus far has deployed only a limited number of ground troops, many of which are mercenaries (Middle East Eye, December 23, 2015; al-Bawaba, December 14, 2015).The retreat of the Houthis and military forces allied with them from parts of southern Yemen left a vacuum that AQAP has been quick to fill. Shortly after the initiation of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, AQAP took over al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest city and the capital of Hadramawt governorate. AQAP has long maintained a presence in the Hadramawt and in the neighboring governorate of Shabwa. These are both areas where the Houthis have little or no influence. The elements of the Yemeni Armed Forces and security services deployed in Mukalla offered little resistance to the takeover. Following their takeover of Mukalla, AQAP advanced throughout the southern parts of Hadramawt. The only real resistance that AQAP faced was in the northern part of the Hadramawt where forces under the command of Major General Abdul Rahman al-Halili, commander of Yemen’s First Military District, blocked their advance.While AQAP was halted in its attempts to push into the northern parts of Hadramawt, the organization is expanding across much of southern Yemen. AQAP has infiltrated its operatives into Aden where it enjoys a complex relationship with a matrix of anti-Houthi, separatist, and Salafi militias. During the four-month battle to evict the Houthis and their





allies from Aden, which ended in July 2015, AQAP operatives worked closely with many of the militias fighting the Houthis, some of which were

backed by the Saudis and the Hadi government. AQAP’s operatives, particularly at more senior levels, were far more experienced fighters than the often raw recruits that made up the bulk of the militias fighting the Houthis. AQAP has also effectively inserted its operatives into the bitterly contested city of Taiz. Houthi allied forces and a loose alliance of "popular committees," pro-government, and Salafi militias are battling each other for control of the strategically and culturally important city. AQAP’s seasoned and increasingly battle-hardened operatives are comparatively well-versed in urban warfare, bomb making, and assassinations. While an overwhelming majority of those fighting against the Houthis and their allies are opposed to AQAP and its ideology, the need for well-trained and relatively disciplined fighters has likely trumped such ideological differences; some of those fighting against the Houthis increasingly view AQAP as a useful source of well-trained, disciplined fighters.Beyond infiltrating operatives into large urban areas like Aden and Taiz, AQAP is also now holding more territory than it ever has in its history. As mentioned above, AQAP has occupied Mukalla since April 2015 (Yemen Times, April 6, 2015). In early December 2015, AQAP launched an offensive in the governorate of Abyan, located to the west of Hadramawt. AQAP last occupied parts of Abyan in 2011, when it took over the towns of Zinjibar and Ja’ar and declared Abyan to be an "Islamic Emirate." By December 5, 2015, in a repeat of 2011, AQAP had secured the towns of Zinjibar and Ja’ar as well as the surrounding areas. Just as it has in other parts of southern Yemen, AQAP filled the void left by an absence of both government-controlled military forces and those controlled by the nominally pro-Hadi popular committees. In the latter's case, the popular committee forces had successfully pushed Houthi and allied forces out of Abyan but subsequently moved onto the neighboring governorate of Lahej to resist a renewed Houthi offensive, leading to a power vacuum in Abyan.Just as it has done in Mukalla, AQAP targeted key political figures in Abyan — and particularly those figures that cannot be easily co-opted or bought off. For instance, during its takeover of Zinjibar and Ja’ar, AQAP killed Ali al-Said, a mid-level commander within the Abyan-based popular committee (The National [UAE], December 3, 2015). The organization also targeted five other key tribal and militia figures. Despite the assassinations, AQAP’s commanders have largely implemented the same “light-footprint” strategy in Abyan that they have used in Mukalla (al-Jazeera, September 16, 2015). As will be explained below, this new light footprint strategy arises from the lessons that AQAP learned in the aftermath of its 2011-12 takeover of parts of Abyan.Lessons Learned and a New StrategyIn June 2012, a coalition of tribal militias — referred to as popular committees — and units from the Yemeni Army forced AQAP to withdraw from the parts of Abyan that they controlled. The leadership of AQAP had, however, already learned a great deal from the year during which they held and—to some degree governed—territory for the first time. In May and August of 2012, the emir of AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, now deceased, wrote two letters to his counterpart in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). [1] Here Wuhayshi sought to impart some of the lessons learned by his own organization in the preceding months.Foremost among these lessons was the need for al-Qaeda to take a more gradual approach to imposing Sharia law and, in particular, to enforcing severe punishments for relatively minor offences. When AQAP took control of parts of Abyan and the neighboring governorate of Shabwa in 2011, the organization stoked local and specifically tribal anger





when it flouted long-established tribal laws and traditions in favor of its own reductionist interpretation of Islamic law. As an example of this, AQAP

sought to end the traditional trade in, and consumption of, the mild narcotic qat. Qat is viewed as halal, or permitted by many tribal religious authorities in Yemen, and is a core part of the Yemeni economy. AQAP's prohibition therefore struck at both traditional and economic sensitivities.AQAP’s heavy-handed approach to governance in Abyan and Shabwa through the qat ban and other comparable measures cost it critical local support. As a result, while units of the Yemeni Armed Forces played a key role in evicting AQAP from its strongholds in Abyan, it was tribal militias made up of men from the governorate that proved critical to defeating AQAP — at least temporarily.Wuhayshi and his deputies — including the current AQAP emir, Qasim al-Raymi — used the lessons learned in 2011-12 to redesign their organizational structure and most importantly their approach to governing and holding territory. AQAP’s takeover and subsequent management of Mukalla are both clear examples of these changes.AQAP’s takeover of Mukalla in early 2015 was swift and resulted in few casualties and relatively little damage to private property. In the days and weeks following their takeover, AQAP targeted those members of the local government and security apparatus who did not accept their authority. However, after they consolidated their hold on the city, AQAP’s leadership left the day-to-day governance of the city to a local council. As part of their effort to indigenize their organization, AQAP began referring to its members who operate in the Hadramawt — Mukalla is the capital of the governorate of the Hadramawt — as the “Sons of Hadramawt” (al-Jazeera, September 16, 2015). In addition, just as Wuhayshi counseled in his letters to the leader of AQIM, AQAP has maintained a relatively low profile in Mukalla. AQAP for instance provides security for the city and has undertaken some “public works” programs like repairing water mains and providing aid in the wake of the November 2015 cyclone. [2]AQAP’s more recent campaign to retake Abyan in December 2015 appears to be of a similar design. Those members of AQAP who are active in Abyan refer to themselves as the “Sons of Abyan” and, apart from targeting a few key figures within the popular committees, the takeover has been relatively bloodless. Much as it has done in Mukalla, it is likely that AQAP will maintain its light footprint strategy and work to re-insert itself into the local governing structures in Abyan.Out-maneuvering the Islamic State in YemenFor all its advantages, AQAP’s light footprint strategy is replete with risks to the group. Foremost among these is AQAP’s potential to be perceived as lacking radical zeal by more hardline militants. . This perception could intensify what is already a simmering conflict between AQAP and Islamic State. Since the Houthi-led offensive and Saudi Arabia’s subsequent commencement of Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015, the Islamic State — which had only a limited presence in Yemen — has expanded. In March 2015, the group claimed credit for four suicide attacks on two mosques in Sana’a (al-Bawaba, March 20, 2015). These attacks killed more than 140 people; Islamic State claimed to be targeting what were predominately Zaidi mosques. However, as with the majority of mosques in north Yemen, the two mosques that were targeted were used by both Zaidis and Sunnis. Notably, AQAP condemned the bombing of the mosques (Middle East Eye, March 20, 2015).Islamic State’s attacks in Yemen have largely been directed at targets associated with the Houthis. The militant Salafi ideology that Islamic State and AQAP embrace means that both groups view all Shi’a as heretics. While AQAP is also locked in a battle with the





Houthis, its leadership has thus far been careful not to target mosques and other strictly civilian targets. This is not to say that AQAP is not just as brutal

and dangerous an organization as Islamic State; however, AQAP takes a pragmatic view and, following its 2011-12 experience, is keenly aware of how important it is to not lose the still limited local support that it enjoys. For instance, local support is critical for maintaining supply chains and evading detection. [3] AQAP is therefore engaged in a delicate balancing act: it must restrain itself and its operatives so as not to alienate and anger local people in the areas that it has nominal control over yet it must also prove that it is as dynamic and “Islamic” as Islamic State.In addition to the lessons that AQAP learned from its 2011-12 attempt to hold territory, the tactics of Islamic State in Yemen have also forced AQAP to moderate its own tactics. AQAP therefore appears to be pursuing something of a “middle way” in Yemen. Its light footprint strategy allows it to hold territory and enables it to claim that it is making progress toward establishing the caliphate that al-Qaeda (and Islamic State) desires. Yet at the same time, the strategy means that it is able to make the most of its still limited, albeit rapidly increasing, resources. For example, by leaving day-to-day governance to local councils, it is able to effectively co-opt local and regional stakeholders while being able to focus on battling the Houthis and Houthi-allied forces, which remain the primary threat to AQAP.The Near or Far Enemy?The debate about whether to pursue the near or far enemy remains contentious within both al-Qaeda central and AQAP. AQAP has a history of pursuing both the near enemy in the Yemeni state and now the Houthis and the far enemy in the West. Since the beginning of the civil war in Yemen, AQAP has focused most of its efforts on attacking the near enemy. The Houthi offensive that saw the Sana’a takeover in September 2014 also put considerable pressure on AQAP. With their allies in the Yemeni Army, the Houthis pushed south into al-Bayda, Abyan, and Shabwa areas where AQAP has long operated and exerted influence. The Houthis and their allies were initially successful at pushing AQAP out of these areas, to the extent that many of AQAP’s operatives fled east to the Hadramawt, where they subsequently regrouped.The Houthis’ push into the south however inflamed what were minimal sectarian divisions and helped — at least to some degree — bolster local support for AQAP and the Salafist militias that fought alongside them. With the entrance of Saudi Arabia and its allies into the war in March 2015, AQAP was therefore able to rapidly regroup and seize large amounts of military hardware and cash from Yemeni Army installations, and banks – in particular, the Yemeni Central Bank branch in Mukalla.AQAP’s counter-offensive against the Houthis and allied forces has been its primary focus in the eleven months since Saudi Arabia entered the war. Only now does AQAP arguably have the operational room and resources to again focus on the far enemy. Most worryingly, AQAP now enjoys more resources and operational freedom that it ever has before. However, with parts of the country, namely Taiz, Lahej, and al-Bayda still being bitterly contested by a host of militias and state-backed forces, AQAP’s short-term focus is likely to remain on the near enemy.In addition to now having considerable resources and operational freedom to carry out attacks on the far enemy, AQAP may also be motivated to at least partially renew its focus on the far enemy by Islamic State. The Islamic State’s attacks in Yemen have focused on sectarian and high profile targets, including a deadly attack on the governor of Aden, the temporary headquarters of the Yemeni government in exile, and the presidential palace in Aden (al-Jazeera, December 7, 2015; al-Arabiya, January 30). These attacks are audacious





and belie the fact that Islamic State’s branch in Yemen is still — relative to AQAP — a small organization. While AQAP has made significant progress

in terms of seizing territory and growing its organization, it has generally eschewed high-profile attacks in favor of fighting along more traditional lines. This is a key part of its light footprint strategy but the lack of high profile attacks also leaves it vulnerable to criticism from hardcore members of the jihadist community. An attack on a Western target, whether that be in Yemen or abroad, would demonstrate the fact that AQAP remains a dynamic force that is still committed to and capable of “global jihad” and thus reassure its hardline supporters who might otherwise be attracted to Islamic State.OutlookThe ongoing civil war and the destruction wrought by eleven months of aerial bombardment by Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners ensure that Yemen will remain fertile ground for the growth of both AQAP and Islamic State over both the medium and long-term. Terrorist organizations by their very nature are predatory, adaptive, and thrive in power vacuums like the one that exists throughout much of Yemen. AQAP in particular has proven itself to be highly resilient and capable of learning from its mistakes and modifying its organizational structure accordingly.The ability to learn and evolve has been clearly demonstrated by AQAP over the last two years. Despite drone attacks that have successfully targeted some of its senior leaders, AQAP has retained and improved upon its ability to interface with local stakeholders, plan and participate in relatively complex offensive operations, and perhaps most importantly, it is also learning how to govern through proxies.Over the medium and even long-term, AQAP’s future in Yemen looks secure. While it may be compelled to take a more combative approach to confronting Islamic State, this is unlikely to significantly weaken AQAP. The only real potential threat to AQAP’s expansion in Yemen are stability and assertive and efficient governance at the local and federal levels. However, neither stability nor the formation of an effective government appear likely. Even when the war in Yemen does end, AQAP will continue to benefit from the destruction of the country’s armed forces, infrastructure, and perhaps most importantly, the intensifying hatred between rival political and religious groups.Michael Horton is an analyst whose work primarily focuses on Yemen and the Horn of Africa.Notes:[1.] See: http://www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf[2] See: https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/aqap-video-focuses-on-cyclone-relief-efforts-for-civilians-in-hadramawt.html[3] In December 2013, AQAP apologized to the Yemeni people for what its own communique described as a “brutal” attack on the Yemeni Ministry of Defense and the hospital inside the ministry. The attack left 56 dead. AQAP took full responsibility for the attack and promised to pay blood money to the relatives of the dead.

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Wilayat Khorasan Stumbles in AfghanistanPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 5March 3, 2016 By: Nathaniel Barr





January marks a year since Islamic State announced its official expansion into Afghanistan. On January 26, 2015, Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, Islamic

State’s chief spokesperson, released an audio statement in which he declared the establishment of Wilayat Khorasan, a branch of the group “encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan and other nearby lands” (Jihadology, January 26, 2015). Since then, Wilayat Khorasan has pursued a campaign of expansion and consolidation in the region, with most of its activity centering in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan. The group, however, has experienced several setbacks on the battlefield that have raising questions about the group’s staying power and future prospects in Afghanistan.Collapse of the Islamic Movement of UzbekistanThe most crushing defeat that Wilayat Khorasan suffered in recent months was the annihilation of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had pledged allegiance to Islamic State in August 2015. The IMU’s decision to join Islamic State marked a break from the group’s historic relationship with the Afghan Taliban.In the 1990s, the Taliban provided the IMU with access to training camps in Afghanistan in exchange for a pledge of allegiance to Mullah Muhammed Omar. The IMU also contributed several hundred fighters to the Taliban’s ongoing conflict with the Northern Alliance (Carnegie, August 12, 2014). The relationship between the Taliban and the IMU continued beyond 9/11. Starting around 2010, the IMU collaborated closely with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, facilitating the Taliban’s expansion into ethnic Uzbek areas (Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 26, 2013).However, declaration of the Caliphate by Islamic State was a game-changer for the IMU. The group began to express support for the Islamic State in September 2014. Then, in August 2015 following a period of flirtation, the IMU released a video in which its emir, Uthman Ghazi, pledged allegiance to Islamic State and announced that the IMU would serve under the command of Wilayat Khorasan.The IMU’s pledge of allegiance was received with great enthusiasm. In late August, the media wing of Wilayat al-Furat, also known as Wilayat Euphrates, produced an Uzbek-language video praising the IMU and calling upon Central Asian Muslims to join the Islamic State (Jihadology, August 21, 2015).The excitement was short-lived. In August 2015, small skirmishes erupted between the IMU and the Taliban in Zabul province, where Ghazi and his supporters had settled. The Taliban then issued an ultimatum to the IMU: renounce the pledge of allegiance to Islamic State or leave Afghanistan (Afghan Islamic Press, September 2, 2015). Several IMU fighters realigned with the Taliban following this ultimatum, according to one press report, but a core group of IMU members, led by Ghazi, defied the Taliban and remained in Zabul (Afghan Islamic Press, November 28, 2015).The conflict between the two groups escalated quickly. The Taliban launched an offensive in Zabul, attacking the IMU as well as Mansoor Dadullah, a Taliban splinter group commander who opposed the appointment of Mullah Akhtar Mansour as Mullah Omar’s successor. Contrary to several news reports, Dadullah never joined Islamic State and remained loyal to the Taliban worldview. However, he maintained an alliance with the IMU in Zabul that pre-dated the latter group’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State.The IMU stood no chance against the Taliban onslaught. In mid-November 2015, an IMU member posted a desperate audio message on Facebook in which he explained that the Taliban had killed hundreds of IMU fighters in Zabul and had laid siege to remaining IMU militants. The fighter concluded his message: “This might be our last appearance on the Internet.” [1]That prediction proved prophetic. On December 9, an Islamic State supporter posted an





Arabic-language statement on his Twitter account detailing the IMU’s demise at the hands of the Taliban. According to this statement, the Taliban killed the

remaining IMU fighters in Zabul, as well as Dadullah and 45 of his relatives. The statement also reported that the Taliban had captured Ghazi, though other reports claimed that Ghazi was killed (SITE Intelligence, December 11, 2015).Regardless of Ghazi’s fate, it was clear the Taliban had brought a decisive end to the IMU. As the Islamic State supporter noted in his statement: “The Taliban achieved in 24 hours what the Americans were unable to do in 14 years.”Troubles in NangarharThe IMU’s collapse in Zabul is not the only battlefield setback Wilayat Khorasan has experienced in Afghanistan. In recent months, Taliban militants, Afghan security forces, and local militias have chipped away at Wilayat Khorasan-held territory in Nangarhar province along the Pakistani border in eastern Afghanistan, where the group had hoped to establish a base of operations.Wilayat Khorasan initially appeared to be on a steady upward trajectory in Nangarhar, with Islamic State reportedly killing Taliban shadow governors from three districts in Nangarhar in May 2015, facilitating the group’s growth in the province (Pajhwok, May 17, 2015). By the following month, Wilayat Khorasan held territory in at least six districts in Nangarhar and began disseminating Islamic State propaganda to local populations and destroying poppy fields – signs that the group was looking to consolidate its control in the province (Reuters, June 29, 2015).In July 2015, however, U.S. drone strikes killed several Wilayat Khorasan leaders in Nangarhar, including former Pakistani Taliban spokesman Shahidullah Shahid (Dawn, July 9, 2015). Several months later, a provincial parliament member from established a local militia intended to combat Wilayat Khorasan, although the militia itself has been mired in controversy because of its involvement in extra-judicial killings (AFP, December 27, 2015).The biggest threat to Wilayat Khorasan, however, has come from the Taliban. In October 2015, the Taliban established a special forces unit, comprised of highly skilled and experienced militants, to combat the Islamic State (BBC, December 18, 2015). After taking on the IMU in Zabul, the unit went on the offensive in Nangarhar, reversing many of the gains Islamic State had made earlier in the year.Wilayat Khorasan’s biggest defeat came in early January 2016, when Taliban forces drove Islamic State out of two districts in Nangarhar (Voice of America, January 5, 2016). According to U.S. military officials, by late January, the group had been “pushed back to the southern parts of Nangarhar province.” [2] In mid-February, Wilayat Khorasan suffered another major loss in Nangarhar, as Afghan army and police units backed by U.S. airstrikes drove the group out of its stronghold in Achin district (Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016).ConclusionDespite its recent losses in Zabul and Nangarhar, Wilayat Khorasan remains active in Afghanistan. Recent estimates indicate that there are approximately 7,000-8,500 Islamic State members in Afghanistan (RUSI, February 5, 2016), including about 1,000 fighters still in Nangarhar (New York Times, January 31, 2016); the group has demonstrated an ability to carry out terrorist attacks in urban areas, including Nangarhar’s capital of Jalalabad.However, Wilayat Khorasan’s recent defeats make it clear that the Taliban poses a serious obstacle to the Islamic State’s expansion in Afghanistan. Unless Wilayat Khorasan can either co-opt or overpower Taliban forces in Nangarhar and other provinces, the group





risks becoming strategically irrelevant.Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global, a consulting firm

that focuses on violent non-state actors.Notes:[1] Message posted on the ‘Afghan Shine’ Facebook page, November 14, 2015.[2] See Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Shoffner via Teleconference from Afghanistan, January 19, 2016.

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Regards CeesMarch 1, 2016Special Dispatch No.6333Indian Islamic Cleric: ISIS 'Was Brought Into Being By Jews, Christians, Western Powers, And Islam's Enemies'

In recent articles, Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, an internationally renowned Islamic cleric from India, has argued that the Islamic State (ISIS) was created by Jews, Christians, Western powers, and Islam's enemies.A lengthy piece titled "ISIS: You Are such [A Friend] Who Even Leaves Behind The Foe" was published in two parts on two successive Fridays, January 1 and January 8, 2016, in the prominent Urdu-language daily Roznama Inquilab. In it, he argued that ISIS is an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, and adds: "It is clear as day that

the U.S. is the power that strengthened Osama bin Laden and created Al-Qaeda."The following are excerpts from the article:"Israel And The Western Powers Are Conspiracy Experts... [But] After A While They Expose Their Own Conspiracies""...It is difficult to establish the date of [ISIS's] formation because no movement comes into being and reaches a position where it can be noticed by all with the stroke of a pen. This is true for ISIS, but it is also well-accepted that it is rooted in Al-Qaeda, which was founded by Osama bin Laden in 1990 [sic; Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988 in Peshawar]. With the help of the U.S and the Western powers, Osama launched jihad in Afghanistan, taking it to the point where a superpower like Russia had no option but to leave...""Three things are important and noteworthy about ISIS. Firstly, who brought this blood-shedding movement into being? Secondly, what are its ideologies and activities? Thirdly, what is the position of its views and deeds in light of the Koran and Hadith [traditions of the Prophet Muhammad]?"The answer to the first question is evident – this movement was brought into being by Jews, Christians, Western powers, and Islam's enemies... It is clear as day that the U.S. is the power which strengthened Osama bin Laden and created Al-Qaeda, and it also did not keep its help a secret. Instead, it helped [Al-Qaeda] openly because it wanted to disgrace





its opponent power, Russia. Therefore, after a secret Pentagon report was published, it was established that the U.S., Britain, France, Israel and other

Western governments not only endorsed Al-Qaeda's type of methodology but also oversaw it. From the belly of that organization, ISIS was gradually born..."Only a few days ago, a U.S. commander's statement that they trained ISIS [was reported] in newspapers. IN 2013, Edward Snowden, leaking NSA reports, said that the U.S., Israel, and Britain created ISIS... Snowden further said that Israel trained [ISIS leader] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi... [It was also reported] in newspapers that some of ISIS's wounded were treated in Israel. Besides, only the U.S and Israel could provide the modern technology that ISIS is using. The Muslims are so backward in such resources that it cannot be expected from them that they would create such things. Israel and the Western powers are conspiracy experts... but after a while they expose their own conspiracies, and it is not too much to attribute to such cunning people..."The real work of creating, strengthening, and promoting this fitna [mischief of ISIS] is being carried out by the Western powers, especially Israel. Also, it is Israel and Syria that are benefiting the most from the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Apparently, its end result would be this: that Iraq and Syria will be divided into small pieces so that there could be no Arab neighbor to even raise its eyes towards Israel.""Khwarij [Like ISIS] Will Spring Up In Every Era – Therefore, Therefore, Allah's Messenger [Muhammad] Said That These Faithless [Apostates, i.e. ISIS] Will Be Born In Every Age""The second question is: What is the source of ISIS's actions and ideology? In one sentence, we can say that they are the Khawarij [Kharijites] of this age. Kharuj means to split off [from the Islamic regime] and rebel. A group from Iraq, were living in Harua and Nahrawan areas, rebelled against Hazrat Ali [the fourth caliph of Islam], and were called Khawarij... Gradually, Khwarij became a sect, and many sects emerged from it, the most violent of which were the followers of Nafe bin Arzaq, called Azareqas..."Azeraqas held the view that those who are not with them are all infidels and polytheists. In their view, it is obligatory to rebel against the tyrant Muslim rulers even though they say Kalima [expressing belief in the oneness of Allah and in the Prophet as His messenger], because in their view they are polytheists and infidels and killing them, or even killing and imprisoning their children, is allowed – to the point where indiscriminate genocide of their opponents is right and their women are Halal [allowed by Islam] as slaves. The property taken from them, and their Amanat [items in safe keeping] are also Halal; neither Nikah [marriage] with them nor Zabiha [animals slaughtered by them] are allowed; and if someone cannot come out against the tyrant ruler because of some [valid] excuse, even he is criminal and it is obligatory to leave a place where such people rule..."Looking at it, ISIS ideology and practice are the same of the Azeraqas, and the whole ummah [Muslim nation] is unanimous and united in [the view that] it has astray and become perverted. It is very important [to note] that Khawarij will spring up in every era – therefore, Allah's Messenger said that these faithless [apostates, i.e. ISIS] will be born in every age. He [Prophet Muhammad]... said, three times, that they are the worst people in creation (Musnad Ahmad 4/621)... The Khawarij would be slain at Jabal al-Lebanon [Hills of Lebanon] or some other hilly areas (Fatahul Bari: 4/334)…"Therefore, the rise of the Khawarij in the Middle East, and their fight with the Muslims, and their gaining strength in a hilly area like the hills near Lebanon – all of this is included in the prediction of Allah's Prophet... It is in the narration of Sahal Bin Haneef; asked whether Allah's Prophet... had said anything about Khawarij... he [Muhammad] pointed towards Iraq with one hand and towards Syria with another and said that there would





emerge from there those who would shave their heads, who would have the Koran on their tongues but that it would not go down their throats, and that

they will be out of Islam like arrows from bows... There is a clear sign in this Hadith that Iraq and Syria will become the special center of Khawarij and that this fitna would rise from Iraq."The third question is about the Islamic teachings regarding ISIS's activities. This needs to be clearly explained. The first and basic ideology of ISIS, according to them, is: Anyone who abandons any practice of Islam or commits a sin is no longer a Muslim and becomes an infidel. This is totally wrong..."ISIS's second basic concept is that the killing of those who are deprived of faith and are infidel is allowed, and that their property is Halal, and that even enslaving their women is allowed. This is a very wrong concept; it is a conspiracy to defame and disgrace Muslims. The Koran calls for jihad only against those who are fighting with Muslims; there too there are limits that should not be crossed."Therefore, Allah says: Fight in the path of Allah with them who fight against you, and do not transgress, because Allah does not like the transgressors (Chapter Al-Baqrah, Verse 190)..."Source: Roznama Inquilab (India), January 1 and 8, 2016.

March 1, 2016Special Dispatch No.6332Pakistani Urdu Daily: ISIS 'Is The Creation Of America And Europe'; It 'Threatens The Muslims More Than The Infidels'; 'Such Organizations Have No Association With Islam'A screen shot of the Roznama Ummat editorialFollowing the November 13, 2015 coordinated terror attacks in Paris, the leading Pakistani Urdu daily Roznama Ummat published, on November 20, an editorial titled "Daesh [the Islamic State, i.e. ISIS] Can Never Be An Organization Of Muslims" accusing the U.S. and its allies of creating ISIS, to be an excuse for attacking Muslim countries. It states that Osama bin Laden's creation of Al-Qaeda was the result of American expansionism and of the American presence in Muslim holy lands.The widely circulated Roznama Ummat is a staunch supporter of Islamist political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan and the jihadi groups that work to the benefit of Pakistan, e.g. the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad which have an anti-India agenda.Following is the text of the editorial, as translated from Urdu:"Recent History Attests To The Fact That Al-Qaeda Was Formed In Reaction To American Expansionism, Enmity Against Islam, And Killings Of Muslims""With regard to terrorism all over the world, Daesh [ISIS] is No. 1. America and its allied countries call Daesh a more savage and brutal terrorist organization than Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, though in the recent past they considered Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda the most dangerous, with false and true stories about its members being concocted and spread. Recent history attests to the fact that Al-Qaeda was formed in reaction to American expansionism, enmity against Islam, and killings of Muslims. At first, this organization's [Al-Qaeda's] only demand was that America should close its bases on Saudi Arabia, the spiritual center of Muslims, and withdraw its troops. But [these troops'] presence will continue posing threats to the Haramain Sharifain [the Holy Mosques in Medina and Mecca] and it is feared that anti-Islam and Western culture will flourish in Saudi society."It may be clarified that in every country, including Saudi Arabia, embassies not only are





the representative of their own countries, but their facilities are not subject to local laws and follow rules and regulations of their own countries. The

embassies' limits are considered the boundaries of their own countries. Similarly, Western countries' embassies in Saudi Arabia are totally free from any restriction. In the countries in which their embassies are located, they get opportunities, through interaction with local people, to promote their conspiracies and cultures. Irrespective of whether Al-Qaeda as an organization was right or wrong, its vision about Western countries was not wrong. In response, it was obligatory for the Western world to make the Muslim world believe, through their words and deeds, that they were not the enemies of Islam and Muslims, and that they believed in interfaith solidarity and harmony."Similarly, Afghanistan's Taliban movement sought to establish a peaceful society based on Islamic teachings. The Taliban, in their five-and-a-half-year rule [1996-2001], after purging the country of crime and drugs, had set on such a humanistic path that even the Western women who went there to find fault [with the Taliban government] acknowledged this. On returning to their own countries, they [the Western women] reported that they saw peace and respect for humanity in Afghanistan that they had not seen anywhere else in the world. Even a British journalist, Mariam Ridley [aka Yvonne Ridley], was so impressed with the Taliban's etiquette that she embraced Islam.""[On The Pretext Of 9/11 Attacks] America Committed The Worst Kind Of State Terrorism In Afghanistan, And After That, Extremism Was Born Among The Muslims" "In the eyes of America and its allies, the Taliban committed two crimes: one, giving protection to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on their land, and two, creating an Islamic society in which people enjoyed their basic rights, and which could become an example for other societies to follow."The rise of Islam has bothered the non-Muslims for the last 1,400 years. So, on the pretext of attacks on its two cities by unknown terrorists [i.e. 9/11], America committed the worst kind of state terrorism in Afghanistan, and after that, extremism was born among the Muslims, and the terrorism of a few groups was depicted as Islam and all the Muslims were accused of terrorism. "The Muslim scholars and public worldwide... condemned the activities of these extremist and terrorist organizations, which emerged in response to America's and its allies' killing of Muslims. They [i.e. the Muslim scholars] proved, with the Koran and the Hadiths [traditions of Prophet Muhammad], that there is no room for terrorism in Islam. In fact, our religion declares that the murder of an innocent person, even a non-Muslim, is as heinous a crime as murdering all of humanity."The Western governments and their media, however, continued conducting the worst propaganda campaign against the Muslims. It is possible that a terrorist organization called Daesh may be also a reaction to this."From the beginning, its [i.e. ISIS's] acts of mass murder, slitting people's throats and burning them cruelly, were disliked by the Muslims, and the Muslims did not support them. In contrast, all the muftis [who deliver fatwas] and religious scholars issued edicts against Daesh. Though it has not yet been ascertained who was responsible for attacks in France, Daesh is being implicated in them. [The Friday after the attacks], Muslims of





France in 2,500 mosques condemn[ed] the acts of November 13 in sermons."ISIS "Is The Creation Of America And Europe" – It "Threatens The

Muslims More Than The Infidels"; With ISIS's "Barbaric Actions As A Pretext [America And Europe] Can Justify Their Attacks And Terrorism Against Muslims""Many scholars believe that Daesh is the creation of America and Europe. [But] it threatens the Muslims more than the infidels. Such organizations have no association with Islam. The reality is that Daesh leaders often pardon non-Muslims [and tell them] that they can live in Islamic State by paying jizya [poll tax on non-Muslims under Muslim rule], but the Muslims who do not conform to their views could be murdered after they are declared as idolatrous and apostate. They [Daesh] take pleasure in killing them in a barbaric way, or chopping their heads off, and also issue videos of their brutal actions. It may be remembered that the Muslim Council of Britain, the coalition of hundreds of Muslim organizations of Britain, also condemned the Paris attacks, in the strongest terms."And then in India, there have been protests against Daesh at 75 places in various cities, including Delhi, under the auspices of [the leading religious organization] Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind. Western countries' launching of anti-Muslim actions following the suicide attacks in France strengthens the feeling among Muslim scholars and religious leaders that this can be an anti-Muslim act like [after] 9/11. Whether Daesh or [any other] group takes responsibility, in reality this looks like part of a deep and broad conspiracy against Muslims. On this basis, a majority of Muslims believe that this organization [ISIS] is a creation of America and Europe, who, using its barbaric activities as a pretext, can justify their attacks and terrorism against Muslims."It is the responsibility of the rulers of the Muslim world, and of Muslim religious leaders, intellectuals, and common people, to comprehend the incessant conspiracies against them and to prepare for combat on intellectual and real grounds. By declaring the Paris attacks to be part of the world war, Pope Francis dropped a hint of war against Muslims – just as former president George Bush did at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan by calling it a a Crusade."Source: Roznama Ummat (Pakistan), November 20, 2015.




al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-138-caliphate-the state of...

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