al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 30-china

CdW Intelligence to Rent -2016- In Confidence [email protected]

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 30-China

The very first freight train arrived to Russia’s Kaluga Region from China as part of the Beijing-led New Silk Road infrastructural project, according to the official website of the Kaluga Region. The Chinese-led $900-billion New Silk Road infrastructural project is supposed to connect East Asia, the Middle East, Europe and even Africa

The Chinese-led $900-billion New Silk Road infrastructural project is supposed to connect East Asia, the Middle East, Europe and even Africa. On February 5, the first freight train arrived to the Kaluga Region under the framework of the international project New Silk Road," the official statement said. Last year, China and Russia signed the "Joint Declaration on the Silk Road Economic Belt construction and the Eurasian Economic Union docking cooperation". The declaration confirmed that Russia supports the Silk Road Economic Belt project construction and is willing to cooperate closely with China to push the declaration

The Pentagon unveiled a proposal Tuesday Feb 4, to boost spending on advanced weaponry and the U.S. footprint in Europe, part of a plan to refocus the defense budget to counter technological and military advances by Russia and China. On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter previewed the Pentagon budget proposal for fiscal 2017, making a case for why China’s rapid military buildup and Russia’s intervention beyond its borders pose a bigger danger to U.S. security, and merit larger investments, than does the immediate threat from the Islamic State.“We don’t have the luxury of just one opponent, or the choice between current fights and future fights,” Carter said in an address at the Economic Club of Washington. “We have to do both.” The proposal reflects Carter’s attempt to broaden the military’s focus to include not just the insurgent conflicts of the post-2001 era but also “higher-end” threats from Russia and China, whose military innovation U.S. officials acknowledge has at times out-paced the United States.

The Pentagon’s Four Horsemen: Milley Rates The ThreatsBy SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 16 03/05/2023

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on January 21, 2016 Gen. Mark Milley

CRYSTAL CITY: Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley offered insight this morning into how the leader of the largest service is racking and stacking the Four Horseman of Pentagon analysis. Miller didn’t explicitly rank them, other than repeating that Russia is Threat No. 1, but the order of danger was pretty clear: Russia, China, North Korea, and lastly Iran.Russia is the biggest threat because they can utterly destroy the United States. They’re the only country on Earth that’s “literally an existential threat,” because of their nuclear weapons, Milley said this morning at an Association of the US Army breakfast. Russia is also modernizing its military, with the defense budget growing by one third in less than a decade. Since 2013, they’ve been testing new armored vehicles like the Armata tank. The notoriously lumbering Red Army is reorganizing into more agile combat brigades (aka “battle groups”), roughly comparable to US brigade combat teams. And the ratio of highly motivated volunteers to reluctant draftees is climbing.Those are Russian capabilities — but threat is the combination of capability and intentions. Unfortunately, Russia’s intentions are looking ugly too.“Russian behavior internationally since 2008 has been aggressive,” said Milley, citing the attack on Georgia in that year, a preview of the seizure of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine. (Arguably, the 2007 cyber attack on Estonia marked the real beginning of Russian revanchism, but that didn’t kill anybody). Russian forces are crossing international borders — overtly or covertly — and invading sovereign nations in a way Europe hasn’t seen since 1945, said Milley, with the possible exception of Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.By contrast, China is “assertive” but not “aggressive,” Milley said, precisely because it isn’t sending its forces over sovereign borders. (The Filipinos, Vietnamese, and other South China Sea countries might disagree, but sending ships into disputed waters and even building artificial islands isn’t quite the same as sending soldiers and main battle tanks across settled international borders).“It’s important [that] the Chinese are not an enemy,” Milley emphasized. “I would caution anyone from saying China is an ‘adversary,’ [even]. Fortunately…the Chinese take a long view.” China’s strategic patience and self-confidence contrasts with the Russians, whom Milley noted are bitter and anxious over the loss of the Soviet empire, the expansion of NATO, and the demographic disaster of an ever-shrinking ethnic Russian population.While Chinese intentions are less aggressive than the Russians’, their long-term capabilities are greater. With the rise of China and the Asia-Pacific generally, Milley said, “we are living through…one of the largest shifts in global power in world history,” comparable to the fall of the Roman Empire or the rise of the current Atlantic-centric global economy after 1492. “History is not necessarily optimistic” about such shifts: In Harvard case studies of 18 rising powers, he said, 15 ended up at war with the incumbent major power.There’s another big problem in the Asia-Pacific: North Korea. The increasingly erratic Hermit Kingdom is an example of mediocre capabilities coupled with clear hostile intentions to make a significant threat. Pyongyang doesn’t have the firepower of a Beijing or Moscow by any means, but it’s far more likely to use its firepower than either.





So we shouldn’t be lulled by the apparent “Groundhog Day” nature of Pyongyang’s repeated provocations, Milley said: We’ve avoided war so far

for 62 years, “[but] just because it didn’t happen before is not a guarantee it won’t happen tomorrow.”Finally, Milley turned to Iran. Its apparent compliance with the nuclear agreement is encouraging, he said, but recent provocations such as capturing US sailors and firing missiles dangerously near US vessels are not. In general, he said, “there’s no doubt Iran is a malign actor. But he didn’t seem to assign it a level of threat — that crucial combination of intent and capability — to match North Korea, let alone China and Russia.

China's New Grand Strategy for the Middle Eastby Gal LuftForeign PolicyFebruary 5, 2016 At the start of 2016, prospects weren't good for what would later become one of Chinese President Xi Jinping's most consequential international tours.The January execution of leading Shite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, the voice of Saudi Arabia's Shiite minority, and the subsequent severing of diplomatic relations between several Sunni countries and Shiite Iran came at a particularly inconvenient time for Xi. His planned maiden trip to the Middle East was to include stops in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all majority Sunni countries. Visiting Sunni leaders at a time of great tension with Shiite Iran would have created the impression that China supported one of the two major branches of Islam over the other, undermining Beijing's long held policy of staunch neutrality in the Middle East.But postponing the visit for a second time in less than a year would have had consequences too. China had already called off a similar trip scheduled for spring 2015, after a Saudi-led coalition of Sunni states launched a military campaign in Yemen against the Houthis, an Iran-backed Shiite group. Since becoming president, Xi has visited almost every region of the world — but not the Middle East. The same is true for Premier Li Keqiang. Another delay would have signaled that regional spoilers could easily interfere with China's foreign policy. Instead, Xi decided to use the crisis in the Muslim world as an opportunity to raise the curtain on China's new Middle East strategy, one that finally involves China getting off the sidelines and plunging into the Middle East's stormy waters.China is no longer willing to sit on the sidelines and watch the region descend into chaos.It has been a busy few weeks for Beijing's Middle East policy. In the past several weeks, even before the al-Nimr execution, Xi has sought ways for China to inject itself into the Syrian crisis, inviting both Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem and the head of the opposition group, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), to high-level meetings in Beijing in an effort to promote peaceful resolution.Significantly, this meant departure from China's long-held policy of supporting Bashar al-Assad. On Jan. 13, Beijing released its Arab Policy Paper, a vague but seminal document articulating China's interests in the Middle East. After the ransacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran, Xi dispatched his Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Ming to both Tehran and Riyadh, urging the sides to exercise calm. Xi also rearranged his travel itinerary, replacing his planned visit to the UAE with an unexpected stop in Tehran, thus becoming the first foreign leader to set foot in Iran since the lifting of the sanctions. For balance, he brought the Saudis a consolation gift: a declaration of support for the sovereignty of Yemen's government, whom the Saudis support in the war against Iran's proxy.Such diplomatic hyper-activity may surprise those accustomed to China's tendency to





avoid interventionism. Cynics may say that these are all tactical moves designed to secure prime business opportunities for China on both sides.

There may be some truth to this. But it would be a mistake to reduce China's latest action to pure economic opportunism.China is no longer willing to sit on the sidelines and watch the region descend into chaos. China has for several months harbored a suspicion that the United States, entering an election year while drowning in domestic oil and gas supply, is not as interested in the Middle East as it has been for the past half century. (At any rate, Washington's relations with Riyadh and Tehran are too thorny to enable it to be an honest broker.)More importantly, Russia has laid down the flag of Middle East neutrality that it carried for most of the post-Soviet era. Moscow once enjoyed equally good relations with Tehran and Riyadh. But in plunging into the civil war in Syria, Russia — despite the fact that most of its Muslim population is Sunni — entangled itself with the Shiite camp, and can no longer be trusted by the Sunnis. With the United States and Russia no longer able to hold the balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China, which has solid relations with both, is increasingly tempted to fill the vacuum.There are several reasons why the Sunni-Shiite divide is of particular concern to China. As home to a large portion of the world's conventional oil reserves, the Persian Gulf region is critically important to the China's resource-intense economy. While the world is currently enjoying extraordinarily low energy prices, this could easily change should the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites continue to escalate. Shiites may be a minority in the Muslim world as a whole, but in the oil-rich Persian Gulf they comprise a majority. If Iran and Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies become embroiled in a regional war involving physical damage to oil infrastructure, crude prices would go through the ceiling, to the detriment of the global economy. With half of China's crude imports coming from the Persian Gulf, such a crisis would likely hurt China more than any other major economy.China's desire to cultivate a Middle East without sectarian instability also traces to the hallmark of its foreign policy in the 21st century: the One Belt One Road initiative. This effort to connect the landmass and surrounding waterways stretching from China to the heart of Europe in a network of trade and transportation corridors is crucial to China's efforts to stimulate Asian economic growth and create new markets for Chinese goods and services.China's Belt and Road initiative is the most ambitious economic development project in human history.The Belt and Road initiative is the most ambitious economic development project in human history, to which Beijing has already committed hundreds of billions of dollars. It offers a major mechanism for China to reboot its economy, currently afflicted by slowing growth. Finally, it positions the western Chinese region of Xinjiang as a future gateway to both Central and South Asia. But a restive Middle East stands in the way of all that. Beijing's concern that the Uighurs that have joined the ranks of the Islamic State, which it says numbers in the hundreds, might one day return to cause havoc in western China, disrupting the Belt and Road initiative.Xi must be seasoned enough to know that Chinese diplomacy, active as it may be, has no chance of overriding centuries of bad blood between Sunnis and Shiites. And an inherently atheist Chinese leadership may not even be able to relate to conflicts rooted so deeply in religion.But China can help keep the flames under control.





In the absence of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran, China's open communication with both capitals may become a vital asset. China can

use the One Belt One Road initiative as a tension-reduction mechanism, promoting projects that create shared Sunni-Shiite economic interests like the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, the port of Gwadar on the coast of the Arabian Sea, and a Silk Road high speed railway connecting Xinjiang and Tehran via the Sunni Muslims countries of Central Asia — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. China is positioned to promote Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose other members are predominantly Sunni, a shift possible now that United Nations sanctions against Iran have been removed.All this, of course, will have to be balanced with Chinese overtures to the Sunnis. With its new anti-terrorism law allowing for the Chinese military to stage counter-terrorism operations abroad — albeit with consent from the relevant country — China can become actively involved in the various coalitions formed to defeat the Islamic State as well as in peacekeeping missions. Additionally, as one of the few remaining countries still in the business of building nuclear power plants, China can help ensure that Sunni countries developing civilian nuclear power — an undesirable yet unavoidable response to the Iranian nuclear deal — do so with the safeguards necessary for nuclear non-proliferation.Washington should welcome Xi's advances toward the Middle East.

Not everyone will appreciate China's new role in the Middle East, especially those in Washington accustomed to America as sole power broker in the region. But with escalating tensions in the region, and neo-isolationism's spread within the American electorate, Washington should welcome Xi's advances toward the Middle East. His forthcoming spring visit to Obama's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington is a chance to explore how the two powers can jointly manage the region's many pitfalls.Winston Churchill once said, "The price of greatness is responsibility." As China strides into greatness, its readiness to pay that price in the Middle East will soon be tested.Gal Luft is co-director of the Washington-based Institute for the Analysis of Global Security and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Can the PLA Navy Make the Indian Ocean Chinese?Does China need to dominate the Indian Ocean in order to have a world-class navy?By Robert Farley February 01, 2016A recent Wikistrat simulation (full disclosure: I am a senior analyst with Wikistrat, although I did not work on this project) investigated the future of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy. In particular, the report (written by David K. Schneider) examined China’s effort to establish control over the East Asian littoral (A2/AD and amphibious capabilities) and to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean.Readers of The Diplomat will recognize familiar notes in the report’s discussion of the PLAN’s A2/AD efforts. The more interesting question evoked by Schneider is this: Can the PLAN make the Indian Ocean Chinese? Chinese growth depends on access to the Indian Ocean, from whence the PRC gets much of its energy and a large proportion of its natural resources. China has spent much of its economic and diplomatic capital on building relationships in the region, from Pakistan to Africa. However, the Indian Navy has the capacity to pose a critical threat to Chinese access. With a large fleet and local bases, India can threaten Chinese control of the Indian Ocean at its leisure.The report also examined China’s relationship with Russia, which remains important for access to technology and expertise. Traditionally the junior partner in this relationship, the





increasing size, sophistication, and range of the PLAN should tip the scales in the next few years. Schneider also emphasized the role that political

coordination between Moscow and Beijing could improve the PLAN’s prospects for strategic action.Perhaps most interesting, the report identifies several key caveats that underlie China’s effort to build a world-class navy. These include the health of long-term collaboration with Russia, the ability of the Chinese national innovation system to deliver advanced technology, the overall health of the Chinese economy, and the ability of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLAN to work well with one another. Of these, the first and the third pose the greatest concern; significant economic problems could severely crimp China’s effort at naval expansion, and a deterioration (for whatever reason) of relations with Russia would leave China in a very, very lonely place.To this I would add the inherent positionality of naval affairs. The power of China’s navy depends directly on the strength of its competitors. If Chinese naval growth continues to inspire India, Japan, and the Southeast Asian countries to expand their own fleets, then Beijing has spent a lot of money for little relative gain. Although the comparison between the PRC and Wilhelmine Germany has been overdone, it’s nevertheless worth noting that Germany built a remarkable fleet that succeeded only in creating enemies, and in spurring foreign naval construction.

Naval Air: Chinese Carrier Fleet Expansion Confirmed And ClarifiedJanuary 12, 2016: At the end of 2015 the Chinese navy finally confirmed that they

were indeed building a second aircraft carrier. The design is apparently based on the first Chinese carrier, the Liaoning. This is a 65,000 ton, 305 meter (999 feet) long ship that is actually a modified version of the last Cold War Russian carrier design. China also confirmed that the new carrier would also have the ski jump deck like Liaoning.





Since 2013 there had been reports that a large aircraft carrier was under construction in northwest China (Dalian). Although China is building a 22

meter (71 foot) high wall around parts of the Dalian naval base to prevent people from taking pictures of what is going on there this has not stopped amateur naval enthusiasts from getting information and distributing it on the Internet. One of the best sources of information on Chinese warship construction is the Internet. Thousands of Chinese naval buffs living close to major shipyards provide a steady supply of photos on the web. The Chinese government tried to prevent this but since 2005 came to realize that cracking down on enthusiastic and Internet savvy Chinese fans of the navy was not a wise move. A lot of important secrets are still preserved by building parts of ships in a shed and a lot of the most valuable military secrets are with equipment installed inside the ship or behind a wall. So the government allows all (with a few exceptions) these photos to appear. Then there are some interesting official photos. In mid-2014 photos of a carrier model being displayed at an official event appeared on the Chinese Internet. The detailed model had the hull number 18 and the ship looked similar to an American CVN (a Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier). The Chinese CVN has four catapults and three elevators and much other evidence of being nuclear and very similar to the Nimitz class.This is not what was thought to be under construction at Dalian but rather a proposal for carrier number three or four or whatever. The first Chinese carrier, the Liaoning is hull number 16 and the 2013 photos showed sections of a new Chinese carrier under construction. This ship would probably have hull number 17. All this implies the third Chinese carrier, the second one built in China, would be nuclear and probably closer in design to the recently decommissioned American USS Enterprise (CVN 65). That is still a mystery because too much information is coming out of China.CVN 65 was the first American nuclear powered carrier and it served as the prototype for the subsequent Nimitz class. The Enterprise was an expensive design, and only one was built (instead of a class of six). While a bit longer than the later Nimitz class, it was lighter (92,000 tons displacement, versus 100,000 tons). The Enterprise was commissioned in 1961, almost 40 years after the first U.S. carrier (the Langley) entered service in 1923.Chinese are keen students of history, their own as well as that of others. Chinese ship designers know all about the Langley and Enterprise. The Chinese are also well aware that in the two decades after the USS Langley there were tremendous changes in carrier aviation. While the innovation slowed after World War II, major changes continued into the 1950s (jet aircraft, nuclear propelled carriers, SAMs). But in the ensuing half century there has been no major innovation in basic carrier design. This has not been a problem because the carriers have proven useful, at least for the U.S. Navy (the only fleet to use such large carriers) and no one else has maintained a force of these large carriers. Only the U.S. has felt a constant need to get air power to any corner of the planet in a hurry. More





importantly, no navy has been able to give battle to the U.S. carrier force since 1945. The Soviets built new anti-carrier weapons and made plans to use

them but that war never occurred. China is building carriers but does not yet seem committed to having a lot of them to confront the U.S. but rather just a few to intimidate its neighbors.Large ships, including warships, are often built in sections, then the sections are welded and bolted together. The section of what appears to be a carrier does not indicate the exact size of the new carrier, other than that it appears larger than the new carrier (Liaoning) China commissioned at the end of 2012. At the time China was believed to be building the first of several locally designed aircraft carriers but the Chinese officially denied this. The only official announcements have alluded to the need for two or three aircraft carriers, in addition to the Liaoning. Construction of such large ships had been seen in shipyards like Dalian.The Liaoning spent over a year on sea trials and as of early 2016 has still not entered regular service. Since its 2012 commissioning Liaoning has been used for training and getting experience with carrier operations. During that time Liaoning began flight operations in November 2012 and these were such a success that the Chinese built “carrier fighter” J-15 (a Su-27 variant) eventually participated in these carrier operations. In 2013 China confirmed that the Liaoning will primarily be a training carrier. The Chinese apparently plan to station up to 24 jet fighters and 26 helicopters on the Liaoning and use the ship to train pilots and other specialists for additional carriers. Meanwhile, the Liaoning will also be staffed and equipped as a combat ship as well.Liaoning began as one of the two Kuznetsov class carriers that Russia began building in the 1980s. Originally the Kuznetsovs were to be 90,000 ton nuclear powered ships (the Ulanovsk class), similar to American Nimitz class carriers (complete with steam catapults). Instead, because of the high cost and the complexity of modern (American style) carriers, the Russians were forced to scale back their plans and ended up with 65,000 ton (full load) ships that lacked steam catapults and used a ski jump type flight deck instead. Nuclear power was dropped but the Kuznetsovs were still a formidable design.The Kuznetsovs normally carry a dozen navalized Su-27s (called Su-33s), 14 Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters, two electronic warfare helicopters, and two search and rescue helicopters. But the ship was built to carry as many as 36 Su-33s and sixteen helicopters. The Kuznetsovs carry 2,500 tons of aviation fuel, allowing it to generate 500-1,000 aircraft and helicopter sorties. Crew size is 2,500 (or 3,000 with a full aircraft load). While the original Kuznetsov is in Russian service, the second ship, the Varyag, was launched but not completed and work stopped in 1992. The Chinese bought the unfinished carrier in 1998, towed it to China, and spent over a decade completing it as the Liaoning.Meanwhile the Nimitz class is being replaced. The U.S. Navy's newest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78) was launched and christened in late 2013 and is expected to enter service in 2016. The first ship of the next class of carriers, the Ford will be about the same length (333 meters/1,092 feet) and displacement (100,000 tons) of the previous Nimitz class ships but will look different. The most noticeable difference will be the island set closer to the stern (rear) of the ship. The USS Ford is expected to cost nearly $14 billion. About 40 percent of that is for designing the first ship of the class, so the actual cost of the first ship (CVN 78) itself will be some $9 billion. Against this the navy expects to reduce the carrier's lifetime operating expenses by several billion dollars because of greatly reduced crew size.Compared to the current Nimitz class carriers (which cost over $5 billion each to build)





the Fords will feel, well, kind of empty even through there will be 4,600 personnel on board. There will be lots more automation, computer

networking, and robots. The most recent Nimitz class ships have a lot of this automation already. Like the Nimitz class, the Fords will carry about 75 aircraft and helicopters. The catapults will be electromagnetic rather than steam powered and its nuclear power plant will not have to be partially taken apart to be refueled. The new catapults and other design improvements will allow the Fords to launch 20-30 percent more sorties per day than the Nimitz class ships.

China’s Aircraft Carrier AmbitionsAs the country builds its first indigenous carrier, what might it have in mind?By Koh Swee Lean CollinJanuary 18, 2016The international media landed itself a gift shortly before ushering in 2016, when it transpired at a recent Chinese Defense Ministry press conference that Beijing’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, and the second one for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) after the Liaoning entered service since September 25, 2012, is currently under construction.A Surprise?The announcement is hardly a surprise, given that open-source intelligence, academic and media commentaries have long reported on China’s ongoing aircraft carrier program. Even Chinese reports (see here and here) have hinted at PLAN’s aspirations to operate more than one carrier. The carrier was even dubbed “Project 001A,” and Internet photos of what appears to be the assembly of modules for an aircraft carrier-like platform at a Dalian shipyard have circulated. Chinese officials, including those from the PLA, have also noted the existence of the program.Compared to the past, Beijing has certainly become more forthright about its defense programs, such as publishing defense white papers since 1998 and holding regular defense ministry press conferences. Of course, one could still claim that these efforts lack real transparency – the white papers, for instance, are rich in policy rhetoric but lack details. Nonetheless, the disparate nuggets of information, whether deliberately intended by Chinese authorities for release into the public domain or otherwise, allow the analyst to formulate a picture, even if an incomplete one.While imperfect, this picture at a minimum allows a glimpse at what exactly may be in store for China’s new aircraft carrier. In a way, the information helped in desensitizing the academic and intelligence communities to the prospective materialization of China’s carrier ambitions, in the context of external suspicions towards Beijing’s massive military buildup. This was very similar to the earlier case of the unfinished ex-Soviet carrier Varyag, which Beijing purchased from Ukraine in the 1990s and subsequently refurbished and refitted prior to adding it to the PLAN as Liaoning in 2012. Since the 1990s, the international community was aware of the existence of this program thanks to the availability of fragmentary information, even though it took quite some time for Beijing to officially announce plans to put Liaoning into service. As such, the Liaoning did not really come as a surprise, even if one continues to question Beijing’s underlying strategic intent behind this move.Based on Beijing’s pattern of information disclosure, one may anticipate that in the future, the public will at least have prior snippets of information related to the PLAN’s new, follow-on carriers before official announcements are made. But as Beijing’s recent clampdown (see here and here) on the leakage of militarily sensitive information has





shown, there is every attempt to safeguard operational security. At the same time, though, Beijing may also rely on the release of disparate information,

through proxy channels perhaps, to help desensitize the international community to its new future carriers. While this certainly falls short of “complete” transparency, it is better than having no information at all.Defying SpeculationBased on this diverse, if disparate information, there has been considerable speculation about the new aircraft carrier based. Much of it has overestimated the progress China has made with its carrier program. This is similar to the errors Western intelligence made with the performance of the much-acclaimed Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor, which was found to be grossly overrated following the defection of pilot Viktor Belenko with one of the jets to Japan in 1976.For example, earlier speculation put the propulsion as possibly nuclear. But the latest official revelations reveal that the new ship will be conventionally powered. Likewise, the new carrier was initially believed to possess steam-powered aircraft launch catapults, dispensing with a ski-jump flight deck that equips the Liaoning. A PLA Daily report in April 2012 claimed that China is developing an electromagnetic catapult analogous to the American electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) installed on board the new Gerald R. Ford class supercarriers, thereby fuelling even more optimistic speculation. But as the new official information reveals, the new carrier will still have a ski-jump, indicating that domestic efforts to develop steam or electromagnetic catapult technologies have yet to reach maturity. Zhang Junshe, a researcher with the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, alluded to this, saying that catapults involve more complex technology.Some Chinese analysts held that virtually every component and subsystem on board the new carrier would be different from those on board the Liaoning, an assertion that could potentially be misconstrued as meaning the new ship would be “revolutionary.” Instead, one can assume that the new carrier will be equipped with a mix of mature, tried-and-tested components and subsystems based on valuable insights Chinese naval technicians gleaned from the Liaoning. Some of these systems may even be improved or refined domestically to suit specific PLAN needs. But a cautionary note here: It would be prudent not to exaggerate the progress Beijing has made in its carrier quest. Perhaps a more relevant question to ask is: How will the future PLAN carrier battle group (CBG) take shape?A Possible CBG Approach?To be sure, while the invariable temptation is to focus on the aircraft carrier itself, it is important to note that such a valuable platform cannot operate independently on its own, but as part of an entire CBG comprising the escorting warships, organic aviation forces and afloat logistics support. The Soviet Kiev class “aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser”, though fitted with a battery of P-500 Bazalt (NATO codenamed SS-N-12 Sandbox) 550km-range cruise missiles as its offensive armament and its own shipboard air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat systems, still had to operate in conjunction with other fleet assets.It is clear that Beijing has adopted a concerted strategy in developing a CBG, paying close attention to how established carrier navies operate such forces. As such, while developing the carrier, efforts are long afoot to develop a slew of other capabilities that can help constitute a full-fledged CBG. Notably, the Chinese are churning out new major surface combatants, such as the Type-052C/D Luyang II/III guided missile destroyers and Type-054A Jiangkai II frigates, which are optimized for fleet air defense and ASW respectively.





Even more ominously, but often overlooked, is China’s ambitious program to build more capable ocean-going fleet replenishment vessels. In the past recent

years, new units of the Type-903 (plus the improved 903A variant) replenishment vessels have entered service. An even more capable successor, touted the Type-901 which is said to displace some 40-45,000 tons (just slightly smaller than the new carrier itself), is at an advanced stage of construction.The U.S. Navy carrier strike group (CSG) is plausibly one that the Chinese aspire towards, but in the distant future. If the Liaoning’s air wing is of any indication, the PLAN’s carrier-borne aviation looks set to remain limited in the range of capabilities available compared to those of the American CSGs. First, the Liaoning air wing has limited airborne early warning (AEW) capacity in the form of Ka-31RLD Helix helicopter that mounts a folding air search radar. But compared to fixed-wing aircraft, such rotary-winged AEW platforms lack the range, endurance and sensor capacity to provide fleet air cover. The Chinese are attempting to rectify this by developing an analogue to the E-2C Hawkeye, touted the JZY-01, but little has come about this project. The Chinese are more likely to employ the larger Z-18J AEW helicopter, which is a refined version of the Z-8 that is in turn a reverse-engineered copy of the old French SA321 Super Frelon design.Second, the new carrier is said to be equipped with the J-15 Flying Shark carrier-borne fighter jets, which currently equip the Liaoning. Plans to develop carrier-borne J-31 multi-role fighters have not materialized, thus leaving the J-15 as the only carrier-borne fighter jet. Suspiciously similar to the Soviet/Russian Su-33 Flanker-D, the J-15 is optimized primarily for fleet air defense while possessing a limited secondary ability for surface strike, mainly anti-ship (especially important since the new carrier will not have shipboard offensive weapons). The Liaoning carries a small J-15 complement (possibly slightly over 20 in all) and the new carrier, of roughly the same size, may carry more or less the same number. Moreover, the new carrier’s ski-jump configuration limits the J-15’s payload, thereby reducing its operational flexibility. In any case, the myriad of envisaged defensive and offensive roles does place an invariably heavy burden on this small fighter component. Although more J-15s being spotted on the Liaoning’s flight deck point to serial production, according to a recent Kanwa Defense Review report some critical steps of the manufacturing process were performed by human labor instead of automated precision machine tools. This not only slows down production rate but also brings airframe and systems reliability into question.As such, the PLAN’s approach to CBG operations may be aligned more closely with that of the Soviet/Russian Navy, giving primacy to defensive carrier-borne air operations and emphasizing the role of accompanying escorts to share defensive and offensive burden. The Type-052C/D destroyers will have to bear the brunt of the fleet air defense mission by utilizing their “Chinese Aegis” system, which revolves around phased array radars to compensate for AEW shortfalls while employing the S-300FM (Chinese copy HHQ-9) long-range surface-to-air missiles to complement the limited coverage provided by the J-15s. The PLAN’s future warship designs may hint at a possible continuation of this approach; there is an existing program to build a new destroyer bigger and more capable than the Type-052C/D. Popularly known as the Type-055, the new ship is envisaged to displace almost 10,000 tons and equipped with a much bigger payload of vertically launched missiles, including surface-to-air, thus bringing its fleet air defense capabilities closer to those of the American Arleigh Burke class Aegis destroyers.Limited Operational Utility?Notwithstanding those aforementioned limitations of the envisaged new carrier, the PLAN’s future CBG is certainly taking shape thanks to immense political will and





funding, to not just simultaneously carry out a complex undertaking of parallel platform and systems sub-programs but also to conduct intense

training and trials using the existing Liaoning and handful of J-15s. The envisaged CBG will certainly expand strategic options available to the Chinese political leadership. Some Chinese thinkers called on the PLAN to acquire a viable carrier capability, arguing that prior to the induction of Liaoning, China was the sole great power without an aircraft carrier. From this perspective, an aircraft carrier – the symbol of a modern, blue-water naval power – equates to national greatness. This coincides also with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s contemporary “Chinese Dream” vision.The question remains whether the PLAN carrier fleet will serve more as a prestige asset or one with real operational utility. No matter how advanced the future Chinese carrier will be, and how the CBG is constituted, it remains to be seen how Beijing will choose to employ this newfound naval instrument. Within immediate regional waters in the Western Pacific littorals, the CBG will be a significant addition to the already impressive plethora of weaponry available to the PLA. In a Taiwan Strait conflict scenario, the PLAN CBG may plausibly station itself to the east of Taiwan in an attempt to at least delay or disrupt any American reinforcements coming from Guam or Hawaii, while opening the “eastern front” by coordinating with land-based PLA units operating against the western Taiwanese coast. This prospect is plausibly seen as an alarming one, for the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense war-gamed the scenario of a PLAN carrier involved in a cross-strait conflict.PLAN carriers are also believed to be useful assets in the context of existing regional maritime disputes. Northwestward into the East China Sea (ECS), it is possible for the CBG to facilitate military operations against Japanese forces within the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. However, the CBG will most likely find itself well exposed to land-based SDF defenses, particularly those arrayed around the remote southwestern Japanese islands and US Forces in Japan. The open nature of ECS waters gives greater room for maneuver by the CBG. But this is not the case for the semi-enclosed South China Sea (SCS) waters. Compared to the land-based PLA forces arrayed along the southern Chinese coast, the CBG may have limited utility and much less survivability in the face of the anti-access and area denial capabilities mustered by some of China’s Southeast Asian rivals, especially Vietnam, whose smaller forces may take advantage of local geography for concealment and surprise anti-carrier strikes. Moreover, Hainan Island and the newly constructed artificial islands in the SCS are comparably more survivable as “unsinkable aircraft carriers.” The loss of such valuable strategic asset as a carrier to cheaper sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles launched by mobile coastal batteries and land-based fighter jets, submarines, and naval mines will be a costly proposition to Chinese defense planners. Or at least, even if Beijing is bent on deploying the CBG in a SCS conflict, it will have to accept its limited operational utility and in the worst case, accept potential losses inflicted upon the CBG.Even further westwards, the utility of the PLAN CBG, as a result of its inherent capabilities, declines exponentially. Far from its mainland bases, the CBG can no longer count on the kind of land-based reinforcements it might expect in the Taiwan Strait, ECS and SCS. It will have to operate autonomously for the most part, with little support available even if there is access to friendly bases and ports. PLAN carrier ambitions were often linked closely with growing Chinese strategic and economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. No doubt, the Chinese carrier will be a welcome asset to do “flag-showing” for Beijing in the region. It will prove more than capable in undertaking such low-intensity missions as non-combatant evacuation (similar to those PLAN warships earlier conducted





in Yemen) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But in a wartime scenario with India as the adversary for example, the CBG will be vulnerable

even if it has ample maneuver space in the open waters of the Indian Ocean. Indian air and naval forces are more likely to secure the local advantage and prove capable of saturating the CBG with kinetic and electronic strikes, even if one factors in Pakistani assistance to the PLAN.The Unstoppable ChineseIt is a foregone conclusion that China will continue to forge ahead with its carrier ambitions. The carrier currently being built in Dalian is its first indigenous attempt, but certainly not its last. More than just a symbol of national greatness, the Chinese carrier program is an indispensable part of the overall PLAN drive towards a blue-water force befitting China’s stature and Beijing’s desire to play a more active global security role, just as it has recently demonstrated in the Indian Ocean region, including Africa and the Middle East. This strategic conviction, which will likely outlast the term of Xi Jinping, will sustain this ongoing momentum if one observes the intensity at which the PLAN seeks to snap up every opportunity to master the intricacies of aircraft carrier construction and operations.In fact, ever since its commissioning, the Liaoning has gone on multiple long-duration training cruises to stage, in particular, flight training in diverse operating environments such as the SCS and the Bohai Gulf. A cadre of pioneer carrier-borne aviators has also been established, which will sow the seeds for an institutionalized PLAN Air Force carrier-borne aviation training program. Chinese naval planners do recognize the “practice makes perfect” mantra. Future Chinese carriers are tipped to be more capable, especially when Beijing’s researchers yield fruits from ongoing high-tech, carrier-related scientific projects such as electromagnetic catapult and fixed-wing AEW platform.For a latecomer into the carrier game, the PLAN appears determined to shorten the capacity-building process by funneling vast amounts of time, resources and manpower into the program, even if it means having to adapt lessons through trial-and-error, overcoming the steep learning curve while having to endure painful setbacks, including the loss of life. That said, there ought to be little doubt that notwithstanding the challenges it faces, China will persist in pushing its dream of operating multiple aircraft carriers towards reality. But one also should also temper expectations by not exaggerating the progress Beijing has made in this gargantuan quest.Koh Swee Lean Collin is associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

May 2015, TAIPEI, Taiwan — China released its first white paper on military strategy Tuesday, just two weeks after the release of the Pentagon's annual report to the US Congress on China's military and security developments.Neither report appears to take blame for the rising tensions in the South China and East

China seas. The Chinese report, "China's Military Strategy," indicates "some of its offshore neighbors" have taken "provocative actions" and reinforced their military presence on China's reefs and islands "illegally."

Without mentioning the US, it says, "some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China."

No mention is made of the recent warning to a US reconnaissance aircraft flying near Chinese controlled areas of the South China Sea. China has not fully





explained massive land reclamation efforts that will turn some reefs and islets into airbases and port facilities.

The Pentagon's "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2015" notes that officially China "seeks to ensure basic stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth China's rise." However, Chinese leaders in 2014 demonstrated "a willingness to tolerate a higher level of regional tension as China sought to advance its interests, such as in competing territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea."

Tolerating "higher levels of tension" includes the fact that "China's military modernization has the potential to reduce core US military technological advantages."

The Chinese government report does make it clear that the military is implementing strategic guidelines of "active defense" in new maritime scenarios.

"In line with the evolving form of war and national security situation, the basic point for PMS [preparation for military struggle] will be placed on winning informationized local wars, highlighting maritime military struggle and maritime PMS."

The Chinese report states that the maritime environment is now a critical security domain. "The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned," it says. China will develop a "modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs [sea lines of communication] and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power."

Taiwan appears doomed in both the Pentagon and Chinese report.The Chinese report states that " 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces and their activities

are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations … the root cause of instability has not yet been removed."

The Pentagon report indicates that the primary driver of Chinese military modernization is a conflict over Taiwan. The self-ruled democratic island has resisted China's threats since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. The report indicates that Taiwan's multiple military variables to deter Chinese aggression are eroding. In the past, these have included China's inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military's technological superiority and the inherent geographic rewards of island defense.

Pending Russian weapons sales to China such as the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 surface-to-air missile will further erode Taiwan's defense.

The land-based Russian S-400, which has a range of 400 kilometers, will give China its first capability to command the skies over the entire island. At present, China's Russian S-300 only allows it to reach the coastal regions of the island's northwest.

The Chinese government report dedicates only one paragraph to its strategic missile and nuclear force. It states that it will press forward on independent innovations in weapons, enhance the effectiveness of missile systems, improve the force structure of both nuclear and conventional capabilities, and "strengthen its capabilities for strategic deterrence and nuclear counterattack, and medium- and long-range precision strikes."The Pentagon report is far more detailed and ominous. China is developing a robust anti-

access/area denial (A2/AD) punch that includes short-, medium- and “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of WarCdW Intelligence to Rent of 16 03/05/2023



intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), destroyers bristling with cruise missiles, and

nuclear-armed submarines, according to the Pentagon report.The report says the DF-21D ASBM would be capable of holding at risk an aircraft carrier within 900 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline.This would keep US ships at a distance too far to be effective in a Taiwan scenario.To supplement the road-mobile nuclear DF-31 ICBM, China also is developing the road-

mobile nuclear DF-41, which will carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Oddly, the Chinese report indicates the country is not involved in outer space weapon efforts.

"Space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition," according to the Chinese report. In opposition to other "countries" developing their "space forces and instruments" for the weaponization of outer space, "China has all along advocated the peaceful use of outer space, opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active part in international space cooperation."

The Chinese report makes no mention of a series of anti-satellite tests beginning in 2006, when US government officials reported China temporarily blinded a US observation satellite with a high-power laser.

Those tests include 2007, when China fired an SC-19 missile and destroyed an aging Fengyun weather satellite. In 2010, China fired an SC-19 missile that destroyed a moving target. And in 2013, China conducted a test launch of a Dong Neng-2 anti-satellite interceptor.The Pentagon report makes a disturbing entry about an event that occurred in May 2013 and one that Beijing refuses to explain:"China launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak altitude above

30,000 km. This trajectory took it near geosynchronous orbit, where many nations maintain communications and earth-sensing satellites. Analysis of the launch determined that the booster was not on the appropriate trajectory to place objects in orbit and that no new satellites were released. The post-boost vehicle continued its ballistic trajectory and re-entered Earth orbit 9.5 hours after launch. The launch profile was not consistent with traditional space-launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research. It could, however, have been a test of technologies with a counterspace mission in geosynchronous orbit."

According to the Chinese report, long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The Pentagon report appears to give a more alarming prediction of what the media often refers to as a coming "drone war" with the United States.

The report says acquisition and development of long-range UAVs will "increase China's ability to conduct long-range reconnaissance and strike operations" and that "estimates indicate China plans to produce upwards of 41,800" UAVs between 2014 and 2023.In 2013, according to the report, China began incorporating its UAVs into military exercises and conducted reconnaissance patrols over the East China Sea with the BZK-005 UAV. In 2013, China unveiled details of four UAVs under development — the Xianglong, Yilong, Sky Saber and Lijian. The last three are designed to carry precision-strike weapons. The Lijian is China's first stealthy flying wing UAV.





Regards Cees***PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — As Islamic State branches out from its base in

Syria and Iraq, fears are mounting here that Southeast Asia is emerging as a new target of opportunity for the violent jihadi group.In some cases, Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL, is supplanting established radical Islamist groups — often with ties to the rival al Qaeda — and in other cases is linking up with local jihadi groups that have long battled governments in the region. PHNOM PENH, Cambodia — As Islamic State branches out from its base in Syria and Iraq, fears are mounting here that Southeast Asia is emerging as a new target of opportunity for the violent jihadi group.In some cases, Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL, is supplanting established radical Islamist groups — often with ties to the rival al Qaeda — and in other cases is linking up with local jihadi groups that have long battled governments in the region.




al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 30-china

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