al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-138-caliphate-the state of...

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-138-Caliphate-The State of al-Qaida-57-Comeback-22

We’ve been fighting “faulty paradigms” for at least 6 years. The state of jihad in three Money Quotes:

If Osama bin Laden were alive today, he would be a happy man”Terrorism is a war of attrition, and the West is losing”

Islamist radicalization is in hyper drive.” The future trajectories of al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) do not leave cause for optimism, nor do the faulty paradigms that have been widely accepted about both groups in recent years.

AQ has been waiting on IS to do much of its workIndeed, IS has seized upon the overarching strategy that a key bin Laden deputy laid out in 2005. This strategy was broken into seven phases complete with a timeline, and the first few steps occurred right on schedule for example, the fifth phase called for establishing the "caliphate" and was projected to take place from 2014 to 2016. Although this phase is coming to an end with the demise of the IS core, even partial fulfillment of bin Laden's strategy promotes AQ's narrative of a divinely ordained struggle ending in inevitable victory. The danger will persist with the fall of the caliphate as thousands of IS fighters try to return home.Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the Senate this February, he painted a bleak picture of a newly resurgent AQ that was "positioned to make gains in 2016."

Long after Islamic State has been degraded as a military threat, there is a real probability that al Qaeda could complete its transformation from a vanguard group into a grass-roots social movement with significant appeal among Sunni Muslims worldwide. That outcome should be the main concern of Western policymakers and government officials focused on counterterrorism.

Three months after its “split” from al Qaeda, which in reality is simply a feint, Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS), formerly known as Jabhat al Nusra, may pose a more significant long-term threat to the West than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

For the West in general, and the United States in particular, the worst possible outcome of al Qaeda’s pragmatism is the risk that Sunnis around the globe will find al Qaeda and its positions legitimate enough to warrant respectful consideration.

This would undermine hopes of stability in the Middle East and would further weaken Washington’s already limited ability to shape the region’s politics.

For the Kingdom, this fact may be too much. The Salafi-Jihadists of al-Qaeda and Daesh will see an opportunity to exploit this debate to their own ends. They know that if Saudi Arabia’s creed is being debated, then the Kingdom will be in a weakened position. Terrorist attacks against key targets to bring instability to Saudi Arabia will be a primary objective. This new debate on Wahhabism will only empower extremists, not neuter them.

Presently, IS has up to 30,000 foreign fighters in its ranks from Europe, Central Asia, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, and Caucus. If IS implodes, will these jihadists go back to their home countries or relocate to the neighbouring countries of Iraq and Syria?

There are three levels to consider: As long as the US and Russia, internationally; Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, regionally; the Iraqi and Syrian regimes and the local Sunni populations and the various rebel groups and their backers, locally; as long as they do not sort out the geo-political, geo-sectarian and political differences, IS will find enough vacuum to regrow and remerge from the ashes like a phoenix.

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent of 11

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Terrorism is a war of attrition, and the West is losing.

Regards Cees***

Three months after its “split” from al Qaeda, which in reality is simply a feint, Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS), formerly known as Jabhat al Nusra, may pose a more significant long-term threat to the West than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

While the West targets ISIS, JFS is quietly laying the groundwork for al Qaeda's resurgence by “hunkering down,” rebuilding, and repositioning itself along several fronts. This should come as no surprise — al Qaeda and its affiliates are nothing if not resilient.

With approximately 10,000 fighters, JFS is now both the largest al Qaeda franchise and by many accounts, the most lethal, eclipsing the capabilities of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Policymakers and terrorism scholars are debating whether al Qaeda or Islamic State is the more dangerous threat to the United States and the West.

After the various bombings and attacks across the West, many experts insist Islamic State is the more serious problem. That is a mistake. Al Qaeda presents the gravest long-term problem to the West.

Post 'Caliphate': The Future of the Salafi-Jihadi MovementOn October 27, Bruce Hoffman and Matthew Levitt addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute as part of the Stein Counterterrorism Lecture Series. Hoffman directs the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and formerly served on the Independent Commission to Review the FBI's Post-9/11 Response to Terrorism and Radicalization. Levitt is the Institute's Fromer-Wexler Fellow, director of its Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, and former deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks. BRUCE HOFFMAN

The future trajectories of al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) do not leave cause for optimism, nor do the faulty paradigms that have been widely accepted about both groups in recent years. Five years ago, many argued that AQ was on the verge of strategic collapse: its founding leader was dead, a succession of key lieutenants had been eliminated, and the Arab Spring was seemingly poised to bring about the changes that terrorists had promised for years. Yet when Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the Senate this February, he painted a bleak picture of a newly resurgent AQ that was "positioned to make gains in 2016." Similarly, IS was able to carry out major international attacks last year in defiance of the widely accepted paradigm that it was not interested in global terrorist operations. These and other past miscalculations raise concerns that the United States and its allies simply do not understand the pulse of IS or the dynamics of the broader jihadi universe.If Osama bin Laden were alive today, he would be a happy man. He was confident that his death would produce thousands more Osamas, and in light of the ongoing global foreign fighter phenomenon, his threat has been realized. He also summoned his followers to commit attacks throughout Europe, and IS has realized that dream. The process of political rebranding that he wrote about is coming to pass as well; AQ affiliates in Syria and elsewhere have adopted different names and are often depicted as more palatable alternatives to other extremists.Indeed, IS has seized upon the overarching strategy that a key bin Laden deputy laid out in 2005. This strategy was broken into seven phases complete with a timeline, and the first few steps occurred right on schedule -- for example, the fifth phase called for establishing the "caliphate" and was projected to


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take place from 2014 to 2016. Although this phase is coming to an end with the demise of the IS core, even partial fulfillment of bin Laden's strategy promotes AQ's narrative of a divinely ordained struggle ending in inevitable victory. The danger will persist with the fall of the caliphate as thousands of IS fighters try to return home.AQ has been waiting on IS to do much of its work -- deepening fissures in the Middle East and the West -- until the time comes to rise again. This strategy was made clear as recently as last year, when a major AQ weapons stockpile was discovered in Afghanistan that rivaled bin Laden's pre-2001 arsenal. The conventional wisdom once held that the bloody split between IS and AQ would mean the end of both groups, but instead their competition resulted in even greater violence and chaos as IS sought to seize the mantle from its predecessor. If the IS core falls, the group will likely default to its international terrorist capabilities and perhaps heighten its efforts to outdo AQ. Reunification between the two groups remains a possibility as well given their relatively small ideological differences and behind-the-scenes conciliatory gestures -- their existing divides are rooted in a clash of egos more than anything else. Thus, the fall of IS could drive senior leaders back to AQ or, failing that, make the weakened group vulnerable to a hostile takeover.Terrorism is a war of attrition, and the West is losing. Western societies are rife with disillusionment over the seemingly endless struggle, breeding political fissures and xenophobia. Terrorists are primed to take advantage of such divides, and their capabilities are growing faster than government security forces can be trained up. To combat this threat, Washington and its allies need to target the various AQ and IS branches that allow the core groups to bring local populations and resources under their control, while also preventing the creation of new branches.MATTHEW LEVITTThe West faced a growing international terrorist threat before the rise of IS, so the group's demise will not be a panacea; tomorrow's bin Laden is probably a teenager already in Iraq or Syria. The delay in addressing IS played no small part in the creation and expansion of the caliphate, and after it dissolves, IS operatives will reorganize as insurgents in Anbar, Diyala, and other core areas. In addition, some operatives may head to the group's "provinces," though the resilience of these branches may vary from country to country.Most important, as long as Syria remains an open sore, the group can continue to exist there and use the conflict as a recruiting beacon. Before IS arose, foreigners were already traveling to Syria to defend fellow Sunnis against the Assad regime's atrocities. As the violence continued, more fighters joined wealthier and better-equipped AQ affiliates, where they were exposed to radical ideologies. The establishment of the IS caliphate only exacerbated the problem, since the group offered fighters the opportunity to be a part of historic work -- an empowering narrative that allowed many disenfranchised individuals to go from "zero to hero." This could not have been clearer than in a phone call intercepted by Belgian police after the November 2015 Paris attacks. The caller, a Belgian militant in Syria, asked what people in the Molenbeek district of Brussels were saying about his friend Bilal Hadfi, a suicide bomber in Paris: "Are they praising him? Are they saying he was a lion?" Thus, while some radical jihadist "pull" factors will dissipate without an idyllic caliphate, many of the "push" factors will remain.As for the eight recognized IS provinces, they may face hardships post-caliphate. The Washington Institute's recent conference on this subject led to three basic conclusions (which will be discussed at length in a soon-to-be-published compendium edited by Katherine Bauer). First, the provinces are not created equal -- some have waged successful attacks on Western interests, while others exist only on paper (e.g., in the Arabian Peninsula); some operate in ungoverned areas, while others are under strain from state security forces. Second, the symbolic value of establishing global affiliates may be more important than their actual success. Third, the staying power of some provinces depends on resources from the core.


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On the latter note, a caliphate on the decline obviously has a harder time directing resources to its periphery. Some groups pledged their allegiance to IS based on the expectation of receiving wealth and experience from the core, and it is an open question what will happen should those resources stop flowing. Preexisting groups that rebranded themselves as IS provinces will likely revert back to their old names. Individual fighters recruited from local organizations, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), might rejoin their former groups, as evidenced by the public rifts within the IS Yemen branch.For its part, AQ has grown and changed and is no longer organized in a rigid top-down structure. Its relationship with IS remains frayed, but tactical relationships continue.More broadly, Islamist radicalization is in hyper drive, and many of the factors that are stimulating it will not be diminished with the fall of IS. The region faces sophisticated online encryption, failed and weak states post-Arab Spring, and a heavy layer of sectarianism. Accordingly, the potential for lone-offender attacks there and abroad has increased. According to Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, we now live in a world where terrorism is "carried out by those who live among us in the homeland and self-radicalize, inspired by terrorist propaganda on the Internet."Yet "lone wolf" diagnoses are often incomplete because IS makes explicit calls for lone-offender attacks, and these calls have had a measurable effect. In the United States, there are currently about 1,000 open investigations into potential homegrown extremists in all fifty states, a sharp increase from just a few years ago. The term "lone wolves" is also a misnomer because evidence indicates that these individuals are often known wolves -- their radicalization is usually noticed by those around them. Authorities increasingly view homegrown extremists on a spectrum, with actors in explicitly directed attacks on one end and lone-offender/self-inspired actors on the other. Rarely are cases clearly on one side of the spectrum.From this standpoint, a victory in Mosul and the demise of IS in Iraq will not win the war. Political and security grievances in the region have worsened. Before IS and the Syria crisis emerged, the director of national intelligence spoke of the region's "looming disequilibria" in the Global Trends 2030 report. Many of the worst-case scenarios in that report have now been realized, with open sores in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere setting the stage for serious problems in the long term.

Note the beautiful satellite imagery map table . . .Rare pictures of Jabhat Fatah al Sham (#JFS) leader Abu Mohammad al Joulani reviewing plans w/ 2 of his #Aleppo military commanders #AlQaeda

RAND: Al-Nusra is Stronger than EverThree months after its “split” from al Qaeda, which in reality is simply a feint, Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS), formerly known as Jabhat al Nusra, may pose a more significant long-term threat to the West than the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).While the West targets ISIS, JFS is quietly laying the groundwork for al Qaeda's resurgence by “hunkering down,” rebuilding, and repositioning itself along several fronts. This should come as no surprise — al Qaeda and its affiliates are nothing if not resilient.With approximately 10,000 fighters, JFS is now both the largest al Qaeda franchise and by many accounts, the most lethal, eclipsing the capabilities of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As a failed state on the periphery of Europe, Syria is the ideal staging ground for al Qaeda to rejuvenate its global campaign of terrorism through JFS.Jabhat Fateh al Sham is now both the largest al Qaeda franchise and by many accounts, the most lethal.Veteran al Qaeda leaders like Saif al-Adl are thought to be among the current leadership directing JFS strategy in Syria. A critical centerpiece of this strategy is seeking consent of locals and working to


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garner political legitimacy in Sunni-dominated parts of northwest Syria, where JFS has established an enclave.This approach stands out in stark juxtaposition to ISIS's ultra-violent, scorched-earth campaign. JFS has benefited from the combined Western and Russian campaign against ISIS, as it has allowed the al Qaeda splinter to survive and thrive. Moreover, by publicly disassociating itself from al Qaeda, JFS has attempted to maintain a lower profile with respect to its adversaries, namely the Russian-backed regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the U.S.-led coalition. The rebranding failed to convince the U.S. government, but as prominent terrorism scholars have pointed out, Washington was never the intended audience.A major line of effort within al Qaeda's broader campaign has been establishing close ties with locals in the areas where it now operates. For the past several years, al Qaeda has been shifting fighters and resources into Syria and slowly accruing popular support among locals. JFS is focused on political and military targets and has worked to build localized bases of influence and embed its fighters into established zones of territorial control.The change in nomenclature from Nusra to JFS serves several specific purposes. One potential

outcome is that countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar may feel more at ease arming or aiding the militants now that they have publicly distanced themselves, even if in name only, from al Qaeda. Qatar, in particular, has been urging such a move for months.Another objective of the rebranding is to present JFS as a more inclusive organization, open to working with, instead of against, the myriad Syrian rebel groups aligned against the Assad regime. Compared to ISIS, JFS has been far more selective in recruiting new members, especially among the thousands of foreign fighters that have flocked to Syria since the civil war erupted five years ago. By merging with parts of the local opposition, JFS can present itself as the most representative and legitimate alternative among active jihadist groups.

Like its parent organization al Qaeda, Jabhat Fateh al Sham is playing the long game.Like its parent organization al Qaeda, JFS is playing the long game. Its new name allows it to portray itself as a vanguard of the Syrian people rather than an al Qaeda puppet.Another motive of the name change is to integrate JFS within the current patchwork rebel coalition of anti-Assad fighters. If JFS successfully embeds itself within the opposition, there are serious


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consequences in both the short and long term. More immediately, this could prolong the conflict. In the long run, this symbiosis could lead to political legitimacy, enabling the militants to emulate the staying power that Hezbollah has demonstrated in neighboring Lebanon.Compared to the more technologically adept and media-savvy ISIS, al Qaeda, and by extension JFS, is a more conservative and “old-school” jihadi outfit. There is little doubt that ISIS poses a significant threat to regional stability in the Middle East and has already demonstrated both a willingness and capability to strike the West. But in the grander scheme, ISIS has been compared to an infection that can be treated and contained, while al Qaeda and its affiliates are likened to a cancer that defies treatment and continues to spread.The West should be doing everything possible to ensure that JFS and its ideological sympathizers are unsuccessful in their attempt to entrench themselves in Syria the way Hezbollah did in Lebanon. This likely means taking aggressive measures to separate or isolate jihadists from the more moderate elements within Syria's rebel opposition.Regardless of whether Assad stays or goes, this should be an overarching goal of Western countries working to resolve the Syrian crisis.

Commentary: Al Qaeda’s ruthless pragmatism makes it more dangerous than Islamic StatePolicymakers and terrorism scholars are debating whether al Qaeda or Islamic State is the more dangerous threat to the United States and the West.After the various bombings and attacks across the West, many experts insist Islamic State is the more serious problem.That is a mistake. Al Qaeda presents the gravest long-term problem to the West.Al Qaeda’s ruthlessly pragmatic approach has placed it in a far better position to achieve its strategic objectives. It has proved more effective in taking advantage of U.S. policy in the Middle East, primarily in Syria, to legitimize itself as an armed force and, increasingly, as a viable political player.The al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra, since rebranded Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, or JFS, is quietly morphing into a mainstream option in the broader panoply of rebel groups operating in Syria, even as Islamic State’s caliphate continues to shrink and the United States and Russia spar over mistaken targets.If Jabhat Fateh al-Sham successfully embeds within the Syrian opposition, it could prolong the conflict in Syria. Even more worrisome, with a concerted political and military strategy, it could attain the long-term success that Hezbollah has achieved in neighboring Lebanon. With a highly capable, well-trained and well-armed franchise group on the periphery of Europe, al Qaeda would be even more dangerous than Islamic State.Al Qaeda’s current strategy reveals a group determined to learn from its past mistakes. The group offers a strong political component, and no longer focuses solely on violence.Since being forced out of Afghanistan, al Qaeda has evolved to include not only a core group based in South Asia but also franchises and affiliates throughout North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. These branches were formed as a response to al Qaeda’s post-9/11 struggle to assure its survival.Over time, however, they have become crucial. A vanguard group of exiles with weak roots in Middle Eastern social networks and an unrealistic U.S.-centric plan has transformed itself into a broad movement whose central leadership provides strategic guidelines while its branches embed in regional social movements.This reorientation helped al Qaeda establish close ties with locals in areas where its affiliates operate. In Yemen, for example, al Qaeda moved to share power with local jihadists after successfully seizing the city of Mukalla in the southern part of the country. (It has since lost the town.) Al Qaeda’s North African branch allied with local actors to govern areas in northern Mali before the 2013 French intervention. Al Qaeda has also been moving fighters and resources into Syria and slowly accruing


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popular support among locals there through its affiliate, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.Al Qaeda’s new focus on building political support has been demonstrated by its efforts to match violence to the local population’s specific regional political objectives. Though al Qaeda affiliates may still rely on militant tactics, including ambushes and improvised explosive devices, they function largely as insurgent forces that hold key terrain, maintain shadow governments and defend Sunni communities from hostile forces. These efforts are bolstered by comprehensive da’wa campaigns, which spread strict Wahhabist beliefs to recruit new members.Al Qaeda has always contained diverse voices. Indeed, several high-ranking militants in its senior leadership, including Abu Musab al-Suri and Sayf al-Adl, viewed the Sept. 11 attacks as counterproductive. Both predicted that Washington’s response would inevitably lead to a loss of the group’s Afghan sanctuary. Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, however, was deaf to their arguments.The group’s struggles in the ensuing years made it more receptive to different ideas. The current al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has long sought to pursue al Qaeda’s objectives without alienating locals. He has warned against the wanton slaughter of Shiites in Iraq, as revealed in his intercepted communications to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Eight years later, Zawahiri issued an official manifesto, “General Guidelines for Jihad,” that lays out clear ground rules for how al Qaeda franchises should deal with local communities.By making the guidelines public, al Qaeda signaled to affiliates and allies that it would no longer let rogue actions tarnish its name and derail its political objectives, as Zarqawi ultimately did.Al Qaeda’s softer, less violent approach seeks to help local Sunni tribes assuage their parochial grievances. As in Syria, this quid pro quo helps al Qaeda build local bases of influence and embed fighters into established zones of territorial control.Over time, al Qaeda likely hopes to incorporate local groups into its radical brand of Islam. In stark juxtaposition to Islamic State focus on occupying terroritory, and in keeping with its philosophy of relative pragmatism, al Qaeda has maintained a far longer timeline for establishing a caliphate.Al Qaeda also declared Islamic State illegitimate because the latter’s actions denied Muslims the right to choose their caliph. They would divide the Islamic world “umma,” or community, rather than unify it.By embedding itself into larger movements, al Qaeda has gained greater protection from external attacks. When attacks do occur, it can present them as evidence of the attackers’ hostility to all Sunnis. In this way, the group may hope local partners will accede to its global agenda and use newly established sanctuaries to launch attacks against the West.For the West in general, and the United States in particular, the worst possible outcome of al Qaeda’s pragmatism is the risk that Sunnis around the globe will find al Qaeda and its positions legitimate enough to warrant respectful consideration.This would undermine hopes of stability in the Middle East and would further weaken Washington’s already limited ability to shape the region’s politics.The real tragedy could be that al Qaeda, particularly because of its franchises, might appear to be a more genuine protector of Sunni interests than legitimate Arab regimes or the U.S.-led West.In keeping with this scenario, Washington’s failed strategy to stop the civil war in Syria has been a boon to al Qaeda. As has Washington’s continued inaction in the face of the President Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime, which is aided and abetted by his allies in Moscow and Tehran.The horrific photographs of maimed civilians in Aleppo, Syria, seriously threaten to undermine U.S. accomplishments in the fight against the jihadist movement. Sadly, they are likely to increase hostility toward the United States and bolster support for al Qaeda.Long after Islamic State has been degraded as a military threat, there is a real probability that al Qaeda could complete its transformation from a vanguard group into a grass-roots social movement with significant appeal among Sunni Muslims worldwide.


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That outcome should be the main concern of Western policymakers and government officials focused on counterterrorism.

New Debate on Wahhabism Threatens Saudi ArabiaThe Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab nation and the home to Islam’s holiest sites, must feel under siege these days. Pressure is coming from many fronts, among them a costly war in Yemen, diplomatic tensions with the U.S. over a new law in which families of 9/11 victims can sue Saudis, and low oil prices that have lead to financial austerity. However, a little-reported debate over the future of a strain of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi creed could be a tipping point that destabilizes the whole country.A consortium of UAE and Egyptian interests meeting of all places in Grozny, Chechnya, is the front line of this new pressure point. They are there to discuss Wahhabism, a Saudi belief system that breeds Salafist terrorists from al-Qaeda to Islamic State. In this sense, the Grozny venue is significant. The Wahhabi creed in the Caucuses region seems to have undergone its own “reformation” in recent years.Gone are the days of Chechnya being a terrorist outpost in the Russian Federation, attacking aviation, transportation, schools, hospitals, and theaters. A new strain of Wahhabism is now an integral part of the Kremlin’s current drive to make Chechnya, under Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, a shining example of Islam and politics working in unison for social and economic development.Kadyrov’s pro-Russian government sees Grozny as a model for expunging takfiri (violent excommunication) thinking from Wahhabism. Benefitting from intelligence from the Chechen community in Arab countries, the Chechen president plays a role in helping Russia, Syria, and Jordan to target Chechen networks in the evaporating Islamic State.In other words, a functional model of political Islam is being generated out of all places from Russia. With backing from Egypt and the UAE, this new model of political Islam based on moderate, politically-oriented Sufism is now at the center of the discussion on Wahhabism. Sufi teachings focus on the spiritual rather than the political side of religion and tend to interpret main religious principles, such as jihad, as spiritual matters that one must tame and guide along the path of goodness.Discussing Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist creed in such a public forum with the active support and participation of the greater Arab world is a direct challenge to the vulnerable House of Saud. In addition to its external pressures, the Kingdom has new leadership following the death of King Abdullah in 2015, and an uncertain succession plan. The country is trying to deploy an ambitious new agenda, including a National Transformation Program (NTP) and a massive “Vision 2030” plan advanced by the Deputy Crown Prince.This is a delicate balancing act: Saudi is trying to accommodate its young population with reforms and development, while placating older conservatives as well as the Kingdom’s clerics, many of whom adhere to the strict Salafist doctrine.To boot, Sufis make up a tiny minority of the Saudi population. Although Sufis in Saudis faced repression under the Al-Saud, since the mid-2000s a reconciliation between Wahhabi and Sufi clerics has helped the latter feel more included in Saudi society. Now, with Sufism seen as a guiding light against Wahhabist Salafism, Saudi Sufis might make themselves heard in new ways on social media against the Saudi clergy.Because of a focus on Sufism emanating from Chechnya, the Kingdom faces another pressure point and an accelerated threat to its stability. Why Arab allies, in conjunction with Russia, would try to undermine Saudi Arabia is questionable. Relations between Sufis and adherents of other non-Sunni religions and sects is largely friendly. This fact is especially true given the deep-rooted idea of pluralism in Sufi eschatology in addition to diverse cultural norms, which makes Sufism more open to neighboring religions and cultures. For the Kingdom, this fact may be too much.The Salafi-Jihadists of al-Qaeda and Daesh will see an opportunity to exploit this debate to their own


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ends. They know that if Saudi Arabia’s creed is being debated, then the Kingdom will be in a weakened position. Terrorist attacks against key targets to bring instability to Saudi Arabia will be a primary objective. This new debate on Wahhabism will only empower extremists, not neuter them.Dr. Al Makahleh is the co-founder of Geostrategic Media and Dr. Karasik is senior advisor at Gulf State Analytics.

That is not very encouraging . . .Baghdadi told Islamic State’s fighters to ``unleash the fire of their anger’’ on Turkish troops fighting them in Syria, and to take the battle into Turkey. ``Turkey today entered your range of action and the aim of your jihad ... invade it and turn its safety into fear.’’

Islamic State continues to plot against the West, US military warnsBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | October 26, 2016 | [email protected] | @thomasjoscelynThe US military warned today that the Islamic State continues to plot attacks against the West from its headquarters in Raqqa, Syria.“We know this plot and planning is emanating from Raqqa,” Army Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend said, according to the Associated Press.Townsend didn’t provide any specifics, but the Islamic State has orchestrated multiple attacks from its safe havens in the past. American and European officials are constantly working to disrupt the group’s logistical support networks and uncover cells.“We aren’t sure how pressing it is. We know they are up to something,” Townsend said, according to FoxNews.com. Townsend added that “we’ve got to get to Raqqa pretty soon” because of this anti-Western plotting.US officials have indicated in recent days that the battle for Raqqa will commence soon, but the details are murky. It is unclear when the offensive against Raqqa will get underway.During a press briefing on Oct. 23, Lt. Gen. Townsend and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter connected the so-called caliphate’s leadership in Mosul and Raqqa to Western attack planning, or “external operations.”In the “top tier” of the Islamic State, Townsend said, “there’s an overlap between leadership in Mosul, leadership in Raqqa and external operations.” The “top tier of leaders do all those” and are “involved in all of those things.”“So by killing those individuals,” Townsend argued, “we affect both sides of this theater and external operations, as well.”The US military’s assessment illustrates that there is no firm dividing line between the jihadists’ warfighting over there and planning attacks over here. The US government has been inconsistent on this point in the past. For instance, in Nov. 2014, CENTCOM claimed that there was some clear demarcation between al Qaeda’s guerrilla warfare in Syria and its plotting against the West, even though senior al Qaeda figures have been involved in both. [See LWJ report, Analysis: CENTCOM draws misleading line between Al Nusrah Front and Khorasan Group.]But American officials are not trying to draw the same misleading distinction with respect to the Islamic State. Instead, they are emphasizing the connectivity between the jihadists’ various operations.Secretary of Defense Carter said earlier this week that preventing “external operations” is “our highest priority.” He said the assault on Mosul will lead to “more intelligence, more information about how they’re operating and therefore get new opportunities to attack external plotters.”“Also, as they get squeezed down in their territory, they get more concerned about their own security and are less free to orchestrate complex attacks against either this country or externally, including, very importantly, obviously, to me and to all of us, the United States,” Carter said. He added that the offensive against Mosul “will give us yet more opportunities” to thwart the Islamic State’s external


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operations.The Islamic State’s leaders wear multiple hats, just as Townsend and Carter claim. For example, the Defense Department said earlier this year that Abu Ali al Anbari, one of the group’s most senior figures, had a hand in external attack planning prior to his demise. Similarly, the Islamic State’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, oversaw external operations in addition to his other duties. Adnani was killed in an airstrike in August.The US has repeatedly targeted the Islamic State’s external attack planners in both Iraq and Syria. The UK has bombed operatives in this wing of the group as well. The external operations arm orchestrates plots involving professionally-trained terrorists, such as the Nov. 2015 assault on Paris, and also oversees “remote-controlled” attacks in which Islamic State supporters and members are guided by online handlers.

RSIS: Mosul Operation: The Endgame for IS?

Synopsis

The loss of Mosul will be a huge setback for the self-proclaimed Islamic State group, posing it an existential threat. However, confusing the loss of territory with the defeat of IS will be premature and over-simplistic.CommentaryIN THE last few months, the self-styled Islamic State (IS) group has suffered significant territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Most recently, the Turkish forces retook the Syrian town of Dabiq from IS—the name of its flagship monthly English language magazine. Similarly, in Iraq after retaking the Sunni-majority Anbar province from IS in July, the Iraqi forces have launched the much-touted operation in Mosul. Currently, Mosul is the last stronghold of IS in Iraq, its strategic cities in Syria, Aleppo and Raqqa are also being targeted. IS is in retreat as the anti-IS forces expand the offensive to cross over into Aleppo.In the context of the anti-IS operation in Mosul and Aleppo, three important questions beg answers. First, will the loss of territory in Mosul and similar territorial setbacks in Syria defeat the IS? Second, what is the military strategy that will be adopted by the anti-IS coalition—comprising of the Iraqi military and police, Shia militias known as the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), the US advisers and the Kurdish Peshmergas? Will it be counter-terrorism (CT) or counter-insurgency (COIN)? Third, if IS implodes, has the international community deliberated and worked out the strategy to deal with the aftermath of such a development?

Will Loss of Territory Defeat IS?The fall of Mosul to the anti-IS coalition which outnumbers the 3,000-4,000 IS fighters by 25,000-30,000 is a foregone conclusion. However, the manner in which Mosul is taken and treated post-operation is as important as retaking it from the IS in the first place. Certainly, the loss of territory will compel IS to beat a tactical retreat. It would be a huge propaganda setback to its slogan of Baqiya Wa Tamaddad (ever remaining and expanding) and may trigger defections and undermine the appeal of the so-called caliphate. However, this is not the first time that the group—then known as Islamic State in Iraq—is facing such a situation. In 2006, when its then leader Abu Musaab Al-Zarqawi was killed, it suffered huge setbacks. The group went underground and re-emerged in 2010 by defeating the Sahwa Movement, the Sunni tribal uprisings against the group. The latter exploited the Arab Spring in 2011, and expanded into Syria to eventually become IS in June 2014. Therefore, conflating the loss of territory with the defeat of IS will be premature and over-simplistic. IS knows the art of reinventing itself and coming back from most challenging situations.


03/05/2023



What Constitutes IS?There are four core components of the IS structure. First, the top leadership of the terror group, which is alive but on the run. Second, IS control over vast swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria. Third, the global appeal of IS ideology with the so-called caliphate as an integral element of its creed. IS has outshone Al Qaeda to emerge as the leading jihadi movement and trendsetter of global jihadism. The attraction of IS’ jihadist brand among its supporters, sympathizers, and fighters is still very strong. Finally, the narrative of Sunniyah Mazloomiyah (Sunni victimhood) i.e. the continued alienation of the Iraqi and Syrian Sunni populations against their Shia regimes which provides IS with the pretext to exploit the situation in its favour. In July when the Shia PMUs retook Anbar—a Sunni majority area of Iraq—from IS they unleashed massive atrocities against the local Sunni population. Such reckless acts of brutality not only alienated the Sunnis but it also strengthened IS’ extremist narrative that the terror group was the sole protector of the Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis political and socio-economic rights.Will Iraqi Forces Use CT or COIN in Mosul?From the strategy point of view, it is important to consider what strategy the anti-IS coalition will use in Mosul: CT or COIN? Notwithstanding several similarities, the two strategies are qualitatively different in their focus, approach, and execution. CT is enemy-centric and relies on timely and accurate intelligence inputs. If the intelligence is weak or poor then the coalition forces will be chasing shadows of the enemy among the local population. Rather than fighting pitched battles with the coalition forces, the IS fighters will melt away in the population making their detection quite difficult. On the contrary, COIN is population-centric and aims to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Does the coalition have enough resources, patience, and political will to engage the population? Post-Mosul operation, it will require reconstruction of infrastructure, restoration of normalcy and redressing local population’s grievances. The US and its Western allies are also toying with the naïve idea of leaving some territory for IS to survive so the jihadists under its banner are not dispersed in different parts of the world. The purpose is to encourage or induce jihadist infighting so that they will kill or weaken each other. The idea is self-defeating and a recipe for more disaster: a wounded and cornered jihadist tiger is more dangerous than a living one. The Aftermath Presently, IS has up to 30,000 foreign fighters in its ranks from Europe, Central Asia, Africa, South Asia, Middle East, and Caucus. If IS implodes, will these jihadists go back to their home countries or relocate to the neighbouring countries of Iraq and Syria? Will they join forces with the local militants to strengthen IS wilayats and enclaves, mount terrorist attacks and keep IS flag flying? IS has affiliates in Egypt’s Sinai area, Libya, Algeria and in Nigeria. IS also has small territorial presence in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province and in the southern Philippines Mindanao area. So, its options are wide open. IS and other jihadist groups which currently operate in Iraq and Syria are the by-products of civil- wars, proxy-battles, misgovernance and the Sunni-Shia sectarian fault-lines. There are three levels to consider: As long as the US and Russia, internationally; Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, regionally; the Iraqi and Syrian regimes and the local Sunni populations and the various rebel groups and their backers, locally; as long as they do not sort out the geo-political, geo-sectarian and political differences, IS will find enough vacuum to regrow and remerge from the ashes like a phoenix.


03/05/2023


al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-138-caliphate-the state of...

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