Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the United Nations General Assembly (I), DISEC of the SAI

Model United Nations 2014! My name is Himanil Raina, and I have the distinct privilege to

serve as your Chair for this conference. A bit about myself – I am a DPS Noida pass out and am

presently a second year B.A L.L.B., (Hons) student at the NALSAR University of Law.

Originally from Kashmir I have had the opportunity to traverse most of the country and many a

nation abroad being a defence kid. I started MUN’ing in my 9th

standard and have not stopped

since.

The UNGA First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that

affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international

security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope

of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations;

the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as

well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of

cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of

armaments.

For the first agenda the Executive Board has chosen to provide a crisp summary of the agenda

touching upon the important thematic elements. A legal overview has been provided so as to

acquaint delegates with the burning international divisions the resolution of which will be critical

to enable any progress on the agenda.

With regard to the second agenda the resolution of legal issues is quite secondary to resolving

more basic political questions such as the role of the UN and the position of states with regard to

it. Therefore an overview of UN Peacekeeping mission as it exists has been provided before

presenting the many alternatives available to the present system which place more permanent

military formations at the UN’s disposal.

This study guide should be a starting point for your research and you are encouraged to by all

means further expand your realm of knowledge by delving into the themes and sub themes raised

in the guide and the reference provided for further research. The Executive Board has not seen it

fit to list the Questions that a Resolution must answer since that will be entirely dependent on the

manner in which the committee probes and explores an agenda. Only Reuter’s reports will be

accepted by the Executive Board as proof of the fact that the UNO recognizes something to be

fact. Delegates may use reports by official government sources/agencies only against that

particular government. All claims, counter claims and allegations which delegates attempt to

further in committee will be expected to be via a hard copy of the same which is to be provided

to the Executive Board. Soft copies will not be accepted.

Delegates are especially requested to be well versed with basic principles of international law,

their foreign policy and display diplomatic courtesy befitting that of a representative in the

United Nations. In this committee we are not going to be judging delegates based on how

experienced or articulate they are. Delegates respecting others opinions/diversity of views while

finding ways around them in consonance with their foreign policy and creating a unanimously

acceptable solution are to be encouraged and thus in this respect newcomers have as good a

chance as veterans. Regardless, whether this is your first time or one of many conferences, I look

forward to impassioned and rigorous debates in the days to come. Feel free to contact the

Executive Board for any doubts you may have.

Wishing you the best of luck with your preparations.

Sincerely,

Himanil Raina

Chairperson, General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament & International Security)

SAIMUN 2014

himanilraina@gmail.com

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations General Assembly of SAIMUN 2014! I am Ankit Sahu and I

guess most of you already know as one of your seniors. But for those who don’t, I graduated

from SAI International School this year, where I have been studying since the past four years and

will be pursuing my higher studies in Japan. It’s an immense privilege to Vice Chair this iconic

committee under the guidance of our academically brilliant Chair. I am just two MUN’s old and

this is my first experience as the Vice Chair of any MUN and I look forward to this memorable

experience.

Here is something about DISEC. As the first standing committee of the United Nations, the

Disarmament and International Security committee (DISEC) addresses issues regarding global

security. According to Article 26 of United Nations Charter, DISEC’s mandate is “to promote

the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for

armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”. Under the UN Charter, all member

states and observers of the United Nations are automatically part of the First Committee of the

General Assembly and possess equally weighted votes. Resolutions require a simple majority to

be passed and, with similar topics to those discussed in the Security Council, DISEC meets once

a year for a five-week session in October. Similarly to other General Assembly committees,

DISEC can merely issue recommendations to the United Nations Security Council or the United

Nations Secretariat. Yet, the committee cannot impose sanctions, authorize armed interventions

or pass any binding resolutions.

Since our Chair has already briefed you about the agendas, let me tell you about what we expect

from you during the 3 days of continuous debate. As representatives of the Member Nations of

the United Nations, we expect you to be diplomatic in your approach not only in terms of debate

or discussion, but also in your dealings with your counterparts representing other nations, as well

as the other members of the Conference.

We take this opportunity to clarify at the outset that decorum and diplomatic behaviour will be

noted carefully, and shall be one of the many other factors that will play a role in the selection of

the awardees of the committee. We thus request you to work on your diplomatic skills in

addition to the research that you will be undertaking for the conference.

As a final note before we give you a background to the proposed agenda for the session, we

request you to keep in mind that this guide is not exhaustive. It gives only a background sketch

to the agenda, highlighting some key areas of interest. As such, you are expected to research in-

depth about any other area that you deem important/is important from your country’s standpoint

just as well as the areas mentioned below. Above everything, we urge you to be solution

oriented in your approach to this agenda.

We hope to see very fruitful and constructive discussion in the committee, with solutions to

many problems that we face today with regard to the agenda.

Best of Luck!

Sincerely,

Ankit Sahu

Vice -Chairperson, General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament & International Security)

SAIMUN 2014

ankitsahu13@gmail.com

AGENDA 1: Cybersecurity & Cyberwarfare

An Overview of the Agenda

Cyber security is divisible into 4 components espionage, crime, cyber war, and cyber terrorism.

These divisions can be further compartmentalized by dividing them into the politico military

stream and the economic stream. The politico military stream concerns itself with the use of

information technology that can result in consequences inconsistent with the goal of maintaining

international stability and security whereas the economic stream is concerned with the criminal

misuse of information technology. Whilst this council is free to deliberate upon either it is to be

noted that the nature of the council requires greater focus on the politico military stream than the

economic one. As of today cyber crime and espionage are the most pressing problems as they

occur on a widespread scale. By contrast cyber terrorism and cyber warfare have been quite

limited in their scope. However it is these which have the potential to wreck catastrophic damage

which is why it is imperative this council develop norms that will guide future attempts at

developing hard law. The cyberspace today presents with a situation quite similar to that

presented to the world with the dawn of the aircraft around World War 1. The aircraft then

seemed to simply have a role for reconnaissance and transportation but over time it has

developed to become so much more. This is why it is important for the UN to guide and shape

the development of the cyberspace. In addition, issue of internet governance also needs to be

addressed by the council which among other things would include the role of the Internet

Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers.

The architecture of the internet presents two problems today. Firstly, not withstanding continual

tweaking and modifications the protocols governing the Internet were made in the 1970’s and

1980’s, an era fundamentally different from the world today. The second problem and which is

at the core of the legal problems as well is the problem of attribution. The problem with

ensuring attribution is that it is fiercely resisted by proponents of privacy rights who are loath to

let go of the anonymity offered by the Internet. Anonymity has its benefits, for instance it can

render useless information collected on an internet user as without knowing who the user is there

is no commercial value in selling it to an interested company. The problem which excessive

privacy poses however is the problem of differentiation of an act of crime from an act of war.

Given the existence of botnets and ‘hired guns’ or ‘cyber mercenaries’ the problem of attribution

is compounded manifold. A lasting solution then requires for a balance to be struck between

political openness and security concerns.

The act of war can be perpetrated over 5 battle spaces, the land, the oceans, the air, space and

cyberspace. What makes cyberspace uniquely different from the other four is that unlike them

the cyberspace does not present any ‘hard’ targets that can be detected, aimed at and be

physically destroyed. The understanding of weapons is quite distinct as from the other battle

spaces owing to the dual use nature of the weapons in the cyberspace which requires nothing

more than a laptop. This raises challenging questions for the committee as to how a cyber arms

race can be prevented and by extension how can deterrence be ensured. Further, given the

integrated nature of the cyberspace how is it proposed that collateral damage be avoided. The

present situation is one where an asymmetry of risk owing to the anonymous nature of the

cyberspace tilts the scales in favor of the attacker.

LEGAL ASPECTS

It is provided in Article 1 of the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission on

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 that every internationally

wrongful act of a state entails responsibility of that state. International responsibility however is

secondary vis a vis international obligations that are the primary rules which are the source of the

state’s responsibility. Over the course of the development of international law many theories of

liability have existed. The damage theory draws an automatic link of responsibility between the

acting and the claiming state provided the claiming state has suffered damage. The fault theory

however would hold that looking at an objective criterion alone does not suffice and that states

should not be of help responsible unless the damaging acts are committed willfully or

maliciously or due to culpable negligence. There also exists the absolute liability/risk theory

which doesn’t require fault on the part of the State to attribute liability. This is generally applied

to activities that are lawful but create serious risk (such as nuclear or space activities).

A state becomes responsible for breach of an international obligation only if it can be proved that

the breach of responsibility is imputable to the state. For the purposes of the same the conduct of

a State organ is taken to be the act of the State. The conduct of a State’s organ or a person or

entity authorized to exercise elements of government power is attributed to the State if the organ,

person or entity acts in that capacity, even if the authority granted is exceeded or the conduct is

in contravention to instructions. A state takes on no responsibility for the acts of an organ or

official acting without authority, such acts being ultra vires. However even in such a case a state

can become responsible if through the commission or default of other officials or organs it has

facilitated the commission of an ultra vires act or has broken an independent duty of international

law. As under the present law a state is not responsible for the illegal acts committed by a private

person provided they were not doing so on behalf of the statejbm,. The conduct of a person or

entity empowered by a State’s internal laws to exercise elements of governmental authority even

if not part a formal structure of the state is considered to be an act of the State.

This law as embodied in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts represents the culmination of decades of work and subscription to certain schools

of jurisprudential thought. The European Convention on Human Rights and the General

Agreement on Tariffs & Trade will for instance be found to have their own particular rules

determining state responsibility.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the use or threat of use of force by one state against

another state cans conceivably extent to cyberspace activities as well. Were a cyber attack to

reach the threshold of an armed attack as defined under international law the right to self defence

permitting a state to respond with attacks becomes activated. One position held in the

international community and espoused by the United States is that cyber attacks amount to armed

attacks and are subject to international law. It acknowledges the possibility for cyber activities to

be interpreted as use of force in some situations. Another position advocates the need for new

treaties. The International Code of Conduct for Information Security advanced by this bloc

which counts amongst its members the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation

amongst others expands the kinds of communication technologies that can be viewed as a

security threat. Whilst the UK & the USA have expressed their desire for the traditional law of

armed conflict to apply to cyberspace the opposing viewpoint argues that cyber attacks by virtue

of not threatening sovereignty or territorial integrity should not fall within the domain of the law

of armed conflict. Further this view says given the impossibility of maintaining neutrality in the

cyberspace and adhering to the principle of proportionality a new regime is needed.

For the Committee it is vital to forge a consensus as to which of the two approaches if not a

hybrid is to be pursued so as to define the norms that will shape the cyberspace over the coming

decades. Further it shall have to examine principles of state responsibility and determine whether

those are found up to the task or require modifications as well.

REFERENCE LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

1. http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/cyberconflict-and-cybersecurity-initiative/pr1497

2. http://csis.org/category/topics/technology/cybersecurity

3. http://www.iiss.org/en/topics/cyber-security

4. http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cybersecurity-and-cyberwarfare-

preliminary-assessment-of-national-doctrine-and-organization-380.pdf

5. http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf

6. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2011/433828/EXPO-

SEDE_ET(2011)433828_EN.pdf

7. http://news.asis.io/sites/default/files/Cybersecurity_and_Cyberwar.pdf

8. http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime

9. http://www.dhs.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan

10. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126097038

Agenda 2: 'Reform Of United Nations Peacekeeping with Special emphasis

upon Creation of a Standing UN Force

An Overview of traditional Peacekeeping

The United Nations Organization developed the tool of peacekeeping to manage tensions

between the two superpowers, the USA & the USSR in the Cold War. That the UN founding

fathers never visualized the need for peacekeeping is evident from the fact that the term was

never mentioned in the UN Charter. The collective security system based on peace enforcement

by the UNSC became unworkable since it relied on consensus which was not available due to

tensions between the two superpowers. Early peacekeeping was then in response to interstate

conflict typically involving the non violent use of military force to ensure there was no

continuation or escalation of violence between the concerned parties.

Chapter VI deals with peaceful resolution of conflicts obligating disputing parties to firstly try

resolving their disputes by means of negotiations, conciliation, mediation, arbitration or resorting

to regional agencies or arrangements. Chapter VII which is the heart of the collective security

system kicks in on a failure of attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. In case of a threat to

peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression the UNSC may resort to enforcement measures

which may include arms embargoes, economic sanctions and the use of force as a last resort.

The envisioned role of the UNSC acting as a ‘global policeman’ never came to be, instead the

classical model of voluntarily drawn UN peacekeeping forces comprising armed peacekeepers

and unarmed observers deployed only with the consent of parties, impartiality by the forces and

the use of arms only in self defence came to develop, with the Korean crisis marking the only

incident when collective use of force was authorized under the UN Charter.

The Korean crisis experience led to a US led movement to enhance the General Assembly’s role

in matters of international peace and security, more specifically in cases where lack of unanimity

between the Permanent members leads to inaction on pressing issues of the day. This led to the

‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution on 3rd

November 1950.

Peacekeeping deployments then acted as important stabilizing influences in regions of power

vacuum where their absence might have led to potentially explosive confrontations between the

superpowers. The period from 1948-1988 saw only 13 UN Peacekeeping missions formed.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, 5 UN Peacekeeping Missions were formed in 1988

and 1989. UN setbacks in Somalia, Bosnia & Rwanda in the 1990’s marked the larger trend of

conflicts now not occurring between state parties but rather between intra state parties. UN

peacekeepers continued to deploy, trained in military skills but lacking in skills for policing,

electoral assistance and the whole spectrum post conflict society rebuilding tasks.

The mid 1990’s saw the UN begin to respond to these changes by in building components to deal

with policing, justice, refugee assistance, human rights monitoring and electoral reform issues

within the UN Peacekeeping mission. However these larger mission required larger resources

and were slowly becoming larger failures. Many of the initiatives Yugoslavia and Somalia most

prominently became living examples of a peacekeeping effort developing into a nation building

effort. This saw a push by nations predominantly the US to shift responsibility for these

operations from the UN to regional organizations and military coalitions, for example the IFOR

& SFOR in the Balkans.

Another unplanned contingency which this had was the impact on the Western military forces as

peacekeeping in the early 1990’s missions required a level of training far greater than for mere

warifighting, training not being imparted or not available at the time. Lacking training, troops

drew upon their own social values and education to respond to new, emerging situations which

created undesired or unexpected results frustrating troops. Though not warfighting missions, UN

Peacekeepers were taking further and further casualties leadign to greater troop unwillingness to

go to missions and also causing the policians to reassess their commitment to deploy their forces.

A bend to this end was also prompted by the rising costs of peacekeeping.

EXISTING PRINCIPLES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

• Consent of the parties

Lacking this the UN risks being drawn towards enforcement operations since it would then be a

party to the conflict. The granting of consent does not necessitate actual consent all the way

down to the local level however.

• Impartiality

While essential for the consent and cooperation of parties this needs to be differentiated from

neutrality or inactivity.

• Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

This principle has over time expanded to include resistance to forceful attempts aiming to

prevent the fulfillment of the mission’s mandate.

RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY

Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-

state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should

build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors

driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary General’s

“good offices,” preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves

diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The UNSG, upon the request

of the UNSC OR UNGA or at his her own initiative, may exercise his or her “good offices” to

facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of

states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be under

taken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working

independently.

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has

been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the

years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and

the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements

– military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable

peace.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a

range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to

restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined

the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security

Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement

action under its authority.

Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing

into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay

the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term

process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the

deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding

measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to

enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASE FOR A PERMANENT UN FORCE

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated the UN is “the only fire brigade in the

world that has to wait for the fire to break out before it can acquire a fire engine”. Sad as the

statement may be, it is one that accurately reflects the state of affairs of the UN today. Lack of

political consensus to create a more permanent UN military force has resulted in the UN being

deprived of an effective military capability that can act as a deterrent and give effect to rapid

response.

In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations called upon the international

community to help the United Nations achieve what it referred to as “rapid and effective

deployment capacity.” In its wide‐ranging report (usually referred to as the Brahimi Report,

after the panel’s chairperson, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi), the panel argued that

many missions were struggling to fulfill their mandates due to a combination of several

factors, including slow deployment times, shortages of well trained troops, and poor access

to necessary materiel and financial resources.

Contrary to popular perception, there exist provisions in the UNSC to give effect to such an

organization. The UN Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee (MSC), it being the only

subsidiary body named in the UN Charter has been entrusted with the task of conducting military

planning and exercising command over forces that the Charter provides are to be mandatorily

placed under the UN’s command. Cold War rivalries however never allowed this potentially

significant arm of the UN to fulfill its visualized role. The Military Staff Committee was

therefore perhaps accurately described by British historian, Dr. Eric Grove, as "a sterile

monument to the faded hopes of the founders of the UN.”

POSSIBLE POLICY OPTIONS:

1. The Present System

UNSAS (United Nations Standby Arrangement System) is essentially a troop procurement

mechanism in which member nations sign up with the UN to make a certain number of troops

available for UN Peacekeeping operations. When the UN authorizes a mission it must go through

those lists and ask nations to fulfill their obligations.

UNSAS is less of an institution in itsown right as it is an arrangement between Member States an

d the governing bodies of the UN. UNSAS “is based on conditional commitments by Member St

ates of specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations.”

To this day, there are only a small number of states that reliably give troops to peace operations.

As of December 2008, only four countries contributed more than 4,000 troops each: Pakistan (10

,189), Bangladesh (8,358), India (7,963), and Nigeria (4,903).

Although these countries are very generous, the UN’s dependence on them for troop contributio

ns poses serious problems. Aside from the longstanding enmities between the first three countrie

s that prevent them from training together, it is troubling that the UN has to rely on a small group

of developing nations for a major portion of its troop needs. If India and Pakistan were to go to

war with one another again, then the UN would lose two of its most reliable troop contributors.

Bangladesh’s state is very fragile, and as the recent mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles demonstrate

d,Bangladesh’s internal security situation is far from stable enough to guarantee that the country

will be able to continue supplying large numbers of troops for peace operations. Nigeria has oth

er security obligations through the Economic Community of West African States, in which it is a

very active provider of troops for peace operations.Countries with poorly equipped militaries are

often drawn topeace operations believing that the UN will help supply them with arms and suppl

ies.

2. The Halfway Approach

A popular alternative approach is the halfway approach, a proposal of which 2 basic variants

exist.

First there is the idea of a permanent standing multinational force. Member states would either l

ease or donate national contingents to the UN for use in peace operations. Once the troops and

materiel had been contributed, the UN would be free to deploy them for use in peace operations

without national parliamentary approval

An alternative to this proposal is the concept of a multinational force where countries retain the ri

ght to veto troop deployments.National governments would retain the final say over troop deploy

ment, and each country could decide on their level of participation in missions on a case by case

basis.

This proposal has been implemented before by the UN in the form of the Stand by Forces High

Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) which became operational 1999 end for Chapter VI operations,

this Danish led initiative aims would allow 5000 troops to be committed within 15 to 30 days

from 10 member nations.

While conceptually a good idea SHIRBRIG problem was that it was dependent on member states

to contribute forces who have been resistant to contribute to missions where there might be

fatalities. At its core, there are 4 primary problems associated with SHIRBRIG’s:

Officially, SHIRBRIG was supposed to have 4,000‐5,000.In reality, however, SHIRB

RIG has never been able to deploy nearly thismany troops at any given time; in fact, t

he maximum number of soldiers it succeeded in deploying was 1,200 during the UN

Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) in 2000

SHIRBRIG is not under direct UN command and the force’s interests have not alway

s been compatible with that of the United Nations. For instance, SHIRBRIG’s leader

ship has frequently competed with DPKO officials for control over peace operations.

For instance, SHIRBRIG’s planning element has argued that it should have more pow

er than the DPKO over designing peace operations

SHIRBRIG has been frequently unwilling to deploy except in missions that the Steeri

ng Committee feels are “safe,” such as Chapter VI peacekeeping missions.When SHI

RBRIG participated in more complex peace operations, such as the United Nations M

ission in Cote d’ Ivoire (UNOCI), it only served in a planning capacity,and very few t

roops were deployed

Fourth, SHIRBRIG does not deploy quickly. Although SHIRBRIG’s founders intend

ed the force to be capable of deploying within 15‐30 days, in reality the amount of tim

e between authorization and deployment is considerably longer. For example, the ma

jority of SHIRBRIG’s 1,200 troops deployed in UNMEE did not arrive on the ground

until the end of December 2000, approximately three and half months after the Secur

ity Council authorized the mission on September 15, 2000

That these were indeed significant problems that rendered almost null the purpose of

creating this force is evident in that the UN did not renew its mandate in June 2009

ever since when it has been deactivated.

3. The Volunteer School

GeneralRoméo Dallaire is famous for his claim that he could have stopped the Rwandan genocid

e with a mere force of 5,000 troops. His statement was one in a long line of efforts that has

sought to establish a more permanent UN armed forces establishment.

The benefits of an all volunteer UN force is apparent, for starters it would be free of charges of

accusations of meddling and self interest that accompany participation of troops from

neighbouring states in UN interventions. States can be unwilling to get involved in conflicts for

reasons of their own and even impede others when their interests are threatened. A rapid

response force if available in say Rwanda could have intervened and prevented a large part of the

million plus deaths which followed.

A standing army would not render the UN a de facto state for army would still be under the

authority of the UNSC and therefore subject to the will and control of its sitting members. With

regard to the question of cost a UN standing army would offset its expenses by bringing benefits

to the world economy (preventing refugee crisis, humanitarian disasters, cut down global

security expenditure). Member states providing troops presently to the UN are paid for their

services so a new system cannot be much more expensive than the existing one

Brian Urqhart, Former Undersecretary General of the UN estimates that a brigade

sized force would cost approximately $300 million/year.

For a six thousand strong force with a few helicopters, this number would still probably come in

at under $1 billion/year. For comparison The international community “spent approximately

$200 billion on conflict management in seven major interventions in the 1990s (Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, and El Salvador).”

Financing would not be a major problem as existing peacekeeping contributing nations are

already paid for their services and nations in the region where there exists a transitional state

have historically been willing to set up trust funds to help it tide over the crisis and achieve

stability since its spillover effects often affect them adversely. Presently the General

Assembly apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a special scale of assessments under a

complex formula that Member States themselves have established. This formula takes into

account, among other things, the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the five

permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their

special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Challenges confronting the proposal

Firstly, some have argued that a standing force could never train for all the different potential tas

ks that they might be asked to carry out, nor could they have the necessary equipment for all poss

ible scenario. Secondly, small forces are insufficient for many operations, especially complex mi

ssions spread out over large areas, such as Somalia and Bosnia. Thirdly, most recent UN peace o

perations have involved civil wars. These kinds of conflicts require long‐term engagement and r

equire a large amount of military involvementmore than a small rapid reaction force could provid

e on its own. Fourthly,many proposals include a time limit on deployment of between 4‐6 month

s. This short deployment period would probably be too short for conventional peace forces to ta

ke over the operation. Fifthly, the creation of a permanent UN force could hurt the UN’s reputati

on as an impartial body and could cause people to see the Secretary‐General primarily as a milita

ry official.Sixthly, regional organizations and alliances are oftenbetter suited to carry out peace o

perations which raises the issue of whether the UNSC is the body best suited to be the military

decision making body. There is finally the question of the creation of an appropriate legal regime

to enable such a revolutionary proposal to be put into effect and whether such a regime could

aspire to be of a universal character or not.

REFERENCE LINKS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

1. https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf

2. http://polisci.uoregon.edu/acrobat/HTGriffith.pdf

3. http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

4. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20A%2064%20573.pdf

5. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1246498.pdf

6. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-

CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PBC%20S%202011%2085.pdf

7. https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/SG%20Report%20on%20PoC%2022%20May

%202012.pdf

8. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/SG_report_december11.pdf

9. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/7FAB3596D7EB5EAF4925777200

08ACD0-Full_Repoert.pdf

GUIDELINES FOR THE POSITION PAPER

A position paper is an introductory document which reflects your research and the position of

your country with regard to the agenda at hand. At a glance, it should make clear the urgency of

the matter and a wholehearted effort to resolve the same. The format of the Position Paper should

be as follows:

Name: ABC

Committee: UNGA (DISEC)

Agenda: (Both to be addressed in different documents)

Country: XYZ

The position paper begins after the above details and should not exceed 1 page in Times New

Roman, 12 font, line spacing 1.5. All position papers should be mailed to

himanilraina@gmail.com & ankitsahu13@gmail.com .The paper should cover the following:

Introduction to the Agenda

Causes and Effects of the problem

Recent Developments

Current Scenario

Country position on the agenda

Treaties and Conventions signed by the country with regard to the agenda

Work done by country to combat the concerned problem

National Initiatives taken up by the country

Suggestions for the International Community

Possible Solutions for implementation by the United Nations

Sample Position Papers can be found at the following link: http://www.unausa.org/global-

classrooms-model-un/how-to-participate/model-un-preparation/position-papers/sample-position-

paper

AFTERWORD

In the entire guide, we have tried our best to keep to the practices of the UN by giving only the

background of the agenda, and its main arms, without resorting to quoting countries or polarizing

the agenda by favouring any bloc-outlook. It is expected of the delegates to research well on the

various tangents that this agenda can take, and take the proceedings forward. We have, still,

given a few additional guidelines to help you research by incorporating the same in the form of

comments.

One needs to be mindful while researching on this agenda to keep the perspective of the country

that you will be representing, and the nature of the problem that you want to address, in prime

focus. Allegations and counter-allegations are bound to occur, but what the world today needs

are solutions that need to be multi-faceted so as to take into account all the players in the

scenario.

And lastly, we remind you that a backing, or proof, of your statements from independent sources

(such as Wikipedia, local newspapers, free-lance researchers, etc.) can be subject to questioning

on the grounds of credibility and authority, and may be dismissed if deemed so. As such, we

recommend that documents from the UN system, or those published from any Government-

authorized body (such as government releases, state-owned newspapers, press releases, etc.) be

given preference for formulating your proofs/backing statements.

Best of luck with your preparations!