unga disec study guide - mopmun 2013 · questions a resolution must answer 15 . 3 mopmun 2013,...

UNGA DISEC – STUDY GUIDE

MOPMUN 2013, January 4, 5&6

2 MOPMUN 2013, January 4, 5&6

CONTENTS

United Nations General Assembly 3

Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) 4

Letter from the board 5

History of Conventional Warfare 6

Introduction to drones: Initial years and subsequent growth 7

Cluster Munitions 10

Landmines: The invisible threat 13

Questions a resolution must answer 15


UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

United Nations General Assembly

The United Nations was created in 1945 after the conclusion of World War II. The purpose of

the UN is to maintain peace and security, develop relations among the states and solve

international problems while respecting human rights. To facilitate the achievement of these

goals, the mandate and scope of the organization is directed by the Charter of the UN. Chapter

IV outlines the composition, function, powers, voting and procedure of the General Assembly.

Article 22 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly the authority to create subsidiary

organs. There are six subsidiary organs: First Committee (DISEC), Second Committee

(Economic and Financial), Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural), Fourth

Committee (Special Political and Decolonization), Fifth Committee (Administrative and

Budgetary) and Sixth Committee (Legal). The intent of these committees is to address questions

“referred to them by the General Assembly and prepare draft resolutions for submission to the

Assembly”.


DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

In the era after World War II, which led to the employment of new conventional weapons and

weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations needed a committee that would be able to

resolve many of the political tensions and security issues leftover from the war. Previously, there

were two separate committees; the Atomic Energy Commission, created in 1946 by the General

Assembly in reaction to the destructive use of the two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, established in 1947

by the Security Council to resolve issues regarding the use of conventional weapons. These two

committees did not work due to a number of reasons featuring conflicts of interests between

nations like the United States of America, People’s Republic of China (after 1949) and the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Therefore, the General Assembly created a Disarmament

Commission in 1952 to resolve all issues. Before 1970, the committee was focused on political

issues and was called the Political and Security Committee (POLISEC). Later, the DISEC began

focusing on the reduction and eradication of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons that threatened and continue to threaten international security and peace. More recently,

DISEC has also begun to focus on issues in outer space, threats of unfriendly entities’ potential

access to weapons of mass destruction and the use of technology to breach security. DISEC is

open for all 193 members of the United Nations to attend. The committee can discuss issues

raised by a member of the United Nations, the Security Council or a state that is not a member of

the UN, as detailed in Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations. While DISEC cannot

make any recommendations to the Security Council unless requested, it can raise awareness of

international security issues to the Security Council. It is important to note that DISEC cannot

adopt resolutions that implement change, but can only debate and issue resolutions that

recommend actions on specific topics to the Security Council.


LETTER FROM THE BOARD

On behalf of the Organizing Committee and the Executive Board, I take great pleasure in

welcoming you all to the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the United

Nations General Assembly. As esteemed representatives of your states, we are hopeful that you

will do justice to the roles which have been offered to you in this committee. In this session of

the DISEC, we shall be the discussing the “The possibility of moving beyond conventional

sources of weaponry (landmines, drones and cluster weapons), with special emphasis on the need

for deterrence and non-proliferation”, which is a very important aspect in current world politics,

especially in an era of terrorism and growing regional/international conflicts. I hope all of you

have begun with you research, and would be well prepared to offer fruitful debate to committee.

We have given a brief introduction to the agenda, and the history and use of drones, cluster

munitions and landmines, along with the questions that a resolution on this agenda must answer.

Please note that this is just not supposed to be the sole source of research, rather it’s only a small

step to help you in starting with it. We hope that you would do justice to your respective nation’s

stand in council and eventually contribute to reaching at a fruitful on the current agenda. Also,

please note that the use of electronic devices (laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.) must be kept to

a bare minimum during active council. We hope that you will utilize all you resources in making

this session of the DISEC a successful one. In case of any queries/doubts, please feel free to

contact any of the Board. We would be happy to assist you. All the best!

Yours sincerely,

Arijit Chakraborti Sriharsha Vavilala Abraar Ahmed

Chair Vice Chair Director

9597397406 9940218855

[email protected] [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


HISTORY OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Conventional wars are defined as armed conflicts openly waged by one state against another by

means of their regular armies fought with conventional arms and ammunition. Conventional

weapons refer to weapons that are in relatively wide use and are not weapons of mass

destruction such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Conventional weapons include

small arms and light weapons, sea and land mines, as well as non-nuclear cluster munitions,

bombs, shells, rockets and missiles.

Since 1945, and particularly in view of the vast increase in the number of independent polities

around that period, there have been quite a number of conventional wars fought. Ignoring

numerous skirmishes too small to be called wars, such as the 1969 “Football War” or 100 Hour

War fought by Honduras and El Salvador and the border clashes that took place between Peru

and Ecuador in 1995, a list of such conflicts would be more or less limited to the following: First,

there are the three Indian-Pakistani wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971. Next, there come the five

Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-70, and 1973. Others were the Korean War of 1950-

53, the Indian-Chinese War of 1961, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88, the war between Ethiopia and

Somalia (1978), the Chinese attack on Vietnam (1979), the Falklands War (1982), the Kosovo

Campaign (1999) and, of course, the two wars fought against Iraq (1991 and 2003). On adding

the “Kargil War” of 1999 (when 500 Pakistani irregulars entered a few hundred yards into India

and had to be expelled) and the Israeli-Syrian clash of 1982 (which, lasting all of three days, was

a byproduct of the invasion of Lebanon), the total number of armed conflicts worthy of the name

“conventional war” stands at nineteen.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_mass_destruction

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_mass_destruction

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_weapon

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_weapon


INTRODUCTION TO DRONES: INITIAL YEARS AND SUBSEQUENT GROWTH

It was nearly eleven years ago, on February 4, 2002, that the CIA first used an unmanned

Predator drone in a targeted killing. The strike was in Paktia province in Afghanistan, near the

city of Khost. The intended target was Osama bin Laden, or at least someone in the CIA had

thought so. The incident occurred during a brief period when the military, which assisted the

CIA’s drone program by providing active service personnel as operators, still acknowledged the

program’s existence. Within days of the strike, journalists on the ground were collecting

accounts from local Afghans that the dead men were civilians gathering scrap metal. The

Pentagon media pool began asking questions, and so the long decade of the drone began.

This new development was not surprising by any means. Air warfare has been in use for over a

hundred years now, since the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911, and the development of drones

was in the works from the start. The reason is simple: even with all the advantages offered by air

power, humans still needed to strap themselves into the devices and fly them. There were limits

to the risks that could be taken. Whatever an airplane was used for, it ultimately had to return to

base with its pilot. Not surprisingly, from the start of the development of airplanes for use in war,

engineers labored to circumvent this limitation. During World War I, the US Navy hired Elmer

Ambrose Sperry, the inventor of the gyroscope, to develop a fleet of “air torpedoes,” unmanned

Curtis biplanes designed to be launched by catapult and fly over enemy positions. In World War

II a different approach was taken: the US Navy launched a new program, called Operation Anvil,

to target deep German bunkers using refitted B-24 bombers filled to double capacity with

explosives and guided by remote control devices to crash at selected targets in Germany and

Nazi-controlled France. Remote control technology was still limited—involving crude radio-

controlled devices linked to motors—so actual pilots were used for takeoff: they were supposed

to guide the plane to a cruising altitude and then parachute to safety in England, after which a

“mother-ship” would guide the plane to its target. The development of drones stagnated for

decades because there was little need for them, thanks to developments in rocketry. By the late

1950s, the US military had developed, in addition to many rockets, a slew of slower but more

guidable “cruise missiles”—which, in their own way, were like little airplanes. Cruise missiles

maintain airplane-like “lift” on stubby little wings, unlike ballistic missiles, which move through

a long curve of flight comprising a launch and rise followed by a guided fall. Cruise missiles

were, in a sense, proto-drones, miniature versions of what the military had attempted as far back

as 1917. They could be dispatched and guided in flight; some had cameras; and, in some

incarnations, could even change target midflight. But cruise missiles could not linger over a

battlefield in the manner of a holding pattern, nor could they return to base. And their weapons

delivery was blunt and inflexible; the delivery was the missile itself, its single warhead. So in the

1960s and ’70s, engineers continued to tinker with unmanned aircraft—in particular for use in

surveillance flights, which don’t engage in complex flight maneuvers and require less


sophisticated piloting. Only with major improvements in computing and electronic controlling

systems in the 1980s and ’90s were modern-day drones made possible. And it wasn’t until the

late ’90s that work began on the technical aspects of arming unmanned aircraft with missiles.

Beginning with an agenda inclined towards photo-reconnaissance, unmanned aircrafts soon

found their way towards the business end of military strategies. Starting with Afghanistan in

2002, drone warfare has become a common propaganda in warfare techniques employed by the

NATO. Furthermore, the absence of human personnel in these aircraft helped ease out popular

concern whenever governments sat down to discuss strategies involving unmanned warfare. One

such example is served by the deployment of American unmanned systems over Libya on April

23, 2011. For the next six months, 146 drone strikes were undertaken in Libya. Often, these

drones were also used to identify and pinpoint the targets for most of NATO’s manned strike

jets. This unmanned operation lasted well past the 60-day deadline of the War Powers

Resolution, extending to the very last airstrike that hit Colonel Qaddafi’s convoy on Oct. 20 and

led to his death. Choosing to make the operation unmanned proved critical to the NATO

leadership in initiating and continuing the operation with minimal public support.

But the real issue is the context of how drones kill. The curious characteristic of drones—and the

names reinforce this—is that they are used primarily to target individual humans, not places or

military forces as such. Yet they simultaneously obscure the human role in perpetrating the

violence. Unlike a missile strike, in which a physical or geographic target is chosen beforehand,

drones linger, looking precisely for a target—a human target. And yet, at the same time, the

perpetrator of the violence is not physically present.

There are reports of military drone operators suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and

studies showing that those who conduct strikes or watch videos of strikes suffer from

“operational stress,” which officials believe is the result of operators’ long hours and extended

viewing of video feeds showing the results of military operations after they have occurred—i.e.,

dead bodies. Still, these reports pale in comparison with those of PTSD among combat veterans.

And there is no public information about stress among those ordering the strikes. A 2011 British

Defense Ministry study of unmanned drones discusses some of these points: from concerns about

drone operators’ potential alienation from violence to the propaganda opportunities for enemies

(noting that drones’ use “enables the insurgent to cast himself in the role of underdog and the

West as a cowardly bully—that is unwilling to risk his own troops, but is happy to kill

remotely”). There were also concerns raised by military analyst Peter Singer, who has written on

“robot warfare” and the risk that drones might acquire the capacity to engage enemies

autonomously. The report envisions a scenario where a drone fires on a target “based solely on

its own sensors, or shared information, and without recourse to higher, human authority.”

Some argue that the issue is not that armed drones are more terrible or deadly than other

weapons systems. They feel that, on the contrary, the violence of drones today is more selective

than many forms of military violence, and human rights groups recognize that drones, in


comparison with less precise weapons, have the potential to minimize civilian casualties during

legitimate military strikes. And yet, what makes drones disturbing is an unusual combination of

characteristics: the distance between killer and killed, the asymmetry, the prospect of automation

and, most of all, the minimization of pilot risk and political risk. It is the merging of these

characteristics that draws the attention of journalists, military analysts, human rights researchers

and extremist propagandists, suggesting something disturbing about what human violence may

become. The unique technology allows the mundane and regular violence of military force to be

separated further from human emotion. Drones foreshadow the idea that brutality could become

detached from humanity—and yield violence that is, as it were, unconscious.


CLUSTER MUNITIONS

A cluster munition is a form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosive weapon that releases

or ejects smaller submunitions. Commonly known as a cluster bomb, they are designed to eject

explosive bomblets that act as projectiles and shrapnel to kill and maim. Other cluster munitions

are designed to disperse chemical or biological weapons or to disperse landmines. Some

submunition-based weapons can disperse non-munitions, such as leaflets. Cluster munitions

saturate areas with explosive force. These weapons pose danger to civilians because they are

prone to indiscriminate effect at time of use and because they create a hazardous residue of

unexploded submunitions. Because cluster bombs release many small bomblets over a wide area

they pose risks to civilians both during attacks and afterwards. During attacks the weapons are

prone to indiscriminate effects, especially in populated areas. Unexploded bomblets can kill or

maim civilians and/or unintended targets long after a conflict has ended, and are costly to locate

and remove.

A basic cluster bomb consists of a hollow shell and then two to more than 2,000 submunitions or

bomblets contained within it. Some types are dispensers that are designed to be retained by the

aircraft after releasing their munitions. The submunitions themselves may be fitted with

small parachute retarders or streamers to slow their descent (allowing the aircraft to escape the

blast area in low-altitude attacks). Modern cluster bombs and submunition dispensers are often

multiple-purpose weapons, containing mixtures of anti-armor, anti-personnel, and anti-materiel

munitions. The submunitions themselves may also be multi-purpose, such as combining a shaped

charge, to attack armor, with a fragmenting case, to attack infantry, material, and light vehicles.

Modern multipurpose munitions may also have an incendiary effect. Recently submunition-

based weapons have been designed that deploy smart submunitions, using thermal and visual

sensors to locate and attack particular targets, usually armored vehicles. Weapons of this type

include the US CBU-97 sensor-fused weapon, first used in combat during the 2003 invasion of

Iraq. Munitions specifically intended for anti-tank use may be set to self-destruct if they reach

the ground without locating a target, theoretically reducing the risk of unintended civilian deaths

and injuries.

Cluster bombs were first used in World War II by German and Soviet forces. During the 1970s,

the USA used massive numbers of cluster bombs in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. More

recently, cluster bombs were used extensively in the Gulf War, Chechnya, the former

Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, in Lebanon in 2006 and in Georgia in 2008.

Given below is a timeline of the use of cluster munitions in civil and international

conflicts across the world

1943 USSR: Soviet forces use air-dropped cluster munitions against German armor.

German forces use SD-1 and SD-2 butterfly bombs against artillery on the Kursk salient.


1943 United Kingdom: German aircraft drop more than 1,000 SD-2 butterfly bombs on

the port of Grimsby.

1960s-1970s Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam: US forces make extensive use of cluster

munitions in bombing campaigns. The ICRC estimates that in Laos alone, 9 to 27 million

unexploded submunitions remain, and some 11,000 people have been killed or injured,

more than 30 percent of them children. An estimate based on US military databases

states that 9,500 sorties in Cambodia delivered up to 87,000 air-dropped cluster

munitions.

1973 Syria: Israel uses air-dropped cluster munitions against non-state armed group

(NSAG) training camps near Damascus.

1975-1988 Western Sahara: Moroccan forces use cluster munitions against NSAG.

1978 Lebanon: Israel uses cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.

1979-1989 Afghanistan: Soviet forces make use of air-dropped and rocket-delivered

cluster munitions. NSAG also use rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.

1982 Lebanon: Israel uses cluster munitions against Syrian forces and NSAG in

Lebanon.

1982 Falkland Islands (Malvinas): UK aircraft drop cluster munitions on Argentinean

infantry positions near Port Stanley, Port Howard, and Goose Green.

1986-1987 Chad: French aircraft drop cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi

Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions.

1991 Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia: The US and its allies France and UK drop

61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. An estimated 30 million

or more DPICM submunitions used in the conflict.

1992-1994 Angola: PTAB submunitions found in various locations.

1992-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh: Submunition contamination identified in at least 162

locations. Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and

AO-2.5.

1992-1995 Bosnia & Herzegovina: Forces of Yugoslavia and NSAG use available

stocks of cluster munitions during civil war. NATO aircraft drop two CBU-87 bombs.

1992-1997 Tajikistan: Use by unknown forces in civil war. ShOAB and AO-2.5RT

submunitions found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley.

1994-1996 Chechnya: Russian forces use cluster munitions against NSAG.

1995 Croatia: On May 2-3, 1995, an NSAG uses Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers

to attack civilians in Zagreb. Additionally, Croatian authorities claim that Serb forces

used BL-755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.

1996-1999 Sudan: Sudanese government forces use air-dropped cluster munitions in

southern Sudan, including Chilean made PM-1 submunitions.

1997 Sierra Leone: Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers use Beluga bombs on the eastern

town of Kenema.

1998 Ethiopia / Eritrea: Ethiopia and Eritrea exchange aerial cluster munition strikes,

Ethiopia attacking the Asmara airport and Eritrea attacking the Mekele airport. Ethiopia

also drop BL-755 bombs in Gash-Barka province of western Eritrea.

1998-1999 Albania: Yugoslav forces launch cross-border rocket attacks and NATO

forces carry out six aerial cluster munition strikes.

1998-2003 DR Congo: BL-755 bombs used by unknown forces in Kasu village in

Kabalo territory.


1999 Yugoslavia (including Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo): The USA, UK, and

Netherlands drop 1,765 cluster bombs, containing 295,000 bomblets.

2001- 2002 Afghanistan: The USA drops 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056

bomblets.

2003-2006 Iraq: The USA and UK use nearly 13,000 cluster munitions containing an

estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions in the three weeks of major combat. A total of 63

CBU-87 bombs dropped by US aircraft between May 1, 2003 and August 1, 2006.

2006 Lebanon: Israeli forces use surface-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions

against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.

2006 Israel: Hezbollah fires more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster

munition rockets into northern Israel.

2008 Georgia: Russia uses several types of cluster munitions, both air- and ground-

launched, in a number of locations in Georgia’s Gori district. Also Georgia uses cluster

munitions in the August 2008 conflict with Russia.

2011 Cambodia: Thailand uses cluster munitions on Cambodian territory during a

border conflict in February 2011.

2011 Libya: Qaddafi’s forces use cluster munitions in Misrata, Libya.

2011, 2012 Syria: Syrian National Council (SNC) reports cases of cluster bombing in

areas of Deir al-Asafir, Abo Hilal and Ma’ar’et al-Nu’man. Initial reports claim

presence of Russian markings on the submunitions.

On May 30, 2008, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted in Dublin under the

depository of the UN Secretary General, prohibiting the use, transfer and stockpile of cluster

bombs or any type of explosive weaponry that scatters submunitions over an area. The

Convention has 111 signatories, 74 of them having ratified it.

In a nutshell, the Convention binds the countries having ratified it to “never under any

circumstances”:

1. Use cluster munitions,

2. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly,

cluster munitions,

3. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to any state

party under the Convention.


LANDMINES: THE INVISIBLE THREAT

Landmines are weight-triggered explosive devices contained in casings of metal, plastic or wood

that are placed under or on the ground and intended to damage a target—either human or

inanimate—by means of a blast and/or fragment impact. Land mines were designed for two main

uses: to create defensive tactical barriers, channeling attacking forces into predetermined fire

zones or slowing an invasion force's progress to allow reinforcements to arrive; and to act as

passive area-denial weapons (to deny the enemy use of valuable terrain, resources or facilities

when active defense of the area is not desirable or possible).

Anti-Personnel Mines (APL): Anti-personnel mines are designed to kill or injure an individual

as opposed to destroying vehicles. Anti-personnel mines explode from the contact or presence of

a person. They are often designed to injure rather than kill, causing injuries like blindness, burns,

destroyed limbs and shrapnel wounds. Some types of anti-personnel mines can also damage the

tracks or wheels of armored vehicles.

Anti-Tank Mines: Anti-tank mines were created not long after the invention of the tank in the

First World War. They set off when a tank passes over and are designed to immobilize or destroy

vehicles and their occupants. Anti-tank mines are typically larger than anti-personnel mines and

require more pressure to detonate.

Landmines have a long history, dating back to the Greek and Roman empires. However, it is

during the Second World War that antipersonnel and antitank landmines started to be widely

used for defensive and tactical purposes and to achieve military objectives. Troops typically

placed the mines by hand, but first mapped the location of the minefields for future clearance,

even though many of the mines laid were not immediately cleared. In many European countries,

a residual threat still exists from landmines placed during the Second World War. Advances in

technology in the 1960s made it possible to scatter mines mechanically rather than planting them

by hand. This meant that hundreds of landmines could be deployed at the same time using

aircraft, rockets or artillery. While a troop of 30 men could lay approximately 50 mines per hour,

one remote delivery system could scatter over 200 mines at the same time. As conflicts became

more brutal, the effect of landmines was no longer strictly limited to military targets. In the

1980s, mines quickly became a weapon of choice in many internal conflicts. The low cost of

antipersonnel mines made them particularly appealing to guerrilla and military forces in

developing countries. The production of smaller and more sophisticated landmines and the

development of homemade devices prompted a huge increase in the amounts placed in the field.

Plastic mines, which cannot be identified with metal detectors, also became common. Civilians

became targets because antipersonnel landmines were used intentionally to harass and terrorize

them, forcing them to leave their homes and blocking access to important infrastructure like


water and electricity. All these factors led to a global crisis—but the biggest contributing factor

was the increase in the planting of mines around the world.

The use of land mines has been deemed controversial at times. Many parties have described land

mines as indiscriminate weapons, harming soldier and civilian alike. They remain dangerous

after the conflict in which they were deployed has ended, killing and injuring civilians and

rendering land impassable and unusable for decades. To make matters worse, factions, at times

fail to keep accurate records (or any at all) of the exact locations of their minefields, making

removal efforts painstakingly slow. These facts pose serious difficulties in many developing

nations where the presence of mines hampers resettlement, agriculture, and tourism.

In 1992, six humanitarian organizations joined together to create the International Campaign to

Ban Landmines (ICBL). From their work in mine affected countries first-hand reports on the

horrendous toll landmines take on innocent people in countries where conflict has already caused

so much pain were created and submitted to the UN Secretary General. The work of the ICBL,

which grew to a membership of more than 1400 non-governmental organizations, in partnership

with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations and governments

worldwide, was categorically aimed to make the history of landmines a short one. As a result of

the findings of the organizations and the grave physical threat that land-mines posed, on 18th

September 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and

Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Mine

Ban Treaty, was adopted. Entered into force on 1st March 1999, the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits

the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines. It is the most comprehensive

international instrument for eradicating landmines and deals with everything from mine use,

production and trade, to victim assistance, mine clearance and stockpile destruction.

There are currently 160 States Parties to the treaty and the treaty is still open for ratification by

signatories and for accession by those that did not sign before March 1999. States not party to the

Mine Ban Treaty include: China, Egypt, Finland, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United

States.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are obligated to:

Destroy their stockpile of antipersonnel mines within four years of entry into force,

Make every effort to identify and clear mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as

soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming a State Party,

Provide assistance to mine victims and support for mine risk education, and

Submit annual reports on Mine Ban Treaty implementation activities.


QUESTIONS A RESOULUTION MUST ANSWER

1. The possibility of a race to acquire/develop armed unmanned aircrafts and the

responsibility of the DISEC in that regard,

2. The psychological effects of the use of non-conventional weaponry, and the feasibility of

their use in the face of such dire consequences,

3. The viability, scope and mandate of the current conventions on use of non-conventional

weaponry and the possibility of amending the existing conventions or the introduction of

new conventions, if required,

4. Introduction of a proper modus operandi for the identification and removal of landmines,

especially in civilian populated areas, and the channeling of proper funds to ensure such

operations are carried out in complete compliance,

5. The feasibility of the use of cluster munitions and landmines, given the fact that they

affect both sides of a conflict almost equally,

6. Special focus on the need to ensure countries follow a strict policy of deterrence and non-

proliferation with regards to the use of weaponry that has the potential to offer disastrous

consequences,

Underlining the responsibility of all member nations to ensure that, in case of an extreme

need to use such sources of weaponry, sufficient steps are taken to ensure minimum

casualties, as well as undertake all possible steps to minimize the after-effects of the use of

such weapons

unga disec study guide - mopmun 2013 · questions a resolution must answer 15 . 3 mopmun 2013,...

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