UNCSW 1

UNCSW 3

Dear Delegates, Hello all, and welcome to the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament and International Security Committee! My name is Harry, and I’ll be one of your two senior staffers for DISEC this year. I am currently a senior in Jonathan Edwards College, majoring in Economics and Mathematics (thankfully, it’s just one major!). Though I’ve been involved in helping to organize YMUN since my freshman year, last year helping to plan content and recruit staff for all of YMUN’s committees, this will be my first year getting to sit on a YMUN dais team, a challenge for which I’m particularly excited! Outside of YMUN, I write a column for our student newspaper and watch a lot (A LOT) of TV. Delegates will be judged on their taste in TV shows (FYI: I love Arrested Development and hate The Mindy Project). I’m extremely excited to see all of you take on two highly relevant and challenging topics at YMUN this year. Rather than discuss a specific dispute or challenge in one part of the world, DISEC faces the challenge of coming to a consensus on two areas of modern warfare (cyber and biological warfare) that have the potential to prove highly destructive without proper international regulation and agreement. What DISEC decides on these issues could impact conflicts all over the world for years to come. - Harry Larson, Yale ‘14 It is with great excitement that I welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) Committee, the First Committee of the General Assembly, at YMUN XL. I am a current sophomore at Yale pursuing a degree in History of Science, Medicine and Public Health. In particular, I am highly interested in global health issues and the ways in which they impact society. Apart from YMUN, I am also involved in other parts of the Yale International Relations Association: I am a senior editor for the Yale Review of International Studies and will serve on the secretariat of the Yale Model Government Europe (YMGE) conference in Budapest in November. I also write for various humor publications and volunteer as a Community Health Educator in New Haven middle schools. Chairing this committee truly brings my Model UN experience full-circle: DISEC was my very first Model UN committee when I was a sophomore in high school, so I understand the apprehension many of you may have upon speaking in front of such a large assembly. Rest assured that my co-chair, Harry Larson, and I will do everything in our power to ensure a productive, comfortable, and enjoyable conference for all! Please do not hesitate to reach out to me if you have any questions or concerns before the conference. I look forward to meeting you all in January! - Aaron Berman, Yale ‘16 Sincerely, Harry Larson (harry.larson@yale.edu) Aaron Berman (aaron.berman@yale.edu)

UNCSW 4

!

TABLE OF CONTENTS History of the Committee 5 Cyber Warfare

Topic History 6 Current Situation 11 Bloc Positions 18

Questions to Consider 20 Role of the Committee 21 Structure of the Committee 22 Suggestions for Further Research 23 "##$%#$&'! ! ! ! ! ! ()!

UNCSW 5

! !!! In 1945, the world had just experienced the deadliest conflict in human history. In order to forestall another such conflict, the allied nations that had prevailed in World War II founded the United Nations as a forum to foster international peace and cooperation.

This new body sought to define and protect human rights and freedom and develop international law that could safely bring order to a world torn apart by war. In addition, this new global government of sorts sought to promote social, economic, cultural, educational, and health cooperation and advancement.

In order to fulfill the United Nations’ promise of truly global representation, the General Assembly was established to serve as a forum wherein representatives of each and every member nation could have a voice. To be more effective in tackling the diverse set of challenges then facing the world, the member nations established different subcommittees of the General Assembly dedicated to handling issues pertaining to specific aspects of the United Nation’s mission. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is one such subcommittee. Its role is to provide a forum for the passing of resolutions in order to promote disarmament and to regulate arms development and production.

Disarmament has a rich political-intellectual tradition with its origins in the thought and speeches of Woodrow Wilson during the First World War. DISEC, one of the original subsidiary committees of the GA and known as the First Committee, specifically works on these issues. It identifies different problems facing the international community in regards to arms

control and world peace, debates these issues, and then attempts to come to a consensus, forwarding its opinions to the Security Council for further debate and eventual implementation. Past agendas have included everything from reduction of military budgets worldwide to the ongoing debate over nuclear proliferation.

DISEC receives annual reports from agencies like the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) to assist in its evaluations and decision-making. DISEC convenes every October to discuss threats to international peace and security. All 192-member nations are welcome to attend. DISEC also coordinates with different UN bodies as well as non-UN bodies. Specifically, it works closely with the United Nations Secretariat (the executive arm of the U.N., which reports to the Secretary-General) through the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

While the committee cannot directly require that the international community or individual countries take action, it has the power to directly recommend action to the Security Council.

History of the Committee!

UNCSW 6

!

Regulating and preventing war has

arguably been the primary purpose of international law from the earliest treaties between city-states to the Geneva Conventions and the founding of the United Nations. The international community’s understanding of warfare has been gradually broadened to include not just instances of formally declared war between nations, but also instances of armed conflict without declarations of war, international police actions, and asymmetric warfare often involving terrorist or other non-governmental parties.i Still, war has generally been understood as kinetic, meaning that physical violence between armed parties is nearly always involved. Armed conflict has been viewed as the defining feature of warfare primarily because it is through force and modern weaponry that humans can do each other the worst kinds of physical damage. Treaties, protocols, and the United Nations’ system of international government are all intended to prevent war whenever possible, and

at www.loc.gov (library of congress) the very least ensure that war does minimal damage to civilian populations, that combatants and civilians have access to medical care, and that no force beyond what is necessary to achieve military aims is used. By establishing and codifying international norms of behavior during

TOPIC I.

Cyber Warfare Topic History !

UNCSW 7 war—the Geneva Conventions being a perfect example—nations can know that their civilians and soldiers have some degree of protection against certain kinds of weapons or ways of using force because all nations are held to the same standard. For a nation to target civilian populations, for instance, or to use chemical weapons invites an international response and makes that nation’s own civilians and soldiers vulnerable to retaliation. While some countries (and many terrorist groups or other non-governmental organizations) have targeted civilians, used chemical weapons, or employed torture, international regulations of warfare have proved at least somewhat effective in restricting certain of the most violent and inhumane tactics that have historically characterized armed conflict.

www.telegraph.co.uk

But while international law and protocols have a great deal to say about what an invading army, armed with tanks, rifles, planes, cluster bombs, and grenades may do to the army and civilians of the invaded country—and what tactics the invaded country may use to defend itself—it has relatively less to say about some of the more modern ways countries and non-state actors may attack and inflict damage on others. In particular, as the world has grown more and more reliant on computers, data networks, electrical power, and a

highly inter-connected financial system, the scope for wreaking havoc in a particular country, or even globally, has expanded as well.

For instance, it would be considered an act of war for one country to bomb another’s oil fields or irrigation systems, even if such an attack resulted in relatively few casualties. The physical nature of the attack clearly warrants a response. However, a much larger blow could be struck to an advanced country such the United States’ wealth through a sophisticated digital attack that caused sustained damage to its banking system. By shutting down, even temporarily, the world’s largest banks, immense real-world damage could be done, as consumers and businesses, unsure of their ability to access savings, horde cash and cease contributing to economic activity. But could a digital attack on private banks ever warrant an armed response? While still (thankfully) theoretical, this is a question the world has struggled to address. Moreover, the potential for damage from cyber attacks is not merely economic. Many countries’ electrical power grids are operated digitally—an attack that shut down a country’s power systems could easily lead to physical damage. Hospitals rely on a steady stream of power in order to operate machines keeping patients alive—and while most have back-up generators, it is not inconceivable that some attackers might have both the means and the motivation to shut a medical system off from power. Air traffic control failure, missed emergency phone calls, spoiling food, water pump failures, and a thousand other disruptions to daily life could be caused by a damaged power grid—and all could result in human injury or death.

UNCSW 8

!

But while the world’s dependence on cyberspace is indisputable, the actual threat posed by cyber warfare remains hotly debated. Despite increasing investments in cyber capacity by governments around the world, many of those investments go towards building defenses against cyber attacks, and even investments in offensive capacity are often intended more to deter attack from other countries than to actually be used. Moreover, much of what is labeled by the media as acts of aggression in cyberspace is more similar to theft than to traditional warfare, with private actors trying to illegally obtain corporate secrets for the sake of their own enrichment. Moreover, concerns have grown that the threat of cyber warfare could lead governments to make inappropriate power-grabs in cyberspace, with the goal not of preventing cyber attacks so much as monitoring their citizens’ online activity. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a body that includes China and Russia, has historically defined acts of cyber war extremely broadly to include the spreading of information by one state that could undermine the “spiritual, cultural, and moral spheres of other states”ii.

Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Such a definition is likely intended to justify the policies of some country to heavily restrict access to resources and information available on the Internet, often for domestic and purely political purposes, totally unrelated to true acts of cyber-aggression. Nor is the West immune from criticism over its aggressive pursuit of security concerns in cyberspace. In May of 2013, Edward Snowden, a computer specialist for Booz Allen Hamilton, a consulting company under commission by the United States National Security Agency, revealed widespread monitoring activity by the United

UNCSW 9 States of phone, email, and other Internet activity between people in and outside of the United States. These disclosures provoked international controversy, with several of the United States’ European allies and privacy advocates harshly condemning what they saw as sweeping violations of citizens of several countries’ rights to privacy. While the United States’ activity is primarily directed at detecting and forestalling acts of physical terrorism, the sheer breadth of its monitoring activity highlights the degree to which security concerns and cyberspace have become intertwined. But while some countries may wish to use the threat of cyber warfare to justify domestic security or political policies with little to do with legitimate defense needs, cyber war is no longer a purely theoretical threat. Indeed, instances of cyber attacks by some governments against others’ computer systems and infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Before Russia actually invaded Georgia in 2008, Georgia found itself the victim of a barrage of cyber attacks that effectively overloaded and rendered in-operational Georgian Internet servers. Though Russia denies involvement, Georgia accused Russia of deliberately engaging in acts of cyber warfareiii. The fact that Russia cannot be definitively said to have been behind the attacks signals a perennial problem of bringing aggressors to justice in cyber-space: their identity is often hard to prove.

The most famous use of cyber-means to accomplish quasi-military ends is probably the covert deployment of the Stuxnet computer worm by the United States and Israel against Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities. Through infecting computer systems in Iran, the United States and Israel were able to cause several centrifuges at

Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant and other locations to spin uncontrollably fast, thereby disrupting a good deal of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capacity for a period of months or years.

Ex-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad touring Natanz nuclear facility. Centrifuges at Natanz were rendered in-operational due to the Stuxnet computer virus.

Israel or the United States may have been more inclined to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities if they had not had other methods of disrupting Iran’s enrichment activities (and alleged pursuit of the capacity to build a nuclear bomb); seen a certain way, the Stuxnet virus can be seen as forestalling or delaying physical war or violence. On the other hand, the use by the United States—a country often held the most responsible for enforcing international codes of conduct—of cyber weapons to damage physical infrastructure shows that cyber weapons are a highly plausible component of modern warfare. And while the United States considered but decided against mounting a digital attack on former Colonel Gaddafi's regime in Libya so as to not set an example sanctioning cyber warfare,iv its willingness to use cyber weapons against Iran has emboldened countries like China, accused of illegally using its own forms of cyber weapons.

UNCSW 10

!

Though China’s government denies accusations of cyber attacks, it is widely suspected that it is behind hundreds of attacks on government and private sector servers in the U.S. and elsewhere. While there is no doubt that several cyber attacks originating from China are conducted by non-governmentally affiliated hackers, the American computer security company Mandiant has released a report claiming to trace many cyber attacks to China’s official People’s Liberation Army’s Unit 61398, operating out Shanghai. Less certain is the motive behind China’s cyber attacks; is it seeking to gain a military advantage by gaining the capacity to shut down parts of other countries’ critical infrastructure? Or is it concerned with the arguably less worrisome though still provocative threat of intelligence and corporate secrets, in order to win a diplomatic and economic advantage?

UNCSW 11

!

Despite historical precedents for regulating new forms of weapons as they arise going back to the Geneva Conventions, efforts to define an international architecture for regulating cyber war have come up relatively short-handed. But even while efforts to internationally sanction cyber war have failed to gain much traction, most countries remain reluctant to admit their use of cyber weapons for fear of being accused of acts of war, or possibly humanitarian crimes involved in targeting arguably civilian targets. Moreover, all countries wish to be able to harness international sympathy if they themselves become victims of cyber-attacks, so while countries have been willing to accuse others over their use of cyber weapons, few will acknowledge their own use. Because not all countries yet have sophisticated military cyber capabilities, this has resulted in a circle of recriminations between a relatively small number of countries that accuse each other of aggressively using cyber warfare in order to gain military, strategic, or economic advantages while denying any such involvement on their own part. The most prominent of these countries are the United States, Israel, China, Russia, Germany, Iran, and North Korea. But while the club of nations capable of mounting highly destructive cyber-offenses (or competent cyber-defenses) remains small, it is likely to grow, and grow rapidly. Indeed, the thousands of attacks that come daily from ultra-patriotic but non-governmental citizens in China on United States government servers shows just how low the barriers to entry can be for this type of warfare; as more and more countries develop and increase their reliance on the digital world, the more vulnerable they will become to sustaining real

damage from attacks on their computer systems. The more vulnerable they are, the more they will seek to build up not just cyber defenses, but also a credible cyber deterrent, meaning the ability to go on the cyber-offensive. This sort of cyber-arms race has already begun; even as Western countries, facing large debt burdens, are moving to significantly reduce their total military spending, such countries are still finding ways to increase the resources they devote to building cyber defensive and offensive capability.

United States Cyber Command. Even as the U.S. cuts its military budget, it is increasing its cyber capabilities.

Tensions between the United States and China over the near-continuous barrage of low-level cyber attacks on United States government and business servers that have originated in China are reaching a boiling point; the United States is much more willing to openly accuse China of acts of cyber aggression than it was even a year ago. U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping failed to come to any agreement over this issue at a two-day summit in June of 2013, with President Xi denying the Chinese government’s role in cyber attacks and pointing out the United States’ own history with cyber weapons.

Current Situation

UNCSW 12

!

Countries today do not even agree on what cyber warfare is; to be called an act of war, need a cyber attack inflict physical damage or cause death? Are attacks on civilian targets that don’t inflict immediate casualties still violations of the laws of war? Is stealing corporate secrets truly a security and defense threat, or should it instead be regarded as a trade dispute and be resolved through economic, rather than security discussions? Without a better international consensus on what actions in cyberspace constitute acts of war, what constitutes an illegal attack on civilians, and what constitutes a legitimate military tactic, the world will likely continue along its current path of increasing disputes over low-level cyber-attacks that go unacknowledged by the perpetrator. Moreover, countries will spend more and more of their resources developing cyber weapons in order to deter others, creating a constant upward spiral that will put pressure on national budgets and take away money and attention from other causes. Vagueness also creates room for truly horrifying uses of cyber weapons against power grids or other targets that could cause immense damage to civilian

countries. While countries certainly need some level of defensive cyber capability, to protect populations in the case of declared war between against terrorist and non-governmental threats as well as other militaries, a better, clearer international regime of regulations on cyber warfare might forestall an all-out digital arms race, or even a full-scale cyber war. In order to give debate more focus, delegates may want to focus in particular on these issues:

Defining An Act of War in

Cyberspace

Many have described the fights in cyberspace as a totally new “5th domain” in modern warfare, beyond the traditional ones of land, air, and sea, and the newer domain of space. According to such a theory, a modern conflict with all-out cyber war would look very different from previous conflicts, with computer specialists deploying bugs that would shut down the enemy’s air traffic control systems, cause oil refineries and pipelines to explode, bring to a halt the opposing country’s financial system, and possibly shut down their power grid.v

UNCSW 13

!

Cyber attacks so sweeping and catastrophic would clearly redefine the face of modern war and constitute obviously aggressive acts, meriting a full-scale military response. Indeed, while such an attack would cause far less death and destruction than a nuclear strike, the capacity to, in a very short time, totally shut down a country’s operations and capacity for resistance suggests some interesting similarities. To the extent such sweeping attacks are possible, countries will likely try to build up their own ability to execute them in order to deter others; much as in the case of the post-World War II wave of nuclear proliferation, an international response and regulatory regime may be required in order to prevent more and more countries building such destructive capacity. As with nuclear weapons, the danger as more and more countries acquire totally destructive cyber capacity becomes that there are more and more pathways for hugely destructive weapons to be deployed.

Electrical power networks in the U.S. and elsewhere may be vulnerable to cyber attacks.

But while the “5th domain” is not a bad prism through which to view certain aspects of war carried through to cyberspace, it can also obscure more plausible ways in which cyber weapons will most likely become a key part of modern warfare. Indeed, militaries today are so

dependent on digital technology that it would be hard to imagine a war without some “cyber” component to itvi—would trying to disrupt the navigation or satellite monitoring systems of another country through spreading computer viruses count as cyber warfare? Or attempting to shut down computer systems at an opposed country’s military command center? Perhaps most important is the question of when a cyber-attack might merit a physical response; when is an attack in cyberspace so clearly an act of war that it may be met with other acts of war, in or out of cyberspace? Some have argued that the term cyber war should only be used to describe cyber attacks with a physical consequence. Under such a definition, a cyber attack could only really be called an act of war if it caused damage to a physical system; the Stuxnet virus, with its impact on Iranian centrifuges, would be one of the few instances to date of such a cyber attack. On the other hand, a targeted cyber-attack with a physical consequence such as Stuxnet may arguably be said to do less damage than an all out attempt to shut down government servers, such as Georgia experienced in 2008, even though the latter form of cyber attack may have fewer consequences.

Georgian President Saakashvili accused Russia of shutting down his government’s servers in what would have been one of the first instances of cyber war.

UNCSW 14

!

As of now, countries have a wide degree of latitude to determine for themselves what sort of cyber actions might be considered an act of war; DISEC may wish to suggest a more formal set of criteria or method for determining what constitutes cyber warfare. Distinguishing Between Military

And Civilian Targets

Because government and civilian infrastructure often overlap in cyberspace, determining how to distinguish between a military and civilian target becomes a highly relevant challenge. Protocol 1, an addition to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibits military attacks that specifically target civilian populations and set in place a somewhat subjective criterion for military targets, forbidding any attack where the damage to civilians is likely to be out of “proportion” to the military objective in question.vii

While the notion of proportionality has generally applied to “kinetic” conflicts (ones which involve physical force), as war increasingly moves into cyberspace, it is likely that the Geneva Conventions will be considered to apply there as well. But what does proportionality mean in a digital context? For instance, shutting down a

country’s electrical distribution network might very well accomplish several legitimate military purposes: rendering organization, communications, transportation, and the distribution of supplies much more difficult for an enemy force. But would the damage to civilian populations be “disproportionate” to such an end?

Such questions are harder to ask because the casualties of cyber warfare might not be as directly evident as those caused by traditional conflict. A bombing that kills some number of enemy soldiers and some number of civilians has very clear casualties; a cyber attack on an electrical grid might not cause any deaths directly, but resulting traffic accidents or ambulances that don’t make it to the hospital on time because of non-functioning street lights could kill civilians. Such a scenario is just one of many potential ways a cyber attack could have indirect but very real—and sometimes fatal—consequences on a civilian population.

The question can become much subtler; while shutting down an electrical grid at the very least clearly causes civilians enormous disruption, what about shutting down government servers that may be used both to facilitate strategic planning and more ordinary government functions? Strategic resources—such as oil

UNCSW 15

!

pipelines or refineries—might actually be owned and operated by private companies, but may be highly necessary for a government militarily.

Moreover, as asymmetric warfare, often between terrorist or other non-governmental bodies and traditional armies becomes more widespread, the lines between legitimate military actions in cyber-space and actions that serve only to disrupt civilians can become even blurrier.

In a civil war or an occupation, can a government attempt to shut down Internet service that might be necessary for rebel coordination but also serves large civilian populations? Internet is not like food or water—in a sense, many might say it is not a violation of anyone’s rights to deny them access, especially during a period of violence. On the other hand, daily lives are becoming more and more intertwined with it in more parts of the world; shutting down service could easily bring business, food distribution, or even medical systems to at least a temporary halt.

Governments have frequently sought to block Facebook, Twitter, and other social media as a way to prevent coordination between protesters or rebel groups.

Non-Governmental Actors and

Cyber warfare

This sub-topic is highly related to the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian targets. In a broader sense, the issue of how and where non-governmental actors fit into

the rules of war is one that has dogged the world for decades, and particularly since Al Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. Since 9/11, Western militaries proved highly effective at defeating the Iraqi army or, initially, the Taliban’s organized resistance. Where they ran into trouble was in fighting non-uniformed terrorist or paramilitary forces and militias employing unconventional tactics, such as suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the use of civilian shields, and the targeting of civilian populations. Effectively fighting such unconventional enemies who were often not clearly distinguishable from civilian populations produced a revolution in Western military tactics and strategy (in particular giving rise to the doctrine of counter-insurgency), but even more sophisticated military techniques proved unable to fully or permanently bring peace to many violent areas. In cyberspace, similar challenges present themselves; how can a nation respond appropriately to cyber attacks question becomes particularly difficult to answer given the coming not from governments but individuals, or shadowy organizations? This emerging balance of powers in cyberspace; countries with significant cyber capacities can, to some degree, deter each other from mounting cyber attacks because of their own ability to respond in kind. But while a government has much vulnerability to cyber attacks and is therefore particularly susceptible to deterrence, less can be done directly against individuals or private organizations in the cyber realm. After all, even if their servers are shut down or infected, they can always move to new ones.

UNCSW 16

!

The most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon comes from China where thousands of cyber attacks originate daily. Many of these are committed with the intent to steal corporate information or other items that could be used for private enrichment. At the same time, however, a phenomenon known as “patriotic hacking” is becoming increasingly widespread.viii

At this summit between Chinese president Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama, cyberattacks originating from China, often from private citizens, were discussed. Patriotic hackers seek to defend their own country’s interests or reputations—and to attack those of their country’s perceived enemies—through actions not authorized by their own government. Examples in China’s case have included attempts to disrupt CNN’s website over its perceived-to-be unfair news coverage of

Chinese actions in Tibet. Moreover, the United States believes that hackers from within China and Russia, possibly with or without their governments’ support, have attempted to imbed numerous viruses in the U.S.’s electrical grid, possibly giving such hackers power to do significant damage at will. Dealing with non-governmental actors in cyber-space who attempt to accomplish quasi-military ends is hard enough—equally worrying is the prospect that countries wishing to execute cyber military actions without inviting retaliation may sponsor covert cyber wars and hide their own involvement.ix Because cyber actions are so often routed through numerous countries in order to veil their origin, any attempt to deal with the non-governmental threat in cyberspace is likely to be effective only if it is a truly international one, involving the support and agreement of various countries on what should and will be done to preempt non-governmental cyber-threats.

UNCSW 17

!

Cyber-Espionage and Cyber Theft

While it should be clear by now that cyber weapons can and may be used to accomplish military ends, not every cyber-attack is an instance of cyber warfare. Indeed, most are not, though they may sometimes be referred to as such by various sources in the media. Much more common than straight-up cyber warfare are instances of cyber-espionage or cyber-theft. Of course, some define cyber war broadly enough to include these phenomena; China and Russia in particular have sought to argue that the dissemination of propaganda on the Internet may be called an act of cyber war, so as to justify their aggressive policies of online monitoring and censorship. And activities such as the United States’ demand that various email and social media cites share data on their users for the sake of detecting terrorists are, while not strictly military, certainly motivated by the desire to protect against real attacks. DISEC will need to consider how broad it wishes its discussions on cyber war to be. Indeed, the most common cyber-attacks aren’t military or even intelligence-based; rather, they tend to be economic in nature, with Internet pirates attempting to steal corporate secrets, intellectual property, or even credit card numbers or financial assets. On its face, such instances of blatant thievery seem more a matter for law enforcement or international trade organizations than for a security-oriented organization such as DISEC. On the other-hand, the pervasiveness and magnitude of cyber-theft and its international nature raises several security concerns. How far may a country go to protect its citizens and businesses from cyber-criminals? In pursuing such criminals

through foreign servers or casting broad nets in order to catch them, can one country infringe on another’s sovereignty?

UNCSW 18

!

Because so few instances of cyber warfare

have, as yet, occurred, and even fewer have been admitted, many countries’ positions on the issues raised by cyber warfare are still developing and often are contradictory. Traditional blocs and alliances don’t necessarily apply; while the United States and Europe are both concerned over China’s aggressiveness in the cyber-worlds, European countries have varied in their willingness to publicly back the U.S. in criticizing China. The same can be said of many European countries in regard to the United States and Israel’s efforts to disrupt Iranian nuclear development. And while Iran professes its anger at others for using cyber weapons against it, it has itself boasted of having the second largest cyber-army in the world.

Many countries’ policies on cyber warfare seem to vary with their own interests; often, they seem to not want to allow others to employ cyber weapons, while wishing to retain that right for themselves if they believe circumstances warrant it. Meanwhile, many countries feel like bystanders in this debate as they currently lack significant cyber-power; even those countries, however, realize that sooner rather than later they will have to reckon with an increasingly digital (and, in

some ways, vulnerable) world. Generally speaking, most countries’ positions fall into these categories:

Countries Wishing to Build

Cyber-Offensive Capacity

In spite of its frequent denials, China has probably been the most aggressive country in deploying cyber weapons offensively in order to gain a security and economic advantage. Russia also falls into this category, as do Iran and North Korea. Often, such countries are seeking to gain an area of advantage in order to compensate for perceived military weaknesses in other categories. Israel and the United States also have extremely sophisticated cyber-offensive capabilities, and though hesitant about using them for fear of starting an arms race, they have shown themselves willing to use cyber weapons covertly to deal with threats they view as highly pressing. Countries Wishing to Limit the

Spread of Cyber Weapons

Most European countries would fall into this category (though some, such as Germany, actually have significant cyber capabilities). In an

Bloc Positions

UNCSW 19

!

Countries Wishing to Limit the

Spread of Cyber Weapons

Most European countries would fall into this category (though some, such as Germany, actually have significant cyber capabilities). In an era of economic stress and declining government budgets, most do not want to open up a whole other arena of combat and be forced to compete at the top-level. Other countries, such as Japan or South Korea, are probably more concerned of the cyber-threat coming out of China or North Korea and are therefore likely to support efforts they see as curtailing that threat, while supporting the aggressive buildup of deterrent capabilities by the United States. !Countries Concerned with

Monitoring Civil Unrest or

Domestic Threats

Many countries may not see themselves as affected (as yet) by cyber warfare, per se, but are subject to a great deal of domestic political volatility and wish to maintain various ways for monitoring and controlling unrest online. Particularly throughout the Arab Spring, governments such as Egypt’s have shutdown social media sites in order to inhibit revolutionary tendencies. Other countries, such as Turkey or China, have longer-standing restrictions on what their citizens can access through the Internet. These countries will be eager to make sure that any new international framework on cyber war does not interfere with governments’ ability to regulate and monitor the Internet—indeed, they may seek to formally codify that ability under the guise of preventing cyber attacks. !

Countries More Concerned with

Cyber Crimes !Some countries with very low cyber-

capabilities may be more concerned with the economic aspects of cyber crimes. This could either be in order to prevent crimes from being executed on their own citizens, or to ensure that their sovereignty is not infringed upon in pursuit of cyber criminals (some countries, such as Nigeria, are thought to be home to large cyber criminal networks).

Countries with Low-Cyber

Capabilities that are concerned

about their defense !Since the United States considered using

cyber weapons in its efforts to depose Colonel Gaddafi’s military regime in Libya, many countries (particularly those hostile to the West) may worry that cyber weapons could provide another avenue for more powerful countries to exploit weaker ones. Such countries may seek to limit or ban cyber warfare outright.

UNCSW 20

!

Questions to Consider!!!Delegates on DISEC will want to consider a number of questions as they begin to draft resolutions. Nothing this committee produces will conclusively answer all these questions, nor should the committee hesitate to explore other areas related to the topic. Still, consider these a good place to start:

• What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? When (if ever) can a cyber attack warrant a physical military response?

• Can or should cyber warfare be banned? Are cyber attacks an inevitable feature of modern warfare, or should the world nip the militarization of cyber-space in the bud, as it has largely managed to do for the militarization of outer space?

• Do traditional understandings of civilian vs. military targets apply in cyber-space? How does the idea of proportionality apply? What restrictions must the world put in place in order to prevent catastrophic damage to civilian populations from cyber attacks? Is it permissible for governments to mount cyber attacks against private civilian targets if they serve a strategic role?

• How can the world’s governments cooperate to prevent and punish non-governmental actors who mount cyber attacks?

• Is a digital arms race inevitable? Are there ways to prevent or slow the proliferation of cyber capabilities?

• Should a distinction be made between cyber war and cyber espionage? Do these categories demand different international regulatory regimes?

• How far may a country go in cyberspace to protect economic and corporate interests? Does Internet piracy ever constitute a military action, or ever warrant one in response?

UNCSW 21

!

Suggestions for Further Research"! Some books have been published which provide a relatively colorful background to many of the issues involved in cyber war. Chief among these is Richard A. Clarke’s Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What We Can Do About It or (for a more technical account of what is actually possible in cyber war) Jason Andress and Steve Winterfield’s Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics, and Tools for Security Practitioners. There have also been good long-form pieces on the strategic implications of cyber war in publications such as Foreign Affairs or The Economist, as well as shorter ones in The New York Times. Generally keeping track of new news on cyber war is important and will put you in a strong place at the beginning of your committee. Finding information on your country’s position won’t necessarily be easy—begin with the website of the foreign ministry of your country, and if you find nothing there, see if any regional organizations of which your nation is a part (The African Union, ASEAN, the European Union, etc.) have an established policy on some of these issues. It is also worth exploring if your country responded publicly to any previous instances of cyber attacks, whether or not your country was directly involved. Do not hesitate to reach out if you have any research questions!

UNCSW 22

!

The notions of “bioterrorism” and “biosecurity” as we know them today did not come into existence until very late in the 20th century, and these broad ideas are themselves still evolving to this day. Indeed, as the scope of medical knowledge and technology expands at a dizzying pace, a growing number of substances, specimens, tools, techniques, and people now fall under the purview of what we consider bioterror threats. Biological specimens have been employed since ancient times as agents of harm and sabotage. As early as the Middle Ages, military leaders recognized the value of victims of infectious diseases in their assault on enemy forces, using plague-ridden cadavers to weaken the opposing line.x Poisoning of water sources was another common technique whose use continued into the 19th century during the American Civil War. xi A historically notable use of biological agents was the spread of smallpox to indigenous American-Indian populations that accompanied

the arrival of European colonists in the 15th and 16th centuries. Though the true intent of these European colonists in providing Native Americans with smallpox-infected clothing has been questioned by historians, the destruction brought about by the disease has been universally acknowledged as a turning point in the deliberate use of biological agents against other human beings.

The Aztec population was decimated by European smallpox in the 16th century (en.wikipedia.org)

TOPIC II.

Bioterrorism and

Biosecurity

!

UNCSW 23

!

More recent—and more relevant—

developments in biological warfare came in the wake of World War II. Immediately after the war, public attention turned to disease outbreaks allegedly caused by foreign wartime actions. Though most, if not all, nations denied employment of biowarfare during WWII, a flurry of allegations ensued implicating various world powers, including the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and the USSR, in the development and testing of biological weapons.xii These accusations culminated in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which will be discussed in the Current Situation section. Biosecurity, on the other hand, has historically dealt with the spread of disease and how nations and individuals react to defend themselves against epidemics. However, the scope of biosecurity was not fully realized until the ‘contagionist’ theory of disease—the theory that posits that diseases can be transmitted from human to human, as opposed to originating as a result of ‘predisposing factors’ or lascivious behavior—began to take form in the late Middle Ages and especially at the turn of the 20th century. One of the earliest instances of biosecurity-related concerns came in the early 1500s with the introduction of syphilis to Europe after the expeditions of Columbus and other explorers in North America. Many Europeans, unaware of the disease’s American origins, began to blame travelers and immigrants from other European countries for the introduction of syphilis to their own nation: euphemisms such as “the French disease” and “the Italian affliction” often came to refer to the disease.xiii

An Iowa influenza clinic in 1918.The Spanish Influenza epidemic seized national attention, killing millions in the process (flu.gov) As a result of such inferences, many 16th century European governments became wary of the importation of foreign goods as well as the entry of foreign visitors and immigrants to their own nations. While these worries rarely evolved into real policy actions, this sort of xenophobic suspicion can be seen as an early precursor to modern fears of international threats to biosecurity.xiv In more recent times, the advent of transnational warfare has also been attributed as a contributing factor to an uptick in pandemic diseases. One salient example is the 1918 influenza (commonly referred to as Spanish influenza) epidemic, which originated in the United States but quickly spread to Europe due to troop deployment during World War I. Killing far more people than war itself—high estimates place the death toll near 50 millionxv—the influenza outbreak made clear the importance of disease-fighting measures, especially during wartime. It will be up to the members of this committee to use these historical examples, as well as more modern developments in bioterrorism and biosecurity, to move toward more effective risk management with regard to such matters.

UNCSW 24

!

The members of this committee will be

tasked with deciding how the United Nations and other associated transnational organizations can effectively stem and prevent bioterrorist attacks, both from rogue terrorist organizations as well as from rogue states with confirmed bioweapon development programs.

The most up-to-date definition of a bioterrorism attack, provided by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is as follows:

A bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, toxins or other harmful agents used to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants. These agents are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could be mutated or altered to increase their ability to cause disease, make them resistant to current medicines, or to increase their ability to be spread into the environment. Biological agents can be spread through the air, water, or in food. Terrorists tend to use biological agents because they are extremely difficult to detect and do not cause illness for several hours to several days.xvi

The Tokyo Sarin attacks drew international attention, perhaps for the first time, to the threat posed by bioterrorism. (wired.com)

Important to note in the enumerated definition of bioterrorism is the especially broad scope of what can be considered an attack; as our

Current Situation: Bioterrorism

UNCSW 25

!

biological capabilities have expanded, so too have the means of producing such technologies and specimens shifted from the specialized, educated few to a more general population—nowadays, a sufficient sum of money is often all it takes for a would-be bioterrorist to acquire biological weapons.

What distinguishes modern bioterrorism attacks from those of antiquity is a marked rise in scope, frequency, and severity of attacks in the late 20th and early 21st century. One of the earliest “modern” bioterrorist attacks occurred in Tokyo, Japan on March 20, 1995. Members of an extremist cult called Aum Shinrikyo (now known as Aleph) punctured bags of liquid sarin, a toxic, highly volatile compound, on several Tokyo subway trains during the peak of morning rush hour. The sarin evaporated and the vaporized compound spread throughout each train, causing nausea, breathing problems, and temporary loss of vision in passengers.

In total, 13 people were killed and 6,252 were injured as a result of the sarin incident, making the attack the most serious to occur in Japan since the US dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945.xvii The Aum Shinrikyo attack was therefore significant in ushering bioterrorism into a new era—one in which the severity of bioterror attacks is recognized as on level with, and even surpassing, that of conventional terror attacks.

Most recently, a bioterror scare shook the United States in May 2013 when traces of ricin, a highly toxic, naturally occurring compound, were discovered in letters mailed to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg as well as to advocacy group Mayors Against Illegal Guns and the White House in Washington, DC.xviii Though

investigations are still ongoing, a minor celebrity named Shannon Richardson was arrested and indicted on three counts in June 2013 in relation to the ricin mailings.xix

The key point to draw from these two examples of modern bioterror threats is the growing ease with which ordinary citizens can acquire the requisite materials to become homegrown bioterrorists. In many cases, all it takes is a sufficient amount of money and rudimentary scientific knowledge to wreak havoc with biological agents, as demonstrated by the aforementioned sarin and ricin cases.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 — Successes and Limitations Perhaps the most important recent development in the fight against bioterrorism is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), which was signed on April 10, 1972 and has 170 parties as of April 2013. Article I of the Convention establishes the overarching goal for all member nations:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

UNCSW 26

!

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.xx

While the BWC triumphed in

establishing a first step, albeit ideological at best, towards unilateral elimination and prevention of biological warfare, there nonetheless remain significant flaws in the Convention that delegates in this committee should address during debate.

The signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 marked the first unilateral international action towards the prevention of bioterrorism (nih.gov).

One of the biggest issues plaguing the Convention is that of compliance: as it stands, ratification of the BWC (as with nearly any international convention) is completely voluntary. However, a compounding flaw is that there remains no clear enforcement mechanism to verify that state parties are indeed complying with the stipulations of the Convention. While certain party states (around half of all convention signatories) have agreed to report to a special UN Implementation Support Unit (ISU) on their Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), participation in this process is also voluntary.xxi

To date, seven review conferences have convened in order to strengthen and reaffirm the aims of the original Convention, with the Seventh Review Conference meeting in December 2011. However, it will remain the task of DISEC delegates to create meaningful and proactive approaches to strengthening the international sway of the Convention.

UNCSW 27

!

Biosecurity occupies a distinct yet highly interrelated place in the scope of international security concerns. Whereas bioterrorism almost invariably stems from human activity and malice, biosecurity concerns itself with the proliferation of natural threats—in particular, the onslaught of epidemics that indiscriminately threaten the wellbeing of the human race. Two salient examples reflect the growing global threat posed by infectious diseases in the 21st century, the first being the pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) that seized the attention of global media in 2002 and 2003. On November 16, 2002, a businessman living in Foshan, a small town in the Guangdong province of China, fell ill with what was then diagnosed as a case of atypical pneumonia. Several weeks later, a chef specializing in exotic wildlife presented similar symptoms and was transferred to a hospital in Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong. By the end of the year, dozens of cases of the same disease had been reported throughout the province.xxii

The SARS epidemic of 2003 redefined the scope of global health in international politics (britannica.com).

Despite initial confusion and difficulty in isolating the pathogen behind these cases, the mysterious ailment was identified as an entirely new disease: severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). In a matter of months, SARS had spread to nearly 30 nations, likely by way of exposure through air travel, infecting thousands of otherwise healthy civilians.xxiii By the time the epidemic subsided at the end of 2003, the disease had infected 8,098 people and killed 774.

The case of Andrew Speaker’s multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) permanently intertwined epidemiology and international security (abcnews.com) However, what makes SARS notable from a biosecurity standpoint is not its death toll, but rather its implications for future, deadlier epidemics. For one, international air travel has created a so-called “global village” wherein a virus can leap from even the remotest of areas and become a global crisis within weeks or even days.xxiv In light of this development, many epidemiologists consider SARS an unequivocal call for “better global citizenship” on matters of transnational importance, stressing the need for full disclosure of time-sensitive issues with global consequences (the Chinese government, for

Current Situation: Biosecurity

UNCSW 28

!

example, had initially been reluctant to report SARS cases to the WHO).xxv Another important development in biosecurity measures came with the case of Andrew Speaker in 2007. Speaker, an Atlanta native, was diagnosed with a rare form of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) in May 2007. After his diagnosis, Speaker flew commercial airlines to several different nations, including France, Greece, Italy, and Canada, before returning to the United States. During Speaker’s travels, however, confusion arose as to the severity and contagiousness of his tuberculosis, and European health officials speculated that he might have been suffering from extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), a much rarer form of the disease. Both European and American CDC officials attempted to apprehend Speaker and force him into isolation, and US border security came under scrutiny for allowing Speaker to cross the US-Canada border without issue.xxvi While Speaker, as it turned out, suffered from a much more treatable form of tuberculosis, the entire case nonetheless raised grave concerns over the protocols surrounding international travel barriers in the context of diseased passengers. As far as this body is concerned, when considering these recent disease outbreaks, it is

crucial to consider the sociopolitical and environmental factors that have the potential to exacerbate future epidemics. Laurie Garrett, a leading infectious disease epidemiologist and bestselling author, argues in her book The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance that certain ‘destabilizing’ factors not only facilitate the spread of diseases, but also increase the severity of outbreaks worldwide:

“While the human race battles itself… the advantage moves to the microbes’ court. They are our predators and they will be victorious if we, Homo sapiens, do not learn how to live in a rational global village that affords the microbes few opportunities.”xxvii

Garrett and other leading global public health experts argue that this destabilization has come as a result of the breakneck speed of globalization and industrialization the world has seen in the past century: human activity, including warfare, has increasingly impinged upon the natural world, collapsing and simplifying ecologies and leaving certain ‘gaps’ for infectious diseases to exploit.xxviii

UNCSW 29

!

Epidemic disease—and its portrayal in the media—has become inextricably intertwined with public opinion and international affairs (channelstv.com). What is more, it has been argued that the same reckless human behavior has led to the advent of entirely new strains of disease—strains that are often resistant to common methods of treatment. Such strains come about as a result of frequent abuse and misuse of antibiotics as well as reckless application of disinfectants, to which certain bacteria and viruses can develop immunity. The aforementioned case of Speaker’s XDR-TB is a prime example, as are recent outbreaks of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and several new influenza strains in the United States.xxix Similar causative links have been established in the aforementioned case of SARS, with China’s rapid urbanization and accompanying “Era of Wild Flavor” contributing to the genesis of the disease, and an increase in international travel responsible for the disease’s quite literal overnight spread around the world.xxx Delegates must decide how to effectively implement policy that can work towards effective

transnational cooperation towards the management of infectious diseases while simultaneously respecting the political considerations that will undoubtedly come into play when dealing with each nation separately.

UNCSW 30

!

Bloc Positions

Determining bloc positions with regard to

matters of bioterrorism and biosecurity is rarely a

clear-cut matter: lines both political and ethical

are frequently blurred as nations attempt to

balance self-interest with the need to act in

concert with the global community to combat

shared threats. As far as biological threats are

concerned, therefore, differences in bloc positions

will ordinarily not fall along regional lines, but

rather according to the degree of each individual

country’s involvement with and investment in

potentially harmful biomedical technologies, as

well the extent of each nation’s willingness to

offer financial and material resources on such

matters. Delegates must thoroughly research their

individual nation’s positions with regard to these

matters and the BWC. A selection of broader bloc

positions, however, is as follows:

Countries suspected and/or accused of developing biomedical weapons programs There are currently no countries that have

openly admitted to developing bioweapons

programs, given the intense international scrutiny

that such programs would generate. However,

given the ease with which bioweapons can now

be produced, there are few experts willing to

affirm that state-sponsored bioweaponry

programs are a thing of the past. A 2010 report

issued by the U.S. Bureau of Arms Control,

Verification, and Compliance alleges that 9

countries are suspected of conducting bioweapons

research: North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Iraq,

Pakistan, China, India, Libya, and Russia.xxxi

Bioweapons involvement has been suspected in

Syria, Taiwan, and Egypt. These nations and

their allies, while clearly unlikely to actively

support bioweapon proliferation legislation, will

likely oppose any unilateral measure that they see

will interfere with their national sovereignty on

matters of biotechnology development.

Countries that have not signed or ratified the BWC of 1972 There are currently a total of 170 party

states to the BWC of 1972, leaving dozens of

nations that have either declined to become a

party to the Convention or have signed but not

ratified the Convention. Most nations who have

declined to ratify take issue with specific

provisions of the Convention, in Article X, which

allows states to exchange biotechnological

UNCSW 31

!

knowledge and materials for peaceful purposes but places restrictions on those countries receiving information rather than distributing it. Less-developed nations and nations with burgeoning biotechnology industries will therefore likely collude to prevent exploitation by larger, more developed nations seeking, in their view, to monopolize biotechnological knowledge and perpetuate their dominance in the industry. Delegates are encouraged to research their own country’s position with regard to the BWC of 1972 and, if their country has not signed or ratified, to develop a thorough understanding of the reasoning behind that decision.

UNCSW 32

!

Questions to Consider!!

• How can this body effectively regulate the proper use of evolving medical technologies, and how can it move to prevent said technology from falling into rogue hands?

• If this body does indeed seek to impose regulations and restrictions on new medical technologies, how will it ensure that such restrictions will not hinder scientific progress?

• What biological risks are associated with globalization and the explosion of international commerce as seen in the 21st century? How can these risks be minimized without sacrificing international communication and cooperation?

• What actions might this body take in order to combat the causative link between wartime violence and the spread of infectious diseases?

• Under what circumstances should travel restrictions be imposed on the general population in order to implement biosecurity measures? Who has the authority to implement travel restrictions? What are the ethical and political implications of such restrictions?

• How much leverage do transnational organizations, such as the UN and the WHO, have with regard to individual governments and the manner in which they respond to biological crises? Using the case of SARS as an example, when should we consider full disclosure to the UN and WHO mandatory?

• Under what circumstances, if any, should transnational organizations such as the WHO supersede the authority of national governments on matters of bioterrorism and biosecurity?

UNCSW 33

!

Suggestions for Further Research Effective research will always begin with a thorough investigation of an individual nation’s official stance with regard to biomedical weapons and biosecurity. Depending on the propensity of a delegate’s country to divulge such sensitive information, such information may be difficult to come by if confined to a single government’s official webpages. Delegates are therefore encouraged to seek out reports, surveys, and documents published not only by their own country, but also that country’s allies, opponents, and transnational organizations such as the UN and WHO. On the issue of biowarfare, the United Nations has published a wealth of documents and treaties pertaining to the malicious use of biomedical technology as well as efforts pertaining to its prevention: United Nations Office at Geneva: Biological Weapons Convention: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument United Nations Office at Geneva: Latest BWC-Related Information: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1B2F?OpenDocument Full Text of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972: http://www.opbw.org/convention/conv.html United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/

UNCSW 34

!

Role of the Committee! In seeking to answer the above and other questions, delegates should be mindful of the scope and limitations of DISEC’s powers. Though DISEC cannot legislate and enforce binding rules on cyber war, its view is likely to be widely noted and used as a starting point for further international dialogue. In particular, DISEC may wish to recommend protocols regarding the militarization of DISEC, both to the Security Council, which has broader authority to mandate changes, and to the international community. DISEC can, for instance, propose guidelines codifying sorts of ways cyber weapons should never be used better defining how civilian and military targets may be distinguished. DISEC’s recommendations may form the basis for countries voluntarily pledging to maintain certain standards.

DISEC also has historically worked closely with the United Nations’ executive arm, which reports to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. DISEC may wish to commission fact-finding reports or work with the U.N. Secretariat to establish international bodies specifically dedicated to monitoring cyber war. DISEC should be careful, however, to avoid pushing responsibility off on the secretariat or proposed new committees; it should be as specific as possible in its recommendations. Also, rather than suggest establishing new bodies, DISEC would do better to see if there are organizations already out there that would be well-placed to handle certain roles DISEC might envision with regard to cyberspace; working within the current infrastructure tends to be less costly and more effective than creating new bureaucracies.

UNCSW 35

!

Structure of the Committee

DISEC will be run as a double delegate committee—countries will be represented by two delegates, which will

allow for debate and resolution-writing to go on simultaneously. Both delegates in a delegation are encouraged

to take part in all aspects of organized debate and the resolution-writing process.

Debate will run according to normal parliamentary procedure. All delegates will receive a packet containing the

rules, which will govern DISEC debate and will have the option of attending a parliamentary procedure

training session at the beginning of the conference. If you have any questions about parliamentary procedure,

do not hesitate to contact us. Delegates’ goal should be to form consensus through debate and write and vote on

at least one draft resolution.

Delegates must submit a position paper; if you wish to receive feedback, please email it to us two weeks before

the conference. Otherwise, you may submit it in the first committee session.

UNCSW 36

!

NOTES !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!i Pictet, Jean (1958). Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary. International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved 2009-07-15. ii Tom Gjelten, Shadow Wars: Debating Cyber 'Disarmament'. World Affairs November/December 2010.

iii JOHN MARKOFF “Before the Gunfire, Cyber attacks”. New York Times August 12, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html. iv Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “US Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on Libya”. New York Times October 17, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html v Richard A Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What We Can Do About It. Harper Collins Publishers Inc, May 2012 vi Jarno Limnéll, “Defining the qualities of cyber warfare”. SC Magazine, March 2013. vii Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b) viii EDWARD WONG, “Hackers Find China Is Land of Opportunity”: New York Times, May 2013. ix Ibid. x Eitzen EM, Jr, Takafuji ET. Historical overview of biological warfare. http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/cwbw/default_index.htm xi Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1200679/#B1 xii Ibid. xiii Radin, Joanna. xiv Ibid. xv Barry, John M. The Great Influenza. xvi http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp xvii Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response. http://www.stimson.org/cbw/pubs.cfm?id=12 xviii Associated Press. “Letters to NYC Mayor Bloomberg contained ricin.” 30 May 2013. MSN News. xix International Business Times. “Vampire Diaries’ Actress Shannon Rogers Guess Richardson Indicted on 3 Counts for Sending Ricin Letters.” xx Biological Weapons Convention Full Text. http://www.opbw.org/convention/conv.html xxi UNOG: The United Nations Office at Geneva. The Biological Weapons Convention: Latest Information. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/87CF9BFD24A8D05FC1257574004B285B?OpenDocument xxii Deborah Davis and Helen Siu, SARS: Reception and interpretations in three Chinese cities (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1. xxiii Counting Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan as part of China, the WHO puts the number of nations directly affected by SARS at 26. World Health Organization. "Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003." xxiv Angela R. McLean, Robert M. May, et. al. SARS: A Case Study in Emerging Infections (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.

UNCSW 37

!

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!xxv Joan Kaufman, “SARS and China’s Health-Care Response: Better to Be Both Red and Expert!” in SARS in China: Prelude to Pandemic?, ed. Arthur Kleinman and James L. Watson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 56. xxvi “Border security scrutinized after TB patient slips in,” CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/conditions/05/31/tb.flight/index.html xxvii Garrett, Laurie. The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. xxviii Ibid. xxix Barry, John M. The Great Influenza. xxx Greenfeld, Karl Taro. China Syndrome: The True Story of the 21st Century’s First Great Epidemic. xxxi Barry Kellman, Bioviolence: Preventing Biological Terror and Crime Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 68.

Please also make sure you are registered on the delegate forum, your advisors should provide you with a sign up ink. For the latest information, updates, topic guides and more, visit Yale Model United Nations online at: http://ymun.yira.org

For the second year, YMUN will be offering a competitive essay competition. For the rules and guidelines visit: http://ymun.yira.org/essay-contest/

Interested in participating in a challenging new program for highly motivated and exceptional delegates? Apply for the Global Exchange Program at: http://ymun.yira.org/global-exchange/

Get connected and download the new Yale Model United Nations iPhone application: https://itunes.apple.com/tc/app/yale-model-united-nations/id721125366?mt=8 or search for Yale Model UN

Like Yale Model United Nations on Facebook and receive all the latest updates: https://www.facebook.com/yalemun

Stay up to date and follow Yale Model United Nations both before and during the conference: @YaleModelUN

Find the latest pictures on Yale Model United Nations’s Instagram: ymun: http://instagram.com/ymun