study guide unga disec | ylgc 2012

Study GuideGeneral Assembly: DISEC

Young Leaders’ Global Conclave 2012

Study GuideGeneral Assembly: DISEC

Young Leaders’ Global Conclave 2012

varun hemachandran chairman

jaideep soodvice chairman

akaash ampilidirector

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ga: disec | weaponization of spaceyoung leaders’ global conclave 2012

from the executive board

Dear Delegates of the General Assembly,

It is with no sense of formality that I congratulate you on your success thus far in being selected to represent your respective nations in the First Committee of the General Assembly at YLGC 2012. My name is Varun Hemachandran, and I will be Chairing this session along with Jaideep Sood, and the both of us will be ably aided by our Director, Akaash Ampili.

With no further ado, I would like to begin with a mission statement -- this council, as we see it, will be as true to life as possible. This can only be achieved with thorough research on your part and well thought out strategy with reference to your respective foreign policies, and of course, good working knowledge of the foreign policies of your counterparts.

We, in rethinking our roles have worked out new ways to engage with you, through our dedicated website at www.ylgcga.co.cc. This is a committee-specific portal and unique to our council. Your position papers must be submitted on this website at the given link by 11:59pm on March 11, and the same will be published for all to see, as is. For those allotted after the 11th, a separate deadline will be applicable and shall be announced on the website. Using this resource, you are expected to read up on the positions of other delegates in council, as narrated by them, and use their policy statements to pre-formulate your speeches and work out a plan of action that will see you through on D-Day. The website is also a place where you can connect with us, the Executive Board, as well as other delegates. From time-to-time we will be posting updates, as well as other information that will help you with your research in the run-up to the conference.

We hope our effort thus far, and this study guide, together, will contribute to your research regime and aid your top performance at YLGC 2012. Having said that, please contact us for any help or assistance you may require. Our contact details will be attached to the end this document and will also be available on the website.

With that, on behalf of the Executive Board, I wish you all the best for the conference and we look forward to seeing you all on the 23rd of March.

Best regards,

Varun HemachandranChairman

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topic:the weaponization of space and the prevention of an arms race

synopsis:The Space race began largely after the USSR launched Sputnik 1 - the first artificial satellite to orbit the Earth. The success of the USSR precipitated the Sputnik Crisis in the United States, and it is at this point in history, that many believe began, not just the Space Race - but an arms race in space. The COPUOS, established in 1959 by the UN General Assembly resolution 1472 (XIV) was established to encourage research and dissemination of information on outer space, however, as many nations have pointed out, large portions of defence budgets of certain nations have been spent on exploring weapons technology that may operate from space or be used to take down foreign satellites. The topic has been brought to the floor of the 1st Committee for its deliberation.

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introduction

When the Space Race first began, President Dwight Eisenhower posed a question

that set the mood for the debate on space weaponization - “Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purposes of war?”

From the beginning, the Space Race had been a militarily driven operation, to not just cross the frontiers of space, but to explore its military applications.

Since space had no jurisdiction, it was open to exploration and exploitation. Space is vast emptiness with no markable boundries or enforceable claims of ownership, but yet it was monopolised at the time by just two nations - the USA and USSR.

Not much has changed since the hay days of the Cold War. Space is still monopolised by a few, and while many countries including developing nations such as India can lay claim to indigenous space programs, these are still in their infancy and pose no real challenge to cartel of traditional space monopolists.

Space is much like the Arctic. It is outside territorial bounds, but strategically important to all nations.

The problem of space weaponization is several fold. There must be an international consensus on whether space may be weaponized and if so, guidelines and rules governing its weaponization must be laid out. However, the over arching problem is that no matter what decisions are made and what rules are drawn, the responsibility of oversight and enforcement loom large, not to mention the question of funds.

These questions are some of many for the council to ponder.

However, before any discussion can begin, a good working definition of the term “weaponization of space” is important to establish before we proceed. A generally agreed upon definition is the placement of any such object that constitutes a weapon into space through an orbiting-vehicle [such as a satellite] with the capability of causing destruction.

The council is also open to other working definitions.

Moving on, it is important to draw a clear distinction here between “weaponization” and “militarization.” Space may be deemed as already militarized, in that satellites currently assist ground, sea, and air forces, as well as enhance global communication and surveillance systems with civilian and military applications. Space has been militarized since the first communication satellites were launched into orbit. At the end of 2001 there were approximately 170 military-related satellites in space belonging to the United States, Russia, and various countries around the world. In this context, the military use of satellites is considered to be “non-aggressive” and “non-offensive,” in that while satellites may be used to assist conventional or air-based weapons, they have no destructive capability.

This definition leaves much to be desired, leaving several loopholes open to exploitation, and yet, it is no secret that countries have designed their defence systems to do just that - exploit. Many ground-based systems operate with the aide of satellites for navigation and target acquisition. Some systems are also designed to take out space assets, but in both these cases, the technical definition of the term does not cover these weapons and this, as described, are covered by the term “militarization”. Weapons such as ballistic missiles - designed to traverse large distances across continents through space, such as those in service by the US military may also constitute space weapons due their silent ability to

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take out targets in space, experts argue.

1967 outer space treaty

T he Outer Space Treaty, formally the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. Out of the 100 signatories, 26 nations are yet to formally ratify it as of October 2011. Some of its signatories are the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Israel and Pakistan.

Concluded in the first years of space exploration, after Yuri Gagarin’s historic flight and before Neil Armstrong’s walk on the moon, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in space. It does not cover the transit of nuclear weapons through space or nuclear weapons launched from earth into space for the purposes of destroying incoming missiles, such as some of the early US and Russian missile defence interceptors in North Dakota and around Moscow (Galosh), permitted under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. It also says nothing about anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) or the placement of conventional weapons in space.

Furthermore, with the rapid development of laser technology, outer space can easily be militarized without the deployment of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, with the US’s stated plans of “dominating the space dimension of military operations, and integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities of full spectrum of conflict,” the Treaty is insufficient against saving outer space from weaponization.

A summary of the treaty is as follows:

Article I maintains that “the exploration and use of outer space… shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries…”

Article II states that “outer space… is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty…”

Article III reiterates that “exploration and use of outer space” will be carried out “in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations…”

Article IV prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction… in outer space…” It further prohibits “the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies…”

Article V renders “astronauts as envoys of mankind” and shall be assisted in any way by all countries;(2)

Article VI upholds nation-states as the bearer of responsibility for all activities in outer space, including those conducted by non-governmental entities; furthermore, all activities require “authorization and continuing supervision” by nation-states;

Article VII holds a State Party “internationally liable” if an object launched into outer space should inflict damage onto the territory of another State Party; (3)

Article VIII maintains that a State Party has control over any object that they launch into space;

Article IX ensures the peaceful uses of outer space exploration; if one State Party believes that the activities of another State Party “would cause potentially harmful interference” with the activities of other States Parties in outer space, “appropriate international consultations” can be called for;

Article X states that all launches may be observed by other States Parties, but that this opportunity “and the conditions under

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which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States”;

Article XI calls for States Parties to inform the Secretary-General, the public, and “the international scientific community” of all of its activities in outer space “to the greatest extent possible.” The Secretary-General in turn disseminates this information “immediately and effectively”;

Article XII ensures that all installations and equipment are open to other States Parties “on a basis of reciprocity”;

Article XIII holds all States Parties responsible for resolving disputes under this Treaty;

The full text of the treaty is available in Annexure II of this study guide which may be downloaded from www.ylgcga.co.cc.

follow-up treaties

1. The Moon Treaty of 1979 or The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was meant to be the follow-up to the Outer Space Treaty, but failed to be ratified by any space-faring nation.

The Moon Agreement was considered and elaborated by the Legal Subcommittee from 1972 to 1979. The Agreement was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 in resolution 34/68. It was not until June 1984, however, that the fifth country, Austria, ratified the Agreement, allowing it to enter into force in July 1984. The Agreement reaffirms and elaborates on many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty as applied to the Moon and other celestial bodies, providing that those bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, that their environments should not be disrupted, that the United Nations should be informed of the location and purpose of any station established on those bodies. In addition, the Agreement provides that the Moon and its natural resources are the common

heritage of mankind and that an international regime should be established to govern the exploitation of such resources when such exploitation is about to become feasible.

Presently, the Moon Treaty has been ratified by six countries. Four countries, including France and India, are signatories, and seven countries have acceded to the Moon Treaty, including Australia. The United States, the Russian Federation (former Soviet Union), and the People’s Republic of China have neither signed, acceded, nor ratified the Moon Treaty, which has led to the conclusion that it is a failure from the standpoint of international law.

The Moon Treaty upholds and elaborates on many of the provisions of its parent. Specifically, the Moon Treaty applies to the Moon and other celestial bodies in the solar system excluding the Earth. The Moon Treaty specifically closes a loophole in the Outer Space Treaty by banning any ownership of any extraterrestrial property by any organisation or private person, unless that organisation is international and governmental.

As discussed earlier, the three major space faring nations (“the Big Three”) are non-parties to the Moon Treaty, which has led to the opinion that the Moon Treaty is a failure as a treaty and international law. However, even though the Moon Treaty is technically not binding on the Big Three, it is technically valid international law. Even with only six nations ratifying the Moon Treaty, the fact that eleven other nations, including Australia, France, and India, have acceded to or become signatories to the Moon Treaty creates a shadow of customary law that could grow such that non-parties could find themselves overshadowed by the penumbra of the Moon Treaty, especially if those non-parties take no action to refute its legitimacy.

2. The Space Preservation Treaty 2001 is a proposed treaty composed by The Institute for Cooperation in Space with the backing

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of approximately 274 NGOs. The treaty was designed to be an extension of the Outer Space Treaty which would establish a peacekeeping body that would oversee the ban on space weapons and enforce all applicable laws.

In the US, the Space Preservation Act was introduced for the fourth time to the United States House of Representatives by Congressman Dennis Kucinich on May 18, 2005. The Act is based on the Space Preservation Treaty.

No major support for the treaty has been expressed, and as it stands, the treaty has no major signatories.

other treaties and protocols governing the use of weapons in space

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 1963 (NTBT), or its formal name Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom that banned all tests of nuclear weapons, most notably in outer space except those conducted underground.

The origins of the treaty lay in worldwide public concern over the danger posed by atmospheric radioactive fallout produced by the above-ground testing of nuclear weapons. This problem had become an important public issue by 1955, but the first negotiations to ban nuclear tests foundered on differing proposals and counterproposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union, which were the two dominant nuclear powers at the time. During most of 1959, both the United States and the Soviet Union temporarily suspended their testing, but negotiations over the next two years were slowed by renewed Cold War tensions between the two countries. A gradual rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union was speeded up by the Cuban

missile crisis (October 1962), which vividly illustrated the dangers of nuclear confrontation.

The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty banned nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater but permitted underground testing and required no control posts, no on-site inspection, and no international supervisory body. It did not reduce nuclear stockpiles, halt the production of nuclear weapons, or restrict their use in times of war. Within a few months of signing by the three original parties in August 1963, the treaty was signed by more than 100 other governments, notable exceptions being France and China. The three original parties to the treaty, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia), have the power to veto treaty amendments. Any amendment must be approved by a majority of all the signatory states, including all three of the original parties.

Prior to the NTBT, the only nations to detonate nuclear weapons in outer space were the United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, ‘HANE’ was a sub-space experiment conducted by both nations. High-altitude nuclear explosions (HANE) have historically been nuclear explosions which take place above altitudes of 30 km, still inside the Earth’s atmosphere. Such explosions have been tests of nuclear weapons, used to determine the effects of the blast and radiation in the exoatmospheric environment. The highest was at an altitude of 540 km.

It was also to determine both feasibility of nuclear weapons as an anti-ballistic missile defence, as well as a means to defeat satellites and manned orbiting vehicles in space. High-altitude nuclear blasts produce significantly different effects. In the lower reaches of vacuous space, the resulting fireball grows much larger and faster than it does near the ground, and the radiation it emits travels much farther.

“It’s politically sensitive, but it’s going to happen.

Some people don’t want to hear this,

and it sure isn’t in vogue, but—

absolutely—we’re going to fight in

space. We’re going to fight from space and we’re going to

fight into space. That’s why the US has development

programs in directed energy

and hit-to-kill mechanisms.

We will engage terrestrial targets

someday—ships, airplanes, land

targets—from space.”

Commander-in-Chief of US Space Command, Joseph

W. Ashy, Aviation Week and Space Technology,

August 9, 1996

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The Soviets detonated four high-altitude tests in 1961 and three in 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, both the US and the USSR detonated several high-altitude nuclear explosions as a form of saber-rattling. The Soviet tests were meant to demonstrate their anti-ballistic missile defences which would supposedly protect their major cities in the event of a nuclear war.

The worst effects of a Soviet high-altitude test occurred on 22 October 1962 (during the Cuban missile crisis), in ‘Operation K’ when a 300 kt missile-warhead detonated near Dzhezkazgan at 290-km altitude. The EMP fused 570 km of overhead telephone line with a measured current of 2,500 A, started a fire that burned down the Karaganda power plant, and shut down 1,000-km of shallow-buried power cables between Aqmola and Almaty.

The NTBT was passed the following year, ending atmospheric and exoatmospheric nuclear tests.

space weapons development

Currently there is a broad range of potential space weapons that are being developed and a great variety of technology that can be used in their construction. The concept of a “space weapon” must be defined in order to distinguish from technology used for non-offensive military, commercial or civilian purposes. Space weapons consist of both weapons deployed in space, capable of attacking targets in space, the air, or the ground; and weapons against space objects, which can be launched in space, in air, or on the ground. There are two types of space weapons that can legally exist under international law: kinetic energy weapons and directed energy weapons. Kinetic energy weapons destroy by hitting another object at high speed, and have the potential to carry chemical explosives to assist in attack. Directed energy weapons destroy targets by focusing energy beams at the speed of light.

When considering all the categories of space weapons, the term ‘space’ must also be clarified: a weapon is space-based if it has a stable station past Earth’s orbit, or orbits the Earth more than once. The most common examples in the weaponization debate are space-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) as earlier referenced; satellite based systems for ballistic missile defence (BMD), and space-to-earth weapons (STEW). Anti-satellite weapons specifically target enemy satellites, while BMDs can use directed energy, direct impact or conventional explosives to destroy ballistic missiles mid-course. STEWs operate in space but project to strike against land, sea, or air targets. All three categories are a subset of kinetic or directed energy weapons. In addition, another serious possibility is the combination of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with space-based offenses. Currently, components of all these systems of weapons exist in some form, and are in development for further utility in space.

Historically there is no frontier explored or occupied by humans that has been free of conflict, and outer space looks to be no exception.

problems of space weaponization

The weaponization of space will have a snowball effect on international peace and security.

PAROS (The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) was formed in April 2008 at the annual organising conference of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space by members of the Network and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

To illustrate the problem of space weaponization, the PAROS Working Group describes it as follows:

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“The weaponization of space will destroy strategic balance and stability, undermine international and national security, and disrupt existing arms control instruments, in particular those related to nuclear weapons and missiles. These effects will inevitably lead to a new arms race. Space weaponization would seriously disrupt the arms control and disarmament process.

The United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the development of US ground- and sea- based “missile defences” have already increased tensions with Russia and have led to increased missile proliferation.

The deployment of these technologies or the development of space-based technologies will likely cause Russia, as well as the United States (in response to Russia), to make smaller and smaller reductions of their nuclear arsenals and to reject the development of new treaties to regulate nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

China would likely build more warheads to maintain its nuclear deterrent, which could in turn encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit.”

Besides creating a new arms race, the weaponization of space means proliferation of space debris. Such debris, resulting from 50 years of space activity, already poses a considerable hazard to spacecraft. This crowding problem could worsen as a large number of space weapons could be deployed in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The launching and testing of weapons would also increase space debris. Moreover, deploying space-based weapons in the increasingly crowded realm of LEO would leave less room for civilian systems. Those problems would also occur during periods of peace. If a number of satellites were to be destroyed during the course of a war, some scientists warn, they

would create so much debris that it would prevent future satellites from being stationed in space and generally limit space access.

Furthermore, perhaps the greatest danger posed by the weaponization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in LEO. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometre or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civilian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometres per second would wreck a satellite. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the space war game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. It is hardly inconceivable as wars have begun over smaller incidents.

key historic incidents

Historically, the earliest known incidents in space took place during the heart of the Cold War, but the most recent and significant incidents that sparked global outcry was an ASAT missile test conducted by China on January 11, 2007. A Chinese weather satellite—the FY-1C polar orbit satellite was

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destroyed by a kinetic kill vehicle launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Centre.

China initially refused to confirm whether such a test had taken place, but later confirmed on January 23, 2007. It was the first known successful satellite intercept test since 1985, when the United States conducted a similar anti-satellite missile test using an ASM-135 ASAT to destroy the P78-1 satellite.

Many spacecraft operate in, or at least transit, the area of space where the attack occurred, and there are concerns that debris from the test could pose a hazard to these satellites. Air Force Space Command data show that when the kill vehicle impacted the target satellite, debris was ejected from the impact point at velocities of up to 2,000 ft/s.

The test is the largest recorded creation of space debris in history with at least 2,317 pieces of trackable size (golf ball size and larger).

In April 2011, debris from the Chinese test threatened the International Space Station. This happened once again on 28th January 2012.

US intelligence agencies calculated in advance that the Chinese were ready for the exercise and programmed American eavesdropping and space tracking sensors accordingly to obtain maximum information.

The revelation of the ASAT test also sparked official condemnation or concern of the Chinese from the governments of Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao stated, “There’s no need to feel threatened about this” and argued that “China will not participate in any kind of arms race in outer space.” Ironically, China had been long advocating to ban space weapons, which had been rejected by the United States under George W. Bush.

Although more of a “policy weapon” at this time, the Chinese ASAT shows that the Chinese military can credibly threaten imaging reconnaissance and other satellites operated by the US, Japan, Russia, Israel and Europe.

Following the 2007 incident, US, who had not tested an anti-satellite weapon since 1985 launched its own strike in February 2008 to destroy a malfunctioning US satellite (USA-193), which demonstrated to the world that it also had the capability to strike in space, though at a much lower altitude than the Chinese test. The US claims that the strike was not a military test but a necessary mission to remove the threat posed by the decaying orbit of a faulty spy satellite with a full tank of hydrazine fuel. The test was called “Operation Burnt Frost” and received much scrutiny from other countries, mainly China and Russia.

The destruction of USA-193 came just weeks after Russia had drafted a new treaty to ban space weapons which was backed by China at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. This treaty would ban the use of weapons against satellites or other spacecraft. This prompted the Russians to accuse the United States of using the hydrazine gas as a cover-up to test an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. They claimed that several countries’ satellites that used toxic fuel have crashed into the Earth in the past but never warranted such “extraordinary measures”. To further this notion, others have speculated that the toxic gas would have not survived re-entry anyway, or that the risk would be extremely small. These speculations have made many believe this was in response to China’s ASAT test in January, 2007 and fear this would begin another “space race”.

US officials said they were not trying to protect classified information on the satellite or to demonstrate their capabilities to China.

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relevant international organisations, committees and conferences

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was set up by the General Assembly in 1959 to explore international cooperation in outer space activities, to encourage research and the dissemination of information on outer space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.

The Committee discusses and monitors the exploration and research of Space. The first launch of an artificial satellite propelled countries around the world into a competition for dominance not only on Earth but now in Space. The General Assembly wanted a committee to create peaceful international cooperation over this new territory. This committee was established in order to maintain close contact with government and non-government organisations, provide an exchange of information relating to outer space activities, and to keep international peace and cooperation in the exploration of space. The UN also wanted to encourage countries to research and explore this unknown frontier.

In 1961 The General Assembly asked COPUOS and the Secretary General to collaborate to ensure the activities and resources of the United Nations found peaceful resolutions to legal problems that may arise during exploration. When COPUOS officially started in 1959 it had 24 members but has grown to be one of the largest committees in the UN with over 70 members.

COPUOS oversees the implementation of five treaties and agreements:

1. “Outer Space Treaty” - The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the

Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

2. “Rescue Agreement” - The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space

3. “Liability Convention” - The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects

4. “Registration Convention” - The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space

5. “Moon Treaty” - The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

The Committee meets annually. COPUOS has achieved the most recent agreement related to outer space activities: in 2007 it adopted debris mitigation guidelines.

UNOOSA or The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs was initially created as a small expert unit within the Secretariat to service the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space established by the General Assembly in its resolution 1348 (XIII) of 13 December 1958. It became a unit within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs in 1962, when the COPUOS met for the first time, and was transformed into the Outer Space Affairs Division of that Department in 1968. In 1992, the Division was transformed into the Office for Outer Space Affairs within the Department for Political Affairs. In 1993, the Office was relocated to the United Nations Office at Vienna. At that time, the Office also assumed responsibility for substantive secretariat services to the Legal Subcommittee, which had previously been provided by the Office of Legal Affairs in New York. Questions relating to the militarization of outer space are dealt by the Conference on Disarmament, based in Geneva.

“Vulnerabilities do not necessarily

result in threats. In order to

threaten US space assets, military

or commercial, a potential adversary

must have both technological

capabilities and intent to use

them in a hostile manner. There is

little hard evidence that any other

country or hostile non-state actor possesses either

the technology or the intention to

seriously threaten US military or

commercial operations in

space—nor is there much evidence

of serious pursuit of space-based

weapons by potentially hostile

actors.”

Theresa Hitchens, Centre for Defence Information,

April 18, 2002

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The Office is headed by a Director and has two sections: the Space Applications Section, which organizes and carries out the United Nations Programme on Space Applications, and the Committee Services and Research Section, which provides substantive secretariat services to the Committee, its two subcommittees and its working groups. The Committee Services and Research Section also prepares and distributes reports and publications on international space activities and on international space law.

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs implements the decisions of the General Assembly and of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The office has the dual objective of supporting the intergovernmental discussions in the Committee and its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (S&T) and Legal Subcommittee, and of assisting developing countries in using space technology for development. In addition, it follows legal, scientific and technical developments relating to space activities, technology and applications in order to provide technical information and advice to Member States, international organizations and other United Nations offices.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a forum established by the international community to negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Established in 1979, it was the forum used by its member states, currently numbering 65, to negotiate the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

While the conference is not formally a United Nations (UN) organisation, it is linked to the UN through a personal representative of the United Nations Secretary General; this representative serves as the secretary general of the conference. Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly often request the conference to consider specific disarmament matters. In turn, the conference annually reports its activities to the Assembly.

past actions

The first significant action by the UN in regards to the space arms race debate was taken by the General Assembly, when it adopted the “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” a resolution that led to the creation of the Outer Space Treaty.

The Treaty has existed as the main legal obstacle to weapons in space, however as earlier elucidated, it implicitly allows for nuclear weapons or WMDs to transit space, other non-nuclear weapons or WMDs to be placed in orbit, all weapons testing, and the existence of anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons.

The current legal regime also includes the Moon Treaty of 1979 (preserving the moon for peaceful purposes and banning the placement of weapons on its surface or in its orbit), the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects and the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, all under the mandate of the COPUOS.

The UN Agenda has included prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) since 1981. The CD has been a key player in the debate since 1982, when the General Assembly called upon it to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS. It succeeded, and between 1985 and 1994 the Ad Hoc Committee examined the threat to global security posed by potential weapons in space. However, disagreements in the international community have stalled any progress on the issue. The CD was in the process of constructing a treaty until a disagreement between China and the US in 1995 stopped all progress, and this has prevented the assembling of the Ad Hoc committee necessary for negotiating PAROS since that time. The disagreement involved a Fissile Missile Control Treaty that was being formulated, that

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China would only negotiate it if the PAROS issue was resolved. Shortly after, the United States blocked PAROS, and effectively stalled both issues. The CD has been paralysed since that time.

However, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly is still in support of PAROS, and at the 2002 session the vote was 156 nations in favour, zero against, with two abstentions (The United States and Israel).

Support for a resolution of this topic has been nearly unanimous, clearly demonstrating the international consensus on the urgency of this problem.

In 2004, the UN General Assembly Resolution recognised that international operation of space should be reformed and enforced, and supported the Conference on Disarmament as the primary reform tool of disarmament negotiation.

However, while there is evident support for the regulation of weaponization, the international community continues to be unable to come to a consensus. In 2003, representatives from Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Sweden and Colombia introduced a proposal outlining nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This was a positive step, evident by the broad representation of nations submitting the proposal, yet the issue has still remained deadlocked.

suggested solutions

Debate on the issue has taken various forms over the years and the solutions have poured in from all avenues and points of view.

However, several factors affect a decision to ban all space weapons. While space is already militarized, it is not too late to introduce new treaties to enforce some form of oversight or accountability. The solution needn’t be over arching or radical

- in fact, the most likely scenario will be a compromise by all parties involved.

The first thing this committee will have to establish will be to define what weapons or military aids are acceptable in space and what are not. Once this is established, further measures may be taken to establish control of what goes into space.

Space is now a busy highway that requires careful management by the international community in order to preserve its utility.

Over the last four decades, the United States has become increasingly reliant on space, and so too has its military. The eyes and ears of the nation are now firmly rooted in space, which is exemplified by the fact that the military depends on satellites to support combat operations. As the United States becomes more reliant on space assets for its everyday existence, it becomes increasingly vulnerable to adversaries who, unlike Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, will make every effort to destroy the eyes and ears of US military forces.

Hence, the US has been the biggest obstacle to a treaty banning space weapons, however, it is not entirely opposed to the notion of a space watchdog.

A new Treaty on banning weapons and warfare in space is also proposed. However, such a treaty would have to cover at least three main components:

1. A ban on the deployment and use of all kinds of weapons in space, thereby extending and strengthening the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction in space so that laser and other directed energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons are also banned, as well as any other potential offensive innovations that military researchers or planners might dream up;

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2. Banning the testing, deployment and use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, whether earth-based or space-based; and

3. Establishing a code of conduct for the peace-supporting, non-offensive and non-aggressive uses of space.

Individually, none of these proposals is new. Similar ideas have been put forward on all three components over the past decades. In 1981, 1983 and 1985, the Soviet Union put forward several initiatives, including a draft treaty banning the possession, use and testing of ASAT capabilities. In 1985 Sri Lanka proposed a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons coupled with multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the stationing of weapons in space and the prohibition of any weapons (whether deployed on land, air or in space) designed to damage, destroy or interfere with any country’s space craft. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia undertook voluntary restraints on ASAT. The CD discussed space ‘rules of the road’, a draft code of conduct that encompassed a formal renunciation of actions that might interfere with the operation of space objects, whether civilian (which are in any case protected from interference under the ITU Convention) or military. None of these got anywhere, in part because space was not seen as a priority issue for arms control. What is new is that plans for space weapons are now being taken seriously.

If weaponization is allowed to occur, the nature of global relations in space will be in flux, for there is no precedent for interactions of this nature. As there is currently no regulation on the potential offensive uses of space or the manipulation of military equipment for such purposes, it is clear that an international “code of conduct” must be established by the global community.

Such an action would help preserve

economic and civilian industries within space, as well as guard against future misunderstandings in space activity. Such a code of conduct could consist of explicitly renouncing any action that interferes with civilian or military objects in space, as well as regulation on distance and speed of satellites in close proximity to each other.

Confidence building measures would also serve to regulate activity in space, and could potentially consist of declarations of intent of any objects launched into space combined with inspections of space programs to ensure transparency.

While both these scenarios are possible, most scholars argue for the middle ground in the regulation of weaponization. Limited arms control of space is one key element in this argument; allowing certain weapons and creating restrictions on their usage. In this case, the space deployment of ASAT, and BMD systems of space weapons against air and ground targets would be banned.

Other limitations would include regulations on altitudes for deployment and testing, a moratorium on testing and development, and restrictions on the number and level of defensive weapons on existing satellites. Anti-military zones would be another facet to consider, ensuring the protection of manned research missions and space stations against any type of conflict in space. These elements constitute a compromise of the two extreme views in the weaponization debate, and have the greatest chance of appealing to the international community.

However, the question of binding law looms large, regardless of what path is chosen in the debate. A UN resolution in the GA will have little legal authority, if any, in space. A treaty, or binding framework, is the only possible enforceable solution available to nations.

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Another suggested solution for implementation, outside of the establishment of the UN, has been a replica of the Ottawa Process, in which a concentrated group of states and organisations worked outside of traditional intergovernmental processes to establish a worldwide ban on landmines. Replicating this process in the space weapons debate would not be easy, but most experts agree that the concept is worth considering.

questions to consider

1. How advanced is my country’s space program?

2. Do space weapons pose a security threat to my nation?

3. What is my country’s stated stance on the issue?

4. If my country has not stated its stance, what is the stance of my closest allies?

5. What is the stance of my adversaries?

6. How much pressure is my country willing to exert on countries that are unwilling to submit to extensions of the Treaty on Outer Space?

7. Should there be a check on the number of satellites a country is allowed to operate?

8. Should dual use technology be subject to the scrutiny of any future ban, such as the ban on dual use nuclear technologies that can be used in civilian and military applications?

9. If a new treaty is established, what organisation will have the legal authority to monitor and enforce it?

10. What compromises am I willing to make in the formulation of such a treaty?

For any information regarding this council or the study guide, kindly contact a member of the executive board.

varun hemachandran chairman

[email protected]

jaideep soodvice chairman

[email protected]

akaash ampilidirector

[email protected]

study guide unga disec | ylgc 2012

Documents

space race

study guidegeneral assembly

general assembly resolution

outer space

dedicated website

research regime

thorough research

executive boarddear