the threat of those who understand: ways in which out-groups induce guilt

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The threat of those who ‘‘understand’’: Ways in which out-groups induce guilt SVEN ZEBEL 1 * , BERTJAN DOOSJE 1 AND RUSSELL SPEARS 1,2 1 University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2 Cardiff University, Wales, UK Abstract Two types of out-groups are hypothesized to make people feel guilty about their in-group’s misdeeds. Given its expertise and legitimacy, a disapproving victimized out-group should raise guilt. However, when a morally tainted perpetrator out-group is the evaluator, a need to differentiate the self from this out-group should characterize the guilt responses. This out-group’s disapproval should therefore diminish guilt, whereas some understanding toward the in-group’s position may paradoxically increase guilt. Moreover, these patterns are likely to be accentuated as in-group identification increases. Predictions were supported among Dutch participants (N ¼ 145) who read how either the current Jewish Dutch (victimized out-group) or Germans (perpetrator out-group) evaluated the Dutch collaboration with the Nazis. Results indicated that compassion for the victimized partially mediated the guilt responses. Implications for how perpetrator groups are persuaded to acknowledge their misdeeds are discussed. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. At the UN conference against racism in Durban in 2001, former colonial countries apologized for past slavery as a ‘‘crime against humanity’’ (Mixed emotions..., 2001). In light of this clear acknowledgment, the Dutch minister of Cities and Integration policies expressed ‘‘deep remorse’’ for Dutch slavery, and said that structural measures were necessary for the descendants of slaves (Nederland, 2001). This statement can be interpreted as an expression of guilt feelings on behalf of one’s nation which motivate reparation intentions. In this paper, we examine how others’ evaluations of the wrongs of one’s group influence such feelings of group-based guilt. In particular, we propose that the evaluations from the victimized out-group, or from a morally tainted perpetrator out-group, are likely to affect guilt. From a social identity perspective, in-group identification is expected to moderate this influence. GROUP-BASED GUILT: IT DEPENDS ON THE SOURCE To the extent that membership in social groups is an important part of people’s identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), events that harm or favor the social group people belong to vis-a `-vis relevant out-groups thus relate to the self and therefore acquire emotional meaning (e.g., Smith, 1993; Zebel, Pennekamp, et al., 2007). Thus, when people learn that their group has illegitimately mistreated or exploited an out-group, such appraisals may elicit feelings of guilt on behalf of their group membership (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Experiencing such feelings, people become motivated to repair the harm their perpetrator group has inflicted (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 39, 154–162 (2009) Published online 14 January 2008 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.492 *Correspondence to: Sven Zebel, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 25 January 2007 Accepted 13 November 2007

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The threat of those who ‘‘understand’’: Ways in which out-groups induce guilt

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Page 1: The Threat of Those Who Understand: Ways in Which Out-groups Induce Guilt

The threat of those who ‘‘understand’’: Ways in whichout-groups induce guilt

SVEN ZEBEL1*, BERTJAN DOOSJE1

AND RUSSELL SPEARS1,2

1University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands2Cardiff University, Wales, UK

Abstract

Two types of out-groups are hypothesized to make people feel guilty about their in-group’s misdeeds. Given its expertiseand legitimacy, a disapproving victimized out-group should raise guilt. However, when a morally tainted perpetratorout-group is the evaluator, a need to differentiate the self from this out-group should characterize the guilt responses. Thisout-group’s disapproval should therefore diminish guilt, whereas some understanding toward the in-group’s position mayparadoxically increase guilt. Moreover, these patterns are likely to be accentuated as in-group identification increases.Predictions were supported among Dutch participants (N! 145) who read how either the current Jewish Dutch(victimized out-group) or Germans (perpetrator out-group) evaluated the Dutch collaboration with the Nazis. Resultsindicated that compassion for the victimized partially mediated the guilt responses. Implications for how perpetratorgroups are persuaded to acknowledge their misdeeds are discussed. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

At the UN conference against racism in Durban in 2001, former colonial countries apologized for past slavery as a ‘‘crimeagainst humanity’’ (Mixed emotions. . ., 2001). In light of this clear acknowledgment, the Dutch minister of Cities andIntegration policies expressed ‘‘deep remorse’’ for Dutch slavery, and said that structural measures were necessary for thedescendants of slaves (Nederland, 2001). This statement can be interpreted as an expression of guilt feelings on behalf ofone’s nation which motivate reparation intentions. In this paper, we examine how others’ evaluations of the wrongs ofone’s group influence such feelings of group-based guilt. In particular, we propose that the evaluations from the victimizedout-group, or from a morally tainted perpetrator out-group, are likely to affect guilt. From a social identity perspective,in-group identification is expected to moderate this influence.

GROUP-BASED GUILT: IT DEPENDS ON THE SOURCE

To the extent that membership in social groups is an important part of people’s identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), events thatharm or favor the social group people belong to vis-a-vis relevant out-groups thus relate to the self and therefore acquireemotional meaning (e.g., Smith, 1993; Zebel, Pennekamp, et al., 2007). Thus, when people learn that their group hasillegitimately mistreated or exploited an out-group, such appraisals may elicit feelings of guilt on behalf of their groupmembership (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). Experiencing such feelings, peoplebecome motivated to repair the harm their perpetrator group has inflicted (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, &Manstead,1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004).

European Journal of Social PsychologyEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 39, 154–162 (2009)Published online 14 January 2008 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.492

*Correspondence to: Sven Zebel, Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018WBAmsterdam, The Netherlands.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 25 January 2007

Accepted 13 November 2007

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However, strong feelings of group-based guilt are not very common, because (a) guilt feelings are aversive due to theirnegative self-focus (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002) and (b) the negative evaluation of the in-group’sbehavior intrinsic to group-based guilt contradicts people’s motivation to perceive their group positively (Tajfel & Turner,1979). Thus, how people come to acquire and accept negative information about their in-group is crucial to predict whenpeople do experience guilt.

There is abundant evidence that people attach great value to information derived from members of their in-group,because such information is most relevant to their identity (e.g., Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion,1990; Turner, 1982). Consistent with this, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (2006) demonstrated howinformation about the in-group’s misdeeds from an in-group source reinforced feelings of guilt, especially among higheridentifiers who attach great importance and relevance to their group membership (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999).

However, we consider it equally important to identify ways in which out-groups might induce guilt. We can think of atleast two reasons for this. First, perpetrator groups are often reluctant to initiate self-critical guilt for the harm they haveinflicted upon other groups (e.g., Cohen, 2002; Leach et al., 2002). Second, if perpetrator groups are susceptible to theinfluence of out-groups, this might benefit those who they have victimized. That is, if out-groups can raise guilt inperpetrator groups, such guilt might stimulate an apology and support for compensation (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003), as well asreduce prejudice toward victimized out-groups (e.g., Pedersen, Beven,Walker, & Griffiths, 2004). Such changes due to thepersuasion of out-groups would offer new insights into intergroup dynamics and more hope for intergroup reconciliation.

In the present research, we examine two types of evaluations directed at a perpetrator group: a clear disapproval or someunderstanding for their position. Based on the literature on intergroup persuasion and criticism, a disapproval fromout-groups may readily be perceived as destructive and illegitimate (e.g., Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002; Hornsey &Imani, 2004) and may thus not elicit strong guilt. Given this sensitivity to a disapproval, an out-group’s expression ofunderstanding might be more likely to raise guilt. Through such ‘‘understanding’’ out-groups may indicate theirappreciation of the difficulty and complexity of the situation during which the wrongs were perpetrated, taking intoaccount the power of the circumstances. Such understanding might raise less sensitivity than an explicit disapproval.

We consider the influence of such expressions from two distinct out-groups: the victimized out-group and a morallytainted, perpetrator out-group. These are compared to identical evaluations from the in-group.

THE VICTIMIZED OUT-GROUP AS SOURCE OF EVALUATION

An important issue is how perpetrator groups react to the attitudes that the victimized out-group expresses about pastwrongs. We argue that these evaluations are difficult to discount, because the victimized out-group can be considered to bemost knowledgeable and the most legitimate source to evaluate these wrongs (see also Alcoff, 1991; Miceli, 1992).Therefore, its disapproval should result in relatively strong guilt feelings compared to when a less legitimate out-groupdisapproves (see below). This pattern should be prevalent among higher identifiers, who are motivated most to protect theimage of their in-group (if possible) in the face of threat (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Ellemers et al., 1999; Gordijn, Yzerbyt,Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006).

When the victimized out-group instead expresses some understanding, it seems more difficult to predict responsesamong the perpetrator group. If anything, we think this expression is quite unexpected coming from this source and mightbe interpreted as a sign of leniency on part of the victimized. Given this relatively positive evaluation, perpetrator groupmembers may feel inclined to reciprocate this with relatively high levels of guilt. Similarly, feelings of interpersonal guiltare strongest in relations that are characterized by feelings of concern and understanding for each other (Baumeister,Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).

A PERPETRATOR OUT-GROUP AS SOURCE OF EVALUATION

Many examples exist in which victimized groups have been hurt by more than one perpetrator group. Some formercolonies have had more than one colonizer (e.g., South-Africa, India). In addition, during world war II (WWII), the

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German Nazis were assisted by large portions of other national groups (e.g., Croatia, Netherlands, Baltic States) in theirpersecution of Jewish people. We argue that when the past misdeeds of one perpetrator group in such contexts areevaluated by another, such evaluations are likely to be rejected, especially among higher identifiers. Higher identifierslikely perceive these evaluations as a threat to the moral value of their group, and are therefore motivated to differentiatethemselves from this perpetrator out-group. This prediction fits a meta-analysis demonstrating that high groupidentification is associated with a strong motivation to differentiate the in-group from the out-group when intergroupdistinctiveness is low (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).

The present study involved Dutch participants and the WWII context to examine the influence of out-groups’evaluations. Thus, some read how the current German population evaluated howmany Dutch people collaborated with theGerman Nazis to persecute Jewish people. When faced with this morally tainted perpetrator out-group, Dutch higheridentifiers should be strongly motivated toward differentiation. One obvious way to do this is to sympathize with theJewish victims during WWII, because the lack of compassion for Jewish people clearly characterized the German Nazis.Thus, when faced with the Germans’ evaluations, Dutch higher identifiers should indicate high levels of compassion forthe Jewish victims during WWII to show that they are on moral ‘‘high ground.’’

In addition, higher identifiers’ need for distinctiveness should also direct their experience of guilt. When the perpetratorout-group disapproves of the in-group’s wrongs, the tendency to contrast from this evaluation by indicating weak guiltshould be stronger as in-group identification increases. The experience of compassion for the victims mentioned abovemay help to reduce guilt, as it moves the focus from the wrongs of the in-group to the plight of the victimized out-group.This is consistent with Iyer et al. (2003) who demonstrated that a focus on the victimized out-group elicits sympathy,whereas a focus on the in-group’s responsibility for wrongdoing induces guilt. Similarly, in another line of guilt research,we demonstrate that taking the perspective of the victimized out-group leads to increased compassion among higheridentifiers, but not to higher levels of guilt as it did among lower identifiers. Here compassion also served to inhibit guilt forhigher identifiers (Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2007).

When the perpetrator out-group expresses understanding, higher identifiers should seek differentiation by evaluatingthe in-group’s wrongs especially negatively, and thus guilt should increase. Thus, paradoxically, higher identifiers mayreport strong guilt feelings in response to signs of understanding from this tainted out-group to indicate that they thinkdifferently about their group’s actions, and thus that they are different from this out-group. Similarly, Ellemers, Spears, andDoosje (2004) demonstrated that sympathetic expressions from an out-group constitute a threat (and induce negativeaffect) when they do not fit the perspective of the in-group on the issue. Given this particular threat of those who‘‘understand,’’ both compassion and guilt should increase as a result of the need for differentiation. Therefore, compassionmay predict positively feelings of guilt in this context.

Taken together, it is hypothesized that in-group identification is positively associated with guilt when either thein-group or victimized out-group disapproves, but a strong negative relation is expected in the case of a perpetratorout-group. In contrast, expressions of understanding from the victimized out-group might be reciprocated with relativelystrong guilt. In addition, signs of understanding from the perpetrator out-group should lead identification to influence guiltpositively due to the need for differentiation among higher identifiers. Statistically, these predictions comprise a three-wayinteraction effect between the type of source, type of evaluation, and group identification on guilt. Crucially, we predicteda significant simple interaction between identification and type of evaluation when the source is the perpetrator out-group.We expect compassion to mediate this simple interaction: identification should predict positively compassion (irrespectiveof evaluation), and compassion should negatively predict guilt in the case of a disapproval, but positively predict it in thecase of understanding (i.e., mediated moderation, Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005).

METHOD

Participants

Students at the University of Amsterdam (N! 185) participated for course credit. Forty participants were omitted (18 werenot Dutch, 17 failed to indicate the correct source on the manipulation check, 3 had missing data, and 2 were Jewish, thevictimized out-group). The remaining 145 participants comprised 109 women (age M! 20 years; range 18–44).

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Design and Procedure

The design consisted of national identification as a continuous independent variable and type of source (victimizedout-group, perpetrator out-group, or in-group) and type of evaluation (disapproval or some understanding) as two betweensubjects variables.

National Identification

Participants first indicated their identification with being Dutch (eight items identical to Doosje et al., 1998; e.g., ‘‘BeingDutch is an important part of how I see myself’’; a! .94). Scales ranged from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree)(M! 5.14, SD! 1.08, range 2–7).

Persecution of Jewish People in the Netherlands During WWII

A text then described how the Nazi’s deported and murdered a high percentage of Jewish people (73%) in the Netherlandsduring WWII compared to other European countries (Moore, 1998). As two causes, it was mentioned that (a) when theNazis’ intentions were still unclear, many non-Jewish Dutch citizens reported which Jewish people they knew; and that (b)many Jewish people were easily traced because 80% lived in the seven largest Dutch cities, despite the many hiding placesthat non-Jewish people offered. We chose to include both negative and positive aspects of the non-Jewish Dutch’ actionssuch that the upcoming evaluations could both be applied.

Manipulation of Source

Participants were then told that their university had recently investigated how these events are viewed upon. In the in-groupcondition, it was stated that this research was done among a representative sample from the Dutch population. In thevictimized out-group and perpetrator out-group condition, the italicized words in the last sentence were changed to theJewish population in the Netherlands and German population, respectively.

Manipulation of Evaluation

In the disapproval condition, participants were then told to what degree this specific population felt that Dutch peopleduring WWII misbehaved (or ‘‘behaved properly’’ in the understanding condition). Accordingly, participants read that92% of this population indicated that they strongly disapproved of the Dutch behavior (or ‘‘felt that the Dutch behaviorwas good enough’’). In their view, the Dutch had not done enough (or ‘‘done enough’’) to help Jewish Dutch people.

Source Manipulation Check

Participants were asked to indicate which population had indicated that the Dutch had not done enough (or ‘‘done enough’’in the understanding condition) to help Jewish people: the French, correct population, Belgian or other population. Theitalicized words were tailored to fit the conditions.

Group-Based Guilt and Compassion

Participants answered two items from Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen’s (2004) and Doosje et al.’s (1998) guilt measure,(i.e., ‘‘I feel guilty about the negative things the Dutch people have done to Jewish people’’, ‘‘I can easily feel guilty about

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the bad outcomes received by Jewish people in the Netherlands brought about by the Dutch’’) complemented with twoitems (i.e., ‘‘I feel guilty when I am confronted with the negative things the Dutch have done to Jewish people’’, ‘‘Thebehavior of the Dutch toward Jewish people makes me easily feel guilty’’). Compassion comprised two items (i.e., ‘‘Isympathize with/feel compassion for Jewish people when I am confronted with the behavior of the Dutch duringWWII’’).A ‘‘principal axis’’ exploratory factor analysis clearly indicated the two expected factors (all loadings of the four guiltitems on factor 1> 0.83; a! .93; both loadings of the compassion items on factor 2> 0.85; r! .77, p< .001).

Source Appraisals

Participants indicated their agreement with ‘‘The (source population) knows well what has happened during WWII in theNetherlands.’’ (perceived expertise), as well as with ‘‘I think the (source population) has no right to make a judgment aboutthe Dutch during WWII.’’(illegitimacy of the source’s evaluation). All above emotion and appraisal items were answeredon scales ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 7(strongly agree).

RESULTS

All analyses comprised GLM procedures in SPSS, with national group identification as a continuous independent variableand the type of source and the type of evaluation as between subjects variables.

Consistent with a regression approach, we standardized all independent variables and first tested all main effectswithout specifying the interactions. In a second analysis, we added the two-way interactions. In the final analysis, weincluded the three-way interaction.1

Group-Based Guilt

In all three rounds of analyses, no main or two-way interactions emerged, all Fs< 2.25, ps> .10. However, the predictedthree-way interaction was significant, F(2,133)! 3.77, p! .026, partial h2! 0.054.

Firstly, this interaction indicated no simple interaction between identification and source in the understandingcondition, F(2,133)< 1. Consistent with predictions, this simple interaction did reach significance in the disapprovalcondition, F(2,133)! 3.30, p! .04. Simple slopes indicated that identification did not predict guilt significantly in thein-group disapproval condition, although the slope went in the expected positive direction, b! .29, SE! 0.31,M! 3.74,p! .36. In the victimized out-group disapproval condition, identification had a marginally significant positive effect,b! .42, SE! 0.22, M! 2.90, p! .06. As hypothesized, identification was significantly negative in the perpetratorout-group disapproval condition, b!"1.02, SE! 0.51, M! 3.06, p! .05 (see Figure 1). This latter slope differedsignificantly from the former two slopes, F(1,133)! 4.66, p! .03 and F(1,133)! 6.53, p! .01, respectively. No otherdifferences emerged.

Secondly, we examined the simple interactions between type of evaluation and identification within each sourcecondition. In the in-group source condition, it was not significant, F(1,133)< 1, indicating no identification effect in theunderstanding b! .04, SE! 0.22, M! 3.71, p! ns, or disapproval condition (above).

In addition, the simple interaction was not significant in the victimized out-group source condition, F(1,133)! 4.38,p! .10. As shown above, national identification influenced guilt marginally positively in the disapproval condition, butthis slope did not differ from the slope in the understanding condition, b!".17, SE! 0.28, M! 3.74, p! .34.Figure 1b shows that some understanding led to the highest guilt levels for this source, irrespective of identification. Asimple main effect analysis corroborated this: on average, understanding (M! 3.74; SE! 0.32) increased guilt comparedto disapproval (M! 2.90; SE! 0.23), F(1,133)! 4.46, p! .037, independently of identification.

1We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. Lower order effects can be quite different depending on whether higher order interactioneffects are included in the model, due to autocorrelation between the independent variables. The current approach should therefore provide the clearestpicture.

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Most importantly, the hypothesized simple interaction was significant in the perpetrator out-group source condition,F(1,133)! 4.22, p! .03. As expected, the significant negative slope of identification in the disapproval condition differedsignificantly from the positive slope in the understanding condition, b! .27, SE! 0.26, M! 3.26, although the latter didnot significantly differ from zero, p! .32 (see Figure 1).

Compassion

In the first round, no effects emerged, all Fs< 1.55, ps> .20. In the second round, the expected interaction between sourceof evaluation and identification was significant, F(2,135)! 5.25, p! .005, partial h2! 0.08, indicating that identificationdid not influence compassion in the in-group (b! .08, SE! 0.13, M! 5.26, p! .56) and victimized out-group sourcecondition (b!".21, SE! 0.16,M! 5.43, p! .19). As expected, identification did influence compassion positively in theperpetrator out-group condition, b! .59, SE! 0.19, M! 5.31, p! .002. Only the latter slope differed significantly from

Figure 1. The effect of disapproval or understanding expressions from different sources on feelings of group-based guilt as a functionof national in-group identification

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the former two, both Fs(1,135)> 9.06, ps< .004. In the third round, no other effects emerged, and the two-way interactionremained.

Mediated Moderation in the Perpetrator Out-group Source Condition

Following Muller et al.’s conditions (2005), a multiple regression analysis again demonstrated the significant interactionbetween identification and type of evaluation on guilt in the perpetrator out-group source condition, b!".64, SE! 0.27,t(37)!"2.32, p! .026. Second, identification influenced the mediator (compassion), b! .58, SE! 0.24, t(37)! 2.44,p! .026, whereas the interaction between identification and evaluation did not, b! .03, SE! 0.22, t(37)! 0.15, p! .88.

In the third step, we included the mediator as a predictor as well as its interaction with type of evaluation in the analysisof guilt outlined in step 1. Compassion had no direct effect on guilt, b!".11, SE! 0.22, t(35)!"0.52, p! .60, but theinteraction with evaluation was significant, b!".67, SE! 0.20, t(35)!"3.33, p! .002. This interaction confirmed thatcompassion reduced guilt marginally significantly in the disapproval condition, b!".69, SE! 0.35, t(35)!"2.01,p! .052, but significantly increased guilt in case of understanding, b! .66, SE! 0.21, t(35)! 3.11, p! .004. Due to thisinteraction, the formerly significant interaction between identification and evaluation on guilt turned non-significant,b!".25, SE! 0.27, t(35)!"0.93, p! .36. This reduction was significant, Sobel’s z!"1.96, p! .05. These resultsdemonstrate mediated moderation (see Figure 2).

Appraisals of the Source of Disapproval

Perceived Expertise

In the first round, the effect of source was significant, F(2,140)! 7.21, p! .001, partial h2! 0.09: participants perceivedthe victimized out-group (M! 4.93; SE! 0.16) to know better what had happened during WWII in the Netherlands thanthe in-group (M! 4.10; SE! 0.17) or perpetrator out-group (M! 4.20; SE! 0.19), both ps< .01. No other differencesemerged. In addition, the effect of type of evaluation was significant, F(1,140)! 4.10, p! .045, partial h2! 0.03,indicating that participants attributed greater expertise when some understanding (M! 4.61; SE! 0.15) compared todisapproval was expressed (M! 4.20; SE! 0.13). In the second and third rounds, these main effects remained; nointeractions emerged.

Perceived Illegitimacy of Evaluation

The effect of source was significant, F(2,140)! 11.18, p< .001, partial h2! 0.14, indicating that the victimizedout-group’s evaluation as expected was perceived as less illegitimate (M! 3.24; SE! 0.20) than the in-group’s (M! 4.31;SE! 0.21) or perpetrator out-group’s evaluation (M! 4.51; SE! 0.23), both ps< .001. No other differences emerged. Inthe second and third rounds, this main effect remained; no other effects emerged.

Figure 2. How compassion mediates the simple interaction between identification and type of evaluation on guilt, in the perpetratoroutgroup source condition. Note: Unstandardized regression weights are shown. #p< .05; ##p< .01; ^p! .052

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DISCUSSION

In the present research, our aim was to examine whether distinct out-groups can induce feelings of guilt about the wrongsof the in-group. A victimized out-group and a perpetrator out-group elicited such self-critical feelings among in-groupmembers, but importantly moderated by the specific evaluation expressed and the level of group identification.

First, the victimized out-group was perceived to be knowledgeable about and as a legitimate evaluator of these wrongs.A disapproval from this source proved therefore difficult to discount, explaining why higher identifiers felt stronger guiltfeelings compared to when a less legitimate out-group source disapproved. This extends findings from the interpersonaldomain of guilt, where opinions from victimized or offended people themselves are given particular weight and legitimacy(Alcoff, 1991; Miceli, 1992). In addition, some understanding from the victimized out-group seemed to be particularlyimpactful on guilt, perhaps because this expression was most in line with the perspective that participants themselves held(i.e., they attributed greater expertise to sources who expressed understanding compared to a disapproval). However, wealso think that participants perceive this understanding from the victimized out-group as quite lenient, although we do nothave direct evidence for this. Participants seemed to reciprocate this positive expression with relatively strong guilt (seealso Baumeister et al., 1994). Future research is needed to examine such reciprocation.

Second, a perpetrator out-group also induced guilt, albeit in a paradoxal manner. As hypothesized, evaluations from thissource were seen as most illegitimate, and the tendency to differentiate the in-group from this morally tainted out-groupwas reflected in compassion and guilt as in-group identification increased. That is, confronted with the perpetratorout-group, higher identifiers expressed stronger compassion for the victimized. This particular focus arguably helped todifferentiate themselves from this tainted out-group (see also Jetten et al., 2004). In addition, evaluations from thisout-group were strongly contrasted in terms of guilt: higher identifiers indicated particularly weak guilt in response to adisapproval, but somewhat stronger guilt feelings in reaction to understanding. Finally, the mediation analysesconvincingly demonstrated how both compassion and guilt serve this need for differentiation. In the case of a disapproval,increased feelings of compassion for the victimized helped higher identifiers to reduce their guilt feelings and thus tooppose this negative evaluation (see also Zebel, Doosje et al., 2007). In contrast, compassion for the victimized intensifiedguilt when higher identifiers wished to oppose the expression of understanding.

Importantly, alternative processes that underlie the effects of the perpetrator out-group source may exist, although weconsider the need for differentiation to be primary. For example, Heider’s balance theory (1958) might also explain thesefindings, although it could also predict a heightened regard for the out-group source to bolster a positive perspective onthe in-group’s actions in the case of understanding (which did not occur). From a need for differentiation perspective, thischange in source evaluation is unlikely. In addition, the above findings do not imply that compassion for the victimized isonly forthcoming in the case of a perpetrator out-group source: the overall mean was well above the scale midpoint.However, they do indicate that compassion among higher identifiers increases further when they feel a need to differentiatetheir social self from a threatening out-group.

One important implication of the present research is that support or understanding is appraised quite differentlydepending on the perpetrator group’s relation to the specific out-group expressing it (such support occurs in theinternational community we argue). On the one hand, such expressions from the victimized out-group might be perceivedas lenient and indicative of a positive attitude toward the in-group and as such be reciprocated with strong guilt feelings.On the other hand, as our research shows, similar understanding from out-groups that are viewed with skepticism or evendistrust on this issue may motivate perpetrator groups to affirm their high moral status through the expression of guilt.Paradoxically then, groups may be persuaded to ‘‘put on a hair shirt’’ when they are confronted with ‘‘threatening’’ supportand accept more readily their perpetrator role. It might also operate indirectly when others than the distrusted out-groupitself point out (perhaps strategically) this understanding.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Dutch Organization for Scientific Research funded this research (grant number 452-02-076). We thank threeanonymous reviewers and Editor Leonel Garcia-Marques for their helpful comments.

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Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 39, 154–162 (2009)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

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