Just war ethics, drone strikes and the American war machine -

Robert Densmore

We were descending quickly through an altitude of 15

thousand feet to make our final approach at Bagram air base,

Afghanistan, when I had my first encounter. The controller in the

tower had no idea - nor did we in the cockpit - that an Air Force

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was on something very near a

collision course with our EA-6B Prowler. In the early morning

hours of an otherwise unremarkable August day in 2004, I saw for

a split second with my own eyes the sleek body of what appeared

to be an MQ-1 Predator UAV (known in the media as a drone due to

it being remotely piloted). We completed what must have been our

30th combat mission and debriefed in the ready room. I gave very

little thought to the encounter. Within several years, I had left

the Navy, had embarked on a career in frontline and military

journalism and re-encountered the subject of UAVs time and again,

particularly in relation to their quickly expanding surveillance

role in places like the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel, the Horn of

Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Due to my experience in

1

military aviation and electronic countermeasures and my interest

in aerospace and defence technologies, I developed an expertise

in reporting on the use of these technologies in the media,

particularly in online publications as well as international

television news. Whilst learning of their capabilities, both

through open source and classified channels, I also learned of

the US’ growing reliance on this technology. US intelligence

agencies, along with the military, were increasingly relying on

drone ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) -

usually in combination with special operations ground units - to

prosecute targets in those regions mentioned above. This ISR role

naturally evolved into a strike role, as well. Most notable are

cases reported in the media of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen

and Afghanistan1.

Whilst drone warfare - or remote strike warfare - is perhaps

the most sensational of emergent US kinetic strike capabilities,

other notable force multipliers (kinetic and non-kinetic) have

contributed to what can best be described as a policy of

continuous kinetic warfare. Electronic warfare, for example, has

1 “A Wedding that Became a Funeral,” Human Rights Watch, accessed 10 April, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload_0.pdf.

2

evolved into network warfare, which enables airborne assets (like

the EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler) to interdict conventional

and military grade electronic networks (like the Internet, or

security protocols around nuclear power stations)2. This type of

warfare - a continuous state of combat operations - remains

relatively opaque to the US public due to the highly classified

nature of the technologies, tactics and units (special warfare).

Conversely, the missions that are the focus of these operations

also inherit high levels of secrecy: Navy SEAL advisors assisting

in the Joseph Kony manhunt, cyber attacks against Iran, China and

select Al Qaeda nodes, drone strikes carried out in the Sahel and

in the Arabian Peninsula.3 It is difficult to pinpoint a time

when US combat operations became continuous (AFRICOM stood up in

2005, the Predator became operational in 2000, Stuxnet deployed

in 2010), but it is reasonable to point to 2001 as the year when

the Global War on Terror coincided with expanding US military

operations. NATO ISAF will remove its last ‘combat forces’ from

2 Lt Col Jason Schuette, interview by Robert Densmore, King’s College London,December 12, 2010.3 “US confirms troops hunting Joseph Kony will be used across central Africa,” The Guardian, accessed 10 April, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/us-troops-uganda-joseph-kony.

3

Afghanistan in 2014, but special operations, combined with drone

operations and cyber operations, will continue without any sign

of interruption.

As we revisit some of the seminal positions on just war, it

is important to note that no Christian ethics case study or

argument has taken into account this de facto state of US

sponsored continuous global strike (kinetic and cyber/network).

This paper will consider three positions: Oliver O’Donovan’s

theory of just war judgment, Daniel Bell’s just war as a

Christian act; and Stanley Hauerwas’ non-violence and resulting

refusal to war. A fourth position (my own) simply encourages

readers to recognise that the nature of war has changed since

these theorems were written and debated. It focuses on the

reality that the US policy of continuous war (as an outgrowth of

counter-insurgency and the Global War on Terror) remains

relatively unchallenged by Christians in America; it further

suggests that traditional theories of just war and nonviolence

have limited relevance for the current state of American military

operations.

4

O’Donovan takes a relatively unique position in choosing to

blur the two modes of just war discussion - jus in bello and jus

ad bellum - though he admits to a principal flaw in advocating

just war, at least for Christians. Christians, he claims, are by

creed pacifists since they do not believe in any conflict that

can not be mediated by God.4 But he steps outside the peace/war

dialectic to build a case for just war, anyway. His primary

assertion is that just war, as waged by a belligerent state,

should only be an act of public judgment that stands in lieu of

action by a formal competent court. In this case, just war’s end

should be the establishing of stable governance by law for the

non-belligerent state. Though he does not name it as such, his

jus in bello doctrine (in praxis) holds up two key guiding

principles: discrimination (intent to damage only those forces

that intend material cooperation with wrong) and proportion

(attack is scaled to meet the threat at the point where peace may

be attained after victory).5 O’Donovan’s approach may be lauded

from a pragmatist’s perspective. Abstinence from armed conflict

4 O’Donovan, Oliver. The Just War Revisited. (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2003), 2.5 O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, 43, 61.

5

is impossible for Christians embedded in a US national politic

striving for secular standards within an international community.

But his notions of categories are dictated by conflicts he knows

- Britain’s experience of IRA-related insurgency and the Nato

doctrine of nuclear deterrence developed during the Cold War. In

the IRA case study, O’Donovan reacts to the British counter-

insurgency by suggesting that Britain consider the separatists as

opponents in war rather than as criminals. Without trying to

compare too closely the Real IRA to Al Qaeda, it still must be

pointed out that the former existed as a geographic phenomenon,

replete with relatively unified leadership, organisation and

geographic location. As UK citizens, real IRA could be tried in

British courts. In contrast, Al Qaeda presents no such salient

features: it retains no concrete command structure; it acts

locally but is dispersed globally (Al Qaeda in the Maghreb vs. Al

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for example). Likewise, AQ

sympathisers coalesce along more general categorical lines:

Islamic extremism or Salafism or similar. This encourages global

support and decentralisation, whereas the real IRA were

relatively isolated. In short, O’Donovan’s idea of folding

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insurgencies into a public act of judgment in war, where the

opposition is given credence by the belligerent in that state of

war, is limited rather than universal. The unique quality of Al

Qaeda and similar Islamist insurgencies is that they are marked

by a distinct lack of interest in co-opting recognised forms of

legal governance or power. There will never be a democratically

elected Al Qaeda Congress, for example. Rather, as evidenced by

AQIM’s excommunication of Mokhtar Belmakhtar, a senior Islamic

separatist leader in the Sahel in 2012, Al Qaeda shifts nodes of

power often.6 His ousting fragmented AQIM in a way that some

claim caused irreparable harm, but in other ways allowed the AQ

organisation to align quickly and easily with other groups. AQ,

in fact, is still credited with the successful attack on the In

Amenas gas facility in 2013, which resulted in the death of 39

foreign hostages, even though it was led by the then ‘ousted’

Belmakhtar. In short, AQ alliances and influences remain

extremely fluid, following religious and ideological lines that

cause friction when placed within O’Donovan’s model.

6 “North Africa’s Menace,” RAND Corporation, accessed 10 April, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR415/RAND_RR415.pdf.

7

Secondly, O’Donovan’s use of deterrence (and the possibility

of total nuclear war) speaks to a very limited scheme of warfare.

Unlike during the Cold War, most hostilities between nations

(including the US) are played out with conventional kinetic

weapons technology. Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples.

Likewise, US drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen and Pakistan are

carried out with LGBs (laser guided bombs) and Hellfire missiles.

Since the inception of the Global War on Terror, no noteworthy

restraints have been placed on drone operations. As I reported

for Al Jazeera, the acquisition of an air base in Niger will

permit AFRICOM (US Africa Command) to expand its 24-7 drone

flights into the African continent, with the goal of more regular

coverage of the continent and the Arabian Peninsula.7 Indeed, the

only limiting factor in prosecuting such missions has been the

pace of technological advancement of drone capability. Also, the

US has expanded its legal definition of drone targeting,

procuring permission from the Justice Department to target

7 “US drones in Africa: surveillance or strikes?” Al Jazeera, accessed 11 April, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/01/201313112397953160.html.

8

American citizens.8 To use O’Donovan’s metrics, these attacks

fall within the realms of reasonable proportion and

discrimination. They target single individuals or groups of

individuals with high levels of accuracy and precision.

Collateral damage, whilst regrettable, is still minimal compared

to say, carpet bombing Hanoi. O’Donovan says that proper

proportion and discrimination are the “decisive argument” that

can affect a political and peaceful end to conflict.9 Yet, there

is no sign that various groups of Al Qaeda or sympathisers are

reacting in a way that would reflect this theory. Finally,

O’Donovan presumes that armed conflict has a clear beginning and

end. I would argue that the use of cyber attack, network

interdiction and drone strike do have a clear beginning - the

latter two technologies were developed almost exclusively for

military application and so were brought online as soon as they

were approved for use. But I would also say that there is no

clear end to the use of these technologies by the US. I will

8 “Judge dismisses case against Obama administration officials over drone strikes on US citizens,” The AP, accessed 11 April, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2014/04/04/judge-dismisses-lawsuit-over-drone-strikes.9 O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited, 60.

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address the reasons why this is so after examining our two

remaining theories of just war.

Daniel Bell presents a just war approach that aims to

resonate, rather than conflict, with Christian tenets, and this

stands in contrast to O’Donovan’s treatment. Bell establishes his

theory that war can be made to be just - and so be made to be

Christian, in its approach to violence. Taking an Augustinian

chord, Bell argues that just war extends from an individual (vis

a via a Christian community) character; he imagines individuals

seeking to love and establish justice for their neighbours.10 The

foundation for this type of reaching out, he claims, is the

church, itself, which should aim to be an arena of politics, both

internal and external. The church politic should be well versed

in war and international affairs and national politics, to the

point it can advise and intercede in conflict along a ‘moral and

theological’ vision.11 Bell also adds a unique corollary to the

church as agent - the individual (both in the form of the soldier

and the citizen) has a part to play in determining the just cause

10 Bell, Daniel. Just War as Christian Discipleship. (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009), 83.11 Ibid., 108.

10

of armed conflict. Finally, Bell authorises preemptive and

preventive wars, leaning towards a de jure position on

justifiable intervention outside the boundaries of self defence.

Repelling an unjust attack, recovering that which was unjustly

seized, restoring the moral order: these all exist within the

domain of just war cause for Christians.12

But Bell’s account of war - and an idealistic Christian just

war - is intrinsically flawed. This is largely due to his

misconception of war and the way in which he believes combat can

be somehow controlled or moderated. I think the weakest link in

this logic chain is his presumption about human motivations. For

example, he supposes that some US combatants in Vietnam

restrained themselves from committing atrocities due to their

superior moral nature. This is entirely unfounded and belies the

complex way in which psychological resilience, chains of command,

impaired situational awareness, combat fatigue and countless

other combat related factors affect both individual and corporate

avenues to violence and killing. Bell contends there are clear

lines of moral behaviour in combat. Those are who are familiar

12 Bell, Just War as Christian Discipleship, 136.

11

with the nature of US combat in Vietnam - military psychiatrists

who treated this cohort and embedded journalists who documented

events on the ground - agree that the moral failure of atrocities

like My Lai arose from a fundamental need to dehumanise the

enemy, as well as from blurred ethical and moral boundaries.13

Several members of the US Army unit responsible for atrocities at

My Lai expressed grief and psychological breakdown as they

carried out orders to shoot women and children; others exhibited

similar behaviour whilst refusing to carry out orders. Only one

combat personnel at the scene actively countervened the

commander’s unlawful orders. In other, separate incidents of

atrocity in Vietnam, military chaplains have been implicated as

accessories to cover-up.14 But perhaps Bell envisions a Christian

military that would carry out these offensives. The strategic

aims of the Vietnam conflict, political scientists and historians

agree, were entirely secular (domino theory was the term given to

the foreign policy doctrine of stemming the spread of global

13 “Post-Vietnam Syndrome,” New York Times archives, accessed 11 April, http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30D17F63B591A7493C4A9178ED85F468785F9. 14 “Witness to Vietnam Atrocities Never Knew About Investigation,” The ToledoBlade, accessed 11 April, http://www.toledoblade.com/special-tiger-force/2003/11/08/Witness-to-Vietnam-atrocities-never-knew-about-investigation.html.

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communism). In light of these two conditions, it is difficult to

see how Bell intends to use his ‘Vietnam’ example to bolster his

moral claims to Christian jus in bello. In fact, his use of this

example calls into question his broader assertions of the

feasibility of controlling or moderating combat.

The killing of the other (I know that Bell envisions a style

of combat that ideally aims not to kill the opponent, though he

can find only one case study from the 12th century that might

support this praxis), military psychiatrists would contend,

requires the opposite of love. It requires the absolute hatred of

the other, as best depicted in the and themes of combat basic and

infantry training.15 In effect, combatants instinctively desire

to do anything other than engage the enemy with lethal force.

Only by reducing the opposition to something less than human can

combatants adequately prosecute the enemy. I would also contend

that objectifying the ‘neighbour’ as something less than human

is, by definition, a non-Christian act that distorts the kind of

‘Christian love through warfare’ that Bell envisions.

15 Grossman, Dave. On Killing. (New York: Open Road, 2002), 225.

13

Perhaps Bell intends to apply his church/state polity of

just war outside the known historical context of war, especially

as Americans understand the phenomenon. Indeed, I agree with his

statement that the American Protestant church is effectively

marginalised from the discussion of war and foreign policy.16 The

biggest spenders among religious Christian lobbying groups in

Washington DC contributed some USD 26 million in 2009.17 Defence

contractors Raytheon, General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin

trumped this amount on their own, contributing a combined USD 33

million in 2011.18 If Bell’s vision of Christian just war were

pushed to the top of Christian lobbying groups’ agendas tomorrow,

it is unlikely their voice would be heard over and above that of

the military industrial complex, among other competing non-

Christian political voices. This begs the question of whether

Bell’s view of a just war structure is relevant to modern

conflict. I suppose there are many conditionals that would need

16 Bell, Just War as Christian Discipleship, 118.17 “Religious advocacy efforts profiled,” Kintera, accessed 11 April, http://www.kintera.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=frLJK2PKLqF&b=3880561&ct=11578751&notoc=1. 18 “Lockheed Martin leads expanded lobbying by US defense industry,” Washington Post, accessed 11 April, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/lockheed-martin-leads-expanded-lobbying-by-us-defense-industry/2012/01/26/gIQAlgQtaQ_story.html.

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changing: a partially revised political system responsive to

church inputs; a revised methodology of war that would redefine

‘limited war for limited purpose’; a more concrete creative

vision for how to dissect self-defence from combat. It is more

easy to imagine Christian character formation through the

institution of the church, as concrete systematics (creeds and

liturgical practice, for example) are part of modern ethics

parlance. Yet again, I bring into this discussion the reality

that continuous US combat operations - partly obscured by

security classifications (TS/SCI or Top Secret/Sensitive

Compartmented Information) - have been growing over the past

decade with no sign of being limited in capacity or time. Public

knowledge is specialised but not completely restricted as media

continually report the effects of cyber and drone attacks (so the

church can not claim to lack information on war).

Additionally, the legal framework supporting these combat

operations is spread equally among the Defense and Justice

Departments, further ensuring that policy remains transparent to

the public. Thus information in the public domain is not an

issue; neither is proportionality or discrimination as drone

15

strikes and cyber attacks tend to produce small numbers of

casualties. And yet, the nature of these continuous wars is that

they continue, largely without input from civil society,

Christian or otherwise. For example, media polls have shown that

only 27 percent of Americans support drone strikes if those

operations put innocent civilians at risk.19 In Pakistan alone,

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates, between 416 and

951 civilians, including 168 to 200 children, have been killed.20

In January, lawmakers rejected a bill that would transfer drone

operations from the CIA to the Pentagon - a move that would have

granted more public oversight to these operations. It would seem

the American public has shaped their views on drone strikes, but

the inertia required to shift the way in which such operations

are governed is lacking. I would venture to say Bell would want

the church politic to weigh into this discussion - and yet, there

is no evidence to show that the church is either interested or

equipped to take on this call.

19 “Drone program poll: The public does not uncritically embrace targeted killings,” Huffington Post, accessed 11 April, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/15/drone-program-poll_n_2696352.html.20 “The toll of 5 years of drone strikes: 2,400 dead,” Huffington Post, accessed 11 April, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/23/obama-drone-program-anniversary_n_4654825.html.

16

Finally, we turn to Stanley Hauerwas for options in

addressing just war. In War and the American Difference, he begins by

accepting a tenable theory on the relationship between faith and

polity in the US. That is, America is entirely more secular than

many Europeans believe it to be, not because faith is lacking.

But rather, it is because Americans choose to believe in ‘belief’

over and above believing in God.21 Essentially, Hauerwas paints a

picture of a nation that has historically co-opted the tradition

and trappings of Christian faith, all the while replacing

Christian tenets with the superstructures of free market

economics, civic loyalty and global military intervention.

Hauerwas accepts from Reinhold Niebuhr that war is a faith-

damaging enterprise, but goes further by arguing that civic non-

violence does not have to be an illusory apparition.

“Christians,” he says, “are not called to nonviolence because we

believe nonviolence is a way to rid the world of war; but rather,

in a world of war, as faithful followers of Jesus, we cannot

imagine being anything other than nonviolent.”22 Also, for

21 Hauerwas, Stanley. War and the American Difference. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,2011), 15.22 Hauerwas, War and the American Difference, 38.

17

Hauerwas, there is a distinction between directly addressing war

(as Christians) and living lives faithful to the teachings and

life of Jesus Christ. One may assume the mantle of nonviolence in

order to address war and to bring about its ending, but that is

not the point of Christian faith practice. The point, he says, is

fidelity to Christ. The practice of this fidelity, by definition,

encompasses the living of life without war.

Hauerwas also rejects the moves that both O’Donovan and Bell

make in linking justice and peace. The latter two believe that

just governance is the will of God and that by achieving justice,

just war achieves peace, even love. Hauerwas rejects this

causality because, fundamentally, he rejects the possibility that

war can be a ‘good’. We can trace his line of reasoning back to

Yoder, who, in turn, held Christ up as a messianic harbinger who

foundationally stood on a tradition of nonviolence.23 In fairness

to Hauerwas, his line of arguing is not cemented in a category of

inaction. His conviction, though times elusive, comes across in

The Peaceable Kingdom where he calls Christians to live out peaceful

lives. “We must remember that the violence that provides the

23 Yoder, John Howard. The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 92.

18

resources for the powers of the world to do their work lies in

each of our souls.”24 The key is employing our individual and

corporate activity into ‘doing’ - into creating a pattern of life

that is centred on Scripture and on a Messiah who chose a

spiritual and political life that was nothing if not engaged (but

also inherently non-violent). In this, Hauerwas says, “we come to

experience that peace in ourselves and with our friends here and

now because we have the assurance that God has made his peace a

present reality through his spirit.”25 We are meant to live out

this state of grace, not because it presents an alternative

reality to war, and not because the human condition is fractured

along soteriological fault lines such that violence and killing

are inevitable. Rather, we live out this grace because it is

founded on truth. This is the root cause that Hauerwas brings to

the just war conversation; indeed, it sidesteps the possibility

of just war by reframing it as a compromised starting point. Just

war, Hauerwas might say, begins with the assumption that humanity

must fix its own problems, using the tools of scriptural

24 Hauerwas, Stanley. The Peaceable Kingdom. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983), 150.25 Ibid.

19

precedence, political theory, and secular politics. Deeper still

is the supposition that the ‘truth’ as Hauerwas presents it, is

philosophic or dogmatic. Rather, this ‘truth’ is a person whose

name is Jesus.

Hauerwas also considers first practical steps Christians

might take in exemplifying this non-violent way of life. “The

greatest gift … that Christians can give the world is to refuse

to kill other human beings because we are Christians.”26 Though

Hauerwas posits other possibilities for human activity in a war-

familiar world, perhaps this is the most significant action that

Christians can take.

From an ethics standpoint, it is easier to preference

Hauerwas’ stance over Bell and O’Donovan simply because of the

former’s efforts to ground any just war discussion in rich

theological soil. It is quite easy to criticise the latter two in

their seeming eagerness to jump to secular authorities in

devising strategies to act out a Christian style of conflict.

Bell and O’Donovan discuss the frailty of international law in

bringing equity and peace to the global political stage. Both

26 Hauerwas, War and the American Difference, 108.

20

fall back on a kind of Augustinian interpretation of war as ‘love

of neighbour’. Of course, as the canon attests, Christ said no

such thing. Old Testament references to elements of just war are

valid and plentiful and Yoder is one who takes these quite

seriously, particularly as regards the Joshanic wars, for

example, as well as God as primary agent of war depicted in 2

Kings: 18-19.27

However, we must still question the vaguity with which

Hauerwas approaches ‘nonviolence’. It is so fully reliant on

grace that it perhaps rules out human agency, altogether. Perhaps

this is too critical, but it would be helpful to know, for

example, how Christians might faithfully respond to drone strikes

or cyber attacks, particularly as there is no indication that

their lifespan is limited. The operational intensity and human

impact of these modes of war may be a far cry from the kind of

‘total war’ imagined by doomsdayers during the height of the Cold

War, but there are no indications that they will not escalate in

the near future. They are, after all, protected under the

umbrella of secrecy and defended as a national security measure.

27 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 81.

21

Unless we can convert all drone operators, their chains of

command, the CIA and the Commander in Chief to Hauerwas’ view of

faith based lives dominated by an ethic of Christian grace,

change likely will not happen. It does not seem enough for

American citizens to live Christian lives, recalling in

particular that public opposition to drone strikes (that endanger

civilian lives) remains high. In fact, it is the court of

international opinion that shows the most promise in checking

America’s policy of continuous war.28 Both O’Donovan and Bell

were dismissive of past UN attempts at moderating the methods and

means of warfare. Yet, it remains the only institution with

sufficient influence capable of slowing US aggression.

Perhaps we cannot presume that Hauerwas’ call for Christian

nonviolence must only be limited to Americans. Having worked in a

non-American Christian country for the past seven years - and for

media outlets that carried non-American editorial perspectives -

I can attest to what seems to be a truly international opposition

to American drone strikes and cyber attacks. It is also perhaps

28 “UN report calls for independent investigations of drone attacks,” The Guardian, accessed 11 April, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/10/un-report-independent-investigations-drone-attacks.

22

telling that whilst no official statement on drone strikes from

churches in America has been offered, the Methodist Church in

Britain has officially condemned their use (by both US and

British forces).29 It would seem that this would be the first

logical step for Christians in America and there are several

political realities that necessitate a response from the American

church. Primary among these is the lengthy and detailed service-

wide doctrine, crafted by senior US military and comprehensively

applied in Afghanistan, called counter-insurgency doctrine

(COIN). As a combined set of strategy and tactics, techniques and

procedures (TTPs), COIN authorises protracted military

engagements, unrestricted by timescales, resources or geography:

“Field Manual 3-24 also makes clear the extensive length and expense

of COIN campaigns: ‘Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus,

COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time

and resources.’”30 Even worse, the elements of COIN that have

29 “Church argues for Just War ethics in drone attacks,” The Methodist Churchin Britain, accessed 11 April, http://www.methodist.org.uk/news-and-events/news-archive-2012/church-argues-for-just-war-ethics-in-drone-attacks.30 “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, accessed 11 April, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan.

23

been extrapolated from Iraq and Afghanistan - and applied to

territories with whom we are not officially at war - have no

relevance to a political end, much less a Christian end. “The US

experience in Afghanistan should serve as a reminder that war

should be waged only in pursuit of clear political goals - ones

informed by military advice but decided on by responsible

civilian leaders.”31 Rather, the political methodology in play

today is a COIN offensive, planned and executed by an exclusive

triumvirate: senior military, intelligence agencies and the

executive branch. Not only do clear political goals do not exist

(killing insurgents and Islamic militants is not a political

goal, I would proffer), but responsible politicians (read

‘civilian oversight’) do not participate in this new state of

continuous war.32

It is indeed difficult to move back and forth between the

academy’s treatment of Christian ethics and the real world of US

counter-terror/counter-insurgency operations. To his credit,

31 Ibid.32 “Delays in effort to refocus CIA from drone war,” New York Times, accessed11 April, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-war.html?_r=0.

24

O’Donovan gives thoughtful treatment to jus in bello, with a keen

interest in addressing the close calls of nuclear deterrence and

stockpiling reminiscent of the Cold War. Bell wishes to crash the

barriers between belligerent and enemy, reframing Christian war

in the context of self and neighbour. Hauerwas abandons just war,

siding with Yoder in a call to nonviolence. But I fear none of

these positions remotely comes close to addressing the

realpolitik of America’s continuous state of war - or where or

how American Christians might make a stand. I would argue that it

has become a political possibility in this country to live the

semblance of a Christian life and remain miraculously untouched

by global events, many of which are impacted (and in a negative

way) by American policy. What is even more frustrating is the

fact that I can no think of no theological means to bridge the

gap between that place in which American Christians stand - and a

more just (and less violent) world. Perhaps that is work the

American church must do, itself.

25

References

Al Jazeera. 2013. “US drones in Africa: surveillance or strikes?” Accessed 11 April. http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/01/201313112397953160.html.

Bell, Daniel. Just War as Christian Discipleship. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2009.

Foreign Affairs. 2013. “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan.” Accessed 11 April. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan.

26

Grossman, Dave. On Killing. New York: Open Road, 2002.

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