bacrim: colombian bandas criminales emergentes
TRANSCRIPT
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Tirrorist dttack fu, the FARC u'itlt a car bomb at the headquorten of Carucol Rodio. The atmck lefi 43 peopl,
Photo by: Julidn Ortega ,
Al ua ro uri bc, Presi de t t r li ( 1, i',i,,; b j. t
Photo b.1,: Centerfor Anerican i)rogrr:
include New Illegal Armed Groups
(NIAGs)a and neo-paramilitaries. Among
the gangs identified as BACNM are:
Aguilas Negras, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de
Colombia, Banda Criminal de Urabd, Los
Urabenos, Los Machos, Los Pahas, Renacer,
Nueud Gcneracidn, ioi R*trojos, ERPAC,
Cordillera, Cacique Pipintd, Grup\Marth Llanos, Los Neuados, and La
Ofcina de Enuigado.s
BACzuM are believed ro operate in 31
of Colombia's 32 departments. Estimates
of their strength range from a Nadonal
Police assessment of 3,870 members to an
Institute of Studies for Development and
Peace (INDEPAZ) assessment of 7,000.
Human fughts Watch places the estimate
higher at 10,000 members.6
The top six groups include: Zos
Urabefios, in rhe departments oflChocd, Boliuu Magdahna and Na
Santandcr; Los Rastrojos, in Naific
and Putumayo; and El Bloque Men
Libertadora deWchada, Renacer at
Machos, in Meta, Wchada and Gu,
In 2008 Bacrim presence was rr
in 259 municipalities, by 2009 in
in 2010 360, and in 2011 they w
found in 347 of Colombiat l,lOimunicipalities (a slighr decrease).
20ll Los Rastrojos susrained a pre
in 207 municipdides, while Zas {
were present in l8l, Agaihs Negr,
present in 88 municipaliries, l.o-,.
in 87, and ERPAC in 36 torvns. 1
situation is reportedly mosr criric
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pioct.;; tlltic/t 22, 20A6.
Plttro b-1,: DEA Public Alfiir'
Antioqufa, Bolivar, Choc6, Sucre, and
Valie.s The ERPAC ofrcidly surrendered
to the government in 2011, but less rhan
half its members actually surrendered.
The remaining members conrinue rheir
operations as part ofnvo riral facrions: E/BloEte Meta and Libertadores de Wchada.')
BACRIM ACTIVITIESThe BACNM are involved in drug
trafficking, extortion, unaurhorized
mining, and smuggling contraband.
Horvever, rheir core competencv is
deeply rooted in narcotrafficking,
including gros,ing coca, processing coca
into cocaine, and moving cocaine to
international cartels. The BACRIM are
also involved in gambling, prostirurion,
unauthorized logging, extortion, arms
trafficking and fuel smuggling.r')
The BACRIM rvork rvith a range ofgangs and guerrilla groups to sustain the
drug trade. According to a BBC reporr,
rhe Colombian government believes thar,
"in some regions rhei-have joined ic:;.sri'ith lefi-rvir.rs ret,=-.
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:.::: ;r'-:E- ::.:i ;i: :: q opr:;iir-rns, rr'hile
in other areas the new gangs and the
guerrillas have clashed."r'
The various BACRIM bands also fight
among themselves for turf and conrrol
of illicir trade florvs. For example, bardes
benveen Los Rastrojos and Los Uabefios in
2006-2009 left 2,300 dead during that
three-1's21 timeframe. I r
Public corruption is also a key feature
of BACRIM acriviry. In order ro protect
their turfand business interests and
gain freedom oFmovement, BACRIM(like other organized crime entities)
suborn public officials through bribes
and corruption. Over 200 contemporary
Colombian anticorruption investigations
involve BACRIful connections with
officials. These officials include police,
securiry forces, municipal council
members, and ma1,ors. il
The corrosive presence of BACUivl-linked corruption is believed ro be
rhe lestro- of linkaees benveen public
olficials and rhe BAczuivlt paramilitary
rrc.ie;essor rhe AUC, The currenr polidcai
po*'<r of rhe BACzuM is assessed to be less
subsrantial than that of rhe AUC, but ithas the potential to gros,ifleft unchecked.
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TRANSNATIONALCONNECTIONS
BACRI\{ have spread their tentacles
beyonci Colombia's borders. This
expansion results from a dual desire to
enhance profir and to elude the reach
of the Coiombian government. This
expansion is also a consequence ofthe
global iiii;ir Corvs: the markets are global
and rrarsrarional actors gain competitive
advanuge. Lo: Rastojos are believed to be
allies of :he -\fexican Sinaloa Cartel rvhile
their rila.s Lo: Urubefios are linked to
Sinaloas .nem\-' Los Zetas.ri
Cenai::lr'. the expanding
transn;:lotal reach of \lexican cartels
and trar.::a::onal gangs llke luloru
Saluarn,:,:,; -\iS-i,l) have contributed to
this sear:h i: ::ci','rnarkets. BACzuM
leaders i:;r'c f.:l ;ound in Argenrina,
Bolivia. Hond'::;s. Panama, Peru, and
Venezueia. 1: .rii:r:sn. BACRIM are
believed ro b= i-:;;:--.'operating in Spain
and Irah-. u'hi:.' ::-=-.- :an earn three times
the profir rhe"';.r: ::i:ze liom uading
with Mexican iirt:,: n. Sp,tiiishfor /utniitr'r, i-, t Li.S., Eirrupt',tit titrl \\'?itr'rit Hetnispltti't'
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ADAPIIVE ACTORS ANDSTATE CHALLENGiS
Colombia has beer r"'o:s:::g :..'."'::i
demobilizing guerrilia srollrs. -i. :.::: .-,:
a "transitional j ustice" in i riarivt t,.',r ;tipeace, the Colombian Congress appro'. cja "Legal Framervork for Peace." As
part of that framervork, guerillas rvere
recognized as actors in armed conflict and
given lenient judicial treatment on their
surrender. Members of the BACRIM
are excluded from this approach (rvhich
.,''as applied to ERPAC in 2011 and the
-{UC in 2003 on the rationale that they
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a:,1-.c:l:a;: :c :j:. s:aie. Like Other"crir:::::;i i:rsu:Ee:ris." rhel seek to avoid
inrertirence tiom tl're government. rs
Ther- do so bv corrupting and co-opting
srate ofEcials and institutions. Co-opred
officials gii'e the BACRIM cover and help
them elude prosecution. The BACRIM
morphed from guerrilla groups,
becoming militarized criminal enterprises
(essentially, third generarion gangs),re
using violence as a means of seeking
control of narco enterprises and other
criminal activities (mainly extortion).
As larv professor David Attanasio
obsened, "BACRIM primarily affect
marginalized populations of limited
interest to state officials. The main areas
rvhere BACRIM have control are rural
areas suirable for the manufacturing
or transportation ofcocaine and
impoverished zones in cities."rolVhile many note the BACzuM,
iike other brigands, have a sparse
politicai agenda, the gangs do have a
Fucl . ,'
political dimensio:--. -: -\ledellfn the
Urrbefios claimec :;s;..nsibiliry for a
drop in murders in ::. ;iiermath of a
criminal pacr btn"'..: :hemselves and
the Ofcina d,' E,:::_a.:,;':,.:t The pact
and drop in n:u;j=: i:*..g 61srt political
dividends. es;c::.i..-.' :. rhe "Urabeios
like ro mair::;::: ::; f :erense they are
a polirical o::::::::::,^:: in the mold oftheir param:-l:f,::' l:.!i3cessors, capable ofreplacinq rh. s:.::. -,.ltn ir fails."r2
CONCr-uSiCN:LESSONS iOR SECURITY
The BACRII'1 s.e.: dominance in
criminal enre:prist. as *'ell as territorial
and social con::o, :r the areas they
operate, in orde: lc susrain organizational
viabiliry and profitabilin. In sustaining
viabiliry and proiitabilin, they challenge
the state. Trvo maior lessons emerge. First,
relying on vigilanres to combat rebeis
is fraught rvith danger. The vigilantes
(paramilitarie s or a u to defensa s) need
funds to operate and often garner them
from criminal enterprises. Second, armed
groups rarelv torallv abandon violence
rvhen the conflicr is over. Opportuniryfor rebels, criminai soldiers, and gangsters
is limited. Violence and profir (as u'ell
as plunder) often become rheir "reason
for being." This is a coniinuins concern
in Colombia, rvhere the governmenr
is negotiating a peace *'irh rhe FARC.
Like the AUC before them, many
FARC operatives ma1, find opporruniry
among the BACRIM. In addition, inMichoacin, lvfexico, u,e are also seeing
a rise of autodefensar (self-defense forces,
aka vigilantes) as the state appears
ineffective or insufficient for combatting
drug cartels. It may be a function of time
before that current crop ofvigilantes
mimics the BACRIM. o
ABOUI THE AUTHORMr. Sulliuan (PltD) is n seniorfellou
at Snnll lVar: Journal-El Centro and
an adjuitct rese,rrclrcr at tlrc Fundacidu
\lortex itt Bogotri, Colorubia. He serues
tts d lieute,Mrtt with the Los Angeles
Sheriffs Departntent.
ENDNOTESrFor an overvierv ofconverging
illicit nenvorls, see Cznuetgnce: IllicitNetuorhs and National Security in tbe Age
of Globalizatiaz, ed. Michael Miklaucic
and Jacqueline Brerveq National Defense
University Press, 2013.rErnesto Suirez G6mez. "BACRIM:
Heirs to Colombiat paramilitary
groups." Infosuryhoy, September I 8,
20 I 3. Available at: http://infosurhoy.
com/en-GB/articles/saii/features/
main/ 20 13 I 09/ I 8/feature-02.
r0 iln'), ltit estii)tdftd .570,000 oJ-cocaitte sit on thefigltr dech oJ'rltt gtrided-titissileJiigre USS Citr (FI:G 52) rtlier
bciitg seizerl itrriitg Operurioit t\,Itrrillo. Pltoto b1': tlltss Coituttuttic,ttiott Speciilist lst Class hu \Y/. Anrlcrsoir
Thr: Cotnrter Tcrrorist - April,/Moy 2014 53
jG6mez,2013.
jNIAG is the term prefered by
rhe International Crisis Group,
see "Dismantling Colombiat Neu,
Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from
a Surrender." Latin America Report,
No4l, June 8,2012. Available at: http://rvrvrl,. crisisgroup. org/en/regions/latin-
america-caribbean/andes/colombia/04 1 -
dismandin g-colombias-new-illegal-
armed-gro upsJessons-from-a-surrender.
asPx.
S"BACRIMs, Colombiat "New'
Nightmare." LatAm-Threads, August
18, 2012. Available at: http://latam-
threads. blogsp or.coml 20 l2l 08/bacrims-
colombias-new-nightmare.hrml.6G6me2,2013.
-G6mez,2013.
t"Bandas criminales operan en 347
municipios." El Especrador. Nolember
17. 2011. A'ailable at: http:/ilss-.elespecrador.com/impreso/remadeldia.l
articulo-3 I I 652-tiandas-criminales-
operan-3 47 - municipios.e"ERPAC." InSight Crime. Available
at: htp://wvw.insightcrime. org/groups-
colombia/erpac.rolacAm-Threads, 20 I 2.I r"Profiles: Colombiat armed groups."
BBC Nervs, August 29,2013. Available
ar: hrtp://s"nrr'.bbc.co,ul</nervs/rvorld-
larin-america- I I 400950.:iGomez. 1013.I iJames Bargent. "lnvestigarions
Show Reach of BACRIM in Colombia."
InSight Crime, November 5,2013.Available at: http://wwwinsightcrime.
org/news-briefs/over-200-investi gations-
shorv-reach-of-bacrim-corruption-in-
colombia.raPaula Delgado-Kling. "Mexican
Cartels Making Territory in Colombia,
Allying rvith Bacrim and FARC." Talking
About Colombia, March 12,2013.Available at: hrtp://talkingaboutcolombia.
coml 20 13 I 03 I 12 I mexican-cartels-
marking- territory-in-colombia-allying-
with-bacrim-and-farc/.t5G6mez,2013.
r6Mariel Perez-Santiago. "Colombiat
BACRIM: Common Criminals orActors
in Armed Conflict?" InSight Crime,
July 23,2012. Available at: http://s,rvrr,. i nsightcrime.org/nervs-analysis/
colombias-bacrim-common-criminals-or-
actors-in-armed-conllict.: -David.
-\rranasio. "Emerginq \bices:
Drug Cartels. Bacrim. and Orher
lVlilitarized Criminal Organizations-A
Nerv Role for the Inter-American
System?" Opino Juris, August 29,
20 I 3. Available at: http://opiniojuris.
orgl 20 13 I 08 I 29 I emergtng-voices-drug-
cartels-bacrim-militarized-criminal-
organizations-new-role-inrer-american-
system/.rJohn P Sullivan. "From Drug
\fars to Criminal Insurgency: Mexican
Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal
Insurgency in Mexico and Central
America, and their Implications for
Global Securiry." Vortex'W'orking Paper
No. 6, Bogotd: Fundaci6n Vortex, March
20 12. Available at: http:/iwwwscivortex.
org/6FromDrug\ilarsCriminallnsurgen
cy.pdf.
'eJohn P Sullivan and Robert J.
Bunker. 'A Crucible of Conflict: Third
Generation Gang Studies Revisited."
Journal of Gang Research, 19.4 (2012):
I -20. Auailable at: http:l/scholarship.
c h rc m o n t. ed u/ cgu ;fa c 4 u b / I 4 0 /.roAttanasio,20l3.
2rCharles Parkinson, "Urabenos Claim
Responsibiliry for Drop in Medellin
Murders," htSight Crime, January13, 2014. Auailable at: hnp://wuw.
i ns igh tcri me. o rght e tus - b ri e$huu b e n os-
a n d- a fi lt o r i t i es -d i sp u te - crcd i t -fo r- drop - i t t -
ntedellin-rnurdets.22Parkinson, 2014.
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