AIR WAR COLLEGE

RESEARCH REPORT

If) THE UNITED STATES ARMY SIGNAL CORPS:0 A CULTURALLY RICH ORGANIZATION

c\I0D

LT COL JOHN R. WILLIAMSON

1988

.DTIC

S EECTED

UNITED STATES AWFORCELES;DIBMAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

AIR WAR COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY

THE UNITED STATES ARMY SIGNAL CORPS:

A CULTURALLY RICH OROAIZATION

by

John R. WilliamsonLt. Colonel, United States Army

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFULLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Dr. Barton J. Michelson

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1988

DISCLAIMER

This research report represents the views of the

author and does not necessarily reflect the official

position of the Air War College or the Department of the Air

Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is

not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States

Government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through

the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 35112-5564 (telephone: (2053

293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7223.

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: The United States Army Signal Corps: A CulturallyRich Organization.

AUTHOR: John R. Williamson, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

' -The purpose of this research project was to identify

and describe the organizational and cultural dynamics of the

United States Army Signal Corps. This was accomplished by

examining organizational analysis techniques used by both

Army organizations and contemporary organizational

behaviorists and then applying them to analyze and describe

the organizational "culture" of the Signal Corps.

The literature review was completed in late 1987 at

the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Al., and the Conrad

Technology Library, Fort Gordon, Ga. Numerous personal

interviews with senior signal officers were conducted to

identify current attitudes, values, and beliefs. A synoptic

history of the Signal Corps was provided by the office of

the Signal Corps historian at the United States Army Signal

Center.

The final analysis and interpretation of the Signal

Corps organization and its "culture" was accomplished

through interviews and consultation with the current

Director, Office of the Chief of Signal, and the Chief of

Signal. However, the concepts presented as implications and

conclusions represent the ideas and views of the author.

iii

BI OGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LTC John R. Williamson (B.S. Mathematics/Physics,

Washburn University 1963 and M.B.A./O.R.S.A., University of

Kansas 1967) completed Ptillery Officer Candidate School

(OCS) and was comissionec' in the United States Army Signal

Corps in September 1969. He has served as an executive

officer in the Republic of Viet Nam, company commander in

Germany, Joint Security Arei (JSA) Signal Officer in Korea

and commanded the 67th Sign.l Battalion (Corps Area)

USAFORSCOM at Fort Gordon, Georgia. He graduated from the

U.S. Army Command and Staff C-llege and received the Masters

Of Military Arts and Science in 1980 (Thesis: The Effects of

Soviet Communications Jamming in the AIM Division Signal

Battalion). Other assignments ;nclude: Chief of the Command

Control Communications and Computers Branch, U.S. Army

Foreign Science and Technology C, nter; Department Director

(Transmission Operations) U.S. Arry Signal Center; and

Deputy Training System Manager(TSM., for Mobile Subscriber

Equiptment (MSE). LTC Williamson i- a graduate of the Air

War College, class of 1988.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

DISCLAIMER ................................. . . . .i

ABSTRACT ........................... a................ ii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............................. iii

I. INTRODUCTION ................................... 1

II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURENational Characteristics ....... .. ........... 3Corporate Cultures ...... a ......... o ........... 5Characters .......... . ............ ..... . . .. 6Types of Cultures ............ .................. 9Summary ....................................... 12

III. ALBERT J. MYER FOUNDER OF THE SIGNAL CORPS ......... 14

IV. THE CHIEF SIGNAL Officer ........................... 22The Triade of Authority ......................... 24

V. VALUES AND BELIEFS, "THE REAL TRUTHS .............. 29

Mentorship ..................................... 32

VI. SUBCULTURES ................... ..... .......... 33Tactical ....................... o................33Strategic. ......... ................... 35Information Managers......................... 36Unit Orientation ............ .................. 38

VII. CULTURE BUILDING ................... .............. . 40Signal Corps Regiment ..................... 41Signal Corps Association ........................ 43Rites and Rituals ......... . ............... .... 45Ceremonies ................................... ... 47

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................ .......... 50Summary ..................... #a ....... a............ 50

Conclusions ............................... 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 56

.v

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTI ON

The United States Army Signal Corps is truely a

culturally rich organization. It is a large combat support

branch with a unique history. Since its founding in 1863,

the Signal Corps has provided the technological foundation

for numerous innovative changes In the U. S. military

forces; i.e., the U.S. Weather Service and the Army Air

Corps were both spawned from research and development

conducted by the Signal Corps. Because of this unique

heritage, the present day Signal Corps is an extremely proud

organization that has developed a distinctive and symbolic

culture. The purpose of this research project was to

identify the cultural structure, symbols, and interworkings=

of the Signal Corps.

Research for this project included library resouces

from the Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, and Conrad

Technical Library, Fort Gordon, Georgia, and personal

interviews with numerous senior signal officers. The

description of the concepts of organizational and corporate

culture was limited to the terminology used by Deal and

Kennedy in their book Corporate Cultures. The Rites and

Rituals of Corporate Life. Dr. Terry Deal spoke to the Air

War College concerning "Managing Organizational Culture" on

• mm m n I II | i

19 August 1987. His presentation was both enlighting and

entertaining and was the stimulus for this reseach project.

There are many other respected behaviorial and

organizational scientists studying and publishing on

organizational and corporate culture. (10,20,21,24,31)

Unfortunately, the terminology used to describe the

*culture* of an organization and the roles that people play

have not been standardized. Therefore, Dr. Deal's

terminology was adopted to sImplify the terminology and

focus this study of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

Chapters Three through Seven discuss the U.S. Army

Signal Corps and present a cultural description of the

organizational structure, its history, culture and the roles

of the major characters. The data provided by the personal

interviews were critical to the development of these

chapters. Without the help of many dedicated senior signal

officers, the concepts presented would not have been

possible to identify.

Chapter Eight provides the summary and conclusions

that have resulted from this study. It should be pointed

out that the study of an organization-% culture is a never

ending process. Thus, the conclusions presented, herein,

represent the beginning of this author's efforts to document

the dynamics of his organizational culture.

2

CHAPTER TWO

ORG. IZATIONAL CULTURE

National Characteristics

The rise of Japan as a leading industrial power has

naturally caused American organizational theorists and

managers to study the relationship between national and

regional values and the productivity of the

workforce.(21:111) Corporate leaders and managers, in

attempts to improve productivity, have researched Japanese

managerial techniques indepth. However, their attempts at

applying Japanese leadership concepts to American

organizations have not always met with the same success as

in Japan.(20:14)

Since industrial organizations are predominatly

product and profit oriented, it would seem that similiar

management strategies should have simil iar success.

However, this has not neccessarily been proven to be true.

Organizations are made up of the workers that normally live

in that region of the world. These people have the values,

knowledge, ideology, laws, and day-to-day rituals of their

own culture.(21:112) "Western culturehas its roots in the

Judeo-Christian tradition. American culture was created by

the values of freedom of speech, religion, and the

press."(20.14) The concept that Japanese and American

cultures have different values is quite easy to understand

3

when a comparison is made between the two countrys' history,

geography, religion, etc. The more interesting

characteristic is the carry over of both Japanese and

American cultural values into their organizations of

commerce .

"The Japanese have always fostered culture as a

nation and, amazingly, have inculcated their unique culture

into their business organizations."(11:58) The cradle to

grave employment, worker participation in setting standards,

quality circles, and familylike loyalty values of the

Japanese corporate culture (11:58) are different from those

of American commerce. The American business world was

founded on the ideals of free enterprise, free trade, and

the notion that any individual could, with wit and work,

attain weal th (20:14).

It is not difficult to understand that

organizational values are a carry over from the national

culture of the workforce.(21:117) It is also obvious that

the national values of the workforce have a strong impact on

the culture of the organization. However, this does not

explain why different organizations within the same country

or region may have differing cultural values. Thus, it can

be concluded that organizations possess a culture that is a

product of both the work and regional environment.(21:120)

4

Corporatt Cul tures

Contemporary researchers of corporate and

organizational behavior have developed conceptual frameworks

defining and describing organizational norms, values, and

behaviors. These concepts have been identified as the

"Corporate Culturew of an organization and are being given

credit as a new area of organizational analysis to determine

what really makes an organization tick.(4:6) It has been

professed that successful performance within an organization

is directly related to an understanding of the culture of

that organization. (21:113)

Dr. Terence E. Deal and Mr. Allen A Kennedy in their

book Corporate Cultures-The Rites and Rituals of Corporate

Life describe the "Culture" of an organization in terms of

the values it represents. They explain that the values of a

corporate culture are many times expressed as marketing

slogans; however, it is the importance of the slogan to the

workforce, rather than the customer, that causes it to have

a impact on the company's values.(4:6) GE's slogan

'Progress is our most important product" becomes culturally

important when it becomes a superordinite goal of the

workforce rather than just a marketing slogan.(4:6)

Deal and Kennedy further describe the successful

leaders of a corporate culture as "heroes". The heroes of a

culture personify the organizations values and provide role

model behavior.(4:37) They show every employee what he/she

5

have to do to succeed within the organization.(4:37) They

explain that heros can be either Obornm or "made" depending

on their roles within the organization. The leader who is

responsible for the founding of the organization, in its

current context, is one that Is identified as the "born"

hero of that organization. Heros that are purposely

designated to exampl ify desired behavior and establish that

behavior as the norm are identified as "made".(4:37)

The social climate and behavorial norms are defined

in terms of the "Rites and Rituals" of the organization.

(4:62) Rites and rituals identify through social play

actions and ceremonies the behaviors that are required for

success within the organization.(4:63)

"Values" are defined as the basic concepts and

beliefs of an organization that form the heart of the

corporate culture.(4:21) They are the essence of the

company's philosopy for achieving success. "Values provide

a sense of common direction for all employees and quidelines

for their day-to-day behavior."(4:21)

Characters

The means of communication wit~hin an organization

is defined In terms of the "Cultural Network".(4:15) Deal

and Kennedy use characters, such as, priests, whisperers,

gossips, spies, storytellers, and cabals to describe the

various players and their roles within the cultural

communications network.(4:85) "This informal network is

6

actually the primary means of communication with in the

organization, it ties together all parts of the company

without respect to positions and titles."(4:I85)

Priests are the guardians of the culture's

values.(4:68) They are concerned about the culture and

ensuring that it survives. The position of priest is

normally informally based and located somewhere ner, the top

of the organization with direct access to the chief excutive

officer. Priests have enormous power that is usually

invisible when assessed by their title or position within

the organization.(4:90)

Whisperers are the powers behind the throne.(4:90)

They are the shakers and movers of the organization but

their source of power is through their boss's ear. They

must be able to read their boss's mind, have a symbiotic

relationship with him and, most importantly, be intensely

loyal.(4:90) In order to be effective, whisperers must have

a vast system of contacts throughout the organization and

stay current with the network information flow.(4,:91)

*Gossips are the troubadors of the culture."(4:91)

They keep track of the current details of trivial day-to-day

happenings. The gossips true role in the organization is

one of entertainment. "They are expected to carry the news

of the heros' past feats and liven up the organizations

latest accomplishments.(4:91) Gossips have no proximity to

power; however, they are the ones who spread the "real

7

story" about official announcements in the lunch room and

break areas.(4:91)

Storytellers tell stories to gain power and

influence. They interpret what goes on in the organization

to suit their own perceptions. Their stories are like the

myths in a tribal setting and give meaning to the work

environment.(4:87) Storytellers reveal what it takes to get

ahead in the culture and are typically found in positions

that provide access to large volumes of information.(4:88)

The storytellers role is to provide insight into the

organization.

Spies of the senior managers are used to keep a

finger on the pulse of the organization. They provide data

about what is going on. Some of the best spies are also

storytellers but have access to the managers and provide

accurate information without interpretation.(4:92) They

are not threatening because they have normally already

reached their terminal level within the company and know

they will be kept around as long as they keep the

communication channels open.(4:93)

Cabals are groups of two or more people who conspire

for a common purpose.(4:94) They are everywhere within an

organization and can vary greatly in size. Cabals represent

strong subcultures within an organization and are useful in

motivating groups toward common goals.(4:97)

8

Typos of Cultures

Deal and Kennedy, after studing hundreds of

corporations, have grouped corporate cultures into the

following four general categories: (1) Tough-guy/Macho; (2)

Work-Hard/Play-Hard; (3) Bet-Your-Company; and (4) Process

Cultures.(4:107) It should be pointed out, that although

Dr. Deal groups corporate culturecs into four categories, he

clearly stresses that most large organizations are normally

comprised of a mixure of these cultures.(4:125) It is also

possible for two or more culture types to be present in the

same organization and be in competition with one another.

Other organizations may shift from one type of culture to

another depending on the needs of the marketplace.(4:126)

The tough-guy, macho culture is a high risk, quick

feedback environment where fortunes or flops are made

o,.ernight. (4:108) Examples of organizations within this

type of culture include police departments, construction,

cosmetics, management consulting, venture capital,

advertising, entertainment and other high stakes activities.

"Tough-guy mach,3 cultures tend to be young ones with a focus

on speed, not endurance."(4:109) The heros in this culture

are gamblers who can tolerate all-or-nothing risks because

they need instant feedback. It is the word of individuals

or stars whose fame and fortune is made overnight and can

parish just as quickly.(4:110) Chance plays a big role in

this culture. Problem solving rituals that work become

9

superstititions and the formation of tight little cabals

provide protection in this high risk environment.(4:111)

Tough-guy cultures do what needs to be done in high-risk,

quick-return environments. However, they have a short-term

orientation that fosters high turnover and make the

establishment of a long-term, strong and cohesive culture

difficult.(4:111)

The work-hard/play-hard culture is the benign and

hyperactive world of manufacturing and the sales

organization. These cultures live in a world of small risks

and quick, often intensive feedback.(4:113) Success comes

with persistence and a high value is placed on customer

satisfaction.(4:113) Work-hard heros measure their worth in

activity volume, not high stakes. The value of team

performance is paramount and the "best workers are friendly,

carousing, hail-fellow-well-met kinds of people".(4:114)

Rituals of this culture revolve on the play-hard energetic

games; such as contests, meetings, promotions, and

conventions.(4:114) Work-hard/play-hard cultures get a lot

done and are ideal for active people who thrive on quick,

tangible feedback. They must be careful not to displace

quantity for quality and have a tendency to use quick fix

solutions for problem solving.(4:115) This culture is often

filled with young people looking to prove their worth and

must retain some of its older people to save its most

important lessons learned.(4:116)

10

The bet-your-company culture is a diet of high risk

but slow feedback. Sometimes feedback is years down the

line.(4:116) Companies in this cult.jre make large capitol

investments with long term returns; such as, off-shore oil

drilling, developing a new aircraft or space shuttle, new

computer designs, and the actuarial end of insurance

companies.(4:117) The armed forces are included in this

culture because they spend billions of dollars preparing for

a war that may never be fought. However, a thorough

analysis of the military services would indicate they

contain elements of all four cultures. The bettors do not

risk just their own careers with their decisions but risk

the entire future of their organizations.(4:117) The values

of this culture are focused on the future and place a high

premium on accurate long-term decision making. Bettor heros

have a great deal of character and the confidence to carry

them through long-term ambiguity with little or no

feedback.(4:118) The respect for authority, shared

technical competence, maturity, mutual dependence, and

mentorship are all requirements for survival in the better

culture. Bet-your-company cultures lejd to high-quality

inventions and major scientific breakthroughs but they also

move with awesome slowness and are vulnerable to short-term

economic fluctuations.(4:119)

The process culture is the low-risk, slow-feedback

world of banks, insurance companies, financial-service

11

organizations, large elements of government, utilities and

heavily regulated industries.(4:119) The stakes are low in

this culture with little or no feedback, thus the work

process becomes more important than outcoms. Technical

perfection is a premium with a strong tendency for the

magnification of the miniscule.(4:120) Protectiveness,

caution, detailed procedure and having all bets covered are

the natural behaviors in the process world. Survivors are

orderly, punctual, attend to detail, and become successful

bureaucrats with little regard for the outside world.(4:121)

Heros often become functions or organizations instead of

people. Rituals center on pattern and procedure with an

inordinate attention to titles and formalities.(4:121) The

process culture's strength is its ability to counter the

negative aspects of the other cultures and provide the

neccessary environment for the stars, worker/ players, and

the bettors to exist.(4:121) However, no one really likes

the red tape of a bureaucracy and blames the process culture

for all that is wrong with the modern world.(4:121)

Summary

It is Dr. Deal's belief that tuccess is only

possible when the manager has a through knowledge of the

*Corporate Culture" of which he or she is a part. "A strong

culture is a system of informal rules that spells out how

people are to behave most of the time*.(4:15) He explains

that an executive who is successful in GE's slow-moving

12

culture may or may not be happy in Xerox's work hard and

play hard culture, even if it means more money, bigger

office, and greater responsibility.(4:16-17) Managers must

understand clearly how the organizational culture works if

he or she wants to accomplish their goals and

objectives.(4:17) The knowledge of an organization's heros,

values, type of culture and subcultures, and its

communication network characters provides a source of power

for the upwardly mobile executive.

13

CHAPTER THREE

ALBERT J. MYER

FOUNDER OF THE SIGNAL CORPS

The United States Army Sianal Corps was founded on 2

July 1860 as a direct result of the efforts of Dr. Albert

James Myer, a medical officer. )octor Myer entered the Army

on 18 September 1854 as an assistant surgeon and was first

assigned to duties at Fort Durican, Texas.(1:8) He was

characterized as a jack-of-all-trades with an intense

curiosity and a strong interest in communication techniques.

His doctoral thesis in 1851 had developed a system of hand

communications for deaf mutes based on the Bain Telegraphic

Alphabet.(lulO) During his tour of duty in Texas, Myer

became fascinated with the Comanche Indians' ability to

signal each other over great distances using smoke, lances,

blankets, horses, and other means to telegraph large amounts

of detailed information.(1:10)

The Army on the western frontier lacked the effective

means to provide a reliable, flexible, and highly mobile

system of communication at distances out of the range of

their bugle calls. The frontier missiqJ required the Army

to travel rapidly and to operate in small units separated at

distances many miles apart. Handsignals, bugle calls, voice

commands, and the electric telegraph were the only means of

command and control communications. These systems did not

provide the necessary means of signaling when units were

14

widely dispersed and moved frequently. Dr Myer's

observation of the signals used by the indians were the

stimulus for his development of a single flag waving system

of communications which later was termed "wig-wagging".(1:8)

Myer's wig-wagging system used a torch at night and a

single flag during day light to transmit information between

units. It required the knowledge of an established visual

signal alphabet based on the Bain Telegraphic Alphabet and

Myer's own hand-signal system for deaf mutes.(1:1O) This

system allowed units to signal back and forth rapidly over

great distances as long as they maintained unobstructed line

of sight. The use of hilltops, lofty perches atop trees and

towers, log stands, houses and even balloons were used to

achieve line of sight between units.(1:1O)

Myer's invention of the wig-wag system was not well

timed. The electronic telegraph was invented in the early

1820's and was widely used by the 18501s. Myer had even

worked as a telegraph operater while he was in medical

school.(1:11) The simplicity of the wig-wag system and its

mobility were superior for military use but were hard to

sell in the new age of electricity. "Qn I October 1856 Doc

Myer wrote the Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis (who was

later President of the Confederacy), and tried to sell his

flag-and-torch signaling system to the Army."(1:11) Davis

did not even reply to Myer's letter. The Navy also refused

Myer's offer of his wig-wag system in 1858.(1:11) The use

15

of a simple system of waved flags and torches was not

sellable in the "ultramodern" world of electronic telepathy.

Finally in 1859, the War Department responded to

Myer's 1856 letter and appointed a boa-d to determine if

wig-wagging should be considered for Army use. Ltc Robert

E. Lee was the chairman of the review board. He was

impressed with the wig-wag system's mobility and could see

its merit for use by the cavalry in the western frontier.

Myer and his assistant, 2Lt Edward Porter Alexander,

organized a group of two officers and sixteen soldiers and

taught them wig-wag signaling. It was the Tenth Infantry's,

stationed in Sante Fe, New Mexico, use of wig-wag signaling

against the Navajo indians in 1860 that finally impressed

the War Department of the value of Myer's system of

communi cation.(1 :12)

With the success of wig-wagging in New Mexico

frontier, Myer approached the Military Affairs Committee of

the United States Senate for the establishment of a Bureau

of Army Signals with himself at its head. The chairman of

the committee, the same Jefferson Davis who had earlier

refused to answer Myer's 1856 letter, vias a tough politican

and did not view Myer's proposal with favor. Davis offered

Myer a flat payment for his invention and a lucrative

contract as a civilian instructor of military

signalers.( :12)

16

Myer persevered with his proposal and requested the

rank of "Colonel" for the head of the Bureau of Signals. He

fought hard for his proposal and actively sought the help of

other senators on the committee. Such "politicking" put Dr.

Myer at considerable risk, since he was an active duty

military officer, but he finally won.(1=12) The committee

voted in Myer's favor and established a newly authorized

Signal Department.

On 2 July 1860 Albert J. Myer was commissioned as the

Army's first signal officer with the grade of Major. At age

thirty-two Major Myer became one of the youngest majors in

the Army and, since he was the head of the Signal

Department, automatically became a primary member of the

Army staff.(1:13) The Signal Department was not originally

established as a separate branch of service but, instead,

was responsible for the training of other branches in the

art of signaling. It was during the Civil War that the role

of the signal soldier caused the Signal Corps to grow into a

separate branch of service.

The beginning of the Civil War was a tramatic event

for America and equally for the Signal %Corps. Jefferson

Davis, Robert E. Lee, J. E. B. Stuart (who had sought vainly

to train with Myer at Santa Fe), 2Lt Edward Porter Alexander

(Myer's assistant), and many others knowledgeable of the

Myer system all joined the Conferate Army.(1:13) Both the

Confederate and Union signalers used Myer's wig-wag system

17

extensively. Each side was able read the other messages and

used the collected data as intelligence on the others

tactical situation.(1:14) After the war many of the signal

soldiers from both sides were rejoined and made strong

contributions for improved communications within the United

States Army.

On 3 March 1863 Congress established the United

States Army Signal Corps as a separate branch of service

with the dual role of both a combat arm and a technical

service.(1:14) Major Myer continued his inventive pursuits,

developing the field telegraph train and the cipher disk for

the telegraph. Myer was appointed Chief Signal Officer on

18 September 1863 with the rank of Colonel but was relieved

of his position and stripped of his rank on 10 November 1863

because of conflicts over the use of military telegraph with

Secretary of War Edwin H. Stanton.(1:14)

It was Myer's contention that as Chief Signal Officer

he should have authority over all communications within the

Army's zone of operation.(1:14) This position placed him in

direct conflict with the Military Telegraph Department, a

civilian bureau with military officerssin charge, and

Secretary Stanton whose close friends ran the American

Telegraph Company. Stanton was also a director in another

telegraph company. Myer accused Stanton of having a

oconflict of interest" at every opportunity and continued to

expand Signal Corps efforts in telegraphy. Myer's conflict

18

with Stanton resulted in his being removed as Chief Signal

Officer and being ordered to make a reconnaissance of the

Mississippi River.(1:14)

Although relieved of his position and demoted in

rank, Myer continued to persist and obtained an assignment

as signal officer of the West Mississippi Division and

participated in Civil War operations along the Mississippi

River.(1:14) After the end of the Civil War, 12 April 1865,

Myer began his efforts for reinstatement as Chief Signal

Officer. Secretary Stanton was determined to block Myer's

reinstatement and fought Myer every step of the way.

Fortunantely for Myer, Stanton became imbroiled in

Reconstruction Era politics and found himself at odds with

President Andrew Johnson.(1:14) With the help of many

senior Army and Navy officers, including General-in-Chief

Ulysses S. Grant, and a majority of the Senate, Myer was

successful in being reappointed as Chief Signal Officer over

the objections of Stanton.(1:14)

On 30 October 1866 Myer was restored as Chief Signal

Officer with the rank of Colonel. Stanton's conflicts with

President Johnson continued and he wasereplaced by Ulysses

S. Grant as Secretary of War on 12 August 1867.(1:15) With

Grant as Secretary of War, Myer was finally successful in

his efforts to gain total control of military communications

and was given sole authority over telegraphy in the combat

19

zone on 21 August 1867.(1:15) The position of Chief Signal

Officer was finally firmly established.

*In the years following the civil war, the Signal

Corps became nearly extinct from inactivity."'1:15) Albert

J. Myer was recognized for his galant efforts during the war

and was promoted to the rank of brevet(honorary) Brigadier

General, a rank he held until two months before his death on

24 August 1880, when he was promoted to Brigadier General.

Myer continued to expand the role of the Signal Corps

throughout his tenure as Chief Signal Officer and

established the United States Weather Bureau under his

direction in February 1870.(22:--) Myer supervised the

Weather Bureau for the first ten years of its operation.

His perseverance in this area led to establishment of a

uniform international reporting system for meteorological

observation. (22:--)

The Signal Corps, as founded by Albert J. Myer, was

established as an inventive, persistent, and professional

organization that would not allow adversity stand in its way

of improving military communications. Myer's contributions

of wig-wag signaling, the use of balloons for observation,

improved use of electric telegraphy and meteorological

observation dramatically enhanced Army operations on the

battle field. BG Myer's picture is proudly displayed at

Fort Gordon, Georgia, the current "Home of the Signal". He

is widely recognizated as the *father' of the Signal Corps

20

and his ideals are taught to each young signal officer

during their initial active duty training.(13) As a truely

deserving great American soldier and innovative leader, Fort

Myer, Virginia, is named after Albert J. Myer.(1:15)

21

21

CIAPTER FOUR

THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

The position of Chief Signal Officer must be

considered as the cultural hero of the Signal Corps. BG

Myer, in his efforts to establish the Signal Department

eventually created the position of Chief Signal Officer when

the Corps was designated a separate branch of the Army. The

importance of the position of Chief Signal Officer can not

be underemphasized. BG Myer knew that in order to have

effective power on the Army staff he needed to be recognized

as the chief of his service. It was his position, more than

his rank, that allowed him to represent the Signal Corps.

Each Chief Signal Officer after BG Myer from 1863 to

1964 was the recognized leader of the Corps. It was

interesting to find, while doing research for this project,

that the majority of Chief Signal Officers were identified

as being responsible for innovative communication

improvements.(22:--) Their selection as Chief Signal

Officer may have been as a result of their previous success

in the development of a new communication system or as a

direct result of their authority as Chk~ef Signal Officer to

effect change. Either situation is probably partialy

correct but an accurate determination could not be concluded

from the historical record. The selection of Army general

officers varies with the needs of the service during that

period of time and, in most cases, the specific reasons for

22

selection are not publicly articulated. It can be

determined that from 1863 through 1964 the position of Chief

Signal Oficer was the single most powerful position within

the Signal Corps.(22:--)

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICERS

8G Albert James Myer 18 Sep 1863-10 Nov 186330 Oct 1866-24 Aug 1880

Colonel Benjamin Fisher 26 Dec 1864-29 Oct 186686 William B. Hazen 15 Dec 1880-16 Jan 1887BG Adolphus W. Greely 3 Mar 1887-10 Feb 1906BG James Allen 10 Feb 1906-13 Feb 1913BG George P. Scriven 5 Mar 1913-13 Feb 1917MG George 0. Squier 14 Feb 1917-31 Dec 1924MG Charles McK. Saltzman I Jan 1924- 8 Jan 1928MG George S. Gibbs 9 Jan 1928-30 Jun 1931MG Irving J. Carr I Jul 1931-31 Dec 1934MG James B. Allison I Jan 1935-30 Sep 1937MG James 0. Mauborgne 1 Oct 1937-30 Sep 1941MG Dawson Olmstead 24 Oct 1941-30 Jul 1943MG Harry C. Ingles 1 Jul 1943-31 Mar 1947MG Spencer B. Akin I Apr 1947-31 Mar 1951MG George I. Back I May 1951-30 Apr 1955LTG James D. O'connell I May 1955-30 Apr 1959MG Ralph T. Nelson I May 1959-30 Apr 1962MG Earle F. Cook 1 Jul 1962-30 Jun 1963MG David P. Gibbs 1 Jul 1963- 1 Mar 1964Chief Signal Officer position vacant 1964-1986MG Thurman (T. D.) Rodgers 3 June 1986MG Bruce R. Harris 3 Jun 1986- 2 Jun 1988

(22:--)

The Signal Corps cultural "hero* was clearly the

Chief Signal Officer until the demise of the position in

1964. The redesignation of the head of the Signal Corps as

the Department of the Army Staff, Chief of Communications

Electronics occurred simultaneously with a major Army

reorganization.(27:--) This reorganization changed the

technical services into branches and altered the Engineer

23

and Signal Corps ability to control the development in their

respective areas of influence.(2:--) The Army was

structured into Combat Arms (Infantry, Artillery, Air

Defense Artillery, Armor), Combat Support Arms (Signal,

Engineer, Chemical, Military Intelligence), and Combat

Service Support Arms (Quartermaster, Adjunant General,

Transportation, Ordance, Medical, etc). The primary reason

for the reorganization related to material management but it

also had a long term effect on Signal Corps

leadership.(2:--)

Triad of Authoritr

The current Signal Corps leadership is empowered in

three positions. The Chief Signal Officer position was

reinstated on 3 June 1986 as a direct result of the U. S.

Army regimental program.(22e--) The commander of the U. S.

Signal Center, the Army's school of signals, was designated

the Chief of Signal, the "reborn* Chief Signal Officer.

However, the new Chief of Signal does not have the same

power as MG Gibbs did when the Chief Signal Officer position

was down graded to a subordinate member of the Army staff.

He must share power with the Director qf Information

Systems/C4 and the Commander of the Information Systems

Comrnand.(9) He is also under the watchful eye of all those

Signal General Officers (retired and active duty) senior to

him. He may be the new chief executive but there is

certainly a Signal Corps Board of Directors that provide

24

oversight on all Signal Corps cultural matters.(9) (See

figure 1)

SIGNAL CORPS CULTURE (MACRO)

CHE O SAF SCKAN O s" onANEW W AON 9OW

A ACIONIUNTO

As coRMmadro h RAONCl prpM en !oriian forISA

SiNal theW new1C Che fSga srsoseor the

dAERIeLoen GMof sigaldtrie(o o ih) h

organization of tatBclsgnlstoscpai,

battalions, and brMiae1sindt0Am op n

subIordnt co1mnds th odutadsuevsonol

signal soldier and officer training, and the personnel

policies related to job responsiblities.(16) He is

responsible for the oversight of all cultural matters

relating to signal, Army-wide, and provides inputs to the

Department of Army acquistion agent for information

management and command-control communications.(8) He

reports to the Commander of TRADOC, who is not a Signal

Officer, for the conduct of training and the management of

the Fort Gordon installation. Normally combat arms officers

are selected to command TRADOC because of the responsibility

for development of the Army's battlefield doctrine.

The Director For Information Systems and

Command-Control Communications and Computers(DISC4) is the

senior signal general officer on the Army staff, currently

with the rank of LTG. He is responsible for advising the

Army Acquistion Executive on all matters relating to signal.

His staff is responsible for managing those lines of the

Army budget that pertain to the acquisition of signal

equipment. He is the former commander of the U. S. Army

Signal Center and holds the position of past Chief of

Signal. In order for the Chief of Sigal to succeed with a

major proposal relating to the acquisition of signal

equipment or doctrine, he must have, as a minimum, the

informal concurrence of the DISC4.(9)

The commander of the Information Systems Command

(ISC) is the senior US Army Signal Corps commander and has

26

the rank of LTG. He is responsible for the installation,

operation, and maintanence for the Army's portion of the

Defense Communication System (DCS) and Information

Management within the Army. The information management

portion of ISC's mission includes the management of

installation computer systems, the development of Army

doctrine relating to general purpose computers and software,

the operation of data processing units throughout the Army,

the operation of all Army printing plants and libraries and

advising all Army installation commanders on matters

relating to the management and transmission of data. ISC is

one of the Army's largest major command and has one the

largest budgets of any Army command. The Chief of Signal

must have the ISC commander's concurrence on all those

matters relating to information management and strategic

communications.(9)

Although the Chief Signal Officer's position was

ressurrected in 1986, it does not possess the functional

power that the position held up until 1964. He does

represent the cultural head of the corps even though he

shares functional power with the DISC4%and the ISC

commander.(9) It his responsibility to maintain the health

of the Signal Corps culture, record its history, and profess

its values.(8) He is assisted in this effort by an informal

board of directors consisting of those signal officers

senior in rank to him, both retired and active duty. His

27

performance as cultural head of the signal corps will have a

strong impact on his later selection for further promotion.

It is the Chief of Signal's job as commander of the

US Army Signal Center that will result in his contribution

to the Signal Corps history. He Is the signal officer most

involved in the development of new communication system

concepts.(16) A role he shares with all those Chief Signal

Officers before him.

28

CHAPTER FIVE

VALUES AND BELIEFS, 'THE REAL TRUTHS-

The values of the Signal Corps culture are directly

tied to its founder, BG Albert J. Myer. Myer's dogged

persistance to produce innovative improvement in the Army's

command and control communication systems is the strongest

value in the Signal Corps. Every signal officer, from ISC

commander to maneuver battalion signal officer, has a

primary duty is to provide the very best communications

support possible to his subscribers. Myer's development of

the wig-wag system and improving military use of the

telegraph are directly related to each signal officers

desire to improve the communication systems provided and

making them serve the customer better. The drive for

invention and innovation within signal corps officers and

non-commissioned officers has lead to the Signal Corps use

of the wireless telegraph in Alaska, the airplane for

observation and vacuum tube radios during World War I,

radars to detect enemy aircraft and guide search lights

during World War II, multichannel radios during the Korean

conflict, massive troposcater systems 6n Viet Nam and many,

many of the new communcation techniques and equipments in

use today.(22:--) A good signal officer is never satisfied

with the status quo. He must improve the system he is

given.

29

It must be understood that not all great signal

officers possess inventive genius. In fact, some of the

brightest young signal officers do not succeed in the Signal

Corps. The success of a signal officer is directly related

to his focus on the unit or soldiers he supports.(16) The

signal officer's role is to provide communications support.

His job is to contribute to his subscriber's success. If he

loses sight of his support role and becomes preoccupied with

his own technical innovation, he will not be sensitive to

the needs of those he supports.(16) Myer's success in

developing and deploying the wig-wag system was not solely

because of the system's capability, but because it could

best support the needs of a mobile military force.

Persistance is a value that each signal officer must

possess to be successful. Dr. Myer had a tough time selling

his wig-wag system until he was able to convince the Army's

leaders of the great need for the system. At great risk to

his professional future, Myer persisted until he finally

won. The same is true today. The development of a new

system is not singularly sufficent to have it adopted. In

an environment of strong competition fer Department of

Defense budget allocation, a new communication system must

compete with the development of weapon systems. Only when a

new communications system contribution exceeds that of a new

weapon system does it stand a chance of adoption. The role

of the Chief of Signal promoting new concepts can place him

30

at odds with other military leaders. He must persist in his

arguement even if it results in his personal risk. Col Myer

was reduced to the rank of Major, but he eventually

succeeded and was reinstated as Chief Signal Officer. The

same challenge and risk is present today.

Flexibility is also a value requirement in today's

Signal Corps. Dr Myer's jack-of-all-trades insight gave him

the ability to adapt his ideas and mold them into functional

innovation. Today's signal officer must understand his

customers objectives. He must see the needs of the combat,

combat support, and combat service support arms in order to

be able to provide effective command-control communications.

In order to be successful, he must have an indepth knowledge

of tactics, weapons, and logistical systems. Only then will

he be able to provide rapid, reliable, and flexible

communications support.

Todays signal officer must also be accepted as an

equal military partner in todays modern action Army. He

must be a soldier first and technican second. He must

maintain the same level of physical and tactical fitness as

those with whom he serves. Many signal units are deployed

to isolated positions and must provide their own site

defense. Thus, the signal soldiers knowledge of site

defense and the use weapons are critical to their survival.

It is the signal officers primary duty to train and lead his

unit in combat. Signal units can not support their

31

subscribers if they do not have the capability to survive on

the battlefield.

Men torsh iD

The concept of mentorship is the primary means used

to pass the cul tural values of the Signal Corps from

generation to generation.(32) The senior signal officer at

each installation, Corps, Division, etc., is responsible for

ensuring his subordinates are trained in the art of signals.

The senior signal officer's leadership and his role as Dr

Myer's disciple make him in charge of the signal culture at

his location. His use of officer calls to pass on the

historical events of the corps and reinforcing the values of

inventiveness, innovation, flexibility, persistence,

physical and tactical proficency, and identity as soldiers

are his primary mission.(32) He must do these cultural

tasks well if he is to be a true candidate for future

selection as the Chief Signal Officer.

32

32

CHAPTER SIX

SUBCULTURES

There are three distinctive major subcultures within

the Signal Corps culture. Three main functional skill

areas, tactical, strategic, and information management,

account for the development of subcultures within the corps.

The difference between these subcultures is the priority

placed on the earlier presented cultural values. All three

have the same values but must place them in a different

order of priority to satisfy their primary customers.

Tactical

The tactical signal officer must place a high

priority on being a soldier first and technican second. His

world is in the mobile environment of the armored, infantry,

and mechanized infantry units. The key to survival in this

world is mobility.(13) Rapid movement prevents major units

from becoming targets. Thus, the signal officer, whose job

it is to provide communications support to major units, must

be extremely innovative to get the most out of his soldiers

and his equipment. He has little or no time to invent new

equipment, but is forced to constantlysimprove the equipment

he is issued.

He must also be persistent. It is his responsibility

to ensure that his customer does not exceed the capability

of his communications equipment. If the maneuver

commander's plan exceeds his capability to maintain command

33

and control then it becomes the signal officers

responsibility to advise him of the weakness in his concept

of maneuver.(13) This is not an easy task! It takes real

persistance to convince a steely-eyed warrior he can not

successfully complete his battleplan, because his

communications can not support him. This scenario

represents many a signal officer's waterloo. He must

persist to prevent his commander from taking an unnecssary

tactical risk; however, such persistent will, in many

circumstances, result in his own professional risk. It is

easy to relate this scenario back to BG Myer's conflict with

Secretary Stanton.(1:14) When a signal officer knows he is

right, he must present his case adamantly until he succeeds

in his arguement. An early retirement is more honorable

than failure or unnecessary casualities on the battlefield.

The tactical signal officers environment parallels that of

Dr. Deals work hard/play hard culture except for the concept

of risk. There is considerable near term professional risk

in this subculture.

Tactical signal officers also serve in Special Forces

and Airborne units. The values in thi# portion of the

tactical signal subculture are the same as mentioned above

with a greater emphasis on physical fitness and

mobility.(32) The priority of being a soldier first and

technican second is even more important in these highly

mobile units.(6) Physical confidence and the self-belief of

34

being capable of accomplishing the most difficult task is

the key to success in these special purpose units.(18) The

Special Forces and Airborne unit tactical signal officers do

not live in a different culture. Their envirorment has the

same values, but the pace is much more intense'

StrateQic

Non-tactical or strategic signal officers lve in the

highly technical world of the defense communications system.

Large, complex and immobile communications systenm that

never move are the equipments in this world of high

technology. This subculture within the corps places a

higher priority on technical competence and innovation than

it does physical fitness and mobility. These signal

officers rarely interface with the warriors from the

battlefield on a personel basis. Theirs is the battle of

high technology. Although the buildings that house the

communications equipment never move, high speed data circles

the globe in less than a second. Survival in this world

requires an indepth knowledge of communication-electronics.

This is the environment of being a technician first and a

soldier second. In fact, many signal qfficers work for or

supervise civilian technicians.

Persistence is an important value in this subculture

but it is not as time sensitive as in the environment of the

tactical signal officer. The nontactical signal officer

manages large amounts of equipment and numbers of people.

35

He must make detailed decisions concerning future

communication projects and make budget recommendations far

into the future. Dr Deal describes this type of environment

as the bet-your-company culture.(4:118) The risk is high

for the organization but feedback is slow. Thus, the merit

of the decisions made by the non-tactical signal officer

are, in many cases, not apparent until he has moved on to

another position. Since military officers change locations

on an average of every three years, it is difficult to

assess the true merit of the non-tactical signal officers

performance in just one or two duty assi g n me-nts- t--is his

long term track record that establishes his reputation.

Information Managers

The information manager is new to the Signal Corps.

The development of military automated data processing (ADP)

in the ninteen sixty's created many new administrative jobs

in the Army. Since the early data processing centers were

used to improve administration and data management, the

Adjunant General Corps was given the responsibility of

supervising the training of ADP officers, noncommissioned

officers, and soldiers. The Signal Corps initial

responsibility was limited to computer repair. The growth

of specialized battlefield computers and the integration of

computers and communication systems eventually resulted in

the management of all information systems being tranfered

36

from the Adjunant General Corps to the Signal Corps in the

mid-ninteen eightys.

At the time of the transfer of responsibility, there

were a large number of both Signal and Adjunint General

officers who indentified their primary or secondary duty

function as being in the computer field. The Army had given

these officers the speciality identifier of 53. However,

the officers'with this identifier were not classed as a

separate branch of the Army and looked to their primary

branch for career management. The separation of branch

identity and functional speciality hindered the development

of strong and distinctive cultural values for the early

information managers. They were considered different. In

many cases, some of the brightest young officers sought out

the speciality area because of its rapid rise of importance

in both civilian and military communities. Unfortunately,

success in the Army is measured primarily on the strength of

an officers branch related success, and not how well he does

in his speciality area. Thus, many early information

managers did not enjoy satisfactory upward mobility within

the military and sought their success 6n the civilian world.

Dr. Deal pointed out that the success of a culture

will be directly affected by the strength of the values

within the culture.(4:33) The cultural values of the

information manager have been hindered in their development

by the division of the culture among other strong branch

37

cultures within the Army. The information management area

is one of the most difficult new missions the Signal Corps

has been assigned. One of the main difficulties is the

previous lack of cultural leadership. Members of the

information management subculture did not have distinctive

identities. The values of the culture never enjoyed a

central proponent and; therefore, have never grown strong.

The.information management area is certainly a new

subculture within the Signal Corps that will develop

distinctive cultural values in time. The development of

strong cultural values for this subculture will determine

its success or failure within the Signal Corps.

Unit Orientation as a Subculture

The establishment of close personal and professional

relationships is very normal among the members of military

units. The shared risk and close working environment causes

soldiers to develop lifelong friendships. These friendships

have the possibility of becoming powerful liaisons as the

individuals progress though their careers. Deal described

the development of small groups who conspire for a common

purpose as a cabal.(4:94) He explaineq they represent very

strong subcultures and are everywhere within an

organization. Such cabals occur frequently within the

Signal Corps.

Many officers serving in battalion and brigade units

develop close relationships that last for many years after

38

they leave the unit. The identification with a particularly

successful signal unit and its comnlander has been used

positively by many ambitious officers. The regimental

system in the Army reinforces the development of these

cabals because it encourges the repetitive assignment to the

same unit. Thus, the association with a good unit and a

successful commander, who later achieves senior rank,

becomes a very powerful subculture. The values within these

subcultures do not differ from the larger Signal Corps

values but the respective priority of particular values will

flucuate from unit to unit. These cabals have a tendency to

develop into power groups when successive commanders of a

specific unit continue to achieve the most senior positions

within the Signal Corps.

39

CHAPTER SEVEN

CULTURE BUILDING

The loss of the position of Chief Signal Officer

caused the temporary loss of a cultural center for the

Signal Corps. Those Signal General Officers serving in

senior positions at the Department of Army and the Signal

training centers realized the need for a cultural 'home".

Successive commanders at the Signal Training Center at Fort

Gordon made numerous attempts to reestablish a "home" of the

Signal Corps.(12)

There were two signal training centers in the ninteen

sixty's. One at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and the

Southeastern Signal School, at Fort Gordon, Ga. Fort

Monmouth was a signal installation because all of its major

tenant units were associated with communications and

electronics. Fort Gordon, however, was commanded by a

Military Police General Officer because of the location of

the Military Police School. Following the same Army

reorganization that eliminated the Chief Signal Officer

title in 1964, the Military Police School was moved to Fort

McClellan, Alabama and Fort Gordon becajse a signal

installation. This paved the way for the development of a

single cultural *home" for the Signal Corps.

The Southeastern Signal School at Fort Gordon,

Georgia, was renamed the United States Army Signal Center in

1974.(22:--) During the time period between 1964 and 1986,

40

the installation grew dramatically. Almost all Army signal

training was consolidated at Fort Gordon. Massive

construction resulted in the building of the largest

communication training facilities centrally located within

the Department of Defense.(7) The Signal Corps museum was

moved from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and numerous

additional facilities are either under construction or have

been approved.(8) The effort to build a "home* for the

Signal Corps realized a substantial success on 6 June 1986

when, under the Army's regimental program, Fort Gordon was

designated the regimental home of the Signal Corps, and its

commander was identified as the Oreborn" Chief Signal

Officer .(8)

Signal CorDs Regiment

The Signal Corps Regiment under the whole branch

concept was formally established at United States Army

Signal Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 6 June 1986. It

established the primary positions of Chief of Signal (new

Chief Signal Officer), Director, Office of the Chief of

Signal (Regimental Adjutant), Sergeant Major of the

Regiment, Regimantal Operations NCO, Editor-in-Chief of the

Army Communicator periodical, Curator of the Signal Corps

Museum, Signal Corps Command Historian, Honorary Colonel

(Retiree), Honorary Sergeant Major (Retiree) and

Distinguished Members of the Corps.(28:3-4) The

41

establishment of these active duty and retired positions

created the formal framework of the Signal Corps culture.

In addition to the establishment of the regimental

structure, the formation of the Signal Corps Regiment

fostered the development of a Hall of Fame, a Lineage and

Honors Book, the restoration of the Albert J. Myer

Mausoleum, and a plan for the regimental designation of all

active duty, reserve, and national guard signal units. It

also developed the distinctive unit insignia (DUI), worn by

all members of the Signal Corps Regiment, and created an

Regimental Awards Program for on-the-spot recognition of

outstanding performance or achievement in support of the

Signal Corps (Regiment) culture.(28z3-4)

The birth of the Signal Corps Regiment and the

rebirth of the Chief Signal Officer postion are the most

significant cultural events to occur since Major Myer became

the first Chief Signal Officer. The Signal Corps culture

had suffered from the lack of an identified leader during

twenty-two year death of its cultural "hero". The

functional power of the new Chief of Signal does not

parallel that of the original Chief Sianal Officer. However,

the emergence of the Army's regimental system may provide

him with even greater cultural power in the future.

The birth of the Signal Corps Regiment establishes an

identifible regimental adjutant that serves as the keeper of

the culture. As the adjutant of the regiment, this new

42

position has functional responsibilities in the personnel

area.(8) These responsibilities provide the staff who have

the capability to maintain a watchful eye on tie health of

the culture. He is involved in the job title and duty

description of all members of the Signal Corps. He

maintains a Ohotline" to all members of the Signal Corps,

Army wide, to facilitate feedback and solve problems.(28:3)

He has become the "Priest" of the Signal Corps culture, in

that, he supervises the operation of the Signal Corps museum

and advises the Chief Signal Officer on matters pertaining

to the regiment. One of his most important duties is to act

as the secretary and informal leader of the Signal Corps

Association.

Sional CorDs Association

The Signal Corps Association was established in the

late ninteen-seventy's to develop support of the

establishment of a National Science Center for military

communications and electronics at Fort Gordon, Georgia.(8)

The leadership at the Signal Center was very concerned about

the quantity and quality of high school graduates. Numerous

studies indicated that American high school students were

not receiving adequate mathematic and physical science

instruction resulting in a quantitative reduction of the

college graduates in science and engineering.

The US Army Signal Center, as one of the largest

Department of Defense communications school, felt it could

43

make a positive contribution to enhancing the quality of

high school graduates. It formulated the development of a

National Science Center for communications and electronics,

that would serve as both a historical center of military

communications and provide an instructional support center

for the advancement of communications and electronics

training. This effort has received considerable

Congressional and industrial support and will hold its first

ground breaking ceremony in 1988. The Signal Corps

Association has played a major role in fund raising and

establishing widespread support throughout the Signal Corps

and the Army for the National Science Center.

With the establishment of the Signal Corps Regiment

at Fort Gordon in 1986, the Signal Corps Association

refocused its attention on the establishment of a strong

Signal Corps culture. It has rewritten its consititution

and by-laws to reflect efforts to build a strong cultural

heritage and promote the formal recognition of its members.

The Signal Corps Association is currently designed to

enhance and reinforce the goals and values of the Signal

Corps culture and ensure that the lessons of history are not

forgotten.(28:9) It provides a world-wide cultural

communications network through a Members-at-Large Program

and established the awards of the Silver and Bronze Order of

Mercury and the Brevet Colonel to recognize outstanding

contributions to the Signal Corps (Regiment).(28:9) The

44

primary mission of the Signal Corps Association has become

the enhancement of the Signal Corps culture and strengthing

its cultural values.

Rites and Rituals

One of the most significant activities within the

Signal Corps culture are the rites and rituals that signify

the acceptance of its new members. This is specially true

in tactical signal units. Members of units with tactical

and mobile missions are not fully accepted until they have

completed a minimum number of field training exercises.(16)

For instance, in airborne units, a specific number of

parachute jumps, plus field exercises fulfill these

requirements.(18) Young soldiers must go to the "field" to

demonstrate their job skill proficiency. Non-commissioned

officers (NCOs) must demonstrate their leadership in a field

environment before they are accepted as members of the units

cadre.(23) Young officers have to demonstrate that,

although they lack experience, they possess the knowledge

and self-confidence to develop into leaders worthy of the

"trust and confidence" of their subordinates.(13) New

company and battalion commanders can not be fully supported

by their soldiers and cadre until they have demonstrated a

stronger loyality to the goals and values of the unit than

their own success.(23) Commanders who are preceived as

self-serving are never fully accepted into the unit culture.

45

Advanced individual training for all soldiers in the

US Army climaxes with the award of thei;" military

occupational speciality (MOS). When soldiers complete

training in a branch speciality he or she will be awarded

the insignia of that branch. The branch insignia is worn on

the left collar of the dress uniform and signifys his or her

membership. All signal soldiers from the rank of private to

command sergeant-major wear a bronze disc with crossed

wig-wag flags on their left collar. This is their label of

membership in the Signal Corps culture.

Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the ranks of

sergeant to sergeant-major are considered "professional"

soldiers.(19) Young troops call them "lifers" but the term

"professional" is more accurate. The NCO corps has a

formal creed that professes high values, morals, loyality to

NCO corps ideals, and allegiance to the commander-in-chief

and the officers appointed over them. Strong NCO cultures

require that each young soldier eligible for promotion to

the rank of sergeant memorize the NCO creed prior to their

promotion. It is also common practice, in units with a

strong NCO cadre, to present each new sergeant with his own

copy of the NCO creed.(23) Non-commissioned officers who

live up to the standards of their creed are extremely

successful .(19)

Young signal officers participate in a formal

"rite-of-passage" as a part of their Signal Officer Basic

46

Course. The Chief of Signal or his representive, usually

the regimental adjutant (Priest of the Signal Corps

Culture), preside over the ceremony.(8) The regimental

colors are passed to each new signal officer as they profess

loyality to corps. Prior to the "rite-of-passage*, each

young signal officer has successfully completed numerous

intellectual and physical tests to prove his or her

worthiness of wearing the Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI) of

the regiment and the Crossed Flags of the Signal Corps.(13)

One of these rituals requires climbing to the top of an

one-hundred foot forestry tower.

Ceremonies

Senior signal officers at every installation or

region throughout the world are responsible for hosting an

annual birthday ball to honor the founding of the Signal

Corps.(16) These lavish affairs are the largest celebration

of the year for members of the Signal Corps culture. Albert

J. Myer is always honored as the cultural "hero" and founder

of the corps. Awards of (honorary) Brevet Colonel and

Orders of Mercury (Silver and Bronze) are bestowed to

deserving members of the culture.(8) JNew friendships are

made and old ones renewed. The primary purpose of these

world-wide birthday balls is to promote cultural comradeship

and reinforce the values of the regiment.

The United States Army Signal Center at Fort Gordon,

Georgia, the cultural "home" of the Signal Corps, hosts an

47

annual comference each December. The conference addresses

functional issues that affect the missions of the Signal

Corps. Leaders of signal units from all over the world

gather in Augusta, Georgia, to reflect on the health of the

regiment. Signal officers and NCOs discuss solutions to

problems, retell the latest happenings, make predictions on

future promotions, and hustle for their next assignment.

The cultural strength of the Signal Corps reaches its annual

peak at this ceremonial 'gathering of the clan*.(8)

Signal General Officers began to hold periodic

symposiums to discuss tough issues in 1986 to insure that

the senior leadership of the corps spoke with one voice.(9)

These officers are in the most powerful signal leadership

positions throughout the Army. They represent the Signal

Corps at all major commands, congressional hearings, and at

every level within the Department of Defense. It is

extremely important for the Signal General Officers to

concur on issues that have a corps wide impact. The Chief

of Signal acts as the informal host for each symposium but

they may be held at the request of another prominent member

of the corps.(9) All participants present their views but,

once a consensus is reached, all are expected to support the

agreed upon position. Those who object to the postion must

do so at the symposium. Later public objection would be

viewed as self-serving.(9) The Signal Corps ability to

48

present a united position on tough issues has increased its

cultural strength.

49

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The United States Army Signal Corps history provides

more than adequate detail of 80 Albert J. Myer's struggle to

found the Signal Corps as a separate branch. His efforts

and the values displayed during those efforts easily

identify him as the original cultural hero of the Signal

Corps. The continuation of the position of Chief Signal

Officer for one hundred years is further evidence that it

was the position of the cultural leader. The lack of an

identifible cultural leader from 1964 to 1986 provides some

explanation for Signal Corps difficulties during that period

of time. The rebirth of the Signal Corps cultural hero with

the establishment of the Signal Corps Regiment on 6 June

1986 was certainly a huge cultural event. Unfortunately,

the new position of Chief of Signal does not possess the

same functional strength of the previous position of Chief

Signal Officer; however, the formation of the Signal Corps

Regiment under the whole branch concept may provide the new

Chief of Signal even greater cultural power than his

predecessors.

The values of the Signal Corps culture were certainly

established by 80 Myer in his efforts to found the corps and

have been reinforced by senior signal officers for over one

hundred twenty-eight years. Each new member of the corps is

50

taught that he must; be a soldier first and techician

second, provide innovation and inventiveness to improve

communications support, be persistent in providing advice

and ensuring that his customers receive the best support

possible, be self-sacrificing to ensure that the Signal

Corps mission does not fail (even at his own professional

risk), never forget his primary mission is to support his

subscribers and become preoccupied with his own inventive

pursuits. Those members of the Signal Corps culture who

live up to the ideals and values established by BG Myer

enjoy consistent success in the Signal Corps.

The Signal Corps has three subcultures and numerous

cabals. The subcultures of tactical and strategic signal

have the same values but differ in their respective order of

priority. The information manager subculture has had more

difficulty identifing cultural values and priorities because

of its earier lack of a cultural center. The success of the

information management area mission will depend upon the

development of strong cultural values for this subculture.

The establishment of cabals among soldiers serving in

successful signal battalions and brigages is common

practice. These cabals and the Army's regimental program

provide the mechanism for the development of powerful,

long-term laisions among members of successful units whose

commanders later rise to senior positions within the Signal

Corps.

51

The United States Army Signal Center has been

successful in establishing the cultural home of the Signal

Corps at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The Signal Corps Regiment

and Association provide the organizational structure for

continued culture building. The annual Signal Corps

Birthday Ball, the annual December conference, and the

Signal General Officer Symposia all provide the ceremonial

opportunity to strengthen the cultural values of the Signal

Corps.

Conclusions

The purpose of this research project was to identify

the cultural structure, symbols, and interworkings of the

United States Army Signal Corps. The primary objective of

the research was to conduct a cultural analysis of a

military organization and define it using the corporate

culture terminology. Both the original purpose and the

primary objective were accomplished; however, the complexity

of such an undertaking was grossly underestimated by the

author. The development of significant findings was

possible in the research time allowed but the completion of

an exhaustive study will require continued effort on the

part of the author.

Since this project was a study of the author's own

organizational culture, further research will be pursued.

The primary area of future research will be to identify the

52

cultural communications network and the its characters;

i.e., the whisperers, gossips, storytellers, and spies.

The literature research on organizational and

corporate culture provided some difficulty for the author.

This field is relatively new and the lack of standardization

of concepts and terminology caused considerable frustration.

In order to describe the organizational culture of the

Signal Corps, the author selected the terminology used by

Dr. Terry Deal. Deal's concepts and terminology were chosen

solely because of his presentation of them at the Air War

College. The authors choice does not indicate his

preference for Dr. Deal's concepts over those of others in

the field.

Once the selection of concepts and terminology was

accomplished the analysis of the Signal Corps culture was

begun. The use of personal interviews as the primary

research procedure proved to be more difficult than

anticipated. The majority of senior officers interviewed

were not at all familiar with the concepts of organizational

or corporate culture. A great deal of time was spent, in

almost all interviews, explaining the concept and how the

author was attempting to apply them to the Signal Corps.

Some officers did not take the research seriously because

they could not relate it to their own experences. In all

cases, the data provided was directly related to the

53

author's objectives and was capable of being used for the

analysis and subsequent findings of the research.

The United States Army Signal Corps culture was not

difficult to describe. The historical accounts of Dr.

Myer's attempts to found the corps and his trials and

tribulations provided more than enough data to identify him

as the Signal Corps "cultural hero". The values and present

day structure of the culture were also easily identified.

The Signal Corps suffered a severe cultural and functional

setback when the Chief Signal Officer's position was done

away with in 1964. The Chief Signal Officer, until his

demise, enjoyed both the command and staff leadership

position within the Signal Corps. The division of the staff

and command responsibilities have made life difficult for

the Signal Corps culture.

The Army's Regimental program gave the Signal Corps

the opportunity to rebuild its cultural center. The Signal

Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, had enjoyed considerable

expansion and provided the perfect place to build the new

home of the Signal Corps. Many previous commanders had

taken positive steps to prepare Fort Gordon for its formal

recognition. The establishment of the Signal Corps Regiment

on 6 June 1986 has become the second most important date in

Signal Corps history. The first, of course, is 2 July 1860

when Dr. Albert J. Myer was commissioned as the first signal

officer in the U.S. Army.

54

The Signal Corps' leadership is firmly committed to

the advancement of its culture and is training its youth on

the ideals and values professed by Dr. Myer. The Signal

Corps Regiment and Association are hard at work building the

strength of its culture. The United States Army Signal

Corps is truely a culturally rich organization.

55

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