@eljko [evi} - anali pravnog fakulteta u beograduanali.ius.bg.ac.rs/a2002-1-2/anali 2002_1-2...

$: @eljko [evi} - Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beograduanali.ius.bg.ac.rs/A2002-1-2/Anali 2002_1-2 006-046.pdf · Jedino sa pojavom postindustrijskog dru{tva, posle Drugog svetskog rata$
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UDC 502.14:347.23

@eljko [evi}*

PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE MARKET ORDERAND THE RULE OF LAW IN PROTECTING THE

ENVIRONMENT

This paper is concerned with the application of a property rights concept in theprocess of protecting the environment, and inter-relates it with the other policy solutions.Particular attention is devoted to private property rights and the Coasian theorem. Thepaper also indicates three main types of legal protection of the environment by usingcriminal, administrative and civil (tort) law instruments. Finally, the paper concludesthat property rights alone cannot provide the best protection to the environment, butshould be eclectically combined with other types of protection (pure legal protection,regulation, use of financial and fiscal instruments, etc.)JEL Classification: K0, Q2, K3.

Key words: Property rights. -- Market. -- Rule of Law. -- Environment.

1. INTRODUCTION

Every economic activity influences the environment inducing somechanges.1 Some of these impacts can be positive, while the majority producenegative effects. To measure the extent to which emissions affect theenvironment, society needs instruments, techniques, knowledge, etc. Peoplein medieval times were probably aware of the changes that mining, forinstance, imposed upon the environment, but they were not able to establishproper causation, measure the emission, and thereby undertake necessarycounter-measures. Their general knowledge was not at the level that wouldallow them to understand the phenomenon and respond adequately, as they

* Dr @eljko [evi}, Principal Lecturer in Accounting and Finance, Head of theAccounting and Finance Subject Group, The Business School, University of Greenwich,London, England, UK.

1 ,,Every economic action has effects.‘‘ (Cheung, 1970, p. 70)

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UDK 502.14:347.23

@eqko [evi}*

PRAVO SVOJINE, TR@I[NI 'POREDAK' IVLADAVINA PRAVA U ZA[TITI

ÔVEKOVE OKOLINE**

Rad analizira primenu koncepta prava svojine u procesu za{tite

~ovekove okoline povezuju}i ga sa drugim re{ewima. Posebna pa`wa je pos-

ve}ena privatnom pravu svojine i Kouzovoj teoremi. Rad tako|e upu}uje na

tri osnovna tipa pravne za{tite putem primene krivi~nih, administra-

tivnih i gra|anskopravnih instrumenata. Kona~no, rad zakqu~uje da pravo

svojine ne moè samostalno obezbediti najboqu za{titu ~ovekove okoline,

ve} bi ga trebalo kombinovati sa drugim tipovima za{tite (~ista pravna

za{tita, regulativa, kori{}ewe finansijskih i fiskalnih instrumenata

i drugo).

Kqu~ne re~i: Pravo svojine. -- Trì{te. -- Vladavina prava. -- ôvekova

okolina.

1. UVOD

Svaka ekonomska aktivnost uti~e na okolinu proizvode}ineke promene.1 Neki od ovih uticaja mogu biti pozitivni, dokve}ina ipak proizvodi dosta negativnih efekata. U ciqu merewastepena do kojeg imisije uti~u na okruèwe, dru{tvu su potrebniinstrumenti, tehnike, znawe, itd. Qudi u sredwem veku su vero-

* Dr @eqko [evi}, glavni predava~ za oblast ra~unovodstva i finansija,{ef katedre za ra~unovodstvo i finansije Poslovne {kole Univerziteta uGrini~u (London).

** Autor zahvaquje mr Jeleni Zeki} na prevodu originalnog teksta nasrpski jezik. Gospo|ica Zeki} je boravila na Univerzitetu u Grini~u kao Cheve-ning Fellow u periodu od septembra 2001. do aprila 2002. godine.

1 'Svaka ekonomska akcija ima efekte' (Cheung, 1970, str. 70).

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faced the problem of technical constraint. Nor could they make trade-offsbetween economic activity and protection of the environment, because of thelow level of economic development.

Only with the appearance of a post-industrial society, after the SecondWorld War (when the World recovered from the losses suffered during thewar), were the social conditions for raising the question of environmentalprotection achieved. Free people, liberal political regimes, modern democ-racy, and the welfare state allowed mankind to consider social actions forthe protection and conservation of the environment. Government regulationthis century (even before the Second World War) took into considerationsome aspects of environmental protection, but real concern, in the form ofwidespread social movements, only appeared in the 1960s and has continueduntil the present day. The protection of the environment is at the top of theagenda for every political party and there exists a world-wide network ofvarious organisations that are concerned with ecological issues and protectionof the environment.

In this paper we are interested in how the introduction of a propertyrights concept can help to protect the environment. An efficient propertyrights concept can exist only if there is a well-performing State whichguarantees these rights and provides law and order. In order to provide awide social setting for the establishment of property rights over (natural)resources, different concepts of economic organisation will be considered.The concept of property rights over natural resources in particular will beanalysed. Legislation, the production of law and the maintenance of anefficient legal order, are regarded as prerequisites for the introduction ofproperty rights, while government regulation is regarded usually as analternative to the property rights concept. By testing a property rights solutionagainst regulation we will come to the conclusion of this paper. This paperanalyses only the economic consequences of an established property rightssystem, and does not look at the efficiency of criminal law enforcementnor punishment policy for minor offences. To some extent, the paperinterrelates the efficiency of the property rights system and criminal codeand the tort law protection of the environment. Being aware of the impor-tance of environmental issues in transitional economies, the paper tacklesthe issue of legal order vs. the legal system, that is the efficiency of theimplementation of set legal rules in a society, and differences between adesired legal situation and the real situation achieved in a particular society.We do not argue here that efficient property rights can entirely replace otherforms of legal protection, that is criminal law and tort law protection Thepaper argues that the establishment of property rights can improve environ-mental quality, only if accompanied with other, more classical means ofprotection.

@eljko [evi}, Property Rights, the Market Order and the Rule of Law (str. 6--46)

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vatno bili upoznati sa promenama koje je va|ewe rude, na primer,izazivalo u okolini, ali oni nisu bili sposobni da uspostaveodgovaraju}u uzro~no-posledi~nu vezu, da mere imisiju i da uskladu sa time preduzmu neophodne protivmere. Wihovo op{teznawe nije bilo na dovoqnom nivou da bi im dozvolilo da upotpunosti razumeju fenomen, i odgovore adekvatno na wega, jersu se suo~ili sa problemom tzv. tehni~kog ograni~ewa (technicalconstraint). Niti su pak, zbog niskog stepena ekonomskog razvoja,mogli da odlu~e {ta je va`nije: ekonomska aktivnost ili za{titaokoline.

Jedino sa pojavom postindustrijskog dru{tva, posle Drugogsvetskog rata (kada se svet oporavio od gubitaka pretrpqenihtokom rata), stekli su se dru{tveni uslovi za postavqawe pitawaza{tite okoline. Slobodni qudi, liberalni politi~ki reìmi,moderna demokratija i dràva blagostawa (Welfare State) dozvoqa-vali su qudima da po~nu razmi{qati o dru{tvenim akcijama uciqu za{tite i o~uvawa okoline. Javni propisi doneseni u ovomveku (~ak i pre Drugog svetskog rata) uzeli su u razmatrawe nekeaspekte za{tite okoline, ali stvarna briga u obliku {irokorasprostrawenog dru{tvenog pokreta, pojavila se tek u {ezdese-tim godinama XX veka i nastavila se do dana{weg dana. Za{titaokoline je pri vrhu dnevnoga reda svake politi~ke partije, a{irom sveta postoji razgranata mreà razli~itih organizacijakoje se bave pitawima ekologije i za{titom okoline.

U ovom radu mi smo zainteresovani da analiziramo pitawekako uvo|ewe koncepta prava svojine moè pomo}i da se okolinaza{titi. Efikasan koncept prava svojine moè postojati samoako postoji i efikasna i delotvorna dràva koja garantuje ovaprava i pravni poredak koji funkcioni{e. U ciqu obezbe|ivawa{iroke dru{tvene osnove za uvo|ewe prava svojine nad prirodnimresursima, bi}e razmatrani razli~iti koncepti ekonomske orga-nizacije. Zakonodavstvo, 'pravqewe' prava i odràvawe efikas-nog pravnog poretka, posmatrani su kao preduslovi za postojaweprava svojine, dok su podzakonski propisi naj~e{}e vi|eni kaoalternativa konceptu prava svojine. Rad }e testirati koncepteprava svojine u odnosu na koncept propisa. Tako|e, rad analizirasamo ekonomske posledice uspostavqawa sistema prava svojine ine posmatra efikasnost primene krivi~nog (kaznenog) i pre-kr{ajnog prava u za{titi ìvotne okoline. Do izvesnog stepena,rad povezuje efikasnost sistema prava svojine sa krivi~nim zako-nom (zakonikom) prava naknade {tete. Imaju}i u vidu va`nostproblema ~ovekove sredine u tranzicionim ekonomijama, ovaj raddodiruje pitawa odnosa pravnog poretka (legal order) i pravnogsistema (legal system), odnosno efikasnost implementacije skupapravnih pravila u jednom dru{tvu i razli~itosti izme|u èqene

@eqko [evi}, Pravo svojine, trì{ni 'poredak' i vladavina prava (str. 6--46)

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However, it should be noted that a full distinction must be madebetween legal protection of property rights alone and the legal protection ofthe environment. We will establish a necessary link between ex officioprotection of the environment and protection of the environment throughcivil suites based on the violation of property rights. However, consider firsthow the structure of an economy can predetermine the concept of environ-mental protection.

2. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ANDENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CONCEPTS

Currently, it is possible to distinguish three main models of marketeconomies. The first is a social market economy which is applied in WesternEurope. The second model is a consumer directed economy typical for theUSA. Finally, the third type is an administratively guided economy, such asin Japan (see: Ostry, 1990). Despite the slightly misleading name, ,,socialmarket economies‘‘ are committed to the prevalence of market forces andprivate property.

All these three concepts support the rule of law and private propertyrights. However, as we already know, institutions matter (Pejovich, 1995).They are the rules of the social game that is played within society, or inother words, the constraints that shape human actions created by humanbeings with the aim of doing so (Cf. North, 1990). They are also ,,theunderlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies‘‘ (North,1990, p. 107). Institutions change over the course of time, and should supportwider social developments. Institutional innovations that reduce transactioncosts are a source of economic growth, as they facilitate wealth-enhancingtrade (North, 1990).

Although these three types generally support the concept of propertyrights, it does not mean that they would equally embrace the establishmentof the property rights concept over natural resources. The crux of the matterfor the introduction of property rights over natural resources is the relativeimportance and strength of the State. In a social market economy, the Stateis very influential within society but is not directly engaged in ,,guiding‘‘ theeconomy. The public sector is relatively strong, but private property domi-nates the economic sphere. However, ,,public goods‘‘ (and often quasi-publicgoods) are, as a rule, provided by the State (the Government in Anglo-Ameri-can terminology). Since the State has a very important redistributive function,it also widely uses the law as an instrument of social and economic policy.As a consequence the State closely regulates the use of natural resources,and licensing is almost an exclusive manner of allowing access to naturalresources. The use of natural resources is strictly stipulated in law, over


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pravne situacije i one koja objektivno postoji u datom dru{tvu.Mi ovde ne tvrdimo da efikasno pravo svojine moè u potpunostizameniti druge oblike pravne za{tite, predvi|ene u krivi~nompravu i pravu naknade {tete. Stojimo na stanovi{tu da sâmouvo|ewe prava svojine moè unaprediti kvalitet ~ovekove oko-line jedino ako je pra}eno i drugim, klasi~nijim merama za{tite.

Me|utim, treba napraviti jasnu razliku izme|u pravneza{tite samog prava svojine per se, i pravne za{tite okoline. Mi}emo uspostaviti neophodnu vezu izme|u slu`bene, ex officio za{ti-te ~ovekove sredine i za{tite okoline putem mera gra|ansko-pravne za{tite, prete`no baziranih na povredi prava svojine.Ali, razmotrimo prvo kako ekonomska struktura moè uticati naizbor koncepta za{tite ~ovekove okoline.

2. EKONOMSKA STRUKTURA I KONCEPT ZA[TITE

ÔVEKOVE OKOLINE

Trenutno je mogu}e razlikovati tri glavna modela trì{neekonomije. Prvi model je dru{tveno-trì{na (social market eco-nomy) ekonomija koja je zastupqena u Zapadnoj Evropi. Drugimodel je potro{a~ki usmeravana (consumer directed economy) eko-nomija tipi~na za SAD. I, kona~no, tre}i tip je administrativ-no vo|ena (administratively guided economy) ekonomija, kao ona uJapanu (videti: Ostrey, 1990). I pored pomalo zbuwuju}eg naziva,'dru{tveno-trì{ne ekonomije' su zasnovane na {irokoj domina-ciji trì{nih snaga i privatne svojine.

Sva tri koncepta podrazumevaju vladavinu prava i postojawe(jasno definisanog) prava privatne svojine. Me|utim, kao {to sei zna, najva`nije su ustanove2 (institucije) (Pejovich, 1995). Onesu pravila dru{tvene igre koja se odvija u okviru jednog dru{tva,ili, drugim re~ima, ograni~ewa koja oblikuju qudske radwe kre-irane upravo sa ciqem da se to i uradi (upor. North, 1990). One sutako|e 'osnovna determinanta dugoro~nog funkcionisawa privre-da' (North, 1990, str. 107). Ustanove se vremenom mewaju i trebalobi da potpomognu {iroki dru{tveni razvoj. 'Institucionalneinovacije' koje umawuju transakcione tro{kove predstavqaju iz-vor ekonomskog rasta jer pospe{uju trgovinu, a trgovina uve}ava(dru{tveno, nap.) bogatstvo (North, 1990).


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2 Ustanove u striktno pravnom smislu re~i u kontinentalnoevropskimpravnim sistemima i tradicijama, kao {to je jugoslovenski (napomena autora uverziji teksta prikazanog na srpskom jeziku).

which the State provides control. Any breach of law, in most cases, willtrigger criminal prosecution.

In a consumer directed (or consumer-driven) economy, the role of theState i.e. government theoretically is not very important. However, the USAopted for the wide regulation of economic activity in some sectors. Despitea wide wave of deregulation in the mid 1970s and 1980s, the Americaneconomy is still over-regulated. Regulation, especially within the Americanconcept, consists of governmental actions to control the pricing, sale andproduction decisions of firms taken in order to prevent private economicagents from taking an inadequate account of public interests. However,deregulation opened the possibility for the State to reconsider the reorgani-sation of the property rights concept. In the field of environmental protection,the creation of saleable pollution credits has been advanced in order to keeppollution within a predetermined limit. It is argued that with such rights anda market for their sale, firms would find it costly to pollute. Hence, it couldbe concluded that the political withdrawal of the State from the regulatoryfield opens a possibility for the establishment of property rights. Certainly,some amount of regulation must remain in force.

Finally, consider an administratively-guided economy. In this conceptthe State has the most important role in the process of economic development.Although privately owned, firms rely on large-scale support from the State,and the bureaucratic apparatus is de facto a very important factor in sociallife. The most important regulatory norms are not stipulated by law, but bythe by-laws or other related acts brought by the Ministries and othergovernmental organisations. In this fairly straight-forward concept, it isalmost impossible to envisage the establishment of property rights as a meansof environmental protection, due to the excessive social power of the State.Countries that apply this concept will rather opt for a classical old-fashionregulatory approach, with a central position kept for the governmentalorganisations. In the administratively guided economy, property rights onwildlife and objects of environmental interest are not widely practised.Usually, the government closely monitors the use of natural resources andowns the most important wildlife habitats in the country, incorporatingnational parks. In this domain, Japan, as the main representative of this groupof economies, was clearly influenced by the Americans who were occupiersof Japan for a number of years. The American influence is clearly seen inJapan, at least in the domain of environment law, and environmental protection.

As can be seen, depending on the type of economy and the role ofgovernment in it, the legislator will opt for different solutions in order toprotect the environment. While it is more likely that ,,social market‘‘ and,,administratively-guided‘‘ economies would apply only a regulatory ap-proach, consumer-directed economies would prefer to establish an additional


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Iako sva tri tipa generalno podràvaju koncept prava svo-jine, to ne zna~i da }e oni podjednako prihvatiti i uvo|ewe pravasvojine nad prirodnim resursima. Relativna snaga dràve je naj-bitnija kod uvo|ewa prava svojine nad prirodnim resursima. Udru{tveno-trì{noj ekonomiji dràva je veoma uticajna u dru-{tvu, ali nije direktno angaòvana u 'vo|ewu' ekonomije. Javnisektor je relativno jak, ali privatna svojina jasno dominiraekonomskom sferom. Me|utim, 'javna dobra' (i ~esto kvazijavnadobra) obezbe|ena su po pravilu od strane dràve ('vlade' u an-glo-saksonskoj pravnoj terminologiji). Kako dràva ima veomazna~ajnu redistributivnu funkciju, ona tako|e {iroko koristito pravo kao instrument dru{tvene i ekonomske politike. Pos-ledica toga je da dràva usko reguli{e kori{}ewe prirodnihresursa i dozvole su gotovo jedini na~in da se dobije pristupprirodnim resursima. Kori{}ewe prirodnih resursa je striktnoodre|eno zakonom, nad ~ijim sprovo|ewem dràva obezbe|uje kon-trolu. Svako kr{ewe zakona ili oglu{ewe o zakon u ve}inislu~ajeva }e inicirati krivi~no gowewe.

U potro{a~ki usmeravanoj (ili potro{a~ki vo|enoj) ekono-miji uloga dràve, drugim re~ima vlade, teoretski nije veomava`na. Me|utim, SAD su izabrale {iroko regulisawe ekonomskeaktivnosti u nekim sektorima privrede. Uprkos {irokom talasuderegulacije sredinom 1970-ih i 1980-ih, ameri~ka ekonomija jejo{ uvek pre-regulisana (over-regulated), posebno u okviru ame-ri~kog koncepta, i sastoji se od vladinih mera sa ciqem kontrolecenovnih, prodajnih i proizvodnih odluka, u nameri da se predu-predi da privatni ekonomski agenti zanemare javne interese.Me|utim, deregulacija je otvorila mogu}nost za dràvu da ponovorazmotri reorganizaciju koncepta prava svojine. Na poqu za{tite~ovekove okoline, prodaja kvota prava zaga|ivawa dosegla je nivokoji moè da obezbedi odràwe zaga|ewa u predvi|enim okvirima.Tvrdi se da su, sa uvo|ewem takvih prava i wihovim trì{tem,firme shvatile da je zaga|ivawe skupo. Dakle, moèmo zakqu~itida politi~ko povla~ewe dràve iz regulatornog poqa otvaramogu}nost za uspostavqawe prava svojine. Svakako, propisi uodre|enom obimu moraju ostati na snazi.

Kona~no, razmotrimo administrativno vo|enu ekonomiju. Uovom konceptu dràva ima najva`niju ulogu u procesu ekonomskograzvoja. Iako su u privatnom vlasni{tvu, firme se oslawaju najaku podr{ku dràve i birokratski aparat je de facto veoma vaànfaktor u dru{tvenom ìvotu. Najva`nije regulatorne norme nisupropisane zakonom ve} podzakonskim propisima ili drugim rele-vantnim aktima donesenim od strane ministarstava ili drugihvladinih organizacija. U ovom poprili~no jednostavnom konceptu


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market -- the market for property rights over natural resources.2 In the formertwo cases, the introduction of a property rights concept over natural resourceswould not be a straightforward process. The social market and administra-tively guided economies need to introduce fairly large institutional changesprior to the introduction of a full property rights concept. Initially, however,regulation might prevail while the property rights are gradually introduced.The explicit legal rule of compulsory nature will remain, for the foreseeablefuture, as the main instrument of environmental protection. But there is anopportunity to introduce property rights on a smaller scale.

Consider now from a comparative perspective the protection of wild-life. At this point the difference emerge between countries following variousforms of organisation. Often some scholars object to the very idea ofestablishing property rights over wildlife, as by its very nature it is fleeting.But wildlife can also be regarded as one of several attributes of the land. Ifso, a particular wildlife habitat can be an entity in itself, supporting orexcluding other uses of a particular piece of land. Consequently, if transactioncosts are zero (nil), each aspect of land would be optimally exploited andconsequently, according to Coase (Coase, 1960), the ownership pattern wouldin fact be irrelevant. As the transaction costs are positive in any existingeconomy in the World today, the ownership matters. If an individual personis an owner of property rights over a piece of land which hosts the particularhabitat, he or she is in any case expected to act as a rational economic agent,maximising their benefits and minimising their losses. Therefore, some otheruse of a piece of land is expected that may harm the existing habitat.Therefore, the government can undertake some activities to enhance the valueof such wildlife and it would appear that it does so. However, in differentcountries different approaches to wildlife protection and preservation areapplied. In the United States, the current legal doctrine supports the govern-ment regulation of wildlife, along with state and federal government owner-ship over habitat. Some private individuals have ownership rights overwildlife, but in those cases the exercise of their rights is closely regulatedby the government. Canada adopts a similar approach (regulation with widegovernment ownership), while in the UK (especially in England) due to thelong tradition of large farms, property rights are mostly allocated to privateindividuals. Consequently, there is also the lack of this kind of environmentalregulation, as the regulatory approach is mainly an American 'invention'.

In contrast, in the USA and Canada, it is generally believed that thegovernment protects the environment, including wildlife, through imposingstrict regulation, and practising property rights over wildlife. The govern-


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2 In western society where there is a priori political support for market-like processes,the social and economic processes and outcomes of that framework are thought to be, for themost part beyond the question‘‘. (Bromley, 1989, p. 221)

gotovo je nemogu}e zamisliti uvo|ewe prava svojine kao sredstvaza{tite okoline, usled preterane dru{tvene mo}i dràve. Dr-àve koje primewuju ovaj koncept radije }e izabrati klasi~nistaromodni regulativni pristup sa centralnom pozicijom zadr-ànom za vladine organizacije. U administrativno vo|enoj eko-nomiji prava svojine nad prirodom i objektima od interesa za~ovekovu sredinu nisu {iroko rasprostrawena. Naj~e{}e, vlada~vrsto kontroli{e upotrebu prirodnih resursa i poseduje naj-va`nije biqne i ìvotiwske habitate u zemqi, ukqu~uju}i inacionalne parkove. U ovom smislu Japan je, kao glavni predstav-nik ove grupe ekonomija, bio pod uticajem Amerikanaca koji subili okupatori Japana duì niz godina. Ameri~ki uticaj se jasnovidi u Japanu, bar u oblasti prava i za{tite okruèwa.

Kako moèmo videti, u zavisnosti od tipa ekonomije i ulogevlade u woj, zakonodavac }e izabrati razli~ite solucije u ciquza{tite ~ovekove okoline. Dok je vi{e verovatno da }e dru{tve-no-trì{ne i administrativno vo|ene ekonomije primeniti jedi-no (ili predominantno) regulatorni pristup, potro{a~ki usme-rene ekonomije }e preferirati da uspostave dodatno trì{te --trì{te za prava svojine nad prirodnim resursima.3 U posledwadva slu~aja, uvo|ewe koncepta prava svojine nad prirodnim resur-sima ne bi bio jednostavan proces. Dru{tveno-trì{ne i admi-nistrativno vo|ene ekonomije treba da sprovedu velike institu-cionalne promene pre uvo|ewa celovitog koncepta prava svojine.Inicijalno, me|utim, regulacija moè preovladati dok se pravasvojine postepeno uvode. Kompulsivno-pravne norme osta}e jo{neko vreme kao glavni instrument za{tite ~ovekove okoline.Ali, postoji {ansa da se uvedu prava svojine u mawem obimu.

Razmotrimo sada, sa komparativnog stanovi{ta, za{titudivqeg biqnog i ìvotiwskog sveta. Ovde se razlika javqa izme|uzemaqa zbog razli~itih formi organizacije. êsto se analiti-~ari protive samoj ideji uvo|ewa prava svojine nad prirodom jermisle da je to u su{tini neodrìvo. Ali priroda tako|e moèbiti posmatrana kao jedan od nekoliko atributa zemqi{ta. Akoje tako, odre|eno prirodno stani{te moè biti entitet za sebe,entitet koji omogu}ava ili iskqu~uje druge upotrebe odre|enogdela zemqi{ta. Kao posledica, ako su transakcioni tro{kovinula (nil), svaki aspekt zemqi{ta bio bi optimalno iskori{}eni posledi~no tome, prema Kouzu (Coase, 1960), vlasni~ki oblik biu stvari bio nevaàn. Kako su transakcioni tro{kovi danas


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3 'U zapadnom dru{tvu postoji a priori politi~ka podr{ka za trì{noorijentisane procese; za dru{tvene i ekonomske procese i rezultate takvogokvira smatra se da su izvan svake sumwe' (prihvatqivi -- prim. prev.). (Bromley,1989, str. 221)

ments attempt to maximise the value of wildlife, and this is the main reasonfor the government intervention in this field. Interestingly, although Englishlaw is the basis of American and Canadian law, their environmental lawdiverge considerably therefrom. North Americans closely follow an idea thatthe purpose of regulation is to maximise the value of wildlife, and thereforeprivate ownership must comply with regulations, and consequently can begranted to individuals or interest groups. One of the points of difference isthe size of the average farm in North America (the USA and Canada) andEngland. Some hundred years ago, the mean farm size in the UK was 390acres, while it was only 134 acres in the USA. In Canada, the privatelandholdings are even smaller and more scattered (Lueck, 1989, pp. 316--317). It is fairly difficult to say whether the property rights concept combinedwith strict government regulation can really support the protection of wildlife.If law enforcement is efficient, and meets all modern criteria, positive resultsmay be expected. Therefore, the property rights concept must have as aprerequisite the organised state, the rule of law, and transparent publicpolicy.

3. PROPERTY RIGHTS, LAW AND ORDER,REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

There are a couple of institutions which are known under the samename in legal and economic literature, but whose contents vary from disci-pline to discipline. Lawyers usually perceive property rights in a classicalancient Roman manner (usus, fructus and abusus), while the economist seesproperty rights rather as a factor of production, an institutional arrangementunder which one economic agent can utilise certain objects or rights. Con-sequently, although both speak about the same thing, their perspectives differ.Consider first the legal approach to property rights.

There is nothing more one can say about a thing than ,,It is mine‘‘.The possessive pronoun ,,mine‘‘ fully explains the status of the thing. Theperson who owns the thing can use it, acquire the yield that it generates, oreven destroy the thing. Usually, it is said that there are no limits in disposingwith the thing one owns. However, it is not particularly true. Within theclassical Roman concept of property it was true, ownership had no limits.3

But, in the modern world, ownership also has a social function (see: Duguit,1920). Namely, the property cannot be used against desired social ends.Every member of society must be prepared to respect the needs and rightsof others, not imposing additional burdens upon them. However, as we have


16

3 Ownership is the right to possess, to use, to manage, to benefit, to be secure andto alienate. (Bromley, 1989)

pozitivni u svakoj postoje}oj ekonomiji u svetu, va`no je i vlas-ni{tvo. Ako je odre|ena osoba vlasnik prava svojine nad delomzemqe koji gosti odre|eno stani{te, od wega ili we se u svakomslu~aju o~ekuje da reaguje kao racionalni ekonomski agent, mak-simiziraju}i svoje koristi i minimiziraju}i svoje tro{kove. Ne-ki drugi na~in kori{}ewa zemqe moè nauditi habitatu. Zbogtoga vlada moè preduzeti neke aktivnosti kako bi oja~ala vred-nosti takvog dela prirode i prime}uje se da ona tako i radi.Me|utim, u razli~itim zemqama primewuju se razli~iti pristupiza{tite i o~uvawa divqeg biqnog i ìvotiwskog sveta. U Sjedi-wenim Dràvama, moderna pravna doktrina podràva vladinu re-gulativu o prirodnom svetu, uporedo sa vlasni{tvom dràvnihvlada i federalne vlade nad habitatom. Neka fizi~ka lica imajuvlasni{tvo nad delom prirode, ali u tim slu~ajevima sprovo|ewewihovih prava je usko regulisano od strane vlade. Kanada uvodisli~an pristup (regulacije sa {irokim vlasni{tvom vlade), doku Velikoj Britaniji (posebno u Engleskoj), usled duge tradicijevelikih gazdinstava, prava svojine su ve}im delom raspore|enafizi~kim licima. Kao posledica se tako|e javqa nedostatak ovevrste propisa o ~ovekovom okruèwu jer je regulatorni pristupve}im delom ameri~ki 'izum'.

Suprotno tome, u SAD i Kanadi, se generalno smatra davlada {titi okolinu, ukqu~uju}i i divqi biqni i ìvotiwskisvet, putem uvo|ewa striktne regulative i uspostavqaju}i pravosvojine nad prirodom. Vlade nastoje da maksimiziraju vrednostprirode i to je glavni razlog intervencije vlade na ovom poqu.Interesantno je da iako ameri~ko i kanadsko pravo poti~u odengleskog, wihova prava o ~ovekovoj okolini se umnogome razli-kuju. Severnoamerikanci blisko prate ideju da je su{tina propisada maksimizira vrednost prirode i, stoga, privatno vlasni{tvomora da se ostvaruje u skladu sa pravnim propisima, i kao takvomoè biti dodeqeno pojedincima ili interesnim grupama. Jednaod ta~aka razlike jeste veli~ina prose~nog poseda u SevernojAmerici (SAD i Kanada) i Engleskoj. Pre nekoliko stotinagodina, osnovna veli~ina poseda u Velikoj Britaniji bila je 390ari, dok je u SAD iznosila samo 134 ara. U Kanadi, privatniposedi su ~ak jo{ mawi i razu|eniji (Lueck, 1989, str. 316--7).Poprili~no je te{ko re}i da li koncept prava svojine u kombi-naciji sa striktnom regulativom vlade moè uop{te podràti iza{tititi prirodu. Ako je primena prava efikasna i u skladu sasvim modernim kriterijumima, mogu se o~ekivati pozitivni re-zultati. Zato koncept prava svojine mora imati kao preduslovorganizovanu dràvu, vladavinu prava i transparentno vo|ewejavnih poslova (transparent public policy).


17

seen, any kind of economic (and wider, social) activity imposes someinfluence on others. This influence can be either positive or negative.

Usually, one cannot charge others for the positive externality, but ifthe negative externality occurs the owner may be liable to cover the damage,if he does not have a full property right. A situation of some confusion nowarises. The owner (property rights holder) will not be liable for damages ifhe/she holds property rights. How can this be possible when the owneralready has property rights? This is the point of distinction between a legaland economic concept of property rights. Lawyers and legal scholars seeproperty rights as a social institution established by law, in which a personhas socially recognised power over the object of property rights. Legal theory,especially after the Constitution of the Weimar republic and the theory ofproperty rights as a social function, limits the extent to which property rightscan be used and prohibits the misuse of property rights. No one can use itsrights to affect and to limit the rights of others. The thing or right which isthe subject of property rights must be used according to social standard, andan owner in the process of use must not affect the rights of others. If he orshe affects the rights of others in exercising their rights, they can be madeliable and asked to cover the damage made to another person. Therefore, thequestion emerges as to whether today's property rights are still 'absoluterights'. It is a certainty, that they are absolute rights only in theory, while inpractice there are many limitations imposed by the modern State, whichlimits the extent to which an owner can exercise their rights.

In terms of economics, property rights are seen as the ability to useresources. Starting with Coase (Coase, 1960), property rights are seen byeconomists as a factor of production.4 Property rights are a set of relation-ships amongst people that define their opportunities, their exposure to theacts of others, their privileges and their responsibilities (Schmid, 1987;Bromley, 1989). Similar to lawyers, economists regard rights as a relationshipamong individuals rather than the relationship between an individual and aresource. The economists, mainly concerned with economic efficiency, be-lieve that the establishment of property rights increases economic efficiency.Whether it is really the case or not, is difficult to tell. The general belief isthat private property is, by definition, more efficient.


18

4 The above-mentioned Coase paper (Coase, 1960) had established assumptions whichlater were labelled as the Coase theorem. The theorem states that in a world of zero transactioncosts, any initial definition of rights will lead to an efficient outcome. It is important notbecause we live in such a world, but because it shows us a different way of looking at a largerange of problems, these resulting from the transaction costs that prevent the parties affectedfrom bargaining their way to an efficient outcome. The Coase theorem addresses the questionas to which bundling of rights would lead, under various circumstances, to an efficient outcome,and if a particular initial bundling of rights leads to an inefficient outcome, how easy will itbe for the parties to negotiate a change with the party who has a greater value for one of therights in a bundle purchasing it from its initial owner ([evi}, 2000).

3. PRAVO SVOJINE, PRAVO I POREDAK,

REGULATIVA I JAVNI POSLOVI4

Postoji nekoliko institucija koje su u pravnoj i ekonomskojliteraturi poznate pod istim imenom ali ~iji kontekst variraod discipline do discipline. Pravnici obi~no posmatraju pravosvojine u klasi~nom, starorimskom maniru (usus, fructus i abusus),dok ekonomisti pravo svojine vide pre kao proizvodni faktor,kao institucionalni aran`man pod kojim jedan ekonomski agentmoè koristiti odre|ene objekte ili prava. Kao posledica, iakoobe grupe govore o istoj stvari, wihove perspektive se razlikuju.Razmotrimo prvo pravni pristup pravu svojine.

Ne postoji ni{ta vi{e {to ~ovek moè re}i o stvari nego:'To je moje'. Prisvojna zamenica 'moje' u potpunosti obja{wavastatus stvari. Osoba koja poseduje stvar moè je koristiti, pris-vajaju}i prinos koji ta stvar generi{e, ili je ~ak moè uni{titi.Obi~no se kaè da ne postoje limiti nad raspolagawem do uni{te-wa stvari koju neko poseduje. Me|utim, to nije ba{ prava istina.U okviru klasi~nog rimskog koncepta svojine bilo je istina, nadvlasni{tvom nisu postojale granice.5 Ali, u modernom svetu,vlasni{tvo tako|e ima i dru{tvenu funkciju (videti: Duguit,1920). Naime, svojina ne moè biti kori{}ena protiv èqenihdru{tvenih ciqeva. Svaki ~lan dru{tva mora biti spreman dapo{tuje potrebe i prava drugih, ne stvaraju}i im dodatne tro{ko-ve. Me|utim, kao {to smo videli, svaka vrsta ekonomske (i {ire,dru{tvene) aktivnosti uti~e na okolinu. Ovaj uticaj moè bitikako pozitivan tako i negativan ([evi}, 2003).

Naj~e{}e se drugi ne mogu napla}ivati za pozitivne ekster-nalije koje uìvaju, ali ako se negativne eksternalije pojave,vlasniku moè biti naloèno da pokrije {tetu, ukoliko on nemapuno pravo svojine. Tu nastaje odre|ena konfuzna situacija. Vlas-nik (imalac prava svojine) ne}e biti duàn da nadoknadi {tetuako on/ona uìva pravno pravo svojine. Kako je to mogu}e kadavlasnik ve} ima pravo svojine? Pravnici i pravni nau~nici videpravo svojine kao dru{tvenu instituciju uspostavqenu pravom, ukojoj osoba ima dru{tveno prepoznatqivu mo} nad objektom pravasvojine. Pravna teorija, posebno nakon konstituisawa Vajmarskerepublike, i teorija prava svojine kao dru{tvene funkcije, ogra-ni~avaju stepen do kojeg pravo svojine moè biti kori{}eno, izabrawuju zloupotrebu prava svojine. Niko ne moè koristiti


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4 Public policy.5 Vlasni{tvo je pravo da se poseduje, koristi, upravqa, bogati, o~uva i

otu|i (Bromley, 1989).

Interestingly, the failure of the socialist experiment contributed to afurther strengthening of this belief. In a full market economy, state property(public ownership) can sometimes be efficient, albeit rarely. There are manyobstacles against the ,,public provision of goods and services‘‘. Publicenterprises, due to their close connection with the government, have a bigproblem in going international both in terms of retailing products and raisingmoney through either equity or debt.

The modern economy does not discriminate against different types ofproperty. All types of property are completely equal before the law. There-fore, there are four different natural resource management regimes based onvarious types of property. The first is state property where individuals haveto follow the rules of using resources determined by law or governmentalagencies, which also have the original right to stipulate rules for the use ofresources. The second type is private property in which individuals or legalentities have the full right to undertake the socially approved and acceptableuse of resources. They have to refrain from socially unacceptable use, whileothers should not interfere in their affairs. The third possibility is commonproperty regime, in which one group has property rights and can excludeothers from use. Others (known as non-members) have the duty to respectthe exclusion, while co-owners must respect the social limits of acceptableuse of resources. The fourth possibility comprises open access to naturalresources. If open access is practised, there are no defined users or owners.Theoretically, everybody can use the resource, without obligation to do so.There are no explicit rules of conduct in relation to use of the resource.

Practice has shown that open access is not a successful propertyregime. If no-one owns resources, it is very likely that the environment willbe at risk. Some scholars argue similarly with the concept of commonproperty. Experience does not support this claim in full. Some commonproperty regimes serve well, while others fail. Usually, if the renewablenatural resource is managed by close-knit groups, the common propertyregime works fine. In the case of the fishery or oyster industry, a commonproperty regime serves the function well (Agnello and Donnelly, 1975). Ifthe common property regime failed, then generally this will be the result ofsome external shock that induced an internal system failure. As usual, formost social institutions, changes in the institutional environment alters theviability of the institution. State property means that, usually, a state insti-tution directly manages natural resources. The State can exclude others fromuse, and all the benefits are, usually directly, collected by the State. However,many authors have raised the question of efficiency of the state propertyregime, as has been mentioned above.

Private property regime vest property rights in an individual or legalentity. It is believed to be the most successful solution to the ,,tragedy of


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svoja prava da ograni~ava prava drugih. Stvar ili pravo koje jesubjekt prava svojine mora biti kori{}eno u skladu sa dru{tve-nim standardima i vlasnik u procesu kori{}ewa ne sme vre|atiprava drugih. Ako on ili ona ograni~avaju prava drugih u primenisvojih prava, mogu biti odgovorni i pozvani da pokriju {tetu kojaje druga osoba pretrpela. Zato se javqa pitawe da li su dana{waprava svojine jo{ uvek 'apsolutna prava'. Izvesno je da su onaapsolutna samo u teoriji, dok u praksi postoje mnoga ograni~ewanametnuta od strane moderne dràve koja limitira stepen do kojegvlasnik moè koristiti svoja prava.

Sa ekonomskog aspekta, pravo svojine je shva}eno kao spo-sobnost kori{}ewa resursa. Po~ev{i od Kouza (Coase, 1960), pra-vo svojine se razume, od strane ekonomista, kao faktor proizvod-we.6 Prava svojine su set odnosa izme|u qudi koji defini{u svojeprilike, svoju izloènost postupcima drugih, wihovih privile-gija i wihovih odgovornosti (Schmid, 1987; Bromley, 1989). Sli~nopravnicima, ekonomisti posmatraju prava kao odnos izme|u poje-dinaca pre nego kao odnos pojedinca i raspoloìvog resursa.Ekonomisti, mahom okupirani ekonomskom efikasno{}u, veruju dauspostavqawe prava vlasni{tva uve}ava ekonomsku efikasnost.Te{ko je re}i da li je to zaista slu~aj ili ne. Op{te je verovaweda je privatna svojina, po definiciji, efikasnija.

Interesantno je da je proma{aj socijalisti~kog eksperimen-ta doprineo daqem ja~awu ovog verovawa. U punoj trì{noj eko-nomiji, dràvna svojina (javno vlasni{tvo) moè ponekad bitiefikasno; dodu{e, retko. Postoje mnogi problemi sa 'javnim obez-be|ewem robe i usluga'. Javna preduze}a, usled wihove tesne vezesa dràvom (vladom), imaju veliki problem u sprovo|ewu inter-nacionalizacije, podjednako u maloprodaji robe kao i u procesuobezbe|ewa sredstava, bilo putem emitovawa akcija ili du`-ni~kih hartija od vrednosti.

Moderna ekonomija ne diskrimini{e razli~ite oblike svo-jine (vlasni{tva). Svi tipovi svojine su potpuno jednaki pred


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6 Pomenuti Kouzov rad (Coase, 1960) uveo je pretpostavke koje su kasnijebile obeleène kao Kouzova teorema. Teorema kaè da }e u svetu nultih tran-sakcionih tro{kova, bilo koja inicijalna definicija prava voditi ka efikasnomrezultatu. To je va`no, ne zato {to mi ìvimo u takvom svetu, ve} zato {to namto pokazuje druga~iji na~in gledawa na ~itav niz problema, koji rezultiraju odtransakcionih tro{kova koji spre~avaju zainteresovane strane da ugovore efi-kasno re{ewe. Kouzova teorema adresira pitawa kao {to su: koje bi pakovaweprava vodilo, pod razli~itim uslovima, efikasnom rezultatu i, ako bi odre|enoinicijalno pakovawe prava vodilo efikasnom rezultatu, koliko bi lako bilo zau~esnike da pregovaraju o promeni sa stranom koja ima ve}u vrednost za jedno odprava u paketu, kupuju}i ih od wenog prvobitnog vlasnika ([evi}, 2000).

commons‘‘. In the classical Coasian tradition, the intervention of the govern-ment is to be rejected in favour of market bargaining undertaken by estab-lished private property right holders in order to achieve the social optimumlevel of pollution. With fully established property rights polluter and suffererwould be left in an unregulated situation. With no transaction costs bargain-ing will be developed between them as the autonomous and logical conse-quence of a newly emerged situation. The standard problem of the Coasiansolution is that it requires perfect competition, zero transaction costs, and abenign society and government.

However, in every day life one faces high transaction costs, thepresence of monopolies (imperfect competition), a problem in identifying ofpolluters and sufferers, an incomplete legal framework, inequality betweencontractual sides, etc. Despite its obvious deficiencies the Coase theorem isan important achievement of theory of property rights. It clearly showed thatproperty rights (in economic terms) are a factor of production. It also forcessupporters of governmental intervention in environmental affairs to clearlydefine their position and aims (Pearce and Turner, 1990).

Within a Coasian framework, a polluter aims to operate at the levelof economic activity which yields highest profit (Qπ -- profit maximisinglevel/point). However, the profit maximising point of an individual economicagent is never a socially optimal point. The social optimum level of pollutionappears at the point in which marginal net private benefits (MNPB) equalmarginal external costs (MEC). With the introduction of (private) propertyrights, a polluter and sufferer will negotiate the level of pollution.

Namely, if a sufferer enjoys property rights, the polluter will be willingto compensate a sufferer up to the point of social optimum level of pollution(Q*). Beyond that point, it would be irrational to expect from a polluter tobuy off the sufferer because his/her gains (MNPB) are lower than thesufferer's losses. Conversely, if the (private) property rights are given to apolluter, he/she will aim to produce at the profit maximising point of output,but now a sufferer can buy off the polluter, up to the social optimum point(Q*). Depending on the monetary strength of a sufferer, the negotiated pointcan be anywhere between the social optimum point of pollution (Q*) andthe profit maximising point (Qπ).

Thus, if property rights are vested in a sufferer, the negotiated levelof pollution will be between nil and the social optimum level of pollution;while if property rights are given to a polluter, the negotiated level ofpollution will be somewhere in-between the profit maximising point andsocial optimum level of pollution. Whatever the short-term solution, in thelong-run the solution should anyway lean towards the point of social optimumlevel of pollution.


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pravom. Stoga postoje ~etiri razli~ita reìma menaxmenta nadprirodnim resursima koji su bazirani na razli~itim tipovimasvojine. Prvi je dràvna svojina, gde pojedinci treba da pratepravila kori{}ewa resursa koja su definisana pravom ili od-re|ena od strane vladinih agencija, koje tako|e imaju izvornopravo da odre|uju pravila za kori{}ewe resursa. Drugi tip jeprivatna svojina, u kojoj pojedinci ili pravna lica imaju punopravo da preduzmu dru{tveno odobrenu i prihvatqivu upotreburesursa. Oni treba da se suzdrè od dru{tveno neprihvatqivogiskori{}avawa, dok drugi ne bi trebalo da se me{aju u wihoveposlove. Tre}a mogu}nost je reìm zajedni~ke svojine, kada jednagrupa ima pravo svojine i moè iskqu~iti druge iz kori{}ewa.Drugi, poznati kao ne~lanovi (non-members), imaju du`nost dapo{tuju iskqu~ewe, dok suvlasnici moraju po{tovati dru{tvenelimite prihvatqivosti kori{}ewa resursa. êtvrta mogu}nostukqu~uje otvoren pristup prirodnim resursima. Ako se prime-wuje otvoren pristup, onda ne postoje definisani korisnici ilivlasnici. Teoretski, svako moè koristiti resurs, ali bez obave-ze da to i u~ini. Ne postoje eksplicitna pravila pona{awa uvezi sa kori{}ewem resursa.

Praksa je pak pokazala da otvoren pristup nije uspe{ansvojinski reìm. Ako niko ne poseduje resurse, veoma je velikaverovatno}a da }e ìvotna sredina biti izloèna riziku. Nekiautori sli~no tvrde i za koncept zajedni~ke svojine. Me|utim,iskustvo ne podràva ovu tvrdwu u potpunosti. Neki reìmizajedni~ke svojine dobro sluè, dok drugi propadaju. Naj~e{}e,ako ~vrsto povezane grupe upravqaju obnavqaju}im prirodnimresursima, reìm zajedni~ke svojine dobro funkcioni{e. U slu-~aju ribarske industrije ili industrije {koqki, reìm zajed-ni~ke svojine dobro sluì svrsi (Angello i Donnelly, 1975). Ako jereìm zajedni~ke svojine propao, onda se to desilo zbog nekiheksternih {okova, koji su uzrokovali krah internog sistema. Kaoi obi~no, za ve}inu dru{tvenih institucija promene u institucio-nalnom okruèwu modifikuju odrìvost same institucije. Dr-àvna svojina zna~i da ~esto dràvna institucija direktno up-ravqa prirodnim resursima. Dràva moè izuzeti druge iz ko-ri{}ewa i sve koristi su, naj~e{}e direktno, prikupqene odstrane dràve. Me|utim, mnogi autori su postavili pitawe efi-kasnosti reìma dràvne svojine, kao {to smo to spomenuliranije.

Reìm privatne svojine podrazumeva da pravo svojine pri-pada pojedincu ili pravnom licu. Veruje se da je to najuspe{nijasolucija u odnosu na 'tragediju zajedni{tva' (tragedy of commons).


23

As we have said, the Coasian solution requires perfect market condi-tions, which are almost unlikely to be ever achieved in the modern world.Therefore, Buchanan (Buchanan, 1969) has suggested a way to overcome itsdeficiencies. Using the monopoly model as a basic framework, he proposedthat P-MC should be established as a polluter bargain curve. It further appearsto be a ,,marginal surplus curve‘‘, that is the marginal change in combinedproducer and consumer surplus. Making P-MC equal to MEC will furthermake an optimal solution but bargaining should then include three parties(polluter, sufferer and consumer of polluter's product), instead of two.However, it is very difficult to imagine such tripartite bargaining taking placein the real world. Another problem is that it is very unlikely that the Statewould step aside and allow such bargaining, in the case of a monopolypolluter, since monopoly is a type of market failure that requires governmentintervention. Often environmental costs will also be a base for calculatingand introducing environmental (green) taxes.

Graph 1.5

Despite these problems, the property rights concept is very importantfor the contemporary management of natural resources. As we have seen,property rights are the best, if not the only, solution that remains afterrelaxation of regulation. With established private property rights and, further,a market for their sale, firms would find it costly to pollute the environment.A system of marketable rights should allow firms and the government agency

MEC

MNPB

Costs,

Benefits

Output

Level of Economic Activity

Q*

A

Qπ0


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5 Legend:MEC-- Marginal External CostMNPB-- Marginal Net Private BenefitQ*-- Social Optimum Level of PollutionQ?-- Profit Maximising Level of Output(Based on: Pearce and Turner, 1990)

U klasi~noj kouzovskoj tradiciji, intervencija vlade treba dabude odba~ena u korist trì{nog poga|awa nosilaca privatnihprava svojine u ciqu dostizawa dru{tveno optimalnog nivoa za-ga|ivawa. U sistemu punih svojinskih prava, zaga|iva~ i o{te}enibili bi u neregulisanoj situaciji. Sa izostankom transakcionihtro{kova, poga|awe bi se me|u wima razvilo kao autonomna ilogi~na posledica novonastale situacije. Standardni problemkouzovske solucije zahteva perfektnu konkurenciju, nulte tran-sakcione tro{kove i 'benigno' dru{tvo i vladu.

Me|utim, u svakodnevnom ìvotu postoje visoki transakci-oni tro{kovi, monopoli (imperfektna konkurencija), problemiidentifikovawa zaga|iva~a i o{te}enih, nepotpun pravni okvir,nejednakost izme|u ugovornih strana, itd. Uprkos svojim o~igled-nim nedostacima, Kouzova teorema je va`no dostignu}e teorijeprava svojine. Ona jasno pokazuje da prava svojine (u ekonomskomsmislu) jesu faktor proizvodwe. Ona tako|e primorava poklonikeintervencionizma u oblasti za{tite ìvotne i radne sredine dajasno defini{u svoju poziciju i ciqeve (Pearce i Turner, 1990).

U kouzovskom okviru, zaga|iva~u je ciq da operi{e na nivouekonomske aktivnosti koji ubira najve}i profit (Qπ -- nivo/ta~kamaksimiziraju}eg profita). Me|utim, ta~ka maksimiziraju}egprofita jednog ekonomskog agenta nije nikad i dru{tveno opti-malna ta~ka. Dru{tveno optimalni nivo zaga|ivawa se pojavqujeu ta~ki u kojoj se marginalna neto privatna korist (MNPB) izjed-na~uje sa marginalnim eksternim tro{kovima (MEC). Sa uvo|ewem(privatnog) prava svojine, zaga|iva~ i o{te}eni }e pregovaratio nivou zaga|enosti.

Naime, ako o{te}ena strana uìva pravo svojine, zaga|iva~}e biti voqan da kompenzira o{te}enog do ta~ke dru{tvenooptimalnog nivoa zaga|ivawa (Q*). Ispod te ta~ke bilo bi ira-cionalno o~ekivati od zaga|iva~a da se naga|a sa o{te}enim, jersu wegovi/weni dobici (MNPB) mawi od gubitaka o{te}enog. Obr-nuto: ako su (privatna) prava svojine data zaga|iva~u, on/ona }eteìti da proizvodi na ta~ki maksimiziraju}eg profita, ali sadao{te}eni moè da se nagodi sa zaga|iva~em do ta~ke dru{tvenogoptimuma (Q*). U zavisnosti od materijalne snage o{te}enog,dogovorena ta~ka moè biti bilo gde izme|u ta~ke dru{tvenogoptimuma zaga|ivawa (Q*) i ta~ke maksimizacije profita (Qπ).

Dakle, ako su prava svojine preneta na o{te}enog, dogovo-reni nivo zaga|ewa bi}e izme|u nule i dru{tveno optimalnognivoa zaga|ivawa; a ako su prava vlasni{tva data zaga|iva~u,dogovoreni nivo zaga|ewa bi}e negde izme|u ta~ke maksimizacije


25

in charge of environmental protection to determine in advance the amountof pollution. The estimated amount of pollution would be equal to the sumof the property right units issued. However both of them (the governmentand polluters), along with sufferers, would not be able to know a priori theprice of property rights in the next unit of time. Spreading this systeminternationally may contribute to the economic development in Third worldcountries. Namely, the national governments there could, with the assistanceof international organisations, fix a social optimum level of pollution, andthen offer at auction a certain amount of property right units which are equalto the social optimum level of pollution. A bidding process will increase theprice of property right units, but the social optimum level of pollution willnot be surpassed. If this practice were internationally accepted, it wouldcertainly help the development of emerging economies, because the initial(public) offer prices of property right units would be significantly lower thatthose in the Western countries, where industrialisation has already taken its,,environmental tribute‘‘. Certainly, this would work only if all those coun-tries would work on their institutional development, liberalisation and de-mocratisation, and would offer a basic institutional infrastructure that wouldguarantee an acceptable level of social stability to the foreign investors.

The economics of regulation was introduced originally to deal with,,market failure‘‘, i.e. the inability of the market mechanism alone to produceoptimum efficiency in all cases. It was believed that the government neededto intervene in the economy in order to handle natural monopolies, providepublic goods, prevent external diseconomies, and remedy existing informa-tional asymmetries. Along with ownership over public companies, regulationoffers another way in which the government can affect economic activity.But, although it was first introduced to cope with ,,market imperfections‘‘,regulation came to be implemented in various other cases, such as to ensurefairness of distribution of resources and income, steady economic growth,the protection of infant industries, assistance for small businesses, pump-priming in recessions, and the promotion of structural adjustments. Addedto these were a series of social regulations aimed at securing health, envi-ronment, education and safety. As always in economics, something can besustained if it is efficient. Regulations can be deemed as appropriate as policyif their benefits outweigh their costs. Theoretically, good regulation has tomeet two cumulative conditions: (1) its implementation must produce someimprovement in economic welfare and (2) the achieved gain in welfare mustbe greater than the cost of regulation. It must be noted that the cost ofregulation is not the pure administrative expense of its adoption and imple-mentation, but also includes various losses that might occur as a result, suchas inefficient and inflexible management, rent-seeking bureaucrats or rent-seeking behaviour of businesses6, damage cost of discretionary decisions, et


26

6 For a profound analysis of rent-seeking behaviour see: Buchanan, et al., eds. (1980),especially: Buchanan: ,,Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking‘‘, pp. 3--15

profita i dru{tveno optimalnog nivoa zaga|ivawa. Kakvo godbilo re{ewe na kratak rok, dugoro~no re{ewe bi svakako trebaloda pokazuje tendenciju ka ta~ki dru{tveno optimalnog nivoa za-ga|ivawa. Pomenuti odnosi mogu se videti iz slede}eg grafiko-na.7

Kao {to smo ve} rekli, kouzovsko re{ewe zahteva per-fektne trì{ne uslove, koji prakti~no nikada ne}e biti postig-nuti u modernom svetu. Stoga je Bjukenen (Buchanan, 1969) pred-loìo put za prevazilaèwe ovih nedostataka. Koriste}i mono-polisti~ki model kao osnovni okvir, on je predloìo da se P-MCuspostavi kao zaga|iva~eva linija pregovarawa. Ona se nadaqepojavquje kao 'linija marginalnog vi{ka', {to je marginalna (gra-ni~na) promena u kombinovanom vi{ku proizvo|a~a i potro{a~a.Izjedna~avawe P-MC sa MET nadaqe }e napraviti optimalno re-{ewe, ali bi pregovarawe onda trebalo da ukqu~i tri strane(zaga|iva~, o{te}eni i potro{a~ proizvoda koje proizvodi za-ga|iva~), umesto dve. Me|utim, veoma je te{ko zamisliti da }e setakvo trostruko pregovarawe uop{te dogoditi u realnom svetu.Drugi problem je da je veoma malo verovatno da bi dràva stajalapo strani dozvoqavaju}i takvo pregovarawe u slu~aju zaga|iva~amonopoliste, s obzirom na to da je monopol nedostatak u funkcio-nisawu trì{ta koji zahteva intervenciju vlade. êsto bi tro-{kovi za{tite ìvotne i radne sredine bili osnova za obra~uni uvo|ewe posebnih zelenih poreza.

MEC

MNPB

Costs,

Benefits

Output

Level of Economic Activity

Q*

A

Qπ0


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7 Legenda:MEC -- Marginal External CostMNPB -- Marginal Net Private BenefitQ* -- Social Optimum Level of PollutionQπ -- Profit Maximising Level of OutputIzvor: Pearce i Turner (1990)

similar. The regulator has the best intentions (supposedly, if he/she wants torenew the mandate) assuming that: markets are fragile, (social or total) costsof regulation are not high, and finally that regulation behaves in a neutralway, i.e. the regulator considers carefully and continuously a category of,,public goods‘‘ in its mind.7

The full introduction of property rights is just one of the ways inwhich the environment can be protected. Other solutions include the directapplication of law when damage made to the environment is significant andthreatens public health. Then a polluter may be subject to criminal prosecu-tion. The polluter can be punished under the Criminal Code, but it will noteliminate his civil liability for damage. Generally, the law protects theenvironment in three main ways. If the pollution is negligible, the pollutercan be fined by the governmental environmental agency, after the properadministrative procedure has been completed. If the damage is significantand public interests (such as public health) are put in jeopardy, a pollutercan even be jailed for a number of years. If the consequences were fatalwith the loss of human life, the responsibility can be extended to manslaugh-ter, and in some countries to murder as well. In both cases, a polluter whohas been found guilty would usually be required to cover losses at his/herexpense, such that restitution could be performed (restitutio in integrum). Aswe can see, threefold legal protection is very important because the threatof sanctions may make polluters ex ante more socially concerned, andresponsible. But in our view full legal protection works best if supplementaryto a property rights concept and markets for property rights. Markets are thebest natural social regulator.

However, the effective application of property rights requires anefficient state, legal enforcement and a social infrastructure which supportsthe created property rights system. If the state is not interested in theprotection of property rights, the established rights will just be formal, andwill not support social efficiency. The same can be said for the situation inwhich legal enforcement is not efficient. If the rights are not guaranteed andenforceable, they are meaningless and the establishment of a property rightssystem is a waste of social resources. The rule of law is also a necessaryprerequisite for a property rights system operating. In developing and tran-sitional economies the concept of property rights is weak, despite a relativelyclear legal situation. Legal acts guarantee property rights, but in practice itis very difficult to exercise property rights, as the state is very slow inenforcing the law and recognising that the rights have been violated byanother party. Even if the court decision has been made, it does not meanthat the decision will be applied soon. There is still a large difference between


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7 For issues of regulation, over-regulation and over-legislation see our paper: [evi}(1996)

Uprkos ovim problemima, koncept prava svojine veoma jevaàn za savremeno upravqawe prirodnim resursima. Kao {to smovideli, pravo svojine je najboqe, ako ne i jedino re{ewe kojepreostaje posle regulativne liberalizacije. Sa uvo|ewem privat-nih prava svojine, i daqe, sa trì{tem za wihov promet, firmebi zaga|ewe ìvotne i radne sredine smatrale skupim. Sistemprava kojim se moè trgovati trebao bi da dozvoli firmama ivladinoj agenciji za za{titu okoline da unapred odrede iznosdozvoqenog zaga|ivawa. Predvi|eni iznos zaga|ivawa bio bi jed-nak sumi izdatih jedinica prava vlasni{tva. Me|utim, obe strane(vlada i zaga|iva~), zajedno sa o{te}enima, ne bi bile u mogu}no-sti da znaju a priori cenu prava vlasni{tva u navedenoj jedinicivremena. Pro{irewe ovog sistema na me|unarodni okvir moglobi pomo}i zemqama Tre}eg sveta. Naime, vlade tih zemaqa bimogle, uz pomo} me|unarodnih organizacija, da utvrde dru{tvenooptimalni nivo zaga|ivawa, a potom da ponude na aukciji od-re|eni iznos jedinica prava vlasni{tva, koji je jednak dru{tvenooptimalnom nivou zaga|ivawa. Proces nadmetawa }e pove}avaticenu jedinica prava vlasni{tva, ali dru{tveno optimalni nivozaga|ivawa ne}e biti pre|en. Ako bi ovakva praksa bila me|una-rodno prihva}ena, ona bi sigurno pomogla razvoju zemaqa u tran-ziciji, jer bi po~etna cena (javne) ponude jedinica prava vlas-ni{tva bila zna~ajno nià nego ona u zapadnim zemqama, gde jeindustrijalizacija ve} uzela svoj 'danak nad ~ovekovom okolinom'.Svakako, ovo bi funkcionisalo samo ako bi sve ove zemqe radilena svom institucionalnom razvoju, liberalizaciji i demokrati-zaciji, i kada bi ponudile bazi~nu institucionalnu infrastruk-turu koja bi garantovala prihvatqiv nivo dru{tvene stabilnostiza strane investitore.

'Ekonomija regulacije' bila je originalno uvedena da re{iproblem 'kolapsa trì{ta'. Drugim re~ima, da re{i problemnemogu}nosti trì{nog mehanizma da samostalno obezbedi opti-malnu efikasnost u svim slu~ajevima. Veruje se da je dràva(vlada) trebalo da interveni{e u ekonomiji da bi re{ila prob-lem prirodnih monopola, obezbedila javna dobra, predupredilaeksternu neekonomi~nost, i izle~ila postoje}e informacioneasimetrije. Zajedno sa vlasni{tvom nad javnim kompanijama, regu-lativa nudi drugi na~in na koji dràva (vlada) moè da uti~e naekonomsku aktivnost. Ali, iako je prvobitno bila uvedena da senosi sa 'imperfekcijama trì{ta', regulativa je kasnije uneta iu razne druge slu~ajeve, kao {to su: osigurawe pravi~ne distri-bucije resursa i prihoda, stabilan ekonomski rast, za{tita 'mla-dih' industrija, pomo} malim preduze}ima, inicijalno finansira-we u recesijama i promovisawe strukturnih prilago|avawa. Ovo-me su bile dodate serije socijalnih propisa sa ciqem da osiguraju


29

the legal system (legal acts enacted by the legislature) and legal order(sociological concept describing human behaviour upon the enacted legalacts). Financial and legal discipline are the most important problems of socialchange and transition facing many developing and all transitional economies,particularly those in Europe.

In parallel with the introduction of property rights, the legislature mustintroduce the 'rules of the game', that is to say regulation.

4. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION:TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS REGIME

With the widespread wave of globalisation, an issue of internationalco-operation amongst different international factors arise, together with thecreation of an international property rights regime in protecting the environ-ment. Although globalisation is a concept developed in the 1990s (Millarand [evi}, 1999), the first attempts to create an international property rightsregime were made as early as 1958 with the promulgation of the Conventionon the Continental Shelf (see: Dam, 1965). The provisions of this Conventiondivided amongst the countries bordering the North Sea some of the com-monly held attributes of that sea, particularly the minerals. Scholars see twofactors that had been working to increase the value of the North Sea in theyears before the Conference was signed: (1) underwater drilling was becom-ing less expensive and more widely spread, and (2) the first signs appearedthat the area may be rich in gas and crude oil. The countries surroundingthe North Sea (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, theUnited Kingdom and the FR Germany) could conceivably have unilaterallyextended their territorial rights towards the middle of the sea (Barzel, 1997).Even potential exploiters of the North Sea were interested to make theireventual economic ownership rights more secure. This leads to the assump-tion that the increase in the relative value of crude oil reserves led to thesituation in which all interested parties argued in favour of defining theownership rights over North Sea resources.

The Convention gave some rights to all interested parties that surroundthe North Sea. Since the countries were given a slot of rights, they coulddecide to exploit them directly or to give some rights to private individualsor private businesses. From the law and economics point of view, there isno difference between these two. It is of no importance whether the govern-ment exploits resources directly, or opts to regulate their use and grantsconcession to the highest bidder who will be required to follow closelygovernment introduced environmental regulations and a particular concessioncontract (Catton, 1967; Toriguiau, 1972). The Convention a priori eliminated


30

zdravqe, okruèwe, obrazovawe i sigurnost. Kao i uvek u ekono-miji, ne{to moè biti podràno samo ako je i efikasno. Regula-tive mogu biti razmatrane kao korisna politika samo ako wihovakorist prema{uje tro{kove wihovog uvo|ewa i sprovo|ewa. Teo-retski, dobra regulativa mora da zadovoqava dva kumulativnauslova: (1) wena implementacija mora proizvesti neki napredakekonomskog blagostawa i (2) dostignuta dobit blagostawa morabiti ve}a od tro{kova regulative. Mora se primetiti da tro{akregulative ne ~ine samo ~isti administrativni izdaci wenogusvajawa i implementacije, ve} su tako|e ukqu~eni i raznovrsnigubici koji mogu nastati kao rezultat, a to su: neefikasan inefleksibilan menaxment, birokrate-rentijeri ili rentijerskopona{awe preduze}a8, tro{kovi {tete diskrecionih odluka, isli~no. Regulator ima najboqe namere (uz pretpostavku da on/onaèle da obnove mandat) ako podrazumeva: da su trì{ta osetqiva,da (dru{tveni ili 'sveukupni') tro{kovi regulacije nisu veliki,i kona~no, da se regulativa pona{a neutralno; drugim re~ima,regulator pa`qivo i stalno uzima u obzir kategoriju ,,javnihdobara‘‘ kada obavqa svoj posao.9

Puno uvo|ewe prava svojine samo je jedan od na~ina na koji~ovekova sredina moè biti za{ti}ena. Druga re{ewa ukqu~ujudirektnu primenu prava kada je {teta na~iwena okolini zna~ajnai preti zdravqu qudi. Tada zaga|iva~ moè biti podvrgnut kri-vi~nom gowewu. Zaga|iva~ moè biti ka`wen po krivi~nom za-konu, ali to ne}e eliminisati wegovu gra|anskopravnu odgovor-nost za na~iwenu {tetu. Uop{teno, pravo {titi okolinu na triglavna na~ina. Ako je zaga|ewe neznatno, zaga|iva~u moè odre-diti kaznu vladina agencija za za{titu, nakon sprovedenog odgo-varaju}eg upravnog postupka. Ako je {teta zna~ajna i ako su ug-roèni javni interesi (kao {to je zdravqe qudi), zaga|iva~ moè~ak biti poslat u zatvor. Ako su posledice bile fatalne, sagubitkom qudskih ìvota, odgovornost bi mogla biti pro{irenai na ubistvo iz nehata, a u nekim zemqama i na ubistvo sa namerom.U oba slu~aja, od zaga|iva~a koji bi bio progla{en krivimnaj~e{}e bi se zahtevalo da pokrije gubitke, tako da se moèizvesti restitucija (restitutio in integrum). Kao {to smo videli,trostruka pravna za{tita je veoma va`na, jer sama pretwa sank-cijama zaga|iva~e moè ex ante u~initi vi{e dru{tveno odgovor-nima. Ali, po na{em mi{qewu, pravna za{tita funkcioni{enajboqe ako je suplementarna sistemu prava svojine i trì{tu


31

8 Za detaqnu analizu rentijerskog pona{awa videti: Buchanan, i dr., ur.(1989), posebno: Buchanan: ,,Rent Seeking i Profit Seeking‘‘, str. 3--15.

9 Za pitawa regulative, over-regulation i over-legalislation videti na{ rad:[evi} (1996).

possible cases of conflict of interests amongst the interested parties, especiallyafter crude oil reserves were found. It is even obvious that oil companieswould not have had an incentive to search the area, if the property rightswere not previously defined. Consistent with the Coase theorem, once rightswere delineated there was very little difficulty in developing the area. Definedownership rights even support the co-operation of interested parties andincrease economic efficiency. The experience of North Sea co-operationbetween Norway and the UK shows that, as well.

Public bodies have the right and duty to enhance property rights andthe value of things which are placed in the public domain. In order to dothat in a globalised world the government are forced to co-operate inpromoting property rights. Globalisation has as a consequence the fall of theNation-State, the concept that dominated economic development in the 19thand early 20th centuries. The nation-state is now forced to decline some ofits traditional duties and to co-operate with other countries to meet betterends. The application of different theories will give different reasons forco-operation amongst the sovereign states, and the wilful declination oftraditional rights (see: Colombatto and Macey, 1996). The public-interesttheory, dominant in Political Sciences, sees the government as a benignentity, possessing the perfect information set. Certainly, this theory is hardlyapplicable in real life situations. In contrast, Public Choice theory assumesthe existence of various interest groups. Politicians, bureaucrats and otherdecision-makers are self-interested, whenever acting, in private or public life.These public players are interested to maximise their personal power andwealth even when these selfish ends conflict with public-spirited goals(Colombatto and Macey, 1996, p. 929). Bureaucrats are interested in themaximisation of their budgets, as economic powers sustain political powers(Niskanen, 1994). Therefore, politicians, bureaucrats and other public policyplayers are primarily interested in spreading their influence, and certainly tostay in power for as long as possible. Therefore, in a globalised world, theyare willing to co-operate with people of the same kind, representing othernation-states, and to create internationally induced regulation in order tomaximise their powers. With international regulatory co-operation and co-ordination, it is almost impossible for an economic agent to avoid theapplication of rules. If the application of rules is avoided in one country,they will be applied in another, as both countries are following the sameregulatory principles, or more often the same regulations. Internationaltreaties also demonstrate that we live today in a rent-seeking society. Thenational regulators co-operate as they perceive that growing globalisationdiminishes their influence, and erosion of their influence can only be stoppedby co-operation with other interested parties of the same kind. However,international agreements in general require a specific compromise amongstthe interested parties. Every national regulator reflects different, nationallyspecific interests, and with the internationalisation of regulations that nationalcharacteristic can be partially or entirely lost. Often this is unpopular with


32

za svojinska prava. Trì{ta su najprirodniji dru{tveni regula-tori.

Me|utim, efikasna primena prava svojine zahteva efikasnudràvu, primenu prava i dru{tvenu infrastrukturu koje podr-àvaju usvojeni sistem prava svojine. Ako dràva nije zaintere-sovana za za{titu prava svojine, uvedena prava }e samo bitiformalna, i ne}e potpomo}i dru{tvenu efikasnost. Isto se moère}i za situaciju u kojoj primena prava nije efikasna. Ako pravanisu garantovana i sprovodqiva, ona su besmislena i uvo|ewesistema prava svojine predstavqa uzaludno tro{ewe dru{tvenihresursa. Vladavina prava je tako|e neophodan preduslov za posto-jawe efikasnog sistema prava svojine. U ekonomijama u razvoju itranzicionim ekonomijama, koncept prava svojine je slab, uprkosrelativno ~istoj pravnoj situaciji. Pravni propisi garantujupravo svojine, ali u praksi je veoma te{ko primeniti pravosvojine, jer je dràva prili~no spora u primeni prava, i u pre-poznavawu ~iwenice da su prava bila povre|ena od druge strane.âk i ako bi sud doneo presudu, to ne zna~i da bi ona uskoro bilai sprovedena. Postoji jo{ uvek velika razlika izme|u pravnogsistema (harmoni~ni sistem pravnih normi) i pravnog poretka(sociolo{ki koncept koji obuhvata pona{awe qudi po pozitiv-nim pravnim propisima). Finansijska disciplina i pravna disci-plina su najva`niji problemi dru{tvene transformacije i tran-zicije sa kojima se susre}u mnoge zemqe u razvoju i sve tranzici-one ekonomije, posebno one u Evropi.

Paralelno sa uvo|ewem prava svojine, zakonodavstvo morauvesti 'pravila igre', tj. autonomnu regulativu.

4. ME\UNARODNA KOOPERACIJA:

KA ME\UNARODNOM RE@IMU PRAVA SVOJINE

Sa {irokim rasprostrawewem globalizacije, javqa se ipitawe me|unarodne saradwe izme|u razli~itih me|unarodnihfaktora, zajedno sa stvarawem me|unarodog reìma prava svojineu za{titi ~ovekove sredine. Premda je globalizacija konceptrazvijen u 1990-im (Millar i [evi}, 1999), prvi poku{aji da sekreira me|unarodni reìm prava svojine bili su u~iweni jo{1958. godine sa promocijom Konvencije o Kontinentalnom pojasu(videti: Dam, 1965). Ova konvencija je raspodelila, izme|u zemaqakoje izlaze na Severno more, neke od zajedni~kih vrednosti togamora, posebno minerale. Stru~waci vide dva faktora koja sudoprinela pove}awu 'vrednosti' Severnog mora u godinama prepotpisivawa Konvencije: (1) podvodno bu{ewe je postalo maweskupo i vi{e rasprostraweno, i (2) pojavili su se prvi znaci da


33

the general public, which still favours the nation-state, despite generalmass-media promotion of cosmopolitanism and globalisation trends.

International co-operation in the field of property rights on 'environ-mental goods' can be very important, as it eliminates possible future conflicts.An a priori definition of property rights helps the allocation of rights to otherinterested parties which may invest in the research and development ofpotential areas of interest. The definition of property rights gives the possi-bility for trade in those defined rights and the loss of 'commons' in the modernworld means that public bodies are socially responsible to work on theprotection of those existing and to increase, overall in, wealth the thingswhich are entrusted to the public domain. This is a very important duty ofmodern government. International government co-operation can significantlyimprove the emerging property rights system, and consequently the value ofallocated property rights. However, the main duty for the government remainsregulating the property rights system in its own country, and imposingregulations which are obligatory or advisory for those to whom propertyrights are allocated whether by law or by contract.

5. CONCLUSION

The environment is of the utmost concern to a modern homo politicusand homo oeconomicus. In order to support a sustainable solution for theprotection of the environment and a successful solution to the ,,tragedy ofcommons‘‘, a modern liberal society establishes efficient property rights overnatural resources. However, the (re)establishment of property rights requires,like every institutional change, the definition of proper policy actions, i.e.policy change. Public policy in itself is concerned with redefining institu-tional arrangements that would fit economic agents in the wider economicstructure (Bromley, 1989). But the change in property rights is only one ofthese options.

Public policy applied to the environment can be operationalised usingtaxes, user fees and charges ([evi}, 1997), or through the application of afirm regulatory framework. One reason why environmental attributes areplaced in the public domain is that it is too costly to measure and superviseall the attributes of environmental transactions. Interested transactors mayattempt to capture attributes that are not adequately measured, or they mayengage in excess measurement in order to reduce capture costs (Barzel,1997). As those costs (establishing and policing property rights) are fairlyhigh, only the government can bear them and ensure that the activities forwhich payment has been made will be performed relatively efficiently. Fiscalexperts believe that fiscal incentives support the environment and its protec-tion. To some extent it is true, but like with all other taxes the problem ofthe Laffer curve remains (Cullis and Jones, 1992). Therefore, the establish-


34

bi oblast mogla biti bogata gasom i sirovom naftom. Zemqe kojeizlaze na Severno more (Belgija, Danska, Francuska, Holandija,Norve{ka, Velika Britanija i SR Nema~ka) tajno su mogle uni-lateralno pro{iriti svoje teritorijalne vode prema sredinimora (Barzel, 1997). âk su i potencijalni eksploatatori Severnogmora bili zainteresovani da svoja eventualna ekonomska vlas-ni~ka prava u~ine jo{ sigurnijim. Ovo vodi ka pretpostavci daje porast relativne vrednosti rezervi sirove nafte nametnuosituaciju u kojoj su sve zainteresovane strane bile za odbranuvlasni~kih prava nad resursima Severnog mora.

Konvencija je dala neka prava svim zainteresovanim strana-ma koje su izlazile na Severno more. Kako je zemqama bio datskup prava,10 one su mogle odlu~iti da ih iskoriste direktno, ilida neka prava daju privatnim licima ili preduze}ima. Sa pravnogi ekonomskog gledi{ta, ne postoji razlika izme|u ova dva re{ewa.Nije va`no da li vlada iskori{}ava resurse direktno ili pakodlu~i da reguli{e wihovu upotrebu i dodequje koncesije onomeko ponudi najve}u cenu (na aukciji) i od koga }e zahtevati dadosledno po{tuje one propise o za{titi okoline koje je samadonela, kao i odredbe posebnog koncesionog ugovora (Catton, 1967;Toriguiau, 1972). Konvencija je a priori eliminisala mogu}e slu~aje-ve konfliktnih interesa izme|u zainteresovanih strana, posebnonakon {to su prona|ene rezerve sirove nafte. âk je o~iglednoi da naftne kompanije ne bi imale podsticaj da pretraùju oblastda prava svojine nisu prethodno bila definisana. U skladu saKouzovom teoremom, kada su prava bila definisana, nije bilonimalo problema u razvoju oblasti. Definisana vlasni~ka prava~ak podràvaju saradwu zainteresovanih strana i pove}avaju eko-nomsku efikasnost. Iskustvo severnomorske saradwe izme|u Nor-ve{ke i Velike Britanije tako|e to pokazuje.

'Javna tela' imaju pravo i du`nost da unapre|uju prava svo-jine i vrednost stvari koje su u javnom domenu. U ciqu da to uradeu globalizovanom svetu, vlade su primorane da sara|uju u promo-ciji prava svojine. Globalizacija ima za posledicu opadawe 'na-cionalne dràve', koncepta koji je dominirao ekonomskim razvo-jem u XIX i u ranom XX veku. Nacionalna dràva je sada primoranada smawi neke od svojih tradicionalnih du`nosti i da sara|ujesa drugim zemqama da bi dostigla boqe rezultate. Primena raz-li~itih teorija da}e razli~ite razloge za to da suverene dràveuvaàvaju svesno ograni~ewe tradicionalnih prava (videti: Co-lombatto i Macey, 1996). Teorija javnog interesa (Public Interest),dominantna u politi~kim naukama, vidi vladu kao benigni entitet


35

10 U stvari, ovde se pre radi o skupu ovla{}ewa (napomena autora uz prevodna srpskom jeziku).

ment of an efficient system of property rights can significantly contribute tothe protection of the environment. When it is known who exercises propertyrights, many interested economic agents may decide to invest in research,exploration and the development of 'environmental goods'. In this way, thegeneral wealth of the nation is improved.

Introducing a property rights system is not a costless activity. Prop-erty rights are social institutions and whenever social institutions are intro-duced transaction costs appear. However, with the use of cost-benefitanalysis (so warmly endorsed by environmental economics scholars) it ispossible to establish when the benefits of the newly established propertyrights system offset the costs of its introduction. Empirical studies haveshown that the introduction of new social institutions, if planned carefully,usually brings more benefits than it incurs costs. However, in the situationof a possibly arbitrary state, the lack of rule of law, and strong politicalfactors, often make it meaningless to introduce any new institutions. Thisis an additional problem faced by most, if not all, transitional economiesin Central and Eastern Europe. However, this lays outside the boundariesof this paper.

Each and every one of the different approaches to the protection ofthe environment has its advantages and limitations, and probably only aproper combination can be most effective. Therefore, we argue in our finalline in this paper, that a properly established property rights system, firmlysupported and guaranteed by law, combined with regulations and an effectiveCriminal Code, would give the best social pay-off regarding the protectionof the environment.

REFERENCES

Agnello, R. J. and L. P. Donnelly (1975), Property Rights and Effi-ciency in the Oyster Industry, in Journal of Law and Economics, 18, pp.521--33.

Barzel, Y. (1997), Economics of Property Rights, 2nd edition, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baumol, W. and W. Oates (1988), The Theory of EnvironmentalPolicy, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bromley, D. W. (1989), Environment and Economy: Property Rightsand Public Policy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bromley, D. W., ed. (1995), The Handbook of Environmental Eco-nomics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Buchanan, J. (1969), External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes andMarket Structure, in American Economic Review, 59, pp. 174--7.


36

koji poseduje perfektan skup informacija. Svakako, ova teorijaje te{ko primewiva u realnoj ìvotnoj situaciji. Suprotno tome,teorija javnog izbora (Public Choice) pretpostavqa postojawe raz-li~itih interesnih grupa. Ovi javni igra~i su zainteresovani damaksimiziraju svoju li~nu mo} i bogatstvo ~ak i kada se te se-bi~ne namere kose sa javno promovisanim ciqevima (Colombatto iMacey, 1996, str. 929). Birokrate su zainteresovane za maksimiza-ciju svojih buxeta, jer ekonomska mo} podràva i politi~ku mo}(Niskanen, 1994). Zato su politi~ari, birokrate i drugi igra~ijavne politi~ke scene primarno zainteresovani za {irewe svoguticaja, i za to da ostanu na vlasti {to je mogu}e duè. Stoga suoni, u globalizovanom svetu, spremni da sara|uju sa qudima istogstatusa, onima koji reprezentuju druge nacionalne dràve, i dadonose me|unarodno iniciranu regulativu, u ciqu maksimizirawasvoje mo}i. Me|unarodna regulatorna saradwa i koordinacija go-tovo spre~avaju jednog ekonomskog agenta da izbegne primenu pra-vila. Ako je primena pravila izbegnuta u jednoj jurisdikciji, ona}e biti primewena u drugoj, jer su obe zemqe usvojile iste regu-latorne principe ili, ~e{}e, istu regulativu. Me|unarodni ugo-vori tako|e demonstriraju da mi danas ìvimo u dru{tvu uìva-laca rente (rent-seeking society). Nacionalni ragulatori sara|uju,jer prihvataju ~iwenicu da rastu}a globalizacija umawuje wihovregulativni uticaj, i da erozija wihovog uticaja moè biti zaus-tavqena jedino kooperacijom sa drugim zainteresovanim stranama.Me|utim, me|unarodni dogovori uop{teno zahtevaju specifi~ankompromis izme|u zainteresovanih strana. Svaki nacionalni re-gulator reflektuje razli~ite, nacionalno specifi~ne interese,ali internacionalizacijom regulacije, ta nacionalna karakteri-stika moè biti delimi~no ili ~ak u potpunosti izgubqena. Toje ~esto nepopularno kod {ire javnosti, ali i daqe ide u prilogopstanku nacionalne dràve, uprkos op{toj promociji kosmopo-litizma i globalizacionih trendova kroz mas-medije.

Me|unarodna saradwa na poqu prava svojine nad 'dobrimaokruèwa' (environmental goods) moè biti veoma va`na, zato {toelimini{e mogu}e budu}e konflikte. A priori definicija pravasvojine pomaè u alokaciji prava drugim zainteresovanim stra-nama koje mogu investirati u istraìvawe i razvoj pojedinihoblasti. Definicija prava svojine daje mogu}nost za trgovaweonim definisanim pravima; dok gubitak 'zajedni{tva' u modernomsvetu zna~i da su javna tela dru{tveno odgovorna da rade naza{titi onih postoje}ih i da pove}aju ukupno dru{tveno bogat-stvo. Ovo je veoma va`na du`nost moderne vlasti. Me|unarodnasaradwa izme|u vlada moè zna~ajno da unapredi nastaju}i sistemprava svojine, i da posredno pove}a vrednost alociranog pravasvojine. Me|utim, glavna du`nost vlade ostaje regulisawe sistema


37

Buchanan, J. M., R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds. (1980), Towarda Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: TX: Texas A&MPress.

Catton, H. (1967), The Evolution of Oil Concessions: The Middle Eastand North Africa, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana.

Cheung, S. N. S. (1970), The Structure of a Contract and the Theoryof a Non-Exclusive Resource, in Journal of Law and Economics, 13, pp.49--70.

Cheung, S. N. S. (1973), The Fable of the Bees: An EconomicInvestigations, in Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), pp. 11--33.

Coase, R. H. (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law andEconomics, 3(1), pp. 1--44.

Colombatto, E. and J. R. Macey (1996), A Public Choice Model ofInternational Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, inCardozo Law Review, 18(3), pp. 925--56.

Cullis, J. and P. Jones (1992), Public Finance and Public ChoiceAnalytical Perspectives, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Curtin, P. D. (1984), Cross-cultural Trade in World History, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dam, K. W. (1965), Oil and Gas Licensing and the North Sea, inJournal of Law and Economics, 8(2), pp. 51--76.

Demsetz, H. (1967), Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in AmericanEconomic Review, 57(2), pp. 347--59.

Dorfman, R. and N. Dorfman (1977), Economics of the Environment,2nd edition, New York: W. W. Norton.

Duguit, L. (1920), Les transformations générales du droit privé depuisle Code Napoleon, Paris: Dalloz.

Hesse, G. (1992), Land Use Systems and Property Rights Evolutionaryversus New Institutional Economics, in Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2, pp. 195--210.

Just R, D. Hueth, and A. Schmitz (1982), Applied Welfare Economicsand Public Policy, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Libecap, G. D. (1989), Contracting for Property Rights, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Lueck, D. (1989), The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, in Journalof Legal Studies, 18(2), pp. 291--324.

Millar, S. M. and @. [evi} (1999), Cross-Cultural Management As-pects of the International Business, in ,,A stratégia, termelés, logisztika ésminöség‘‘, Veszprém: University of Veszprém, pp. 120--7.


38

prava svojine u sopstvenoj zemqi, i nametawe regulative koja jeobavezuju}a ili savetodavna za sve one kojima su prava svojinedodeqena, bilo putem zakona ili ugovorom.

5. ZAKQUÂK

ôvekova okolina je od najve}eg mogu}eg zna~aja za modernoghomo politicus-a i oeconomicus-a. U ciqu podr{ke dugotrajnom re-{ewu za za{titu ~ovekove sredine i uspe{nom re{ewu 'tragedijezajedni{tva', moderno liberalno dru{tvo uspostavqa efikasnaprava svojine nad prirodnim resursima. Me|utim, (ponovno) uspo-stavqawe prava svojine zahteva, kao uostalom i svaka instituci-onalna promena, definisawe odgovaraju}ih politi~kih akcijaili, drugim re~ima, promenu politike. Politika (Public Pollicy)sama po sebi zaokupqena je redefinisawem institucionalniharan`mana koji bi odgovarali ekonomskim agentima u {iroj eko-nomskoj strukturi (Bromley, 1989). Ali, promena u pravima svojinesamo je jedna od ovih opcija.

Politika primewena na okruèwe moè biti operaciona-lizovana kori{}ewem poreza, naknada i taksi ([evi}, 1997), ilikroz primenu jasnog regulatornog okvira. Jedan od razloga {to seprirodna okolina nalazi u javnom domenu, jeste i to {to je pre-vi{e skupo meriti i nadgledati sve aspekte transakcija kojeukqu~uju ~ovekovu okolinu. Zainteresovani u~esnici u prometumogu poku{ati da obezbede kvalitete koji nisu adekvatno mereni,ili se mogu angaòvati u ekstenzivnom merewu, u ciqu redukova-wa tro{kova nabavke (Barzel, 1997). Kako su ovi tro{kovi (uvo-|ewa i nadzirawa ostvarivawa prava svojine) poprili~no visoki,jedino vlada moè da ih snosi i da osigura da }e aktivnosti zakoje je pla}awe izvr{eno biti relativno efikasno izvedene. Fis-kalni eksperti veruju da fiskalni podsticaji potpomaù okolinui wenu za{titu. U odre|enom stepenu ovo je istina, ali kao i sasvim drugim porezima, ostaje problem Laferove krive (Cullis iJones, 1992). Zato uspostavqawe efikasnog sistema prava svojinemoè znatno doprineti za{titi okoline. Kada je poznato koraspolaè pravom svojine, mnogi zainteresovani ekonomski agen-ti mogu odlu~iti da investiraju u istraìvawa i razvoj 'dobaraokruèwa'. Na ovaj na~in, sveobuhvatno nacionalno bogatstvo jeunapre|eno.

Uvo|ewe sistema prava svojine samo po sebi nije besplatnaaktivnost. Prava svojine su dru{tvene institucije, i kad god sudru{tvene institucije uvedene, pojavquju se i transakcioni tro-{kovi. Me|utim, analiza korisnosti (cost-benefit analysis), takoprihva}ena od strane poklonika ekonomije okruèwa, omogu}ava


39

Minasian, J. R. (1975), Property Rights in Radiation: An AlternativeApproach to Radio Frequency Allocation, in Journal of Law and Economics,18, pp. 221--72.

Niskanen, W. A. (1994), Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Fairfaxand Cheltenham: The Locke Institute and Edward Elgar.

North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, NewYork: Norton.

North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and EconomicPerformance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostry, S. (1990), Government and Corporations in a Shrinking World:Trade and Innovation Policies in United States, Europe and Japan, NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations.

Pearce, D. W. and R. K. Turner (1990), Economics of NaturalResources and the Environment, Hemel Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Pejovich, S. (1990), Economics of Property Rights, Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers.

Pejovich, S. (1995), Economic Analysis of Institutions and Systems,Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

Pigou, A. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, London: Macmillan.

Schmid, A. A. (1987), Property, Power and Public Choice, 2ndedition, New York: Praeger.

[evi}, @. (1996), The Political Economy, Economics and Art ofNegotiation and Reconciliation: The Production of Law and Legal Order ina Polycentric Federation of a Yugoslav Type, a paper presented at the 9thMaastricht Workshop in Law and Economics‘‘, University of Limburg,Maastricht, 2--4 April.

[evi}, @. (1997), Non-Tax Revenue Sources, in J. Nemec and G.Wright, eds. (1997), Public Finance, Bratislava: NISPAcee, pp. 250--94.

[evi}, @. (2000), Law and Economics (econ), in J. Michie, ed. (1999),Reader's Guide to Social Sciences, London: Fitzroy Dearborn, forthcoming.

Stroup, R. and J. Baden (1973), Externality, Property Rights and theManagement of our National Forests, Journal of Law and Economics, 16,pp. 303--12.

Tietenberg, T. (1994), Environmental Economics and Policy, NewYork: Harper Collins.

Toriguiau, S. (1972), Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the MiddleEast, Beirut: Hanaskain Press.

Veljanovski, C. (1987), Selling the State Privatisation in Britain,London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.


40

da se utvrdi kada koristi novouvedenog sistema prava svojineanuliraju tro{kove wegovog uvo|ewa. Empirijske studije su poka-zale da uvo|ewe novih dru{tvenih institucija, ako je dobro pla-nirano, obi~no donosi vi{e koristi nego {to name}e tro{kova.Me|utim, u situaciji mogu}e 'arbitra`ne dràve', nedostatak vla-davine prava i jak politi~ki faktor ~esto ~ine besmislenimuvo|ewe bilo kakvih novih institucija, {to je dodatni problemsa kojim se suo~avaju mnoge, ako ne sve, tranzicione ekonomijeCentralne i Isto~ne Evrope. Me|utim, to leì izvan predmetaovog rada.

Svaki od razli~itih pristupa za{titi ~ovekove okolineima svoje prednosti i ograni~ewa, i verovatno samo dobra kombi-nacija moè dati dobre rezultate. Zato mi tvrdimo, na samomkraju, da bi adekvatno uveden sistem prava svojine, sna`no po-dràn i garantovan zakonom, u kombinaciji sa odgovaraju}om re-gulativom i efektivnim krivi~nim zakonom, dao najboqi dru-{tveni rezultat kada je za{tita ~ovekove okoline u pitawu.

BIBLIOGRAFIJA

Agnello, R. J. and L. P. Donnelly (1975), Property Rights and Effi-ciency in the Oyster Industry, in Journal of Law and Economics, 18, pp.521--33.

Barzel, Y. (1997), Economics of Property Rights, 2nd edition, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baumol, W. and W. Oates (1988), The Theory of EnvironmentalPolicy, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bromley, D. W. (1989), Environment and Economy: Property Rightsand Public Policy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bromley, D. W., ed. (1995), The Handbook of Environmental Econo-mics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Buchanan, J. (1969), External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes andMarket Structure, in American Economic Review, 59, pp. 174--7.

Buchanan, J. M., R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds. (1980), Towarda Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: TX: Texas A&MPress.

Catton, H. (1967), The Evolution of Oil Concessions: The Middle Eastand North Africa, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana.


41

Cheung, S. N. S. (1970), The Structure of a Contract and the Theoryof a Non-Exclusive Resource, in Journal of Law and Economics, 13, pp.49--70.

Cheung, S. N. S. (1973), The Fable of the Bees: An EconomicInvestigations, in Journal of Law and Economics, 16(1), pp. 11--33.

Coase, R. H. (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law andEconomics, 3(1), pp. 1--44.

Colombatto, E. and J. R. Macey (1996), A Public Choice Model ofInternational Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, inCardozo Law Review, 18(3), pp. 925--56.

Cullis, J. and P. Jones (1992), Public Finance and Public ChoiceAnalytical Perspectives, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Curtin, P. D. (1984), Cross-cultural Trade in World History, Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dam, K. W. (1965), Oil and Gas Licensing and the North Sea, inJournal of Law and Economics, 8(2), pp. 51--76.

Demsetz, H. (1967), Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in AmericanEconomic Review, 57(2), pp. 347--59.

Dorfman, R. and N. Dorfman (1977), Economics of the Environment,2nd edition, New York: W. W. Norton.

Duguit, L. (1920), Les transformations générales du droit privé depuisle Code Napoléon, Paris: Dalloz.

Hesse, G. (1992), Land Use Systems and Property Rights Evolutionaryversus New Institutional Economics, in Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2, pp. 195--210.

Just R, D. Hueth, and A. Schmitz (1982), Applied Welfare Economicsand Public Policy, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Libecap, G. D. (1989), Contracting for Property Rights, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Lueck, D. (1989), The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, in Journalof Legal Studies, 18(2), pp. 291--324.

Millar, S. M. and @. [evi} (1999), Cross-Cultural Management As-pects of the International Business, in ,,A stratégia, termelés, logisztika ésminöség‘‘, Veszprém: University of Veszprém, pp. 120--7.

Minasian, J. R. (1975), Property Rights in Radiation: An AlternativeApproach to Radio Frequency Allocation, in Journal of Law and Economics,18, pp. 221--72.


42

Niskanen, W. A. (1994), Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Fairfaxand Cheltenham: The Locke Institute and Edward Elgar.

North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, NewYork: Norton.

North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and EconomicPerformance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostry, S. (1990), Government and Corporations in a Shrinking World:Trade and Innovation Policies in United States, Europe and Japan, NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations.

Pearce, D. W. and R. K. Turner (1990), Economics of NaturalResources and the Environment, Hemel Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Pejovich, S. (1990), Economics of Property Rights, Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Publishers.

Pejovich, S. (1995), Economic Analysis of Institutions and Systems,Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

Pigou, A. (1920), The Economics of Welfare, London: Macmillan.

Schmid, A. A. (1987), Property, Power and Public Choice, 2ndedition, New York: Praeger.

[evi}, @. (1996), The Political Economy, Economics and Art ofNegotiation and Reconciliation: The Production of Law and Legal Order ina Polycentric Federation of a Yugoslav Type, a paper presented at the 9thMaastricht Workshop in Law and Economics‘‘, University of Limburg,Maastricht, 2--4 April.

[evi}, @. (1997), Non-Tax Revenue Sources, in J. Nemec and G.Wright, eds. (1997), Public Finance, Bratislava: NISPAcee, pp. 250--94.

[evi}, @. (2000), Law and Economics (econ), in J. Michie, ed. (1999),Reader's Guide to Social Sciences, London: Fitzroy Dearborn, forthcoming.

Stroup, R. and J. Baden (1973), Externality, Property Rights and theManagement of our National Forests, Journal of Law and Economics, 16,pp. 303--12.

Tietenberg, T. (1994), Environmental Economics and Policy, NewYork: Harper Collins.

Toriguiau, S. (1972), Legal Aspects of Oil Concessions in the MiddleEast, Beirut: Hanaskain Press.

Veljanovski, C. (1987), Selling the State Privatisation in Britain,London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.


43

@eljko [evi}*

PROPERTY RIGHT, THE MARKET SYSTEM AND THE RULEOF LAW IN THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN

ENVIRONMENT

Summary

Even though every human activity has some sort of effect on theenvironment, it was not until the XX century that rules were introduced toprotect the environment because only then was it possible to technicallyquantify the human influence on his environment, and the awareness haddeveloped regarding the significance of preserving the environment. Inpresent-day legal systems, the environment is protected by means of differentconcepts and legal instruments, and one of them is the concept of propertyrights, based on the instruments of protection provided by civil law. Thechoice of a particular concept in a society depends on its economic structure.The concept of regulations and permits suits the social and market economyof Western Europe, the property concept fits the United States' consumerorientated economy, and the concept of state control and enactments suitsthe administratively controlled economy of Japan. From the economic aspect,the property concept implies the autonomous care of the holders of propertyrights for the protection of the environment, which is achieved by stateintervention, the aim of which is the increased value of the environment forthe proprietor. According to the legal approach to ownership, this is appro-priation, with limitations. According to the economic approach, ownershipimplies the possibility of using resources. From this point of view, both stateand private, and communal and general (open) ownership have the sameimportance. Private ownership leads to the market regulation of environ-mental protection issues. In that way, it is possible to determine the sociallyoptimal level of pollution. The pre-condition for this is a developed rule oflaw, and the effective and swift protection of property. As opposed toownership and the market, regulations, more often than not, lead to ineffec-tiveness. The concept of ownership is possible to apply even at the inter-national level, because it has already produced results.

Key words: Property rights. -- Market. -- Rule of Law. -- Environment.

* Dr @eljko [evi}, Principal Lecturer in Accounting and Finance, Head of the Acco-unting and Finance Subject Group, The Business School, University of Greenwich, London,England, UK.


44

@eljko [evi}*

DROIT DE PROPRIETE, ORDRE MARCHAND ET REGNE DUDROIT DANS LA PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT

Résumé

Les premiers règlements sur la protection de l'environnement n'appa-raissent qu'au XXème siècle. Dans les systèmes juridiques actuels l'environ-nement est protégé par différents concepts et moyens juridiques. Du pointde vue économique, le concept de propriété sous-entend une protectionautonome de l'environnement par le titulaire des droits de propriété. Lapropriété privée conduit à une régulation marchande du problème de laprotection de l'environnement. Cela permet de déterminer le niveau sociale-ment optimale de la pollution. Une condition préliminaire à cela est le règnedu droit développé et une protection de la propriété efficace et rapide.Contrairement à la propriété et au marché, la réglementation conduit le plussouvent à l'inefficacité. Le concepte de propriété est applicable aussi biensur le plan international, étant donné qu'il y a déjà donné des résultats.

Mots-clés: Droit de propriété. -- Marché. -- Règne du droit. -- Environnement.

@eljko [evi}**

EIGENTUMSRECHT, MARKTORDNUNG UNDRECHTSHERRSCHAFT BEIM UMWELTSCHUTZ

Zusammenfassung

Vorschriften über Umweltschutz erscheinen erst im 20. Jahrhundert.In modernen Rechtsordnungen wird die Umwelt mittels verschiedener Kon-zepte und Rechtsmittel geschützt. Vom Gesichtspunkt der Wirtschaft bedeutetdas Eigentumskonzept den autonomen Schutz der Umwelt seitens des Trägersder Eigentumsrechte. Das Privateigentum führt zur Marktregelung der Um-weltschutzfragen. Auf diese Weise kann ein gesellschaftlich optimales Nive-au der Verschmutzung bestimmt werden. Die Voraussetzung in diesem Sinnewäre eine entwickelte Herrschafts des Rechts und ein effizienter und schne-

* Dr @eljko [evi}, enseignant principal en la matière de comptabilité et des financesà l'Ecole des affaires de l'Université de Greenwich (Londres).

** Dr. @eljko [evi}, Dozent für Fachbereich Rechnungsführung und Finanzen, Leiterder Abteilung für Rechnungsführung und Finanzen der Wirtschaftsschule der Universität inGreenwich (London).


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llwirkender Eigentumsschutz. Im Gegensatz zum Eigentum und Markt führtdie Regelung am häufigsten zu einer Uneffizienz. Das Eigentumskonzeptkann auch auf der völkerrechtlichen Ebene angewandt werden, da er indiesem Bereich schon bedeutende Ergebnisse gezeigt hatte.

Schlüsselbegriffe: Eigentumsrecht. -- Markt. -- Rechtsherrschaft. -- Umwelt.


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@eljko [evi} - anali pravnog fakulteta u beograduanali.ius.bg.ac.rs/a2002-1-2/anali 2002_1-2...

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