Who’s Happy in Plato’s Republic?

Jonathan Culp1

Abstract: Plato’s Republic suggests that everyone

is better off being just than unjust, yet scholars have

disputed whether Plato actually proves it. It is

especially unclear whether the Republic shows that non-

philosophers are better off being just. I argue that,

despite appearances to the contrary, Plato knowingly

offers no convincing proof of this, though it is

reasonable to infer from the text that Plato genuinely

believes it. Thus, the Republic comes to light as a

complex piece of protreptic rhetoric: offering an

exhortation (‘Be just!’) while withholding the rational

basis for that exhortation—thus provoking philosophic

inquiry rather than concluding it.

Keywords: Plato, Republic, justice, happiness, law,

education, virtue

1 Department of Politics, University of Dallas, 1845 East Northgate Drive, Irving, TX 75062. Email: jculp@udallas.edu.

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In Plato’s Republic, Socrates faces a twofold challenge:

to explain what justice is, and to prove that it is in

every way better to be just than to be unjust. The

need for this defense stems from the suspicion (on the

part of Glaucon and Adeimantus) or the certainty (on

the part of Thrasymachus) that, if justice is what it

is commonly taken to be, then the life of large-scale,

successful injustice is by far the most profitable

life. The bulk of the Republic is devoted to Socrates’

response to this challenge. In this article, I will

focus on the following aspect of that response. In the

process of meeting the challenge, Socrates appears to

redefine justice in a radically novel way (each part of

the soul ‘minding its own business’) that bears no

obvious, immediate relation to the common conception of

justice (roughly, ‘giving to each what is owed’). What

is more, this novel conception of justice would seem to

be attainable only by philosophers. And yet, it is

this novel conception of justice (rather than the

ordinary conception) that Socrates explicitly defends

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as necessary for happiness. Since, however,

philosophers are exceedingly rare, it would seem that

the Republic therefore gives the vast majority of human

beings no reason to be just in the ordinary sense of

the term (the only kind of justice that is within most

people’s reach). The argument of the Republic therefore

appears to commit a fallacy2 or at least to contain a

gap,3 which naturally raises the question whether this

2 According to D. Sachs, ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic’, PhilosophicalReview, 72 (1963), pp. 141-58, esp. pp. 152-6. Responses to Sachsinclude the following: R. Demos, ‘A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic?’ Philosophical Review, 73 (3) (1964), pp. 395-98; R. H. Weingartner, ‘Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 25 (2) (1964), pp. 248-252; R. H. Weingartner, ‘Vulgar Justice and Platonic Justice’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 25 (2) (1964), pp. 248-252; J. P. Schiller, ‘Just Men and Just Acts in Plato’s Republic’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 6 (1) (1968), pp. 1-14; G. Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness in the Republic’, in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978), pp. 66-95; R. Kraut, ‘Reason and Justice in Plato’s Republic’, in Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (Assen, 1973), pp. 207-24; J. Annas, ‘Plato and Common Morality’, Classical Quarterly, 28 (2) (1978), pp. 437-451; N. O. Dahl, ‘Plato’s Defense of Justice’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 51 (4) (1991), pp. 809-834; I. H. Jang, ‘The Problematic Character of Socrates’ Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic’, Interpretation, 24 (1) (1996), pp. 85-107; E. Brown, ‘Justice and Compulsion for Plato’s Philosopher-Rulers’, Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000), pp. 1-15; E. Brown, ‘Minding the Gap in Plato's Republic’, Philosophical Studies, 117 (2004), pp. 275-302; R. G. K. Singpurwalla, ‘Plato’s Defense of Justice in the Republic’, in The Blackwell Guide to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. Santas (Malden, MA, 2006), pp. 263-82.3 See Demos, ‘Fallacy’, p. 395.

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gap is real or merely apparent, and, if the former,

whether Plato is aware of it.

I will argue that this gap is both real and

deliberate, and, further, that the text lacks the

information that would be necessary in order to close

the gap. That is, the Republic by itself does not

provide the materials necessary for filling the gaps in

its explicit arguments. Nonetheless, I will also show

that it is highly plausible that Plato genuinely holds

that everyone is better off being just. Hence, the

Republic proves to have a complex rhetorical character,

indicating certain philosophic conclusions but

withholding the genuine reasons for those conclusions.

It is properly understood as a work of protreptic

rhetoric.4

I.

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates faces a twofold

challenge: to explain what justice is, and to prove

4 H. Yunis, ‘The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge,2007), pp. 1-26, pp. 1, 4, 12-19.

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that ‘it is in every way better to be just than

unjust,’5 because ‘justice is the greatest good’ one

can have in one’s soul, while injustice is the greatest

evil.6 This challenge is explicitly put to Socrates by

Glaucon and Adeimantus7 after Socrates had failed to

refute Thrasymachus’ contention that the best life for

a human being is one of tyrannical injustice.8

Thrasymachus assumes that the best life for a human

being consists in having and enjoying for oneself as

many of the good things as possible.9 Since most of

those goods things belong to others and can be

appropriated to oneself only by injustice (where

injustice is taken to consist in the use of force or 5 Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. A. Bloom (New York, 1991), 357b.All translations from the Republic will be taken from this edition.Textual references are to Stephanus page numbers, and, unless, otherwise noted, all further Stephanus references are to the Republic. I have used Burnet’s edition of the Greek text: Platonis Opera, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1902).6 See 357a-b, 358b, 366c, 366e, 367b-e.7 See 358e-367a.. 8 See esp. 343b-344c and 348b-354a.9 Thrasymachus seems to identify the human good with material gratification: see 343d-e, 348d. Hence the best life is the one where one can ‘get the better in the biggest way’ (ton megala dunamenon pleonektein, 344a). Pleonektein (‘to have more’ or ‘to get the better’) and pleonexia are words used in the Republic and commonly associated with injustice. See K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Berkeley, 1974), p. 193, and Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness’, p. 71, for more on pleonexia.

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fraud to take for oneself what belongs to others10), it

follows that successfully unjust people generally will

have more of the good things than those who are just,

and the person who commits injustice on the largest

scale possible acquires the most for himself. Thus,

the person who is successfully unjust on the largest

scale is happiest.11 Justice, on the other hand,

consists in fulfilling one’s social or legal

obligations and refraining from taking what belongs to

others.12 (I will call this conception of justice

‘common justice’ in the remainder of this essay.13)

Since it would be profitable to take those things if

one could, it follows that being just entails denying

oneself the enjoyment of admittedly good things. For

anyone who wants to be happy, however, it is not

reasonable to deny oneself good things.

10 See 343d-344c, 351a-c, 358e-359b, 360b-c, 361a-b, 362b-c.11 343e-344c, 362a-c.12 See 343d-e, 348d, 349b-d, 351c, 352b-c, 358e-359c, 360b-d, 442e-443a.13 In this usage, I follow Vlastos: see ‘Justice and Happiness’, pp. 91-2. Sachs (‘Fallacy’, p. 143) refers to this conception as ‘vulgar justice.’ Both terms have a basis in the text of the Republic: see 442e and 500d.

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Nonetheless, since detected injustice brings in

its wake ill repute and punishment,14 and since it is

possible that even successful injustice ultimately does

not pay because the gods punish the unjust in the

afterlife,15 most people most of the time best serve

their interests by being just. They do not value

justice for its own sake, however; rather, they

consider justice burdensome but beneficial, since,

although living justly entails self-denial at times, it

brings with it the reputation for justice, which

carries with it social and material advantages.16

Hence, the benefits of justice and the liabilities of

injustice are socially contingent and, in particular,

contingent upon one’s being known by others to be

just.17 Without its socially contingent ‘wages,’

justice is useless self-denial; without its socially

contingent sanctions, injustice is personally

advantageous. Consequently, those who can avoid the

14 348d, 358e-359b, 363d-e15 330d-e, 363d16 357c-358a17 See esp. 365b

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sanctions of injustice (through evasion18 or impunity19)

ought to commit injustice whenever they can get away

with it. The more one can commit profitable injustice,

the happier one will be.

Glaucon and Adeimantus do not agree with

Thrasymachus, but they claim never to have heard an

adequate refutation of his position. Hence, they ask

Socrates to deliver a defense of justice.20 Socrates

responds by developing a radically novel definition of

justice (a conception which I will call ‘psychological

justice’ in the remainder of this essay).21 Through

the use of a structural analogy of soul to city,22 18 360e-361b, 365c-d19 344a-c.20 358c-d, 366e, 367a-b. It should be noted that the brothers arenot asking for a defense of the profitability of just behavior; which may be engaged in ‘unwillingly’ (357c-358a). The brothers wish Socrates to prove that the virtue of justice itself produces the greatest good for the soul (366e). As Vlastos (among others) has noted, this need not require proving that every act of justiceis profitable (‘Justice and Happiness’, pp. 67-68 and 68 n.6).21 Rep. Books II-IV, esp. 441d-e, 442d-443d. At times, I will alsorefer to this condition of soul as ‘psychological harmony’, or ‘having an ordered soul’, or ‘justice in the soul’.22 435b-441c. The most famous treatment is B. Williams, ‘The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’, in Plato 2, ed. G. Fine (Oxford, 1999), pp. 255-64. I have found the most illuminating discussion of the analogy to be that of G. R. F. Ferrari’s City and Soul in Plato’s Republic (Chicago, 2005). He effectively refutes Williams’s position at pp. 42-50. Another helpful discussion is N. Blössner, ‘The City-Soul Analogy’, in The

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Socrates defines justice as the virtue by which each

part of one’s soul—calculative, appetitive, and

spirited—does its own proper work.23 A person with a

just soul would be guided by wisdom (‘the knowledge of

that which is beneficial for each part [of the soul]

and for the whole composed of the community of th[e]

three parts’24) and would pursue wisdom’s course with

unfailing courage and temperance.25 His entire soul

would form a harmonious unity, free of internal discord

or motivational conflict.26 Such a person would

possess the health of soul without which life is not

worth living,27 would be most able to do what he wishes

Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge,2007), pp. 345-85.23 Or ‘minds its own business’—the Greek is ta hautou prattein (441e; see 441d-e and 443b). I will use ‘to mind one’s own business’ and‘to do one’s own proper work’ synonymously. The desiring or appetitive part of the soul (to epithumetikon) is discussed at 437b-439b; the calculative part (to logistikon) at 439b-e; and the spirited part (to thumoeides) at 439e-441c.24 442c.25 442c-d. A person is courageous ‘when his spirited part preservers, through pains and pleasures, what has been proclaimed by the speeches (hupo tōn legōn) about that which is terrible and that which is not’ (442c). He is moderate on account of ‘the friendship and accord of [the] parts [of the soul]—when the rulingpart and the two ruled parts are of the single opinion that the calculating part ought to rule and don’t raise faction against it’(442c-d).26 413c-d.27 444d-445b.

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and satisfy his needs,28 and would be uniquely suited

to partake of the greatest and purest of pleasures,29

while at the same time ensuring that his entire soul

receives what it needs and thereby allowing his entire

soul to partake of the full range of proper

pleasures.30 The perfectly unjust life, as the

opposite, would be full of discord, pain,

insatiability, neediness, fear, and fleeting, illusory

pleasures.31 In this way, Socrates justifies justice

at the bar of happiness.

Scholars have regularly disputed the extent to

which Socrates’ arguments succeed in meeting the

brothers’ challenge. 32 Glaucon and Adeimantus had

asked Socrates to prove that being a commonly just

person is necessary in order to be happy. Socrates has

28 576b-580c. See E. Brown, ‘Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta (Winter 2011), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/plato-ethics-politics/>. accessed June 25, 2013, § 3.1 for discussion of this.29 580c-588a.30 586d-587a, 591c-592a.31 577c-580a, 587a-b.32 This debate started in earnest by Sachs, ‘Fallacy’. See note 2above for responses.

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shown that being psychologically just is necessary for

happiness. It is not immediately obvious from the

text, however, whether Socrates has demonstrated a

necessary relationship between common justice and

psychological justice such that the possession of one

requires or entails possession of the other. If we

assume that psychological justice is necessary for

happiness, then Socrates’ response to the brothers will

remain incomplete until he can show two things: (1)

that the psychologically just person will always choose

to act in a commonly just manner and never unjustly;

and (2) that the practice of common justice (and the

disposition to practice it for its own sake) fosters

psychological harmony, while the practice of injustice

disorders the soul.33 If he does not meet the first

condition, then it remains possible that a person may

be happy but commonly unjust. If he does not meet the 33 The precise conditions Socrates must meet have been a matter ofdispute: see Sachs, ‘Fallacy’, pp. 152-53. Kraut, ‘Reason and Justice’, pp. 207-8 is particularly helpful. Annas (‘Common Morality’, pp. 445-6) notes that psychological justice need not entail behavior that conforms perfectly to the canons of common justice, since the latter is shown by the Republic to be defective at times.

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second, a person may be commonly just but unhappy.34

Either result would contradict the brothers’ request.

Sachs has argued that the Republic fails to meet

the first condition,35 but several scholars have argued

in different ways that the Republic does offer a

coherent argument.36 I will not focus on this dispute,

however, because even if the Republic did successfully

meet this condition, that would be of little or no

relevance to most of its readers. Over the course of

Books V-VII, it becomes clear that Book IV’s

psychologically just person is, in fact, the

philosopher, since only the philosopher possesses the

knowledge of the good presupposed by the definition of

wisdom, while possession of wisdom is a necessary

condition for psychological justice.37 Further, all 34 See Sachs, ‘Fallacy’, p. 153.35 Sachs, ‘Fallacy’, pp. 154-5.36 Brown, ‘Gap’, pp. 277-83 extensively reviews the major strategies that have been followed to show that the psychologically just person will necessarily be commonly just. Brown also persuasively establishes that these various strategies are all inconsistent with the text of the Republic. See also Singpurwalla, ‘Plato’s Defense’, pp. 269-75.37 That only the philosopher has knowledge of the good is clear from 540a-b. Wisdom is defined at 442c. Since psychological justice consists in each part of the soul minding its own business, and wisdom is necessary for the calculating part to do

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three defenses of perfect justice offered by Socrates

apply directly only to the philosopher. 38 Philosophers

are a very rare type, however.39 Thus, whether or not

a philosopher must be commonly just in order to live

the philosophic life has no direct bearing on the

question whether non-philosophers must be commonly just

in order to be happy.

For most readers of the Republic, therefore, the

second condition mentioned above is more important one.

Does the Republic establish that the cultivation of a

commonly just character engenders the order of soul

necessary for happiness, even in non-philosophers?

Does the Republic show that the cultivation of a

commonly unjust character necessarily disorders the

its business, it follows that only the philosopher is psychologically just. Some scholars have asserted that a person can be psychologically just without wisdom, provided they possess true opinion and have been properly educated (see Demos, ‘Fallacy’, p. 396, Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness’, pp. 93-94 and93 n.71, R. Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, Ancient Philosophy, 18 (1998), pp. 315-339, pp. 333-4, and Brown, ‘Gap’, pp. 284-8).38 The first proof (576b-580c) asserts that the man who corresponds to the best city is the happiest, but that is the philosopher (see 549c-550b). The second (580c-583a) and third (583b-588a) proofs both invoke the superior pleasure of the philosophic life.39 491a-b.

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soul? Obviously, the order of soul possessed by a non-

philosopher could be only analogous to the psychological

justice of the philosopher, since only the latter

possesses wisdom and knowledge. Still, it might be

possible for non-philosophers to acquire a properly

ordered soul through education and habituation in

correct opinion.40 If this derivative kind of

psychological justice both is necessary for happiness

and requires the willing cultivation of a commonly just

character, then Socrates would be in a position to meet

the brothers’ challenge. He could argue that being a

commonly just person is always more advantageous than

being a commonly unjust person. If, however, the

Republic does not offer some such argument, it would

seem that Plato has the brothers raise their challenge

only to have Socrates fail to meet it.

Some scholars have argued that the Republic either

fails or does not even aspire to prove that the

40 Among others, Vlastos claims this to be the Republic’s position, though he thinks this kind of proper habituation is available onlyin Kallipolis: see ‘Justice and Happiness’, pp. 93-4.

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cultivation of common justice fosters psychological

justice.41 Others have argued that the Republic does

prove that common justice fosters psychological

justice, but only in ideal circumstances—namely, only

in the ideal regime (Kallipolis42) that the

interlocutors build in speech: only in that regime

will the laws be informed by wisdom and therefore

properly order the souls of those living under them.43

Both of these interpretations, however, conflict with

the initial impression given by the text. On a number

of occasions, Socrates speaks as though his arguments

have vindicated the practice of common justice for all,

even in non-ideal circumstances. Consider the closing

statement of the entire dialogue:

41 Sachs, ‘Fallacy’, pp. 156-7, and Annas, ‘Common Morality’, pp. 444-5.42 Socrates gives the city this name at 527c.43 Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness’, p. 93 n.71 implies this. Kamtekar (‘Imperfect Virtue’, p. 333), and Brown (‘Gap’, pp. 284-8) also adopt this interpretation. In this essay I will refer to this position as the ‘narrow interpretation’ of the Republic, sinceit holds that Socrates vindicates common justice only in ideal circumstances. On the other hand, I will call ‘the broad interpretation’ of the Republic that which maintains that Socrates defends common justice also in non-ideal circumstances.

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…if we are persuaded by me, holding that soul

is immortal and capable of bearing all evils

and all goods, we shall always keep to the

upper road and practice justice with prudence

in every way so that we shall be friends to

ourselves and the gods, both while we remain

here and when we reap the rewards for it like

victors who go about gathering in the prizes.

And so here and in the thousand year journey

that we have described we shall fare well.44

Read in light of the Myth of Er (which this exhortation

closes), the ‘justice’ Socrates refers to here is

clearly common justice,45 and the message of the myth

itself appears to apply to every human being, since it

ostensibly speaks of the fate of all after death.

Thus, Socrates closes the Republic with a statement

suggesting the common justice has been universally

vindicated. As I will show in the next section, this 44 621c-d.45 The just souls in the afterlife clearly are not all philosophers, and their various choices of lives show that most ofthem do not possess psychological justice (see esp. 619b-c). Hence, they are best understood as examples of common justice.

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passage is consistent with several other passages where

Socrates implies or directly states that the practice

of common justice imparts psychological justice to non-

philosophers even in non-ideal circumstances. All of

these passages indicate that Socrates recognizes the

need to satisfy the second condition mentioned above in

order to meet the brothers’ challenge. I will also

show that none of these passages present a compelling

argument to support this claim, and that there are

other passages in the Republic that make the claim

highly implausible.

II.

On four occasions Socrates supports the broad

interpretation either by implying or by asserting that

the practice of common justice is necessary for

developing and sustaining psychological justice. The

first two passages46 are not expressly limited to

philosophers, while the third and fourth passages47 are

46 442d-444a, and 587a-c.47 589c-591a, and 604a-d.

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expressly addressed to the case of non-philosophers.48

Taken together, these passages suggest that not only

philosophers are better off being just, and that a non-

philosopher need not be a citizen of Kallipolis in

order to be happy. I will discuss the first, third,

and fourth of these passages.49

The first passage comes in Book IV. After his

initial description of the just soul,50 Socrates

implies that the practice of common justice is

necessary in order to attain and preserve psychological

justice. First, he secures Glaucon’s agreement that a

person whose soul is just will adhere to the ‘vulgar

standards’ (ta phortika) of justice. He will not steal a

deposit, rob temples, steal, or betray his friends or

city, nor will he break his oaths, commit adultery,

neglect his parents, or neglect his duties to the

48 Sachs therefore must be mistaken in claiming that Socrates neither saw the need nor thought it possible to prove that the practice of common justice fosters justice in one’s soul must be mistaken (‘Fallacy’, pp. 156-7).49 I will not discuss the second passage (587a-c), since it is consistent with the other passages.50 443c-d.

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gods.51 Second, Socrates shortly thereafter implies

that acting in accord with the vulgar standards of

justice is necessary for fostering and maintaining a

just soul, while unjust practices disorder it. He says

that the psychologically just man, ‘[i]n all [his]

actions…believes and names a just and fine action one

that preserves and helps to produce this condition

[namely, psychological justice], and wisdom the

knowledge that supervises this action; while he

believes and names an unjust action one that undoes

this condition, and lack of learning, in its turn, the

opinion that supervises this action.’52 If, however,

the psychologically just person refrains from acts of

common injustice and performs the positive obligations

associated with common justice (as the first passage

suggests), then this second passage implies that acts

of common injustice disorder the soul, and that neglect

of the positive duties of justice also disorders it.

The passage taken as a whole clearly implies,

51 442d-443b52 443e-444a

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therefore, that the practice of common justice is a

necessary part of building up and maintaining a just

soul.

The next—and most important—passage I will discuss

comes in Book IX.53 This passage most explicitly

asserts that habituation in law (including common

justice) provides a means for non-philosophers to

develop psychological justice.

After having completed hisproofs for the

superiority of perfect (psychological) justice to

perfect (psychological) injustice, Socrates offers a

new image of the soul as a kind of strange composite

animal. He likens the appetitive part of the soul54 to

‘a many-colored, many-headed beast that has a ring of

heads of tame and savage beasts.’55 He further likens

the spirited part to a lion, and the calculating (or

wisdom-loving) part to a human being.56 The just and

53 589c-591a.54Which is now said to include necessary, unnecessary, and lawlessdesires. Necessary are distinguished from unnecessary at 558d-559d; lawful from lawless at 571a-d.55 588c.56 588d-e.

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happy person is the one in whom the human being rules

over the beast with the help of the lion, and where

both beast and lion are as docile as can be.57

Socrates then claims that the ‘lawful noble and

base things have come into being on such grounds as

these[:] the noble things cause the bestial part of our

nature to be subjected to the human being … while the

base things enslave the tame to the savage.’58 In

other words, conventional standards of conduct exist in

order to produce the proper order of soul in those

subject to them. Socrates then illustrates this claim

by listing several base or shameful actions that serve

to disorder the soul: taking gold unjustly (which I

take to be a stand-in for most of the common standards

of justice), licentiousness, stubbornness and bad

temper, luxury and softness, flattery and illiberality,

and mechanical and manual art59—all of which either

invert the proper order of the soul or make some

57 589a-b.58 589c-d.59 589d-590c.

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particular part too strong or too weak. Law shows

itself on the side of justice and of the happiness of

all by condemning each of these actions or

conditions.60 Socrates thus concludes that the

intention of the law is to put the proper order of the

soul into those who lack the ability to order

themselves—in other words, into non-philosophers.61

Law makes non-philosophers happy by ordering their

souls as wisdom would.

The final passage associating common with

psychological justice comes in Book X.62 Socrates

asserts one last time that argument and law (logos kai

nomos) both intend to foster a proper order in the

soul. In this context, he is discussing the fact that

both reason and custom dictate that a person who has

suffered some great loss must resist excessive grief as

much as possible. The ‘best part’ of the soul63 is

‘ready to be persuaded in whatever direction the law

60 590e.61 590c-e. 62 604a-d.63 604d.

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leads,’64 while law is said to counsel calmness in the

midst of suffering, not least because the grief could

be based on a mistaken estimate of one’s condition, and

because excessive grieving renders it impossible to

accept one’s condition and deliberate properly: one

cannot respond ‘in whatever way argument (logos)

declares would be best’ if grief clouds one’s

thinking.65 Once again, then, law and reason are said

to be aligned in their purpose, and law is said to be a

means to reasonable living because it restrains the

elements of the soul that frustrate reason’s rule. On

the other hand, when ‘[w]hat is by nature best in us…

[has] been adequately educated by argument [and] habit

(logōi…ethei),’ we are able to keep a proper order in our

souls and be better off.

Taken together, these passages reveal three

things. First, they establish that the Republic

contains several statements that the practice of common

justice is necessary for developing and maintaining the

64 604 b.65 604b-c.

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psychological harmony necessary for happiness, while

common injustice precludes psychological harmony.

Second, these various passages either explicitly or

implicitly apply to non-philosophers in non-ideal

circumstances. These two points together show that the

Republic at least presents itself as having met the

second condition mentioned in Part I. Unfortunately,

the third thing made clear by these passages is that

all of them assert, while none of them prove, that non-

philosophers living in non-ideal circumstances are

better off being commonly just than commonly unjust.

No supporting arguments are offered.

Thus, while it is indisputable that the Republic

presents itself as vindicating common justice for all

people under all circumstances, it seems to do so at

the level of assertion rather than of argument. And

these assertions are problematic themselves. For

example, even if it is the case that avoiding common

injustice is necessary for ordering one’s soul toward

the practice of philosophy, it is less clear why a non-

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philosopher would need to order his soul in a similar

way. In fact, we do not know what good or goods

properly order the life of those who are not wise.66

Further, some of the assertions in favor of justice

prove, upon inspection, to be weaker than they might

seem. For example, the discussion of the ‘lawful noble

and base things’ says less than its introduction67 and

conclusion68 imply. In almost every case, Socrates

says that the various base practices (injustice,

illiberality, cowardice, etc.) are justly condemned

when69 they disorder the soul. He does not actually

say that every instance of these conventionally blamed

66 Someone might, like Vlastos (‘Justice and Happiness’, p. 95), assert that it is simply a given of Platonic moral epistemology that right reason commands common justice and the various other virtues, and that it is a given of Platonic metaphysics that a soul ordered in this way is objectively better off. The problem with this reading is that it is singularly inapt for Plato to relywithout argument on these assumptions in the very dialogue where the first of these assumptions is explicitly called into question (by Thrasymachus; see 348b-d about justice as ‘high-minded innocence’ and injustice as ‘good counsel’). More than in any other dialogue, we would expect the Republic to explain why right reason aligns with common justice (at least most of the time).67 589c-d.68 590c-591a.69 hotan: said four times at 590a-c, and asserted by implication at589d-e.

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activities or conditions necessarily does disorder the

soul.70

Finally, elsewhere in the Republic Socrates offers

several reasons why we should be suspicious of the

claim that the laws in any existing city are reliable

guides to our own true welfare. Politicians are said

to be inexpert, haphazard, and contradictory in their

law-making,71 while those with the true art of rule are

excluded from power.72 In many cities, the laws and

the standards of praise and blame corrupt the

development of true virtue rather than fostering it.73

Political life is depicted as implacably hostile to

true virtue74 and a prison with necessarily distorted

standards.75 It is hard to see how habituation in the

laws of actually existing cities could foster

psychological justice if these claims are true.

70 Schiller notes this as well (‘Just Men’, p. 8).71 425c-427a.72 488a-489a.73 492a-494a.74 496a-497a.75 514a-517a.

26

In sum, the defense of common justice for non-

philosophers in non-ideal circumstances is

unconvincing. It is evidently needed, but it lacks

supporting arguments, as well as rebuttals of the

assertions suggesting that common justice does not

foster psychological harmony. It is highly implausible

that Plato is unaware of these shortcomings. It is

probably for reasons such as these that Bloom has

suggested that the defense of law and common justice in

Book IX should be read as applying solely to

Kallipolis, and not to any actually existing regime.76

Unlike in existing cities, in Kallipolis the laws would

be informed by the wisdom of the philosopher-kings and

citizens would be thoroughly habituated to abide by

those laws. Since common justice is a necessary part

of that habituation,77 Socrates would on these grounds

be able to argue that, in principle, it is better for

76 Bloom, ‘Interpretive Essay’, in Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. A. Bloom (New York, 1991), pp. 307-436, p. 426. The same positionis implied by the arguments of Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness’, pp. 94-5, Kamtekar, ‘Imperfect Virtue’, pp. 333-34, and Brown, ‘Gap’, pp. 284-6.77 433e-434a

27

everyone to be commonly just than unjust, even if the

laws of actual cities fall short of the true standards.

Elsewhere, I have called this position the ‘narrow

interpretation’ of the Republic, since it backs away

from the apparently universal claims Socrates makes

elsewhere. Such a conclusion would be unfortunately

restricted, given the expectations the dialogue raises,

but perhaps it is simply the nature of things that,

under most circumstances, most people cannot attain

psychological justice no matter how commonly just they

are.78 Perhaps, then, Kallipolis is the only hope for

the vindication of common justice for non-philosophers.

In the next section, I will show that the narrow

interpretation also does not hold up.

III.

It seems plausible to assume that, if any non-

philosophic citizens of Kallipolis possess

psychological justice, it will be the auxiliary

guardians, since their education in virtue is

78 This is, again, Vlastos’s position: see ‘Justice and Happiness’, p. 95.

28

extensively discussed.79 It is also clear from the

text that they will scrupulously practice common

justice without regard to their private interest, and

that this devotion to justice will be one of the

products of their education.80 If formation under the

Kallipolitan regime is not sufficient to order the

souls of the auxiliaries, it is highly unlikely that it

suffices to order the souls of the productive class

Thus, I will limit my investigation to the

auxiliaries.81

In order to show that the auxiliaries possess

genuine psychological harmony, and therefore happiness,

two conditions would have to be met. First, it would

have to be shown that the auxiliaries’ education

embodies wisdom and thus imparts true opinion. Since

happiness requires a well-ordered soul, we must show

79 376c-412b. The auxiliary guardians make up the military, police, and much of the administration of Kallipolis, though they are not the rulers; see 414b, 463a-b.80 See 386a and 433d-434a.81 There are certainly scholars who have claimed that the lowest class in Kallipolis (the craftsmen and farmers—hereafter, the ‘producers’) possess psychological harmony. See Kraut, ‘Reason and Justice’, pp. 216-22, for an influential account.

29

that the laws in Kallipolis order the soul in the

proper way. According to Socrates, justice in the soul

is ordered by wisdom, the virtue by which we ascertain

our own good and how to attain it.82 If the lawful

opinions in Kallipolis are indeed true opinions, then

they will reflect and embody wisdom and therefore would

be reliable guides to the true good of those subject to

them by ordering their souls.83

Even if the laws do impart true opinion, however,

a second condition would still have to be met in order

to prove that the auxiliaries possess psychological

justice. One must show that the non-philosophic

citizens’ characters can be stably and reliably formed

in accordance with those opinions—or, in other words,

that the opinions embodied in the law can be deeply and

enduringly internalized such that they can be said to

82 442c.83 See Meno 97a-98c on true opinion. Many scholars posit that thelaws in Kallipolis embody and impart true opinion. Examples are Vlastos, ‘Justice and Happiness’, p. 93 n.71, Kamtekar, ‘ImperfectVirtue’, pp. 333-4, Brown, ‘Gap’, pp. 284-8, Kraut, ‘Reason and Justice’, p. 223, for example.

30

have formed a genuinely ordered soul.84 If this cannot

be shown, we would hardly be justified in attributing

genuine psychological harmony to the citizens of

Kallipolis. Rather, to borrow an image from Book

VIII,85 we would have to say that their souls are

ordered by ‘force’ (and external circumstances) and

that the prevailing motivations might shift under

different circumstances. But such a contingent order

of the soul would hardly be the sort that could be said

to attain to the level of the genuine psychological

harmony that Socrates presents as necessary for

happiness.

In what follows, I will argue that neither of

these conditions is met. Although there is textual

evidence seeming to support both claims, none of this

evidence is unambiguous and some of it is contradicted

by other statements in the text. I will begin by

considering the second condition: whether the

84 Kamtekar (‘Imperfect Virtue’, pp. 323-38) discusses this point in some detail. 85

31

education that auxiliaries receive durably orders their

souls.

There is certainly textual evidence to suggest

that the auxiliaries acquire permanently

psychologically harmonious souls. In one key passage,

Socrates asserts three times that the dispositions

imparted to the auxiliaries by their education will

persist ‘through everything’ (that is, through all

external challenges and circumstances).86 He likens

the auxiliaries’ souls to pure wool, the virtues

imparted by the education to dyes, and the education

itself to the process of dying wool. Just as pure wool

thoroughly dyed becomes colorfast and keeps its color

‘through everything,’ just so the auxiliaries are so

thoroughly formed by their education that they will

never lose its effects.87

Despite the force of Socrates’ claim that the

auxiliaries will be permanently formed by their

education, there is clear textual evidence showing that

86 429b, 429c, and 430b.87 429d-430b.

32

the souls of the auxiliaries are not, in fact,

‘colorfast’—that their convictions and virtues would

not, in fact, persist ‘through everything.’ As is well

known, Socrates prescribes that the auxiliaries will

live under austere communal conditions. 88 They are

denied private homes. They are denied private

possessions beyond what is necessary for their jobs.

They are not allowed so much as to touch gold or

silver. They are not even allowed closets or chests or

any place in which they can hide themselves or anything

else. They are subsequently denied any permanent and

exclusive attachments to other human beings: there are

no lasting marriages, and children are in common.89

They are, in short, denied any semblance of wealth or a

household. They will have ‘nothing private but the

body.’90

As Bloom has observed, this removal of privacy

renders it virtually impossible for the guardians to

88 415d-417b.89 458b-461e.90 464d.

33

commit any kind of privately advantageous injustice.91

Why does Socrates arrange matters this way? One might

conjecture that living in this manner will make the

auxiliaries do their proper work in the best way

possible, free from temptations to selfishness or

slacking. But Socrates says something much more than

this: namely, that unless the guardians are denied

privacy, they will not be guardians at all.92 In a

clear allusion to Thrasymachus’ earlier description of

political rule, Socrates says that ‘the most terrible

and shameful thing of all is for shepherds to rear dogs

as auxiliaries for the flocks in such a way that due to

licentiousness, hunger or some other bad habit, they

themselves undertake to do harm to the sheep and

instead of dogs become like wolves’; and he adds that

he and the brothers must ‘in every way guard against

91 Bloom, ‘Interpretive Essay’, p. 369.92 416a-b, 417a-b. In a later essay, Vlastos recognizes that the living conditions prescribed to the guardians are presented as necessary in order to prevent their corruption: see ‘The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato’s Republic’, in Interpretations ofPlato, ed. H. F. North (Leiden, 1977), pp. 1-40, pp. 2023, esp. p. 23 n.85. He does not seem to note, however, that this undermines his claims in ‘Justice and Happiness’ (pp. 93-94) about the durability of the effects of the guardians’ ‘musical paideia’.

34

the auxiliaries doing anything like that to the

citizens, since they are stronger than they.’93 Yet

Socrates claims that the possession of private property

and privacy will cause the auxiliaries to become just

such ‘savage masters’: ‘Whenever they’ll possess

private land, houses, and currency, they’ll be

householders and farmers instead of guardians, and

they’ll become masters and enemies instead of allies of

the other citizens.’94 In other words, the living

conditions of the guardians do not augment their

education; rather, they are a necessary supplement or

support to that education, without which the guardians

would descend into common injustice.

It is therefore not true that the effects of the

auxiliaries’ education would persist ‘through

everything,’ because Socrates admits that the enjoyment

of privacy and private property would fatally undermine

the effects of the education. But if possession of a

household would corrupt the guardians, it must be

93 416a-b.94 416b, 417a-b.

35

because, even after their education, there still

persist certain desires or passions in their souls that

are contrary to justice and to the aims of their

education. Something in the auxiliaries’ souls still

resists the law and is powerful enough that, under

certain conditions, internal fortitude would not be

sufficient to keep it down.95 But this means that

their souls are not truly harmonious in the manner

described in the account of psychological justice.96

In sum, the justice of the auxiliaries is not

fully internalized.97 It depends crucially on

favorable external circumstances (both material and

political). Hence, the education of the guardians does

not produce durable psychological harmony comparable to

that of the philosopher.98

95 Consider, in this light, 416a-b, 571b-c, 572b, and 619b-d.96 443c-d.97 Kamtekar (‘Imperfect Virtue’, pp. 337-8) does not seem to note the implications for her argument of the discussion of privacy.98 This chain of reasoning alone is sufficient to call into question Brown’s claim that the philosopher-kings’ disposition to be just comes from their formation in the musical education (see ‘Gap’, pp. 286-8).

36

Nonetheless, even if the auxiliaries’ practice of

common justice (a major aim of their education) does

not foster psychological harmony of the highest order,

it is still theoretically possible to argue that they

are made as well off as they possibly can be by their

education. Even if the justice (and hence the

happiness) of the auxiliaries depends on external

props, it could still be the case that they are better

off being ordered in this way than in any other. If

the laws and education which form them are themselves

informed by wisdom, whose proper object is the good of

the individual soul,99 then the convictions and laws

forming the auxiliaries would impart to them true

opinions guiding them toward their proper good, even if

external props are required. This would also establish

that the happiness of the auxiliaries, however inferior

to that of philosophers, would be superior to any that

could be gotten through injustice. The question is

99 See 442c.37

whether the education and practices do in fact embody

wisdom and impart true opinion.

It is important to be specific about the kind of

true opinion that is needed here. It need not be the

case—and is not the case—that the auxiliaries’

education will contain only true opinions and no false

ones. Socrates straightforwardly admits that the

auxiliaries’ education will necessarily contain many

lies.100 Rather, the relevant true opinions would be

those concerning the practice of the virtues that order

the soul: what pleasures to pursue or avoid, and to

what extent; what pains to endure or avoid, and to what

extent; what is obligatory or fitting to do in social

relations, and what is not; what honors are worth

pursuing, and what not; and so forth. Insofar as the

laws impart true opinion on these matters, they would

foster in the appetitive and spirited parts of the

auxiliaries’ souls the same virtues (especially

courage, moderation, and justice) that order the

100 414b-415d, 459c-d.38

spirited and appetitive parts of the philosopher’s

soul. Since the latter virtues constitute an essential

element of psychological harmony, and thus are ordered

toward the good of the philosopher, it would follow

that, if the auxiliaries have the same virtues, they

too will be ordered toward their proper good. If this

is true, then in Kallipolis the laws would be doing

what Socrates in Book IX claims they do: order the

souls of the unwise in the same manner the wise order

their own.101

Thus, to determine whether the laws and education

in Kallipolis impart true opinion of the relevant kind,

we must see whether they inculcate in the auxiliaries

the same virtues as those of the philosopher (excepting

wisdom and related intellectual virtues, of course)—and

there is one passage in the Republic which suggests

exactly that.102 As part of his defense of his proposal

that philosophers be kings, Socrates says that

101 589c-591a.102 485a-487a; see also 490a-d and 535a-536a. The significant of this passage, as well as the problems with it that I discuss, havealso been noted by Bloom, ‘Interpretive Essay’, 395-97.

39

philosophers possess all the virtues of character

possessed by the auxiliaries.103 He then goes on to

argue that the various virtues inculcated in the

auxiliaries through their musical education will also

be possessed by philosophers by virtue of their natural

love of wisdom: moderation, courage, liberality, and

so forth. Socrates thus implies that, except for the

virtues particular to the pursuit of wisdom,104

auxiliaries and philosophers possess the same virtues.

And that would suggest that auxiliaries possess well-

ordered souls, since the philosopher possesses complete

psychological justice and his virtues are dictated by

his wisdom. It would seem, then, that the auxiliaries

do possess a species of psychological justice—the non-

philosophic or law-derived kind.

Upon closer inspection, however, this passage does

not establish that philosophers and auxiliaries have

the same virtues; it cannot be used, therefore, as

103 Rep. 484d-487a catalogues the philosopher’s virtues; compare with 377e-392a, which gives a similar catalogue of auxiliary virtues.104 See 485a-d.

40

proof that the laws of Kallipolis impart true opinion

and foster genuine psychological harmony.105 The various

virtues of the philosopher are all necessary parts of a

life devoted to the practice of philosophy (either as

prerequisites or as inevitable results).106 The virtues

of the auxiliaries, on the other hand, all have as

their explicit end making the auxiliaries good at their

jobs: tame with respect to producers, docile with

respect to rulers, friendly with one another, and

fierce toward enemies. This is repeatedly said to be

the end of the education.107 While the practice of

philosophy is evidently good, since it imparts the

knowledge necessary to provide the whole of one’s soul

with its proper goods,108 and therefore the

philosopher’s virtues can be affirmed as good, it is

not clear that being formed for service to the city

yields the same benefits. It is true that the 105 Again, the argument of this paragraph is anticipated by Bloom, ‘Interpretive Essay’, pp. 395-7.106 485a-487a and 490a-d.107 The following passages from the Republic either say this or imply it: 375c, 378c, 380b, 382c, 386a, 389b, 389d-e, 399a-c, 414e, 415d, 416a-d, 417a-b, 421a-c, 462e-464b.108 591c-592a.

41

auxiliaries are formed to believe that their own good is

simply identical to the good of the city,109 but that

claim is rejected by philosophers (that is, the

wise).110 Why, then, should we think it true for non-

philosophers? If it is not true for them, it is

unclear whether their education orders them towards

what is genuinely good for them.

Socrates does speak at times as though the

auxiliaries are ordered toward their proper good. He

says or implies on a number of occasions that the

auxiliaries, by being formed to do well their job for

the city, are rendered useful not only to the city but

also to themselves.111 These passages are not

sufficient evidence, however, because they do not say

why the auxiliaries are rendered useful to themselves

by their education.

Indeed, it should be clear by now that the Republic

does not contain the materials to resolve this question

109 See 412d-e and context.110 516c-d, 517c-d, 519c-520d.111 See 406d-407a, 407d-e, 413e, and 417a

42

because it lacks a comprehensive, rationally grounded

account of the human good, one that could be used to

assess the well-being not only of philosophers but also

of non-philosophers. Plato provides certain

suggestions on this score, but nothing demonstrative.

We are told that the wise are happiest because they

alone are able to discern on their own their proper

good and order their lives by it.112 We are also told

that the pursuit and possession of knowledge of ‘what

is’ is the pinnacle of human happiness—at least for

those capable of it.113 More concretely, we are told

that the goods of the soul (the virtues) are higher in

rank than any bodily goods (health or beauty) or

external goods (wealth or honor), and that the value of

these latter two classes of goods is to be assessed in

light of their effects on the goods of the soul.114 One

might conclude, therefore, that Plato’s position is

that happiness (or the human good) consists in the

112 442c, 580c-583a, 591c-592a.113 580c-588a..114 591c-592a.

43

practice of the virtues in conjunction with the

possession of such external and bodily goods as are

necessary or beneficial to the practice of the virtues.

In that case, one could say by way of shorthand that

virtue is the human good.

But the Republic does not allow the reader to draw

this conclusion, however tempting it may be. The text

clearly suggests that psychological harmony is

necessary for happiness, and that psychological harmony

requires wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (as

defined in Book IV115). Yet the definitions of these

virtues seem to rule out the possibility that the goods

of the soul (the virtues) or the practice of the

virtues could simply be the human good.116 As already

noted, wisdom consists in knowledge of what is good for

the whole soul and its parts. That is, wisdom is

knowledge of the human good; it is not equated with the

115 441d-443e.116 This consideration tells against Brown’s claim that, throughoutthe Republic, Socrates holds to the belief that the practice of virtue is happiness: see Brown, ‘Plato’s Ethics’, § 3.1.

44

human good.117 The other three virtues are all, in one

way or another, ancillary to the rule of wisdom in the

soul: dispositions necessary in order for a person to

be able to discern and attain his or her good. Book IV

thus suggests that the practice of the virtues is

guided by knowledge of the human good and is oriented

toward the human good, but one cannot conclude without

further argument that the practice of virtue simply is

the human good. Further, even if knowledge of ‘what

is’ is the highest good, we still do not know what the

good is for those incapable of wisdom. Insofar as

psychological harmony is good because it enables the

pursuit of wisdom, we do not truly know even what good

psychological harmony is for non-philosophers. But

until we have a comprehensive and grounded account of

the human good, we are simply unable to assess to what

extent (if any) lawfulness in non-ideal circumstances

is necessary for happiness or to what extent (if any) 117 The discussion of philosophy in Books V-VII would seem to rule out that the human good even is the proper object of wisdom (and perhaps even of the philosophers’ activity); rather, the good is. For one influential discussion of this, see J. Annas, An Introductionto Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), pp. 261-71.

45

service to the common good is good for non-

philosophers.

In sum, the Republic does not supply full and

persuasive proof that common justice is necessary for

happiness because it engenders the psychological order

necessary for happiness. It is asserted but not proven

that common justice in non-ideal circumstances fosters

psychological order. At the same time, Socrates calls

this claim into question when he points out the defects

of most political orders. Nor does the argument fare

better when talking about ideal political

circumstances. The text does not allow us to conclude

definitively that auxiliaries in Kallipolis will

possess psychological harmony and thus be made happier

than they could be through the practice of injustice.

It is true that there also is no decisive evidence

contrary to the claim that the auxiliaries possess

psychological harmony, or that non-philosophers in non-

ideal circumstances could. Nonetheless, if Plato has a

convincing argument to offer, one would hope he would

46

provide it, since the argument as it stands not only

contains gaps but even seems to make it difficult to

figure out how to fill those gaps. Thus, although the

Republic gives the impression of having vindicated

common justice for all, it at most vindicates it only

for philosophers. In the next section, I will discuss

the significance of these results.

IV.

If my interpretation is correct, then the main

argument of the Republic is not only a failure but a

deliberate failure: it raises the expectation that

common justice will be vindicated, yet provides no

convincing argument that does so. The Republic would

also appear to be misleading. It fails to accomplish

what it purports to set out to accomplish, yet at the

same time Socrates on several occasions speaks as

though his argument has indeed been universally

successful. Although one might think that careful

analysis could uncover an argument justifying the

impression given by Socrates, no such argument is

47

forthcoming. Indeed, careful analysis seems to increase

the difficulties associated with finding such an

argument.

How to account for this combination of

insufficiency and misdirection? One might conclude

that Plato holds that common justice simply cannot be

vindicated apart from the practice of philosophy, but

that he wishes to hide this conclusion from most

readers behind a screen of moral rhetoric. According

to this interpretation, it could be that the life of

injustice is actually better for non-philosophers,

since they are incapable of tasting the pleasures of

philosophy. Or it could be that that the happiness of

non-philosophers is so far inferior to that of

philosophers that it hardly matters whether they lead

lives of justice or not. Again, Socrates might wish to

hide this distressing thought behind moral rhetoric.

Neither of these possibilities seems to square

with the text, however. Although Socrates does not

decisively vindicate justice, his argument does

48

seriously undermine the case for injustice in a manner

that suggests that Socrates and Plato genuinely believe

that human beings are better off being just than

unjust. The premise of the case for injustice is that

pleonexia is good, and that is a claim that Socrates

resolutely refuses to make any concessions to.118 To

see pleonexia as the high road to happiness would, in

terms of the Republic’s provisional psychology, be to

say that genuine happiness could be found through

gorging one’s appetites and ignoring the needs of the

other parts of one’s soul (or at least subordinating

the other parts of the soul to the needs of one’s

appetites). Even if following such ‘a foolish

118 At various points Socrates does, in fact, indirectly concede the truth of some of the claims made by Thrasymachus and Glaucon. The Ship of State image (488a-489a) indirectly confirms Thrasymachus’ description of politics in the cities (338d-339a), as does his statement about what would happen in a city of good men (347a-e) and his explanation why philosophers avoid politics (496c-e). His introduction of the ‘wage-earner’s art’ (345e-347a)indirectly concedes to Thrasymachus that ‘rulers in the precise sense’ are not wholly disinterested, even if their art does not directly obtain their own good; see D. Stauffer, Plato’s Introduction to the Question of Justice (Albany, NY, 2001), pp. 87-93, for more on this last point. And Socrates’ account of the soul of the good citizenchoosing to be reincarnated as a tyrant is an indirect acknowledgment that few if any human beings could resist the temptations of the Ring of Gyges (619b-d).

49

adolescent opinion about happiness’119 did yield the

most pleasant life (as ‘the many’ believe), that fact

alone would not prove it to be the best life for

anyone, since even the use of the two proofs by

pleasure120 and the assumption that the best life will

be the most pleasant does not entail that pleasure is

the sole or even the most important criterion for

assessing the goodness of a life.121

Indeed, one of the primary effects of the

Republic’s argument is to show up the superficiality of

the case for injustice. Thrasymachus and the other

speakers whom Glaucon draws upon in his speech all

purport to see through the façade of conventional

justice and to uncover the true or natural basis of

human conduct.122 These speeches presuppose that

pleonexia is natural and, when satisfied, good. They

further suppose that all restraints on pleonexia are the119 466b.120 580c-588a.121 As Kraut points out, the first proof that justice is better does not rely on pleasure at all: see R. Kraut, ‘The Defense of Justice in Plato’s Republic’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R.Kraut (Cambridge, 1992), pp, 311-37, pp. 312-4. 122 359b-c, 360d.

50

result either of calculations regarding how best to

secure our overall advantage in some given circumstance

(say, when evading detection is impossible or

retaliation certain), or of having been duped by the

hypocritical praise that the city and its authorities

heap upon just conduct.123 These beliefs, Thrasymachus

and Glaucon suggest, are implicit in the behavior of

‘the many’, who (we are told) are ‘unwillingly just’124

because they believe that pleonexia is good (as a means

to greater pleasure),125 and are therefore willing to

commit injustice when they think they can get away with

it in order to serve their private advantage.126

Thrasymachus implies that ‘the many’ are in fact right

about the human good. To be somewhat anachronistic,

the case for injustice holds that the many are correct

in their desires but incorrect in their consciences,

because the latter have been formed by conventions that

are not what they seem.

123 344b-c, 360d.124 357c-358a.125 358e-359a, 359c.126 360c-d.

51

The initial plausibility of this position is

evident, insofar as it makes sense of the

contradictions—or at least the apparent contradictions—

which exist in common opinion, and it can at the same

time claim to expose the roots of those

contradictions.127 The superficiality of the position

becomes clear, however, when one starts to explore the

actual complexities of the human soul. Is all

resistance to appetite the result of either

calculations of personal advantage or folly? Are all

‘higher’ motives (of pride, of disinterested affection,

of fairness) simply conventional delusions? How could

praise and blame ever get such hold on our souls if by

nature our good were constituted solely by appetite?

Can Thrasymachus even account for his own blushing, or

his petulance?128 Can he account for the concerns that

that move people such as Glaucon and Adeimantus to ask

so much of justice? These questions could be

multiplied. The notion of the human soul implicit in

127 As Adeimantus does in his speech; see 362e-365a esp.128 350c-e, 351d, 352e, 354a.

52

the case for injustice would seem to explain away,

rather than genuinely explain, such phenomena.

None of this is to say that the case for injustice

is straightforwardly refuted by such considerations.

The point, which Socrates shows quite clearly, is that

the case for injustice simply has not accounted for them.

On the other hand, Socrates puts before us a wealth of

suggestions, arguments, and anecdotes which show to us

a rich variety of human souls and motivations, and thus

he demonstrates the need for us to find out how to

account for such remarkable diversity. Provisionally,

then, Socrates appears to speak about the human good

with greater authority than Thrasymachus and his ilk,

if only for the simple reason that Socrates evidently

has a better grasp of the complexity of the problem.

And, as is well known,129 not only Socrates’ speeches

but his very life speaks in favor of justice.130 He has

not, however, clearly shown us why this is his

preference and should be ours. We are left, then, with

129 358c-d, 367c-e.130 See Blössner, ‘City-Soul Analogy’, pp. 376-7 for more on this.

53

a provisionally true opinion in need of further

confirmation.

We see that readers of the Republic are being

exhorted to live justly and, at the same time, being

provoked (if we have been paying attention) to think

further about why we should. In this way, the rhetoric

of the Republic manages to be both protreptic and

philosophic. By ‘protreptic,’ I mean that the work

aims to move its audience to live a certain way and, in

support of this aim, is willing sacrifice precision for

the sake of persuading an audience made up largely of

individuals that would not necessarily be moved by or

even comprehend the most philosophically compelling

arguments.131 Socrates is, in fact, quite open about

131 ‘Protreptic discourse is not educational discourse as a whole and does not by itself bring about education in virtue. Rather, protreptic addresses the initial or preparatory stages of education. It aims to get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction, and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority’ (Yunis, ‘Protreptic Rhetoric’, p. 4). Thus, the Republic, though demandingat times (such as its discussion of the forms), seeks to address both specialists and non-specialists, and thus it makes ‘concession[s] to the nonspecialist reader’, as, for example, it its use of not entirely precise analogies (Yunis, ‘Protreptic Rhetoric’ p. 12). This approach to Plato’s rhetoric is echoed inFerrari, City and Soul, and Blössner, ‘City-Soul Analogy’, esp. pp. 375-81.

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the provisional character of his main premises and

their lack of precision;132 he is also quite open in

saying that at least one reason he withholds his own

opinion about the good is because Glaucon would not be

able to follow him.133 He even disclaims knowledge of

the good.134 Since the knowledge of the idea of the

good is said to be prior (in order of knowledge) to

that of the human soul and virtue (including justice),

we should not expect that a clear and fully cogent

argument would be given that conclusively proves the

superiority of (either kind of) justice. To do that,

we would have to follow the longer road of dialectic,135

a task that very few are capable of doing themselves.136

In short, we should not expect direct philosophic

argument in the Republic, or at least not a certain

decisive steps in it.

Despite the lack of demonstrative reasoning,

however, the Republic’s main argument is not mere 132 435c-d, 504a-c (esp.).133 506d-507a, 532d-533a.134 505a.135 435c-d, 504b-d, 511b-d, 519c-d.136 491a-b, 496a-b.

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rhetoric, devoid of philosophic significance. As I

hope I have also shown, there is no strong reason to

believe that Socrates’ exhortation to (common) justice

is disingenuous, even if his (and Plato’s) true reasons

are not given. Rather, I think it is best to read its

arguments as preparatory to philosophy.137 To recall,

the Republic does put the case for injustice before us

in lively detail and remarkable clarity. It is also

provides several suggestive arguments and observations

concerning the human soul that help us to assess the

cogency of that case. Thought of in this manner, the

account of the tripartite soul (however provisional138

and perhaps ultimately inadequate139) serves as a

provocation to think more deeply about the character of

the soul—which is necessary in order to arrive at a

sound account of the human good, which in turn is

necessary for a decisive answer to the brothers’

challenge. The Republic thus gives the potential 137 As Yunis says, protreptic rhetoric can foster not only moral motivation but philosophic motivation (‘Protreptic Rhetoric’, p. 4).138 535c-d.139 611a-612a.

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philosopher and also the thoughtful general reader

pointers for thinking through these problems, even as

it provides provisional conclusions by which to live

(‘be just!’) while one thinks them through.

Jonathan Culp140 University of

Dallas

140 An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 2013 annual convention of the Northeastern Political Science Association. I would like to thank Daniel Burns, Natalie Culp, Roslyn Weiss, and an anonymous reviewer at Polis for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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