HERMATHENA

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HermathenaA TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN REVIEW

No. 189 Winter 2010

UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN

C o n t e n t s

Ar t ic le s

Notes on contributors.

Introduction. John D illo n

O n the new approach to the chronology o f the Corpus Platonicum.Yury Anatolievich Shichalin

O n the position o f C rito in the Corpus Platonicum. Anastasia Zolotukhina

Concerning the date o f P lato’s Phaedrus. Anna Usacheva

Elenchus and Diairesis in P lato’s Sophist. Olga Alieva

Some Support from Computational Stylistics. H aro ld Tarrant

Review s

M . Scott. D elphi and Olympia: the Spatial Politics o f Panhellenism in the Archaic and Classical Periods. JULIA KINDT

John Ma, Nikolaos Papazarkadas, and Robert Parker (Eds.). Interpreting the Athenian Empire. Sa r a h B o l m a r c ic h

H yun Jin K im . Ethnicity and Foreigners in A ncient Greece and China. CARLA M . A n t ONACCIO

O. Taplin and R. Wyles (Eds.). The Pronomos Vase and its Context. TYLER JO SMITH

5

9

15

33

53

71

93

103

105

109

114

M ary P. Nichols. Socrates on Friendship and Community: Reflections on P lato’s Symposium, Phaedrus, and Lysis. WILLIAM D . DESMOND

O. Amitay. From Alexander to Jesus.H u g h B o w d e n

Stuart Lyons. M usic in the Odes o f Horace.T im o t h y J. M o o r e

Katharina Volk. M anilius and his Intellectual Background. EMMA Gee

Richard Hunter. C ritical M oments in Classical Literature: Studies in the A ncient View o f Literature and its Uses. LAWRENCE KlM

P. Liddel and A. Fear (Eds.). H istoriae M undi: Studies in Universal Historiography.K a t h e r in e C la r k e

Alan Bowman and Andrew Wilson (Eds.). Q uantifying the Roman Economy: M ethods and Problems. ALESSANDRO LAUNARO

Karelisa V. Hartigan. Performance and Cure: Dram a and H ealing in A ncient Greece and Contemporary America. MATTHEW DILLON

122

124

127

131

136

140

117

144

Introduction

by John D illo n

This collection o f essays is the fru it o f a very pleasant occasion that took place on Friday, M ay 11, 2012, consisting o f an all­day seminar in the Centre for the Study o f the Platonic T rad ition given by the distinguished Russian Platonist Prof. Yury Shichalin o f Moscow University and a group o f his students, all substantial scholars in the ir own right, on the subject o f the Platonic Corpus and our understanding o f its composition. The topic was a most stimulating and controversial one, and naturally excited considerable discussion, much o f it critical. The contribution o f this in troduction w ill be to reflect something o f that discussion, while endeavouring to give a sympathetic account o f the arguments o f the various papers.

First, however, some general reflections. An occasion such as this, airing as it does a series o f radical and provocative views from Prof. Schichalin and his colleagues, rouses one to a realization o f how litt le we really know about the composition o f the Platonic Corpus, the role o f the dialogues in the life o f the Academy, and the manner o f the ir production and ‘publication’ . T o take the last point first, are we to suppose, as G ilbert Ryle once suggested, rather whimsically, a long time ago,1 that Plato would launch a new dialogue by means o f a dramatized public reading, at a sort o f ‘m oot’ o f the Academy, w ith various members taking one part or another? I must say that I rather like this idea, to ta lly bereft o f evidence though it is, not least because o f the many successful efforts along the same lines carried out by our colleague David Horan, at his annual Plato Days. These dialogues were surely meant to be performed, or at least read out loud in a communal setting - though o f

1 Ryle 1966. There are, it must be said, many more implausible proposals than this in Ryle’s very speculative work, making the theses of Yury Shichalin seem positively moderate by comparison!

10 John Dillon

course they also repay repeated close reading as well.However, that is only one problem. Another is to determine

how Plato intended his dialogues to slot in to the ongoing activity o f the School. D id he view them as in some way authoritative, laying down guidelines for future investigation, or were they something more devious — ironic comments on ongoing debates and disputations, designed to provoke further argument? M y impression o f Plato and his strategies for managing the School persuade me to the latter alternative. Such later dialogues as the Parmenides, the Theaetetus or the Philebus seem to f it this role particularly well, but the case could be made, w ith varying degrees o f ingenuity, for practically all the dialogues. This postulation o f a role relates to one important thesis o f Yury Shichalin, that there are no ‘early’ dialogues that precede the foundation o f the Academy in 387, and that many o f those dialogues traditionally identified as such, as for instance the Hippiases, Ion, Euthyphro o r Crito, are later productions, in im ita tion o f Plato, by various members o f the School. This conclusion may well come as a shock to many, used to beginning their study o f Plato w ith the Euthyphro and Crito in particular, but it does us all good, I th ink, to re-examine our assumptions in this area.

This brings up a th ird problem, however: i f these dialogues were not composed by Plato, but yet they are not alleged to be pastiches concocted in a later age, what are we to say o f them? Here we are faced w ith a most intriguing possibility, for which I th ink there is no evidence whatsoever (except, perhaps, in the case o f the later Epinomis)·. it may have been a practice, in P lato’s later years, for members o f the Academy to compose short dialogues in the ‘Socratic’ mode developed by Plato in his earlier years, perhaps w ith the encouragement or even guidance o f the Master himself, and these ‘essays’ were then later incorporated in to the Platonic Corpus, whenever the first edition o f that was put together.

W hich brings me to the last problem which seems to raise its head in this connection: when was the Corpus first put

Introduction 11

together? Elsewhere, e.g. in The Heirs o f Plato,2 1 have expressed my inclination to accept the view o f the French scholar Henri A lline3 that this edition was put together in the O ld Academy under the direction o f Xenocrates (scholarch, 339-314 B.C.). This strikes me, as I say, as very probable, though it must be admitted that, like all the other resolutions o f problems that I have put forward here, it is unsupported by any evidence. In that case, at any rate, we must assume that a certain number o f dialogues not composed by Plato himself, but approved by him as raising useful questions and filling in gaps in his oeuvre, were included in the first edition o f his works w ithout a ttribu tion o f authorship, as reflecting his views accurately enough. This would apply, I suggest, to such works as the Hippias M ajor, Minos, Clitophon, or Alcibiades I, which I would regard as un- Platonic, as well as to the Epinomis, which Philip o f Opus may have been able to have included as representing what the aged Plato would have provided as a sort o f ‘cap’ to the Laws, i f time had not caught up w ith him .4 I f we are to accept the proposals o f Shichalin and his team, we would have to add to that list such works as the Hippias M inor, Ion, Euthyphro and Crito - -a proposal at which many may baulk, but for which I am here endeavouring to provide an enabling scenario.

W ith all these questions in mind, we may turn to survey briefly the various contributions to this collection. Prof. Shichalin leads o ff w ith a wide-ranging critique o f certain traditional assumptions about P lato’s intellectual progress and the composition o f his works. H is first thesis, which I must say I find quite plausible, is that we should not imagine the young Plato composing ‘Socratic’ dialogues before the establishment o f the Academy in the mid-380s. For whom would he have composed such dialogues? Adm ittedly, we do not know the chronology o f the dialogues composed by other followers o f Socrates, such as Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines o f Sphettus,

2 Dillon 2002, 1,54.3Alline 1915.4 Philip had the advantage o f having been his secretary in his latest period, and so

could appeal to oral communications which he could claim to have transcribed.

12 John Dillon

or Phaedo, but it is fairly certain that Plato did not invent the genre; he merely raised it to its highest level. Shichalin’s suggestion is that Plato first composed the Apology, in response to Polycrates’ attack, and then such works as the Menexenus, and perhaps an early form o f the Phaedrus or the Gorgias, leading in to a series o f ‘ frame-dialogues’, in the 380s and ’70s, culm inating in the Republic (I am interested that he not does here postulate a separate Thrasymachus). I like in particular the concept o f the Charmides leading up to the Republic, laying down an aporia about sophrosyne that is resolved in the latter dialogue.

I find his observations about the presentation o f an amorous Socrates, descriptions o f blushing, abandonment o f frame- dialogues, and the interaction between Aristotle ’s works such as the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi w ith what he terms the ‘school’ dialogues composed by Plato’s pupils, all most stimulating and thought-provoking, w ithou t necessarily being absolutely convinced at all points - but that is not, I th ink, to be expected in the present context; it is enough to have one’s assumptions challenged.

Turn ing next to Anna Usacheva’s fine study o f the Phaedrus, I find myself largely in agreement w ith her analysis. Plato does manage to make the dialogue into a unified whole, but it has to be admitted that it creaks at the seams, and the whole latter part on rhetoric is redolent o f a later period than the in itia l series o f speeches on love. She accepts the palinode, w ith the myth, as part o f the original version, but would like to relegate the defin ition o f the soul at 245c to the later revision, and I th ink I would accept that. She also sees the particular use o f homoiotes, and the diairesis o f mania, as proper to the later version, and that seems entirely reasonable. W hat I presume that we must postulate is either an unfinished sketch for a dialogue, or a short early dialogue ending aporetically, which Plato took up again at a later stage o f his development, and recast in to an exploration o f the nature o f rhetoric. There is certainly nothing impossible about such a supposition.

Th ird ly , we have a most penetrating study by Anastasia

Introduction 13

Zolotukh ina on the Crito. She presents a close analysis o f the literary features o f this short dialogue, pointing to the numerous ‘echoes’ o f other works such as the Phaedo, and to its references to former arguments. She also draws attention to the rather peculiar presentation o f the character o f Socrates, and his new­found loyalty to the Laws o f Athens, as opposed to his service to the God (sc. Apollo), and indeed to his own conscience, as set out in the Apology. She concludes that the C rito is not only relatively late (in the v ic in ity o f the Laws), but also not by Plato. One could certainly demur at her interpretation o f the literary echoes (many could be seen as relatively natural), but cumulatively she makes an impressive case. A ll I can say is that her paper drove me to read over the C rito w ith her criticisms in mind, and I must confess that it now strikes me as in many respects odd.

Lastly, we have a fine study by Olga Alieva on the Sophist. This does not in itse lf require us to revise our view o f either its authorship, or o f where it fits in the development o f P lato’s work, but it raises the im portant question o f the status to be accorded to the method o f elenchus in the dialogue, and in P lato’s later philosophy generally, calling attention to the significance o f Aristotelian evidence from the Sophistici Elenchi, and showing how attention to this enriches our understanding o f the dialogue.

As an appendix to this sequence o f papers, I have been most fortunate in persuading our friend and colleague H aro ld Tarrant (who paid a most welcome visit to the Platonic Centre himself back in the autumn o f 2011) to comment briefly on the papers from the perspective o f his own researches on the stylometry o f the Platonic corpus, from which he has been drawing many conclusions which intersect most interestingly w ith the theses o f our Russian colleagues. H is contribution, I th ink, forms a most helpful coda to this collection, particularly in relation to Anna Usacheva’s discussion o f the Phaedrus.

J o h n D il l o n T rinity College, Dublin

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s

by Olga Alieva

The well-known sixth defin ition o f the sophist in the homonymous dialogue contains a discussion o f the elenchus (230b4-e3) which is often referred to as a manifestation o f the late P lato’s attitude towards this method o f argumentation. I t is generally assumed that the defin ition o f the sophist ‘o f noble lineage’ given here should be applied to Socrates as represented in earlier Platonic dialogues.1 Since the elenchus is associated mainly w ith Socrates, little , i f any, attention is paid to the elenchus in the Sophist itself. This is only partly due to the fact that Socrates is not a leading character in the dialogue; more significantly, ever since Robinson the elenchus has been believed to be an essential prelim inary - but a prelim inary only - to the constructive search for knowledge.2 The Sophist, on the contrary, pursues a rather positive task o f defining the sophist and, moreover, seems to complete this task successfully - not by means o f the elenchus, but by means o f diairesis.

The scope o f this paper is to demonstrate that the mention o f the elenchus at 230b4-e3 is not merely retrospective, and to draw attention to the elenctic dimension o f the whole dialogue. This, in its turn, enables us to reconsider also the method o f diairesis and its methodological potential. This potential has been repeatedly doubted, and, indeed, scholars are justified in asking why Plato ‘sandwiched’ a piece o f ‘sophisticated

1 Cornford 1935, 177; Vlastos 1991, 23; Notomi 1999, 64-5. Duelinger (2005, 17) takes a different stance.

2 Robinson 1953, 12-13. Cf. (Kahn 1996, 99): ‘In the Sophist the Socratic elenchus is described as a noble cathartic art, the first stage o f education. [...] Plato recognizes the negative elenchus as a necessary preliminary, preparing but not constituting the constructive search for knowledge.’ We cannot discuss here Vlatos’s interpretation o f the elenchus, according to which this method is not merely cathartic, but rather is a ‘truth-seeking device’. See: Vlastos 1991, 114-15- For criticism of Vlastos see, e.g: Benson 1995, 45-112 and 2004, 101-13; Penner 2007, 3-19 etc.

72 Olga Alieva

philosophical reasoning’ between kind-ladders reminiscent o f Linnaeus’ ‘contribution to botany’ .3 This question is all the more intriguing because Plato identifies diairesis w ith philosophy (253d: κ α τά γένη διαιρεΤσθαι) while dwelling on being and non-being, not while constructing definitional kind- ladders.

In the first section o f this essay we w ill see how the problem o f the elenchus is introduced in the dialogue, and point out some parallels w ith A risto tle ’s Sophistical Refutations. Both Plato and Aristotle consider the possibility o f apparent refutations which reveal pseudo-contradictions. In the dialogue, the apparent elenchus is instantiated w ith the falsehood paradox, to which the second section o f our paper is dedicated. To solve an aporia created by an apparent refutation one must eliminate ambiguity and homonymy by making distinctions, i.e. recur to the diairesis. This move, suggested by the Sophistical Refutations o f Aristotle, is discussed in the section 3 o f this essay. Finally, we highlight some o f the distinctions made by the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus in the dialogue in order to refute their opponents and to solve the falsehood paradox, as well as some puzzles about (non-)being.

1. ‘God of refutation’

A t the beginning o f the dialogue Theodorus introduces to Socrates the Stranger from Elea, recommending h im as ‘a man proficient in philosophy’4 (216a4). This characteristic makes Socrates suppose that the Stranger is θεός ελεγκτικός , a god o f refutation (2 l6b5-6 ). Theodorus associates the adjective ελεγκτ ικός w ith ‘those who zealously practice eristic’ (2 l6b8 : περι τά ς έριδας έσ π ουδακότω ν). This confusion shouldn’t be attributed only to Theodorus’ naivety: what we have here is a first formulation o f the problem which is specified further in Socrates’ question (217a7-8): whether the people in Elea th ink

3 Ryle 1966, 136-9.4 Hereinafter the translation is that o f Duerlinger (2005), unless specified

otherwise.

that sophists, philosophers and politicians ‘are [reducible to] one or two, or d id they, since there are three names (τά όυόμ ατα ), distinguish three kinds (τρ ία ... τ ά γένη δ ια ιρούμενοι) and attach a name to each individually according to its k ind .’ The relation between ο νό μ α τα and γένη , expected to be clarified by means o f division (δ ια ιρούμενο ι), is in the focus o f the subsequent discussion, as is obvious from the Stranger’s remark at 218c4-5: ‘ [ I ] t is always and in every case necessary to agree about the thing itse lf (τό π ρ ά γμ α ) by giving accounts (δ ιά λ ό γ ω ν ) rather than to agree only about a name w ithou t any account (ή το ΐίν ο μ α μόνον ... χω ρ ίς λ ό γ ο υ ).’5 The required ‘thing’ , or π ρ ά γμ α , is the answer to the ‘W hat is?’ question6 analogous to those we find in earlier dialogues where definitions o f various moral concepts are sought for. I t is assumed on default that this π ρ ά γμ α is a γένος7 and that this γένος is a branch o f τέχνη - ‘despite the well-known denial o f this in the famous Gorgias passage (462-3)’, as L. Brown justly observes.8 I t is beyond the scope o f this paper to assess the va lid ity o f the definitions o f the sophist given in the dialogue; what matters here is that όνομα ‘sophist’ turns out to refer to various π ρ ά γ μ α τα , and therefore the task o f defining the sophist overlaps, i f not fu lly coincides, w ith distinguishing different meanings o f the word ‘sophist’. A parallel w ith the Phaedrus (237c sqq) seems opportune here, for in the latter dialogue the search for the defin ition o f love is inseparably linked w ith disambiguation. As J. A ckrill puts it, ‘neither Plato nor Aristotle is absolutely clear about the difference between distinguishing types o f X and distinguishing senses o f ‘X ’ [ . .. ] [b ]u t either activity can be philosophically rewarding; and i t is

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 73

5 Cf: Soph. 221b: ‘[N]ot only have you and I now agreed about the name (οΰ μόνον τοΰνομα) o f the angling art, but also we have an adequate grasp of the account of its very function (περι αύτό τούργον).’

6 Plato, Soph. 217b3: διορίσασθαι σαφώς τ ί ποτ' έ'στιν; 218c7: τ ί ττοτ' έ'στιν.

7 Plato, Soph. 218d4: τό τού σοφιστοΟ γένος; 223c4: έτερον είναι τ ι γένος; 224c7: τό σοφιστικόν γένος; 226al: τό χρηματιστικόν γένος.

8 Brown 2010, 164.

74 Olga Alieva

d ifficu lt to deny that Platonic division concerns itse lf w ith such activities.’9

One o f the definitions o f the sophistic art includes a description o f the elenctic method on which we should linger here. The sophists o f ‘noble lineage’ th ink that all ignorance is involuntary, so they recur to the follow ing procedure:

Soph. 230b4-8: They ask questions about things about which someone thinks he is saying something when he is saying nothing (λέγω υ μηδέν). Then they easily assess the beliefs o f those in error, gather them in their arguments in to the same place, set them beside one another, and then having done this, they demonstrate that the beliefs are contrary (εναντίας) to one another at the same time, concerning the same things, and in the same way (περι τώ ν α ύ τώ ν προς τ ά α ύ τά κ α τά τα ύ τά ).

Thus they remove the beliefs that impede learning (230d). Two characteristics o f the elenchus should be emphasized here. Firstly, it reveals ‘contrary’, i.e. contradictory, beliefs; secondly, the contradiction must be genuine and concern ‘the same things, and in the same way’ . This reservation is paralleled in the Sophistical Refutations o f Aristotle, where the genuine elenchus is defined as follows:10

Sopb. E l. 167a23-27: ‘ [RJefutation is a contradiction o f one and the same predicate (άντίφ ασ ις το ύ α ύ το ΰ κα ι ένός), not o f a name but o f a th ing (μή ονόματος ά λ λ α π ρ ά γμ α το ς), and not o f a synonymous name but o f an identical name, based on the given premises and follow ing necessarily from them (the original po in t at issue not being included) in the same respect, relation, manner and tim e’ (κα τά τ α ύ τ ό κα ί προς τ α ύ τ ό κα ί ω σ α ύ τω ς κα ι έν τ φ α ύ τ φ xpovcp).

Aristotle ’s indication that elenchus is a contradiction ‘not o f a name but o f a thing’ means that homonymy should be avoided in refutations.11 This echoes Plato’s reservation that

9 Ackrill 1997 [1970], 105. Cf: Brown 2010, 154.10 Translation: Forster and Furley 1955.11 Dorion 1995, 239.

contradictions must concern same things (περ'ι τώ υ α υ τώ ν). Besides, in compliance w ith the Sophist Aristotle specifies that contradictions must be κ α τά τ α ύ τ ό κα'ι προς τα ύ τό . A risto tle ’s defin ition o f the elenchus thus implies the necessity to avoid amphiboly and homonymy.12 A refutation that fails to meet these requirements is, therefore, an apparent one. Such refutation we find in the Sophist.

2. Apparent refutation

After the interlocutors have agreed that the sophist appears as ‘having a k ind o f reputed knowledge o f everything but not having the tru th ’ (2 3 3 c l0 - l l) , the Stranger attacks this defin ition on behalf o f the virtual sophist arguing that i t is impossible to utter or to believe falsehood. The falsehood paradox13 (236d9-237b2) turns out to be the first refutation in the dialogue - and, as we w ill see, an apparent one.

Soph. 236d9-237a9: M y dear friend, we really are engaging in a very d ifficu lt enquiry. For this appearing to be and seeming to be, w ithout being, and saying things, but things not true (τό λέγε ιν μέν ά τ τ α , άληθή δέ μή), all such things have always been and still are utterly perplexing (μεστά άπορίας). For it is very d ifficu lt [ . . . ] to see how a person can say or believe that there really are falsehoods (ψευδή λέγε ιν ή δοξάζειν) w ithout being caught up in a statement contrary to itself (ε ν α ν τ ιο λ ο γ ία ). [ . . . ] This statement is based on the daring hypothesis that a non-being is a being (τό μή δν είνα ι), since in no other way would a falsehood become a being (ψεΰδοξ γ ά ρ ούκ αν ά λλω ς έγ ίγ ν ε το δν). W hen we were children, my boy, Parmenides the Great began to object to this [hypothesis] and continued to do so to the end o f his life both in prose and in verse:

‘Never let i t prevail that non-beings are beings.In pursuit o f the tru th keep your thought from this path.’

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 75

12 Schreiber 2003, 88 and passim.13 A version o f this paradox can be found in the Euthydemus (283e). On different

interpretations o f the paradox see: Crivelli 2012, 30.

76 Olga Alieva

The connection between falsehood and non-being is reiterated further: ‘Then you say that false belief is belief that non-beings are beings (240d9: τ ά μή ό ν τα δοξάζε ιν τη ν ψευδή δόξαν)?’ the Stranger says. This defin ition is then divided in to two: ‘And a statement [ . . . ] w ill also be considered false i f it states that non-beings are beings or that beings are non-beings (2 4 la l: τ ά τε ό ν τα λ έγ ω ν μή ε ίνα ι κα ι τ ά μή ό ν τα ε ίνα ι).’ This defin ition o f falsehood involves contradiction (εν α ν τ ιο λ ο γ ία )14 for, according to Parmenides, only being is.

A variation on the Eleatic theme is found at 237c-e. The paradox unfolds in two steps. F irst step, (a) The name ‘non- being’ (237c2: τοϋνομ ' ... το ύ το , τ ό μή όν) cannot be applied (έπιφέρειν) to any being (237c7: τ ω ν ό ν τω ν έπί < τ ι> ). (b) The name ‘something’ always refers to a being (237d l-2 : τ ό ‘τ ι ’ τ ο ύ τ ο [ρήμα] επ' ό ν τ ι λέγομεν). (c) Ergo, the name ‘non- being’ is not applicable to any something (2 3 7c l0 :15 ούδ' έπ'ι τ ό τ ι) . Second step, (c) the name ‘non-being’ is not applicable to any something6. (d) He who speaks o f something must be speaking o f something that is one (237d6-7: ά νά γκη τό ν τ ι λ έ γ ο ν τα εν γ έ τ ι λέγε ιν ). (f) Ergo, he who speaks o f non­something is speaking o f non-one (237e2: μηδέν). The impossibility o f falsehood is deduced from this argument:17

Soph. 237e4-6: [S]hould we not say that he who tries to speak o f a non-being (μή δν φθέγγεσθα ι) does not speak at all (ουδέ λέγειν)?

I t now becomes clear why any defin ition o f the sophist involving

14 An apparent one, as we’ll see later.15 The Stranger first puts forth the conclusion, thus causing Theaetetus’

confusion (237812: Πώς δή;) and only then the second premise.16 The conclusion of the first step of the argument is used as the first premise of

the second step.17 Duerlinger (2005, 139) observes: ‘The translation of this sentence is painfully

literal, and doesn’t represent how it would, in other contexts, be translated, which is “He who speaks o f non-something is speaking o f nothing at all.” The literal translation o f meden as “non-one” is made necessary by the previous statement in the argument that what is something is what is one, so that here, by placing “non” before “something,” the placing o f “non” before “one” is justified.’

the notion o f falsehood is self-contradictory and u tterly perplexing.18 The interlocutors have faced the aporia which they are to solve by disambiguating the terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being’. In doing so, they also secure the sophist o f noble lineage, for according to the description o f the elenchus cited above, the noble sophists refute those who th ink they are saying something whereas they are saying nothing (230b5: λ έγ ω ν μηδέν). I f ‘saying nothing’ is impossible, there can be no elenchus at all.

3. Aporia and diairesis

Shrewd arguments, Aristotle says, cause most embarrassment (άπ ορεϊν ποιεΤ μ ά λ ισ τα ).19 ‘Embarrassment is o f two kinds. In a reasoned discussion (έν το ϊς σ υλλελογ ισμένο ις) one is in doubt which o f the questions one should subvert (άνέλη), whereas in contentious arguments (έν το ϊς έριστικοΤς) it is about the way in which one is to express the proposition (πώς ει'πη τ ις τ ο π ροτα θέν)’ (182b32-35). I t is not always easy to tell ‘whether refutation takes place or no t’ (182b30-31: π ότερον έ'λεγχος ή ούκ ελεγχος), i.e. whether an argument is a reasoned or a contentious one, or whether the elenchus is a genuine or an apparent one.

Aristotle illustrates this thought w ith the example o f Parmenides. Though fallacies due to equivocation (έν τοΤς π αρά τη ν ομω νυμ ίαν) are generally regarded as the stupidest form o f fallacy (1 8 2 b l3 -l4 ), he says, some o f the ambiguities even the most expert foil to discern:

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 77

18 Cf. εναντιολογία and μεστά άπορία$ above, Soph. 236d9-237a9.19 The notion o f falsehood in the Sophist is analyzed in terms of propositional

logic, which brings to mind Aristotle’s Organon. Although the dating of Plato’s and Aristotle’s texts is rather problematical, we can assert with some confidence that at the time the Sophist was written the discussion concerning the dialectical method(s) was underway in the Academy. On chronology see TheslefF 1982, 193-8.

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Soph. El. (185b22-27): A p roo f o f this is that people often dispute about the terms used (περί τω ν ο νο μ ά τω ν), for example, whether “ Being” and “ U n ity ” always mean the same th ing or something different (π ότερον τ α ύ τ ό σημαίνει κ α τά π ά ν τω ν τ ό δν κα'ι τ ό εν); fo r some people hold that “ Being” and “ U n ity ” are identical in meaning, while others solve the argument o f Zeno and Parmenides by saying that “ U n ity ” and “ Being” are used in several senses (τό π ο λλα χ ώ ξ φ άνα ι τ ό εν λέγεσθα ι κα ι τ ό δν).20

As is evident from this passage, Aristotle takes Parmenides’ argument to be eristic - and, indeed, elsewhere he states it explicitly.21

Dealing w ith eristic arguments, Aristotle says that the shrewdest o f them are those which make it uncertain ‘whether the reasoning is conclusive or not (άδηλος π άτερου σ υ λ λ ελ ό γ ισ τα ι ή ου), and also whether the solution is due to a false premiss or a distinction (δ ια ίρεσ ίν) (183a7-9). He mentions diairesis as a means to solve aporiai throughout the Sophistical Refutations?1 Thus, in chapter 17 he claims:

Soph. El. 175a36-175b3: [ I ] f refutation is unequivocal contradiction (άντίφ ασ ις) based on certain premisses, there can be no necessity to make distinctions against ambiguity and equivocation (δ ια ιρεΐσθαι προς ά μφ ίβολα κα'ι τη ν ομω νυμίαν); for they do not make up the proof. But the only other reason fo r making further distinctions (π ροσδια ιρετέον) is because the conclusion looks like a refutation (έλεγχοειδές). One must, therefore, beware not o f being refuted (τό έλεγχθήνα ι) but o f appearing to be so, since the asking o f ambiguities and questions involving equivocation (ά μφ ίβολα καί τ ά π αρά τη ν ομω νυμίαν) and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even a genuine refutation (το ν άληθ ινόν ελ εγχ ο ν άφανίζει) and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not (τό ν έλεγχόμενον

20 ‘That this dispute over the ambiguity o f “being” and “one” took some o f its impetus from the Parmenides and the Sophist can hardly be doubted’, Owen (1960, 165) believes.

21 Arist. Phys. I, 2 (185a8) and I, 3 (186a6).22 The diairesis mentioned here must be distinguished from the fallacy described

in chapter 4. The verb διαιρέω and its derivates are used in the Sophistical Refutations to refer to a specific type o f fallacy due to enunciation (166a33), to Aristotle’s taxonomy o f fallacies (168a 17), and to the distinctions against ambiguity and equivocation (175a37).

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 79

κα ί μή έλεγχόμενον ά δηλον ποιεί).

Likewise, in chapter 18 he says that ‘one solves (λύειν) the correctly reasoned arguments (τω ν λ ό γ ω ν τους μέν συλλελογ ισμένους) by demolishing (ά νελόντα ) them, the apparent reasonings (τους δέ φαινομένους) by making distinctions (δ ιελ ό ν τα ).’

Let us now see how Aristotle himself solves Parmenides’ argument in the first book o f his Physics.23 A risto tle ’s criticism o f Parmenides runs as follows.24 (I) Parmenides erroneously assumes that ‘being’ has one meaning. However, ‘being’ is used in many senses (185a21: π ο λ λ α χ ώ ς λ έ γ ε τα ι τ ό ov), so one must distinguish between different meanings o f ‘being’ (185a22: πώς λέγουσ ιν ),25 which may refer to substance (185a23: ουσ ίαν), quality or quantity (185a23: ή π οσά ή π ο ιά ). Ergo, there w ill be many beings that differ from one another (185b3-5).

(II) Another o f Aristotle ’s objections to Parmenides in the Physics is that even i f we take ‘being’ as having one meaning, the argument is badly reasoned (186a24: ού συμπ εραίνετα ι). I t fails both in case we assume being (II. 1), as Ross puts it, ‘to be an attribute belonging to something that has a distinct substantial nature o f its own’, or (II. 2) ‘to be the substantial nature o f that which is.’26

The first argument fails because (II. 1. 1) ‘ [t] he fact that ‘w hite ’ has but one meaning (σ ημα ίνοντος εν το υ λευκοΰ) doesn’t prevent [the things that are white] being many (π ο λλά τ ά λευκά )’ (186a26-7). The d istinction implied here is that between a universal and particulars that instantiate it: ‘for to be

23 Dorion (1995, 403) points to an important parallel between the Sophistical Refutations and the Physics. During (1968, 213) also notes multiple points o f contact between the two texts. The first book o f the Physics is generally agreed to be one of the earliest o f Aristotle’s writings (During 1968, 232).

24 Translation and commentary: Ross 1936.25 Cf. above Soph. El. 182b35: ττώς εϊπη. In both cases the expression marks the

necessity to διελεΐν different meanings.26 Ross 1936,473.

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the colour white and to be that which has the colour are not the same’ (186a28-29: ά λ λ ο y a p εσ τα ι τ ό ε ίνα ι λ ευ κφ κα'ι τ φ δεδεγμένω ). The confusion is caused by a particular sort o f homonymy which is due to the power o f universals to apply to many particulars.27 The second objection to this argument is that (II. 1. 2) i f ‘being’ signifies one thing and is an accident then ‘what it is an accident o f (φ συμβεβηκε) w ill not be; so that there w ill be something that is not’ (186a34-bl; Ross’ italics), which is nonsense.

N or can we consider being in manner (II. 2), i.e. as substance, because (II. 2.1) all attributes o f being-as-such (δπερ δν) w ill be non-being, and characterized by them it ‘w ill not be being anymore than not-being’ ( τ ί μ ά λλο ν τ ό δπερ δν σημαίνει τ ό δν ή μή δν) (1 8 6 b 3 -ll) . (II. 2. 2) I f to avoid this we suppose that its attributes are being-as-such, then it w ill appear that the name ‘being’ signifies (σημαίνει) more than one th ing (186b 11-12).

Hereby, the question o f the un ity o f being turns out to be closely connected to the semantics o f ‘being’, to the search for its peculiar π ρ ά γμ α (τα ). Considering ex hypothesi various options, Aristotle rejects them one after another as entailing contradictions, and refutes Parmenides. A similar sort o f semantic diairesis we find also in the Sophist.2* In what follows next we’ll endeavor to show that the relation between δνομα and π ρ ά γμ α is a key m o tif in the Sophist and that its relevance is not lim ited to the outer part o f the dialogue.

4. Elenchus and diairesis

W e left the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus at the moment when the virtual sophist caught them up in a contradiction which can be roughly summarized as follows: falsehood has to

27 Schreiber 2003, 17.28 O f course, Aristotle’s terminology is not applicable to Plato who nowhere

speaks o f ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ as two different meanings o f ‘being’. However, one distinction is clear throughout the Sophist, namely that o f being as a form and being as whatever participates in this form.

do w ith non-being; non-being is not; hence, falsehood is impossible. T o solve the aporia and to go on w ith defining the sophist the interlocutors must proceed to the disambiguation o f ‘non-being’, but first, they have to understand what i t is which is being negated in ‘non-being’ .

The enquiry in to the meaning o f ‘being’ opens w ith the argument against the pluralists. Addressing those who say that all things are hot and cold, the Stranger asks:29

Soph. 243d8-e6: W hat on earth is this thing you are expressing about both, when you say that both o f them and each are (λέγοντες άμφω κα'ι έκάτερου είναι)? W hat shall we take this being o f yours to be (τ ί τ ό ε ίνα ι τοΟ το ύπ ολάβω μευ ύμών)? Is it a th ird th ing besides those two, and should we assume that in your view the tota lity o f things is three and not two?

The im plication here is that ε ίνα ι predicated both o f the hot and o f the cold must refer to some ‘thing’ (τ ί) . This ‘th ing’ should not necessarily be understood in terms o f Plato’s theory o f Forms, but what does it denote, then? This question, though left unanswered so far, is per se crucial for the following discussion o f being: is there some ‘thing’ (τ ί), some π ρ ά γμα , signified by ‘being’? Thus formulated, the problem leads the pluralists to an impasse: they can neither admit a th ird ‘th ing’ along w ith the other two (243e2-4), nor identify ‘being’ w ith either o f them (243e4-6), for in this case the other w ill be non- being.30 The th ird option put forward by the Stranger is also rejected: being cannot be identical w ith both (243e8-244al), for then the two w ill be identical and, s trictly speaking, one. So when the Stranger asks the pluralists to make it clear what it is they want to signify (σημαίνειν) when they speak o f being (244a5), they have no answer at all: they do not want to signify any particular ‘thing’ but just adhere to conventions o f ordinary language.

The search for the π ρ ά γμ α o f ‘being’ continues in the

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 81

29 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 73.30 For analysis see: Crivelli 2012, 73.

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argument against the monists. Their theory also proves to be contradictory:

Soph. 244b9-c2: Let them answer the question [. . . ] : ‘Yousomehow say that only one is? (Έ ν πού φ α τε μόνον ε ίνα ι;)’- ‘We surely say that’ [ . . . ] . ‘And you call something “being” (Τ ί δε; όν κ α λε ΐτέ τι;)? - Yes. - ‘Is i t the very th ing you call “ one” , by using two names fo r the same thing, or what? (Π ότερον όπερ εν, έπϊ τ φ α ύ τ φ π ροσχρώ μενοι δυο ΐν όνόμασιν, ή πώ ς;)’.31

Here, ε ίνα ι is predicated o f the ‘one’ : ‘only one is’ . A t first sight, there are no logical problems w ith this assertion, though i t ’s hardly consistent w ith our everyday experience. But when the Stranger makes the second move and forms the participle ov (‘being’), i t immediately becomes evident that there are at least two things which are the one and the being - but, o f course, the monists would never consent to it. So they are forced to admit that ‘one’ and ‘being’ stand for one and the same thing. H ow , this taken for granted, can ‘being’ be predicated o f ‘one’ - and how, generally speaking, can there be two names i f ‘only one is’ (244c8-9)? W h a t’s more, ‘even to accept someone’s statement that there is a name (ώς εσ τιν όνομά τ ι) is unreasonable’ ,because ‘by positing the name as different from the object(τουνομ α το ΰ π ρ ά γμ α το ς ετερον), one somehow speaks o f two things’ (244c 1 l-d 4 ).32 This playful argument reveals contradictions inherent in ordinary language and makes the interlocutors conscious o f the discursive reality, o f the όνομα- π ρ ά γμ α relationship. Good for them, but still, they are as far from ‘being’ as at the beginning o f the dialogue.

For the disambiguation o f ‘ (non-)being’ and, thereby, the (genuine) elenchus to take place, another move needs to be undertaken. I t would be far too daring for a mortal to intervene in the battle o f gods and giants, but i t ’s not a coincidence that the Stranger was called a ‘god o f refutation’ . I t is in this battle

31 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 78.32 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 78.

that his divine power manifests itself. The aim o f this argument, as V. Politis puts it, is ‘to put an end to this ceaseless and bloody battle by arguing first, against the materialists, that changeless things are real also, and then, against the friends o f the forms, that changing things are real also.’33 The Stranger’s attempt to overcome the underlying discrepancy between the materialists and the friends o f the forms brings him, once again, to an impasse (249d l0 : τη ν άπορίαυ):

Soph. 249cl0-d3: [T]he philosopher [ . .. ] must, as i t seems, absolutely not agree w ith those who say that the stable tota lity o f things (τό παν έστηκός) is one or the many kinds, nor listen at all to those who change being (π α ντα χή τ ό δν κ ινούντω ν) in all ways, but, as w ith the prayer o f children, say that being and the tota lity o f things (τό δν τε κα ι τ ό παν) are both together, all changeless things and all changing things (όσα ά κ ίνη τα κα ί κεκινημένα).34

Again, Theaetetus doesn’t realize the d ifficu lty they faced (249el): i t seems perfectly natural to admit that being and the to ta lity o f things include changeless and changing things. The aporia only becomes clear when the Stranger draws a parallel w ith the argument against the pluralists (250al-2): in saying that both change and stability are we divine ‘a th ird thing’ (250b7, 250c l: τ ρ ίτ ο ν τ ι) along w ith the other two which w ill be, paradoxically, ‘neither at m otion nor at rest’ (250c6-7: ουτε εστηκεν ουτε κ ιν ε ίτα ι) . So, the Stranger summarizes, ‘being and non-being are equally d ifficu lt for us’ (250e6-7: έξ ’ίσου τ ό τε ον κα ί τ ό μή όν άπ ορ ίας μ ετε ιλήφ α τον).

This puzzle, Crivelli justly observes, springs from ‘a fallacious slip from the claim that the k ind being is neither stable nor changing in that neither stability nor change constitutes its nature to the claim that the k ind being is neither stable nor changing in that i t instantiates neither stability nor change.’35 T o guard against this fallacy, the Stanger must attack

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 83

33 Politis 2006, 155.34 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 92.35 Crivelli 2012, 109.

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the late-learners who ‘enjoy not allowing us to call a man good, but the good good and the man a man’ (251b8-c2).36 Hereby he defends the possibility o f ordinary predication statements along w ith identity statements,37 or, to put it differently, the possibility to attribute things to each other: to call a man good or being stable. Thereafter, he proceeds to what might be called an ontological justification o f this claim, namely to the defense o f the communion (251e8: κο ινω νία ) ofkinds.

Equipped w ith this (onto)logical communion-apparatus, the interlocutors return to the puzzle about being, change and stability - and find out that ‘each o f these three is other than the other two (τοΓν μέν δυο ίν ετερόν έστιν) and the same as itse lf (α υ τό δ' έα υ τω τα ύ τό ν ) (254d l4-15). Having then included the same and the different as two more kinds in to their enquiry, the Stranger and Theaetetus observe that these two kinds, unlike the other three, cannot be spoken (λέγεσθαι) by themselves (καθ' α υ τά ), but always in relation to others (προς ά λ λ α ) ’ (255cl2-13). This ability o f language to represent different relations between things may sometimes be misleading, as is evident from the set o f apparent contradictions concerning change set forth at 255el0-256d9.38 Thus, the statements ‘change is not the same’ (256a5) and ‘change is the same’ (256a7) might seem contradictory though they are not: change is not the same by virtue o f being different from the kind sameness (257a3); change is the same by virtue o f partaking (δ ιά τ ό μετεχειν) in sameness in relation to itse lf (256a7). O n the logical level, the statements o f the first k ind assert (lack of) identity, whereas the statements o f the second kind simply

36 Crivelli 2012, 109.37 Definitional statements according to another interpretation. Cf: ‘ [T]o refute

the late-learners Plato should draw a distinction between predications whereby the predicate-expression is taken to provide a full description of the nature or essence of the item signified by the subject-expression, on the one hand, and predications whereby what is said is simply that the item signified by the subject-expression instantiates the kind signified by the predicate-expression, on the other’ (Crivelli 2012, 108-9).

38 On the whole, I accept L. Brown’s interpretation o f this section. See Brown 2008.

Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist 85

predicate one thing o f another (change partakes in sameness). The Stranger himself speaks o f the ambiguity:

Soph. 256al0-b4: [W ]e must agree w ithout dissent that indeed m otion39 is both the same and a non-the same (τα ύ τό υ τ ' ε ιυα ι καί μή τα ύ τό ν ). For when we say this, we have not spoken o f the same and non-the same in the same way (ού γ ά ρ ... ομοίω ς είρήκαμεν). For we say that it is the same because it partakes o f the same in relation to itself (δ ιά τήυ μέθεξιυ τα ύ το ΰ προς έαυτήν), and that i t is a non-the same because o f its combination w ith the other (διά τή υ κο ινω ν ία ν αύ θατέρου), because o f which, since it is separate from the same, it does not become that but other, w ith the consequence that i t is also correct to say that i t is a non-the same.

Plato’s d istinction o f two types o f statements (ού y a p ομοίω ς είρήκαμεν) parallels A risto tle ’s advice to distinguish different ways in which a proposition can be expressed (cf. above: πώς εϊπη τ ις τ ό προταθέν; πώς λέγουσ ιν ) in order to guard against apparent refutation. This also echoes the defin ition o f the elenchus at 230b4-8: the contradictions revealed in the course o f refutation must concern the same things, in the same way and in respect to the same things (περ'ι τ ώ ν α ϋ τώ ν πρός τ ά α υ τά κ α τά τα ύ τά ) .

Now, to what extent this d istinction is useful for solving the aporia concerning non-being? Tw o types o f non-being (we’ll label them here as non-being I and non-being II), corresponding to the two types o f relations between kinds (καθ' α ύ τά / πρός ά λ λ α ) or, on the logical level, the two types o f statements, are discovered in the course o f the subsequent enquiry (given that the absolute non-being has been discarded long ago, 258e8). The non-being / found by the interlocutors is that o f the phrase ‘change is not being’ (256d8-9: κίνησις ό ντω ς ούκ όν έστι). Change is a non-being by virtue o f being different from the kind being and, hence, lacking identity w ith the k ind being.40 This non-being is, indeed, a partial solution to the falsehood paradox.

39 Or ‘change’.40 O ’Brien 2011,211.

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According to the defin ition o f falsehood discussed earlier, false discourse says that non-beings are beings or that beings are non­beings (2 4 la l) . W ith the non-being / the false discourse amounts to false (lack of) identity assertions concerning the k ind being.

Obviously enough, false discourse is not lim ited to (lack of) identity statements, especially i f only the identity w ith the k ind being is concerned. So the Stranger goes on to analyze ordinary predication statements and the non-being characteristic o f them.41 The upshot o f the previous argument was that ‘the nature o f the other renders [each kind] a non-being by making them other than being’ (256e l), i.e. other than the k ind being. However, m otion as well as other kinds are also beings because they partake o f being (256e3: δ τ ι μετεχει το ΰ δντος, ε ίνα ι τε κα ι δ ν τα ). The next step o f the argument is concerned w ith these beings-by-virtue-of-participation-in-being (and w ith ordinary predication statements, correspondingly). T o each o f those beings, a part o f the nature o f otherness is opposed (257e3: ά ντ ιτεθ έν ); thus, ‘non-beautiful is some sort o f contrast o f a being to a being (όυτος δή πρός δυ άυτίθεσ ις)’ (257e6-7). This part o f otherness is then claimed to be ‘the very non-being’ :

25 8 a ll-b 7 : Then it seems that the contrast (άντίθεσ ις) in which a part o f the nature o f the other (ή τη ς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως) and the nature o f being (της το ΰ δντος) are set against one another (άντικειμένω ν) is, i f we may speak in this way, a being no less than is being itself [to whose nature the part o f the nature o f the other is set in contrast], since the contrast does not signify (σημαίνουσα) what is contrary to being, but only what is other in relation to it. [ . . . ] I t is evident that i t is the very non-being (τό μή δν) for which we were searching because o f the sophist.

T o sum up, non-being turns out to be existent on at least two interpretations o f being: when ‘being’ stands for the form Being on its own, non-being (I) is conceivable as part o f difference in

41 The new start is marked by the Stranger’s remark at 257b 1.

relation to this kind; secondly, when ‘being’ stands for some k ind which participates in the k ind being, non-being (II) is conceivable as part o f difference in relation to this particular kind. I f we recall the defin ition o f the false discourse given above, we’l l see that non-being I I provides room for falsehood in ordinary predication statements.42

O f course, this is only a sketchy outline o f the argument concerning non-being in the dialogue, but it suffices for the purposes o f this essay - that is, to show that, in solving the aporia concerning falsehood and non-being, the Eleatic Stranger recurs to distinguishing different meanings o f non-being. By means o f semantic diairesis he refutes his opponents and proves the ir refutation to be only an apparent one (259d5-6: οϋτε τ ις ελεγχος ουτος άληθινός), for they create apparent contradictions. He distinguishes between qualified and unqualified ‘ (non-)being’ , as well as between different meanings o f the former. As the Stranger puts it, in order to solve the falsehood paradox they have ‘to force non-being in some way to be a being (τό τ ε μή ον ώς εσ τι κ α τά τ ι) , and again, to force being in some way to be a non-being (τό δν αυ π ά λ ιν ώς ούκ εσ τι π η)’ (24 ld6-7). This πη is o f crucial importance in the dialogue, and it is hardly an exaggeration to assert that to this m inor qualification the whole m ultid irectional and multidimensional argument o f the dialogue is dedicated.

I f we recur to Aristotle ’s vocabulary once again, we may say that the Sophist guards against the secundum qu id fallacy. Aristotle exposes this fallacy in Parmenides’ argument43 saying that i t springs from confusion between existential and predicative modes o f being, or between unqualified and qualified predication. This fallacy is mentioned in chapter 5 o f the Sophistical Refutations·.

Soph. E l. 166b37-a7: Fallacies connected w ith the use o f some particular expression absolutely (άπλώς) or in a certain respect (πη) and not in its proper sense (μή κυρίως), occur when that

42 For analysis see, e.g. McDowell 1982, 121.43 Back 2000, 56. See also Schreiber 2003, 141.

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which is predicated in part only (τό έν μέρει λεγόμενον) is taken as though it was predicated absolutely. For example, ‘I f that-which- is-not is an object o f opinion, then that-which-is-not is’; fo r i t is not the same thing ‘to be something’ and ‘to be’ absolutely. O r again, ‘That-which-is is not, i f i t is not one o f the things which are, e.g. i f i t is not a man.’ For it is not the same thing ‘not to be something’ and ‘not to be’ absolutely; but owing to the sim ilarity o f the language, ‘to be something’ (τό εΤναί τ ι) appears to differ only a little from ‘to be,’ (το ΰ είνα ι) and ‘not to be something’ (τό μή ε ΐνα ί τ ι) from ‘not to be’ (το ΰ μή είνα ι).

The upshot o f the Sophist is rewarding: the interlocutors manage to demonstrate that non-being is not only πή, but also ττολλαχτ) (259b5), ‘ in many respects’ . This non-being, discovered through the chain o f refutations and diaireseis, in turn, provides room for falsehood and, consequently, for the elenchus as such.

O l.G A Al.IF.VA

National Research University, H igher School o f Economics

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