Denis O'Brien

THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS.

PART II. INTRICACIES OF SYNTAX AND MEANING

(154E7-155C7)

AbstractPlato's paradox of relative change in size and number (154e7-155c7) cannot beunderstood unless the text is emended (see Part i of this article) and unless fullweight is given to shifts of mood and tense and to the play of particles. Thecritical reader will also need to adapt to a non-Fregean concept of equality and toa definition of change different from Geach's definition of `̀ Cambridgechange''. Only so will the structure of the paradox explain young Theaetetus'bewilderment, while also showing that the author of the dialogue was not him-self a victim of the paradox he has created.

KeywordsPlato, Theaetetus, negation, mood and tense, responsory particles, a\kka* ``post-positum'', ``Cambridge change'', paradox, ambiguity

1. A ``subjective'' negation (155a2-5 and 155a7-9)

`̀ Suppositions'' or `̀ appearances'' (155a2: ua* rlasa) may seem an

odd way of referring to the three fairly tightly worded propositions that

follow (155a2-5, 155a7-9 and 155b1-2), the more so as the same expres-

sion is used elsewhere for myths (Pol. 268e10), legends (Leg. v 738c2) and

even visions, benign (Phaedr. 250c3) and less benign (Leg. x 910a2).When

Socrates has won Theaetetus' agreement to the three `̀ appearances''

(ua* rlasa), he refers to them more simply as so many `̀ agreements'' or

`̀ admissions'' (155b4: o< lokocg* lasa). The choice of the two Greek words

(ua* rlasa, o< lokocg* lasa) is presumably dictated by Socrates' understand-

able reluctance to grant the three propositions in question any firmer

ELENCHOSxxxiv (2013) fasc. 2BIBLIOPOLIS

STUDI E SAGGI

status, since they so obviously clash with the way that we in fact talk

about change of size and number, as will be seen when Socrates turns to

the comparison between himself and Theaetetus (155b6-c1).

Goodwin notes that the negative particle with an infinitive gov-

erned by ugli* , would more usually be ot\ , not lg* , and quotes our

passage (``155a'', presumably including the two sentences, 155a2-5

and 7-9) as one of the texts ``opposed to the regular usage of the

language'', which would demand what other grammarians sometimes

label the objective form of the negation (ot\ ). Goodwin's explanation is

that ``the use of lg* with the infinitive was so fixed, before the in-

finitive began to be used in indirect discourse, that lg* always seemed

natural, even after ot\ had become the regular form after verbs of

saying, thinking, etc.'' 1.

It would seem more likely that, in our passage, use of the so-called

``subjective'' negation (lg* ) is a direct consequence of Socrates' initially

referring to these pronouncements as mere ``suppositions'' or ``appear-

ances'' (155a2: ua* rlasa). In such a context, the seemingly simple

introductory verb ``we shall say'' (155a3: ug* rolem) is so to speak

drawn into the ambit of verbs signifying ``agreement'' or ``consent''

(specifically o< lokocx& ), verbs which Goodwin lists as regularly taking

for the negation that follows them lg* not ot\ 2.

The explanation of Goodwin's anomaly will be that, although the

infinitives in our passage do indeed depend syntactically on the seem-

ingly ``objective'' verb ``we shall say'' (155a3: ug* rolem), the proposi-

tions that follow are nonetheless specifically referred to as no more

than ua* rlasa (155a2) and o< lokocg* lasa (155b4), and therefore take

the negative particle which, on Goodwin's own admission, would quite

normally follow the corresponding verb (o< lokocx& ) 3.

260 DENIS O'BRIEN

1 W.W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, rewrit-ten and enlarged, London 1897, pp. 269-70 (§ 685). Liddle-Scott-Jones list thenegative particle in our passage as an `̀ occasional'' use. See L.-S.-J., s.v., B 5, c(p. 1124).

2 See again W.W. Goodwin, ibid.3 The association of ua* rlasa and o< lokocg* lasa serves only to accentuate the

uncertainty over the origin of the former word. It is usually said to be derived fromuai* mx, as t% uarla from t< uai* mx. See, for example, E. Schwyzer,Griechische Gram-

2. The modality of Socrates' first sentence (155a2-5)

In the subordinate clause of the first sentence (155a4-5: e% x| i> rom

ei> g at\so+ e< ats{& , ``for however long it may be that it stays equal to

itself''), the use of an optative without the modal particle (a> m), as

opposed to the subjunctive mood with a modal particle, indicates

that the realisation, or not, of the eventuality in question is left un-

determined.

The alternative syntax is neatly illustrated when Clytemnestra,

after the murder of Agamemnon, brushes aside the warnings of retribu-

tion uttered by the chorus, denying that she has anything to fear `̀ so

long as Aegisthus is there to kindle the fire upon my hearth'', Aeschylus,

Ag. 1435-6: e% x| a/ m ei> hz pt& q e\u\ e< rsi* a| e\lg& |/Ai> cirho|. The combination

of the subjunctive (ei> hz) and the modal particle (a> m) indicates that there

is no uncertainty as to the length of time envisaged. Clytemnestra is

confident that Aegisthus will always stand by her, and protect her 4.

By contrast, in the present passage (155a4-5), with the verb in the

optative (ei> g) and no modal particle, it is immaterial, and left uncer-

tain, for how long, and even whether, ``equality'' may continue, since

the point is simply that, for so long as it does continue, however long

that may be, there can be no change in size or number 5. Clytemnestra

clings to the presence of Aegisthus. Socrates is completely indifferent

as to whether or not, or for how long, an object remains equal, so long

as there is no question of its becoming ``larger'' or ``smaller'', ``more''

or ``less'', while still being equal.

261THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

matik, Band i, dritte, unveraÈnderte Auflage, MuÈnchen 1959, p. 524. But the wordis also given synonymously with q< g* lasa, as a definition of ug* lasa by Hesychius

(U 348.1). H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches WoÈrterbuch, Band ii, Heidelberg1970, therefore includes the word both under uai* mx (p. 983) and under ugli*

(p. 1009). The curiosity is that our passage would go equally well with either origin,or with both (conceivably an indication that the two words were originally related).

4 See W.W. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, cit., p. 202 (§ 529). Goodwintranslates: `̀ so long as Aegisthus shall kindle fire upon my hearth''.

5 See ibid., p. 203 (§ 531). Goodwin translates: `̀ so long as it should remainequal to itself''. I hope I have not overdone the emphasis in translating `̀ for howeverlong it may be'', almost a shrug of the shoulders, `̀ that it stays equal to itself''.

The aorist infinitive with the modal particle, as in the antecedent

clause (a> m followed by ceme* rhai), may be the equivalent of either an

indicative or an optative in oratio recta, the indicative (a/ m e\ce* meso)

indicating an outcome contrary to fact, the optative (a/ m ce* moiso), an

outcome contrary to expectation 6.

Our sentence implies a ``potential'' use of the optative. The point

is not that the object in question, whatever it may be, will never in fact

be larger or smaller, but that it could never be envisaged as becoming

larger or smaller, for however long it remains equal ``itself to itself'',

since it would then be, at one and the same time, and in relation to one

and the same term of comparison (``itself''), both ``equal'' and not

``equal'', so flying in the face of the principle of contradiction.

(More on this in a moment.)

3. The modality and the syntax of Socrates' second sentence (155a7-9)

In the following sentence, the repeated use of the optative mood

in the subordinate clause (the ``protasis'', 155a7: pqorsihoi& so and

a\uaiqoi& so), again without a modal particle, has essentially the same

connotation as the use of the optative mood in the equivalent clause of

the sentence preceding. The two negative conditions cover an indefi-

nite range of potential objects, ``whatever has nothing added to it nor

anything taken away from it'' 7.

The difficulty, at this point, lies in keeping close to the syntax of

the Greek. The subject of the two verbs in the Greek is not, as it is in

the translation, the relative pronoun, which in the Greek text is in an

oblique case ({' ). If the two verbs are not to be taken impersonally

(very awkward), we need to supply a subject, whether an indefinite

pronoun (si, ``anything'') or, more likely, a repetition of the negation

(lgde* m, ``nothing'') carried over from the preceding sentence.

The case of the relative pronoun has to match the prefix of the

262 DENIS O'BRIEN

6 Ibid., p. 68 (§ 207). The `̀ counter-factual'' indicative, see pp. 147-8 (§ 410).The ``potential'' optative, see p. 80 (§ 239).

7 Cfr. ibid., p. 198 (§ 521).

first verb (pqor-), and is therefore a dative ({' ), literally, 155a7: {' lg* se

pqorsihoi& so (scil. lgde* m), ``to whatever nothing is added''. The prefix

of the second verb (a\u\, a\po* -) might be expected to require a genitive

(ot' ), literally, 155a7: lg* se a\uaiqoi& so (scil. lgde* m), ``from whatever

nothing is taken''. The Greek is content to leave the change of case,

if there is one, to be supplied from the inner ear 8.

English has difficulty achieving such concision. We can however

make use of phrasal verbs, `̀ added to'', `̀ taken away from'', preceded by

a common antecedent which, in English, is most easily given as the

subject of the two verbs: `̀ Whatever is not added to or taken away

from...''. This form of words is still fairly close to the syntax of the

Greek, but suffers from a fatal defect in so far as it leaves open a residual

ambiguity. With the relative pronoun no longer in an oblique case, the

phrasal verbs could be heard as implying a complement which would be

other than the subject of the two verbs: `̀ Whatever is neither added to

(scil. something else) nor taken away from (scil. something else)...''.

To avoid the ambiguity, the simplest solution is to move a step

further from the syntax of the Greek, by adding a fresh verb which has

the relative pronoun for its subject and the unspoken subject of the

two verbs for its object, while at the same time supplying, as a com-

plement to the two phrasal verbs, a pronoun which looks back to the

subject of the sentence. So it is that we arrive at the translation

adopted above, 155a7: {' lg* se pqorsihoi& so lg* se a\uaiqoi& so..., ``What-

ever has nothing added to it nor anything taken away from it...''. The

meaning is intact, but the construction of the English no longer mir-

rors the construction of the Greek.

4. ``Equality'' as an internal relationship

There remains, in the opening two sentences, a problem not so

much of translation as of interpretation. A literal translation of the

concluding words of Socrates' first sentence (155a2-5) would state that

263THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

8 The genitive and the dative are both found. For the wide variety of possibleconstructions, with varying connotations, see L.-S.-J., s.v. a\uaiqe* x (pp. 285-6).

an object never becomes larger or smaller so long as it is ``equal itself to

itself'' (155a5: i> rom [...] at\so+ e< ats{& ). So translated, Socrates' words

lay themselves open to the obvious objection that however much, and

however often, an object changes in size or number it is necessarily, at

any one time, invariably ``equal itself to itself''. For example, my bank

balance fluctuates wildly, but there is never a time when the sum in my

account is not ``equal itself to itself'', whatever the sum may be.

That use of ``equal'' is obviously not what Plato has in mind here.

His point is that what becomes neither larger nor smaller is necessarily

``equal itself to itself'', in so far as it remains unchanged in size, over

time. The meaning is made unmistakably clear in the sentence follow-

ing by the use of the adverb.Whatever neither increases nor diminishes

``is always equal'' (155a8-9: a\ ei* [...] i> rom ei# mai), where ``always'' take its

meaning, in the context of the sentence as a whole, from the absence of

either increase or diminution. The point is not that an object which

changes in size invariably remains ``equal to itself'', but that the object

in question here is ``always equal'' precisely because there has been no

change in size, no ``increase'' (cfr. pqorsihoi& so) nor any ``diminution''

(cfr. a\uaiqoi& so). For that point to come over as clearly in English as it

does in Greek, we have to resign ourselves to a translation ad sensum.

Rather than change the translation of i> rom, the key term in the passage,

from ``equal'' to ``the same'', the solution adopted by both Cornford

and Chappell, I prefer to modify the translation of the verb. The object

in question ``stays equal'', ``stays always equal'' 9.

In the first sentence (155a2-5), I have shied away from a literal

translation of the two pronouns i> rom at\so+ e< ats{& , equal ``itself to

itself'', writing instead that the object in question stays equal ``to

itself''. I do so, only because the repetition would be hopelessly alien

264 DENIS O'BRIEN

9 Cornford and Chappell play fast and loose, translating i> rom by ``equal'', inthe first sentence (155a5), and by `̀ the same'', in the second (155a8). SeeF.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist ofPlato Translated with a Running Commentary, London-New York 1935, p. 42;T. Chappell, Reading Plato's Theaetetus, Sankt Augustin 2004, p. 69. Admit-tedly, the same word does not always have to be translated in the same way, butthere has to be a good reason for not doing so in successive sentences, when therehas been no change in the meaning of the word.

to the English idiom. The repetition, in the Greek, is not without

significance for the meaning of the passage as a whole, since it gives

added force to the point that the equality in question is, unusually, an

internal relationship (if that is not too paradoxical an expression). The

point is not that the object is, as one might expect it to be, equal to

some other thing; it is ``equal itself to itself'', with the implication

that, so long as it stays in that condition, it is unchanged in size 10.

The added emphasis makes it doubly clear that there is the same

implication for the two comparative adjectives in the main body of the

sentence. Whatever stays equal ``itself to itself'' cannot become ``lar-

ger'' or ``smaller'', scil. than itself. For ``larger'' and ``smaller'' as for

``equal'', the object itself is the term of comparison. The point is not

that something cannot, while remaining ``equal itself to itself'', be-

come ``larger'' or ``smaller'' than some other thing, but that it cannot,

while remaining ``equal itself to itself'', become larger or smaller than

what it is already.

There is the same implication in the second sentence (155a7-9),

but here the point is brought out by the prefixes to the two verbs. The

object which ``stays always equal'' (a\ ei+ de+ i> rom ei# mai), cannot have

anything ``added to it'' (pqor-sihoi& so) nor ``taken away from it''

(a\u-aiqoi& so). The denial of addition (pqor-) and of subtraction (a\u-,

a\po-) can obviously be nothing other than a denial that the object in

question increases or decreases in size by itself becoming larger or

smaller. There is no reference to a mere relative change in size, where

the one object becomes larger or smaller than some other object, when

it is the other object that changes in size.

265THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

10 The notion of equality as what I have called an `̀ internal relationship'',though found elsewhere in Plato (Parm. 140b6-d8, 149d8-151e2), is not one thatwill spring to the mind of a modern reader. It has no place in Frege's account ofequality, in the opening pages of his celebrated article: G. Frege, UÈ ber Sinn undBedeutung, «Zeitschrift fuÈ r Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik», c (1892)pp. 22-50. Its absence in the context of Frege's article hardly calls for comment.Even in French, where the expression does occur, it has only a figurative meaning.See the TreÂsor de la langue francËaise. Dictionnaire de la langue du XIXe et du XXe sieÁcle(1789-1960), tome 7, Paris 1979, s.v. `̀ eÂgal''(p. 773: ``eÂgal aÁ soi-meÃme''). There is noequivalent in English, nor, I think, in German.

5. Theaetetus' change of tone (155a6, a10, b3)

Somuchmay seem obvious enough, but is crucial for measuring the

precise degree of assent in Theaetetus' successive answers to the three

propositions. There can be no ambiguity in Theaetetus' first answer, a

straightforward ``yes'' (155a6: mai* ). My translation of Theaetetus' reply

to the second question (155a10: jolidz& le+ m ot# m) as `̀ Undoubtedly so''

calls for the briefest of brief comments. There are twenty-seven occur-

rences of the same expression given by way of a self-contained answer in

the Platonic corpus, all conveniently listed by des Places 11. Denniston,

in the body of his work, counts our text as a `̀ self-contained elliptical

answer'', `̀ assentient in the full sense'' 12. That is how I have taken the

expression when Theaetetus accepts Socrates' second proposition 13.

However, in his Addenda (p. 587), Denniston gives voice to mis-

givings over the use of the two particles (le+ m ot# m) generally, and is

inclined to allow for the possibility of a residually corrective connota-

tion. I cannot myself see any such connotation in the combination of

the two particles with jolidz& , in any of the ``responsory'' passages

listed by des Places. The connotation, in every case, including our

passage, seems to be one of unqualified assent 14.

The precise nuance of Theaetetus' agreement to the second ques-

tion (155a10) is the more important in that there is a slight, but

significant, change of tone in his answer to the question following

(155b3). The verb is now dojei& , ``it seems'', and the accompanying

particles (ce dg* ) are not always ``purely emphatic'' 15. By highlighting

266 DENIS O'BRIEN

11 EÂ . des Places, EÂ tudes sur quelques particules de liaison chez Platon, Paris1929, pp. 119-20.

12 J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, 2nd edn. with corrections, Oxford1966, pp. 477-8.

13 L.-S.-J., s.v. jolidz& , 3 (p. 975), quote our passage with the meaning `̀ just so''.14 The only ``corrective'' force that des Places allows for, in the `̀ responsory''

use of the two particles, is when the speaker, as he sometimes does, goes one betterthan his interlocutor, and agrees to more than he has been asked to agree to. See EÂ .des Places, EÂ tudes sur quelques particules de liaison, cit., p. 106: ``confirme'' and``encheÂrit'' (see also p. 121).

15 J.D. Denniston,Greek Particles, cit., pp. 245-6, lists the paired particles in

his choice of verb, Theaetetus indicates, perhaps not lack of agree-

ment, but something short of conviction. ``At least'' would be too

much of a volte-face. I prefer to suggest the mildly ``limitative'' force

by translating ``would seem'' instead of ``does seem''.

But the use of an English conditional does not quite hit off the

tone of the answer. Although the two particles emphasise, by drawing

attention to, the dubitative note marked by the choice of verb (dojei& ),

they also add a touch of assertiveness. I have hoped to convey the

almost contradictory nuance by adding an intensive adverb to the

translation, dojei& ce dg* , ``So indeed it would seem''.

A sceptical reader may find the almost contradictory nuance a trifle

far-fetched as the implication of two fairly ordinary particles. But the

meaning is not very different when, in the opening pages of the dialogue,

Socrates asks Theaetetus if he is having lessons from Theodorus in astron-

omy, music and mathematics, as well as in geometry. The boy rather

sweetly replies, 145d3:pqohtlot& lai* ce dg* . The simple answer is obviously

that no, he isn't. The initial effect of the two particles, one might perhaps

think, would therefore be `̀ limitative''. So no doubt it is. But there is a

compensatory emphasis. Instead of answering with a flatly corrective:

`̀ No, but I hope to do so'', Theaetetus bursts out with an enthusiastic:

`̀ Oh but I am so eager to do so''. (I exaggerate slightly, but that is only

because the subtlety ofGreek particles has no exact equivalent inEnglish.)

There is the same conjunction of particles towards the end of the

dialogue, linked with the same word (as a noun, not a verb). Socrates

congratulates Theaetetus on his ``eagerness'' (204b4: pqohtli* a) in

coming up with an answer, but warns him that the answer is something

that they ``have to look into'' (b5: rjepse* om). To which Theaetetus

replies, as eager as ever: ``Oh indeed, so we must'' (b6: dei& ce dg* ).

6. The brewing storm

The difference between the unqualified assent given to Socrates'

first two propositions (155a6 and 155a10) and the slight but unmistak-

267THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

this text (ce dg* ) under the heading: ``sometimes purely emphatic, but usuallylimitative''.

able hesitation in Theaetetus' reply to the final question (155b3: dojei& ce

dg* , `̀ So indeed it would seem'') is an essential ingredient in the philoso-

phical drama of the dialogue. We see here the significance of the re-

peated pronoun in Socrates' first sentence, where the object in question

is said to be equal `̀ itself to itself'' (i> rom at\so+ e< ats{& ). With that quali-

fication, it becomes impossible to deny, or even to hesitate in assenting

to, either one of Socrates' first two propositions, since to do so would be

to fly in the face of the principle of contradiction. In the context, what-

ever stays equal `̀ itself to itself'', cannot change in size, becoming there-

fore larger or smaller, and still be counted as `̀ equal'' to what it was

before, since in that case it would be, at one and the same time, equal and

not equal in relation to one and the same object ± `̀ itself'' 16.

The oddity lies in the whole notion of something being equal ``to

itself'', an internal relationship for a property which would more

usually be construed as one thing being ``equal'' to another. But

once we let that oddity pass, the truth of Socrates' first two proposi-

tions (155a2-5 and 155a7-9) is unassailable. If ``larger'', ``smaller'' and

``equal'' have all the same term of comparison (albeit the object itself),

then the first two relationships necessarily exclude the third, and vice

versa. Whatever is ``equal'' cannot be ``larger'' or ``smaller'', and what-

ever is ``larger'' or ``smaller'' cannot be ``equal'', if the term of com-

parison, for all three relationships, is the same.

But is the term of comparison the same in Socrates' third propo-

sition (155b1-2)? In so far as the third proposition is presented as a

``consequence'' of the other two (cfr. 155b1: ot# m), the natural implica-

tion is again that whatever change there might be would be a change in

the size of the object itself. If the object remains equal ``itself to

itself'', then there will be no change of size. If it does change in

268 DENIS O'BRIEN

16 The object in question would be ``equal'' (to itself, before it became largeror smaller), `̀ not equal'' (after it become larger or smaller), in relation to one andthe same thing (itself, before it became larger or smaller). The contradiction arisesif we attempt to think of something increasing or decreasing in size while remaining``equal itself to itself'' and therefore (so it is implied) staying the same size. Asnoted above (§ 4), the description of something as ``equal itself to itself'' is ob-viously taken, in the context, as excluding any intrinsic change of size, over time.

size, it will do so by becoming itself larger or smaller, and will there-

fore no longer be ``equal'' to what it was before.

But that seemingly inflexible alternative is brushed aside when

Socrates introduces as a counter-example (155b6-c4) his own differ-

ence of size in relation to Theaetetus, now and a year from now. For

this is a change of size where the term of comparison is no longer the

object ``itself'' (namely Socrates), but a second object (Theaetetus),

and where Socrates does therefore ``change'' in size, in so far as he

ends up shorter instead of taller (in relation to Theaetetus), despite

remaining equal ``himself to himself'' 17.

The dubitative tone of Theaetetus' reply to the third proposition

(155b3: dojei& ce dg* , ``So indeed it would seem'') nicely hits off the

ambiguity. Theaetetus agrees to Socrates' third proposition because at

this moment in the dialogue, thanks especially to the consecutive

particle at the beginning of the sentence (155b1: ot# m), the third pro-

position is presented as all of a piece with the two propositions that

have preceded, and therefore as sharing the supposition that whatever

relationship may be in question is still an ``internal'' relationship (the

object in question is ``equal to itself'', and can become larger or smaller

only if it is no longer ``equal to itself'').

But there is an apprehensive note in the young boy's expression of

assent because, despite the presence of the consecutive particle, the third

proposition can be made to apply, and will be made to apply, to a novel

circumstance that had been excluded by the two preceding propositions,

namely the possibility of something being different in size at different

times, exclusively in relation to some object other than `̀ itself''.

There may be no intrinsic change of size for so long as Socrates

remains ``equal to himself'', and therefore becomes neither ``smaller''

269THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

17 The `̀ change'', so Socrates would say, is therefore not a real change at all(hence my scare quotes). In the preliminaries to his statement of the paradox,Socrates specifically denies that an object which is ``large'' can ``become other''simply as the result of meeting up with a second object, ``without itself undergoingany change'' (154b1-3). This is exactly the situation that obtains when Socrates iscompared to Theaetetus, now and a year from now. It is Theaetetus who haschanged. There has been no `̀ change'' in Socrates himself, nor therefore has Soc-rates himself ``become other''.

nor ``larger'' than he is already. But Theaetetus does change in size,

and his relationship to Socrates therefore changes, conversely with

Socrates' relationship to Theaetetus. As Theaetetus becomes ``taller'',

so Socrates is seen to be ``shorter''. Socrates does therefore acquire a

``new'' size (``shorter'' instead of ``taller''). He does so, however, not in

relation ``to himself'', the term of comparison implied by the first two

propositions, but exclusively in relation to an object other than himself

(Theaetetus, now and a year from now), a form of comparison that the

wording of the third proposition had, but only by implication, ex-

cluded, in so far as the introductory particle (155b1: ot# m) implied

continuity with the two propositions preceding.

Half aware of the peril that lies ahead, Theaetetus no longer

answers with a simple ``yes'' (155a6: mai* ), still less with an ``undoubt-

edly so'' (155a10: jolidz& le+ m ot# m). As willing and eager as ever, but

now a trifle apprehensively, he replies: ``So indeed it would seem''

(155b3: dojei& ce dg* ) 18.

7. ``Postponement'' of a\kka*

Is the position of a\kka* in Plato's text as fragile, and indeed

impossible, as I have made it out to be in the first part of this essay?

Denniston's extensive analysis of uses of the particle in classical Greek

turns up no parallel for our text 19. ``Postponement'' of a\kka* , in so far

as it is to be found at all in the fourth century, is a clearly defined

phenomenon, which affords no opening at all for the position of a\kka*

in the sentence quoted above from the Theaetetus.Postponement following an apostrophe, an oath or an exclama-

tion is a common phenomenon, for a\kka* as for other particles that

270 DENIS O'BRIEN

18 That briefest of brief incursions into the philosophy of the dialogue isintended as no more than a curtain raiser for a separate essay, How Tall Is Socrates?Relative Size in the Phaedo and the Theaetetus, in A. HavlõÂcÏek-F. KarfõÂk-SÏ . SÏpinka (eds.), Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium PlatonicumPragense, Prague 2008, pp. 55-78 (text), pp. 79-119 (Additional Notes).

19 J.D. Denniston, Greek Particles, cit., pp. 1-32.

would normally stand first in their clause or sentence 20. The phenom-

enon is easily understandable in so far as such expressions, of their

nature, are not usually an integral part of the syntax of the sentence to

which they are attached. The postponement, in the case of an excla-

mation, may indeed be hardly more than a question of punctuation, as

it is in the passage quoted under this head by Denniston, from the

Hippias major 21. If wealth is a measure of wisdom, then Hippias pre-

sumably makes most money in Sparta, since he goes there so often. So

speaks Socrates, obviously needling his opponent (cfr. 283a7-b6). Not

at all, replies Hippias (283b7). ``What do you mean?'' exclaims So-

crates. ``You're not telling me it's the other way round, that that's

where you make the least cash?'' (cfr. 283b8: px& | ug* |; a\kk\ e\ka* virsom;)

Socrates' ``exclamation'' (px& | ug* |;) is most simply punctuated as an

independent question, as it is by Denniston himself, earlier in his

volume 22. Such a punctuation leaves the particle in the sentence follow-

ing with no more than its very frequent ``oppositional'' value 23.

When a\kka* is joined with other particles, the first of which is a

negation (ot\ lg+ m a\kka* , ot\ le* msoi a\kka* , ot\ ca+ q a\kka* ), the resulting

expression is again not fully a case of postponement, in so far as a\kka*

gives a special twist to the negation, which therefore has to have

entered the reader's mind first, before being modified by the addition

of the adversative particle. ``I won't praise Love the way you've all

done'', Socrates warns the company when it is his turn to speak in the

Symposium (cfr. 199a3-7). ``No, but what I am prepared to do, if you

want me to, is praise Love my way, by telling the truth'' (199a7-b1: ot\

le* msoi a\kka+ sa* ce a\ kghg& , ei\ bot* kerhe, e\he* kx ei\pei& m jas\ e\latso* m).

When a\kka* is preceded by de* , the resulting expression might

seem closer to an undoubted case of postponement. But even here

``postponement'' is not quite what it may seem to be. The combination

is ``strictly circumscribed'', with the expression ``nearly always'' pre-

ceded by rt* , and ``always followed by an imperative, expressed or

271THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

20 Ibid., p. lx (in general), pp. 22-3 (for a\kka* ).21 Ibid., p. 23.22 Ibid., p. 10.23 Cfr. ibid., pp. 7-8.

understood'' 24. When these conditions are observed, the effect of rt+

de* is close to that of an apostrophe, while the imperative preceded by

a\kka* is not dissimilar to the regular use of a\kka* introducing a com-

mand (varying from a pleading ``Oh, but do'' to an admonitory ``come''

or ``come now'') 25. ``I seem to see two kinds of the mimetic art'', says

the Stranger of Plato's Sophist, thoughtfully and rather uncertainly.

``But I'm not sure that I can get across to you the one we want'' (cfr.

235c8-d3). ``Oh but it's for you to speak first'' (rt+ d\ a\ kk\ ei\pe+

pqx& som), says Theaetetus (cfr. 235d4-5), ``and to tell us how you

mean the two kinds to be divided''. Clearly not a precedent for post-

ponement in our sentence in the Theaetetus, where there is nothing

even approaching an apostrophe or a command.

To illustrate postponement, in the Greek of the period, there re-

mains what Denniston calls an `̀ adverbial'' use of the particle, in such

expressions as a\kka+ mt& m and a\kka+ sot& so 26. Electra calls on the family

gods, when she hears of her mother's dream: `̀ Be with me, now at least!''

(Sophocles, Electra 411: rtcce* merhe* c\ a\kka+ mt& m). Denniston hears here

an unspoken protasis: `̀ If not before, but now''. A few lines later in the

same play, her sister Chrysothemis warns Electra that she has little to tell

her of their mother's terrifying nocturnal vision (cfr. 414), to which

Electra replies: `̀ Tell me at least that little'' (415: ke* c\ a\kka+ sot& so).

With Denniston's unspoken protasis, this will imply, in old-fashioned

English: `̀ if you have nothing else to tell me, tell me but this'' 27.

``Common in tragedy and comedy, but very rare in prose'', is

Denniston's comment on this use of a\kka* 28. Again, out of the question

for our text. The two words juxtaposed do happen to be the same (in

both cases, a\kka+ sot& so), but the meaning of the two words, even apart

272 DENIS O'BRIEN

24 Ibid., p. 10.25 See again ibid.26 Ibid., pp. 13-4. For Denniston's use of ``adverbial'' in this context, see

p. xxxix.27 A similar explanation of an adverbial ``but'' is given by the editors of the

Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford 1933, i, s.v., 6 (p. 1211): `̀ By the omission of thenegative accompanying the preceding verb, but passes into the adverbial sense of:Nought but, no more than, only, merely''.

28 J.D. Denniston, Greek Particles, cit., p. 13.

from the difference between verse and prose, is obviously not in the

least similar.

For true postponement, we have to wait for Callimachus, and for

quotations from various still later poets recorded in the Anthology(Crinagoras, Gaetulicus, Rufinus) 29. Their usage is duly noted in Ste-

phanus' Thesaurus, but appears in the Oxford Lexicon only in the

Revised Supplement, with the note: ``usually in first place, but occa-

sionally postponed'' 30. The editors of the Revised Supplement are too

coy. Callimachus' usage in all likelihood reflects, not so much an ``oc-

casional'' use, as a later development of the language, not noted by

Denniston simply because his range of texts extends to hardly more

than a generation following Plato's death 31.

A postponed a\kka* in Hellenistic Greek may very possibly help to

explain why late copyists of Plato's dialogue were willing to tolerate

the anomaly. But so late a usage can do nothing to weaken the con-

clusion that a postponed a\kka* , as recorded in the manuscripts of the

Theaeteteus, is not a Platonic idiom at all. Its presence, in this one

instance, in the manuscripts is in itself sufficient to mark the sentence

as requiring emendation.

8. Copulative and ``existential'' ei# mai

I make no apology for calling upon the distinction between a copu-

lative and an existential use of ei# mai (`̀ be''), as part of the argument put

forward in the opening pages of this essay (Part i, §§ 2-4). By `̀ existen-

tial'' I mean, quite simply, a use of the verb without a complement, its

use therefore as what grammarians sometimes like to call a `̀ complete''

predicate. So defined, the `̀ existential'' use of the verb, although ob-

273THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

29 For example, Callim. Epigr. 5, 11:Jkeimi* ot a\kka+ htcasqi+ di* dot va* qim. Seealso Hymn. in Jov. 18, et alibi. Five passages in all are noted in R. Pfeiffer, Calli-machus, ii, Oxford 1953: Index vocabulorum, s.v. a\kka* `̀ postpositum'' (p. 144).

30 H. Stephanus, Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, i, Paris 1831, s.v. a\kka* (col.1508 D). L.-S.-J., Revised Supplement, Oxford 1996, s.v. a\kka* (p. 19).

31 J.D. Denniston, Greek Particles, cit., p. vii: `̀ I have taken about 320 B.C.as my terminus ad quem''.

viously very much less frequent than its use as a copula, is nonetheless

well rooted in Greek literature from Homer to the Apocalypse.Calchas is presented early on in the first book of the Iliad as a seer

who knows ``things that are, and things that will be, and things that

are before'' (a70: sa* s\ e\o* msa sa* s\ e\rro* lema pqo* s\ e\o* msa). The use of

the participles is here essentially the same as it is in the prologue to the

New Testament Apocalypse, when the author refers in the opening

verses to one ``who is, and who was, and who is to come'' (i 4: o< x/ m

jai+ o< g# m jai+ o< e\qvo* lemo|, qui est, et qui erat, et qui venturus est, in the

Latin version traditionally ascribed to Saint Jerome).

For all their difference in place and time, and not least in reli-

gious and cultural affinity, those several uses of the participle, pre-

ceded only by the definite article, are neither incomplete nor elliptical.

To ask of ``things that are'' (sa* s\ e\o* msa) and of ``things that will be''

(sa* s\ e\rro* lema), ``Are... what?'', ``Will be... what?'', is to misunder-

stand the speaker's purpose, to ask for information that the poet, by

his use of those expressions, has not attempted to convey. Similarly, to

ask the author of the Apocalypse, ``He who is (o< x> m) ± he who is...

what?'', is again to rob his words of their force and their meaning. In

the verse from Homer, as in the words from the Apocalypse, the author

has said all that he means to say. The ``substantivised'' participles fully

express their author's meaning, and they do so by a use of the verb

that neither requires, nor implies, the presence of a complement, and

that is clearly distinct therefore from the use of the same verb as a

copula.

It is that same distinction, applied now to a ``finite'' use of the

verb, that I have called upon in the opening pages of this essay (Part i,

§§ 2-4). When the words o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m appear in our sentence

from the Theaetetus (155b1-2), they may be understood initially in one

or other of two quite different ways: ``what was not before'' and ``what

it was not before''. With the first syntax (``what was not before''), we

take the relative pronoun (o% ) as subject of the verb, and the verb itself

therefore as a ``complete'' predicate, with only the addition of an

adverb (pqo* seqom, ``before'') to emphasise the difference of time in

relation to what will follow. With the alternative syntax (``what it was

not before''), we anticipate there being a subject to the verb, and we

274 DENIS O'BRIEN

take the relative pronoun as belonging to the predicate, with the verb

having therefore a copulative function.

To decide which of those two translations, in the context, is the

right one, and whether therefore the verb is ``existential'' (the first

interpretation) or ``copulative'' (the second interpretation), is a central

feature of my analysis. Whether the answer I give is right or wrong,

the distinction in question is firmly rooted in the ancient texts, and

fully recognised in any dictionary or grammar of ancient Greek worthy

of the name.

To protest, as more than one critic has done, that the very dis-

tinction I draw upon is invalid, outdated by the work of Kahn and

others, is a sign of the increasingly low level of literacy tolerated today

in the study of ancient philosophical texts 32. As is perhaps only to be

expected, Kahn's various categorisations meet with varying degrees of

success. I am especially sceptical of Kahn's attempt to foist a veridical

ei# mai onto the poem of Parmenides, since the use of the verb in the

extant fragments fails to meet the criteria that Kahn has himself es-

tablished for such a usage, taking as his key text a sentence from

Plato 33. No less dubious is Kahn's account of what Aristotle has to

say of the multiple meanings of ei# mai in various places in the Metaphy-

sics. The exaggerated claims made for Aristotle's supposedly veridical

use of the verb are again at variance with the detail of the text 34.

But disagreement on questions of detail is of only marginal sig-

nificance in the present context. The multiple distinctions that Kahn

has drawn, between vital, locative, veridical and ``static-mutative''

uses of ei# mai in ancient Greek, may help to explain, they do not for

one moment undermine the simple and obvious distinction, writ large

275THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

32 Cfr. C.H. Kahn, The Verb `Be' in Ancient Greek, Dordrecht-Boston 1976.33 Ibid., pp. 331-70 (chap. vii: `̀ The Veridical Use''), drawing on Hipp. ma.

282a4. Very curiously, the text from Hippias major is misquoted in the long Intro-duction added to a reprinting of Kahn's volume, Indianapolis 2003, p. xix (forKahn's o% px|, read x< |).

34 See my critique of Kahn's thesis in E tudes sur ParmeÂnide, i: Le PoeÁme deParmeÂnide, texte, traduction, essai critique, Paris 1987, pp. 152-63 (on Parmenides)and pp. 262-77 (on Parmenides and Aristotle), especially pp. 271-4 (§ iv: `̀ Aristoteet les «sens» de l'eÃtre'') and pp. 275-7 (§ v: `̀ L'eÃtre-veÂrite et l'eÃtre «absolu»'').

in the surviving texts, between a complete and an incomplete use of

the verb 35.

9. Copulative and ``existential'' ci* cmerhai

The distinction between an existential and a copulative use of the

verb is as true for ci* cmerhai as it is for ei# mai. In Socrates' statement of

his rule (155b1-2), the two infinitives (ceme* rhai and ci* cmerhai) have to

take their cue from the meaning given to g# m and ei# mai in the words

preceding, copulative if the two leading verbs (g# m and ei# mai) are copu-

lative, existential if the two leading verbs are existential.

To bring out the distinction, I translate the copulative use of the

verb by ``become'', as opposed to ``come-into-being'' for an existential

use of the same verb. A copulative use of the verb implies the presence

of a complement, even if the complement has to be supplied from the

context. Something that already exists ``becomes'' other than what it

was. With an existential use of the verb, something that did not exist

before ``comes-into-being'' (the hyphens are a merely typographical

reminder that one word is translated by three).

My adding, for the copulative use, `̀ even if the complement has to

be supplied from the context'' is not a mere scruple. The complement is

276 DENIS O'BRIEN

35 If I touch so lightly on this question, it is simply because to do otherwisewould lengthen unduly my present study. Much of the misunderstanding in recentliterature stems from a misreading of Plato's Sophist, where what is very plainly anexistential use of einai (256a1: movement `̀ is, because of its participation in being'')has been construed as an ``incomplete'' use of the verb, with some notional com-plement (``is different'', ``is different from rest'') implied by the context. SeeM. Frede, PraÈdikation und Existenzaussage, Platons Gebrauch von ,,...Ist...`` und,,...Ist nicht...`̀ im Sophistes, GoÈttingen 1967, pp. 55-9, and G.E.L. Owen, Platoon Not-Being, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays, i: Meta-physics and Epistemology, Garden City (N. Y.) 1971, pp. 223-67 (esp. pp. 254-5).Frede and Owen have misunderstood the syntax of the sentence (256a1) and itsplace in the argument. Here as elsewhere in the Sophist (252a2-4, 254d10), toparticipate in `̀ being'' is to ``be''. Further predicates (``to be other'', `̀ to be thesame'') require participation in forms other than ``being''. See D. O'Brien, Le Non-EÃ tre. Deux EÂ tudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, Sankt-Augustin 1995, pp. 63-4 (theStranger's thesis) and pp. 91-102 (Owen's error).

unexpressed with the use of the participle found in Socrates' counter-

example, 155c1-2: ei\li+ ca+ q dg+ t% rseqom o= pqo* seqom ot\j g# , ot\ cemo* -

lemo|. But it is clearly implied (Socrates, a year from now, will be

shorter, not taller), and I translate accordingly, adding an adverb

`̀ so'' to the English translation: `̀ I am later on what I was not before,

despite my not having become so''.

10. The change of tense (155b1-2: ceme* rhai, ci* cmerhai)

My translating a> met sot& ceme* rhai jai+ ci* cmerhai, in Socrates' state-

ment of his rule (155b1-2), `̀ without having completed a process of

becoming and undergoing a process of becoming'' (for a copulative use

of the verb), and `̀ without having completed a process of coming-into-

being and undergoing a process of coming-into-being'' (for an existential

use of the verb), may seem, even so, impossibly ponderous. The peri-

phrases are a forlorn attempt at conveying the difference of tense, be-

tween an aorist infinitive (ceme* rhai) and a present infinitive (ci* cmerhai).

The aorist infinitive displays the verb as marking a completed

event, but without the connotation (not excluded, but not conveyed

by the choice of tense) that what has been brought to completion in

the past carries over into the present as a permanent state or condition

(which would be the nuance conveyed by use of the perfect tense). The

``present'' infinitive is more an indication of the lack of any reference

to past or future than an insistence that the action of the verb is taking

place (or denied to be taking place) at the time of speaking, or at a time

contemporaneous with the tense of the leading verb in the sentence.

Such a distinction is less arcane than it may seem, especially in

the present context. Socrates does not imply that the ``becoming'' in

question (ci* cmerhai), were it to be realised, would still be taking place

at the time designated by the temporal adverb (t% rseqom, ``later on'')

accompanying the leading verb (ei# mai). The distinction is between

``actually becoming'' (aorist, ceme* rhai) and ``going through a process

of becoming'' (present, ci* cmerhai).

In the context of Socrates' ``rule'', the juxtaposition of the two

tenses (aorist and present) is designed to show that fulfilment of two

277THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

conditions is required for a change from what something ``was not'' at

an earlier time (pqo* seqom) to what it ``is'' (or will be) at a later time

(t% rseqom). The object in question must have completed a process of

becoming (aorist, ceme* rhai) and it must undergo a process of becoming

(present, ci* cmerhai) 36.

11. ``And'' not `̀ or'' (155b2)

I can therefore give Chappell only a proxime accessit for a transla-

tion that reads well in English, but does not convey the meaning of the

Greek: ``unless there is or has been a coming-to-be'' (155b2: a> met sot&

ceme* rhai jai+ ci* cmerhai) 37.

Quite apart from the question of an existential or copulative use

of the verb, Chappell wrongly translates jai* as ``or'', not ``and''. In the

context, the two infinitives indicate, not alternative requirements, as

Chappell's translation would have us suppose, but joint requirements,

as is shown by Socrates' writing a few lines later, 155c2-3: a> met ca+ q

sot& ci* cmerhai ceme* rhai a\ dt* masom. ``Without becoming, it is impossible

to have become''.

In both sentences (155b1-2, c2-3), the object that changes cannot

be content with either ``becoming'' or ``having become''. It has to do

both. For change to take place, the object that changes has to engage in

a process of becoming and it has to complete the process. Socrates'

point, in the context (cfr. 155c2-3), is that ``without going through the

process of becoming (ci* cmerhai) smaller, it is impossible for me to get

(ceme* rhai) smaller'' 38.

278 DENIS O'BRIEN

36 For the distinction between the present and aorist infinitive, see W.W.Goodwin,Moods and Tenses, cit., p. 30 (§ 97). Goodwin quotes Aristotle, Eth. Nic.J 3.1173a34-b4: we may `̀ become pleased'' quickly (g< rhg& mai), but we cannot `̀ bepleased'' quickly (g% derhai). Goodwin rightly notes (p. 29, § 96) that, in such cases,the present or aorist infinitive ``has no reference to time in itself'' (the difference,as we would now say, is a difference of `̀ aspect'').

37 T. Chappell, Reading Plato's Theaetetus, cit., p. 69.38 I quote Goodwin's paraphrase of the sentence, Moods and Tenses, cit.,

p. 30 (§ 97).

12. The order of the two infinitives

The slight difference between the two sentences lies in the order

of the two infinitives. An aorist infinitive is followed by a present

tense in the statement of the rule (155b1-2: ceme* rhai followed by

ci* cmerhai). A present tense is followed by an aorist infinitive in the

sentence of explanation following the counter-example to the rule

(155c2-3: ci* cmerhai followed by ceme* rhai).

The difference is easily explained. In his statement of the rule

(155b1-2), Socrates goes out of his way to insist that, if the succession

of ``earlier'' and ``later'' is to be accompanied by a change in the state

of the object in question (``other'', later on, in relation to what it was,

or was not, ``before''), then the change has to be explained, not simply

by the object's having become different (ceme* rhai, aorist), but by its

having gone though a process of becoming (ci* cmerhai, present).

His point is that we cannot simply register the fact that, at the

later time, the object is ``other'' because that is what it has ``become'';

for it to have ``become'' what it is at the later time (ceme* rhai, aorist), it

must have been subjected to a process of becoming (ci* cmerhai, pres-

ent). By contrast, in the later sentence (155c2-3), Socrates is content to

follow the logical order of events. An object has to undergo a process

of becoming (ci* cmerhai, present) before it can be said to have com-

pleted the process (ceme* rhai, aorist).

13. The `̀ double'' condition of change

The ``double'' condition is an essential feature of the argument

and of the paradox. When Theaetetus ``becomes'' taller, he does so

gradually. Day by day, we see him (or would see him, if Socrates were

to live that long) catching up with his interlocutor, until one day we

discover that he has overtaken him, and is now taller than Socrates

instead of shorter. Faced with facts as familiar as these, we would be

hard put to deny that Theaetetus has both gone through a process of

``becoming'' and has completed the process, even if ``completion'' is

none other than the arbitrary moment when Theaetetus, who until

then had been shorter than Socrates, is now taller.

279THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

But how can we possibly apply that same conception of change to

Socrates? Socrates, too, can claim that he will end up no longer what he

was before, `̀ shorter'' instead of `̀ taller''. But, as he is at pains to point out

(155b6-c1), that is not because there has been any change in his own size,

whether of increase or of diminution. At a point in time, a year from now,

Socrates who had been taller than Theaetetus, is so no longer. But when

did Socrates ever go through a process of `̀ becoming'' smaller? And if he

never went through such a process, then how can it have been completed?

How can a process be `̀ completed'' if it was never even begun?

The long drawn-out process of ``becoming'' was true only of

Theaetetus, so that Socrates, in his framing of the paradox, can

deny that he ever did complete a ``becoming''. ``I am later on'', so

he insists, ``what I was not before, without having become so'' (155c1-

2: ot\ cemo* lemo|).

14. The denial of `̀ becoming''

Socrates' denial of ``becoming'' (cfr. 155c1-2: ot\ cemo* lemo|) ac-

quires full significance only in the light of the sentences that precede

and that follow. In the initial statement of the rule, in the lines pre-

ceding, nothing can be later on what it was not before, ``without

having completed a process of becoming and undergoing a process of

becoming'' (155b1-2: a> met sot& ceme* rhai jai+ ci* cmerhai). So too in the

sentence that follows the counter-example to the rule: ``without be-

coming, it is impossible to have become'' (155c2-3: a> met ca+ q sot& ci* c-

merhai ceme* rhai a\ dt* masom). In either sentence, in the initial statement

of the rule (155b1-2) as in the comment on the counter-example to the

rule (155c2-3), ``becoming'' can be completed (cfr. ceme* rhai) only if

there is an antecedent process, marked by a present tense of the same

verb, leading to completion (cfr. ci* cmerhai).

When Socrates uses the same verb in the aorist tense preceded by

a negation (155c1-2: ot\ cemo* lemo|, ``not having become so''), he is not

therefore stating simply what was not so; he is stating what cannot

have been so. A ``becoming'' that is completed (ceme* rhai) has to be the

completion of a process that is already under way (ci* cmerhai). But

when was there such a process? Socrates is the same size, now and a

280 DENIS O'BRIEN

year from now. There is therefore no antecedent period when he ``is

becoming'' shorter, nor therefore can he ``have become'' so. He cannot

have ``completed'' a process if there was no process to be completed.

It is that implication that gives point to Socrates' denial of be-

coming. Although there is no doubt that Socrates is, or will be a year

from now, what he ``was not before'', ``shorter'' instead of ``taller'', he

cannot therefore claim to ``have become'' so (cfr. 155c2: ot\ cemo* -

lemo|), for the simple reason that, not having undergone any change

of size in that same period of time (now and a year from now), and not

therefore having been himself caught up in a process of becoming, he

cannot be supposed to have completed such a process. At a certain

point in time, he is what he was not before (``shorter'' instead of

``taller''). But he has not ``become'' so.

15. ``Real'' change and `̀ relative'' change

The denial of ``becoming'' triggers the paradox. For something to

be ``later on'' what it was not ``before'', it has to ``have become'' so. It

cannot ``have become'' so if there was no antecedent process of ``be-

coming''. Socrates, now and a year from now, is neither any larger than

he was nor any smaller than he was (cfr. 155b6-c1). For Socrates there

was therefore no antecedent process of ``becoming''. But if there was

no antecedent process of ``becoming'', and if Socrates therefore never

``became'' so, then he cannot be ``later on'' what he was not ``before''

(``shorter'' instead of ``taller''). But he is...

The modern critic, the modern philosopher, will of course step in

to brush aside the difficulty, by appealing to the difference between a

``real'' change and a ``relative'' change. If we keep to the example of a

difference of size, ``real'' change will, no doubt, imply a process.

Theaetetus becomes, progressively, taller (a ``real'' change), until one

day he is taller than Socrates (both a ``real'' change and a ``relative''

change). Not so Socrates. Socrates displays a ``relative'' change (he

ends up shorter than Theaetetus), but without undergoing a ``real''

change (whether ``taller'' or ``shorter'', Socrates stays the size he is) 39.

281THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

39 This is my elaboration of the ``explanation'' of the paradox put forward by

That ready-made, off-the-shelf solution does not occur to the

young Theaetetus. One reason it does not do so is that, in Socrates'

statement of the rule (155b1-2), the young boy has not been offered

the choice between a ``coming-to-be'' that either ``is'' or ``has been''

(cfr. Chappell: ``unless there is or has been a coming-to-be''). Socrates'

formulation of the paradox does not leave open that easy option. It is

not enough for the ``becoming'', or for the ``coming-to-be'', either to

``be'' or to ``have been''. The becoming that ``has been'' (cfr. ceme* rhai)

must have been preceded by a process of becoming (cfr. ci* cmerhai).

The becoming that ``is'' (cfr. ci* cmerhai) has to be brought to comple-

tion (cfr. ceme* rhai).

That seemingly simple conjunction, the requirement that, for

something to be ``later on'' what it was not ``before'', it must both

engage in a process of becoming (cfr. ci* cmerhai) and complete the

process (cfr. ceme* rhai), effectively excludes an appeal, in this context,

to a ``relative'' change of size, unless it has been accompanied, as it will

have been in the case of Theaetetus, by a ``real'' change. Socrates'

change of size cannot, as it were, be recognised as such, precisely

because it is not a change that will have been accompanied by a process

of becoming, and by a completion of the process, on the part of

Socrates himself.

A ``relative'' change of size, a change of size consequent upon

some other object engaging in a process of becoming and completing

the process, has been excluded by the statement of the rule, and

specifically by the requirement that, for an object to be, or to be

``other than'', what it was not before, it must itself have both engaged

in, and completed, a process of becoming (155b1-2).

Socrates does not fulfil that condition. Hence the seemingly im-

possible paradox inherent in his claim that he is ``later on'' what he

was not ``before'' without ``having become'' so (155c1-2). The objec-

tion that the change of size has been a mere ``relative'' change, a

change independent therefore of ``becoming'' and of ``having become''

282 DENIS O'BRIEN

P. Geach, Truth, Love and Immortality. An Introduction to McTaggart's Philosophy,Berkeley-Los Angeles 1979, pp. 89-92, and frequently repeated, in one form oranother, in the subsequent literature.

on the part of whatever is spoken of as the subject of change, has

already been side-stepped by Socrates' statement of the rule, and by

Theaetetus' acceptance of the same.

16. The point of the paradox

Given the context that has been carefully put in place as a set-

ting for the paradox, to assert that Socrates, despite not ``having

become so'' (155c2: ot\ cemo* lemo|), has, nonetheless, undergone a

``relative'' change is no more than a denial of the principles that

give rise to the paradox. It is a denial of the principle that, ``without

going through a process of becoming'', it is impossible for whatever is

spoken of as the subject of change ``to have become'' (cfr. 155c2-3:

a> met ca+ q sot& ci* cmerhai ceme* rhai a\ dt* masom). It is equally a denial of

the principle that there can be no passage from ``was not before'' to `̀ is

later on'' (cfr. 155c1-2), without the object in question having itself

`̀ completed'' a process of becoming and therefore first `̀ undergoing'' a

process of becoming (cfr. 155b1-2: a> met sot& ceme* rhai jai+ ci* cmerhai).

The paradox arises precisely because there can be no completion of a

process that never even began. Socrates, who never underwent, in his

own person, a process of becoming, cannot therefore be said to have

completed the process. He is ``later on'' what he was not `̀ before'', but

`̀ without having become so'' (cfr. 155c2: ot\ cemo* lemo|).

It is only if the paradox is presented in that form that it is seen as

paradoxical. Socrates' claiming to be `̀ later on'' what he was not `̀ be-

fore'', ``without having become so'' (155c1-2), contravenes the condi-

tion for a passage from `̀ was not before'' to `̀ is later on'', as laid down

in the initial statement of the rule (155b1-2), and carefully repeated in

the sentence that follows the counter-example to the rule (155c2-3). In

both places (155b1-2 and c2-3), the repetition of the same verb, in both

the present and the aorist tense (ci* cmerhai, ceme* rhai), effectively ex-

cludes any merely `̀ relative'' change of size, where the object that is

``later on'' what it was not ``before'' has not itself engaged in any

process of ``becoming'' (cfr. ci* cmerhai) and a fortiori cannot be said to

have ``completed'' the process (cfr. ceme* rhai).

283THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

To fail to translate the difference of tense (155b1-2: ceme* rhai

followed by ci* cmerhai, 155c2-3: ci* cmerhai followed by ceme* rhai), as

expressing a difference between the process of `̀ becoming'' (ci* cmerhai)

and a completion of the process (ceme* rhai), and still more to fail to

translate the conjunction in the statement of the rule (155b2: jai* ) as

expressing, not an alternative requirement (`̀ or''), but a joint or cumu-

lative requirement (`̀ and''), betrays a radical misunderstanding of the

nature of the paradox. Unless the passage is translated correctly, the

paradox has no point, and hardly even calls for a solution 40.

17. Translation of the temporal adverbs (pqo* seqom, t% rseqom)

There remains the discrepancy noted earlier (Part i, n. 7) be-

tween my translation of the temporal adverb in Socrates' statement

of the rule (155b1) and in his counter-example to the rule (155c2). In

both sentences, I translate t% rseqom, simply enough, as ``later on'', but

I vary the translation of pqo* seqom, which comes out as ``at an earlier

time'' in the statement of the rule and as ``before'' in the counter-

example to the rule. Why the difference? Why not translate the same

word the same way in both places?

The variation is made solely as a concession to the English idiom,

and not as marking any difference of meaning in the Greek. The

284 DENIS O'BRIEN

40 For Chappell's erratic translation, see supra, § 11. The mis-match betweenGeach's conception of what is commonly called a `̀ Cambridge change'' and changeas defined by Socrates looms large in my contribution to the Symposium PlatonicumPragense already referred to (supra, n. 18). Geach's definition of ``Cambridgechange'', taken over from McTaggart and Russell (change defined by the truth oftwo contradictory propositions, identical except for the specification of a differ-ence of time, irrespective of whether the difference is the result of a ``relative''change or a `̀ real'' change), fails to engage with the statement of the paradox(154e7-155c10) and is also completely at odds with the concept of change putforward by Socrates in the preceding pages of the dialogue (see esp. 154b1-8).Socrates here expressly denies that something can be counted as `̀ changing''(154b: lesaba* kkom) `̀ as a result of its encounter with something else'', and ``with-out itself having been in any way affected''. What Geach calls a `̀ relative change''is, for Socrates, in the context of the Theaetetus, no change at all.

freedom of word order in a language as highly inflected as ancient

Greek allows the two temporal adverbs (pqo* seqom, t% rseqom) to be

virtually juxtaposed, as they are both in Socrates' statement of the

rule (155b1) and in his counter-example to the rule (155c2). There is

not the same freedom in English, where grammatical function is heav-

ily dependent on the position of a word. The result is that an English

sentence which begins (cfr. 155b1) ``What it was not before...'', only

to continue with some version of ``it is not possible for that same

thing...'', leaves time for the question to flash across the reader's, or

the hearer's, mind: ``Before... before what?''

The continuation of the sentence will of course give an answer to

the question. The answer may be a tautology, but it is an answer

nonetheless: ``before scil. later on''. Even so, for the native reader

of English, the relief afforded by the answer, even a tautological an-

swer, arrives a split second too late. When we read, or hear, ``before'',

we expect to know already, or to be told by the words joined syntac-

tically to the adverb (e.g. ``before the war''), what ``before'' refers to.

A lapse of time, however fleeting, sufficient for the mind to form the

question ``Before... before what?'', is linguistically and conceptually

irksome.

To an English ear, the sentence is no less confusing if it begins

``What it was not earlier on...'' With this form of words we are more

or less content to hear the phrasal expression as establishing its own

time-scale, confident that ``earlier on'' will be answered, if only im-

plicitly, by ``later on''. But we do so, with the confident expectation

that the difference marked by the two expressions will not be purely

temporal. What was so ``earlier on'', we confidently expect to be told,

will no longer be so ``later on''. Conversely, what was not, ``earlier

on'', we are confident will turn out to be so ``later on''. What runs

contrary to our expectation is for what was so, or what was not so,

``earlier on'', to be presented, in the continuation of the sentence, as a

permanent state. Yet such is the initial implication if we are told, in an

English sentence, that what was not so ``earlier on'' cannot be so ``later

on''... before being given the explanation ``without becoming so''. The

initial implication is again, if only fleetingly, unsettling, both linguis-

tically and conceptually.

285THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

To recover the simplicity of the Greek, a suitably unobtrusive

solution is therefore to spell out the temporal reference in full when

the adverb (pqo* seqom) falls in the first part of the sentence, as it does

in Socrates' statement of the rule, and therefore to translate, as I have

done, by ``at an earlier time''. ``At an earlier time'' establishes an

independent time sequence (unlike ``before'') and carries no implica-

tion as to whether or not there will be any change, other than a purely

temporal change, ``later on''.

Admittedly, to cater for such a nuance, we are led to a different

translation of the same adverb in the statement of the rule (155b1:

pqo* seqom, ``at an earlier time'') and in the counter-example to the rule

(155c2: pqo* seqom, ``before''). In the counter-example to the rule, the

difference marked by the two adverbs is not only a temporal differ-

ence. Socrates does ``change'', in so far as he stops being ``taller'' and

ends up ``shorter'', and he can therefore perfectly well begin his sen-

tence with a simple reference to what is, or will be, ``later on'', as in

the translation adopted above. ``I am later on what I was not before,

despite my not having become so'' (155c1-2: ei\li+ ca+ q dg+ t% rseqom o=

pqo* seqom ot\j g# , ot\ cemo* lemo|)

The translator who prefers to ride roughshod over such niceties is

at liberty to do so. It is easy enough to shrug off the whole difficulty by

writing, in both sentences, ``at an earlier time'' and ``at a later time'',

for the two adverbs. ``What it was not, at an earlier time, for that same

thing to be other than that, at a later time...'' (cfr. 155b1-2). ``I am at a

later time what I was not at an earlier time'' (cfr. 155c1-2). The

translator who is content to have Socrates adopt, in English, so cum-

bersome and pedantic a form of words, may be left to wallow in his

contentment.

18. A change in the choice of negative particle (155b1-2, c1-2)

Other subtleties defy translation. The difference in the choice of

negative particle, lg* not ot\ in the statement of the rule, ot\ not lg* in

the counter-example to the rule, is presumably deliberate. The ``sub-

jective'' form of the particle (lg* ) is presumably appropriate to a sub-

286 DENIS O'BRIEN

ordinate clause (the ``protasis'') in the statement of a general rule,

purportedly claiming to establish what can, or cannot, be so (155b1-

2). The ``objective'' form of the negation (ot\ ) comes into its own with

the firm assertion of a particular fact: Socrates ``was not'' shorter than

Theaetetus before Theaetetus grew to be taller (155c1-2) 41.

To convey the difference in English, we may think to change the

modality of the verb: ``what it may not have been to start with'' (cfr.

155b1: o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m). But such a form of words is simply too

heavy-handed, in so far as it would seem to introduce an element of

uncertainty. ``Subjectivity'' arises, not because the rule is doubtful,

but because it expresses an abstract impossibility (155b1-2: lg* there-

fore, not ot\ ), as opposed to the down-to-earth assertion of a specific

fact, what Socrates was, or was not, at an earlier time (155c1-2: ot\

therefore, not lg* ) 42.

19. The chiasmus (155b1-2, c1-2)

The chiastic arrangement of the verbs and adverbs in the two

sentences, in the statement of the rule (155b1-2) and in the counter-

example to the rule (155c1-2), is clearly deliberate. A present tense

(ei# mai) follows an imperfect tense (g# m) in the statement of the rule; an

imperfect tense (g# ) follows a present tense (ei\li* ) in the counter-exam-

ple to the rule. ``Later'' (t% rseqom) follows ``earlier'' (pqo* seqom) in the

statement of the rule; ``earlier'' (pqo* seqom) follows ``later'' (t% rseqom)

in the counter-example to the rule.

The chiastic balance has been achieved by reversing the order of

the main clause and the relative clause. The main clause follows the

relative clause in the statement of the rule, precedes the relative clause

287THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

41 For the difference between the two forms of negation, I repeat the con-ventional labels (`̀ subjective'', ``objective'') used earlier (supra, § 1).

42 There is, at this period, no anomaly in the negative particle being placedbefore the contrasting adverb, as it is in the statement of the rule (155b1: o= lg+

pqo* seqom g# m), instead of being tied directly to the verb, as it would tend to be inlater Greek and as it is in the counter-example to the rule (155c1: o= pqo* seqom ot\j g# ).Cfr. A.C. Moorhouse, Studies in the Greek Negatives, Cardiff 1959, pp. 138-40.

in the counter-example to the rule. The reversal of the two clauses

explains why the statement of the rule has to include a demonstrative

pronoun. With the main clause placed second, the unity and the cohe-

sion of the sentence require the subject of the verb to be marked by a

pronoun, looking back to, and picking up from, the relative clause that

precedes.

The pronoun, here as often, is sot& so 43. For such a use, the dic-

tionary translation of ``this'' is misleading, since ``this'', in English, is

too easily taken to be ostensive (``this one'', pointing) or proleptic

(``this is what I think'', introductory). An idiomatic translation of

the retrospective use of the pronoun calls for some variant of ``this

same thing'', or even ``that same thing''.

20. The role of the relative pronoun (155b1 and c2: o% )

With or without a demonstrative pronoun, the relation of the

main clause to the subordinate clause is the same in the two sentences,

in the statement of the rule (155b1-2) and in the counter-example to

the rule (155c1-2), in so far as, in either case, the subject of the verb in

the main clause is not expressed by the relative pronoun of the sub-

ordinate clause, but is the same as the subject of the verb, of which the

relative pronoun provides the complement. In the counter-example to

the rule, this is obvious enough: ``I am later on'', says Socrates, ``what

I was not before'' (155c1-2: ei\li+ ca+ q dg+ t% rseqom o= pqo* seqom ot\j g# ).

There is here not a flicker of doubt that the speaker (Socrates) is the

subject of the two verbs (ei\li* and g# ), and that the relative pronoun (o% )

is the complement of the verb in the subordinate clause.

The structure is the same in the earlier sentence (155b1-2), but is

not so immediately obvious. With the relative clause placed before the

main clause, the syntactical function of the relative pronoun (again o% )

is left open, however fleetingly, to conflicting interpretations, existen-

tial, if the pronoun is taken as the subject of the verb: ``what was not,

at an earlier time'', copulative, if it is taken as the complement of the

288 DENIS O'BRIEN

43 See L.-S.-J., s.v. ot' so|, ii (p. 1276).

verb: ``what it was not, at an earlier time'' (in either case: o= lg+ pqo* -

seqom g# m).

It is to resolve the potential conflict that `̀ other'' (a> kko) is urgently

needed in the main clause, and is therefore brought in immediately

following the contrasting temporal adverb (t% rseqom a> kko...), so swing-

ing the balance in favour of a copulative meaning (155b1: o= lg+ pqo* seqom

g# m, `̀ what it was not, at an earlier time''), with an immediacy which

English cannot hope to emulate, and which makes Socrates' statement

of the rule in Greek, once a> kko has been restored to the text, more

immediately understandable than it can ever be in translation.

21. The antecedent of the demonstrative pronoun

Although the role of the relative pronoun (o% ) is therefore iden-

tical in the statement of the rule (155b1-2) and in the counter-example

to the rule (155c1-2), there remains a syntactical discrepancy between

the use of the relative pronoun in Socrates' statement of the rule

(155b1: o% ...) and its use in the sentence immediately preceding

(155a7: {' ...).

The relative pronoun, in the sentence preceding, is the antece-

dent of the demonstrative pronoun that introduces the main clause of

the sentence (ibid.: {' lg* se pqorsihoi& so... ``Whatever has nothing

added to it...'', sot& so ... ``that same thing...''). The syntax, we may

think, should therefore be the same in the sentence following (155b1-

2), where a relative pronoun (o% ) is again followed by a demonstrative

pronoun in the main clause, the very same demonstrative pronoun that

begins the main clause in the first sentence of the pair (155a7, 155b1:

sot& so).

But for the syntax to be the same, the antecedent to the demon-

strative pronoun would again have to be the relative pronoun, in the

statement of the rule (155b1-2) as it is in the sentence preceding

(155a7-9). With this reading of the text, we would therefore be drawn

back into an ``existential'' reading of the sentence (155b1: o= lg+ pqo* -

seqom g# m..., ``What was not, at an earlier time...'', sot& so ... ``that same

thing...''). If that is not to be so, if the statement of the rule is to have

289THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

a ``copulative'' meaning, matching therefore the counter-example to

the rule, then the demonstrative pronoun in the main clause (ibid.:

sot& so) has to have for antecedent, not the relative pronoun itself, but

the subject of the verb of which the relative pronoun is the predicate

(ibid.: o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m..., ``What it was not, at an earlier time...'',

sot& so ... ``that same thing...'').

Although the ``copulative'' meaning is undoubtedly the meaning

required by the argument, the syntactical discrepancy may nonetheless

still be found unsettling, the more so as the syntax of the earlier

sentence (155a7-9), where the demonstrative pronoun looks back di-

rectly to the relative pronoun for its antecedent, is far and away the

more common construction of the two 44. But it is, I would suggest, the

very proximity of the more usual syntax, in the earlier sentence of the

pair (ibid.), that makes it easy enough for the reader, or the listener, to

grasp intuitively the sequence of thought required by the argument in

the sentence following (155b1-2). The demonstrative pronoun in the

earlier sentence (155a7: sot& so) looks back to an antecedent ({' ...) of

which we are told only that it is subject neither to increase nor to

diminution, but which, from that very fact, we do obviously suppose

to exist. The same assumption governs the sentence following, in so far

as the same demonstrative pronoun (155b1: sot& so) looks back to some-

thing that again we suppose to exist, even if the only description we

are given of it is now entirely negative (ibid.: o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m,

``What it was not, at an earlier time'').

The open-ended specification in the statement of the rule is es-

sential to the meaning. The point and purpose of the generalisation

(155b1-2) is that it establishes a condition of change, or lack of change,

which brooks no exception. But in being asked to envisage an object

that is lacking in whatever specification it may, or may not, receive at

some later time, we are not therefore asked to envisage the terminus a

quo of change as simply non-existent (155b1: o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m...,

``What was not, at an earlier time...''). In both sentences (155a7-9

290 DENIS O'BRIEN

44 The examples of ``retrospective'' sot& so quoted in L.-S.-J., s.v. ot' so|, ibid.,all follow the norm of Socrates' earlier sentence (155a7-9), in so far as the referenceof the relative pronoun and of the demonstrative pronoun is invariably the same.

and 155b1-2), the demonstrative pronoun, in looking back to a pre-

ceding relative clause, looks back to an object that exists. The differ-

ence between the two sentences lies only in the point that the object in

question is first presented as something that is subject to neither in-

crease nor diminution (155a7-9), before being presented, more gener-

ally (155b1-2), as lacking in whatever specification may be indicated in

the continuation of the sentence (155b1: o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m..., ``What

it was not, at an earlier time...''). The very difference is founded on

the supposition, common to both sentences, that the object in ques-

tion, whether or not it changes, does undoubtedly exist.

22. A ``non-existent'' antecedent?

That conclusion becomes only the more obvious if we spare a

moment for the alternative reading, where the demonstrative pronoun

does have to be heard as looking back to an object that, far from

lacking in some unspecified determination, is lacking in any determi-

nation at all ± where the antecedent to the demonstrative pronoun has

to be an object that simply does not exist. Can we, easily or at all, still

give meaning to the demonstrative pronoun? Can the demonstrative

pronoun still be a demonstrative pronoun if it has nothing to ``demon-

strate'' ± nothing to point to? Can a sentence that begins by a denial of

existence plausibly continue ``that same thing...''?

Not surprisingly, translators caught up in an ``existential'' reading

of the text have done their best to rid the Stranger's argument of so

troublesome a form of words; but they have been able to do so only by

adopting a translation that floats free from the syntax of the Greek. So

it is, even with Cornford. When Cornford starts off his translation ``A

thing which was not at an earlier moment ...'', his reader is given no

indication that ``a thing'' is the translation of a demonstrative pronoun

with retrospective force, despite this being a salient feature of the

sentence in Greek 45. Once we adapt Cornford's translation to mirror

the syntax of the Greek, the reader is left to grapple with an assertion

291THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

45 F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, cit., p. 42. Cfr. Part i, n. 11.

that, in Cornford's lucid prose, would have stuck out like a sore

thumb: ``What was not at an earlier moment, this same thing...''.

Chappell's translation, ``What does not exist before cannot exist

later'', is even further from the Greek, since there is nothing at all in

his translation to represent the demonstrative pronoun 46. It is only too

easy to see why. Add a translation of sot& so as ``this same thing'' and

the sentence in Chappell's translation becomes so puzzling as to be

virtually meaningless: ``What does not exist before, this same thing

cannot exist later...''.

To avoid so impossible a conundrum, we have to return to the

syntax outlined above (§ 21). We have to give the demonstrative

pronoun, in both sentences, an antecedent that does indeed exist,

but that is lacking in some specification, whether a difference of

quantity (155a7-9: ``Whatever has nothing added to it nor anything

taken away from it...'') or, more generally, any difference of size or

state (155b1-2: ``What it was not, at an earlier time...''). It is true that,

in doing so, we find ourselves faced with the anomaly that, in the

latter sentence, the antecedent to the demonstrative pronoun is not,

as it was in the sentence preceding, marked by the relative pronoun;

the antecedent of the demonstrative pronoun has now (ibid.) to be

heard as the unspoken subject of the verb of which the relative pro-

noun forms the predicate. But is that too high a price to pay? The

alternative is to break the sequence of thought running throughout the

passage by introducing, at this point, an existential use of the verb,

with the demonstrative pronoun (155b1: sot& so) therefore looking back

to what, as yet, does not exist at all. A reading of the text so con-

voluted as to be hardly even possible.

23. Copulative or existential? The need to choose

Do I need to insist (cfr. supra, § 8) that the conflict between the

two uses of the verb, existential and copulative, does have to be

292 DENIS O'BRIEN

46 T. Chappell, Reading Plato's Theaetetus, cit., p. 69. Cfr. Part i, ibid. ForChappell's mistranslation of the tense of the verb, see Part i, § 11.

resolved? The doubting Thomas who thinks to make life simple for

himself and his reader by denying that there is any difference, in

Plato's Greek, between a copulative and an existential use of ei# mai,

may like to cut his teeth on a translation that blurs the difference by

giving successive uses of the verb (155b1-2: g# m and ei# mai) a different

value. ``What there was not at an earlier time, it is impossible for the

same thing to be other than that, later on...''. Rest assured, dear

reader, that not even at his most paradoxical would Socrates have

you grapple with such an impossible conundrum.

There are passages where the author makes play with the two

meanings of the verb, existential and copulative 47. But that is not

Plato's purpose here, nor does Plato have Socrates play fast and loose

with the subject of the sentence. In adopting a copulative meaning, for

both ei# mai and ci* cmerhai, in Socrates' statement of the rule (ibid.), I

exclude the possibility that the verbs are existential because the sub-

ject of the verbs is a property, not the bearer of a property. It would

seem to me casuistical, in this context, to claim that Socrates' short-

ness ``was not'' before and ``is'' later on, and that Socrates' shortness

cannot pass, from ``before'' to ``later on'', ``without having completed

a process of coming-into-being and undergoing a process of coming-

into-being''.

Admittedly, as subject of the verb for the statement of the rule,

we have only the neuter demonstrative pronoun (155b2: sot& so). Even

so, it seems to me clear enough, from the context, that the demon-

strative pronoun is a stand-in for the object which, were it to change,

would be ``larger'' or ``smaller'' (cfr. 155a2-5), would ``increase'' or

``diminish'' (cfr. 155a7-9), and therefore looks forward to Socrates

who does in fact undergo what today we would call a relative change

of size (or who would do, if he lived long enough), taller than Theae-

tetus now, shorter than Theaetetus in a year's time. The subject of the

sentence is the bearer of the property, not the property itself, the thing

293THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

47 Emped. fr. 17, 11-13 (in v. 13, e> arim is first heard existentially, with ai\e* m,and then heard linked to the phrase that follows acting as a complement to theverb). Parm. fr. 8, 5-6 (e> rsim, v. 5, is first heard existentially, with mt& m, and is thenheard linked to the adjectives that follow acting as a complement to the verb).

that ``changes'' (Socrates), not the property acquired (Socrates' ``short-

ness'' in relation to Theaetetus) 48.

24. ``Other'' in English

But this is an imperfect world. Even when all such misunder-

standings have been cleared away, there remains one point, at the

very heart of the sentence, where the English translation has difficulty

in matching the Greek. When a> kko is restored to the text, how is it to

be put into English?

In everyday English, ``other'' calls for a complement, and prefer-

ably for a complement that is not merely implied by the context, but

that is given some explicit expression, however minimal, for example

``other than that''. Hence the temptation to translate Socrates' state-

ment of the rule (155b1-2): ``What it was not, at an earlier time, for

that same thing to be other than that, later on...'', despite the fact that

there is, in the Greek text, no comparative particle (``than'') nor any

demonstrative pronoun (`̀ that''), linking ``other'' (a> kko|) to the words

that I have taken as expressing the second term of the relation (``what

it was not before'', o= lg+ pqo* seqom g# m).

If we do choose to translate the sentence in that way, we need to

recognise therefore that the addition ± the liberty that the translator

294 DENIS O'BRIEN

48 There remains one desperate remedy, which I mention here only because,if I don't, others will. The verb of the relative clause (155b1: g# m), so it may beclaimed, is to be heard with a silent complement: `̀ What was not <something> atan earlier time...''. The word enclosed in angular brackets is for many a modernphilosopher inseparable from the very notion of existence: ``To be is to be some-thing'', `̀ To be is to be the value of a variable''. Perhaps so. But even if Quine'sdictum could properly be called upon to fill out the syntax of a sentence in ancientGreek, there is nothing to be gained from the addition in the present passage. If to``be'' is to be defined as to `̀ be something'', the negation `̀ what was not <some-thing>'' presumably has to be understood as implying ``what was not <anything>'',and therefore what didn't exist at all. Socrates' argument collapses. The demon-strative pronoun in the following clause (155b1: sot& so) has lost its antecedent:``that same thing later on'' looks back to what didn't exist ``before''. As alreadynoted (supra, § 22), a conclusion so convoluted as to be hardly even possible.

would have to take, in adding to his translation words that have no

direct equivalent in the Greek ± stems simply from the English idiom.

In English, ``other'' is not used easily, if at all, without a comple-

ment 49.

25. ``Other'' in Greek (155b1: a> kko)

The same is not true of a> kko| in Greek, freely used in contexts

which do not exclude, but which give little encouragement to look for

a specific term of reference, and where the word is therefore used

more or less independently, so acquiring sufficient force to warrant

translation by ``different'' 50. For example, when the faithless lover of

the Phaedrus is shown up in his true colours, he is twice said to be

a> kko| (241a4 and 7). The implication is not merely that the wretch is

``other'' (scil. than what he was before), but that he is totally different,

barely recognisable as the ardent and devoted suitor that he had earlier

appeared to be 51.

There is the same use of the word later in our dialogue (168a2-7),

when Socrates, speaking on behalf of Protagoras, describes those who

turn to philosophy because they have conceived a ``hatred'' of their

former selves. They aim, so he tells us, to ``escape from their own

selves'' and to become a> kkoi (168a6) by ``cutting themselves off

from the person they were before''. The language could hardly be

295THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

49 See Part i, n. 13.50 See again (cfr. Part i, n. 12) L.-S.-J., s.v. a> kko|, iii 1: ``= a\kkoi& o|, of other

sort, different'', 2: various comparative uses (p. 70). Translation by `̀ different'' (formeaning iii 1) is only a pis aller. An ``independent'' use of a> kko| is not fullysynonymous with dia* uoqo|, even in texts where both words are translated bythe same word in English. The apparent synonymy arises only because `̀ other'',in English, calls for a complement, whereas ``different'' may be left without acomplement, leaving the specification of the difference to be drawn from thecontext. `̀ Different'', in English, therefore matches the syntax of an `̀ indepen-dent'' use of a> kko|, in Greek, with the result that it easily replaces ``other'' as anobvious translation for this use of the word.

51 I repeat the example given by Liddell-Scott-Jones to illustrate the first oftheir two uses, noted above (s.v., iii 1).

more forceful. Such people are not aiming to become merely ``other''

(scil. than what they were before); they mean to start out on a wholly

new way of life, as a different person altogether.

It is no doubt because a> kko| may be used more or less indepen-

dently that in our text the word can be left without either a compara-

tive particle or a ``genitive of separation'' to mark the second term of

the relationship. Even so, the use of the word here is not on all fours

with the repeated use of the word in the text quoted from the Phaedrus

and with the use of the word later in the Theaetetus, if only because, in

our text, the term of the relationship is not left to be drawn as an

implication from the general drift of the passage; it is set out explicitly

in the opening clause of the sentence, and the lack of any syntactical

connection (``other than...''), rather than giving heightened emphasis

to the degree of otherness, the implication that would attach to a fully

``independent'' use of the word, is simply a result of the inversion. It

would be clumsy to add in Greek, as ideally we would want to do in

English, a specification of the term of the relationship, however ab-

breviated (``other than that''), when the term has already been spelled

out in full in the clause preceding.

26. Socrates' intrusive negation

But there is another and more fundamental reason why a> kko, as

restored to our text (155b2), cannot properly be grouped with a> kkoi

later in the dialogue (168a6) or with the two uses of a> kko| in the

Phaedrus (241a4 and 7). When we are told that the false lover of the

Phaedrus, or the new-born philosopher later in the Theaetetus, is

``other'', the thought implied, but not stated, as the second term of

the relationship is the minimal logical implication that the person who

becomes ``other'' does so in relation to what he was before. There is no

intrusive negation as there is in Socrates' statement of the rule, where

what is ``other'' is so in relation to ``what it was not before''.That distinction lies at the heart of our enquiry. The false lover

or the new-born philosopher, in becoming ``other'', becomes other

than what he was before. Only in the convoluted statement of Plato's

296 DENIS O'BRIEN

paradox does the object in question, if ever it is to become ``other'', do

so in relation, not to what it was, but to what it was not, with the

terminus a quo of change seen, as it were retrospectively, from the

point of view of the terminus ad quem. If Socrates is taken to exemplify

the rule, then his earlier state has to be seen, not in terms of what he

was, but in terms of what he was not, as the negation of what, if and

when his ``otherness'' is ever to be realised, he will ``become''. If

Socrates is to ``become other'', he has to start out as ``not other''.

The terminus a quo is a negation of the terminus ad quem.

27. ``Other'' versus ``different''

The conceptual distinction, as so often, is essential to the choice

of translation. But the lesson to be drawn may not be obvious. The

very complexity and the convolution caused by the presence of the

negation in the expression of the terminus a quo is all the more reason,

or so it may be said, for keeping as close as possible to the wording of

the Greek, and therefore attempting to reproduce, as simply as possi-

ble, and without any additions, the syntax of the original. When used

without a comparative particle (g> , ``than''), or without a ``genitive of

separation'', a> kko| may conveniently (see supra, n. 50) be translated

not as ``other'', but as ``different''. Why not avail oneself of that

liberty here? Why not translate (cfr. 155b1-2): ``What it was not, at

an earlier time, for that same thing to be different, later on...'', so

avoiding the temptation to add words that have no direct equivalent in

the Greek (``other than that'')?

The answer is that this would be to give the game away. If we are

told, boldly and clearly, that for the object to be ``different'', it must

``become'' so, there is no reason for hesitation: if the object in question

is ever to ``become different'', then it will obviously have to become

``what it was not before''. To bring out the possibility of misunder-

standing, we have to abandon the disjunctive meaning, proclaimed

loud and clear by ``different'', and return to the comparative meaning

inherent in ``other''. Only so, do we capture something of the colour

and the tone of the original.

297THE PARADOX OF CHANGE IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS

If something is ``different'' later on, then there has all too ob-

viously been a change. With ``other'', there is room for doubt, how-

ever fleeting. The comparative meaning inherent in ``other'' calls,

quietly but insistently, for completion, ``other than...'', the ghost of

a secondary implication beckoning us on to suppose that the object in

question is ``other than what it was not before'', with all the confusing

ambiguity inherent in what thereby becomes, in effect, a repeated

negation. If Socrates ends up ``other than what he was not before'',

does he end up the same or different? Does he end up taller or shorter?

By keeping to the translation of a> kko as ``other'', and by retain-

ing therefore, though without making explicit, the comparison latent

in the very notion of ``other'' in English, as of a> kko in Greek, we

preserve something of the fluidity of the original. We see, as we might

well not do otherwise, the temptation for an over-scrupulous reader to

answer the question and remove the doubt by tampering with the text,

in order to make quite sure that what is said to be ``impossible'' is that

there has been a change with no ``becoming''. We see too, with the

clarity of hindsight, what happens when he yields to the temptation.

By the alteration of a single letter (a\kka* for a> kko), the vigilante copy-

ist removes the logical anomaly, and leaves the syntax of the sentence

in ruins 52.

CNRS ± Centre Jean PeÂpin, Parisplotinus@wanadoo.fr

298 DENIS O'BRIEN

52 Acknowledgment. Timothy Chappell, Michel Narcy and Marwan Rashedgenerously agreed to read earlier versions of the thesis set out here. I am dulygrateful to them for expressing various degrees of disbelief. Special thanks aredue to Marwan Rashed for a crucial modification of the English translation thatI had initially adopted of the sentence as emended. Michel Christiansen kindly, andvigorously, insisted on the syntactical anomaly of successive uses of a relative and ademonstrative pronoun not having an identical reference. David McKie guided mysteps on the use of a\kka* in Callimachus.