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CentralizedanddecentralizedtourismgovernanceinTurkey

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Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 859–886, 2005� 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZEDTOURISM GOVERNANCE IN TURKEY

Fisun YukselBill Bramwell

Sheffield Hallam University, UKAtila Yuksel

Adnan Menderes University, Turkey

Abstract: In many developing countries governance is highly centralized. The considerablepotential benefits of decentralization for such countries are widely espoused, but less attentionis paid to the potential difficulties and dangers. This paper develops a framework of issues toconsider when evaluating the decentralization of tourism governance, including its potentialbenefits and shortcomings. There is examination of the transfer of authority and the distribu-tion of power, legitimacy and accountability. The framework is used to assess tourism gover-nance in the Turkish coastal resort of Belek, notably the involvement of central and localgovernment, a privatized company, and a nongovernmental organization. The difficultiesand threats linked to decentralization in Belek warn against an uncritical adoption of such pol-icies. Keywords: decentralization, governance, coastal tourism, Turkey. � 2005 ElsevierLtd. All rights reserved.

Resume: La gouvernance centralisee et decentralisee du tourisme en Turquie. Dans beau-coup de pays en voie de developpement, la gouvernance est extremement centralisee. Lesbenefices de la decentralisation pour de tels pays sont generalement soutenus, mais on pretemoins d’attention aux possibles difficultes et dangers. Cet article developpe une structuretheorique pour les questions a considerer pour evaluer la decentralisation de la gouvernancedu tourisme, y compris les avantages et les desavantages eventuels. On examine le transfert del’autorite et la distribution du pouvoir, de la legitimite et de la responsabilite. La structure estutilisee pour evaluer la gouvernance du tourisme a Belek, une station cotiere turque, surtoutle role des gouvernements central et local, d’une entreprise privatisee et d’une organisationnon gouvernementale. Les difficultes et les menaces associees a la decentralisation a Belekservent d’avertissement contre l’adoption sans reserves de telles politiques. Mots-cles: decen-tralisation, gouvernance, tourisme cotier, Turquie. � 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION

Policymaking in developing countries tends to be highly centralized,with national government deciding on many policies and providingmuch of the infrastructure and services. In many of these countries,the concentration of authority and decisionmaking within the centralstate and its bureaucracies has been identified as a major obstacle to

Fisun Yuksel is Research Associate and Bill Bramwell is Reader in Tourism at SheffieldHallam University (Sheffield S1 1WB, United Kingdom. Email <w.m.bramwell@shu.ac.uk>).They share research interests in governance networks in planning and in Turkey’s tourismdevelopment. Atila Yuksel is Lecturer at Adnan Menderes University at Kusadasi in Turkeywhere he researches tourist satisfaction and destination management.

859

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more effective governance. The problem of providing public serviceshas often brought calls for the transfer of responsibility for public func-tions from the center to lower government organizations or otheragencies (Oliveira 2002; Rondinelli, McCullough and Johnson1989:57). Decentralization is believed to offer improvements in theefficiency of service delivery, and to bring decisionmaking closer tothe population. Such is its growing appeal that most developing coun-tries have claimed to pursue this policy direction. Thus, Van Lindertand Nijenhuis claim that ‘‘Almost all Latin American countries havenow introduced some form of decentralization policy’’ (2002:175).In developed countries too this has been an international trend formany areas of state responsibility (Ehrenberg 1999; Lane 2003:284).Decentralization has been described as involving ‘‘a transfer of

authority to perform some service to the public from an individual oran agency in central government to some other individual or agencywhich is ‘closer’ to the public to be served’’ (Turner and Hulme1997:152). There has been a tendency to see this process only as thedevolution of authority from central to local government, rather thanto conceive of it more broadly as any dispersal of activities from the cen-tral state. However, ‘‘new governance’’ perspectives suggest that one canexpect to see a growing range of services that formerly were delivered bynational government being provided instead in more decentralized andfragmentary arrangements involving diverse public, private and volun-tary sector organizations. Governance networks are increasingly com-plex, often being organized informally and characterized by fluidityand hybridity (Healey 1997; Rhodes 1996). Such diversity is seen as blur-ring the boundaries between the public, private, and voluntary sectors,as well as increasing the spread of authority. Thus, some researchershave broadened the notion of decentralization further to include anystructures that disperse responsibilities both within and outside the gov-ernment structure (Oliveira 2002:1714). Discussion can then includethe transfer of authority to quangos, the private sector, partnershiparrangements, and not-for-profit organizations (Rondinelli et al 1989).In the literature on tourism policymaking, this has prompted growinginterest in service planning and delivery including public-private sectorpartnerships and community forums (Araujo and Bramwell 2002; Lad-kin and Bertramini 1999; Williams, Penrose and Hawkes 1998).Many compelling arguments can be deployed to make the case for

transfers of authority from national government. With the devolutionof state powers to democratically elected local government, it can beargued that this facilitates responsiveness, because local representativesare well placed to provide what people demand. Such devolution mayalso be supported on the grounds that it encourages participation inpolicymaking and makes local political representatives more accessibleto the populace. Both of these features have potential to increase polit-ical accountability. The presumed greater political participation withdevolution is also thought to reduce the likelihood of a concentrationof power. Devolution from central to local government is also often jus-tified on the grounds that it leads to better decisionmaking and servicedelivery.

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The trend toward decentralization reflects worldwide changes in gov-ernance over recent decades. Transformations of public administrationhave been encouraged by global economic restructuring, an attach-ment to neoliberal economic philosophies and profound societalchanges. It is in this context that public administration has been af-fected by efforts to make policy processes more efficient and effective,notably by making bureaucracy smaller, moving from administration tomanagerialism, and devolving responsibilities to local government.Calls for greater direct participation by the public and interest groupsin policy arenas have also been encouraged by feelings that bureaucra-cies are remote and too often perform poorly, and that the people whoare affected by policies should be directly involved in working on them(Bramwell and Lane 2000; Healey 1997; Turner and Hulme 1997).While there are substantial pressures for change in public administra-tion, there are also important constraints on these changes, includingon decentralization. For example, it may be difficult to secure decen-tralization when central government bureaucracies are reluctant tocede power to others, and they may find indirect means to continueto meet their own priorities. Local government may also lack the re-sources necessary to respond to the enhanced responsibilities that itseeks. Moreover, poor social groups may prove to be disinterested inbecoming involved in local policy, as they are preoccupied with dailyeconomics or because of their history of exclusion fromdecisionmaking.Furthermore, there are potential dangers of decentralization. Smith

suggests that it ‘‘is too readily transformed into a value in its own rightby romantic idealization’’ (1985:25). Its use has perhaps assumedessentialist qualities—that it will result in desirable outcomes becauseof its inherent qualities—when the practice can demonstrate otherwise(Paddison 1999:108). Certainly, it can become an ideology that masksproblems. This may occur, for example, if decentralized institutionalstructures are captured by corporatist alliances between industry andgovernment that use them to suit their own interests rather than thoseof all citizens. In addition, local government might defend narrow localinterests rather than consider national priorities. When decisions aremade by numerous local units, then more resources may be neededfor administration and coordination.While decentralization may often promote more inclusive and dem-

ocratic decisionmaking, the proponents of decentralized governancerarely consider the potential constraints and dangers. If these prob-lems were better understood then implementation activity might beimproved. There is a need to move from normative propositions abouttransferring authority to critical evaluations of potential benefits andproblems based on theoretical debate and the analysis of practice. Thispaper develops a framework of issues to consider when evaluating evi-dence of decentralized tourism governance. It includes considerationof the extent of any decentralized relations and the potential benefitsand shortcomings of such relations. Because the potential advantagesof decentralization are better known, the discussion focuses more onits possible dangers. Among the issues considered in the framework

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are the distribution of authority for functions and territory, as well asthe distribution of control and power, political legitimacy, and demo-cratic accountability. The paper indicates the framework’s utility byapplying it to the coastal resort of Belek in Turkey. It assesses the ex-tent of any decentralization of tourism-related governance in Belek,including the benefits and problems of the balance between central-ized and decentralized relations, and the constraints on decentraliza-tion. The evaluation uses a constructivist approach based on viewsexpressed by actors involved in the resort’s planning, and also on thediscourses contained in a local development plan. Consideration isgiven to actors’ views on existing policymaking arrangements andon how more authority might best be transferred from centralgovernment.The resort of Belek provides an interesting context in which to exam-

ine decentralization. First, there is a prevailing centralism in publicadministration in Turkey. This reflects the legacy of ideologies of mod-ernizing nationalism and of the secularization of society (both muchinfluenced by Kemal Ataturk), with these ideologies having beenimplemented from above by a modernizing elite and a centralized state(Sapelli 1995:152). This centralism is a characteristic of many develop-ing countries (Tosun and Timothy 2001), as well as a feature of theearly development of international coastal mass tourism in certainother parts of the Mediterranean (Bramwell 2004a). Thus, Ivars de-scribes the indicative planning in Spain between 1959 and 1974 as‘‘an authoritarian, centralized kind of scheme with an expectable dem-ocratic deficit and insufficient decentralization, an aspect that mighthave helped to improve planning effectiveness’’ (2004:319).While the central state is prevalent in Turkey, very tentative steps

have been taken in a ‘‘search for a new division of labor between thedifferent levels of the state, private sector, nongovernment organiza-tions, professional, and voluntary organizations’’ (Goymen 2000:1026). The country’s political climate has become more receptive tothe principle of decentralizing some public administration, althoughpractical success has been limited (Koker 1995; OECD 1993; StatePlanning Department 1996). The national Five Year Development Plan(1996–2000) proposed a more decentralized approach, with intentionsthat the provinces, municipalities, and villages would be reformed tobe more self-sufficient, both financially and administratively. Somestate responsibilities were also to be transferred to the provinces, andlocal government’s dependence on national government was to be re-duced. But there are enormous structural obstacles to such changes,and Turkey’s severe economic difficulties in the late 90s were anotherconstraint.In this context the Turkish government occasionally has begun to

experiment with new forms of governance, including in Belek, dueto its rapid recent expansion and also to the inclusion of tourism inthe country’s high priority development sectors. Goymen argues thatthe pressures of rapid development and relatively weak local govern-ment in some resorts have meant that ‘‘it has become imperative toexperiment with new cooperative schemes and management forms,

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with the participation of new partners, capable of filling the manage-ment gap’’ (2000:1037). Experimentation was more likely because ofthe 1982 Tourism Encouragement Law, which reflected new govern-ment priorities to attract private sector involvement in tourism. TheLaw sought to reduce state investment in tourism by providing newincentives to businesses, and it added to pressures on some localauthorities by concentrating development in a few locations (Var2001:102; Yarcan and Ertuna 2002:164–7).Neoliberalism and a limited decentralization in tourism planning are

trends found in developing countries (Desforges 2001). They also oc-curred in some other Mediterranean countries after their initial phasesof growth in coastal mass tourism. In the case of Spain, tourism plan-ning between 1975 to 1982 was characterized by ‘‘a higher degree ofdecentralization, plans were study documents rather than instrumentsfor direct implementation’’(Ivars 2004:321).

CENTRALIZED AND DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE

According to Kickert, governance networks are ‘‘(more or less) sta-ble patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, whichtake shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes’’(1997:6). These networks can be variably centralized in relation tocentral government institutions. The discussion here presents a frame-work of issues to consider when evaluating the decentralization oftourism governance. However, it is not inevitable that this is the pre-valent direction of change, and this direction itself should be the sub-ject of critical evaluation. The framework focuses on the extent towhich there are decentralized relations, as well as on their potentialstrengths and shortcomings. More attention is paid in the discussionto possible disadvantages because they are less well-known than poten-tial benefits. Consideration is given to the consequences of decentral-ization for the distribution of authority for functions and territory, forcontrol and power, and for political legitimacy and democraticaccountability.

Distribution of Authority

A first issue to consider is whether decentralization does lead toauthority shifting away from the central state. This can involve twotypes of transfer. One is territorial, with power passed to a lower levelin the territorial hierarchy that is geographically closer to public serviceproviders and clients. The second is functional, that is, movement to anagency that is functionally specialized but not based at a geographicallylower tier. Authority can also be transferred within or between differ-ent types of institutions and arrangements, such as from the state tothe private sector and within public administrative or parastatal struc-tures. These features of the transfer of authority from the central gov-ernment are developed as a typology in Table 1, which draws on workby Hyden (1983) and Turner and Hulme (1997). It describes five

Table 1. Forms of Decentralization

Nature of Transferof Authority

Basis for Transfer of Authority

Territorial Functional

Within FormalPolitical Structures

Devolution Interest grouprepresentation

Within Public Administrativeor Parastatal Structures

Deconcentration Establishment of a parastatalor quango

From State Sector toPrivate Sector

Privatization of geographicallytransferred functions

Privatization of nationalfunctions

From State Sector toNGO Sector

Geographical transferof functions

Transfer of nationalfunctions

From State Sector to Public,Private and NGOSector Partnership

Geographical transferof functions

Transfer of nationalfunctions

Source: Extended from ideas developed by Hyden (1983) and Turner and Hulme (1997).

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different types of transfers of authority, with each distinguished by itsterritorial or functional basis.One type of transfer in the typology is when authority is delegated

within formal political structures. When central government gives addi-tional responsibilities to local authorities, this is called devolution.Entities that gain enhanced influence through devolution may varyin geographical scale, and could include local and provincial tiers ofgovernment. Alternatively, delegation within formal political structuresmay involve an interest group becoming represented within a stateforum, such as an industry association attending meetings of the tour-ism ministry. A second type of transfer is when authority shifts withinthe public administrative or semi-independent parastatal structures.A transfer within the public administration system is termed deconcen-tration, such as from the headquarters of the tourism ministry (oftenlocated in the national capital) to its provincial branches. Most devel-oping countries have administrative structures where some functionsare delegated to public officials at a more local geographical scale. Thisgives responsibilities to officials appointed by the central state ratherthan to local community representatives who are locally accountable.Thus, deconcentration may raise government efficiency rather thanpromote local democracy. Alternatively, the transfer of authority mayinvolve establishing a parastatal agency, these often being semi-inde-pendent and located outside the regular government structure (Rondi-nelli et al 1989:74). This could include a national tourism board beingestablished outside of the ministry.The third type of transfer, that of privatization, occurs when a state

institution cedes some authority to a private sector organization, eitherat a lower geographical tier or at the national scale. Thus, certain devel-opment functions could be transferred to a private sector company.Privatization became a common approach in developing countries

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from the 80s, often reflecting neoliberal, market-oriented views whichfavored the ‘‘rolling back’’ of the state and greater private sectorinvolvement, and it was sometimes introduced in combination withmacroeconomic stabilization measures. In tourism it was often influ-enced by beliefs that the state had other demands on its capital re-sources, that it had limited expertise, and that commercial businessescan be more responsive to tourist demands (Jenkins 1994:5). A fourthtype of altered authority involves its delegation from the state to a non-governmental organization, that is to an agency bringing together indi-viduals sharing a common purpose within civil society. This ‘‘thirdsector’’ may include international and national nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), such as environmental and grassroots entitiesoperating in a limited area, such as community groups and coopera-tives. Examples are community and wildlife organizations undertakingtourism-related development and management in a national park. Inthe 80s the NGO sector moved to center stage in many developingcountries in terms of the development debate and related practice(Turner and Hulme 1997:202). Finally, the transfer can be from a stateinstitution to a partnership involving various organizations, which mayor may not include the public sector. Partnership organizations areincreasingly common in tourism. As with the other types of transfersof authority, this may involve the delegation of functions either to alower territorial scale or else at the national level.Typologies such as in Table 1 simplify real-life situations that actually

are much more complex. They are merely heuristic devices to aidunderstanding, and there should not be a presumption that specificpractical instances will conform exactly to ‘‘ideal type’’ features. Inpractice there are often multiple combinations of balances of authoritywithin public policy networks. For example, there may be both devolu-tion and deconcentration in a ‘‘mixed authority’’, that is, an organiza-tion where authority is shared among both elected representatives andpublic sector officials. Analysis of decentralization should also focus onprocesses and trends, while typologies sometimes focus more on staticfeatures.

Distribution of Control and Power

A second issue to consider is whether decentralization genuinelystrengthens control and power beyond the central state. Here somecommentators might contend that devolution from central to localgovernment is the only acceptable decentralization form, because onlythen is greater control gained by the democratically elected govern-ment tier that is territorially closest to the public. There are many po-tential ways in which decentralization policies may be frustrated inpractice. Thus, central bureaucracies may continue to retain controlover certain matters and keep executive powers to alter the system.Other organizations gaining enhanced powers may further fail to getthe technical and administrative support required from central govern-ment (Rondinelli et al 1989:77). Policies to disperse powers can also

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face problems due to the undemocratic influences in society. Powerfulactors in civil society may attempt to subvert, rather than promote, thedesired dispersal of control and power to a range of parties. As Mercerargues in the context of developing countries, ‘‘civil society has no pre-determined essential qualities and is as likely to be riven with corrup-tion and undemocratic practice as is the state’’ (2003:748). Further,power relations between civil society and state actors can lead to corpo-ratism in the form of private agreements or practices brokered betweenelite actors and the state for mutual rather than societal benefit, or toclientelism, entailing patronage relationships between governmentand selected actors, with both limiting the dispersal of influence andpower (Bramwell 2003). Young (1990) argues that one reason for theseconstraints is that interest group pluralism makes no distinction be-tween claims to seek justice or democracy and the potential assertionof selfish interests.Transfers of authority from the state will be more effective if politi-

cians and bureaucrats at higher levels are strongly committed to atransfer of decisionmaking and resources to lower administrative levelsor other agencies. But in practice these actors can be intensely jealousof such transfers. They may extol the virtues of dispersing power, butthen they may neglect, resist, or sabotage it. Thus, when others submitplans they may find their funding from above is already earmarked inways that are inconsistent with their wishes (Crook and Manor1994:221,215).In more diffuse governance networks, the center may still attempt to

retain its control and secure its own policy priorities. It may steer thenetworks in their preferred ways using indirect management, such asthrough cultural persuasion and communication and monitoring tech-niques, as well as using direct management, through financial subsi-dies, structural reform, and more (Bramwell 2004b; Few 2001; Stoker1999; Twyman 2000). Such steering by the central state can be easierwhen decentralized institutions depend significantly on it for funding.Turner and Hulme conclude that substantial devolution from centralto local government rarely occurs, suggesting that ‘‘most decentraliza-tions have ensured that there is considerable central government influ-ence and control over sub national government’’ (1997:160). Policiesclaiming to enhance local autonomy may actually conceal and alsolegitimize substantial continued state influence, providing effectiverule ‘‘at a distance’’ without resort to direct control or conditionality.Decentralization might function as a mode of rhetoric or as a superfi-cial performance of new relationships that actually alters little (Mercer2003:746–748). Nevertheless, there will be limits on the center’s abilityto steer a complex governance network.Organizations gaining decentralized functions need adequate re-

sources to be able to perform them. They need funding, professionalskills, buildings and equipment commensurate with the public servicesthey are expected to deliver (Crook and Manor 1994:226). When alocal authority gains additional responsibilities from central govern-ment, it may struggle because of its weak institutional capacity and lim-ited human and other resources, while money provided for it by the

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 867

center may be limited and already earmarked for certain activities (Oli-veira 2002:1731). Unfortunately, governments may expect the transferof functions to be a method to curtail public expenditure, and this maycripple the organizations gaining new responsibilities, boost popularcynicism about government, and wreck decentralization’s potentialbenefits. A lack of capacity to perform new roles can mean that servicesdecline in quality instead of being delivered more efficiently, such asthrough the use of local knowledge. In addition, another aim of devo-lution to local government may be to promote local-level resourcemobilization, notably through increased local taxation. But in realitythe potential to achieve that can be limited. A major constraint on localelected bodies imposing additional taxes can be that the residents aretoo poor to pay more.

Distribution of Public Participation and Political Legitimacy

A third issue to examine is whether decentralized governance doesserve to strengthen public participation in policy processes and alsoto enhance the political legitimacy of arenas outside the central state.Direct public participation potentially can build public support, in-crease understanding of issues of popular concern, and demonstratethat governance is responsive and accountable. Direct participationby the public in policy processes may be easier to secure at local geo-graphical scales. One dimension of this is the vitality and legitimacyof the organizations in civil society, such as environmental groupsand residents’ associations, that could be engaged in less centralizedpolicy arrangements. Difficulty can occur if there is a transfer ofauthority to NGOs and local social groupings when there is little tradi-tion of such associations in civil society or of their participation in pol-icymaking. Pickvance (1997:137) argues that in eastern Europe thetendency towards decentralization of the political arena to local geo-graphical scales has not necessarily promoted democratization, as ithas not always been accompanied by development of the ability of cit-izens to exercise their democratic rights. He takes as a key index of theability to apply democratic rights the ease with which NGOs and socialmovements in civil society can form and develop and are successful inachieving their aims. But such groups may not form easily due torepression, due to familial or political networks providing more effec-tive ways to secure desired outcomes, or because of skepticism as towhether such groups will be effective.A further consideration is whether or not a dispersal of central state

powers involves a strengthening of democratic accountability. The var-ied types of transfers of authority tend to be associated with differingforms and degrees of public accountability. Thus, with devolution tolocal government, accountability is usually through the mechanismof local elections. By contrast, with deconcentration the reporting linesusually occur within the state bureaucracy and then ultimately tonational political leaders. The accountability structures for mutualbenefit of NGOs, (those seeking to provide benefits only to their

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membership) are reasonably straightforward as they generally reportto their members. However, accountability is often much less clearfor those nongovernment organizations seeking to provide benefitsto society at large. The process of transferring state authority towardscivil society serves to externalize the political process, and one conse-quence is that accountability becomes more diffuse, which clearly haspotential dangers for democracy. Thus, when authority is privatizedto a commercial operator or is transferred to parastatals, quangos, part-nerships, or NGOs, then the lines of accountability become less clear,even if they are specified in legal documents. The architecture of anygovernance reforms needs to include clear mechanisms for account-ability and transparency to the citizenry as a whole. Ribot (2002) arguesthat with decentralization to subordinate tiers of government and civilsociety in developing countries, the organizations thus empoweredmust ensure they are downwardly accountable.It is essential that changes in governance are considered in relation

to their consequences for the efficiency and effectiveness of policyprocesses. This includes their implications for improved interorganiza-tional cooperation, for avoiding unnecessary duplication of responsi-bilities, and for the coordination of activities. Another keyconsideration is their success in meeting goals, such as a certain levelof service delivery. These goals may be identified in legislation or inorganizational missions. Effectiveness can also be judged through theopinions of relevant actors, or else by external evaluative criteria devel-oped by the researcher. The administrative, coordination, and othercosts of meeting policy purposes may be minimized through someforms of governance and increased with others. The more efficientthe mechanisms used to reach a given goal, the more society can spendon other objectives.

Tourism Development in Belek

The framework of issues that has been explained is used to evaluatethe scope and character of decentralized governance related to devel-opment in the Turkish coastal resort of Belek. This is a new resort thathas experienced rapid, large-scale growth. It is located 40 kms from thecity of Antalya on the Mediterranean coast (Figure 1). The coast herewas largely undeveloped prior to its designation as a ‘‘Tourism Invest-ment Area’’ by the Ministry of Tourism in 1986, and plans subse-quently were drawn up for 23 hotel sites providing a total of 20,000beds, a conference center, two theme parks, and five golf courses(DHKD 1996:26; Temimhan 1999; Yuksel 2002). Hotel constructionbegan in 1990, and it was reported in 1998 that work was completedon 25 hotels, holiday villages, or tourism complexes, with a total of21,900 beds (Ozkan 1998). The resort is geared largely to beach andsun tourism. In 1995, it attracted about 150,000 tourists who mainlywere brought by tour operators based outside Turkey. Most were Ger-mans and Russians, and only about 10–15% were Turkish (DHKD1996:32). There are four clusters of resort facilities in Belek, which

Figure 1. The Resort of Belek

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 869

fringe the coast and are set amid an extensive pine forest and sanddunes. While the environmental impacts are reduced by the buildingsbeing set back behind the beach, the area has still been damaged eco-logically and many local residents feel they gain few benefits from tour-ism (DHKD 1996:30). There has also been intense pressure to buildsummer or second homes behind the coastal belt, with many of theseconstructed haphazardly and some lacking public utilities. Nearly 4,000second homes were built in Belek between 1990 and 1997 (Ozkan1998).Tourism governance in Belek has characteristics found in other rap-

idly developing coastal areas in Turkey. These features include the cen-tralism in public administration, and some other areas have begun toreflect recent trends towards neoliberalism and a restricted decentral-ization. But two aspects of Belek’s governance are unusual amongTurkish resorts. First, there has been privatization of tourism-relatedfunctions that in other resorts are still undertaken by central govern-ment. The Belek Tourism Investors’ Association (Betuyab) was estab-lished in 1990 in order to assist the Ministry of Tourism withfunding, constructing, and managing the resort’s infrastructure. Thestate has leased development sites to individual businesses that weremembers of Betuyab. A second feature of Belek’s governance that isuncommon in Turkey was the involvement of an NGO—the Societyfor Nature Protection in Turkey (DHKD)—in drawing up a develop-ment plan for the area. Work on the plan was led by the DHKD, andit was substantially funded by the World Bank. The DKDT subsequentlybecame World Wide Fund for Nature Turkiye. Their involvement was

870 DECENTRALIZED GOVERNANCE

prompted by concern about tourism impacts on Belek’s beach, animportant nesting site for globally threatened marine turtles (BedekaProject 2003; Demirayak 1999).

Study Methods

Belek’s governance is examined using an institutional approach thatconsiders how such networks could have influenced participation inthe policy process, promoted the inclusion and exclusion of issuesfrom the agenda, and enhanced or reduced democratic accountability.The analysis also adopts an actor-centered perspective that focuses onhow actors conceived of the various institutions and also acted in rela-tion to them. Governance networks are not treated as social structuresfrom which one could read off the interests, beliefs, and actions of indi-viduals, being determined by each person’s ‘‘objective’’ position in anorganization or network. Instead, they are regarded as being enactedby individuals, with their beliefs and actions creating, sustaining, ormodifying the networks of institutions. Use is made of a constructivistapproach involving microanalysis that builds up a multifaceted pictureof the way several actors understood and reacted to the networks, andof how they were actively engaged in constituting them.The approach taken was to conduct semistructured interviews with

30 people from the diverse parties affected by Belek’s growth whohad participated in devising the DHKD development plan. They wereidentified from those mentioned in the plan and also through a snow-ball technique where respondents were asked to identify other partic-ipants in the planning. Only two people refused an interview. Seveninterviewees were from central government (including the Governor,Planning Coordinator, and Director of the Tourism Directorate of An-talya province), ten from local government, five from private sectororganizations, six from NGOs (including the DHKD and academics in-volved in research for the plan), and two were local people (a formervillage headman and a teacher). Of these respondents, 28 were inter-viewed in two stages so that issues of Belek’s governance could be dis-cussed in depth, with the duration of both interview stages averagingabout two hours. A group interview was also held with ten villagersand their village headman. The interviews were tape-recorded andtranscribed, and relevant themes were identified from the transcriptsby two independent researchers using NUD.IST computer software.When differences emerged in the identified themes, they were dis-cussed until an agreed interpretation was established. In addition tointerviews, there was analysis of the discourses or narratives containedin the DHKD development plan for Belek.This account of Belek’s governance utilizes the framework of issues

previously developed to assess the extent to which it was centralizedor decentralized, and to evaluate the potential benefits and shortcom-ings of any decentralizing trend. Discussion is organized around keyinstitutions in the resort’s development, and it relates largely to thesituation in 2000 when the interviews took place.

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 871

Institutions and Decentralization in Belek

Turkey’s governance is strongly centralized, with considerable powervested in national government, in the President’s office, Council ofMinisters, and ministries (Mahalli _Idareler 2003:2). The State PlanningDepartment’s five-year national development plans exemplify the cen-tralized policy process (State Planning Department 1996). That processis also evident in tourism, which after the 1980 coup became a highdevelopment priority (Goymen 2000; Korzay 1994; Toledo 1985; Tosunand Timothy 2001; TYD 1992; Yuksel, Bramwell and Yuksel 1999). The1982 ‘‘Tourism Encouragement Law’’ sought to maximize the benefitsof new investment by concentrating it into priority geographical zones,including Tourism Investment Areas (Var 2001:101). Coordination oftourism development in Belek was assigned to the Ministry of Tourism,which subsequently gave leases for this state-owned land to developers(DHKD 1996:34). In the interviews as many as 15 of the 30 respondentscriticized the extent to which central government influenced Belek’sdevelopment. One cause for complaint was that to secure action lo-cally, they often had to lobby parliamentary representatives or minis-tries in Ankara, thus adding to the considerable national governmentbureaucracy and reducing direct democratic accountability withinBelek itself.The tourism ministry had much influence in Belek, but politically it

had a lower ranking than several other ministries, and it often requiredpermissions from them before it could act. This form of centralized gov-ernance had not encouraged clear lines of policymaking, and insteadthere were overlapping responsibilities, complex ministerial hierar-chies, and difficulties of coordination. A tourism ministry official com-plained that other government departments ‘‘clog our progress due tothe powers resulting from their higher position’’. A particular problemfor this ministry was that to alter land use and construction plans, it re-quired the approval of the Ministry of Work and Resettlement. As manyas 16 of the 30 respondents thought the tourism ministry was relativelyineffective in Belek, many attributing this to its having less influencethan its counterparts. There were also conflicts between governmentdepartments due to their differing priorities for Belek’s development,such as in relation to development proposals at Kumkoy (Demirayak1997). This area had been designated a tourism center by the ministry,but following lobbying by the DHKD it was declared a ‘‘Grade One Nat-ural Conservation Area’’ by the Ministry of Culture. When the ministryappeared to support a proposal for a marina there, it was blocked by theculture ministry, because it was a protected area. Further, as many as 14of the 30 respondents claimed Belek’s development planning washindered by competition for prestige among the ministries.

Provincial Government and Municipalities

Central government in Turkey includes administrative organiza-tions in Ankara and also in the provinces and districts. Provincial gov-ernment implements decisions on behalf of the center, based on the

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transfer of authority through deconcentration. In each province thereis a governor who, as the representative of the state, is appointed by theCouncil of Ministers (OECD 1993). The governor is head of the pro-vincial units of the central administration and also of the provincialassembly or council, the latter being a locally elected body (Mahalli_Idareler 2003; Shinn 1980:200). Provincial government responsibilitiesinclude public works, education and training, public health, and theimplementation of settlement development plans for rural areas. Localrespondents in this study depicted Antalya’s provincial government aslargely controlled by the national center, with its work often led by theprovincial units of federal government. Thus, Antalya’s provincialauthority was perceived locally as representing the deconcentrationrather than the devolution of central administration, with relatedimplications for the distribution of control, power, and accountability.Local authorities in Turkey have devolved powers, as they are outside

of the central administration and deliver local public services. Onelocal authority type is the municipality, which can be established in set-tlements with over 2000 residents, with members elected for five years.Municipalities have powers in relation to urban planning, regulation ofconstruction, granting building permits, and the provision of water,sewage, and gas infrastructure (Unal 1992; Yeter 1993). But, despitethe devolved authority of local government, central administrationhas retained substantial control over the municipalities, this oftenbeing applied by the Ministry of the Interior and provincial governors(Kocdemir 1998; Toledo 1985; Unal 1992). Central administrative con-trol is exercised over their decisions, activities, organization, and per-sonnel (Donmez 1999; Mahalli _Idareler 2003:3). Further, thenational government draws up settlement development and tourismplans, and the municipalities are expected to implement these evenif they are disliked (Soybay 1995). In practice, the duties of local gov-ernment are also sometimes performed by the provincial units of thecentral state. In such ways, the latter has continued firmly to directand steer the country’s municipalities.In Belek the municipalities had only a modest influence on local gov-

ernance. One reason was that Kadriye, Belek, and Karadayi becameseparate municipalities only in the mid-90s, following populationgrowth induced by tourism, and thus they lacked experience and facil-ities (Adaman 1995). As with other Turkish municipalities, they werealso very short of finance (Tortop 1988; TID 1995). In the mid-90s,spending by local authorities of all types only represented about 13%of national public expenditure (Yalcndag 1999). Many intervieweesidentified Belek’s municipalities as institutions with few resources attheir disposal. One former Mayor criticized how local authorities wereresponsible for diverse activities despite lacking the necessary funds,with this difficulty increased by the resort’s expansion. The industrycreated acute problems as state funding of local government took ac-count of the resident population but not the number of tourists andtemporary hotel workers. Belek’s municipalities also struggled to deli-ver services due to the rapidly growing local population and the prolif-eration of second homes. Their resource problems help to explain why

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 873

many summer home owners paid to join a local association, the Asso-ciation of Second Homes Cooperatives in Serik, that provided drinkingwater and sewage disposal services (DHKD 1996:29–30).Underfunding of the municipalities by central government had very

adverse consequences for effective policies for the environment andstrategic land-use planning. Some respondents suggested that lack ofresources had tempted the municipalities to permit additional houseconstruction so as to raise more local taxes. A provincial official com-plained that the ‘‘municipalities apply different ‘solutions’ to bridgetheir deficits, such as encouraging more summer house developmentin the area’’. Some of these developments were also illegal (DHKD1996:36). According to a central government representative,‘‘although the existing construction plan only allows two storey build-ings in the region, these mayors used to, and still do, condone the ille-gal construction of five- and six-storey buildings. The higher thenumber of floors the higher the tax that they will earn from the hous-ing’’. Further, the resource problem could encourage municipalities torequest donations or charge questionable levies, making them vulner-able to subsequent requests for favors, and thus reducing their politicallegitimacy. One former mayor described how

we have worked closely with cooperative owners and hoteliers. Whenthe municipal budget was tight, we summoned these people to see usto explain the situation, and to ask them for their generous dona-tions. Without them we would not have been able to deliver the ser-vices within the budget allocated by central government. Of coursethe contribution of these people to the municipal budget was notunconditional. The process was like you scratch my back and I’ll scratchyours.

Another respondent complained that ‘‘collecting funds from bars,shops, or restaurant owners through issuing them an operating permitis a rampant practice. . ., but later the municipalities accede to theillegal wishes of these individuals’’.The potential for Belek’s municipalities to mobilize additional finan-

cial resources from local residents through taxation rather than fromthe state was limited, not least because many were small-scale farmersand were very poor. Further, there was much skepticism in Belek aboutlocal government’s ability to deliver even basic services and abouthow the municipalities would use additional funding, from whateversource. The municipalities would probably need to gain back somelegitimacy and public confidence before their residents would notresist paying more local taxes and also would participate more fullyin their activities. Here, attempts to strengthen this government tierwould be hindered by a vicious circle where poor local governmentperformance has inspired cynicism (Crook and Manor 1994:216).Many interviewees (17 of the 30) thought Belek’s municipalities

were not carrying out their development and planning tasks effectively.They attributed this to several problems, notably to the public admin-istrative system being so centralized (mentioned by 16 respondents),control resting with central government (14), organizations having

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overlapping responsibilities (12), and municipalities lacking eitherfinancial resources (12) or human resources (12). According to theDHKD report, there were also problems due to ‘‘a lack of communica-tion between municipalities and local populations’’, so that ‘‘people ofthe region are not inclined to participate in local government and deci-sionmaking processes’’ (1996:46). The municipalities probably wouldbenefit from encouraging greater participation by the public and localgroups in Belek so as to gain popular support, increase their under-standing of local issues, and demonstrate their responsiveness andaccountability.

Belek Tourism Investors’ Association

Betuyab was a private sector company that brought together com-mercial businesses investing in hotels and other facilities in Belek’sTourism Investment Area. Its formation was facilitated by the 1982Tourism Encouragement Law. It was an unusual organization in Tur-key and it reflected neoliberal shifts in Turkey’s tourism developmentpolicies, with government halting its earlier investment in accommoda-tion and encouraging private sector involvement through variousincentives, including the provision of loans and long-term leases fordevelopment on state-owned land. Betuyab’s private sector memberscontributed one third of the cost of Belek’s infrastructure, such asthe roads and sewage systems, with the rest funded by the tourism min-istry (DHKD 1996:29). It worked closely with this ministry in fundingand supervising the installation of this infrastructure.Interviewees employed by Betuyab acknowledged that they under-

took tasks that normally would be undertaken by provincial units ofthe tourism, environment, and culture ministries. This company waswidely regarded as a local counterpart of central government, withmany noting that it represented a substantial transfer of control andpowers from the state. The DHKD report described it as ‘‘exercisinga de facto public authority in the Belek coastal region’’ (DHKD1996:33). Betuyab lacked a clear legal basis in legislation, but itsstrength came from its impressive financial resources, with many largebusinesses and corporations among its members, and from its politicalconnections. A DHKD representative concluded that ‘‘Betuyab is theking of the area at the moment. While they do not have authority inlegislation, through using their political ties, they act as if they havebeen thus empowered’’.Betuyab represents the privatization of central government func-

tions, with its commercial organizations taking on the developmentof national property, the provision of accommodation, and part ofthe cost and organization of providing public infrastructure in the re-sort. But this transfer of functions did not also promote a substantialterritorial delegation, as most of Betuyab’s commercial members werebased in Istanbul and Ankara (DHKD 1996:33). The association alsoworked closely with the tourism ministry in developing Belek, withina corporatist arrangement. Privatization in this case provided a signifi-

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 875

cant opportunity for a limited circle of investors drawn from economicand political elites to work with central government officials, and as aresult these investors could accumulate additional power and wealth.These economic actors had been able to gain and control propertyrights through the combination of their access to privileged powerwithin the state and also from their construction of a network of severalfirms. The interview responses reveal concerns about the corporatistrelations between Betuyab and the government, and also the transferof state-owned land to a private company. There were concerns tooabout the largely external sources of the investment in Belek. Theseanxieties were held despite the speed with which this agency had se-cured investment in the area and despite the resulting rapid increasein tourism.Betuyab provided some services, such as garbage collection and fire

fighting, that normally would be delivered by the municipalities, lar-gely because of local government’s lack of resources. For that reasonit also directly assisted Belek municipality, with some of its membersjoining the Belek council. Many local respondents considered thatthe municipalities were weakly positioned relative to Betuyab due tothe latter’s notable financial and political advantages. One argued that‘‘our mayor has to get along very well with Betuyab as he knows thatthey are powerful and influential in relation to the central authorities;he doesn’t want to contradict them in any way’’. The DHKD report sta-ted that ‘‘local governments perceive the tourism investors as a sectorexerting economic, political, and other real forms of power which theyfeel unsupported and powerless to confront or counteract’’ (1996:35).There was some resentment from local government about the consid-erable power held by Betuyab. An official of this organization claimedthat the municipalities ‘‘have not been able to stomach the existence ofour organization. To be honest with you, they take our organization asa mine from which at any time they can take away resources necessaryfor their existence’’.There was only limited participation by local actors in Betuyab, so

that control and power lay largely with businesses and institutions out-side the area. This company organization was criticized because ‘‘localgovernment units and representatives are not present at meetings inwhich major decisions regarding the region are made’’, although inpart this may simply have reflected the weaknesses in local government.An associated problem was that its ‘‘composition, structure, and mis-sion are unfamiliar and indeed opaque to the local community, thuscreating negative feelings’’. It was claimed that the ‘‘locals have beenneither consulted nor included in any aspect of the developmentprocess and its commercial opportunities’’, and as a consequencethere was ‘‘growing social unrest in local communities’’ (DHKD1996:33,15). Some local parties also argued that the transfer of powersto Betuyab from the tourism ministry was illegitimate since it lacked aformal legal basis. In sum, there was a local perception that this orga-nization manifested a deficit in democratic accountability and that itlacked political legitimacy, with many respondents being suspiciousof it and some even quite hostile to it.

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Local actors also felt that Betuyab had implemented policies thatprovided insufficient benefits, while they had delivered large rewardsto a few businesses based outside the area. In particular, it was felt thatthis organization had paid inadequate attention to integrating the re-sort zones with the region’s economy and job markets. One criticismwas that the hotels did not support local businesses: ‘‘Hotel managerscomplain of illegal local tradespeople, and do not buy from local farm-ers, since they are more connected to distributors from major cities’’.There was also resentment that there was no public transport betweenthe hotels and villages, which reduced employment benefits for localsand also tourist expenditure in the region. Several locals were criticalof the all-inclusive holidays provided by many hotels. One complainedthat ‘‘the shopkeepers will suffer great losses, and eventually will be-come bankrupt, as long as the hoteliers continue to sell their roomsas all-inclusive’’. According to the DHKD report, the ‘‘hotel investorsare. . . not contributing to the integration of the local community, sincethey monopolize touristic services and show no interest in takingadvantage of local production and employment offerings’’(1996:33,47). Many locals also resented being stopped by hotel securitystaff from using beaches near the hotels.

Society for Nature Protection in Turkey

One reason why Belek’s governance was unusual in Turkey was thatan NGO—the Society for Nature Protection in Turkey (the DHKD)—intervened to produce a development plan for the area. Central gov-ernment in Turkey normally would undertake such a task. Between1994 and 1996, this national environmental NGO led developmentof the ‘‘Belek Management Plan’’, with this organization interveningbecause of its considerable concerns about resort development harm-ing the marine turtles that nest on the beach (Aureggi 2003). Its planwas a ‘‘land-use management plan based on the physical and ecologicalfeatures of the area’’, with specific uses proposed for the designatedzones so as to conserve ecological resources (DHKD 1996:Summaryand 46). It also covered broad economic, social, and environmental is-sues related to tourism development, and it sought to enhance the ben-efits from tourism for residents (Belek Tourism Center 2003; DHKD1996:Forward).The plan by the DHKD posed several challenges to Turkey’s tradi-

tion of centralized state governance. First, this national NGO led inter-vention in a policy function normally undertaken by the central state,although territorial decentralization was much less evident as it was it-self a national organization (also with links to the international envi-ronmental NGO, the World Wide Fund), and although it did open alocal office for its work in Belek. Second, in devising the plan, theDHKD adopted both consultative and partnership approaches, work-ing with several researchers, consulting with individuals, and also host-ing meetings involving key actors. A draft of the plan was sent to allmain organizations and investors for their comment (DHKD

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 877

1996:Acknowledgements and Forward). Thus, although the planlacked statutory or legal status, the process of developing itinvolved some dispersal of control, power, and accountability to multi-ple parties. This participative approach to planning is unusual inTurkey.Third, the plan advocated establishing a partnership approach to the

area’s governance that would continue to engage many of the affectedparties in refining and implementing the development policies. It sug-gested that this strategy should be led by a new local partnership orga-nization ‘‘involving key national and local institutions which wouldoversee the construction and operation of infrastructural facili-ties and co-ordinate land-use planning’’ (DHKD 1996:Summary). Itfavored the establishment of a public-private sector organizationthat would replace the exclusively private sector Betuyab (DHKD1996:62). This was conceived as a widely-drawn partnership, but withthe public sector as the majority partner. The plan also endorsed theapproach adopted in another coastal area in Turkey (in South Ant-alya), where a public-private sector company, including local govern-ment, had been established to construct and operate environmentalinfrastructure facilities, with support from the tourism ministry. Theapproach used there was based on the principle that utility serviceswould be operated by the private sector, while ownership of the fixedassets would remain with the public authorities (Arısoy 1999:35–6).Finally, the plan endorsed the establishment of an association of

local authorities in the area in order to increase the power and influ-ence of individual municipalities and to improve the coordinationand quality of their planning, management, and service delivery(DHKD 1996:62). In Turkey, local authority associations are allowedas a means to assist neighboring areas to work together to address com-mon issues. The formation and policies of these associations need tobe approved by Turkey’s Council of Ministers, or by a provincial gover-nor if they are in just one province. The implication of the proposalsfor organizational changes contained in the DHKD-led plan is thatsome control and powers would be transferred on a permanent basisfrom the central state and also from Betuyab. But in practice theDHKD lacked the authority, and also the political influence, to securethe implementation of these ideas.Still many actors involved in devising the Belek Management Plan

considered that the DHKD’s participative approach to this processhad not been a success. Only 7 of the 30 respondents considered thatthe various participating organizations had worked together effectively.There was a widely-held view that the process had failed to dispersemuch power to the multiple actors and also had not led to a sharedview being reached. These related failures were attributed to severalfactors. A significant proportion felt that while their concerns had beenlistened to, subsequently they had been incorporated inadequately inthe plan’s proposals. Several considered that the failure to build a con-sensus was due to marked differences in the actors’ values and priori-ties, and the DHKD workers claimed it was due to developmenthaving already begun so that attitudes had already hardened. Several

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respondents thought the difficulties were related to the tradition ofpolicies being made in top-down fashion by central government, sothat an established culture of joint decisionmaking was lacking. Therewas also a belief that the more influential organizations saw little rea-son to work closely with others, and also that they did not want to sharetheir authority with others. Some central government respondentsattributed these difficulties to the novelty of an organization in civilsociety taking the lead role in such work. In addition, the DHKD inter-viewees admitted that some parties were suspicious of them becausethey were an environmental organization and thus might give priorityto environmental issues rather than to residents’ socioeconomic wel-fare. One of these respondents conceded that because ‘‘we had gainedan image as an organization resisting every development, we had lostfavor among local people’’.It should be recognized that, while the DHKD could lobby policy-

makers and also influence public understanding at national level, itlacked power in terms of formal authority, political access, and finan-cial resources (Bramwell 2004a). It was not invited to devise the devel-opment plan by the government and it lacked close ties with influentialnational politicians and bureaucrats. It did not have a history of strongroots in Belek’s social and political networks, and it lacked strong rea-sons to be accountable to the area’s residents rather than to its ownmembership and to the plan’s funding sponsor, the World Bank. Ithad no authority to impose its policy recommendations on other par-ties. Further, towards the end of the research period, it faced severefinancial difficulties and it had to withdraw from its earlier active rolein the area. Evidently, it was not easy for this NGO to overcome its dif-ficulties in Belek.

Preferences for Decentralization

The 30 respondents were asked to comment on their preferred orga-nizational arrangement in a hypothetical scenario where more author-ity for Belek’s planning was transferred from central government. Themost popular response to this scenario was for authority to be gainedby some form of partnership (favored by 12 respondents), followedby devolution to municipalities (preferred by 10 respondents). Decon-centration to a regional unit of central government was favored by onlyfive interviewees, all of them central government staff. The least pre-ferred option was privatization, this being favored by only three, allbeing Betuyab employees. Privatization was specifically singled outfor criticism by several respondents from central and local governmentand from the DHKD. Their views about privatization related to theirexperiences of Betuyab and their concerns about its corporatist rela-tions with government, its lack of local accountability and legitimacy,and the limited benefits for residents resulting from its encouragementof enclave urban development.The most popular response to the scenario was to establish a partner-

ship, this being either a combination of central and local government,

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 879

or else a public-private sector collaboration that might also includeNGO participation. Such joint working was supported by some respon-dents from the national ministries, provincial government, the munic-ipalities, and DHKD, with no respondents strongly opposed. Someconcluded that national government and municipalities needed tocombine their respective strengths and that they are less effective work-ing independently. However, NGO participation in shared workingwould likely be hindered by the limited number of local associationsin Belek. Research conducted for the DHKD plan found that locallythere was ‘‘a serious absence of nongovernmental organizations, notonly for environmental purposes, but for other social, cultural, andeconomic purposes as well’’, the only significant exceptions beingcooperatives for house construction and for taxi and ‘‘minibus’’ oper-ators (DHKD 1996:30). The presence of NGOs in civil society in anarea is an important indicator of the locality’s ‘‘institutional thickness’’and of the potential vitality and legitimacy of initiatives to widen grass-roots involvement in decentralized policymaking (Amin and Thrift1995).The favored way to decentralize planning for many respondents in

local government, and some in the DHKD, was to devolve more author-ity to the municipalities. But this potential approach was criticized asinappropriate by several government ministry and Betuyab staff. TwoBetuyab respondents accepted that the municipalities ought to havea key role, but they feared that it would lead to environmental damageif they gained more development powers. One of them explained:‘‘Look at the destruction of the natural environment occurring inthe majority of areas opened to tourism development in the country.In my opinion, the greatest responsibility for this problem rests withour municipalities and their unlimited authority in relation to build-ing construction’’. There were also concerns that the municipalitiesdirected favors to their political supporters through clientelism(Gunes�-Ayata 1994:49). A private sector respondent argued that ifthe municipalities were given ‘‘full authority to control resources, thenyou will have to put up with dire consequences, as resources will bewasted in order to get individual gains’’. A tourism ministry officialwas concerned that if the municipalities had more powers ‘‘there arestrong local forces, which a mayor cannot stand up to’’. These viewslend support to the conclusion that for many the municipalities lackedsome political legitimacy.Many felt that greater planning authority could be devolved to the

municipalities only if certain conditions were met. It was consideredimportant for the national agencies to stop treating municipalities lar-gely as an extension of their own influence to be directed and steeredbased on their own priorities. As one ex-mayor argued, the ministries‘‘need to give up the traditional conception of viewing municipalitiesas organizations operating under their strict order and control. Theyneed to show a bit of confidence in local government’s capacity tobring local solutions to local problems’’. Many stressed the importanceof municipalities gaining additional resources, including the recruit-ment of well-qualified professional staff, so as to match any increased

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responsibilities. According to the DHKD plan, Belek’s residents wereuninterested in engaging with local government because they consid-ered it would be unproductive due to its limited powers (DHKD1996:33). One NGO respondent asserted that ‘‘because local authori-ties are not empowered to be active in serving public needs, local peo-ple find participation to be inconsequential’’.Residents’ disinclination to participate in local government was also

attributed to the municipalities failing to communicate regularly withthem and also to them not listening to their views (DHKD 1996:30,46; Yalcndag 1999). A typical comment of the villagers who were inter-viewed was ‘‘Why do we need to participate? Will they really listen tous?’’ Thus, it was also considered vital for the municipalities to becomemore open and active in their dealings with local residents. Wider par-ticipation in Belek’s municipalities potentially might help to avoid adanger that the present centralized decisionmaking in Belek wouldbe replaced with a new hegemony by a local elite (Adaman 1995).Respondents were also asked if they believed that some activities cur-rently undertaken by Belek’s municipalities could be delivered moreeffectively by another organization. As many as 16 of the 30 suggestedthat an association of the area’s municipalities might be more effectivefor certain work, in part because by working together the municipali-ties might have more influence on central government and onBetuyab.

CONCLUSION

The paper used a framework of issues—including concern forauthority, power, accountability, legitimacy, and effectiveness—to eval-uate the decentralization of tourism-related governance in the Turkishresort of Belek. The framework helped to clarify the extent of dispersalof authority and also the strengths and difficulties involved. Manyaspects of policymaking in Belek remained centralized, with nationalgovernment continuing to be highly influential, notably through min-isterial direction. One way in which the state retained influence wasthrough deconcentration, a very modest scheme where some stateactivities had been transferred to its own provincial administrativeunits. While Belek’s municipalities had some authority, the centralstate was able to direct and steer their activities, as they lacked powerand financial and human resources. In many other less developedcountries, tourism policy is still dominated by national governments,although there are exceptions such as India and South Africa, wheretourism policy is relatively devolved to regional organizations (Church2004:564).But in Belek there had been some significant transferal of functions

normally undertaken by the state. The rapid growth of the resort wasled by a private sector organization, Betuyab, with government institu-tions giving it specific authority and powers. This company brought to-gether major commercial investors, coordinated their activities, partlyfunded the resort infrastructure, and planned and managed much of

YUKSEL, BRAMWELL AND YUKSEL 881

the resort’s initial and subsequent development. This reflected the in-creased political influence in Turkey of a corporatist or neoconserva-tive economic agenda, a political ideology that put much emphasison efficiency, investment returns, the role of the market, and industryparticipation. A related factor was the priority given to tourism in Tur-key as a lead economic activity to promote rapid development, largelyby the private sector, as embodied in the 1982 Tourism Encourage-ment Law.Belek’s experience was an early and unusual attempt by the Turkish

state to privatize selected activities. Betuyab succeeded in the rapidconstruction of the resort’s infrastructure, accommodation stock, golfcourses, and other facilities. Within the defined resort zones, the devel-opment was planned and building densities were controlled, illegalconstruction was avoided, the hotels were set back behind the beach,and a wide range of jobs were created. Despite these achievements,there was suspicion and resentment of this company. Its limited per-ceived legitimacy was influenced by concerns about corporatist rela-tions between Betuyab and government ministries, the transfer ofstate property to commercial businesses, the external sources of capitalfor the resort’s development and the associated outflow of financial re-turns, and the exclusion of local parties from policymaking. There wasresentment too about the limited employment and other economicbenefits for Belek’s residents from the enclave form of resortdevelopment.A more restricted decentralization occurred when DHKD intervened

to work with local actors to devise a development plan for Belek, an-other activity normally undertaken by the state. This environmentalorganization’s involvement was unusual in Turkey but, unlike the Bet-uyab case, it had not been invited to participate by the government, soit lacked authority and power. The DHKD sought to involve diverse ac-tors in the planning process, but it lacked political influence to imple-ment the plan and its resources were insufficient to sustain its owninvolvement. Further, this organization lacked clear lines of account-ability to Belek’s residents, and in general it had insufficiently broadlegitimacy as a planning agency.A transfer of functions to Belek’s local authorities was favored by

some, as this was the government tier with elected representatives geo-graphically closest to the population. But such devolution would likelyface major difficulties. The municipalities needed substantial addi-tional funding simply to perform their existing duties, let alone to takeon expanded functions. Their lack of funds tempted them to raise rev-enue by issuing permits for second-home development, but subse-quently these added further demands for services that they could notdeliver. By issuing these permits they also lost credibility with both na-tional and local actors, because the developments often caused envi-ronmental damage and because some associated the permits withpolitical clientelism. Many local interviewees wanted the municipalitiesto have more resources, including recruitment of additional well-qual-ified professional staff, so that they could respond to increaseddemands resulting from greater devolved responsibilities.

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In the context of decentralization, another organizational arrange-ment that potentially had some popular support was a partnership ap-proach. But the experience of collaborative working around theDHKD-led development plan suggests that this strategy might be ham-pered by Turkey’s long history of centralized decisionmaking, with par-ties being unused to the power-sharing and consensus-building involvedin successful collaborative working. Decentralization to a partnership orto Belek’s municipalities could also struggle because of the limited num-ber of NGOs in civil society in the area, which can restrict the responsive-ness and accountability of attempts to widen participation.Decentralization can have very positive outcomes. It may establish

more democratic procedures and create new sites for debate and con-sensus-building, and for dissent and conflict; these are closer to thepopulation and can encourage the reformulation of dominant para-digms and lead to positive change (Wearing and Huyskens 2001).But in unfavorable contexts, decentralization can lead to problems.It may provide the means for economic and political elites to incorpo-rate dissenting groups and to manage potential conflicts broadly withintheir own agendas. One issue is that the wider dispersal of authority inmore diffuse arrangements may make accountability less clear and canestablish undemocratic sites of exclusion. There are also threats due tothe strong corporatist tendencies in many countries and also the pres-ence of local elites. Decentralization can also be difficult to secure inpractice, for reasons such as lack of resources in arenas outside centralgovernment and reluctance by central bureaucracies to cede power toothers. Critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of decentral-ized governance has to examine detailed specific circumstances andprocesses. Careful consideration needs to be paid to the place-specificcircuits of power which link the economy, society, and the state, as wellas the political and institutional relations, the issues of democracy andaccountability, and the distribution of benefits and costs from the pol-icy processes and policy outcomes.

Acknowledgements—Research for this paper has benefited from discussion with Sheela Agarwalat Plymouth University. Thanks are also due to Joan Butt for her cartographic work and toMert Temimhan, Ays�e Oruc, and others for their contributions during the fieldwork.

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Submitted 15 December 2003. Resubmitted 29 June 2004. Accepted 3 September 2004. Finalversion 24 November 2004. Refereed anonymously. Coordinating Editor: Robert A. Poirier