G.R. No. L-35707 May 31, 1979

CRISPINO FLORES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. G. JESUS B. RUIZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cagayan,

PROVINCIAL WARDEN of Cagayan and LEONARDO MANDAC, represented by his

Heirs, thru the Widow DOLORES VDA. DE MANDAC, respondents.

Petitioner Crispin Flores filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus after he has been

allegedly arrested and detained illegally by Order of the respondent Judge finding him

guilty of indirect contempt.

Petitioner was actually arrested and since then he has been detained until his release

by virtue of a bond of P500.00 which he was allowed to file by this Court in its

Resolution dated October 31, 1972 (p. 33, Rollo), which he must have filed as he had

precisely asked to be bailed, pending his appeal from the Order of the respondent judge

Petitioner claims to have been deprived due process of law which voided the

proceedings against him as for lack of jurisdiction of the court to inflict the penalty

imposed on him.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process so as to entitle him to the writ of

habeas corpus

HELD: We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the proceedings on the contempt charge has been vitiated by lack of due process,

entitling petitioner to the writ of habeas corpus he seeks.

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a

person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.

Such defects results in the absence or loss of 'jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent

conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be

challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if

another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant

In Harden vs. The Director of Prisons (81:741/1948/), Justice Tuason, speaking for the Court, explicitly announced that

"deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights" justify a proceeding for habeas corpus, on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Abriol vs. Homeres (84 Phil. 525) is even more categorical. In that case, the action of a lower court, denying the

accused the opportunity to present proof for his defense, his motion for dismissal failing, was held by this Court as a

deprivation of his right to due process. As was made clear by the opinion of Justice Ozaeta: 'No court of justice

under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the accused does not waive his

right to be heard but on the contrary invokes the right, and the court denies it to him, that court no longer has

jurisdiction to proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense; and the

sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. (Santiago

vs. Alikpala, supra.)

G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,

vs.

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.

Facts: The petitioners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo.

They claim that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom

and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our

Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been

demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about

to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.

They claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were

issued by certain Land Officials. These Land Officials should be

summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of

these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the

Private Respondents

Issue : Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.

HELD: NO.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any

person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation

by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual

or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not

included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which

the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they

still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute

right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the

writ of amparo.

Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in

the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been

threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless

there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be

protected.

G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.

RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from

Bulacan who were suspected of being members of the New People’s Army,

were forcibly taken from their home, detained in various locations,

and tortured by CAFGU and military units.

After several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo

recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led by

General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in

place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist

insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the

still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and

Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents

and members of the NPA.

After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing

acts, the brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ

of amparo.

HELD: .

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal

killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to

these two instances or to threats thereof.

"Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal

safeguards or judicial proceedings."75

On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics:

an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups

or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the

refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal

to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection

of law."76

What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of

constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:

(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus

writ;

(2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;

(3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial

decision;

(4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and

(5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform

process.85

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of

Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second

paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides

for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government."

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of

injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus

under Rule 102,90

these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of

extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to

resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability

of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of

the common law and civil law traditions offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and

enforced disappearances and threats thereof.

The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that

requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it

is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability

for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring

substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of

extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the

expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates

the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent

investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to

deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any

person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with

violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private

individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

(emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall

establish their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial

evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper

and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals

that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,

San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they

escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents

were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.

Right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life

and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as

respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual

hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall

be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge...

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise

of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human

beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been

proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied)

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126

(emphasis supplied)

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any

threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind,

a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more

correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in

this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo

Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the

provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity

or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule,

one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128

Physical injuries

inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more

than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities,

and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself

escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because

they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the

government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the

right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to

security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)

under Article III, Section 2.

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State

"guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987

Constitution.133

As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the

Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered

ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are

under threat.

While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article

9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right

to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right

to security of person to be invoked.

Whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now

determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life,

liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families,

including them, would be killed.

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in

detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they

have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and

torture.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and

protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The

threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149

Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape

reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,

tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and

life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the

failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the

abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective

investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation

report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th

Infantry

Division.

G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.

ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL

TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC

Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC,

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the

PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU

18th

DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,

respondents.

FACTS:

1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for

forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory

injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.

2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of

the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners –

armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons –

entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission

and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and

bamboo structure.

3. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor,

finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.

6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate

implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario

after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to

reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for

demolition.

7. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge

nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15)

days after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to

allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.

8. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the

present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective,

both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the

other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of

ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the

right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the

person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or

destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act

complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the

PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the

acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the

Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[ … ]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine

National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the

houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report

if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a

minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete

allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to

life, liberty or security.

The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information

under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral

annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of

previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the

issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in

the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a

writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of

the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

G.R. No. 116945 February 9, 1996

ROMULO DELA ROSA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and BENJAMIN MAGTOTO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the dismissal of a criminal action for violation of the constitutional right to a speedy

trial constitute a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense? May the offended

party, on his own and independently of the Solicitor General, appeal a trial court's order

dismissing a criminal case?

Nine (9) separate informations were filed against petitioner, charging the latter with violation of

B.P. Blg. 22

The trial court set hearings on the following dates: August 4, 10, 18, 25 and September 2, 9, 16,

23, 1992.

The hearings set for August 4, 10, and 18, 1992 were all cancelled at the instance of

petitioner, who claimed that he had not yet secured the services of his counsel de parte.

The trials scheduled on September 2 and 9, 1993 were likewise cancelled upon written

motion of petitioner, who claimed that his counsel had prior commitments.

Private respondent moved for the postponement of the trial set for September 16, 1992, October

21, 1992, and November 17, 1992on the ground that Antonio was not available due to work-

related matters and previous out-of-town commitment, and date on the ground that private

respondent had doubts "as to his inability to bring out the details of the transaction"

Consequently, the trial court dismissed all the nine cases against petitioner

Petitioner contends that since the dismissal of the cases against him by the trial court was based

on his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the reinstatement and remand of the same would

place him in double jeopardy.

The Issues: Speedy Trial and Double Jeopardy

In Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan6, we held:

It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the

right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only;

when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive

delays; or

when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,

or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to

elapse without the party having his case tried.

Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant

has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case

for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant

are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the

defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant

resulting from the delay, are considered.

Records show that the delay in the trial of the case was mainly due to petitioner's fault.

Indeed, the several postponements sought and obtained by petitioner, in effect, amounted to

a waiver or abandonment of his right to a speedy trial7. Delay of his own making cannot be

oppressive to him.8

On the other hand, private respondent's reasons for the postponement of the trials set on

September 16, 1992, October 21, 1992 and November 17, 1992 cannot be said to be vexatious,

capricious and oppressive as to result in the denial of petitioner's right to a speedy trial.

G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,

vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with

the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing

charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information

Francisco S. Tatad.

The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it

became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President

Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet.

On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal

complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1,

1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres.

Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation

and report.

On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of

charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By

October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for

disposition by the Tanodbayan.

However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan.

Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against

petitioner Tatad alone.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the

cases against him.

Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.

Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out

with President Marcos.

Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,

which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the

respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential

Security Command for finding investigation and report.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing

attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process,

lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. We cannot

emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the

impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for

political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of

serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike,

whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the

established procedure may the public's perception of the prosecutor be enhanced.

The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case

under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the

respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it

cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to

three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance

obtaining in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 164953 February 13, 2006

JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, Petitioner,

vs.

Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District for illegal

possession of a dangerous drug.

Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained

uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all

throughout that period of limbo.

Petitioner’s counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on the account of the

violation of his client’s right to speedy trial. Petitioner points out the fourteen postponements

that resulted in his intolerable detention for almost two years

Issue: Whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the

Information against petitioner.

Right to Speedy Trial

Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally informed

of the charges against them.33

The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided in Rule 116 of

the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows that arraignment is

not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process.34

Particularly, it implements the

constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation

against them and their right to speedy trial.

Speedy Trial Construed

The thirty-day period invoked by petitioner was construed in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.

How.36

It was held in that case that the period was not absolute. Certain delays were allowed

by law and excluded from the computation of the time within which trial must commence.

The Court ruled that those exclusions should "reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that

the concept of ‘speedy trial’ is a ‘relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.’"37

It held further that courts must strive to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of

due process and the strictures of speedy trial, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right of

the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals.

. Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:

"x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive

delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when

without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the

party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a

defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that

matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such

factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of

his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."38

Reasonable Postponements

It should be stressed that petitioner never acquiesced to the seemingly endless postponements

of the arraignment. He asserted his right to speedy trial twice, but was denied by respondent in

both instances. Considering that petitioner has been under detention since December 2002, we

need not belabor the prejudice, distress, and anxiety he suffered as a result of the delayed

arraignment.

We concede that the bases for some of the delays were completely sound, such as the

retirement of Judge Arranz39

and the manifestation of petitioner that the latter would be filing a

Motion for Preliminary Investigation.40

Those matters were manifestly not intended to delay the

proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-208426.

The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the ordinary

conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable. The second ground was the

right of the accused accorded by Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal

Procedure.41

Verily, petitioner’s request for a preliminary investigation before arraignment was

well-advised, in view of the rule that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the right.42

Thus, it has been held that though the conduct of a preliminary investigation may hold

back the progress of a case, such investigation is necessary so that the defendant’s right will

not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.43

Unjustified Delay

This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from

being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes for the

delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the

arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could

have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner’s

constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.

Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, a violation of the right

of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest.

In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the

conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can

be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could

not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay

became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty

of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.

Postponement Due to Absence of Counsel

It will be recalled that the arraignment set for August 6, 2003, was postponed by the trial court

due to the absence of the counsel of petitioner. 45

The latter sought to proceed with the

arraignment by requesting the assistance of the public defender as counsel de oficio, but the

request was denied on the flimsy ground that the accused already had a counsel de parte. We find

no legal basis for the trial court’s action.

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte is not

prohibited,46

not even by the Constitution,47

especially when the accused themselves request that

appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de oficio when the

accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.48

"x x x [A]n accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by a

court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be represented by counsel

is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de parte, however, is not absolute.

The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the state's

and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the

court may restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on

an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the

attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the

like."50

Like other personal rights, the right to a counsel de parte is waivable, so long as

1) the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or

prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law; and

2) the waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.51

Applying these principles, it would have been more prudent for respondent judge to have

appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of arraignment only. This course of action became

more compelling in the instant case when petitioner himself requested the appointment.52

To be

sure, he would not have been prejudiced by that action, provided there was a proper observance

of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 8 of this rule, before

proceeding with the arraignment, the court is mandated to give the appointed counsel de oficio

reasonable time to consult with the accused as to the latter’s plea.53

Clearly, respondent judge’s postponement of the arraignment on August 6, 2003, had no

substantial basis. Thus, the postponement, initially caused by the absence of petitioner’s

counsel, became unreasonable and ultimately attributable to respondent’s inflexibility as

regards contingencies.

Responsibility of Judges in Minimizing Delay

The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail

wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings,54

spanning seven

months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance was

caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the produce order on

time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although respondent judge was

justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was presented,55

the problem could

have been easily averted by efficient court management.

In his role as administrator, respondent should have supervised his clerk of court to ensure a

timely service of the produce order on the wardens of the Manila City Jail. Judges must keep

a watchful eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their

immediate supervision, who are primarily employed to aid in the administration of justice.

Judges who set the pace for greater efficiency, diligence and dedication, could prompt their

personnel to be more diligent and efficient in the performance of official duties. For certain,

leniency in the administrative supervision of court personnel must be avoided.56

We stress the need to remind judges to exhibit more diligence and efficiency in the

performance of their judicial duties to avoid loss of faith and confidence in the

administration of justice. Rule 3.09 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires them

to "organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch

of business x x x." Additionally, Section 5(d) of Rule 135 confers upon every court the power to

control the conduct of its ministerial officers and of all other persons who in any manner are

connected with a case before it.

Respondent did not exercise his prerogatives in administering speedy justice. Instead, he

was content with issuing reminders57

that miserably failed to resolve the problem expeditiously.

We can only conclude from the distinct circumstances of the case that he failed to assert actively

his authority to expedite the proceedings.

Instead of being proactive and steering the course of the proceedings with deliberate dispatch,

respondent tended to be passive and reactive by allowing the pace of the proceedings to be

dictated by the listlessness of the parties, his staff, and the jail wardens. Judges should be more

deliberate in their actions and, within the bounds of law, make full use of their authority to

expedite proceedings while continuing to respect the rights of parties to ventilate their

respective causes fully.

Indeed, judges are required to dispose of the court’s business expeditiously, in accordance with

Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which we quote:

"A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the

required period."

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to act promptly on their cases.

Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary,

lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.58

In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of petitioner, the sought

for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.

G.R. No. 136051 June 8, 2006

ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, Petitioners,

vs.

JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FACTS: On 5 December 1995, respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed a Complaint for

Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and Separation

Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito

P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province of

Mindoro Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-25803.5

On 13 June 1997, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition

Upon Oral Examination.32

They contend that since there are two criminal cases pending before

the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in

the present case wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private complainant and petitioners

are the respondents, to permit the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right

against self-incrimination.

In short, petitioners Mapalo and Chito Rosete refuse to have their depositions taken in the civil

case because they allegedly would be incriminating themselves in the criminal cases because

the testimony that would be elicited from them may be used in the criminal cases. As

defendants in the civil case, it is their claim that to allow their depositions to be taken would

violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination because said right includes the right to

refuse to take the witness stand.

TRIAL COURT denied the petitioner’s motion stating THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION OF OSCAR MAPALO AND CHITO ROSETE

WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED BY THE TAKING OF THEIR DEPOSITION IN THE CIVIL

CASE FILED IN THE LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ALSO RESPONDENTS

OR DEFENDANTS IN THE AFOREMENTIONED CRIMINAL CASES FILED BY HEREIN

PRIVATE RESPONDENT JULIANO LIM INVOLVING THE SAME OR IDENTICAL SET

OF FACTS; AND

HELD: The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence,

whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or

administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It

secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular

incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for

some crime.

However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in

character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not

give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the

time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey

it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular

question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to

answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.57

As to an accused in a criminal case, it is settled that he can refuse outright to take the stand

as a witness. In People v. Ayson,58

this Court clarified the rights of an accused in the matter of

giving testimony or refusing to do so. We said:

An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of

Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others—

1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and

2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be

cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall

not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself"

signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in

which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by

subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either

for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. In other words – unlike an

ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,

having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put

to him – the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to

take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. X x x (Underscoring supplied.)

It is clear, therefore, that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness

stand.

The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative

cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating

questions are propounded.

This Court applied the exception – a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed

not to take the witness stand – in administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the

nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding.59

It is likewise the

opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal

in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline

to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the

proceedings that controls.60

In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance

with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness

stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal

proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such.

They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can

invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually

asked of them.

G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE

JUSTICES AUGUSTO AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN,

GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO

MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO

TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN

(OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,

vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN. PROSPERO

OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO

MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO BONA AND AIC ANICETO

ACUPIDO, respondents.

FACTS: To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination od

President Benigno Aquino and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of

all aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board

which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. 2

The Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced

documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued

by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board

were the herein private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt.

Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and

AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4

UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President

Ferdinand E. Marcos. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed

with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S.

Aquino which and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found

dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In

both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several

principals, and one accomplice.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.

In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution represented by the

Office of the petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the

individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava Board. 6

Private respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the admission of said exhibits

contending that its admission will be in derogation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination

and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. They prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected

as evidence for the prosecution.

Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by the private

respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to them

because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding

Board.

The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8)

private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.

It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said

testimonies are admissible against the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure to

invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not

invoke said privilege, the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure

to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver thereof. 16

The private respondents, on the other hand, claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the privilege

against self- incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as

mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the

second clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same

Section would suffer from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self-

incrimination

ISSUE: WON the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies of the private respondents made

before the Agrava Board is violative of their right against self-incrimination

HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied the private respondents the right to remain silent. They were

compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice.

They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or

refused to do so. 21

The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled

before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both

of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. 21

-a

Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself)

were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as

ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.

Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing

custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter

which reads:

... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to

remain and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. ... 22

(Emphasis supplied)

Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23

on this specific

portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person

detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right

to remain silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be

used against him.

Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that

a person similarly undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is

not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of

Rights.

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it

inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase

"any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda

doctrine. 24

Neither are we impressed by petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in the

last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police

investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only

"confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible

against the source of the confession or admission and against third person. 25

,he records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by the Agrava

Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the transcript of their

testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and

determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination.

In the light of the examination reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were

called to the stand to determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have

not been informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that particular

stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may

be used against them.

Not only that. They are also entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent,

to counsel, and be informed that any and all statements given by them may be used against them.

Did they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava

Board and not by any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be

construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against

themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of

Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or

produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their

constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right

to remain silent.

Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it

may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his

will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational

judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion 'tending to force

testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. 26

The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all

cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29

If in a

mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a

witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied

to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the

statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.

Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this constitutional

provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth

Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of

American influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United

States and was as follows:

That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. 30

As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said

provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be

compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding

that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case

A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which

is the first test of admissibility. It reads:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under

investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to

counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any

other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession

obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis

supplied)

The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As

herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to

admissions, 33

whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal

proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense.

Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution must be

avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to,

then that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for

this purpose to disregard the more usual and apparent import of the language used. 34

To save the

statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable construction that will bring it

within the fundamental law. 35

Apparent conflict between two clauses should be harmonized. 36

But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination as a

condition sine qua non to the grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has

the option to refuse to answer questions and therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however,

forecloses such option of refusal by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:

SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose

appropriate penalties therefor. A person guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to

answer as a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to

do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. ...

Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer

and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is

apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings

against anyone who makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of

P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the witness' right

against self-incrimination.

As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,

meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of

IMMUNITY is offered. 37

Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be

offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional

right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents

had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only

way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in

fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify

or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed

immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886

cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law

practically strips away from the witness.

APPLICATION OF THE IMMUNITY STATUTE

Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other,

which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows:

"Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in

connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for

an offense to which his compelled testimony relates." 32

Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more

specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads:

SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing

books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a

subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required

of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his

testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection

with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having

invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that

such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for

perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from

office. (Emphasis supplied)

it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity

from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the

basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from

prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved from

the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being

prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the

hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to

remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them.

This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no

obligation to so inform them.

.

G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,

vs.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR

GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

The broad, all-embracing sweep of the self-incrimination clause,1 whenever appropriately

invoked, has been accorded due recognition by this Court ever since the adoption of the

Constitution.2 Bermudez v. Castillo,

3 decided in 1937, was quite categorical. As we there stated:

"This Court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration

may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad

interpretation favorable to the person invoking it." As phrased by Justice Laurel in his concurring

opinion: "The provision, as doubtless it was designed, would be construed with the utmost

liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be served." 4

Even more relevant, considering the precise point at issue, is the recent case of Cabal v.

Kapunan,5where it was held that a respondent in an administrative proceeding under the Anti-

Graft Law 6

cannot be required to take the witness stand at the instance of the complainant. So it

must be in this case, where petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could

not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against

in an administrative charge for malpractice. That was a correct decision; we affirm it on appeal.