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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40779 November 28, 1975

EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, petitioner,vs.THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein

represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO, respondent.

Epicharis T Garcia in her own behalf.

Bengzon, Villegas, Zarraga, Narciso and Cudala for respondents.

FERNANDO, J. :

The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty AdmissionCommittee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino,to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she isdeemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only ongeneral principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institutioninvolved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a

privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to suchan obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this explicitlanguage: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."

1The petition

must therefore fail.

Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studiesleading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enrollfor the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letterhe had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission intheir school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do notconstitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any ofthe school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25,1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at acompromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoythe benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in

fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offeringwere unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek foradmission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries insaid school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. inTheology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties,but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy inorder to have her degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five yearsmore of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is beingunlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. ThatPetitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to bedeprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled asa special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby becredited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner couldhave recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First

Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is hisbusiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... "

2She prayed

for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester.She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would beallowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and thatwhatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewiserecognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambinowhich started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theologysubjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by this portionthereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too pleasant.The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several members are stronglyopposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty

may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your frequent questions anddifficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress ofthe class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exertedmore effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties andproblems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of your completing aprogram (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That youhave the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in yourbest interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your orientation. I regret tohave to make this report, but I am only thinking of your welfare."

3

This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part of respondentFaculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.

4As submitted on behalf of

Father Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent is the Chairman of the FacultyAdmission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminarysituated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo de ManilaUniversity, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classesand/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to beobtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by theLoyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to theLoyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officiallyadmitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila Universityin order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program ; Petitioner in thesummer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but saidadmission was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean ofthe Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the case ofpetitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate Schoolwas given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed totake some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore, petitioner was notcharged a single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila

University in connection with the courses she took in the summer of 1975, as she wasallowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or theLoyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily hasdiscretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school anyparticular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also otherconsiderations such as personality traits and character orientation in relation with otherstudents as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.The Petition forMandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clearduty, on the part of respondent to admit the petitioner therein in the current year to take upfurther courses in the Loyola School of Theology."

5It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid

comment that as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitionerto take up further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonablegrounds, ... ."

6Then reference was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies which

petitioner could have pursued.7

The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of

merit. Petitioner sought permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter, she had adetailed recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In a


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resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answerand required the parties to file their respective memoranda. That they did, and the petitionwas deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the outset, we do not see meritin it. It must therefore be dismissed.

1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made c lear why a petition for mandamus is not theproper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admither into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no clear dutyto so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood.Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay

person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumentithat she is qualified to studyfor the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to saidstudies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicantsdue to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size andcomponent considerations."

8No authorities were cited, respondent apparently being of the

view that the law has not reached the s tage where the matter of admission to an institutionof higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolled discretion of the applicant. There arestandards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be ofthe essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitionerpossesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime andindispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no dutyimposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum ofpetitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute thecontention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was notsufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather thana practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable todemonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of thiswrit.

2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution ofinstitutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified withthe right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafterto make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would bevisited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to thepowers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For thesociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher andas investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without beingsubjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions areunacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution." 9 As for the

educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom?Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publishand teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no controlor authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths orconclusions are sought and established in these disc iplines."

10

3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope ofacademic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the reference isto the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would follow then thatthe school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims andobjectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference savepossibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere ofautonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is notto be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrateits purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the

Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grantsthe right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the

academic freedom of a university professor."11

He cited the following from Dr. MarcelBouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectorsand vice-chancellors of European universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and yet onewhich sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that thecollective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of theindividual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarilyconnected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish,therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedomof the individual university teacher." "

12Also: "To clarify further the distinction between the

freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: "The personal aspect

of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher recognized and effectivelyguaranteed by society to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in hisacademic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individualuniversity teacher is at least as important, in considering academic freedom, as the statusof the institutions to which they belong and through which they disseminate their learning."'13

He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir EricAshby: "'The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academicstaff should have de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission andexamination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment andtenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the differentcategories of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universitieshad to rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for theiracademic members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another mostof these functions are laid on the shoulders of the law governing body .'"

14Justice

Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former Professor of theHarvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a university and the fouressential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business of a university to providethat atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is anatmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university todetermine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shallbe taught, and who may be admitted to study."

15Thus is reinforced the conclusion

reached by us that mandamus does not lie in this case.

4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in thefield, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect freedom ofthought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizing thefull respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by theConstitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity to theapproach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon as public utilities

devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especially highereducation, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.

5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of petitioner tocontinue her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legalappraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any wayreflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent dueacknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter ofFather Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as ofthe other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere.There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. Itcould be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer tosome other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, asindicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in thisdecision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-44251 May 31, 1977

FELIX MONTEMAYOR, petitioner,

vs.ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, JUAN SALCEDO, JR., TOMAS DAVID, MARTINCELINO, MARCELO AMIANA, as Members of the Panel of Investigators, Members of the

Board of Trustees, FR. ROMEO PELAYO and the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,respondents.

E. B. Garcia & Associates for petitioner.

Marcelo C. Amiana for private respondents.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and SolicitorJesus V. Diaz respondent Secretary of Labor.

FERNANDO, J.:

The protection to labor mandate is more of a reality with the present Constitution expresslyproviding for security, of tenure.

1Moreover, for a university professor, aptly referred to as

a tiller in the vineyard of the mind, there is the guarantee of academic freedom.2

Nonetheless, for cause duly shown there may be a forced termination of his services. It isessential though that prior to his removal, procedural due process be observed. Thegrievance alleged by petitioner in this case, a university professor, was that there was afailure to comply with such a requisite. When therefore respondent Secretary of Laborgranted a clearance to the private respondent, the Araneta University Foundation,

3for his

dismissal for immorality he instituted this certiorari proceeding. A thorough and exhaustivecomment, considered as the answer, filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza

4with

full support from the record, negates such a contention. There is no basis for a reversal.certiorari does not lie.

It is undisputed that petitioner Felix Montemayor was a fulltime professor of respondentAraneta University Foundation, serving as head of its Humanities and PsychologyDepartment, Previously, he was on the faculty of other educational institutions. There was,on April 17, 1974, a complaint for immorality lodged against him by the Chaplain of the

Araneta University Foundation for alleged immorality. Its then President, Dr. Juan Salcedo,Jr., created a committee to investigate such charge. The first hearing, which took place onApril 24, 1974, was attended by petitioner as well as complainant with his two witnesses.One of them. Leonardo de Lara, submitted an affidavit. Petitioner sought thepostponement of the investigation to May 3, 1974. It was granted. On that occasion, hewas furnished a copy of the affidavit of the other witness, Macario Lacanilao. Theaccusation centered on conversations on sex and immoral advances committed againstthe person of Leonardo de Lara. There was cross-examination by petitioner of thewitnesses against him. With the assistance of counsel, he filed on May 28, 1974 a motionto dismiss or to hold the hearing in abeyance. He likewise filed an affidavit to sustain hisdefense on June 17, 1974. The report and recommendation of the investigating committeecame on July 8, 1974. It was adverse to petitioner, who was found morally responsible forthe act complained of. The recommendation was for his demotion in rank by one degree.The then President Juan Salcedo, Jr., on August 5, 1974, adopted such recommendationand thereafter referred the same to the Board of Trustees of private respondent forappropriate action. Subsequently, on November 8, 1974, with new charges being filed byProfessor Luis R. Almazan, one Jaime Castaneda, and Jesus Martinez against petitioner

for conduct unbecoming of a faculty member, another committee was appointed. Thencame his preventive suspension, ordered to last until the administrative investigation wasconcluded. There was a motion by petitioner for the postponement of the hearing set forNovember 18 and 19, 1974, but the same was denied. The hearing proceeded in hisabsence. There was testimony by Professor Luis Almazan and Jaime Castaneda.Thereafter, on December 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the chargesagainst petitioner to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the Presidentand the Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from theUniversity, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of theUniversity. The Committee found as established: "1. That immoral advances on several

occasions have been made by respondent [herein petitioner] on Prof. Luis Almazan 2.That immoral advances have also been made by respondent on Jaime Castaneda, astudent- employee of the university on several occasions; 3. That said immoral advanceswere frustrated because both Professor Almazan and Mr. Castaneda had refused toaccept them; 4. That both witnesses and victims of said immoral advances have declaredthat the behavior of respondent was detrimental [and] prejudicial to the moral andeducational standards of the Araneta University Foundation; 5. That because of saidbehavior, respondent should not continue as Professor in the University; and 6. That theacts of respondent complained of are offensive to good morals [and] inimical to the welfareof students and greatly prejudicial to [the] interest and educational objectives of University,hence the same are highly reprehensible."

5His dismissal was then ordered on December

10, 1974, effective November 15, 1974, the date of his preventive suspension. TheUniversity, on December 12, 1974, filed with the National Labor Relations Commission areport of his suspension and application for clearance to terminate his employment.

Meanwhile, on November 21, 1974, petitioner in turn lodged a complaint with the NationalLabor Relations Commission against private respondents for reinstatement and paymentof back wages and salaries, with all the privileges, benefits and increments attendantthereto. There was a motion to dismiss on the part of the latter. Both the labor arbiter andthe National Labor Relations Commission found in favor of petitioner. He was orderedreinstated to his former position with back wages and without loss of seniority and otherprivileges. Petitioner's complaint for unfair labor practice was, however, dismissed. Privaterespondents appealed to respondent Secretary of Labor who, on July 14, 1976, set asidethe Commission's order for his reinstatement. He found petitioner's dismissal justified, Norwas he persuaded by the plea that there was denial of due process. He was satisfied withthe procedure followed by private respondent. Moreover, he could not have ignored thefact that the controversy between the parties was passed upon and the parties heard ontheir respective contentions in the proceedings before the labor agencies. RespondentUniversity was, however, required to pay complainant the amount of P14,480.00representing the latter's accrued back wages which the former voluntarily offered to extendhim. Dissatisfied with the Secretary's decision, petitioner filed this instant petition forcertiorari.

1. The present Constitution, as noted, expanded the scope of the protection to labormandate by specifying that the State shall assure the right of workers to security of tenure.This Court, as stressed in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees

Associations6

is called upon to manifest realty to a constitutional command."7

Subsequently, in Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines,8

it was the ruling of this Tribunalthat even where disciplinary action against an employee is warranted, "where a penaltyless punitive [than dismissal] would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed oughtnot to be visited with a consequence so severe."

9An instructor or member of a teaching

staff of a university was held, in the leading case ofFeati University v. Bautista,10

to be anemployee. As such, he is entitled to that security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.The explicit pronouncement in Feati University v. Bautista was foreshadowed by Far

Eastern University v. Court of Industrial Relations ,11

a 1962 decision. While a faculty


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member such as petitioner may be dismissed, it must be for cause. What is more, theremust be clearance from the Secretary of Labor. So it is provided in the Labor Code.

12

2. The stand taken by petitioner as to his being entitled to security of tenure is reinforcedby the provision on academic freedom which, as noted, is found in the Constitution. Whilereference therein is to institutions of higher learning, it was pointed out in Garcia v. TheFaculty Admission, Committee

13that academic freedom "is more often Identified with the

right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter tomake known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would bevisited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the

powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. For thesociologist, Robert Maclver, it is 'a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacherand as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions withoutbeing subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because theseconclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond theinstitution.'"

14Tenure, according to him, is of the essence of such freedom. For him,

without tenure that assures a faculty member "against dismissal or professionalpenalization on grounds other than professional incompetence or conduct that in the

judgment of his colleagues renders him unfit" for membership in the faculty, the academicright becomes non-existent,

15Security of tenure, for another scholar, Love joy, is "the

chief practical requisite for academic freedom" of a university professor.16

As with Maclver,he did not rule out removal but only "for some grave cause," Identified by him as "provedincompetence or moral delinquency."

17

3. The charge leveled against petitioner, that of making homosexual advances to certain

individuals, if proved, did amount to a sufficient cause for removal. The crucial questiontherefore is whether it was shown that he was guilty of such immoral conduct. He is thusentitled to the protection of procedural due process. To paraphrase Webster, there mustbe a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner,and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. As far back as 1915, the American

Association of University Professors adopted the principle that "every university or collegeteacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against himstated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a specialor permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial theteacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence."

18Thus the phrase,

academic due process, hag gained currency, Joughin referred to it as a system ofprocedure designed to yield the beat possible judgment when an adverse decision againsta professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way ofreaching a conclusion.

19

4. The procedure followed in the first investigation of petitioner, conducted in June of 1974,did satisfy the procedural due process requisite. The same cannot be said of theNovember, 1974 inquiry when the petitioner had to face anew a similar charge of makinghomosexual advances. As admitted in the exhaustive comment of the Solicitor General:"On November 16, 1974, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the postponement ofthe hearing set for November 18 and 19, 1974 but the same was rejected by thecommittee. The hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Professor Montemayorand his counsel. In said hearing, Prof. Luis Almazan and Jaime Castaneda testified. OnDecember 5, 1974, the Committee submitted its report finding the charges againstMontemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending to the President andthe Board of Trustees of the Araneta University Foundation his separation from theUniversity, in accordance with Sections 116 and 351 of the Manual of Policies of theUniversity."

20It does appear therefore that the members of such investigating committee

failed to show full awareness of the demands of procedural due process. A motion by

petitioner for postponement of the hearing, apparently the first one made, was denied.What is worse, in his absence the matter was heard with the committee losing no time in

submitting its report finding the charges against petitioner to have been sufficientlyestablished and recommending his removal. If that were all, respondent Secretary of Laborcannot be sustained. certiorari would lie. But such deficiency was remedied, as pointed outin the same comment of the Solicitor General, by the fact "that petitioner was able topresent his case before the Labor Commission ."

21Then he continued: "Thus, the record

discloses that at a mediation conference held on December 9, 1974, the parties appearedand, after all efforts at conciliation had failed, they agreed to submit their dispute forcompulsory arbitration. Several hearings were conducted by Labor Arbiter Atty. DanielLucas, Jr., wherein petitioner submitted his evidence supported by his affidavit impugningthe regularity of the proceedings before the investigating committees and assailing the

legality of his removal. The entire record of the administrative proceedings, including thetranscript of the stenographic notes taken therein, was elevated to the Labor Commissionfor review. Petitioner herein, thru counsel, moved for reinstatement during the pendency ofthe case. In another motion, he prayed for the consolidation and joint hearing of hiscomplaint for unfair labor practice against herein private respondents (NLRC Case No. R-IV-1060-74) with that of the application for clearance filed by the University to terminateMontemayor's employment. On the other hand, the University moved to dismiss thecomplaint for unfair labor practice against its officials on the ground that they were notcomplainant's employers and that their participation in the administrative case against thelatter was official in nature. Respondent University also presented the affidavit of ThomasP. G. Neill Dean of the Institute of Agricultural Business Administration and Chairman ofthe Committee created to investigate the charges of immorality against petitioner attestingto the regularity of the proceedings and the validity of the dismissal."

22The legal aspect as

to the procedural due process having been satisfied was then summarized by the Solicitor

General thus: "All the foregoing clearly shows that petitioner was afforded his day in court.Finally, and more significant, is the fact that petitioner claims denial of due process in theproceeding had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before theNLRC wherein, as shown heretofore, he was given the fullest opportunity to present hiscase."

23

5. The comment of the Solicitor General was submitted on January 4, 1977. Thememorandum for petitioner was submitted on April 25. What immediately calls attention isthat no attempt was made to refute specifically such recital of the Solicitor General, ofdecisive significance as far as the due process issue is concerned. Instead, the emphasiswas on the alleged commission of an unfair labor practice by private respondent.Inasmuch as the Arbiter as well as the National Labor Relations Commission absolvedprivate respondent from the charge of unfair labor practice, it would appear that theemphasis of counsel for petitioner was misplaced. Accordingly, there is nothing in therecord that would militate against the contention of the Solicitor General that there was an

observance of procedural due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed No. costs.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGERPOSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANIMEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO

NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHULAMBINO, petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE,respondents.

MENDOZA, J. :

For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appeals1

in CA-G.R. SP No.42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondent's application for a wr itof mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners' motionfor reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of

a Philippine visitor's visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program inAnthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences andPhilosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City.

After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, privaterespondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer ofthe Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Rightto Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on herdissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines."

On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department ofAnthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean andGraduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertationand was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held onJanuary 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it

on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. ArsenioManuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the lastincluded as the dean's representative.1wphi1.nt

After going over private respondent's dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP DeanConsuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent's dissertation thatwas lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour's Cyclopaedia of India andEastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885reprint) and from John Edye's article entitled "Description of the Various Classes ofVessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar,and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society ofGreat Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).

2

Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5,1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her

oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel,

Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to hissignature:

Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successfuldefense of her P.D. thesis.

3

Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment:

Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mgarevisions ng dissertation.

4

Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:

Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel andbound copies.

5

In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, privaterespondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, todiscuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. Themeeting was held at the dean's office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority ofthe defense panel present.

6During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of

the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure toobtain the consent of the Dean's representative.

On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent'sgraduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.

In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertationto Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation.Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisionssuggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation.

Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoro's office April 15, 1993 andproceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina andDr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March 5, 1993 statement.

Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approvalform.

7

Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's dissertation in partial fulfillment of the courserequirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology.

In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over

matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medinawas not affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since shealready had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed herdissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the revision approvalform. She likewise expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration andcharged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of herdissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts againsther.

On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates forgraduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which wasendorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondent's name.

On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor forAcademic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent's name from the list of

candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation.Her letter reads:

8


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Abril 21, 1993

Dr. Milagros IbeVice Chancellor for Academic AffairsUnibersidad ng PilipinasQuezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.

Mahal na Dr. Ibe,

Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y]William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology)

ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panelpara sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya.

Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degrikay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ngpinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad.

(Sgd.)

CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D.Dekano

Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time,because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council'srecommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent.Two days later, April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in Anthropology.

On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21,1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated theaccusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993.

In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medina'sunfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include himand Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed byDrs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno wasguilty of harassment.

In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged privaterespondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her bewithdrawn.

9

On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoccommittee, composed of faculty membersfrom various disciplines and chaired by Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarismcharge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. DilimanChancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondentbe withdrawn.

10

In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the chargesagainst her.

11

On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at leastninety (90) instances or portions in private respondent's thesis which were lifted fromsources without proper or due acknowledgment.

On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved therecommendation to withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree and forwarded its

recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved andendorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation tostudy the legal implications of its approval.

12

Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor EmerlindaRoman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her tosubmit her written explanation to the charges against her.

During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges andprovided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee.

13Private respondent, on

the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993.

Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and privaterespondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled onOctober 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board ofRegents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard.

On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President,alleging that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case.

14

She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman ofthe Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process andclaiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had alreadybeen accepted by the CSSP.

15

Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Councilin its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 andMarch 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon.

On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on StudentConduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction todecide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was notone of the authorized penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose.

On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondent's transcriptof grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed herdissertation with 12 units of credit.

On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. unitsoutside Diliman to review the University Council's recommendation to withdraw privaterespondent's degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. DilimanExecutive Committee, Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B.Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana

Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 13, 1994, the members ofthe Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baos.

Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondenta copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation.

In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requestedthat the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870),the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response toChancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well as all her other communications.

On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committee's report,signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondent's doctoratedegree. The report stated:

16


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After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms.Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were established:

1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published sourceword for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without anyacknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These formpart of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee createdby the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the SpecialCommittee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectualdishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting withimproper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in placeof Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged sourcein support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents forreference); and

2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation ofplagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had beenadmitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sourcessince the beginning.

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms.Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee s trongly supports therecommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms.Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William.

On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommendedto the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission tothe University either as a student or as an employee.

On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent thefollowing letter:

17

4 January 1995

Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy WilliamDepartment of AnthropologyCollege of Social Sciences and PhilosophyU.P. Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William:

This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081stand 1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case,the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith.

Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree asrecommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by theExternal Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.These faculty members were chosen by lot from names submitted by the UniversityCouncils of U.P. Los Baos and U.P. Manila.

In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer bythe Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that youdirect your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.)VIVENCIO R. JOSESecretary of the Universityand of the Board of Regents

On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoez,Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commission's intervention.

18In

a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board ofRegents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience withthe Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by PresidentJavier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995.

On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayerfor a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as CivilCase No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity.

19She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without

justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitionersbe ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplarydamages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost of earnings.

On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petitionfor mandamus for lack of merit.

20Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,

which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of theappellate court's decision reads:

21

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside.

Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. inAnthropology.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THEWRIT OF MANDAMUSAND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENT'SDOCTORAL DEGREE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THEDOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLEDWITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVINGPETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.

22

Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfullyexcluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to

justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to provethat the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of thedegree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners actedarbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to


8/46

verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to thecharges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she wasdeprived of the opportunity to comment or refute their findings.

In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from, withdrawingher doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to 9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P.Rules and Regulations of Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, whichaccording to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erringstudents; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal maydecide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a majority of its members.

We find petitioners' contention to be meritorious.

Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the actrequired to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which thelaw specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other isentitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw.

23In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,

24this Court ruled

that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom.In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for oneyear by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and obtained from the lowercourt a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order ofsuspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student'spetition, this Court said:

[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminaryinjunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lowercourt's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspensionon Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishinghis course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly,such a ruling considers only the s ituation of Nadal without taking into account thecircumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament.More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academicfreedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of adisciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should haverestrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal.Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certainright on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an officialor government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or

judgment.25

In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent's petition precisely on grounds ofacademic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent wasdenied due process. It said:

It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assemblyculminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal ofpetitioner's Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard untilafter the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner's subsequentletters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.

26

As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees hadbeen formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism

and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticismmay be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped

of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigationsconducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonestyin submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D.degree.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply theopportunity to explain one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of theaction or ruling complained of.

27A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his

position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.28

In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her29

and

afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation,which she forwarded on September 25, 1993.

30Private respondent then met with the U.P.

chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition,she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

31

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audiencebefore the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not requiretrial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.

32It is noteworthy that the

U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as itemson the agenda of the Board of Regents.

33

Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of theZafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v.Capulong,

34we held:

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were notaccorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements whichbecame the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were deniedprocedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, thesame may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, fordisciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right tocross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigatestudents' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributesof a judicial proceeding. . .

In this case, in granting the writ ofmandamus, the Court of Appeals held:

First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology.After graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is nolonger within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she

is entitled to the right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall thedegree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act ofabuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioner's right of enjoyment to intellectualproperty.

Second. Respondents aver that petitioner's graduation was a mistake.

Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after almost a year after graduation.Considering that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly,and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumenand integrity, as respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that thealleged "mistake" might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other hiddenagenda which respondents do not wish to reveal.

At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herselfenmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equitydemand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after hercompliance with the academic and other related requirements.


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Art. XIV, 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in allinstitutions of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution

35and the 1973

Constitution36

likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for theinstitutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out bythis Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,

37it is a

freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere ofauthority certainly extending to the choice of the students." If such institution of higherlearning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine onwhom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained throughfraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thusconferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of astudent, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a studentthat is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's casebegan before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board ofRegents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for theconstitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty AdmissionCommittee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or ina grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of theUniversity of the Philippines.

38It has the power confer degrees upon the recommendation

of the University Council.39 If follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on erroror fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of dueprocess, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institutionof higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it hasconferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing auniversity's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the samethrough fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university's concern. Itshould be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself fromserious threats to its integrity.

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their educaiton,the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academicfreedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that thisfreedom is not jeopardized.

40

In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted bya committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that privaterespondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in herdissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private respondent's doctoratewas based on documents on record including her admission that she committed theoffense.

41

On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard andexplain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim isthat her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board ofRegents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly,we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof tothe contrary.

42

Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since privaterespondent was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the "ambit

of disciplinary powers of the U.P.," is private respondent's contention that it is the StudentDisciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge isdishonesty. Private respondent invoke 5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on StudentConduct and Discipline which provides:

Jurisdiction. All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shallbe subject to the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except thefollowing cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college orunit;

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the

college, or

(b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within itsclassrooms or premises or in the course of an official activity;

Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction overall cases involving students of such units.

Private respondent argues that under 25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations,dishonesty in relation to one's studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only withsuspension for at least one (1) year.

As the above-quoted provision of 5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, thejurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extend only to disciplinary actions. In thiscase, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate courtobserved, private respondent is no longer within "the ambit of disciplinary powers of the

U.P." Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty foracts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from theUniversity for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is toprotect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degreeshe obtained through fraud.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petitionformandamus is hereby DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68288 July 11, 1986

DIOSDADO GUZMAN, ULYSSES URBIZTONDO, and ARIEL RAMACULA,petitioners,vs.

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY and DOMINGO L. JHOCSON in his capacity asPresident of National University, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado and Haydee Yorac for petitioners.

Samson S. Alcantara for respondents.

NARVASA, J .:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students ofrespondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what theydescribe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." Intheir petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for

preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they allege:1) that respondent University's avowed reason for its refusal to re-enroll them in their respective courses is "the latter's participation inpeaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

2) that this "attitude of the (University) is simply a continuation of itscavalier if not hostile attitude to the student's exercise of their basicconstitutional and human rights already recorded in Rockie C. SanJuan vs. National University, S.C. G.R. No. 65443 (1983) and itsutter contempt for the principle of due process of law to theprejudice of petitioners;" and

3) that "in effect petitioners are subjected to the extreme penalty ofexpulsion without cause or if there be any, without being informed

of such cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defendthemselves. Berina v. Philippine Maritime Institute (117 SCRA 581[1983]).

In the comment filed on September 24, 1986 for respondent University and itsPresident pursuant to this Court's requirement therefor

1 , respondents make the

claim:

1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985is due to their own fault and not because of their allegedexercise of their constitutionaland human rights;"

2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only on July 5, 1986 "when theenrollment period was already closed;"

3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to hisactivities in leading boycotts of classes"; that when his father was notified of this

development sometime in August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son "reformor else we will recall him to the province"; that Guzman was one of the petitioners inG.R. No. 65443 entitled "Rockie San Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.,"at thehearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had admonished "the studentsinvolved (to) take advantage and make the most of the opportunity given to them tostudy;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or actively participate in activitieswithin the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities,that disturbed or disrupted classes therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facingcriminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila(Crim. Case No. 066446) in connection with the destruction of properties ofrespondent University on September 12, 1983 ", and "is also one of the defendants inCivil Case No. 8320483 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'NationalUniversity, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al.'for damages arising from destruction ofuniversity properties

4) that as regards petitioner Ramacula, like Guzman "he continued to lead or activelyparticipate, contrary to the spirit of the Resolution dated November 23, 1983 of this ...Court (in G.R. No. 65443 in which he was also one of the petitioners) and touniversity rules and regulations, within university premises but without permit fromuniversity officials in activities that disturbed or disrupted classes;" and

5) that petitioners have "failures in their records, (and) are not of good scholasticstanding. "

Respondents close their comment with the following assertions, to wit:1) By their actuations, petitioners must be deemed to have forfeited their privilege, ifany, to seek enrollment in respondent university. The rights of respondent university,as an institution of higher learning, must also be respected. It is also beyondcomprehension why petitioners, who continually despise and villify respondentuniversity and its officials and faculty members, should persist in seeking enrollmentin an institution that they hate.

2) Under the circumstances, and without regard to legal technicalities, it is not to thebest interest of all concerned that petitioners be allowed to enroll in respondentuniversity.

3) In any event, petitioners' enrollment being on the semestral basis, respondentscannot be compelled to enroll them after the end of the semester.

On October 2, 1984 this Court issued a resolution reading as follows:

... Acting on the Comment submitted by respondent, the CourtResolved to NOTE the same and to require a REPLY to suchComment. The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a MANDATORYINJUNCTION, enjoining respondent to allow the enrolment ofpetitioners for the coming semester without prejudice to anydisciplinary proceeding to which any or all of them may besubjected with their right to lawful defense recognized andrespected. As regards petitioner Diosdado Guzman, even if it be afact that there is a pending criminal charge against him formalicious mischief, the Court nonetheless is of the opinion that, asabove-noted, without prejudice to the continuation of any

disciplinary proceeding against him, that he be allowed to resumehis studies in the meanwhile. As shown in Annex 2 of the petition


11/46

itself, Mr. Juan P. Guzman, father of said petitioner, is extending fullcooperation with petitioners to assure that whatever protest orgrievance petitioner Guzman may have would be ventilated in alawful and peaceful manner.

Petitioners' REPLY inter alia

1) denied that Urbiztondo attempted to enroll only on July 5, 1984 (when enrollmentwas already closed), it being alleged that "while he did try to enroll that day, he alsoattempted to do so several times before that date, all to no avail, because

respondents ... persistently refused to allow him to do so" respondents' ostensiblereason being that Urbiztondo (had) participated in mass actions ... within the schoolpremises," although there were no existing disciplinary charge against petitionerUrbiztondo" at the time;

2) asserted that "neither the text nor the context of the resolution2

justifies theconclusion that "petitioners' right to exercise their constitutional freedoms" hadthereby been restricted or limited; and

3) alleged that "the holding of activities (mass action) in the school premises withoutthe permission of the school ... can be explained by the fact that the respondentspersistently refused to issue such permit repeatedly sought by the students. "

On November 23, 1984, this Court promulgated another resolution, this time readingas follows:

... The Court, after considering the pleadings filed and deliberatingon the issues raised in the petition for extraordinary legal andequitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunctionas well as the respondents' comment on the petition and the replyof counsel for petitioners to the respondents' comment, Resolved to(a) give DUE COURSE to the petition; (b) consider therespondents' comment as ANSWER to the petition; and (c) requirethe parties to file their respective MEMORANDA within twenty (20)days from notice. ... .

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum isthe fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whetheror not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the

university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, thatdisturbed or disrupted classes therein"3

or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercionand intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for anddefiance of University authority."

4Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for

damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman,cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment fromre-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to anyduly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

Under the Education Act of 1982,5the petitioners, as students, have the right among

others "to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continuetheir course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, orviolation of disciplinary regulations."

6 Petitioners were being denied this right, or

being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual ofRegulations for Private Schools7 that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any

student except for cause as defined in ... (the) Manual and/or in the school rules andregulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have beenconducted."

8This Court is therefore constrained, as in Berina v. Philippine Maritime

Institute,9

to declare illegal this act of respondents of imposing sanctions on studentswithout due investigation.

Educational institutions of course have the power to "adopt and enforce such rules asmay be deemed expedient for ... (its) government, ... (this being)" incident to the veryobject of incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of thecollege."

10The rules may include those governing student discipline. Indeed, the

maintenance of "good school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on "everyprivate school" by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools;

11 and in this

connection, the Manual further provides that-

... The school rules governing discipline and the correspondingsanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writingand made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians.Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgatesuch rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from timeto time effective as of the date of their promulgation unlessotherwise specified.

12

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance ofprocedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases

involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to thoseprescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings instudent discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary topetitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards whichmust be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of anyaccusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges againstthem, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of theevidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their ownbehalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committeeor official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondents are directed to allow thepetitioners to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without

prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings to which any or all of them may besubjected in accordance with the standards herein set forth.

SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL,respondents.

G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

No. 28196:Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.Juan T. David as amicus curiaeOffice of the Solicitor General for respondents.

No. 28224:Salvador Araneta for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.

Petitioner therein prays for judgment:

1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or fromperforming any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of theconstitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses ofCongress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing fromprinting ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passingin audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913;and

2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of theConstitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House ofRepresentatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximumof 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to thenumber of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1)member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, theconvention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be"elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended soas to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates tothe aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats inCongress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17,1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitutionproposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by thepeople, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28,1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. Davidand counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as thePHILCONSA were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after asubstantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on Elections,

1

which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all probability, beappealed to this Court had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decisionon the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filedwith this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review by certiorariof the resolution of theCommission on Elections

2dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed

submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, thememorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.

Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and avoter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General havefiled an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have noknowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to bea perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressedhimself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.

The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existingunder the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization theobjective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitutionagainst erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement inL-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no

jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merelypolitical" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.

3Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before

the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, wasallowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that theCourt has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon thelegality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted,would, in effect, render in operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure ofCongress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of renderingillegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."

JURISDICTION

As early asAngara vs. Electoral Commission,4

this Court speaking through one of the leadingmembers of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr.Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ whichcan be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the severaldepartments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs.Lopez Vito,

5this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to

pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of aproposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people forratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force ofthis precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,

6

Avelino vs. Cuenco,7

Taada vs. Cuenco,8

and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9

In thefirst, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under itssupervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in thesecond, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in

the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having thelargest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the


13/46

second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, asmembers, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declaredunconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for theHouse of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as maybe possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected thetheory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questionsthe determination of which is beyond judicial review.

Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not includedin the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.

10It is part of the inherent powers of the

people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11

to make, and,

hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to theConstitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.12

Hence, when exercisingthe same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not asmembers ofCongress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting assuch, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,when performing the same function,

13for their authority does notemanate from the Constitution

they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, themembers of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily,that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutionallimits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenetthat ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Suchrigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,

14

the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15

despite the eminently political character oftreaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicialreview, and, to the extent

consti cases 11

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