13 consti cases

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SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19Mar 1997]Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of PeoplesInitiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with

COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of

elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article

XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the

people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the

publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the

case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-

Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco

filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is

cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,

Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition

rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional

provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be

implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been

passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the

Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a

revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme

Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-

executing provision.
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(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the

absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a

revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, withoutimplementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution

has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if

Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and

regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,

is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated,

cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegationof the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly

promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to

peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would

affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of

elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for

public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be doneby initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue,

the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has

become academic.


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Santiago vs COMELECon December 12, 2011

Political LawSeparation of Powers

On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to

Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set

the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of

the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist

petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a

special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a

motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. Santiago

argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendment s to the Constitution NOT a

revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the

President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative. The respondents

argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot

take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin

petition. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC

Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent

Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings

under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign

to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,

undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been

dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing

Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted

without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

Being so, the Supreme Court can then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago

notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even act on Rocos petition. In the final analysis, when

the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme

Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. It

must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on

the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC


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made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors

at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or

oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin

Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for

Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.

CASE DIGEST ON IBP V. ZAMORA 338 SCRA 81 [GR.NO. 141284]

CASE DIGEST ON IBP V. ZAMORA

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President

directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment

and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merelytemporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have

improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and

void and unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1)Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is

subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the

constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art.

VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis

thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the

Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different

category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers

and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the

President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is

considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and

suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by

Congress and review by the Court.
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6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions

to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution;

(3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held:According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the

basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that

the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino

petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be

informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do

so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

ConstitutionDisallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between

amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in

sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose onlyamendments to the

constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical

change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because

the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must

first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735


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This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of

signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the

proposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of

signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and

failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the

initiative void.

In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single

word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in

the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state thatthe text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The

signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people

approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the

Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The

signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the

proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature

sheet. This omission is fatal.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without

first showing to the people the full text of the proposed

amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a

gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution

requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the

people x x x in a petition meaning that the people must sign

on a petition that contains the full text of the proposedamendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations

fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed

amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general


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or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and

unelected individuals.

2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of

amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress

upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is

through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through

a peoples initiative.

Section 1 ofArticle XVII, referring to the first and second

modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this

Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to

the third mode, applies only to amendments to this

Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the

deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples

initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an

amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In

contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose

both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute an amendment

or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under

any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a

Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the

Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of

Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an

amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly
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implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,

like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system

of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change

alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when thechange affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the

other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,

reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.

Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution,

while amendment generally affects only the specific provision

being amended.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision

of the Constitution without affecting any other section or

article, the change may generally be considered an amendment

and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting

age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a

revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of

mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment

and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as

an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an

amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification

of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific

provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the

structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances

among or within the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an

amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one

sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an


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court examines only the number of provisions affected and

does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the

proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is

whether the change will accomplish such far reaching

changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to

amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the

structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,

a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental

plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the

fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature

of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that

jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system

of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino

Group initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.

Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaultwo articles Article VIon the Legislature andArticle VIIon the

Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire

Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter

substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to

parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral

legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of theConstitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of

government in the present Constitution are reduced into two.

This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift

from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
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Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the

Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is

a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition

alone of the Office of the President as the locus of ExecutivePower alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a

revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one

chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances

within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the

Constitution.

The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between

amendment and revision is only one of

procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that

when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the

Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions

because members of the deliberative body work full-time on

the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed

through an initiative, are called amendments because

the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an

occupation, profession, or vocation out of such

endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of

the framers and the plain language of the Constitution

contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of

the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and

plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical

intent and language.

3. A revisit ofSantiago vs. COMELECis not necessary

The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and

scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There
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is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts ruling

in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or

wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system

of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation orreversal ofSantiago will not change the outcome of the present

petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the

constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on

some other grounds.

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the

result here because the present petition violates Section 2,

Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be

complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the

petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735:

a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition

as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the

petition or the amended petition filed with the COMELEC. Only

Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petition andamended petition.

b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more

than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate. The

proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating

the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or

revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally

unrelated to the shift in the form of government.

Tolentino vs COMELEC41 SCRA 702

Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

Respondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing

Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.

Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F.


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Ortega and Juan V. Borra

Facts

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from

undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional

amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines

to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution

No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by

declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the

Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of

two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly

convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution

namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17,

1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of saidresolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Issue

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for

the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

Decision

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single

"election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the

same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV

of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction

are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a

convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same

provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution

when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are

submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many

"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the

same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an

election" which means only one.

The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971

and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding

of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying


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therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,

Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby

enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar

circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9Nov 1967]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Facts:The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminaryinjunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and

the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5,

Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to

increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum

of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be

apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according

to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall

have, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said

Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates

from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to

be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same

Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of

the House of Representatives to become delegates to the

aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective

seats in Congress.
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Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the

President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing

that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned

Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the

general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituentassembly, violates the Constitution.

Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor ofdeclaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and

invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby,

dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special

pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed

collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto

proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the

ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1)

it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of

a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as

the public is concerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called

upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several

departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."

Article XV of the Constitution provides:

. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of


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all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting

separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a

contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this

Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at

which the amendments aresubmitted to the people for their ratification.

From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are

satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits

Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for

and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29

Jan 1990]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts:This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality ofSection 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the

constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On

October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR

AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was

enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras

which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra

and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall

take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally

scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30,

1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.

The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987

Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other

pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the

conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera

Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein

petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the

"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/sanidad-vs-comelec-78-scra-333-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/sanidad-vs-comelec-78-scra-333-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/sanidad-vs-comelec-78-scra-333-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/sanidad-vs-comelec-78-scra-333-gr-no.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/sanidad-vs-comelec-78-scra-333-gr-no.html


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circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the

constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which

provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.

During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the

plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or

personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for

or against the plebiscite Issue.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of

expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular

news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news,

petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and

necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue

or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media

practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue

submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and

desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of

the issue.

Issue:Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 isunconstitutional.

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.

2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution

that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and

regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued

for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of

communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and


21/35

space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for

public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.

The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a

franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in

terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason

why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a

candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from

his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It

cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate

would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates

unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd

par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been

granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media

practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite

periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during

plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In

fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19

of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's

right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a

decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the

Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a

plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where

the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec

radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full

dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are

limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or

television times.


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The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167

is declared null and void and unconstitutional.

on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of theConstitution. Another petition for

Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo Salapantan,

to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees.

Issue:

W/N the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendmentto, or

revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourthsof

all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-

thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members,

submitthe question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof

provides that"Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a

majority of the

votescast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of suchame

ndment or revision."In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly

instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with

that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "Theinterim National Assembly,

upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of allits Members, propose

amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratifiedin accordance with

Article 16 hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the

nation: period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be

initiated by theproposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its

members; or (2) by aConstitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the

National Assembly.However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the

electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the

National Assembly. In times of transition,

MylaRuth N.Sara

amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of theinterim National Assembly

upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled

that the incumbent President is vested withthat prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially


23/35


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lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in

the anti-crime campaignare merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable

period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP

filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines

null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of thenecessity of

calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacyover the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of

the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court mayreview the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such

equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents

action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out

power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the

framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers

and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights

the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion

in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more

benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve


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the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual

freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the

Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary

power to determine the necessity of calling out thearmed forces, it is

incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally

bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy

burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no

justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of

Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not

constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the

Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the

visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake

the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations

is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the

military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members

of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of.

Hence, the deployment ofthe Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not

destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

>FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTEATIVES G.R. NO. 160261Posted on May 7, 2010bykrizsexzy

>FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against

Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was
http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives-g-r-no-160261/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives-g-r-no-160261/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives-g-r-no-160261/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/author/krizsexzy/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/author/krizsexzy/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives-g-r-no-160261/http://krizsexzy.wordpress.com/2010/05/07/francisco-vs-house-of-representeatives-g-r-no-160261/


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the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the

rules of impeachment provided for by law.

ISSUE:Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and

whether the resolution thereof is a political question h; as resulted in a political crisis.HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional.

Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this

Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of

powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means

prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the

governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully

calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches

must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no

constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over

impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the

Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to

defeat another. Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence

and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers

assigned to it bythe Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus

when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the

Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this

was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does

not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or

endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by

the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with theSecretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes

clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment

complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the

merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against


27/35

the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.

Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor

indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is

not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great

branches of the government.

Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No.160261; 10 Nov 2003]Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief

Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court

was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to

controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.

Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint

against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of

Representativesfalls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and

whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political

crisis.

Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is

sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court

unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-

constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally

permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in

adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is

ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of

powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by

no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that

part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/francisco-vs-house-of-representatives.html


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At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been

carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of

these three branches must be given effect without destroying

theirindispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the

contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings

would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be

interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."

Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and

interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the

powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the

constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to

show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he

sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result

of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite

way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be

denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about

to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act

complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public

right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal

interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public

funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any

improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the

enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the

power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has

sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by


29/35

taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement

of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a

general interest common to all members of the public.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's

suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the

petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate

of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will

necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official

action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a

member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the

prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary

meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at

least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary toinitiate

impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the

ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but

rather the filing of a complaint does.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate

impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of

Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of

impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the

principle ofreddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with

"impeachment proceeding."


30/35

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral

or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on

Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of

Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning

ofSection 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint

has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on

the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings

initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-

year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where

it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political

questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to

assertjudicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal

system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the

law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience

to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or

instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality

other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and

ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-

profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the

law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the

Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else.

The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.


31/35

Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were

approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are

unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against

Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of

Article XI of the Constitution.

KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al.

G. R. No. 118910

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the

same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that

the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSOs charter and the decision of the

Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section

2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents

questioned the petitioners standing to bring this suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law

because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of

the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in

the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing

this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring

this suit.

KILOSBAYANvs .

MANUEL L. MORATOG.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC

leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of

ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of

lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the

expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition

was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's

Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It isviolative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.

Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's

reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to

determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have

funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing

because they were not parties to the contract
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ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is

were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the

same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any

sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE

ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and

determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same

parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least

when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an

instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first

proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the

legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude

determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no

constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are

REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

UMALI VS. GUINGONA [305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21Mar 1999]Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Facts: Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director ofthe Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in

Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 andMakati, March 16, 1994

to August 4, 1994. On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a

confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of

internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as

Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasanceand nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former

President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension

of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to

the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for

investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And
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was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets,

and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial

hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On

August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the

evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994,

finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges

against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of

the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152

dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all

benefits under the law.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of

Tenure.

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law

(3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government agency

and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly

in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges

against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with

forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152

Held:Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, hecan only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6

loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal.

Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence

violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful


34/35


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MALALUAN vs. COMELEC Case DigestMALALUAN vs. COMELEC254 SCRA 397

Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose Evangelista were both mayoraltycandidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private respondent was proclaimed by

the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor with a winning margin of 706 votes.Petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared petitioner asthe duly elected municipal mayor with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the courtfound private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral andexemplary damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appealwhich was granted by the court. Subsequently the First Division of the Comelec ordered Malaluan tovacate the office. The Comelec en banc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition forcertiorari and prohibition on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the term ofoffice of the local officials elected in the May 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition,thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioners right to the mayoralty seatbecause expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of renderingthe same moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforeciteddamages in favor of private respondent.

Held: The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of damages is that the same is inaccordance with law, specifically, the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to damages. TheOmnibus Election Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be granted in allelection contests or in quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law. Comelec Rules ofProcedure provide that in all election contests the Court may adjudicate damages and attorneysfees as it may deem just and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has includedsuch claims in his pleadings.Notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election protest, an elective official who hasbeen proclaimed by the Comelec as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and

entered into the performance of the duties of office is entitled to the compensation, emoluments andallowances legally provided for that position. The emolument must go to the person who renderedthe service unless the contrary is provided.

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