consti chapter 13 to 17 cases
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G.R. No. 134990 April 27, 2000
MANUEL M. LEYSON JR., petitioner,vs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, TIRSO ANTIPORDA, Chairman, UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and OSCAR A. TORRALBA, President, CIIF Oil Mills, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business, entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.
On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and existing contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of documents and reports to stop the operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to disqualify MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e) double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f) engaged and entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of millions of pesos to Cocochem. 1
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.
On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its finding that —
The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations (over) which this Office has no jurisdiction. 2
On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied. The Ombudsman was unswayed in his finding that the present controversy involved breach of contract as he also took into account the circumstance that petitioner had already filed a collection case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila-Br. 15, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-83354. Moreover, the Ombudsman found that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 31 March 1998 was beyond the inextendible period of five (5) days from notice of the assailed resolution on 19 March 1998. 3
Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in dismissing his complaint. He submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG 4 and Republic v.Sandiganbayan 5 have declared that the coconut levy funds are public funds then, conformably with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 6 corporations formed and organized from those funds or whose controlling stocks are from those funds should be regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary, 7 it follows that they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily, petitioner asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleges next that public respondent's conclusion that his complaint refers to a breach of contract is whimsical, capricious and irresponsible amounting to a total disregard of its main point, i. e., whether private respondents violated The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act when they entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corporation which was grossly disadvantageous to the government in general and to the CIIF in particular. Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its rules in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a matter of days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed the complaint.
Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that they are not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel. They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly filed a case for collection of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal indictment of private respondents.
We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. COCOFED v. PCGG referred to in Republic v. Sandiganbayan reviewed the history of the coconut levy funds. These funds actually have four (4) general classes: (a) the Coconut Investment Fund created under R. A. No. 6260; 8 (b) the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 276; 9 (c) the Coconut Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No. 582; 10 and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No. 1841. 11
The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On 21 October of that year, P. D. No. 96112 was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it was amended by P. D. No. 1468 13 by
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inserting a new provision authorizing the use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in the establishment and operation of industries . . . commercial activities and other allied business undertakings relating to coconut and other palm oil indust(ries)." 14From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were purchased.
We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper management thereof were certainly the concern of the Government. These funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.
Quimpo v. Tanodbayan involved the issue as to whether PETROPHIL was a government owned or controlled corporation the employees of which fell within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We upheld the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan on the ratiocination that —
While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled corporation, after it was acquired by PNOC, which is a government-owned or controlled corporation, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil, a vital commodity in the economic life of the nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or government-related functions, as the marketing arm of the PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply.
But these jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim that the CIIF companies are government owned and/or controlled corporations are incomplete without resorting to the definition of "government owned or controlled corporation" contained in par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of the shares of UNITED COCONUT. 15 Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/or UNITED COCONUT was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature
unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its jurisdiction.
With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner.
A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive Secretary v. Gordon 16 is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, is different from the cause of action in the case pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying his motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
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G.R. No. 125296 July 20, 2006
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. and WENCESLAO L. MALABANAN, petitioners, vs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), ROSAURO F. TORRALBA* and CELESTINO BANDALA**, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court addresses the issue of whether public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 30191 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
In February 1989, private respondents Rosauro Torralba and Celestino Bandala charged petitioners before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) for violation of RA 3019. In their complaint, private respondents accused petitioners of using their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and janitorial services in which they were shareholders.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application of RA 3019.
In a resolution dated July 13, 1989,2 the Deputy Ombudsman3 denied petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss.
On petitioners' first argument, he ruled that, although PAL was originally organized as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).4 Therefore, it became a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan.5
On the second argument, the Deputy Ombudsman held that petitioners were public officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b). Under that provision, public officers included "elective, appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the Government."
The dispositive portion of the Deputy Ombudsman's order read:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit to [petitioners'] OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS, the same is hereby DENIED and petitioners are hereby ordered to submit their answer within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.6
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Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman. There, they raised the same issues. Treating the appeal as a motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman dismissed it on February 22, 1996. He held that petitioners were officers of a GOCC, hence, he had jurisdiction over them.7 He also affirmed the Deputy Ombudsman's ruling that Quimpo was applicable to petitioners' case.
In this petition for certiorari, with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioners assail the orders dated July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996 of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and the Ombudsman, respectively. They claim that public respondents acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the investigation of the case against them although they were officers of a private corporation and not "public officers."8
In support of their petition, petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsman's jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include PAL, a private entity created under the general corporation law; (2) Quimpo does not apply to the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns "public officers," thus, they cannot be investigated or prosecuted under that law.
We find merit in petitioners' arguments and hold that public respondents do not have the authority to prosecute them for violation of RA 3019.
JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER GOCCSIS CONFINED ONLY TO THOSE WITH ORIGINALCHARTERS
The 1987 Constitution states the powers and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. Specifically, Article XI, Section 13(2) provides:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
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(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (italics supplied)
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Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.
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In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 we ruled that the phrase "with original charter" means "chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code." PAL, being originally a private corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners.
Quimpo Not Applicableto the Case at Bar
Quimpo10 is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo charged in 1984 two officers of PETROPHIL in the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) for violation of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as officers/employees of a private company. The Court declared that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because PETROPHIL ceased to be a private entity when Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired its shares.
In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this case (like PETROPHIL, PAL's shares were also acquired by the government), closer scrutiny reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here.
In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to "perform functions related to government programs and policies on oil."11 The fact that the purpose in acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to oil was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan's jurisdiction over it. This was certainly not the case with PAL. The records indicate that the government acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were involved.
Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the 1973 Constitution which the Court relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL's accused officers. Particularly, the Court cited Article XIII, Section 6:
SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as the Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the proper court or body. (italics supplied)
The term "government-owned or controlled corporations" in the 1973 Constitution was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters.12
Petitioners, as then Officers ofPAL, were not Public Officers
Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) defines who "public officers" are. Instead, its varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes13 and jurisprudence.14 Usually quoted in our decisions is Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject.
In the 2002 case of Laurel v. Desierto,15 the Court extensively quoted his exposition on the term "public officers":
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
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Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; − that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16 (italics supplied)
From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are those endowed with the exercise of sovereign executive, legislative or judicial functions.17 The explication of the term is also consistent with the Court's pronouncement in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed "public officers" if their corporations are tasked to carry out governmental functions.
In any event, PAL has since reverted to private ownership and we find it pointless to scrutinize the implications of a legal issue that technically no longer exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the Ombudsman are restrained from proceeding with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against petitioners for violation of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996, respectively, are SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.
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G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so.
Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.
The background of this case is as follows:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima facieevidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. 2
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E.
Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. 4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe. 5
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape. 6
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were thereupon conducted.
It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10and another one was a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting evidence.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice:
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(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.
(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the authority of said Office.
(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs. Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay.
(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.
(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the petition.
I.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public
officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office.
In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrismo.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the
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Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.
II.
The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.
III.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
A.
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia: 17
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added).
It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before
8
him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. . . . 19
In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:
A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.
Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. 20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal
from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.
B.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant.
On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.
C.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner assails in the case at bar.
It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman. Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority to suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a little further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension,vis-a-vis the provisions on preventive suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90) days. 1However, a comparison of the grounds therefor 2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman Act 3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is strong and the additional ground that "the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive suspension may be imposed on the mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service: whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, it is required thatsuch charges must be supported by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the people, but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered "after the issues are joined." That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary requirements and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his counter-affidavits to the affidavits of the complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready for resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably include the service of thesubpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions for certiorari.
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded by the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al., 5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated by this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through repeated resourceful submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992 and it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be reviewed on the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the same dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office and, in the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed against him."
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by the Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional provisions creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by impeachment. 6
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:
10
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objective of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for Department of which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).
On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it is puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.
Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which petitioner assails in the case at bar.
It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman. Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority to suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a little further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension,vis-a-vis the provisions on preventive suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90) days. 1However, a comparison of the grounds therefor 2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman Act 3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is strong and the additional ground that "the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him." Further, in the aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive suspension may be imposed on the mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the
service: whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, it is required thatsuch charges must be supported by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 4 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the people, but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered "after the issues are joined." That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary requirements and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his counter-affidavits to the affidavits of the complainant and the latter's witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready for resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably include the service of thesubpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions for certiorari.
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded by the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al., 5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated by this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through repeated resourceful submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992 and it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be reviewed on the merits and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the same dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office and, in the language of the law, could "prejudice the case filed against him."
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by the Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional provisions creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by impeachment. 6
11
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:
The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objective of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for Department of which it was created (Cf. Department of Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).
On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it is puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted by law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.
XXOOXX
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G.R. No. 133715 February 23, 2000
DOUGLAS R. VILLAVERT, petitioner, vs.HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Region VII, Cebu City, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 67701(The Ombudsman Act of 1989), seeking the annulment of the Memorandum2 of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas dated 17 July 1997, in Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088, approved by the Ombudsman, which recommended the dismissal of petitioner from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), Cebu, as well as the Order3 dated 30 January 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales & Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO sweepstakes tickets withdrawn by him, which are already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected to sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed by the PCSO to consign tickets to ticket outlets and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually sidewalk peddlers and hawkers.
From 20 March to 12 June 1994, or for two (2) months of weekly draws, petitioner Villavert incurred a total of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. On 13 October 1994 he wrote the Chairman and Acting General Manager of PCSO, Manuel L. Morato, proposing to settle his unpaid ticket accounts.4 His proposal involved the payment of P50,000.00 in cash as down payment; payment of the remaining amount in equal monthly installments of P5,000.00; application of all his per diems and commissions to his account as they became due; and, sale of fifty (50) booklets or more per draws.5
On 11 January 1995 Lorna H. Muñez, COA State Auditor III, wrote petitioner demanding the immediate settlement of the latter's past due ticket accounts with PCSO in the total amount of P997,373.60 with interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum. Muñez also required petitioner to submit within seventy-two (72) hours a written explanation for the delay.6 In response, petitioner informed Muñez that he had already submitted a proposal for the settlement of his past due accounts and that pending its approval he had already made a total payment of P23,920.68.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995 the PCSO Board of Directors7 approved Resolution No. 059, Series of 1995, which adopted the recommendation of the Management Committee to reinstate sales supervisors Rene de Guia and Luis Renolla, Jr., and rehabilitate their accounts. By reason of the
Resolution, OIC Manager of the Sales Department, Carlos M. Castillo, requested Chairman Morato to give petitioner the same terms and conditions given to de Guia and Renolla, Jr.
On 20 February 1995 Santos M. Alquizalas, COA Director IV, recommended to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo C. Mojica that the shortage in the ticket accounts of petitioner should be properly treated under Art. 2178 of the Revised Penal Code, Sec. 3 of RA 3019,9 and RA 6713.10 Taken as a letter-complaint, it was docketed as Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088.
On 27 February 1995 petitioner submitted an amended proposal of settlement for his accounts: a down payment of ten percent (10%) of the total unpaid account or P97,345.29, and the balance to be paid on equal monthly installments equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the down payment or P9,734.52. Petitioner likewise bound himself from then on to purchase all his tickets in cash; to have a ticket quota of no less than fifty (50) booklets for the small draws, and twenty-five (25) booklets for the big draws; and, not to be entitled to his salary for the month if he failed to meet his quota in any draw within that month. The amended proposal was favorably indorsed and recommended for approval by Regional Manager of PCSO-Cebu, William H. Medici, and by PCSO OIC-Manager of the Sales Department, Carlos M. Castillo.11
On 19 April 1995 petitioner filed his counter-affidavit where he explained the circumstances which led him to incur subject unpaid ticket accounts. He emphasized his proposal to settle his liability and underscored the favorable indorsement of the Regional Manager of PCSO-Cebu as well as by the PCSO OIC-Manager of the Sales Department.12
On 4 June 1996 petitioner filed a Manifestation13 with respondent Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas informing the latter of the approval by PCSO Chairman and Acting General Manager of his amended proposal for settlement. However, in an Order dated 14 August 1996 respondent Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas required petitioner to secure further approval from the PCSO Board of Directors.14
In compliance, petitioner submitted inter alia a copy of the Affidavit of Desistance15 executed by the Regional Director of PCSO-Cebu manifesting the disinterest of the PCSO in further prosecuting the case against petitioner. On 20 December 1996 the PCSO Board of Directors approved petitioner's proposed settlement of 13 October 1994 in its Resolution No. 1491, Series of 1996.16
Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales, after due consideration of the evidence submitted by petitioner, rendered a resolution recommending the dismissal of Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088 in view of: (a) the approval of petitioner's proposal of settlement by the PCSO Chairman-Acting General Manager; (b) the findings that petitioner did not mismanage his responsibilities in the sale of sweepstakes tickets; and, (c) the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the PCSO through its authorized representative. Despite the recommendation, however, the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas through Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago issued a Memorandum dated 17 July 1997 finding petitioner "liable for administrative sanction for Grave Misconduct and/or Dishonesty." Consequently, petitioner was recommended for dismissal from the public service with all the accessory penalties provided under Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989, of the Civil Service Commission.17 On 7 November 1997 respondent Ombudsman approved the Memorandum. On 4 December 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas in an Order dated 30 January 1998 and approved by the Ombudsman on 3 April 1998. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770.
13
This petition for review was filed on 18 June 1998. Thereafter, on 16 September 1998 we promulgated Fabian v.Desierto18 where the basis for the filing of this petition before this Court, i.e., Sec. 27, RA 6770,19 insofar as it allows appeals to the Supreme Court in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared invalid, thus depriving this Court of jurisdiction.
In Fabian, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution20 against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent. In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, as reiterated in the subsequent case of Namuhe v. Ombudsman.21
In both Fabian and Namuhe, the petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals for final disposition and considered as petitions for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 9 February 1999 this Court promulgated A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC thus —
In light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998), any appeal by way of petition for review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or special civil action relative to such decision, resolution or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999shall no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals but must be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.
As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999, its referral for final disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order.
ACCORDINGLY, let this case be REFERRED to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to be disposed of in accordance with law.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.Buena, J., is on leave.
XXOOXX
14
G.R. No. 159747 April 13, 2004
GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner, vs.THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (LEO DACERA, SUSAN F. DACANAY, EDNA A. VALENZUELA AND SEBASTIAN F. CAPONONG, JR.), CIDG-PNP- P/DIRECTOR EDUARDO MATILLANO, and HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V. MARCELO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On August 4, 2003, an affidavit-complaint was filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano. It reads in part:
…
2. After a thorough investigation, I found that a crime of coup d'etat was indeed committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood on the 27th day of July 2003 and Senator Gregorio "Gringo"Honasan, II …
3. …
4. The said crime was committed as follows:
4.1 On June 4, 2003, at on or about 11 p.m., in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila, a meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan. Attached as Annex "B" is the affidavit of Perfecto Ragil and made an integral part of this complaint.
…
4.8 In the early morning of July 27, 2003, Capt. Gerardo Gambala, for and in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on nation television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and they are willing to risk their lives in order to achieve the National Recovery
Agenda of Sen. Honasan, which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Sworn Statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil referred to by PNP/P Director Matillano is quoted verbatim, to wit:
1. That I am a member of the Communication –Electronics and Information Systems Services, Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Major;
2. That I met a certain Captain Gary Alejano of the Presidential Security Guard (PSG) during our Very Important Person (VIP) Protection Course sometime in last week of March 2003;
3. That sometime in May 2003, Captain Alejano gave me a copy of the pamphlet of the National Recovery Program (NRP) and told me that: "Kailangan ng Bansa ng taong kagaya mo na walang bahid ng corruption kaya basahin mo ito (referring to NRP) pamphlet. I took the pamphlet but never had the time to read it;
4. That sometime in the afternoon of June 4, 2003, Captain Alejano invited me to join him in a meeting where the NRP would be discussed and that there would be a special guest;
5. That Capt. Alejano and I arrived at the meeting at past 9 o'clock in the evening of June 4, 2003 in a house located somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila;
6. That upon arrival we were given a document consisting of about 3-4 pages containing discussion of issues and concerns within the framework of NRP and we were likewise served with dinner;
7. That while we were still having dinner at about past 11 o'clock in the evening, Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan arrived together with another fellow who was later introduced as Capt. Turingan;
8. That after Sen. Honasan had taken his dinner, the meeting proper started presided by Sen. Honasan;
9. That Sen. Honasan discussed the NRP, the graft and corruption in the government including the military institution, the judiciary, the executive branch and the like;
10. That the discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. At this point, I raised the argument that it is my belief that reforms will be achieved through the democratic processes and not thru force and violence and/or armed struggle. Sen. Honasan
15
countered that "we will never achieve reforms through the democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions as they have their vested interests to protect." After a few more exchanges of views, Sen. Honasan appeared irritated and asked me directly three (3) times: "In ka ba o out?" I then asked whether all those present numbering 30 people, more or less, are really committed, Sen. Honasan replied: "Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil." I decided not to pursue further questions;
11. That in the course of the meeting, he presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolution and after which, a junta will be constituted and that junta will run the new government. He further said that some of us will resign from the military service and occupy civilian positions in the new government. He also said that there is urgency that we implement this plan and that we would be notified of the next activities.
12. That after the discussion and his presentation, he explained the rites that we were to undergo-some sort of "blood compact". He read a prayer that sounded more like a pledge and we all recited it with raised arms and clenched fists. He then took a knife and demonstrated how to make a cut on the left upper inner arm until it bleeds. The cut was in form of the letter "I" in the old alphabet but was done in a way that it actually looked like letter "H". Then, he pressed his right thumb against the blood and pressed the thumb on the lower middle portion of the copy of the Prayer. He then covered his thumb mark in blood with tape. He then pressed the cut on his left arm against the NRP flag and left mark of letter "I" on it. Everybody else followed;
13. That when my turn came, I slightly made a cut on my upper inner arm and pricked a portion of it to let it bleed and I followed what Senator HONASAN did;
14. That I did not like to participate in the rites but I had the fear for my life with what Senator HONASAN said that "…kaya nating pumatay ng kasamahan";
15. That after the rites, the meeting was adjourned and we left the place;
16. That I avoided Captain Alejano after that meeting but I was extra cautious that he would not notice it for fear of my life due to the threat made by Senator HONASAN during the meeting on June 4, 2003 and the information relayed to me by Captain Alejano that their group had already deeply established their network inside the intelligence community;
17. That sometime in the first week of July 2003, Captain Alejano came to see me to return the rifle that he borrowed and told me that when the group arrives at the Malacañang Compound for "D-DAY", my task is to switch off the
telephone PABX that serves the Malacañang complex. I told him that I could not do it. No further conversation ensued and he left;
18. That on Sunday, July 27, 2003, while watching the television, I saw flashed on the screen Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the June 4th meeting that I attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. I also saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner which was displayed and on which we pressed our wound to leave the imprint of the letter "I";
19. That this Affidavit is being executed in order to attest the veracity of the foregoing and in order to charge SENATOR GREGORIO "GRINGO" HONASAN, Capt. FELIX TURINGAN, Capt. GARY ALEJANO, Lt. ANTONIO TRILLANES, Capt. GERARDO GAMBALA and others for violation of Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of "coup d'etat". (Emphasis supplied)
The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
On August 27, 2003, petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He filed a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be filed in court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.
Respondent Matillano submitted his comment/opposition thereto and petitioner filed a reply.
On September 10, 2003, the DOJ Panel issued an Order, to wit:
On August 27, 2003, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed through counsel a "Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction". On September 1, 2003, complainant filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
The motion and comment/opposition are hereby duly noted and shall be passed upon in the resolution of this case.
In the meantime, in view of the submission by complainant of additional affidavits/evidence and to afford respondents ample opportunity to controvert the same, respondents, thru counsel are hereby directed to file their respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on or before
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September 23, 2003.1
Hence, Senator Gregorio B. Honasan II filed the herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Respondent Ombudsman, the Office of Solicitor General in representation of respondents DOJ Panel, and Director Matillano submitted their respective comments.
The Court heard the parties in oral arguments on the following issues:
1) Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner;
2) Whether Ombudsman-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 violates the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 or Ombudsman Act of 1989; and
3) Whether respondent DOJ Panel of Investigators committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the resolution of the petitioner's motion to clarify jurisdiction considering the claim of the petitioner that the DOJ Panel has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation.
After the oral arguments, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The arguments of petitioner are:
1. The Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over all public officials, including petitioner.
2. Respondent DOJ Panel is neither authorized nor deputized under OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 to conduct the preliminary investigation involving Honasan.
3. Even if deputized, the respondent DOJ Panel is still without authority since OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ultra vires for being violative of the Constitution, beyond the powers granted to the Ombudsman by R.A. 6770 and inoperative due to lack of publication, hence null and void.
4. Since petitioner is charged with coup de 'etat in relation to his office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman which has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.
5. The respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred in deferring the resolution of
petitioner's Motion to Clarify Jurisdiction since the issue involved therein is determinative of the validity of the preliminary investigation.
6. Respondent DOJ Panel gravely erred when it resolved petitioner's Motion in the guise of directing him to submit Counter-Affidavit and yet refused and/or failed to perform its duties to resolve petitioner's Motion stating its legal and factual bases.
The arguments of respondent DOJ Panel are:
1. The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation on petitioner pursuant to Section 3, Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to P.D. No. 1275, as amended by P.D. No. 1513.
2. Petitioner is charged with a crime that is not directly nor intimately related to his public office as a Senator. The factual allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavits are bereft of the requisite nexus between petitioner's office and the acts complained of.
3. The challenge against the constitutionality of the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular, as a ground to question the jurisdiction of the DOJ over the complaint below, is misplaced. The jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant under the Revised Administrative Code. It is not derived from any provision of the joint circular which embodies the guidelines governing the authority of both the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation on offenses charged in relation to public office.
4. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, petitioner opted to file a motion to clarify jurisdiction which, for all intents and purposes, is actually a motion to dismiss that is a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The DOJ Panel is not required to act or even recognize it since a preliminary investigation is required solely for the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The DOJ panel did not outrightly reject the motion of petitioner but ruled to pass upon the same in the determination of the probable cause; thus, it has not violated any law or rule or any norm of discretion.
The arguments of respondent Ombudsman are:
1. The DOJ Panel has full authority and jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation over the petitioner for the reason that the crime of coup d'etat under Article No. 134-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) may fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only if the same is committed "in relation to office" of petitioner, pursuant to Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as
17
amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
2. Petitioner's premise that the DOJ Panel derives its authority to conduct preliminary investigation over cases involving public officers solely from the OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is misplaced because the DOJ's concurrent authority with the OMB to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving public officials has been recognized in Sanchez vs. Demetriou (227 SCRA 627 [1993]) and incorporated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3. Petitioner's assertion that the Joint Circular is ultra vires and the DOJ cannot be deputized by the Ombudsman en masse but must be given in reference to specific cases has no factual or legal basis. There is no rule or law which requires the Ombudsman to write out individualized authorities to deputize prosecutors on a per case basis. The power of the Ombudsman to deputize DOJ prosecutors proceeds from the Constitutional grant of power to request assistance from any government agency necessary to discharge its functions, as well as from the statutory authority to so deputize said DOJ prosecutors under Sec. 31 of RA 6770.
4. The Joint Circular which is an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman need not be published since it neither contains a penal provision nor does it prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain or penalty. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which provides:
Sec. 1. Declaration of policy - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; …
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and functions:
…
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system; (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 1 of P.D. 1275, effective April 11, 1978, to wit:
SECTION 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal's Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution, pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.2
The Court is not convinced. Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same Section 13 of the Constitution
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provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
…. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court.
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise
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of his primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo,5 pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
. . . . . . . . .
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.6
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,7 that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,8 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Natividad vs. Felix,10 a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to
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the subject matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -- the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
. . .
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.11
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire
primary jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pari materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.12 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of
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their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001
Series of 1995
TO: ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the supreme court on the extent to which the ombudsman may call upon the government prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "an act to strengthen the functional and structural organization of the sandiganbayan, amending for the purpose presidential decree no. 1606, as amended" and its implications on the jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the department of justice, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against public officers and employees, the conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and informations, and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants as deputized prosecutors of the ombudsman.
Recognizing the concerns, the office of the ombudsman and the department of justice, in a series of consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed in the investigation and prosecution of cases against public officers and employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to office whether cognizable by the sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed with the office of the ombudsman or with the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the office of the ombudsman.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the office of the provincial/city prosecutor, which shall rule thereon with finality.
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the office of the ombudsman has jurisdiction over public officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of cases involving public officers and employees, the office of the provincial/city prosecutor shall submit to the office of the ombudsman a monthly list of complaints filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
Manila, Philippines, October 5, 1995.
(signed)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.SecretaryDepartment of Justice
(signed)
ANIANO A. DESIERTOOmbudsmanOffice of the Ombudsman
A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations-
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
22
Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information, He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after their investigation, transmit the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss the complaint without the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the prosecutor file an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and without prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Next, petitioner contends that under OMB-Joint Circular No. 95-001, there is no showing that the Office of the Ombudsman has deputized the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge filed against him.
We find no merit in this argument. As we have lengthily discussed, the Constitution, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, the prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
Petitioner's contention that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published is not plausible. We agree with and adopt the Ombudsman's dissertation on the matter, to wit:
Petitioner appears to be of the belief, although NOT founded on a proper reading and application of jurisprudence, that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, an internal arrangement between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, has to be published.
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As early as 1954, the Honorable Court has already laid down the rule in the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954) that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.
What is more, in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (at page 454. emphasis supplied)
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.
Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be published.14
Petitioner insists that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because petitioner is a public officer with salary Grade 31 so that the case against him falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Considering the Court's finding that the DOJ has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate charges against public officers, the fact that petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position does not by itself remove from the DOJ Panel the authority to investigate the charge of coup d'etat against him.
The question whether or not the offense allegedly committed by petitioner is one of those enumerated in the Sandiganbayan Law that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan will not be resolved in the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation being conducted by the DOJ Panel as to the questions whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the information against the petitioner; and to which court should the information be filed considering the presence of other respondents in the subject complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.Puno, J., joins J. Ynares-Santiago.Vitug, J., see separate dissenting opinion.Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent.Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting opinion.Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Preliminary investigation is an initial step in the indictment of an accused; it is a substantive right, not merely a formal or a technical requirement,1 which an accused can avail himself of in full measure. Thus, an accused is entitled to rightly assail the conduct of an investigation that does not accord with the law. He may also question the jurisdiction or the authority of the person or agency conducting that investigation and, if bereft of such jurisdiction or authority, to demand that it be undertaken strictly in conformity with the legal prescription.2
The Ombudsman is empowered3 to, among other things, investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may, at any stage, take over from any agency of Government the investigation of such cases. This statutory provision, by and large, is a restatement of the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to investigate and prosecute "any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal x x x."4
The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, in taking cognizance of the preliminary investigation on charges of coup d'etat against petitioner Gregorio Honasan, relies on OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001. That joint circular must be understood as being merely a working arrangement between the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) that must not be meant to be such a blanket delegation to the DOJ as to generally allow it to conduct preliminary investigation over any case cognizable by the OMB.
While Section 31 of Republic Act No. 6770 states that the Ombudsman may "designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
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certain cases," the provision cannot be assumed, however, to be an undefined and broad entrustment of authority. If it were otherwise, it would be unable to either withstand the weight of burden to be within constitutional parameters or the proscription against undue delegation of powers. The deputized fiscal, state prosecutor or government lawyer must in each instance be named; the case to which the deputized official is assigned must be specified; and the investigation must be conducted under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman remains to have the basic responsibility, direct or incidental, in the investigation and prosecution of such cases.
The Sandiganbayan law5 grants to the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, committed by the public officials, including members of Congress, in relation to their office. The crime of coup d'etat, with which petitioner, a member of the Senate, has been charged, is said to be closely linked to his "National Recovery Program," a publication which encapsules the bills and resolutions authored or sponsored by him on the senate floor. I see the charge as being then related to and bearing on his official function.
On the above score, I vote to grant the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The first question to answer is which court has jurisdiction to try a Senator who is accused of coup d'etat. Behind the simple issue is a more salient question - Should this Court allow an all too restrictive and limiting interpretation of the law rather than take a more judicious approach of interpreting the law by the spirit, which vivifies, and not by the letter, which killeth?
The elemental thrust of the Majority view is that the Department of Justice (DOJ), not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner, a Senator, for the crime of coup d'etat pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 (Sandiganbayan Law). The Majority maintains that since the crime for which petitioner is charged falls under Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law, it is imperative to show that petitioner committed the offense in relation to his office as Senator. It reasoned that since petitioner committed the felonious acts, as alleged in the complaint, not in connection with or in relation to his public office, it is the DOJ, and not the Office of the Ombudsman, which is legally tasked to conduct the preliminary investigation.
In light of the peculiar circumstances prevailing in the instant case and in consideration of the policies relied upon by the Majority, specifically, the Sandiganbayan Law and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), I submit that the posture taken by the Majority seriously deviates from
and renders nugatory the very intent for which the laws were enacted.
The crime of coup d'etat, if committed by members of Congress or by a public officer with a salary grade above 27, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
x x x x x x x x x
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
x x x x x x x x x.
In the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,1 we clarified the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Presidential Decree ("PD") No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act ("RA") Nos. 7975 and 8249, and made the following definitive pronouncements:
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office." The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite
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to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
As worded, the Sandiganbayan Law requires that for a felony, coup d'etat in this case, to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, two requisites must concur, namely: (1) that the public officer or employee occupies the position corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; and (2) that the crime is committed by the public officer or employee in relation to his office. Applying the law to the case at bar, the Majority found that although the first requirement has been met, the second requirement is wanting. I disagree.
Following its definition, coup d'etat can only be committed by members of the military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without civilian support. Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 134-A. Coup d'etat. – How committed. – The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications network, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment, with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power.
A coup consists mainly of the military personnel and public officers and employees seizing the controlling levers of the state, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder. As defined, it is a swift attack directed against the duly constituted authorities or vital facilities and installations to seize state power. It is therefore inherent in coup d'etat that the crime be committed "in relation to" the office of a public officer or employee. The violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth which are inherent in the crime can only be accomplished by those who possess a degree of trust reposed on such person in that position by the Republic of the Philippines. It is by exploiting this trust that the swift attack can be made. Since the perpetrators take advantage of their official positions, it follows that coup d'etat can be committed only through acts directly or intimately related to the performance of official functions, and the same need not be proved since it inheres in the very nature of the crime itself.
It is contended by public respondent that the crime of coup d'etat cannot be committed "in relation" to petitioner's office, since the performance of legislative functions does not include its commission as part of the job description. To accommodate this reasoning would be to render erroneous this Court's ruling in People v. Montejo2 that "although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that ". . . the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds'] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions." Simply put, if murder can be committed in the performance of official functions, so can the
crime of coup d'etat.
The Ombudsman is wrong when he says that legislative function is only "to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The growing complexity of our society and governmental structure has so revolutionized the powers and duties of the legislative body such that its members are no longer confined to making laws. They can perform such other functions, which are, strictly speaking, not within the ambit of the traditional legislative powers, for instance, to canvass presidential elections, give concurrence to treaties, to propose constitutional amendments as well as oversight functions. As an incident thereto and in pursuance thereof, members of Congress may deliver privilege speeches, interpellations, or simply inform and educate the public in respect to certain proposed legislative measures.
The complaint alleges that the meeting on June 4, 2003 of the alleged coup plotters involved a discussion on the issues and concerns within the framework of the National Recovery Program (NRP), a bill which petitioner authored in the Senate. The act of the petitioner in ventilating the ails of the society and extolling the merits of the NRP is part of his duties as legislator not only to inform the public of his legislative measures but also, as a component of the national leadership, to find answers to the many problems of our society. One can see therefore that Senator Honasan's acts were "in relation to his office."
It is true that not every crime committed by a high-ranking public officer falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is also true that there is no public office or employment that includes the commission of a crime as part of its job description. However, to follow this latter argument would mean that there would be no crime falling under Section 4, paragraph (b) PD No. 1606, as amended. This would be an undue truncation of the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction and contrary to the plain language of the provision.
Only by a reasonable interpretation of the scope and breadth of the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused's] office" in light of the broad powers and functions of the office of Senator, can we subserve the very purpose for which the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman were created.
The raison d' etre for the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant of its broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances, and misfeasances committed by public officers.3
In similar vein, the Constitution provides for the creation of the Sandiganbayan to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees. It is a special court that tries cases involving public officers and employees that fall within specific salary levels. Thus, section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law makes it a requirement that for offenses to fall under the exlusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the public officer involved must occupy a position equivalent to Salary Grade 27 or higher. This
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salary grade requirement is not a product of whim or an empty expression of fancy, but a way to ensure that offenses which spring from official abuse will be tried by a judicial body insulated from official pressure and unsusceptible to the blandishments, influence and intimidation from those who seek to subvert the ends of justice.
If we were to give our assent to respondent's restrictive interpretation of the term "in relation to his office," we would be creating an awkward situation wherein a powerful member of Congress will be investigated by the DOJ which is an adjunct of the executive department, and tried by a regular court which is much vulnerable to outside pressure. Contrarily, a more liberal approach would bring the case to be investigated and tried by specialized Constitutional bodies and, thus ensure the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Second, the "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation of an offense within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan operates as a mandate on the Office of the Ombudsman, especially when the person under investigation is a member of Congress. The Ombudsman's refusal to exercise such authority, relegating the conduct of the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2003-1120 to the respondent Investigating Panel appointed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") under DOJ Department Order No. 279, s. 2003, is a dereliction of a duty imposed by no less than the Constitution.
Insofar as the investigation of said crimes is concerned, I submit that the same belongs to the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation of cases involving illegal acts or omissions committed by any public officer or employee. Section 15, paragraph (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
SECTION 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x.4
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan,5 the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct investigations was described as:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
The "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan was reiterated in Laurel v. Desierto:6
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
"Primary Jurisdiction" usually refers to cases involving specialized disputes where the practice is to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court has said that it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.7 The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court."8 It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.9
Where the concurrent authority is vested in both the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should operate to
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restrain the Department of Justice from exercising its investigative authority if the case will likely be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In such cases, the Office of the Ombudsman should be the proper agency to conduct the preliminary investigation over such an offense, it being vested with the specialized competence and undoubted probity to conduct the investigation.
The urgent need to follow the doctrine is more heightened in this case where the accused is a member of Congress. The DOJ is under the supervision and control of the Office of the President; in effect, therefore, the investigation would be conducted by the executive over a member of a co-equal branch of government. It is precisely for this reason that the independent constitutional Office of the Ombudsman should conduct the preliminary investigation. Senator Honasan is a member of the political opposition. His right to a preliminary investigation by a fair and uninfluenced body is sacred and should not be denied. As we stated in the Uy case:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability n public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.
These pronouncements are in harmony with the constitutional mandate of he Office of the Ombudsman, as expressed in Article XI of the Constitution.
SECTION 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any agency, subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the actions taken and the result thereof. (Underscoring supplied.)
SECTION 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. x x x.
Coupled with these provisions, Section 13 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
SECTION 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people. (Underscoring supplied)
The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 both mention, unequivocally, that the Office of the Ombudsman has the duty and mandate to act on the complaints filed against officers or employees of the Government. It is imperative that this duty be exercised in order to make real the role of the Office of the Ombudsman as a defender of the people's interest specially in cases like these which have partisan political taint.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons: (1) it evades the consequence of the statutory definition of the crime of coup d'etat; (2) it violates the principle of stare decisis without a clear explanation why the established doctrine has to be re-examined and reversed; and (3) it trivializes the importance of two constitutional offices – the Ombudsman and the Senate – and in the process, petitioner's right to due process has been impaired.
I
It is an established principle that an act no matter how offensive, destructive, or reprehensible, is not a crime unless it is defined, prohibited, and punished by law. The prosecution and punishment of any criminal offense are necessarily circumscribed by the specific provision of law which defines it.
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code defines coup d'etat, thus:
"Article 134-A. Coup d'etat. – How committed. – The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communications networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment with or without civilian support or participation for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power."
There is no question that Senator Honasan, herein petitioner, holds a high public office. If he is charged with coup d'etat, it has to be in his capacity as a public officer committing the alleged offense in relation to his public office.
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The complaint filed with the Department of Justice alleges the events supposedly constituting the crime of coup d'etat, thus:
1. On 04 June 2003, Senator Honasan presided over a meeting held "somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila."
2. After dinner, Senator Honasan, as presiding officer, "discussed the NRP (National Recovery Program), the graft and corruption in the government, including the military institutions, the judiciary, the executive department, and the like."
3. "The discussion concluded that we must use force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP. x x x Senator Honasan countered that 'we will never achieve reforms through the democratic processes because the people who are in power will not give up their positions as they have their vested interests to protect.' x x x Senator Honasan replied 'kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.' x x x."
4. In the course of the meeting, Senator Honasan presented the plan of action to achieve the goals of the NRP, i.e., overthrow of the government under the present leadership thru armed revolution and after which, a junta will be constituted to run the new government.
5. The crime of coup d'etat was committed on 27 July 2003 by military personnel who occupied Oakwood. Senator Honasan and various military officers, one member of his staff, and several John Does and Jane Does were involved in the Oakwood incident.
The above allegations determine whether or not petitioner committed the alleged crime as a public officer "in relation to his office." If it was in relation to his office, the crime falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is the Ombudsman who has the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the complaint for coup d'etat, thus:
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as follows:
"SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"a. Violations of Republic No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensations and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 67 58), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers , assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
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provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986."
Section 15 of Republic Act 6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
"1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above provisions, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender, that is, whether he is one of those public officers enumerated therein.
Petitioner, being a Senator, occupies a government position higher than Grade 27 of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. In fact, he holds the third highest position and rank in the Government. At the apex, the President stands alone. At the second level, we have the Vice-President, Speaker of the House, Senate President and Chief Justice. Clearly, he is embraced in the above provisions.
Following the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," it is the Ombudsman who should conduct the preliminary investigation of the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner. The DOJ should refrain from exercising such function.
The crux of the jurisdiction of the DOJ lies in the meaning of "in relation to their office."
The respondents start their discussion of "in relation to public office" with a peculiar presentation. They contend that the duties of a Senator are to make laws, to
appropriate, to tax, to expropriate, to canvass presidential elections, to declare the existence of a state war, to give concurrence to treaties and amnesties, to propose constitutional amendments, to impeach, to investigate in aid of legislation, and to determine the Senate rules of proceedings and discipline of its members. They maintain that the "alleged acts done to overthrow the incumbent government and authorities by arms and with violence" cannot be qualified as "acts reminiscent of the discharge of petitioner's legislative duties as Senator."1
The allegations in the complaint and in the pleadings of the DOJ, the Solicitor General, and the Ombudsman (who is taking their side) charging petitioner with coup d'etat show hat he was engaged in a discussion of his National Recovery Program (NRP), corruption in government, and the need for reform. The NRP is a summary of what he has introduced and intended to introduce into legislation by Congress. There is no doubt, therefore, that the alleged coup d'etat was committed in relation to the performance of his official duty as a Senator.
II
The ponencia is a departure or reversion from established doctrine. Under the principle of stare decisis, the Court should, for the sake of certainty, apply a conclusion reached in one case to decisions which follow, if the facts are substantially similar. As stated in Santiago vs. Valenzuela2, stare decisi et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
In Deloso vs. Domingo3, where the Governor of Zambales and his military and police escorts ambushed the victims who were passing by in a car, we held that the multiple murders were committed in relation to public office. In Cunanan vs. Arceo4, the mayor ordered his co-accused to shoot the victims. We ruled that the murder was in relation to public office. In Alarilla vs. Sandiganbayan 5 , the town mayor aimed a gun and threatened to kill a councilor of the municipality during a public hearing. We concluded that the grave threats were in relation to the mayor's office. Following these precedents, I am convinced that petitioner's discourse on his National Recovery Program is in relation to his office.
III
The respondents state that the DOJ is vested with jurisdiction to conduct all investigations and prosecution of all crimes. They cite PD 1275, as amended by PD 1513, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of this plenary power.
While the DOJ has a broad general jurisdiction over crimes found in the Revised Penal Code and special laws, however, this jurisdiction is not plenary or total. Whenever the Constitution or statute vests jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of certain crimes in an office, the DOJ has no jurisdiction over those crimes. In election offenses, the Constitution vests the power to investigate and prosecute in the Commission on Elections.6 In crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, the Ombudsman is given by both the Constitution and the statute the same
30
power of investigation and prosecution.7 These powers may not be exercised by the DOJ.
The DOJ cannot pretend to have investigatory and prosecutorial powers above those of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer with a rank equivalent to that of an Associate Justice of this Court. The respondent's Prosecution Office investigates and prosecutes all kinds of offenses from petty crimes, like vagrancy or theft, to more serious crimes, such as those found in the Revised Penal Code. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, prosecutes offenses in relation to public office committed by public officers with the rank and position classification of Grade 27 or higher. It is a special kind of jurisdiction which excludes general powers of other prosecutory offices.
I agree with the petitioner that a becoming sense of courtesy, respect, and propriety requires that the constitutional officer should conduct the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the complaint against him and not a fifth assistant city prosecutor or even a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ National Prosecution Service.
I do not believe that a mere agreement, such as OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, can fully transfer the prosecutory powers of the Ombudsman to the DOJ without need fordeputization in specific cases. As stated by the petitioner, the DOJ cannot be given a roving commission or authority to investigate and prosecute cases falling under the Ombudsman's powers anytime the DOJ pleases without any special and explicit deputization. On this point, I agree with Justice Jose C. Vitug that the Joint Circular must be understood as a mere working arrangement between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ that must not be meant to be such a blanket delegation to the DOJ as to generally allow it to conduct preliminary investigation over any case cognizable by the Ombudsman.
Petitioner further raises a due process question. He accuses the DOJ of bias, partiality, and prejudgment. He states that he has absolutely no chance of being cleared by the respondent DOJ panel because it has already decided, before any presentation of proof, that he must be charged and arrested without bail.
As stated by the petitioner, there are precedents to the effect that where bias exists, jurisdiction has to be assumed by a more objective office. In Panlilio vs. Sandiganbayan,8 we recognized that the PCGG has the authority to investigate the case, yet we ordered the transfer of the case to the Ombudsman because of the PCGG's "marked bias" against the petitioner.
In Conjuangco vs. PCGG,9 we held that there is a denial of due process where the PCGG showed "marked bias" in handling the investigation. In Salonga vs. Cruz Paño,10 where the preliminary investigation was tainted by bias and partiality, we emphasized the right of an accused to be free, not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and biased prosecution.
The petitioner's pleadings show the proofs of alleged bias. They may be summarized as
follows:
First, on July 27, 2003 when the Oakwood incident was just starting, DILG Secretary Lina and National Security Adviser Roilo Golez went on a media barrage accusing petitioner of complicity without a shred of evidence.
Second, petitioner was approached by Palace emissaries, Velasco, Defensor, Tiglao, and Afable to help defuse the incident and ask mutineers to surrender. Then the request was distorted to make it appear that he went there to save his own skin.
Third, even before any charge was filed, officials of the DOJ were on an almost daily media program prematurely proclaiming petitioner's guilt. How can the DOJ conduct an impartial and fair investigation when it has already found him guilty?
Fourth, petitioner was given five days to answer Matillano's complaint but later on, it was shortened to three days.
Fifth, petitioner filed a 30 page Reply but the DOJ Order was issued at once, or only after two days, or on Sept. 10, 2003. The Order did not discuss the Reply, but perfunctorily glossed over and disregarded it.
The petitioner states that the DOJ is constitutionally and factually under the control of the President. He argues that:
"No questionable prosecution of an opposition Senator who has declared himself available for the Presidency would be initiated without the instigation, encouragement or approval of officials at the highest levels of the Administration. Justice requires that the Ombudsman, an independent constitutional office, handle the investigation and prosecution of this case. The DOJ cannot act fairly and independently in this case. In fact, all of the actions the DOJ has taken so far have been marked by bias, hounding and persecution.
And finally, the charges laid against Senator Honasan are unfounded concoctions of fertile imaginations. The petitioner had no role in the Oakwood mutiny except the quell and pacify the angry young men fighting for a just cause. Inspiration perhaps, from his National Recovery Program, but no marching orders whatsoever."
Prosecutors, like Caesar's wife, must be beyond suspicion. Where the test of the cold neutrality required of them cannot be met, they must yield to another office especially where their jurisdiction is under question. The tenacious insistence of respondents in handling the investigation of the case and their unwillingness to transfer it to the Ombudsman in the face of their questionable jurisdiction are indications of marked bias.
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WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the Department of Justice to refrain from conducting preliminary investigation of the complaint for coup d'etat against petitioner for lack of jurisdiction.XXOOXX
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G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs.FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
33
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
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G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA,respondents.
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G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
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G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs.HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
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G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
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G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means
35
and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
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(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. Therelevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings.
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one (1) year.
of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
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Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
38
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court
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to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose
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P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
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former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
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constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
43
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful
words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
44
In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. InCoseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
45
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicataprinciple, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
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success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners
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would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
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had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
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agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
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previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens
the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear
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cut definition or even a standard therefor.114Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
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They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is notthe resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his]
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office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
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5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
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Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedurefor Impeachment Proceedingsadopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I
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could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts
with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachmentcase." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
57
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citingVera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
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of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window
to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154
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x x x
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of government.155
x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156
x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
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Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter
or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law
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is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.Carpio, J., concur.Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.XXOOXX
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G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the
PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
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These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were
under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or
64
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
65
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
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higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
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does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one —
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage. 44
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should
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be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
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That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the
allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
70
informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
71
[G.R. Nos. 140199-200. February 6, 2002]
FELICITO S. MACALINO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan to take cognizance of two criminal cases[2] against petitioner and his wife Liwayway S. Tan, contending that he is not a public officer within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[3]
On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations against petitioner and Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification of official documents (Criminal Case No. 18022) and frustrated estafa through falsification of mercantile documents (Criminal Case No. 19268), as follows:
“CRIMINAL CASE NO. 18022
“That on or about the 15th day of March, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, and hence, a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation to his office and conspiring and confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation in the following manner: in preparing the application with the Philippine National Bank, Buendia Branch for the issuance of a demand draft in the amount of NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO & 11/100 PESOS (P983,682.11), Philippine Currency, in favor of Bankers Trust Company, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO superimposed the name “Wacker Marketing” as payee to make it appear that the demand draft was payable to it, when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew, it was the Bankers Trust Company which was the real payee as indicated in Check Voucher No. 3-800-89 and PNB Check No. B236746 supporting said application for demand draft; subsequently accused FELICITO S. MACALINO likewise inserted into the letter of PNCC to PNB Buendia Branch the words “payable to Wacker Marketing” to make it appear that the demand drafts to be picked up by the designated messenger were payable to Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact the real payee was Bankers Trust Company; and as a result of such acts of falsification, PNB Buendia issued 19 demand drafts for P50,000.00 each and another demand draft
for P33,682.11, all, payable to Wacker Marketing, which were subsequently delivered to accused Felicitor S. Macalino and which accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter exchanged with PNB Balanga Branch for 19 checks at P50,000.00 each and another for P33,682.11 and all of which she later deposited into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust Cubao, thereby causing pecuniary damage and prejudice to Philippine National Construction Corporation in the amount of P983,682.11.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.
“Manila, Philippines, August 24, 1992.”[4]
“CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19268
“That on or about the 4th day of April, 1990, and subsequently thereafter, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, FELICITO S. MACALINO, being then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head of the Loans Administration and Insurance Section of the Philippine National Construction Corporation, a government-controlled corporation with offices at EDSA corner Reliance St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and hence, a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his position, committing the offense in relation to his office, and conspiring and confederating with his spouse LIWAYWAY S. TAN, being then the owner of Wacker Marketing, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and by means of deceit defraud the Philippine National Construction Corporation in the following manner: after receiving Check Voucher No. 04-422-90 covering the partial payment by PNCC of the sinking fund to International Corporate Bank (Interbank) as well as Check No. 552312 for TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P2,250,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable to Interbank for the purpose, accused FELICITO S. MACALINO falsified PNB Check No. 552312 by altering the payee indicated therein to make it appear that the aforesaid check was payable to Wacker Marketing instead of Interbank and further falsified the schedule of check disbursements sent to PNB Buendia by making it appear therein that the payee of Check No. 552312 was Wacker Marketing when in truth and in fact and as the accused very well knew, it was Interbank which was the real payee; accused LIWAYWAY S. TAN thereafter deposited Check No. 552312 into Account No. 0042-0282-6 of Wacker Marketing at Philtrust Cubao and Wacker Marketing subsequently issued Philtrust Check No. 148039 for P100,000.00 in favor of accused FELICITO S.MACALINO; which acts of falsification performed by the accused would have defrauded the Philippine National Construction Corporation of P2,250,000.00 had not PNB Buendia ordered the dishonor of Check No. 552312 after noting the alteration/erasures thereon, thereby failing to produce the felony by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.
“Manila, Philippines, May 28, 1993.”[5]
Upon arraignment on November 9, 1992, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. Hence, trial proceeded.[6]
However, during the initial presentation of evidence for the defense, petitioner moved for leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him since he is not a public officer because the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), is not a
72
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter.[7] The People of the Philippines opposed the motion.[8]
On August 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
The Issue
The sole issue raised is whether petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that an employee of the PNCC is not a public officer as defined under Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:
“Sec. 2. (a) xxx xxx xxx.
“(b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the unclassified or classified or exempted service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.”
We agree.
To resolve the issue, we resort to the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, on the Accountability of Public Officers, provides:
“Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government , or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations x x x.”
“Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
“1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. x x x
“2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any public official or employee of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.” (underscoring supplied)
Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters.” (underscoring supplied)
Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
“Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties -The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
“1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
“2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.”
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.[11]
The cases[12] cited by respondent People of the Philippines are inapplicable because they were decided under the provisions of the 1973 Constitution which included as public officers, officials and employees of corporations owned and controlled by the government though organized and existing under the general corporation law. The 1987 Constitution excluded such corporations.
The crimes charged against petitioner were committed in 1989 and 1990.[13] The criminal actions were instituted in 1992. It is well-settled that “the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the institution of the action.”[14]
The Fallo
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court SETS ASIDE the order dated July 29, 1999 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18022 and 19268 and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of the two (2) cases against petitioner and his wife.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
73
XXOOXX
74
G.R. Nos. 120681-83 October 1, 1999
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner,vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,respondents.
G.R. No. 128136 October 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO, CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioner,vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F. MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has undergone variouschanges, 1 the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975 2 and 8249. 3 Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 3019 4 and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code 5 is the central issue in these consolidated petitions.
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.1âwphi1.nêt
The, facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
G.R. Nos. 120681-83
On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, 6 and two for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. 7 The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting
these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contented that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion.
On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspensionpendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 8and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, 9 to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspensionpendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.
After allowing and considering petitioner's reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite.
Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995. 10
On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitioner's motion, holding thus:
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade "27" under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in the above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor
75
Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade "27", because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade "27" does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of the very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade "28" under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position Classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade "27." 11
On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court annul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner. The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay's co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the
respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This case was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.
In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note:
Authority is given to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court. 12
On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.
In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with the proper court." The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.
On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e)of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378.
On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accused's motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the
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Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.
On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition raises the following issues:
I
Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?
II
Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court?
III
Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?
IV
Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?
V
Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping? 13
On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).
In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first address the common question of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
I
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases.
The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606, 14 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861, 15 the pertinent provisions of which state:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.
Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
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a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
xxx xxx xxx
While the cases against petitioners were pending in this Court, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.
As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
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(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlunsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:
(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27.
(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.
(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A
In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:
. . . The new law's consistent and repeated reference to salary grades show[s] an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades. 16
Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification 17 from the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758.
Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification 18 from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:
. . . that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Sec. 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve.
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
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The Constitution 19 states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take "into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions," thus:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.
Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 6758 20 provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based"upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions." In short, the nature of an official's position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logic as well.
Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the "grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 985 21 as including
. . . all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation. 22
The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one's position — the level of difficulty, responsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof — relative to that of another position. It is the official's Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit. 23Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade.
Thus, Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable" and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein.
To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An official's grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law, of which the Court must take judicial notice. 24
As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the Municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitioner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. 25
B
Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction.
Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous. 26 The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."
The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation.
The premise of petitioners' argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive, 27 or where the enumeration is by way of example only. 28 In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was "necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above." The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.
Should there be any doubt as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
In the Court's Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."
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C
Petitioner Binay cites previous bills 29 in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials, especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila.
The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]). 30
Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:
. . . that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witnesses in their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will.
Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:
Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called
"small fry" — the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like — who are involved with "nickel-and-dime" cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. . . .1âwphi1.nêt
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in the Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court. 31
It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a legislator's opinion in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator. 32Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress. 33
D
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides:
Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong: 34
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute.
R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.
Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts. 35 There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.
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The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter.
The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to "regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or "regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. [emphasis supplied.]
Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the cases shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. No. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., 36 the Court explained the purpose of the foregoing provision.
. . . it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [the Sandiganbayan's] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. . . . . The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." . . . . Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]
The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. No. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort already devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases the trials of which have yet to start.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.
II
Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman.
Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
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Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. 37 Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 38
However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, 39 is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 40 Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 41 The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 42
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. 43 In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 44
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 45 the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The "unexplained inaction" 46 of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad.
In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 47 the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 48 the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 49 the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the parties' lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
In petitioner Binay's case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan, Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents; (c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillante's complaint was based on the initial findings and observations of the COA on the examination of the cash and accounts covering transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988 and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty days within which to explain/clarify the findings in the report and is subject to change or modification depending upon the explanation/clarification to be submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this the information from the COA the preliminary investigation was held in abeyance until the submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes of the ensuring preliminary investigation
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to the Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22, 1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere stated as the basis of Bobby Brillante's complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the documentation and analysis of its findings and preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3. This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio, Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit on May 18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990, Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990. Feliciano Bascon submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November 22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26, 1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a copy of this Petition forCertiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that
said petition is submitted to support Binay's stand as regard COA Finding No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an affidavit containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992 affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded the same and the entire records to the Office of the Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994; the Ombudsman approved some of the recommendations of the Review Panel and directed the preparation and filing of the informations. 50
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution, unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents considering that no less than the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15
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raw reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of time for preliminary investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding the fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the preliminary investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two (2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed his last pleading, on April 30, 1992. 51
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid and petitioner's suspension pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof. 52 Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of information and forum shopping.
Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance." 53 They claim that the filing of the information in
the Sandiganbayan was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan.
Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. 54 As a consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals 55 that:
It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law.
It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases 56 that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law. 57 Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners.
Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the "People of the Philippines." 58 Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.59 Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder, 60 is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel. 61
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. 62 The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. 63 Their remedy was
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to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 64
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. — A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:
Sec. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
xxx xxx xxx
Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but with more than one information charging one offense.
The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal orcertiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 65 We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to "gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."
Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Panganiban in his separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.
Quizumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.
Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binay's cases, I believe, should be deemedexceptions and referred to the "proper courts," that is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the Informations charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, prior the enactment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over municipal mayors, then Binay's cases should be referred by the anti-graft court to itself, not to the regional trial courts.
With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should the words "proper courts" be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The majority's ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayan's being required to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory construction: Interpretation is needed
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only when the law is vague, not when it is clear and unambiguous, 1 as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975.
Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in G.R. Nos. 120681-83, because Binay's cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysay's cases were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.
Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binay's cases, I believe, should be deemedexceptions and referred to the "proper courts," that is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the Informations charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, prior the enactment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over municipal mayors, then Binay's cases should be referred by the anti-graft court to itself, not to the regional trial courts.
With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should the words "proper courts" be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The majority's ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayan's being required to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory construction: Interpretation is needed only when the law is vague, not when it is clear and unambiguous, 1 as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975.
Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in G.R. Nos. 120681-83, because Binay's cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to DISMISS the Petition in G.R. No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysay's cases were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.1âwphi1.nê
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G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, petitioners, vs.THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod. 1
His appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from the Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the civil service."
The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MSB. UP relied heavily on the case of University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 2 where it was held that administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees properly fall under the Jurisdiction of the state university and the UP Board of Regents.
The motion was denied. Thereafter, in its decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 3 UP, represented by its Office of Legal Services, moved for reconsideration, but this was denied on January l0, 1986.
UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.
On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of record, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become final and executory.
Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988. Judge Teodoro P. Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina "to his former position as mimeograph operator without change of status as permanent employee with back wages from June 22, 1982, up to his reinstatement, plus salaries for the period of his preventive suspension covering December 15, 1981 to March 15, 1982." 6
On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission directing the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioners also pray that the decision of the UP President and Board of Regents ordering Pamplina's dismissal be upheld.
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906, it enjoys not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. 7 Under the 1967 Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
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Coming now to the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy of the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.
In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect at that time, it is provided that:
. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 8
In this connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order or ruling of any Constitutional Commission is denied, the 30-day reglementary period does not begin anew. The petitioner has only the balance of that period (after deducting the time elapsed before the motion was filed) to come to this Court on certiorari.
The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to seek mandamus to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino was quite correct when he issued the questioned writ.
The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 9 cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took affect only in 1975.
In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on the Civil Service Law of 1959, which then empowered the Civil Service Commission:
Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prebcribe standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)
Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "har and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or
brought to it on appeal," without the qualifiying phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special power they claim under Act 1870.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission, are AFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., took no part.
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G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997
BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor.
On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. 1
Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. 2
Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED. 3
On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. 4
On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case. 5
On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:
The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under the Corporation Code.
Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters. (emphasis supplied)
From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed. 6
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. 7
On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:
It appears . . . complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in the words of the complainant, a "legal knot" that has to be untangled. 8
Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated. 9
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10
The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations . . . .
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v.Juco, 11 that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])
In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 12 we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation
statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.
We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.
In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. 13 Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation, 14 where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.
Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. 15 Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemna in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
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G.R. No. 147402 January 14, 2004
ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO, in his capacity as General Manager of the Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD), Tacloban City, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Chairman CELSO D. GANGAN, Commissioners RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, and Regional Director of COA Region VIII,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 to annul the Commission on Audit’s ("COA") Resolution dated 3 January 2000 and the Decision dated 30 January 2001 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The COA denied petitioner Ranulfo C. Feliciano’s request for COA to cease all audit services, and to stop charging auditing fees, to Leyte Metropolitan Water District ("LMWD"). The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees previously paid by LMWD.
Antecedent Facts
A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD. Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999 requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner sent a reply dated 12 October 1999 informing COA’s Regional Director that the water district could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 ("PD 198")2, as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 ("RA 6758"). The Regional Director referred petitioner’s reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999.
On 19 October 1999, petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.
On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying his requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on 30 January 2001.
On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this instant petition. Attached to the petition were resolutions of the Visayas Association of Water Districts (VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts (PAWD) supporting the petition.
The Ruling of the Commission on Audit
The COA ruled that this Court has already settled COA’s audit jurisdiction over local water districts in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission and Commission on Audit,3 as follows:
The above-quoted provision [referring to Section 3(b) PD 198] definitely sets to naught petitioner’s contention that they are private corporations. It is clear therefrom that the power to appoint the members who will comprise the members of the Board of Directors belong to the local executives of the local subdivision unit where such districts are located. In contrast, the members of the Board of Directors or the trustees of a private corporation are elected from among members or stockholders thereof. It would not be amiss at this point to emphasize that a private corporation is created for the private purpose, benefit, aim and end of its members or stockholders. Necessarily, said members or stockholders should be given a free hand to choose who will compose the governing body of their corporation. But this is not the case here and this clearly indicates that petitioners are not private corporations.
The COA also denied petitioner’s request for COA to stop charging auditing fees as well as petitioner’s request for COA to refund all auditing fees already paid.
The Issues
Petitioner contends that COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by auditing LMWD and requiring it to pay auditing fees. Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether a Local Water District ("LWD") created under PD 198, as amended, is a government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA;
2. Whether Section 20 of PD 198, as amended, prohibits COA’s certified public accountants from auditing local water districts; and
3. Whether Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits the COA from charging government-owned and controlled corporations auditing fees.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution and existing laws4 mandate COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations ("GOCCs") with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for COA’s audit jurisdiction, as follows:
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SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The COA’s audit jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or instrumentalities," but also to "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters.
Whether LWDs are Private or Government-Ownedand Controlled Corporations with Original Charters
Petitioner seeks to revive a well-settled issue. Petitioner asks for a re-examination of a doctrine backed by a long line of cases culminating in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission5 and just recently reiterated in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit.6 Petitioner maintains that LWDs are not government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Petitioner even argues that LWDs are private corporations. Petitioner asks the Court to consider certain interpretations of the applicable laws, which would give a "new perspective to the issue of the true character of water districts."7
Petitioner theorizes that what PD 198 created was the Local Waters Utilities Administration ("LWUA") and not the LWDs. Petitioner claims that LWDs are created "pursuant to" and not created directly by PD 198. Thus, petitioner concludes that PD 198 is not an "original charter" that would place LWDs within the audit jurisdiction of COA as defined in Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution. Petitioner elaborates that PD 198 does not create LWDs since it does not expressly direct the creation of such entities, but only provides for their formation on an optional or voluntary basis.8 Petitioner adds that the operative act that creates an LWD is the approval of the Sanggunian Resolution as specified in PD 198.
Petitioner’s contention deserves scant consideration.
We begin by explaining the general framework under the fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens.9 The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.10
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code,11 except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.12
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code, thus:
From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision.13 (Emphasis supplied)
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter. Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is constitutionally infirm.
Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, LWDs derive their legal existence and power from PD 198. Sections 6 and 25 of PD 19814 provide:
Section 6. Formation of District. — This Act is the source of authorization and power to form and maintain a district. For purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered as
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a quasi-public corporation performing public service and supplying public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed, under this Act.
(a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name of the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said system, followed by the words "Water District".
(b) A description of the boundary of the district. In the case of a city or municipality, such boundary may include all lands within the city or municipality. A district may include one or more municipalities, cities or provinces, or portions thereof.
(c) A statement completely transferring any and all waterworks and/or sewerage facilities managed, operated by or under the control of such city, municipality or province to such district upon the filing of resolution forming the district.
(d) A statement identifying the purpose for which the district is formed, which shall include those purposes outlined in Section 5 above.
(e) The names of the initial directors of the district with the date of expiration of term of office for each.
(f) A statement that the district may only be dissolved on the grounds and under the conditions set forth in Section 44 of this Title.
(g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as set forth in Section 36 of this Title.
Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district beyond that specifically provided for in this Act.
If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be adopted in each city, municipality and province.
x x x
Sec. 25. Authorization. — The district may exercise all the powers which are expressly granted by this Title or which are necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and purposes herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives of this Act, a district is hereby granted the power of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be subject to review by the Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198, which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section 6 of PD 198 provides that LWDs "shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws." Without PD 198, LWDs would have
no corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are government-owned and controlled corporations with a special charter.
The phrase "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" means GOCCs created under special laws and not under the general incorporation law. There is no difference between the term "original charters" and "special charters." The Court clarified this in National Service Corporation v. NLRC15 by citing the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, as follows:
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Romulo is recognized.
MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am amending my original proposed amendment to now read as follows: "including government-owned or controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The purpose of this amendment is to indicate that government corporations such as the GSIS and SSS, which have original charters, fall within the ambit of the civil service. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies such as the Philippine Airlines, Manila Hotel and Hyatt are excluded from the coverage of the civil service.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee say?
MR. FOZ. Just one question, Mr. Presiding Officer. By the term "original charters," what exactly do we mean?
MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law.
MR. FOZ. And not under the general corporation law.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. FOZ. With that understanding and clarification, the Committee accepts the amendment.
MR. NATIVIDAD. Mr. Presiding Officer, so those created by the general corporation law are out.
MR. ROMULO. That is correct. (Emphasis supplied)
Again, in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission,16 the Court reiterated the meaning of the phrase "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" in this wise:
By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter," We mean government owned or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under
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the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Thus, in the case of Lumanta v. NLRC (G.R. No. 82819, February 8, 1989, 170 SCRA 79, 82), We held:
"The Court, in National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 69870, promulgated on 29 November 1988, quoting extensively from the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in respect of the intent and meaning of the new phrase ‘with original charter,’ in effect held that government-owned and controlled corporations with original charter refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under our general incorporation statute — the Corporation Code. In NASECO, the company involved had been organized under the general incorporation statute and was a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, a bank chartered by a special statute. Thus, government-owned or controlled corporations like NASECO are effectively, excluded from the scope of the Civil Service." (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner’s contention that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution creates the LWDs assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations. This is a patently baseless assumption. The Local Government Code17 does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create corporations.18 What the Local Government Code empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide for the establishment of a waterworks system "subject to existing laws." Thus, Section 447(5)(vii) of the Local Government Code provides:
SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
x x x
(vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the inhabitants; regulate the construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage of water;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no power to create a corporate entity that will operate its
waterworks system. However, the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like PD 198, to form and incorporate a water district. Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create corporations, the LWDs would remain government-owned or controlled corporations subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan would constitute an LWD’s special charter, making the LWD a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. In any event, the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water District v. Trajano19 that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the special charter of LWDs, thus:
While it is true that a resolution of a local sanggunian is still necessary for the final creation of a district, this Court is of the opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the same being intended only to implement the provisions of said decree.
Petitioner further contends that a law must create directly and explicitly a GOCC in order that it may have an original charter. In short, petitioner argues that one special law cannot serve as enabling law for several GOCCs but only for one GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution mandates that "Congress shall not, except by general law,"20provide for the creation of private corporations. Thus, the Constitution prohibits one special law to create one private corporation, requiring instead a "general law" to create private corporations. In contrast, the same Section 16 states that "Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters." Thus, the Constitution permits Congress to create a GOCC with a special charter. There is, however, no prohibition on Congress to create several GOCCs of the same class under one special enabling charter.
The rationale behind the prohibition on private corporations having special charters does not apply to GOCCs. There is no danger of creating special privileges to certain individuals, families or groups if there is one special law creating each GOCC. Certainly, such danger will not exist whether one special law creates one GOCC, or one special enabling law creates several GOCCs. Thus, Congress may create GOCCs either by special charters specific to each GOCC, or by one special enabling charter applicable to a class of GOCCs, like PD 198 which applies only to LWDs.
Petitioner also contends that LWDs are private corporations because Section 6 of PD 19821 declares that LWDs "shall be considered quasi-public" in nature. Petitioner’s rationale is that only private corporations may be deemed "quasi-public" and not public corporations. Put differently, petitioner rationalizes that a public corporation cannot be deemed "quasi-public" because such corporation is already public. Petitioner concludes that the term "quasi-public" can only apply to private corporations. Petitioner’s argument is inconsequential.
Petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA’s audit jurisdiction depends on the government’s ownership or control of a corporation. The nature of the corporation, whether it is private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial.
The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters," as well as "government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters refer to corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA’s audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law.
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The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation. In Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank,22 the Court even ruled that the criterion of ownership and control is more important than the issue of original charter, thus:
This point is important because the Constitution provides in its Article IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the Government although it does have an original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518,23 it clearly does not fall under the Civil Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides. The consequence is that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor laws, under which in fact they have already been paid some of their claims. (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The government organizes LWDs in accordance with a specific law, PD 198. There is no private party involved as co-owner in the creation of an LWD. Just prior to the creation of LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls all their assets. The government controls LWDs because under PD 198 the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of an LWD for a fixed term of six years.24 The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. LWDs have no private stockholders or members. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject to civil service laws25 and anti-graft laws.26
While Section 8 of PD 198 states that "[N]o public official shall serve as director" of an LWD, it only means that the appointees to the board of directors of LWDs shall come from the private sector. Once such private sector representatives assume office as directors, they become public officials governed by the civil service law and anti-graft laws. Otherwise, Section 8 of PD 198 would contravene Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution declaring that the civil service includes "government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without original charters, then they would fall under the term "agencies or instrumentalities" of the government and thus still subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. However, the stark and undeniable fact is that the government owns LWDs. Section 4527 of PD 198 recognizes government ownership of LWDs when Section 45 states that the board of directors may dissolve an LWD only on the condition that "another public entity has acquired the assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and liabilities attached thereto." The implication is clear that an LWD is a public and not a private entity.
Petitioner does not allege that some entity other than the government owns or controls LWDs. Instead, petitioner advances the theory that the "Water District’s owner is the District itself."28 Assuming for the sake of argument that an LWD is "self-owned,"29 as petitioner describes an LWD, the government in any event controls all LWDs. First, government officials appoint all LWD directors to a fixed term of office. Second, any per diem of LWD directors in excess of P50 is subject to the approval of the Local Water Utilities Administration, and directors can receive no other compensation for their services to the LWD.30 Third, the Local Water Utilities Administration can require LWDs to merge or consolidate their facilities or operations.31 This element of government control subjects LWDs to COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that upon the enactment of PD 198, LWDs became private entities through the transfer of ownership of water facilities from local government units to their respective water districts as mandated by PD 198. Petitioner is grasping at straws. Privatization involves the transfer of government assets to a private entity. Petitioner concedes that the owner of the assets transferred under Section 6 (c) of PD 198 is no other than the LWD itself.32 The transfer of assets mandated by PD 198 is a transfer of the water systems facilities "managed, operated by or under the control of such city, municipality or province to such (water) district."33 In short, the transfer is from one government entity to another government entity. PD 198 is bereft of any indication that the transfer is to privatize the operation and control of water systems.
Finally, petitioner claims that even on the assumption that the government owns and controls LWDs, Section 20 of PD 198 prevents COA from auditing LWDs. 34 Section 20 of PD 198 provides:
Sec. 20. System of Business Administration. — The Board shall, as soon as practicable, prescribe and define by resolution a system of business administration and accounting for the district, which shall be patterned upon and conform to the standards established by the Administration. Auditing shall be performed by a certified public accountant not in the government service. The Administration may, however, conduct annual audits of the fiscal operations of the district to be performed by an auditor retained by the Administration. Expenses incurred in connection therewith shall be borne equally by the water district concerned and the Administration.35(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that PD 198 expressly prohibits COA auditors, or any government auditor for that matter, from auditing LWDs. Petitioner asserts that this is the import of the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 when it states that "[A]uditing shall be performed by a certified public accountant not in the government service."36
PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No amount of clever legislation can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COA’s audit jurisdiction. Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any scheme or devise to escape COA’s audit jurisdiction, thus:
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like that of Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit. The following exchange in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission elucidates this intent of the framers:
MR. OPLE: I propose to add a new section on line 9, page 2 of the amended committee report which reads: NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED EXEMPTING ANY ENTITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS SUBSIDIARY IN ANY GUISE WHATEVER, OR ANY INVESTMENTS OF PUBLIC FUNDS, FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT.
May I explain my reasons on record.
We know that a number of entities of the government took advantage of the absence of a legislature in the past to obtain presidential decrees exempting themselves from
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the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, one notable example of which is the Philippine National Oil Company which is really an empty shell. It is a holding corporation by itself, and strictly on its own account. Its funds were not very impressive in quantity but underneath that shell there were billions of pesos in a multiplicity of companies. The PNOC — the empty shell — under a presidential decree was covered by the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, but the billions of pesos invested in different corporations underneath it were exempted from the coverage of the Commission on Audit.
Another example is the United Coconut Planters Bank. The Commission on Audit has determined that the coconut levy is a form of taxation; and that, therefore, these funds attributed to the shares of 1,400,000 coconut farmers are, in effect, public funds. And that was, I think, the basis of the PCGG in undertaking that last major sequestration of up to 94 percent of all the shares in the United Coconut Planters Bank. The charter of the UCPB, through a presidential decree, exempted it from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit, it being a private organization.
So these are the fetuses of future abuse that we are slaying right here with this additional section.
May I repeat the amendment, Madam President: NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED EXEMPTING ANY ENTITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OR ITS SUBSIDIARY IN ANY GUISE WHATEVER, OR ANY INVESTMENTS OF PUBLIC FUNDS, FROM THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT.
THE PRESIDENT: May we know the position of the Committee on the proposed amendment of Commissioner Ople?
MR. JAMIR: If the honorable Commissioner will change the number of the section to 4, we will accept the amendment.
MR. OPLE: Gladly, Madam President. Thank you.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, point of inquiry on the new amendment.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you. May I just ask a few questions of Commissioner Ople.
Is that not included in Section 2 (1) where it states: "(c) government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries"? So that if these government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries are subjected to the audit of the COA, any law exempting certain government corporations or subsidiaries will be already unconstitutional.
So I believe, Madam President, that the proposed amendment is unnecessary.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, since this has been accepted, we would like to reply to the point raised by Commissioner de Castro.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Monsod will please proceed.
MR. MONSOD: I think the Commissioner is trying to avoid the situation that happened in the past, because the same provision was in the 1973 Constitution and yet somehow a law or a decree was passed where certain institutions were exempted from audit. We are just reaffirming, emphasizing, the role of the Commission on Audit so that this problem will never arise in the future.37
There is an irreconcilable conflict between the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 prohibiting COA auditors from auditing LWDs and Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution vesting in COA the power to audit all GOCCs. We rule that the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198 is unconstitutional since it violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution.
On the Legality of COA’sPractice of Charging Auditing Fees
Petitioner claims that the auditing fees COA charges LWDs for audit services violate the prohibition in Section 18 of RA 6758,38 which states:
Sec. 18. Additional Compensation of Commission on Audit Personnel and of other Agencies. – In order to preserve the independence and integrity of the Commission on Audit (COA), its officials and employees are prohibited from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, government-owned or controlled corporations, and government financial institutions, except those compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions.
Government entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations including financial institutions and local government units are hereby prohibited from assessing or billing other government entities, including government-owned or controlled corporations including financial institutions or local government units for services rendered by its officials and employees as part of their regular functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
Claiming that Section 18 is "absolute and leaves no doubt,"39 petitioner asks COA to discontinue its practice of charging auditing fees to LWDs since such practice allegedly violates the law.
Petitioner’s claim has no basis.
Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of compensation from any government entity except "compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions." Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an exception to the statutory ban on COA personnel receiving compensation from GOCCs. In Tejada v. Domingo,40 the Court declared:
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There can be no question that Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 is designed to strengthen further the policy x x x to preserve the independence and integrity of the COA, by explicitly PROHIBITING: (1) COA officials and employees from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local government unit, GOCCs and government financial institutions, except such compensation paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions , and (2) government entities, including GOCCs, government financial institutions and local government units from assessing or billing other government entities, GOCCs, government financial institutions or local government units for services rendered by the latter’s officials and employees as part of their regular functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to said officials and employees.
x x x
The first aspect of the strategy is directed to the COA itself, while the second aspect is addressed directly against the GOCCs and government financial institutions. Under the first, COA personnel assigned to auditing units of GOCCs or government financial institutions can receive only such salaries, allowances or fringe benefits paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and contributions. The contributions referred to are the cost of audit services earlier mentioned which cannot include the extra emoluments or benefits now claimed by petitioners. The COA is further barred from assessing or billing GOCCs and government financial institutions for services rendered by its personnel as part of their regular audit functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to such personnel. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Tejada, the Court explained the meaning of the word "contributions" in Section 18 of RA 6758, which allows COA to charge GOCCs the cost of its audit services:
x x x the contributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of audit services which are based on the actual cost of the audit function in the corporation concerned plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead expenses. The actual audit cost shall include personnel services, maintenance and other operating expenses, depreciation on capital and equipment and out-of-pocket expenses. In respect to the allowances and fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA personnel assigned to the former’s auditing units, the same shall be directly defrayed by COA from its own appropriations x x x. 41
COA may charge GOCCs "actual audit cost" but GOCCs must pay the same directly to COA and not to COA auditors. Petitioner has not alleged that COA charges LWDs auditing fees in excess of COA’s "actual audit cost." Neither has petitioner alleged that the auditing fees are paid by LWDs directly to individual COA auditors. Thus, petitioner’s contention must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Commission on Audit dated 3 January 2000 and the Decision dated 30 January 2001 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are AFFIRMED. The second sentence of Section 20 of Presidential Decree No. 198 is declared VOID for being inconsistent with Sections 2 (1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.