Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Summary: Valmonte vs. Belmonte (GR 74930, 13 February 1989)

Valmonte vs. Belmonte[GR 74930, 13 February 1989]En Banc, Cortez (J): 13 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion

Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.

Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as

regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.

Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.

Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

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REYES VS. BAGATSING [125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free

speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.

Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,

communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.

.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from 2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held.

On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied.

Issues :

1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of manila.

2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger.

Ruling : The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.

Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.

BAYAN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA [488 SCRA 226; G.R. NO. 169838; 25 APR 2006]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of “Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the “no permit, no rally” policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one

can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No. 880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all rallies.

Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our

people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita

Facts:

Petitioners come in three groups.

Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al,, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et al.,

The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested

in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only

Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated

Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no

permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced.

Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public

assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also

curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as

the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the

expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass

actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or

influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,

the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the

government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot

pass the strict scrutiny test.

Issue:

Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as organizations

and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005

Held:

Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right ascitiz ens to engage in

peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is

directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly

assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged inpublic assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the permit.

Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of

grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right

that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute

the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would

be meaningless and unprotected

Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and,

for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well

as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than

the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of

Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed

pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies

but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, it as a

"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers toall kinds

of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does

not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,

otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words

"opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content

based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for

redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be

avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and

is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to

public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health

the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament

and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our

people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.

880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict

freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of

assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyistsnot the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is

valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger"

standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving

local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific freedom

parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified

in accordance with Section 15 of the law,all public parks and plazas of the municipality

or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever

kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written

notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly

activities.