Rufino Nuñez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines

“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan

as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of

estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed

in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several

cases. It is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the

due process,  equal protection, and ex post facto  clauses of the

Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates

Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right

became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was

shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts

and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by

certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other

estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law

and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to

the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal

protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided

for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over

cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The

constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court,

the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of

which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows

that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been

aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution

came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether

a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily

offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the

classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be

based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be

germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing

conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.”

Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous

decision from 3 justices –  a showing that decisions therein are more

conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

 

Read full text

 

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not

belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are

guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts – first, to the CA, and

thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the

same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who,

under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal

– to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the

Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial

distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on

the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted

out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are

the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a

review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better

justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of

the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari,

likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction

or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or

conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not

as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are

reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater

guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is

subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the

evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality

unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered

during the trial.

Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the

Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion,

likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the

accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond

reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan

January 30, 1982G.R. No. L-50581-50617 FACTS:Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial document committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree     No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and  ex post facto clauses of the Constituiton, thus decraling it unconstitutional? HELD:No, The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such       Decree cannot be adjudged. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same       fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before     the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when            committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than      the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a  former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner.This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.Petition dismissed. No costs.

Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6770             November 17, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.

Section 3. Office of the Ombudsman. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as recommended by the Ombudsman.

Section 4. Appointment. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation.

In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.

Section 5. Qualifications. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of recognized probity and independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective national or local office in the immediately preceding election whether regular or special. The Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

Section 6. Rank and Salary. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same ranks, salaries and privileges as the Chairman and members,

respectively, of a Constitutional Commission. Their salaries shall not be decreased during their term of office.

The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the Ombudsman shall receive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable positions in any office in the Government.

Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term.n case the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any of the Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.

(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall perform the duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to perform his duties.

Section 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. — The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following their cessation from office. They shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman for two (2) years following their cessation from office.

No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree and no law, business or professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or Special Prosecutor within one (1) year preceding the appointment may appear as counsel or agent on any matter pending before the Office of the Ombudsman or transact business directly or indirectly therewith.

This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This disqualification likewise extends to the law, business or professional firm for the same period.

Section 10. Disclosure of Relationship. — It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath,

to the best of their knowledge and/or information, a public disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship with the persons referred to in the preceding section.

The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the Ombudsman before the appointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures made pursuant to this section shall form part of the public records and shall be available to any person or entity upon request.

Section 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office.

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those appointed as directors or heads shall have the rank and salary of line bureau directors.

(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations of the different offices under the Office of Ombudsman.t shall likewise perform such other functions and duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon the authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:

(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman.

(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the Office of the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including those of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Section 12. Official Stations. — The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, and the Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy for the Visayas, in Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The Ombudsman may transfer their stations within their respective geographical regions, as public interest may require.

Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against

officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: provided,

further, that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

Section 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

Section 17. Immunities. — In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Ombudsman, including preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: provided, that no person shall be prosecuted criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to punishment for contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.

Section 18. Rules of Procedure. —

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are made suppletory.

(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one of which is printed in the national language.

Section 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:

(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;

(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or

(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.

Section 23. Formal Investigation. —

(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.

(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or employees, which shall be determined within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

(3) In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises of any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record, file, document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and the official concerned.

Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Section 25. Penalties. —

(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.

(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one (1) year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of

the Ombudsman, taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.

Section 26. Inquiries. —

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public officer, employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has received, the Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be:

(a) contrary to law or regulation;

(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of the operations and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;

(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or palpable error in the appreciation of facts;

(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;

(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or

(f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable.

(2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission.t shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor.f it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof.f the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.

(3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by law, or when urgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee, office or agency concerned to:

(a) expedite the performance of duty;

(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;

(c) correct the omission;

(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or

(e) take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect and preserve the rights of the complainant.

(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or employee to whom it was addressed.

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.

Section 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. — The Office of the Ombudsman may establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside Metropolitan Manila, under the immediate supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, where necessary as determined by the Ombudsman. The investigation of complaints may be assigned to the regional or sectoral deputy concerned or to a special investigator who shall proceed in accordance with the rules or special instructions or directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or investigator may issue orders and provisional remedies which are immediately executory subject to review by the Ombudsman. Within three (3) days after concluding the investigation, the deputy or investigator shall transmit, together with the entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the Office of the Ombudsman. Within five (5) days after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall render the appropriate order, directive or decision.

Section 29. Change of Unjust Laws. — If the Ombudsman believes that a law or regulation is unfair or unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the necessary changes therein or the repeal thereof.

Section 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. — In every case where the Ombudsman has reached a decision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public official or agency, he shall transmit his decision, conclusion, recommendation or suggestion to the head of the department, agency or instrumentality, or of the province, city or municipality concerned for such immediate action as may be necessary. When transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or recommendation, he shall, unless excused by the agency or official affected, include the substance of any statement the public agency or official may have made to him by way of explaining past difficulties with or present rejection of the Ombudsman's proposals.

Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under his supervision and control.

The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them and/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found.

Section 32. Rights and Duties of Witness. —

(1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid the same fees and travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose attendance has been required in the trial courts. Upon request of the witness, the Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for his person and his family as may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, the Ombudsman may, at its expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said security.

(2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or documentary information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as are extended to witnesses in the courts, and shall likewise be entitled to the assistance of counsel while being questioned.

(3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena, or refuses to be examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or his Deputy shall issue an order directing the person to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The contempt proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Section 33. Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. — Any officer or employee of any department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and local governments, when required by the Ombudsman, his Deputy or the Special Prosecutor shall render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman.

Section 34. Annual Report. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual report of its activities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted within thirty (30) days from the start of the regular session of Congress.

Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files a completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 36. Penalties for Obstruction. — Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the proper exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully misleads or attempts to mislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor in replying to their inquiries shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 37. Franking Privilege. — All official mail matters and telegrams of the Ombudsman addressed for delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted, and delivered free of charge: provided, that such mail matters when addressed to private persons or nongovernment offices shall not exceed one hundred and twenty (120) grams. All mail matters and telegrams sent through government telegraph facilities containing complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman shall be transmitted free of charge, provided that the telegram shall contain not more than one hundred fifty (150) words.

Section 38. Fiscal Autonomy. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the amount appropriated for the previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 39. Appropriations. — The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the current General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 40. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.

Section 41. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, executive orders, rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or amended as the case may be.

Section 42. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Approved: November 17, 1989.

Garcia v. MojicaPosted on October 3, 2012

G.R. No. 139043

September 10, 1999

Facts:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor,

signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the

city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which was to

commence on September 1998 upon F.E. Zuellig’s first delivery.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the

alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the

contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the

Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer

of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the

inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he

recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and

administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials

involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for

the Visayas, approved this recommendation

Issues:

1. Whether Garcia may be held administratively liable.

2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue

of the Local Government Code.

Held:

1. No. As previously held, “…a reelected local official may not be

held administratively accountable for misconduct committed

during his prior term of office.” The rationale is that when the

electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so

with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past

misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him,

then such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the

contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed

just 4 days before the date of the elections. It was not made an

issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said

to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular

aspect of his life and character.

Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act

done during his previous term. The agreement between petitioner

and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was

signed, during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment, petitioner

already acceded to the terms of the contract, including

stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government.

Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract

already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It

hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are

supposed to have been made months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for

signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice

the filing of any case, other than administrative, against

petitioner. The ruling does not mean the total exoneration of

petitioner’s wrongdoing, if any, that might have been committed

in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the

question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our

considered view that he may not.

2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed,

whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the

Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in

question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to

compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The

decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail

over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong.

The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the

Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

In Garcia vs. Mojica (GR No. 139043 September 10, 1999), the Supreme Court held that while petitioner, then Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia, can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case outside of the administrative suit previously filed against Garcia.

The Court used the Aguinaldo Doctrine, which states, “a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale being that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.†�

In Aguinaldo vs. Santos, the Court made clear the rule that a public official cannot be removed from administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condoning of the officer’s previous misconduct, thereby cutting off the right to remove him.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply to criminal cases pending or which may be filed against the official

Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)356 SCRA 636 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension

of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019 

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then

Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID),

approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her

act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter

against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The

legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which

prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by

Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal

cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis

Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant

of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since

she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995,

a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,

who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the

Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member

of the Senate without violating the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “…house may

determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly

behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,

suspend or expel a Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed,

shall not exceed sixty days.”

But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against

whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or

under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense

involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a

simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and

mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. 

Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or

gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to

reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive

during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings

have been filed against him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the

power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The

suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower

House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct

from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a

penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact

that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a

Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of

Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus

decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID

commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer

concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to

have committed the acts with which he has been charged.  Thus, it has

been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to

any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the

particular office under which he stands accused.

Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be

suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established

in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. 

Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of

the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense

charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the

witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another

evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive

suspension pending the trial of the case.  All it secures to the accused is

adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the

proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right

to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not

constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office

under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is

subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of

the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial

proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxxRepublic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

CASE DIGESTERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. 

HELD:1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes

clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Francisco vs. HRErnesto Francisco, Jr. vs. The House of Representatives

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Carpio Morales, J.:

Facts: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an

investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and

expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary

Development Fund (JDF). Then on June 2, 2003, former President

Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice

Hilario Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices. The complaint was

endorsed and was referred to the House Committee in accordance with

Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the

first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form, but voted to

dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in

substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint

was filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the

alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned

House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was

accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed

by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of

Representatives.

Issues:

1. Can the Court make a determination of what constitutes an

impeachable offense?

2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on

Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional.

3. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred under

Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Held:

1. No. Such a determination is a purely political question which the

Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Although

Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for

impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of

public trust, elude a precise definition.

2. Yes. The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House

Impeachment Rules contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give

the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.”

3. Yes. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of

filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House

Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of

Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment

complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not

be filed against the same official within a one year period following

Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on

June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on

October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the

initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable

officer within a one-year period.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant, vs.JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister,respondents-appellees.

 

AQUINO, J.:

Like L-49623, Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".

Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church (Exh. D).

The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land

had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N).

On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides:

Chapter VIII.—Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the Land Register Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Direct/r of Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that applicant, as a private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945.

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.

As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).

The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. "

In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Plana, J., took no part.

 

 

Separate Opinions

 

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente,as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2

I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.

It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not.

This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I as impelled to write it only because in the �dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.

FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:

It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case ofVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore, the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:

Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).

This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariñoand the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.

The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had

installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.

The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon.

Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land.

On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.

Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:

It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant

and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title?

1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property.

(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. ")

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that:

... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that

said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient,under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:

In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."

In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.

In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).

In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect

the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."

3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly acquired by it.

4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law." The law does I notprovide that one acquires ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that:

 

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."

5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's

predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.

8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and of 313

square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.

9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "

It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

 

 

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623.

DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:

Justice Teehankee cites in his dissenting opinion the case of Herico vs. Dar, 1 the decision in which I am the ponente,as reiterating a supposedly well-established doctrine that lands of the public domain which, by reason of possession and cultivation for such a length of time, a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thus consider said land as no longer public land but "private" lands and therefore, not within the prohibition of the New Constitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2

I cannot subscribe to the view that the land as above described has become private land, even before title thereto, which is, as of this stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. 3 This is the only legal method by which full and absolute title to the land may be granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land, referred to as administrative legalization, resulting in the issuance of free patents, also based on possession, in which case, as in the issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the area disposable to a citizen-applicant by the Director of Lands is limited to 24 hectares. There is no limit to the area subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title, except possibly the limit fixed for a State grant under old Spanish laws and decrees, which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents.

It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect title that some statements are found in many cases, such as those cited by Justice Teehankee, to the effect that such land has ceased to be public land. What these statements, however, really mean is that the land referred to no longer forms part of the mass of public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for in the aforecited Act which deals with "public land" gives rise to the very strong implication, if not a positive conclusion, that the land referred to is still public land. Only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.

The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. " As previously stated, by express provision of the Constitution, no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public

domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are "corporations or association" within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. This observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land. Although it may further be observed that supposing a corporation has been in possession of a piece of public land from the very beginning, may it apply for judicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believed obvious-it may not. If its possession is not from the beginning but has commenced only upon the transfer to it by the prior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not.

This separate opinion should have had no need to be written because the majority opinion written by Justice Aquino is already well-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I was impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponenciawas cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit.

FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting:

It is with regret that unlike in the case of Meralco v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 1 where I had a brief concurrence and dissent, I am constrained to dissent in the ably-written opinion of Justice Aquino. I join him in according the utmost respect and deference to this provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristo being a corporation sole, then I would have no hesitancy in sustaining the conclusion that if the land be considered public, its registration would have to be denied. For me, that is not the decisive consideration. It is my view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case ofVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration. 5 There is for me another obstacle to a partial concurrence. The right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore, the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting:

Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious corporation sole, in the second case (both admittedly Filipino corporations qualified to hold and own private lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquired by them by purchase or exchange from private persons publicly recognized as the private owners (who have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty [30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications).

This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cariñoand the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of

alienable public land for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted.

The land covered by the Meralco application of November 26, 1976 consists of two (2) small lots with a total area of 165 square meters located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270.00. This land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before World War II which broke out in the Pacific in 1941. Olimpia Ramos sold the land on July 3, 1947 to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva Inocencio who constructed a house thereon. But because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of its steel posts on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the land to the Meralco on August 13, 1976. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. It is residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land. It is likewise established that it is not included in any military reservation and that since 1927 it had been certified as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain.

The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon.

Respondent judge in the Meralco case sustained the Republic's opposition and dismissed the application, holding that under both the provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land.

On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the applicant." Respondent judge in the case accordingly granted the application for registration of the land in the name of the Iglesia, holding that it had been "satisfactorily established that applicant [Iglesia] and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended.

Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated

since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar 2 that the lands in question ceased, ipso jure, or by operation of law, to be lands of the public domain upon completion of the statutory period of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and unchallenged possession thereof by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest who were qualified natural persons and entitled to registration by right of acquisitive prescription under the provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated:

It is expressly provided in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957) that citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons who have occupied lands of the public domain but whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of the certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act in cases where they "by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." 3 In such cases, is the land ipso jure or by operation of law converted into private land upon completion of the 30th year of continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by private corporations or does such land, as held by respondent judge in the Meralco case, remain part of the public domain and does not become private land until after actual judicial confirmation proceedings and the formal court order for the issuance of the certificate of title?

1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property.

(At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45 (b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957, the period of open and unchallenged possession was reduced to "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, wherein it is stated that "(I)n the Susi case, this Court applied section 45 (b) of Act No. 2874 which corresponds to what is now section 48(b). It was held that the long possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894 gave rise to the conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. Justice Aquino's opinion 5 and quotes the reduced statutory period of open and unchallenged possession of "at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application. ")

Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already

ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands of the same land to another person was void and of no effect and Susi as the rightful possessor could recover the land as his private property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain. The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that:

... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain, openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient,under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows:

In Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 7 the Court held that "(I)n the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424, it was observed that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim."

In Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 8 the Court stressed that by force of possession, the land in question became private property on the strength of the Susi doctrine.

In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus:

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.

If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it.

In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10 the Court again held that where possession has been continuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424).

In the latest 1980 case of Herico vs. Dar, 11 " the Court once more reiterated the Susi doctrine that "(A)nother obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens Title, the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides: ... As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent."

3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession underbona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of thirty yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application and "it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statute that the possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicant Meralco cannot be said to be barred as a corporation from filing the application for registration of the private property duly acquired by it.

4. It should be noted that respondent judge's decision in the Meralco case expressly finds as established facts that the Meralco's predecessors-in- interest had possessed and occupied as owners the land in question for at least over 35 years; Olimpia Ramos having possessed the same since the last world war in 1941 and then having sold the same on July 3, 1947 to the Piguing spouses who built a house thereon and continuously possessed the same until they sold the same in turn to the Meralco on August 13, 1976, 12 Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had therefore acquired by operation of the Public Land Act a Government grant to the property, as well as acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership as set forth in Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that "By prescription one acquires ownership and other real rights through lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law." The law does I notprovide that one acquires ownership of a land by prescription only after his title thereto is judicially confirmed. To this same effect is the ruling in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot

chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

To the same effect is the Court's ruling in Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, that "an owner does not obtain title by virtue of certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title."

5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justification for denying the Meralco's application for registration of its duly acquired title to the land. Meralco's predecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. The land became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the public domain can be invoked any longer as the land had long ceased to be public land but had become private property. Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title being transferred to the Meralco by right of purchase and traditio — for it is not claimed that there is any legal prohibition against the Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them.

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 )

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed

in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be duly issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest.

8. It should bear emphasis that what are involved here are small parcels of land, of 165 square meters in the Meralco case used for installation of an "anchor guy" for its steel posts in connection with its tasks as a nationalized domestic corporation to furnish electrical service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon to minister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the undue control and exploitation of our public lands and natural resources by corporations, Filipino and foreign-controlled) be deemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not hold the small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public.

9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cariño and the 1925 case of Susidown to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice De Castro categorically reiterated for the Court that "As interpreted in several cases .....the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. "

It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the domain'" (at page 2) that "hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia which admittedly are 'corporations' or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue of whether the land in question is public or private land" (idem) might mislead one to the wrong conclusion that corporations with 60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as well as the counterpart provisions of the 1935 Constitution have always expressly permitted Filipino-owned corporations to own private lands, and the only change effected in the 1973 Constitution is section 11 which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote for reversal of respondent court's judgment in the Meralco case and for the entry of a new judgment granting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

Footnotes

1 45 SCRA 437.

2 Section 11, Article XIV, Constitution.

3 See Section 48 of the Public Land Act.

4 Section 1 1, Article XIV, Constitution.

FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting Footnotes:

1 G.R. No. L-49623.

2 Article XIV, Section 11 of the Constitution.

3 According to Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution: "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

4 L-25246, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54.

5 Cf. De la Llana v. Alba, G. R. No. 57883, March 12,1982.

6 102 PhiL 596 (1957).

7 According to Article IV, Section I of the Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. "

TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting Footnotes:

1 48 Phil. 424.

2 95 SCRA 437 (Jan. 22, 1980), citing Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 108 Phil. 251 (1960).

3 Emphasis supplied.

4 At page 6; emphasis supplied.

5 At pages 4 and 5 thereof.

6 Emphasis supplied.

7 108 Phil. 251, 253 & 255 (1960).

8 63 Phil. 654, 655 (1936), citing Delos Reyes us. Razon 38 Phil. 480: Susi vs. Razon, supra, and PNB vs. Luis, 53 Phil. 649. See also Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 503 (928).

9 21 SCRA 743, 747-748 (1967).

10 29 SCRA 760, 779 (1969).

11 95 SCRA 437, 443-444, per De Castro, J.

12 Record p. 22.

13 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 Lawyer's Ed. 594; emphasis supplied.

14 12 SCRA 628,634. Page 898

15 "Sec. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens." (Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution).