ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 5 1

Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza

The nature of threats and the challenges

that NATO is faced with in the present day are

ever changing and have added difficulties. The

alliance has been posed with an aggression by

Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the reaction

has been reluctant.

In addition, a world financial crisis has

worsened the contributions to the defense in-

dustry. More and more nations are cutting

back on defense spending at a time when in-

vestment are mostly needed. The need for

military spending is of great importance espe-

cially for European nations, as its Eastern

neighbour grows increasingly hostile.

In that sense, how can prior experiences

pave NATO’s road towards a stable and secure

Euro-Atlantic region?

This edition of Atlantic Voices will exam-

ine two different views to NATO’s defense

capabilities. This issue will first explore how

past lessons can be applied to the present situa-

tion of NATO, followed by an analysis of de-

fense spending and its need for reform.

The Airborne Early Warning and Control Force one of the military assets that is owned and operated by NATO. (Photo: NATO)

Challenges and Future of

NATO’s Defense Capabilities

Volume 4 - Issue 5 May 2014

Contents:

Operation Enduring Freedom And The Weakness Of The

Revolution In Military Affairs: A Lesson To Learn For The

NATO Allies

Francesco Di Massa offers historical background behind the Revolution in Mili-

tary Affairs and explains why it has not fulfilled its potential. He argues that

there is a need for investment in military technology in order to avoid face-to-

face combat and to reduce casualties.

NATO Capabilities And Threats Since The Global Financial

Crisis

Quint Hoekstra examines the capability cutbacks that have taken place since the

Global Financial Crisis. Additionally, he explores the challenges and difficulties

that NATO has endured during the crisis.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 2

Operation Enduring Freedom & The Weakness Of The Revolution In Military Affairs: A Lesson To

Learn For The NATO Allies

By Francesco Di Massa

A fter the defeat in the Vietnam War, an

asymmetric conflict in which around 58,000

American soldiers lost their lives, the US

Department of Defense decided to modernize its se-

curity apparatus by engaging in a process of military

application of technology, best known as the Revolu-

tion in Military Affairs (RMA). The direct applica-

tions of this process were reconnaissance, based on

the employment of drones and satellites, as well as

accuracy of ranged weapons. The final aim was to di-

minish human casualties in conflict, by reducing the

need of engaging troops in face-to-face combat, and

make the idea of waging new wars more appealing to

the American public opinion.

This military revolution

turned out to be a successful

choice during the First Gulf

War. However, the 2001 Op-

eration Enduring Freedom

(OEF), the US led military

engagement aimed at eradicat-

ing Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,

dismantled this new certainty, as the RMA develop-

ments resulted to be a partially effective means in the

fight against the September 11 perpetrators. In princi-

ple, RMA should have allowed the US and its allies to

win the military campaign by only employing drones,

Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) and laser

guided bombs, without risking the loss of human

lives. In practice, ground combat played a fundamen-

tal role in defeating the enemy.

In future military operations, reconnaissance

devices and long distance fire power should be inde-

pendent means for winning wars and Special Opera-

tion Forces (SOFs) should stand away from frontal

combats. The US, as well as the other NATO allies,

which do not contribute as much as the former to the

development of RMA, should bridge their gaps and

conduct new R&D joint efforts, by adopting a strate-

gy of commercialization of the defence industry. As a

result of the development of the RMA technologies,

soldiers could avoid engaging in face to face mortal

combat and the loss of human lives among NATO

troops would remarkably diminish. Ultimately, the

anti-war sentiment in the countries joining the mili-

tary alliance would decrease.

From Vietnam to the First Gulf War: the Illu-

sionary Revolution in Military Affairs’ At the

beginning, OEF was thought to be a short conflict

conducted mostly through the use of new technolo-

gies, offered by the previous RMA. This military rev-

olution has its roots in WWI and saw its first develop-

ment after the Vietnam War.

America lost the conflict in

South East Asia for several rea-

sons. First, the US army, which

was used to fighting conven-

tional wars, found itself unpre-

pared in the asymmetric con-

flict against the Vietcong, communist guerrillas who

used to engage the enemy by employing ambushes

and “hit and run” tactics. They knew very well how to

move into the jungle and they exploited the

knowledge of the territory to their advantage. Sec-

ond, during that long and troubled conflict, which

lasted from 1964 to 1973, around 58,000 American

soldiers lost their lives and the public opinion became

very restless about the war. Third, the Vietnam War

was televised and people who saw the slaughtering

from home expressed dissent about the military oper-

ation forcing the government to withdraw from the

war.

After such a demise, which stained the American

military reputation abroad, showing that the first

world superpower could be defeated on the battle-

The impact of such a revolution has been to reduce human casualties in conflict

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 3

ground, the US Department of Defense decided to en-

gage in a process of military application of technology,

best known as RMA. Its aim was to improve military ca-

pabilities and its direct applications were twofold: recon-

naissance, based on collecting information about enemy

positions and weaknesses through the use of drones and

satellites, and accuracy of weapons, enhanced by the use

of sophisticate lasers, able to target objectives at a dis-

tance of 8 km. The impact of such revolution has been to

reduce human casualties in conflict, considering the fact

machines and not just human power have been employed

since then, and enhance the effectiveness of military capa-

bilities.

This new revolution proved to be highly productive

during the First Gulf War. Indeed, US satellites quickly

identified Saddam Hussein’s positions in Iraq and the new

enhanced long range precision fire weapons destroyed

them during a conventional war conducted mostly on the

open field. After this success,

America thought to have de-

feated its strategic weaknesses,

which caused the demise of the

Vietnam War, and restored its

military image worldwide.

However, the 2001 Afghan-

istan War would have resulted

in a doubtful symmetric con-

flict, which quickly changed its

identity in asymmetric warfare,

revealing to the US and its al-

lies the ineffectiveness of the RMA

developments.

Operation Enduring Freedom: fighting an asym-

metric war with traditional tactics

On the 7th of October 2001, OEF began with a

bombing campaign against the Taliban’s air force and

communication systems. In the first stage, which recalled

a typical symmetric warfare theatre, enemy targets were

exposed and easy to acquire for the Precision Guided Mu-

nitions (PGMs) technology. The Taliban made no effort

in hiding themselves and their positions, openly standing

on mountain peaks. Even their armoured vehicles were

deployed without revetment shields. Those positions

were quickly targeted by the RMA precision fire pow-

er from 8 km and bombed.

This propitious situation changed after some weeks,

especially when Al Qaeda combatants started replacing

Taliban forces. Weeks of bombardment failed to de-

stroy all the Al Qaeda garrisons and the innovative pre-

cision guided fire power could not kill all the insur-

gents. This happened because PGMs could do only a

part of the job in Afghanistan, a country with a particu-

larly dense mountainous environment, where enemy

targets could disperse, cover and conceal themselves.

Another major problem for PGMs, was that Al Qaeda

combatants used to hide themselves in civilian villages,

making it difficult for aerial warfare computer models

to distinguish between the insurgents and the local

population.

The situation changed only when terrain SOFs

reached the battlefield. At the same time, CIA teams

were operating, tasked with

making connections with the

Northern Alliance commanders

and asking them for assistance

on the battlefield. The intelli-

gence campaign worked suc-

cessfully and the US led coali-

tion had on its side a combina-

tion of PGMs, SOFs and indige-

nous allies. One of the first bat-

tles, fought close to Mazar-i-

Sharif, saw SOFs fighting side

by side with Northern Alliance

troops against the Taliban. During this battle enemies

hid in small underground chambers to escape allied

firepower. Coalition troops eventually had to flood the

chambers with cold water in order to kill the insur-

gents.

During the following stage of the military opera-

tion, advanced US terrain vehicles found it impossible

to move over rocky mountain trails and troops had to

proceed with ponies, bearing the weight of their equip-

ment on their shoulders. Another important battle saw

coalition troops fighting against Taliban hidden in old

Soviet bunkers at the small village of Bai Beche. Here,

again, the Taliban fell easily but Al Qaeda troops de-

fended themselves from target acquisitions. Coalition

Geographic Map of Afghanistan (photo: Talking Proud)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 4

forces showed resolve and Kabul fell to its feet on

the 13th of November 2001. 5,000 Taliban and Al

Qaeda troops organized a resistance in Konduz,

but after 12 days they surrendered. After Kabul

and Konduz were taken, SOFs moved with Kar-

zai’s troops toward the Taliban’s fortress in Kan-

dahar. On the 6th of December, before coalition

troops reached the area, Mullah Omar and some

other Taliban rulers had escaped. The Taliban re-

gime was finished.

The last great battle of the military cam-

paign, namely Operation Anaconda, started with

an intensive reconnaissance operation during

which less than 50% of the Al Qaeda positions

were identified before SOFs and Northern Alli-

ance troops engaged in direct fighting. This hap-

pened because drones could not identify all tar-

gets, covered by the complex Afghan natural envi-

ronment. The battle saw coalition troops fighting

face to face against Al Qaeda combatants in the

Shah-I-Kot valley. During this fight, soldiers got

surprised by Al Qaeda’s

insidious fire attacks, which

came from previously un-

seen positions, and conse-

quently had to engage in

close combat operations

conducted by traditional

infantry. The remaining enemy positions, which

drones had not been able to identify, were discov-

ered by ground forces observing through the

source of fire.

This unforeseen situation should not have

taken place. Drones and long distance fire power

should have been able to defeat the enemy with-

out the need to expose the US led forces to

frontal mortal attacks. This is the reason why,

although coalition troops won the battle, a group

of Al Qaeda survivors probably including Osama

Bin Laden escaped to Pakistan through the White

Mountains near Tora Bora. From a strategic point

of view, this episode caused tactical and diplomat-

ic challenges, considering the fact that the Taliban

obtained a new refuge outside of Afghanistan.

Here they could reorganize their forces and plan fu-

ture counterattacks against NATO’s International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Learning from the past: NATO’s need for a re-

newed RMA engagement

OEF revealed the weakness of RMA as the mil-

itary campaign was conducted as an orthodox exam-

ple of modern face to face warfare, despite the pres-

ence of drones and heavy fire support. Precision air

power played a fundamental role in making the differ-

ence between stalemate situations and victory, even if

it could not have ensured the final result by itself. In-

deed, ground combat revealed to be a necessary strat-

egy against Taliban and Al Qaeda combatants, who

engaged in asymmetric operations by exploiting their

knowledge of the Afghan territory and hiding on the

mountains. Precision fire power, based on the use of

JDAMs as well as laser-guided bombs, and land troop

manoeuvers demonstrated the interdependent means

necessary to win the war. However, RMA should

have allowed the US led coalition

to employ only fire power, ob-

taining success on the battlefield

without risking the loss of human

lives. Then, OEF represents an

element of continuity with WWI

and WWII, where joint air-land

tactics were employed, instead of a turning point in

the history of military strategy.

The US and NATO military apparatus must be

redesigned in order to give major power to the long

range precision engagement and leave ground frontal

combat behind. In future operations, reconnaissance

devices and ranged weapons should be independent

means for gaining victory and SOFs should only play a

backing role by standing apart from face to face com-

bats and enemy fire.

However, a major obstacle for a renewed RMA

engagement within NATO is represented by the mili-

tary capability gap between the US and its European

allies, partially due to reduced defence budgets in

Western European countries. Indeed, since the end of

the Cold War, these members have cut military

spending by 25% in real terms. The US spends

NATO members should embrace the so called “globalization and commercialization of the

defence industry”.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 5

around two and a half times as much on R&D as all

the other NATO allies combined. With regard to this

point, Bill Lynn, chief executive officer of both

Finmeccanica North America and DRS Technologies,

argues that NATO member states should embrace the

so called “globalization and commercialization of the

defence industry” and

bridge their differ-

ences in military capa-

bilities, since not all

innovations in such

field will come from

the US.

M o s t i m -

portantly, giving ma-

jor power to long

range precision en-

gagement and leaving

ground face to face

combat behind could reduce the loss of human lives

among NATO troops and thus defeat a major point of

weakness for the US and the whole military alliance:

namely, the ability to achieve strategic objectives fast-

er while avoiding high casualty rates which would

simultaneously lower the anti-war sentiment at home.

Francesco Di Massa holds a Master of Arts in Inter-

national Politics and Security Studies, completed at

the Roberto Ruffilli Faculty of the University of Bolo-

gna and the University of California Santa Barbara.

After having completed an internship at the Italian

Embassy in Oslo, during which he attended several

conferences at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, he

is currently contributing through the organization

Automated Mapping – Facilities Management GIS

Italia to some EU funded projects, including the Up-

sidedown Project for the protection of underground

critical infrastructures.

Bibliography

Biddle S. (2002), Afghanistan and the Future of

Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense

Policy, Carlisle, US Army War College.

Biddle S. (2003),

Afghanistan and the

Future of W a r -

fare, in Foreign Af-

fairs, vol. 82, no. 2,

pp. 31-46.

Lynn B. (2013), Interview with Bill Lynn on 2013

Global Security Forum, in The International

Relations and Security Network, URL: http://

isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Video/Detail/?

lng=en&id=172492

Sloan E. (2000), DCI: Responding to the US Led

Revolution in Military Affairs, in NATO

Review, URL: http://www.nato.int/docu/

review/2000/More-capable-balanced-alliance/

DCI-Responding-US-led-Revolution- Military

-Affairs/EN/index.htm

Watts B.D. (2011), The Maturing Revolution in

Military Affairs, Washington DC, Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

About the author

Predator UAV. Widely used for reconnaissance missions throughout OEF (photo:

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 6

ing. His successor Chuck Hagel echoed these words

more recently by saying European states must renew

their investment in military capacity. Ironically, the US

has also been cutting its own defence spending. Last

February, Hagel even announced he is planning to

shrink the US army to pre-World War Two levels.

Capabilities, therefore, are a central concern to

both the US and NATO. But capabilities on their own

do not say much. It is their relation to the threats

NATO faces that is important. So, does there exist

something like a threat-capability gap? Is there really

something to worry about? This article first investigates

what capability reductions there have been since the

outbreak of the global financial crisis. It then examines

trends in threats and issues NATO faces over the same

period.

Capabilities

The assess-

ment of NATO

capacity levels first

requires a way to

measure military

capabilities. This is

not as easy as it

may seem. The

s imp le s t way

would be to count

and compare troop

numbers. The

more soldiers a

state has, the high-

er its capabilities

are. A core prob-

lem with this

method is that it does not account for differences in

equipment. One thousand poorly equipped Turkish

soldiers would arguably be no match for a hundred

NATO Capabilities And Threats Since The Global

Financial Crisis

By Quint Hoekstra

N ext September, NATO member states

will gather in Wales to discuss collective

NATO capability levels. In some member

states, the Global Financial Crisis has led to reduced

military spending. Yet the recent crisis in Ukraine

shows threats continue unabated. So by how much

have budgets exactly been cut? How have NATO

threats evolved since the outbreak of the financial cri-

sis? And what does that mean for the alliance?

After years of economic woes dominating

Western newspapers, Russia’s advance in the Ukraine

has reminded NATO member states that money is not

everything. The global financial crisis and the corre-

sponding government budget deficits have sparked a

string of cuts on military spending, leaving military

analysts worried about the collective level of NATO

capabilities.

The Obama

administration

has repeatedly

urged Europe

to spend more

on defence,

insisting that

peace does not

come free of

c h a r g e . I n

2011, US Sec-

retary of De-

fence Robert

Gates warned

that NATO

would have a

“dim if not dis-

mal future” if it does not increase its military spend-

Table 1. Percentage change in military budgets from 2007 to 2013. (Source: SIPRI

Military Expenditure Database 2012)

1 Turkey 17,3 15 Estonia -13,2

2 Norway 9,5 16 Albania -15,2

3 Germany 7,3 17 Italy -17,8

4 USA 2,4 18 Netherlands -18,2

5 Portugal 2,1 19 Slovenia -30,1

6 Poland 1,3 20 Spain -30,8

7 Denmark -1,1 21 Slovak Rep. -31,4

8 Luxembourg -4,1 22 Iceland -31,9

9 Romania -4,4 23 Czech Rep. -34,5

10 France -5,2 24 Bulgaria -35,0

11 UK -6,9 25 Lithuania -35,1

12 Canada -8,0 26 Hungary -36,3

13 Belgium -8,8 27 Greece -37,5

14 Croatia -13,1 28 Latvia -49,6

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 7

highly specialized British troops using the latest technolo-

gy. This problem could be solved by measuring material

capacity instead. Yet this too runs into problems. An old

former Soviet tank is not equivalent to Germany’s best.

Academics at the SIPRI institute offer a solution for this

problem. They track all official national government mili-

tary spending in their Military Expenditure Database,

allowing for cross-national comparisons. Simply put,

higher budgets are assumed to lead to higher capabilities.

One downside is that this mechanism does not pick up on

differences in purchase power. A thousand dollars spent

on military personnel wages arguably goes a lot further in

India than in the United States. But as the goal here is on-

ly to compare Western military budgets, this poses less of

a problem. This paper therefore uses SIPRI’s 2014 dataset

to compare military figures between 2007, which is the

year before the global financial crisis started, and the lat-

est figures from

2013.

The f i rst

question to ask is

whether NATO

military spending

has indeed de-

creased in this time

period. In 2007,

combined NATO

s p e n d i n g w a s

$939,407 million.

Six years later this

had dropped to

$928,348 million, a

decline of just over 1%. From these figures, it would be

tempting to say the global financial crisis has almost no

effect on NATO’s military spending. However, as table 1

illustrates, a closer look reveals great differences between

member states.

With a rise of 17.3%, Turkey has by far increased

its military budget most. Other risers are Norway, Portu-

gal and Poland. Perhaps surprisingly, Germany displays

an impressive increase of 7.3%. The only other riser is

the United States, with 2.4%. Out of all 28 member

states, 22 (79%) show negative figures. Latvia ranks last;

it nearly halved its military spending. Worryingly, over a

third of member states (10 out of 28) have decreased

their budgets by more than 30%. Admittedly, these are

the small member states and this explains why the total

has remained so stable. Figure 1 shows differences be-

tween Europe’s great powers: the United Kingdom,

France and Germany. France remains the top spender

out of these three but Germany is steadily closing the

gap.

Figure 2 shows differences between the US and

the EU. The earlier 2007-2013 comparison hid the

true dynamic of US spending. During the first three

years of the crisis the US budget increased, but it noted

a sharp decline afterwards. The EU, by comparison is

much more stable. It first slowly increases and then

decreases a year prior to the US. The figure’s scaling

somewhat hides the fact that between 2007 and 2013,

total EU military spending decreased by 9.3%. The

graph does clearly

show the differ-

ence between the

US and EU: de-

spite its much

larger population

and economy the

EU only spends

just under half

(45%) of what

the US does.

The con-

clusion on NATO

capabilities since

the global finan-

cial crisis is that while total NATO capacity has re-

mained stable, differences between major EU powers

have shrunk and differences between US and EU mili-

tary spending have increased. Gates and Hagel’s com-

ments therefore do appear to be justified. But how

does this compare to the threats NATO faces? After

all, defence spending primarily serves to protect the

Alliance. If the threats have reduced proportionally,

the reduced spending can be seen as a positive sign as it

keeps NATO safe while freeing up resources for other

policy areas.

Figure 1. Military spending figures from France, Germany and the United

Kingdom, expressed in millions of constant 2011 US dollar. (Source: SIPRI Mili-

tary Expenditure Database 2012)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 8

Threats versus Issues

In order to fully understand the context in

which NATO operates, it is important to distin-

guish between threats and issues. Threats are de-

fined as any external actor (state or non-state) that

jeopardizes the territorial integrity of NATO

member states. A historical example is the Soviet

Union during the Cold War and a more contem-

porary example is Al-Qaeda. Issues, on the other

hand, are external problems that NATO faces but

which do not directly challenge NATO member

states’ sover-

eignty. Exam-

ples are, for

instance, inter-

national crime

(such as drug

trafficking) and

environmental

change. Even

though these

issues can have

a great impact

on the long

term, on their

own they do not warrant large military expendi-

tures.

Contrary to the previous section, threats

and issues cannot be easily quantified. A more ho-

listic approach is therefore needed to map these

out. The 2007 Dutch National Security Strategy

provides a good starting point in classifying their

impact. It states five vital interests of the state.

First, there is the aforementioned territorial secu-

rity. Second, is economic security, which refers to

the free and independent functioning of the econo-

my, such as international trade. Third is ecological

security. This concerns the capacity to be resilient

to the environment, something challenged by cli-

mate change. Fourth is human security, which is

used to indicate the functionality of individual citi-

zens. Epidemics, for example, can inhibit citizens

from carrying out their daily life. The last vital

interest for the state is social and political stability.

Social cohesiveness and stability may be undermined

by friction between different generations, such as

youth unemployment or elderly care. Another issue

can be friction between a host population and migrant

communities.

Some of these interests are in general only chal-

lenged by outside actors, such as a states’ territorial

integrity. Others, such as forced migration issues, are

more often caused by internal actors. But as recent

events in the Ukraine show, minority groups can also

cleavages and attract (military) attention from outside

states. If NATO

aims to protect

member states

from all these

threats and issues,

it must pay atten-

tion to each of the

five levels out-

lined in the Dutch

National Security

Strategy. Now

that it is clear

what threats and

issues can consist

of, it is time to analyze security trends in the 2007 to

2013 period.

Trends

Staying with the Dutch analysis in 2010 the

Dutch government released a report called Verken-

ningen [Explorations]. In the midst of the global finan-

cial crisis the authors of the report attempted to antic-

ipate future developments in the world of security

politics, in order to help policy makers to make stra-

tegic decisions.

One of the main conclusions is that the interna-

tional environment can go one of four ways, illustrat-

ed in Table 2. The crucial factor is whether the domi-

nant actors in international politics are state or non-

state actors and whether cooperating is high or low. A

multipolar world would see states cooperate with

each other, while a multilateral world would see

states struggling to do so. Fragmentation occurs when

Figure 2. Military spending figures from the US and the EU (combined total of member

states), expressed in millions of constant 2011 US dollar. (Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure

Database 2012)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 9

non-cooperative non-state actors dominate global pol-

itics. Lastly, the world can be classed as a ‘network’

environment when non-state actors dominate and

cooperate with each other. Using this model to ana-

lyze the trend in international politics will help assess

NATO’s threat levels.

Before the global financial crisis NATO mem-

bers were fully embroiled in the conflicts in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Back then,

Islamic extremist terror-

ism arguably posed the

largest threat to NATO

member states. Analysts

spoke of the rise of non-

state actors such as Al-

Qaeda and of the general

decline of the threat em-

anating from militarily

strong states. Contrary

to the Cold War era, it was now weak states that

NATO worried about. In 2002, the US National Se-

curity Strategy stated that “America is now threatened

less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”.

The idea was that these failing states, such as Somalia,

Sudan and Yemen, could be used as safe havens for

terrorists. Yet more recent thinking suggests non-

state actors do not tend to operate from failed states.

Just like citizens, terrorists require some degree of

order to carry out their business. They rely on stable

communication methods and they need access to

banking and international transport. Weak states can-

not provide these, making terrorists turn to middle-

tier states instead. These are weak enough not to dis-

turb their business but do have the facilities terrorists

require. This means weak states no longer appear to

be a grave danger to NATO security as analysts

thought they were a decade ago. In addition, the glob-

al financial crisis marked a general decline in the im-

portance of non-state actors in international security.

Al-Qaeda, for example, did expand throughout the

Middle East and North Africa but the organization

failed to repeat its attacks on Western targets of the

late 90s and early 2000s.

Non-state actors also made a retreat in the do-

mestic politics of the developed world. At the turn of

the century, globalization was seen to lead to a ‘race

to the bottom’ whereby states deregulated business

and dressed down social welfare provisions in order

to stay internationally competitive. This was especial-

ly the case in Europe, where the European Union

passed liberalization laws to be implemented in mem-

ber states. But as the markets (and especially the fi-

nancial sector) failed

to deliver, states saw

no option but to in-

tervene in the econo-

my. For a short peri-

od, Keynesianism

was back. Once

some North Europe-

an economies recov-

ered, member states

pressed the European

Union to call for austerity measures. This put states

firmly back in the driving seat of international politics

at the expense of businesses and other non-state ac-

tors.

While the global north struggled with its econ-

omy, the south (especially Asia and Latin America)

continued to grow. The global financial crisis marked

China’s rise to superpower status, overtaking Japan as

the world’s second biggest economy. India grew in-

creasingly confident while high gas prices led to a re-

assertive Russia.

Some of NATO’s pre-global financial crisis se-

curity threats moved to the background. NATO ef-

forts in Iraq were rounded off with the training of

over 15,000 Iraqi security forces. NATO involvement

in Afghanistan is winding down later this year, even

though continued support to the new Kabul admin-

istration is expected. Yet these old issues have been

replaced by new ones, such as the aftermath of the

Arab Spring. NATO showed its continued relevance

by exercising an effective air campaign to oust Libya’s

Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.

In contrast to 2007, current NATO member

state threats are predominantly state based, but they

also highly differ. The US keeps a tab on develop-

ments in China, with Obama calling even himself the

Cooperative Non-cooperative

State-based Multipolar Multilateral

Non-state based Fragmentation Network

Table 2. The Scenario Framework. Source: (Ministerie van Defensie.

2010)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 10

first ‘Pacific President’. Turkey, on the other hand, is

more focused on preventing the civil war in neigh-

bouring Syria from spilling over to its territory.

Western European NATO member states are worried

about instability in North-African states, such as

Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while East-European states

perceive Russia as the biggest threat to their security.

Turning to the smaller issues, global state co-

operation has repeatedly proven difficult. Progress on

climate change is obstructed by seemingly irreconcila-

ble differences between the developed and developing

world. The permanent members of the United Na-

tions Security Council also clashed over how to han-

dle the Arab Spring and its

aftershocks. Superpower co-

operation has been successful

in some cases. There has

been strong action on piracy

off the Somali coast and the

US and Russia have cooperat-

ed with regards to the issue of Syria’s chemical weap-

ons supply. Yet recent events in Ukraine re-ignited

tensions between the two former rivals, marking an

end to the brief period of détente.

To summarize, the trend during the global fi-

nancial crisis is one towards a state-based multilateral

world in which the specifics of security threats have

changed but the level of threats and issues have re-

mained the same. US political, economic and military

hegemony in much of the world continues, but it is

increasingly questioned by other rising powers, prob-

lematizing global cooperation.

Conclusion

Military spending figures suggest total NATO

military capabilities have not significantly decreased

since the global financial crisis. Differences between

major European powers have shrunk while the Atlan-

tic divide (between the US and EU) has widened. The

total level of threats NATO faces remained un-

changed. That means on a NATO-wide level there is

no need to speak of a threat-capability gap. Yet the

type of threats have significantly changed.

In 2007 threats predominantly came from non-

state actors, such as Al-Qaeda, but in 2013 they ap-

pear to originate from stronger states instead, such as

Russia and China. There is also greater diversity be-

tween the threats the various NATO member states

face. This potentially undermines NATO solidarity.

Not helping matters is the fact that NATO’s role in

the world is still debated. The global financial crisis

has not brought NATO any closer to the question

whether it should be a regional or global actor. The

more diverse threats also make it more difficult for

states to anticipate on future military needs. This adds

an extra challenge to those states wishing to further

reduce military budgets. In

an increasingly uncertain

world, states have no option

but to maintain a versatile

military force. State differ-

ences between the level of

military budget cuts and the

difference in threats mean individual NATO member

states can end up facing threat-capability issues in the

near future.

Smart defence, the idea of doing more with

less, can be part of the solution. The increase of

NATO interoperability could for example help main-

tain collective capabilities. Yet military might is not

everything. Recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq

have shown that high capabilities do not always trans-

late into desired outcomes. The lesson may very well

be to try and use what capabilities NATO has got in a

more intelligent way. After all, military capacity is

constrained by the capacity of political leaders to use

it effectively and efficiently. Russia’s swift invasion of

the Crimea shows that NATO military might does

little to protect its interests if it is not utilized proper-

ly. If military capacity goes unused (in the sense of

ineffective deterrence or non-deployment), these re-

sources may be better redirected to other policy are-

as, such as education or health care. If NATO-

member states really seek to make the most out of

their capabilities they must think better about how

they deploy their forces. Both too much (Afghanistan)

From this perspective, a hundred thousand extra dollars for NATO’s War College in Rome may very well be bet-ter spent than millions for a few extra Joint Strike Fight-

ers.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 4 11

and too little (Crimea) can be detrimental to its inter-

ests. From this perspective, a hundred thousand extra

dollars for NATO’s War College in Rome may very

well be better spent than millions for a few extra Joint

Strike Fighters.

Quint Hoekstra currently studies Political Science

with a Specialization in International Relations and Or-

ganizations at Leiden University, the Netherlands.

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Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 5 13

Edited by: Genaro Aguilera-Reza

The nature of threats and the challenges

that NATO is faced with in the present day are

ever changing and have added difficulties. The

alliance has been posed with an aggression by

Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the reaction

has been reluctant.

In addition, a world financial crisis has

worsened the contributions to the defense in-

dustry. More and more nations are cutting

back on defense spending at a time when in-

vestment are mostly needed. The need for

military spending is of great importance espe-

cially for European nations, as its Eastern

neighbour grows increasingly hostile.

In that sense, how can prior experiences

pave NATO’s road towards a stable and secure

Euro-Atlantic region?

This edition of Atlantic Voices will exam-

ine two different views to NATO’s defense

capabilities. This issue will first explore how

past lessons can be applied to the present situa-

tion of NATO, followed by an analysis of de-

fense spending and its need for reform.

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