atlantic voices - one year after the iran nuclear deal

YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 06 1

- Flora Pidoux

In July 2015, a much expected nuclear

deal was finally reached between Iran and

the P5+1 (Permanent members of the

United Nations Security Council and

Germany), announcing the lifting of

international sanctions against Tehran in

exchange for the country’s agreement to

limit its nuclear activity to energy purposes.

This issue focuses on the impact the deal

has had on world security. The lifting of

sanctions against Iran has acted as a game

changer for the country which is now able to

openly trade with world powers as well as

have a voice on the international scene.

Iran is now able to export its large oil

resources across the globe, notably to China

and Europe, which has had negative impacts

for the price of crude oil and thus for other

oil exporting countries like Saudi Arabia and

Russia. On top of traditionally tense

relations with Riyadh, Tehran’s disregard for

OPEC’s guidelines and increased influence

in Syria can be expected to further

contribute to the region’s instability.

Despite the deal, the nuclear threat has

not disappeared and remains a concern for

NATO which is in a dire need to redefine its

nuclear strategy in face of Russia’s assertive

attitude and other actors’ threatening

attitude.

One Year After the Iran Nuclear Deal

Volume 6 - Issue 06 June 2016

Contents:

One Year On: Iran and the World

Mr. Neil Thompson examines the state of Iran's relations with the major

world and regional powers in the year since its nuclear deal was signed with the

international community, and how the lifting of sanctions has affected regional

security after Iran’s return to the international scene.

Ms. Flora Pidoux analyses how short term security priorities are forcing

NATO to revise its nuclear strategy despite the West’s support for

denuclearization, arms reduction and non-proliferation.

The Iranian flag next to a ballistic missile (Photo: Center for Security Policy )


By Neil Thompson

W hen an Iranian opposition group

released information showing

secret activity, including the

construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a

heavy-water reactor which could theoretically both be

used to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, it

sparked a thirteen-year standoff between the West and

the Islamic Republic. After the allegations about Iran's

previously undeclared nuclear activities became

public, the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) launched an investigation that concluded in

2003 that Iran had systematically failed to meet its

obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

to report those activities to the organisation.

However, while the IAEA said that Iran had

violated the NPT’s

safeguards agreement, it

neither reported evidence

of links to a nuclear

weapons program nor did Tehran withdraw from the

NPT like North Korea had done in an earlier

confrontation over illicit nuclear programmes. Instead,

the Iranian leadership insisted that Iran had discovered

and extracted uranium domestically in pursuit of its

legitimate right under the treaty to obtain nuclear

energy for peaceful aims. The United Nations Security

Council did not find this a convincing explanation and

sanctions were imposed on Iran, which were extended

in 2010. These had a crippling effect on the Iranian

economy though they did not end the standoff.

The sanctions did lead to further talks which, after

a change in administrations in Iran, eventually led to

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to

ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be

exclusively peaceful during the period the agreement

would be in force. By signing the deal, Iran “reaffirms

that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek,

develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.”

The IAEA has been put in charge of the monitoring

and reporting of Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA.

The deal, among other elements, demanded that Iran

restricted its sensitive nuclear activities to two nuclear

plants and to civilian energy production levels, defined

at 3.67% (before the JCPOA, Iran’s enrichment was on

average 20%). The JCPOA additionally stipulated that

nuclear research and development would take place

only at Natanz and be limited for eight years, and that

no enrichment

would be permitted

at Fordo for 15

years. Since January

2016, Iran has drastically reduced the number of

centrifuges which can enrich fuel, and shipped tonnes of

low-enriched uranium to Russia.

The deal struck a year ago has since realigned actors

inside and out of the Middle Eastern region; this article

examines the trends amongst both NATO members’

partners and rivals which might destabilize further the

regional balance in the future.

Renewed Saudi-Iranian Energy Rivalry

Despite the scepticism and hostility with which the

JCPOA agreement was greeted in both Western

countries and inside Iran, it has so far held firm. Since

this agreement reduces the chances of war between the

One Year On: Iran and the World

The deal struck a year ago has since realigned actors

inside and out of the Middle Eastern region


Western powers and Tehran, its arrival was certainly

applauded by NATO. But the agreement has also had an

immediate impact on Iran’s standing in the Middle East

and the wider international community, in ways which

have not been as positive for international peace and

security. This has played out particularly in the field of

energy politics.

In May, Iran’s Tasnim news agency, which has strong

links with the notorious Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Corps (IRGC), reported Iranian Oil Minister Bijan

Namdar Zanganeh claiming that, thanks to the lasting

implementation of the nuclear deal, Iran’s capacity to

produce and export crude and oil products has doubled

in comparison with the pre-sanctions era. The agency

also quoted a recent report by the International Energy

Agency as saying Iran’s oil production had returned to

the level of pre-sanctions era, reaching 3.56 million

barrels a day in April, and added that Iran’s crude

exports had increased to 2 million barrels a day, close to

the pre-sanction level. The result has been a dramatic

increase of Iranian oil available on the international

market at a time when oil prices remain at rock bottom,

which energy importers like Europe and China largely

benefit from.

But the return of Iran to the oil market has also had

negative consequences, sparking tensions with traditional

Western allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia. When

ministers from the Organization of the Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) including Saudi Arabia,

Qatar and Venezuela, together with other non-member

oil producers such as Russia, met in Doha in April it had

been expected that the first agreement to freeze

production in fifteen years would soon drive up oil

prices. But when Riyadh suddenly demanded that Tehran

limit its oil production, Iran proved unwilling to

squander the opportunity that returning to world

markets afforded. As a result, the expected agreement

stalled and any agreement was pushed back to June.

Saudi Arabia’s continued rift with its rival in both OPEC

and the Middle East in general has played a large role in

torpedoing the old effectiveness of the producers’

cartel.

This is good economic news for Western energy

importers, but it signals a renewed regional hostility

between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran which should

concern NATO. The two powers are on opposing sides

in two hot Middle Eastern proxy wars - in Yemen and in

Syria. The civil war in Yemen is between a Saudi-led

coalition and Zaidi Shia rebels known as Houthis, who

overthrew the Yemeni government in cooperation with

forces loyal to Yemen’s former dictator Ali Abdullah

Saleh. The Saudis allege that the Houthis are Iranian

pawns, saying that Tehran has supplied weapons, money

and training to the Shia militia as part of a wider pattern

of interference in the region via Shia proxies. There are

longstanding fears in Saudi and NATO that Iran has

exploited turmoil between Sunni and Shia Muslims in

Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and now Yemen to

expand its regional influence. Now, with the expansion

of Iranian capabilities following the ending of sanctions,

there is some danger that a rattled Saudi Arabia will use

its influence to nudge the United States and NATO

towards intervention of one of these quarrels despite the

relative improvement in relations between Tehran and

the West.

Negative Implications for Syria

While Saudi Arabia is not a NATO member and US-

Saudi relations have been cool under the administration

of outgoing US president Barack Obama, there is one

particular area of overlap between the concerns of the

Alliance and those of the leading Sunni Gulf power. In

Syria, Iran is backing an array of pro-regime militias and


has encouraged its Lebanese ally Hezbollah to join in the

fighting as well. A major objection to the JCPOA

agreement from Riyadh (and Tel Aviv) was that the lifting

of sanctions and unfreezing of Iranian assets would act as a

boost for Iranian funding of overseas armed groups,

especially in Syria. The United Nations Special Envoy for

Syria, Staffan de Mistura, estimates the Islamic Republic

spends $6 billion annually on backing Damascus.

NATO has become concerned about the situation in

Syria due to the joint Iranian and Russian intervention.

Late last year, Major General Qassem Soleimani, the

commander of the Quds Force, the elite extra-territorial

Special Forces arm of the IRGC, travelled to Moscow to

solicit greater Russian involvement in the Syrian war. In

September 2015, at a

time of heightened

Russian-NATO

tensions in Europe and

the Middle East, a

Russian military

intervention on behalf

of the regime began to

turn the tide in favour

of Damascus. Iran and

Moscow are now

cooperating in Syria to

restore the Assad regime’s control over the western parts

of the country where most of the population lives.

NATO now faces a challenging situation whereby a

resurgent Russia flexes its muscles in Eastern Europe and

has drawn closer to Tehran over Syria, despite the friction

this has caused with neighbouring NATO member

Turkey. This is not, however, a case of an Iranian-Russian

bloc emerging to confront the West and its Arab allies.

While Iran and Turkey have disagreed over their views on

regional political developments in the last five years

Turkish-Iranian relations are nowhere near as bitter as

Saudi-Iranian ones. Since the January 16 "Implementation

Day" of the JCPOA, Ankara has agreed to expand

bilateral trade with Iran to $50bn a year. It is

manoeuvring to become Iran's first trading partner as a

way to compensate for Russian sanctions.

Moscow-Tehran Relations and NATO

The signs are that Iran continues to see Moscow as a

great power in the Middle East, and one which it can

cooperate with on occasions to foil Western moves it

deems anti-Iranian. Likewise, Moscow will work with

Tehran on occasion. Despite participating in the sanctions

regime, Moscow has continued to honour a nuclear deal

struck with the Islamic Republic of Iran to construct a

series of nuclear power

plants at Bushehr in the

south of the country.

Moscow and Tehran both

remain committed to

rolling back Western

influence in the Middle

East and will work

together on an ad hoc

basis when it suits them

both.

But despite their shared suspicions of the United States

and NATO, Russia and Iran have had a long and

contentious relationship. Just as the United States and

European members of NATO have remained aloof of

Turkish and Saudi policy in Syria, Moscow has allowed the

Western powers to enlist its help in curbing Iranian

nuclear ambitions. Together with China, Russia was one

of the nations which agreed to impose tough sanctions on

Tehran to force it to the negotiating table. It has also

helped ease the passage of the JCPOA by agreeing to

recycle Iranian nuclear fuel in Russia, removing any

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan (center) meets with his Russian

and Syrian counterparts, Sergei Shoigu (left) and Fahd Jassem al-Freij (right), in Tehran, on

June 9, 2016. (Photo: RNA)


justification for enrichment inside Iran. Moscow does

not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons while fearing

that a nuclear agreement will lead to improved ties

between Iran and the United States.

The return of Iran to the oil market has also

disrupted Russian hopes for a price floor to be

coordinated with OPEC producers thanks to Saudi-

Iranian rivalry. Iran is pushing to find new ways to

extract and export its vast natural-gas reserves, and has

entered into preliminary talks with NATO-member

Greece to provide a gateway for the Islamic Republic to

supply fuel to European markets. Since the dispute

between Russia and Ukraine disrupted gas supplies and

sped up the EU’s bringing an antitrust case against the

Russian gas giant, Russian energy exports to Europe

have lost ground of which Iran is hoping to be a

beneficiary. Tehran is also competing with Saudi Arabia

and Russia in its energy exports to China; Beijing is the

largest importer of crude

from both Saudi Arabia

and Iran.

Therefore, although

the pair are happy to

cooperate over Syria,

whose regime was a

longstanding ally of Iran’s

dating back to the Iraq-

Iran war and whose port

of Tartus was the site of

the only Russian military

facility outside of the former Soviet Union, this was a

coincidence of overlapping interests rather than a sign

that Moscow and Tehran will draw closer together as

Iran emerges from under the shadow of over a decade

of crushing economic isolation from the global

economy. Moscow does not want to be seen as

affiliated with Iran by the mainly Sunni Arab world

amidst the escalating Sunni-Shia conflict. Iran is wary

of Moscow’s strong ties with Israel and its continued

efforts to court anti-Iranian Arab states and

longstanding disputes over the Caspian Sea continue to

impede Russian-Iranian economic cooperation.

Relations between Russia and Iran will continue to

be seen through a lens of shifting interests and

alliances, in which they are neither quite friends nor

enemies, but rivals. Moscow fears friendlier relations

between Iran and the West following the JCPOA

could, one day, allow former Soviet states in the

Caucasus and Central Asia to export their petroleum to

and through Iran, lessening their economic dependence

on Russia. The possibility of improving Western-

Iranian ties is therefore an alarming one to Russia at a

time of deteriorating relations between itself and the

West. It is therefore anxiously watching the progress

towards reform of Tehran’s

more liberal factions as these

actors favour greater

openness towards the West.

China and Iran

China is now Iran’s number

one trading partner as a

direct result of the sanctions

regime imposed over Iranian

nuclear activities, and this

closer relationship has

continued following the

implementation of the JCPOA. In January, Chinese

President Xi Jinping visited Iran and signed a long

series of agreements on economic and technological

cooperation with his Iranian counterpart Hassan

Rouhani. Iran’s leaders have also announced they will

cooperate with Beijing on its One Belt One Road

President Xi Jinping (right) meets his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rowhani in

Jakarta on 23 April 2015 to discuss the construction of a pipeline between Iran

and China as part of Beijing’s ”One Belt, One Road Initiative”. (Photo: Xinhua )


initiative.

China and Iran do not share the history of mutual

suspicion that divides Iran from Russia, which both

have clashed with in the past. Moreover, the drawing

together of Tehran and Beijing could ultimately

threaten Russia’s economic interests in both China's

hydrocarbon market and Iran's nuclear energy sector.

China has agreed to construct two nuclear power

plants in Iran and import Iranian oil on a long-term

basis. Russia's place in the Chinese oil market, which

it turned to as an alternative following the Ukrainian

crisis, could now be threatened while its monopoly

position as the Islamic Republic’s nuclear supplier has

been broken. Russian self-interest makes it very

unlikely that a Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis will

emerge as a united front against the NATO powers,

though all three will continue to cooperate together

on an ad hoc basis, as Russia and Iran have in Syria.

Iran also acts as an

important transport hub

between China and

Europe, part of a trading

relationship dating back to

the Iran-Iraq war, when a

combination of the Islamic Revolution and the Cold

War led Iran to purchase weapons from China instead

of Russia or the reviled US. But with the end of

sanctions and the tentative return of European states

to rebuild their interrupted political and economic

relations with Tehran, Chinese firms may find

themselves facing increasing competition from

outsiders, disturbing a cosy status quo which has been

built up during the past decade or more. The visit of

China’s president and the inducements he offers may

be in part a gambit to pre-empt this, and one which

Iran’s leadership seem to have accepted as a continued

hedge against overdependence on the West. For now,

Beijing is looking to deepen rather than limit its

involvement in Iran, whose political elite seem happy to

accept the Chinese overtures.

Conclusion

So far the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has

been a surprising success for Euro-Atlantic diplomacy

against all odds. A year on, the tensions with Iran are

lower and progress towards an Iranian nuclear weapon,

however obliquely pursued, has been halted for now,

while trade and transparency have given the two sides a

chance to recalibrate their relationship. However, the

agreement should not be seen as a panacea for everything

which ails Iranian-Western relations. Iran remains

aligned with a threatening Russia in Syria, which has put

sanctions on NATO member Turkey amidst a plunge in

relations with other Alliance member states. Tehran has

also stepped up its proxy conflicts and economic warfare

with Saudi Arabia, a major

US and NATO ally in the

region. It is moving closer

into the orbit of a more

assertive China which has

its own territorial disputes

with key NATO member America and is looking to

gather allies into its own competing institutions. One

year after the nuclear deal was signed, it is clear that

much remains to be done before relations between the

Alliance and the Islamic Republic can truly be said to

have been reset; what prevails now is more of an

armistice.

One year after the nuclear deal was signed, it is

clear that much remains to be done before rela-

tions between the Alliance and the Islamic Repub-

lic can truly be said to have been reset; what pre-

vails now is more of an armistice.


Neil Thompson is a Contributing Analyst at

geostrategic analysis and business consultancy Wikistrat

and a blogger at the Foreign Policy Association. His work

has appeared in the Diplomat, the International Security

Network, the Independent, the Financial Times, and

various other publications. He holds an MA in the

international relations of East Asia and is presently based

in London.

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About the author

Bibliography


the different security priorities of the Allies, the Euro-

Atlantic Alliance is split into two groups, some wishing

to see the nuclear component more present in the

confrontation with Russia, others rejecting the idea. In

both cases, the effectiveness of the chosen response will

be challenged by Moscow’s increased assertiveness and

other global threats.

A New Nuclear Age

When trying to define NATO’s best possible

approach to today’s nuclear threats, it is crucial to

analyse the current nuclear paradigm, which has been

referred to by scholars as the Third Nuclear Age.

The First Nuclear Age refers to that of the Cold

War which rested on the NATO-Warsaw Pact bipolar

confrontation; the second corresponds to the post-Cold

War era when the threats were no longer states but

rather unchecked non-state actors; the Third Nuclear

Age is a system where the nuclear threat is used by

irrational actors (be it state or non-state actors) to

assert political power on the international scene when

they do not otherwise have the resources to do so. It is

generally accepted that the Third Nuclear Age started

in 2014 with the illegal annexation of Crimea by

Russia. By doing so, Russia unsettled the European

security order by putting an end to its partnership with

NATO and using its nuclear arsenal to assert itself as an

influential world power again, thus making up for its

conventional power inferiority.

The Third Nuclear Age opposes a political or

economic ‘midget’, i.e. an actor which is insignificant

on the international scene such as North Korea, a rising

Incompatible Goals: Denuclearization vs. Nuclear Deterrence

By Flora Pidoux

O n May 27th, 2016, United States (US)

President Barack Obama used his

visit to Hiroshima, Japan, to refocus

the world’s attention on denuclearization, a project

which has been Obama’s concentration since he took

office, and which awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize

in 2009.

The speech was deemed hypocritical as the US is

currently heavily investing into the modernization of

its nuclear arsenal, instead of reducing it, as the

denuclearization guidelines would suggest.

Washington has also supported the deployment of

more nuclear weapons to NATO’s eastern front in

response to Russia’s threatening attitude. Of course,

some efforts have been made towards nuclear arsenal

reduction, notably through the signing of the New

START Treaty signed by the United States and Russia,

but overall, Obama’s project has been stalling since it

was first announced.

The discrepancy between discourse and action is

not only visible in the US; NATO seems to be

following the same route as nuclear deterrence has

regained importance over the past few years. North

Korea’s nuclear tests, Iran’s controversial recent

ballistic missile tests, and Russia’s annexation of

Crimea are pushing NATO to redesign its nuclear

strategy and increase its deterrence capacity.

At the upcoming NATO Warsaw Summit, the

Allies will have to define how to use nuclear weapons

in order to reassure the member states whilst not

provoking a security dilemma elsewhere. Because of


power like China, a declining power like Russia, or a

non-state actor, to an established power through the use

of nuclear weapons and whereby the former tries to

impose its will on the latter. This confrontation is also

used by political leaders as a means to boost their

popularity; Kim-Jong Il proudly announced on May 7th

“that his nuclear-weapons and missile programmes had

brought the country ‘dignity and national power’”.

The current nuclear age is also tainted with

ideological antagonism between legal models: on one

hand, the Western principles of rule of law,

international rules and regulations, arm reduction and

denuclearization are sought after; on the other hand,

counterparts use hybrid methods as means of power.

The latter model seems to rest on irrationality, which

raises the issue of containment if a crisis were to erupt;

indeed, the traditional nuclear concepts of first strike,

escalation and even deterrence are not respected by all,

thus creating further uncertainty and increasing the

chances of security dilemma and as a consequence of a

nuclear response.

The challenge is therefore to deter irrational actors

who depend on their nuclear weapons to make their

voices heard and make themselves look more important

than they really are.

Deterring Russia: Reviewing NATO’s Strategy

In face of Russia’s renewed threatening attitude, the

Alliance must modernize its nuclear strategy, a publicly

recognized need, though NATO officials assert that no

drastic turn will be made. In any case, NATO must

ensure that “there is no doubt in the Russians’ mind that

this idea of using nuclear weapons to "de-escalate a

crisis" isn’t going to work.”

In Warsaw, NATO will thus work on refreshing its

nuclear stance, which has not changed since NATO’s

“Deterrence and Defense Posture Review” developed at

the 2012 Chicago Summit. The Alliance is indeed in dire

need to review this document as most principles it is

based on, namely NATO-Russia good relations and

cooperation, are no longer reflecting today’s reality.

What will be closely monitored by the general public

is whether the Allies will modify the 1997 Founding Act

on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between

NATO and Russia, which asserted that NATO had “no

intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear

weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need

to change any aspect of [its] nuclear posture or nuclear

policy”. If NATO did so – Poland, Latvia, the United

Kingdom and the United States support the idea of an

increased nuclear deployment towards the East - it

would add a nuclear component to the Alliance’s

sovereignty reinforcement measures already in place

which will most certainly not be well received by

Moscow.

A report from the Center for Non-proliferation

Studies (CNS) studied the Allies’ take on reinforcing the

nuclear presence closer to the frontline. The results lean

towards a nuclear status quo where the atomic

capabilities would remain in Western Europe as the

frontline states see hosting nuclear weapons on their soil

as “heightening their risk of being involved in a nuclear

conflict with little positive payoff.”

It appears that border states believe that much can be

done to deter Russia by implementing small changes in

the Alliance’s conventional (and not nuclear) strategy. In

addition, investing more resources into nuclear

deterrence is regarded as a non-credible military and

political choice which would take away crucial resources

from conventional forces. What NATO can do is

encourage the three nuclear Allies to cooperate to offer

the rest of the Alliance a credible nuclear stance which

will not demand further nuclear efforts.


Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

When revising its nuclear strategy, the Alliance

must keep the big picture in mind in order to send a

coherent message to the world. NATO has never

taken part in the denuclearization movement, only in

the arm reduction and anti-proliferation ones, as

illustrated by the annual NATO Conference on

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Arms

Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation. The

Alliance believes, however, that nuclear weapons

must be controlled and used for deterrence and not

for intimidation. NATO must therefore continue to

count on its nuclear capability while not increasing it,

and expand its conventional capabilities to match that

of Russia while not making Moscow feel insecure to

the point where it will require to flex its nuclear

muscles.

Placing nuclear weapons in NATO’s most eastern

Allies, like Poland was suggesting, can be regarded as

nuclear proliferation, as supported by

denuclearization advocates. One can argue that

nuclear weapons posted in NATO’s nuclear sharing

program beneficiaries, that is Germany, the

Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Turkey, do not make

those nations nuclear because the missiles belong to

the US and are controlled by Washington; but this is

subject to criticism as the host countries are seen as

violating the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a

result of which NATO has been accused of double-

standards by contributing to the proliferation of the

nuclear technology. In that regards, expanding the

scope of NATO’s nuclear sharing program, and

especially to include Poland and the Baltic states,

would send the wrong message regarding

disarmament and non-proliferation, a goal the West

has been supporting since the end of the Cold War.

Prevailing Short Term Security Goals

Obama stated on 30 March 2016 that, “as the only

nation ever to use nuclear weapons, the United States

has a moral obligation to continue to lead the way in

eliminating them. Still, no one nation can realize this

vision alone. It must be the work of the world.” So far,

the US has not led the way to this goal other than in

discourse.

Needless to say that unilaterally diminishing the

number of nuclear warheads is no easy task, especially

when confronted with irrational actors such as North

Korea, Russia and China who do not see eye to eye with

the West on denuclearization. China sees this project as

counterintuitive; after all, why destroy what one has

spent so much money to build?

Regional crises have multiplied in recent years,

notably because of the nuclear threat: China is currently

expanding its arsenal without announcing to what extent

and what for, which has repercussions for India, Pakistan

and Asia-Pacific at large and for relations with the West

and Russia; Israel’s undercover nuclear program impacts

Iran, Saudi Arabia and other regional actors; Russia’s

nuclear exercises and tests, notably close to Sweden, and

direct declarations that they would not hesitate to use

the nuclear bomb if provoked are all signs of renewed

tension; and North Korea’s tests and unruliness threaten

South Korea and Japan, both NATO Partners Around

the Globe.

The lack of transparency and accountability that some

nuclear actors display to international organisations is

worrisome as their disrespect of international laws

increase uncertainty and cause a potential security

dilemma, like Iran’s nuclear plans did before the 2003

sanctions. Russia renounced to participating in the

annual Russian-American summits on nuclear safety, and

withdrew from “the bilateral cooperation program


designed to increase nuclear safety under the so-called

Nunn-Lugar Act” which increases the risk of Russia’s

“radioactive substances, nuclear weapon elements and

nuclear expertise from falling into the wrong hands.”

Some countries are no longer willing to play by the

West’s rules, thus making denuclearization extremely

unlikely.

Killing the Bird in the Nest

Today, denuclearization is not a priority for

countries, preferring disarmament and non-

proliferation as they are more realistic goals in

threatening times. Disarmament is working to a certain

extent, notably thanks to the New START Treaty. Non

-proliferation has proven effective in the case of Iran:

the sanctions aimed to kill Teheran’s nuclear ambitions

in the nest before it was too late. This strategy has,

however, proved unsuccessful in North Korea due in

part to China’s support to the country, limited impact

of the Six Party Talks, and Pyongyang’s disregard for

international sanctions.

The risk of nuclear confrontation today is real. The

increasing number of nuclear actors and their declared

willingness to use their nuclear technology makes it

necessary for the West to reassert its defensive

strategy. Deterrence seems the best route to take in an

effort to avoid provoking the irrational actors as well as

support the denuclearization project.

While the West is officially trying to limit its

armament, the rest of the world does not seem to be

willing to follow suit. Denuclearization is an ambitious

goal that most ultimately supports for the security of

the world. Unfortunately, one cannot win a game

where the others do not play by the rules, so for now,

short-term security priorities will have to prevail.

Flora Pidoux currently works at Transparency

International Belgium and previously worked at the

Atlantic Treaty Association. She holds a Master’s Degree

in International Relations from Université Catholique de

Louvain. Her interests include power relations,

territorial conflicts and overseas territories. She blogs at

florafranca.com

Delpech, Thérèse, “Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century – Lessons from the Cold War for a new era of strategic piracy”, RAND Corporation, (2012)

Kamp, Karl-Heinz, “Commentary: NATO Must Reopen the Nuclear Dossier”, Defense News (09.03.2016)

Kamp, Karl-Heinz, “The agenda of the NATO summit in Warsaw”, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitpolitik, Security Policy Working Paper No.9/2015

Kamp, Karl-Heinz, “Welcome to the Third Nuclear Age”, The National Interest (02.05.2016) Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-the-third-nuclear-age-16020?page=2

Kristensen, Hans M., “Adjusting NATO’s nuclear posture”, Federation of American Scientists (07.12.2015)

Lyon, Rod “The New Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence”, The Diplomat (03.07.2015) Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/the-new-dilemmas-of-nuclear-deterrence/

NATO, “Deputy Secretary General calls for efforts to strengthen non-proliferation regime” (09.05.2016) Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130629.htm

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About the author

Bibliography

https://florafranca.com/

http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/the-new-dilemmas-of-nuclear-deterrence/



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