atlantic voices - the warsaw summit

YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 08 1

- Flora Pidoux

Two years ago, the Wales Summit marked a historic turn for NATO as the

Alliance was forced to recognize that its European territory was threatened for the first time in 25 years; menaces emerging

from the South and the East made NATO vulnerable despite so many years of peace. The Summit in Newport in June 2014 acted

as the first step of what will certainly be a long process of securing the Euro-Atlantic again. It also reasserted the fundamental values the Alliance is based on: collective

defense, crisis management and cooperative security.

So, in two years, what has changed? The

official communiqué of the Warsaw Summit announced that the Allies have worked together to secure the borders of NATO,

while recognizing the hybrid nature of threats posed to them. Russia is then directly pointed out as challenging the security of the

Alliance. This issue analyzes the focal points of the Summit: the first article focuses on the security situation in the Eastern Flank ; the

second article dwells on the Alliance’s new integration of the cyber sphere as its 5th operative domain; and the last article details Macedonia’s membership prospects

throughout the years.

The Warsaw Summit

Volume 6 - Issue 08 August2016

Contents:

From the Warsaw Pact to the Warsaw Summit Mr. Mateusz Krupczyński explores the evolution of the security

environment of the Eastern Flank from the creation of NATO to today.

Russia’s Use of Cyber Warfare in the Conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine

Mr. Luka Mgeladze focuses on cyber security which has been largely

discussed during the Summit in an effort to integrate this operative domain into

the Alliance’s field of action.

Security After the Warsaw Summit – Prospects and Expectations for Macedonia

Ms. Marija Jankuloska & Mr. Ilija Djugumanov analyze Macedonia’s

membership prospect and involvement in the Alliance.

Family photo of Allied and Partner Heads of State and Government of International Organizations, 6. July 2016 (Photo:NATO)


By Mateusz Krupczyński

he choice of location for a NATO

Summit is symbolic, sometimes even

historical. By hosting the 2002 summit

in Prague, the Alliance sent a strong signal to the

world by holding such an important event in a country

of the former Eastern Bloc for the first time, thus

declaring to the world that times had changed. Four

years later, NATO held its Summit in Riga– first time

in a territory of the

former Union of

Soviet Socialist

Republics -

reaffirming the ties

between the West

and the Baltic states.

In 2010, choosing

Lisbon was a symbol

of recognition of a

long term

transatlantic

importance of

Portugal. In 2004, mainly due to American

endeavours, the Summit took place in Istanbul due to

the commitment and merits of Turkey to the Alliance.

This year’s summit has borne further significance for

the unity and security of the Alliance as the Heads of

State met to discuss the security challenges in Warsaw

as NATO is facing increasing threats from its Eastern

neighbour, Russia. In addition, the working dinner

took place in the exact room in the Palace of the

President of Poland where the Warsaw Pact was signed

in 1955, 25 years after the collapse of the Eastern

Block. In light of Russia’s renewed assertiveness, there

is little chance that having Poland host the Summit and

choosing the historical room to have one of the most

important discussions was a coincidence.

Reaffirming Collective Security

The Warsaw Summit aimed to further reassure and

develop the decisions made at the Wales Summit in

2014. The official Warsaw communiqué gathered the

focus points and the

decisions made during

the Summit:

collective security

was reaffirmed,

making NATO

refocus on its core

mission. The Summit

also enabled the

Eastern Allies to share

their worries in the

face of Russia’s

threats, making the Member States realise that the

security threats are closer to their borders than had

been the case since 1991, thus also making the Allies

refocus on their own territories rather than deployment

across the globe.

Wales focused on reassuring the Eastern Flank

countries, a few months after the annexation of the

Crimean Peninsula by Russia. At that time, NATO

presence in the East of the Alliance did not have any

From the Warsaw Pact to the Warsaw Summit

Communist Bloc Conclave: The Warsaw Pact conference, 11 May 1955, Warsaw,

Poland (Image: Getty Images UK)


military potential as it assumed rotational presence for

exercises and trainings of small number of troops. Due

to the lack of consensus in regards to enhancing its

presence in the Eastern Flank, NATO decided to reform

the Response Force by creating the Very High Readiness

Joint Task Force (VJTF), meaning making brigade size

contingencies quickly deployable to the conflict zone in

case of crisis. The decisions made in Warsaw changed

the character of NATO’s engagement in the Eastern

Flank, but has proven insufficient. Indeed, the current

situation requires a higher number of troops deployed to

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as well as more

combat readiness.

Warsaw underlined the urgency of the situation of

the Eastern Flank vis-à-vis Russia; these countries mainly

refer to Poland, the Baltic

states and Romania as those

have similar, if not the

same, perception of

security challenges.

Countries of the Visegrad

framework generally feel

threatened by Russia's

military developments in

the region, but they do not

seem to demand that

NATO stations on their

territories like the

countries cited above have. Nonetheless, notably the

Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, seem to

recognize the potential threat posed by Russia and

pledged to each deploy a company-seized group to the

Baltic states. Bulgaria, on the other end, support’s the

demilitarisation of the Black Sea in order to create a

military free zone. Sofia’s efforts to closer economic ties

with Moscow may explain Prime Minister Borissov’s

position.

The Eastern Flank After the Warsaw Summit

The most important decision made in Warsaw was

to develop an enhanced forward presence in Poland,

Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Stationed on a rotational

basis, NATO troops are aimed to deter Russia from

undertaking any military actions against the countries in

the Eastern Flank.

The enhanced forward presence will be

multinational, to make clear that an attack against one

Ally is an attack against all Allies, and that NATO will

respond in case of aggression. The battalion-seized

battle groups, bigger and better equipped than

traditional battalions will be stationed in Poland, Latvia,

Estonia and Lithuania -approximately 1000 troops will

be posted in each states. The United States, Germany,

Canada and the

United Kingdom will

be the framework

nations; they will be

supported by

Romania, Norway,

Belgium and

Denmark.

Additionally,

the United States will

locate heavy a brigade

in Poland as part of

the Pentagon’s $3.4

billion European Reassurance Initiative deployed from

2017. The command of the brigade, according to

unofficial information, will be also stationed in Poland.

The agreement on enhancing NATO’s forward presence

in the Eastern Flank has been developed in respect of the

NATO-Russia Act of 1997, thus not directly

threatening Moscow.

According to a Rand report based on war games

Working dinner of NATO Heads of State and Government on 6 July 2016 at the

Presidential Palace, in the room where the Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955

(Image: NATO)


conducted earlier this year, seven brigades, three heavy

armoured brigades supported by air, land-based fires and

other means on the ground at highest readiness, could

prevent the rapid takeover of the Baltic states. Therefore,

the proposed battalions deployed in each state of the

Eastern Flank would not be sufficient if Russia were to

attack any of the countries, and even less so if several at a

time. It is important to emphasize, however, that the

battalions’ aim is to deter rather than stop any kind of

aggression. They are the first step of a complex reaction

mechanism on NATO’s end; the battalions, the way they

stand today, could not possibly stop Russia if they were to

attack but would probably

delay them enough to allow

back up troops to come to

the frontline.

The Summit fulfilled the

postulates of the Baltic

States, which were

formulated by the Ministers

of Defence in 2015, calling

for the deployment of

battalions in each of the

three countries. The Baltic

states will continue their efforts so that the battalions will

be equipped with heavy weapons to complement their

defensive capabilities. When comparing battalions which

will station in the Baltic states to the battalion in Poland,

it is more likely they will have lower combat capability -

mainly due to the frequent rotations and difficulties with

communications and cooperation which may occur. They

will consist of subdivisions of different NATO countries

which will be led by framework nations - Germany,

Canada and the United Kingdom.

Romania’s efforts to get NATO to its presence in the

Black Sea region in the form of a multinational brigade

and a Black Sea fleet was achieved to a certain extent.

NATO decided to establish a multinational brigade

integrated into the Romanian brigade. The brigade will be

under the authority of the Headquarters of a Multinational

Division Southeast in Bucharest. Although a relatively

modest support from the Alliance, it is a gradual

expansion of NATO’s presence in the Black Sea region. It

must be mentioned that there are American troops

already present in Romania. They are stationed there as

part of the American forces deploying to the Middle East

and in Africa. The US Army also put in place in 2010 the

Black Sea Rotational Force to secure the Eastern Allies.

There were, however, no

commitments made in

Warsaw in regards to the

continuous deployment of

a NATO Black Sea fleet; it

is expected that NATO

ships will conduct

exercises and trainings in

the region.

Furthermore,

during the Summit, the

Allies announced the

reinforcement of the ballistic missile defence (BMD)

system whose command has been passed by the United

States to NATO in order to deter any possible aggression

coming from the East. On 19. August, General Wolters,

Commander of the Allied Air Command qualified this

transfer of command as “a significant step toward the aim

of NATO BMD, offering a stronger capability to defend

populations, territory, and forces across southern NATO

Europe.” The installation will consist of SM-3 missiles

Aegis Ashore in Deveselu (Romania), a radar to detect

and track ballistic missiles located in Turkey, submarines

of the Aegis systems based in Spain and missiles SM-3 in

The presidents of Poland and Romania met at the Belvedere Palace for a

working meeting to sum up the two-day NATO Warsaw summit on 11 July

2016 (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs )


Poland, of which the construction is underway.

The decision for enhanced forward presence in the

Eastern Flank is certainly an important step for the

Alliance’s deterrence strategy. However, there is a

need for further steps to be taken to allow effective

cooperation of all elements of the NATO chain of army

reaction in order to make this strategy credible and

effective.

Cyber Security

At the Warsaw

Summit, cyber security

played an important role

in the discussions. In

accordance with earlier

information and

announcements by the

Secretary General,

NATO decided to

recognise cyberspace as

the fifth operative

domain of war along

with sea, air, land and space. This decision requires

from the Alliance to create increased defence

capabilities in the virtual space and operate in it without

any obstacles. It also obliges NATO to continue the

integration process of cyber defence in the framework

of operational planning future missions and operations

conducted by the Alliance. Integrating cyber defence

will also increase cooperation in the Cyber Range

framework, meaning wider exploitation of the

educational infrastructure located in Tallinn, Estonia.

During the military exercise Anaconda which took

place in Poland at the beginning of 2016, cyber defence

was tested for the first time as an integral part of the

military operations. While troops were conducting

military manoeuvres, the telecommunications systems

were disrupted causing problems with relocation.

Immune tests were also tested in order to prepare for

cyber-attacks. In both cases, shared American

experience in cyberspace was an added value and was

used where possible, helping to develop good case

practices and prepare for the eventuality of such

scenarios.

It is an important aspect of the collective defence

because weak security systems of one of the NATO

members threaten the

whole organisation. By

targeting the weakest point,

hackers can install malware

software which can

jeopardize the Alliance’s

telecommunication system.

Unfortunately, after

the Warsaw Summit there

are still pending questions

on when retaliating to a

cyber attack is deemed

acceptable. Leaders limited the discussion only to

repeating what had been stated in Newport without

providing details about what kind of a cyber-attack may

trigger Article 5. Due to the lack of clear answers,

NATO may be challenged by adversaries on that front,

risking to undermine the security and credibility of the

Alliance.

Nevertheless, some of the decisions taken during

the Summit will strengthen the Alliance’s posture in

regards to the cyber domain and showed that changes

in the security environment were recognised.

Post Summit Challenges

The implementation of decisions, the adaptation of

the military structures and all political processes in

order to create a cohesive and reliable deterrence

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets with the President of Poland,

Andrzej Duda on 6 July 2016 (Photo: NATO )


strategy will be confronted with challenges of political

nature in the coming months.

Many in Western Europe may consider decisions

made in Warsaw a strong political signal to Moscow,

which do not require further military developments

by the Alliance but which should also be

counterbalanced with intensified dialogue and

cooperation with Russia. With the upcoming

elections in the United States, France and Germany,

and the potential political changes they may cause, it

can be expected that these Allies may come to adopt a

different approach to Russia depending on who wins.

Decisions made in Warsaw may then be affected and

need to be revised considering the weight of these

three NATO member states.

NATO solidarity

and credibility was

already challenged by

some in their post

Summit statements.

For instance, French

President François

Hollande stated that

“For France, Russia is not an adversary, not a threat. Russia

is a partner which, it is true, may sometimes, and we have

seen that in Ukraine, uses force which we have condemned

when it annexed Crimea”, which goes against the

Warsaw communiqué. Frank-Walter Steinmeier,

Germany’s Foreign Minister, criticised large scale

military exercises in the Eastern Flank, despite

German soldiers taking part in them.

Furthermore, an unsuccessful coup d’état took

place in Turkey, reflecting the increasing instability

and division currently shaking the country. This

geostrategically important NATO member could then

further complicate the already fragile security of the

Euro-Atlantic. As a result, the Incirlik air base, located

in Southern Turkey, used by the US, was temporarily

closed. Weakening relations between Ankara and

Washington led to a more worrying initiative: on

August 9, Turkish President Erdogan met President

Putin in St Petersburg, in order to "restore relations"

and discuss issues of military cooperation. A

rapprochement between Turkey and Moscow was

never part of the plan developed in Warsaw.

Meanwhile at the beginning of August Moscow

displayed its aggression acts checking NATO reaction

capabilities by deploying for "an anti-terrorist exercise"

on the Nistru river - an armed forces operational group

in the Republic of Moldova's secessionist region of

Transnistria, close to Romania, a NATO member.

Conclusions

The NATO Warsaw

Summit from the

Polish perspective as

well as for countries

constituting the

Eastern Flank was a

significant strategic

success, which also proved that NATO has fully

integrated its geographical extension to the East. The

security of the Eastern Flank is a priority for the Allies,

and NATO has shown solidarity and understanding of

the security threats which are particularly seen from

Poland and the Baltic States.

NATO has also made important steps forward in the

context of cyber security. However, to completely

assess the meaning of recognising cyberspace as the fifth

operational domain, we shall wait and see. The only

way forward would be that the Alliance fully invests

into its cyber capabilities by developing its own cyber

strategy, command and engage in cyber activities.

Official logo of the NATO Warsaw Summit (Image: NATO)


Despite successful meetings in Warsaw, NATO

continues to face challenges to which it must respond and

adapt. Following the Summit, the Alliance should take a

series of measures in order to enable comprehensive

cooperation in the NATO chain of military response.

NATO should develop decision mechanisms in order

to improve the decision making process in case of crisis.

An alternative solution is to find a consensus on

transferring responsibility for making decisions about the

use of NATO troops (battalions or VJTF) from the North

Atlantic Council to the Supreme Allied Commander

Europe.

Furthermore, NATO must look into the idea of a

Schengen zone, as suggested by Lieutenant General Ben

Hodges. Although the idea is challenging for many

European countries for a number of reasons, it would

undeniably be a useful tool as a response to the access-

denial capabilities deployed in Kaliningrad and Crimea by

Russia. Those capabilities are a serious threat for NATO

therefore “military forces should have pre-arranged

coordination that allows us to move quickly back and forth inside

the alliance”.

One month after the Warsaw Summit, it is easy to see

that NATO needs to make some fundamental changes to

its overall strategy to security and deterrence. It is time

to address the conflicting views and interests of all the

Member States while acknowledging that all have their

own interests. Maybe going back to NATO’s core

mission is the way to bring everyone back in sync and find

the threats to the integrity of the Euro-Atlantic the only

challenge that brings everyone together.

Mateusz Krupczyński is an expert at the National

Centre for Strategic Studies in Warsaw. He is also an

Atlantic Council Future NATO Fellow. He previously

served as an advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of

Poland. He holds an MA in International Relations

from the University of Dundee, and a MA in Global

Security from Keele University. His areas of interest

are transatlantic security, cyber warfare, and NATO-

Russia relations.

NATO HQ Allied Air Command Ramstein, 2016, https://www.airn.nato.int/archive/2016/allied-air-command-takes-over-nato-first-permanent-ballistic-missile-defence-resource

NATO Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

The Sofia Globe, 2016, Bulgarian PM Borissov: Black Sea should be a demilitarised zone, http://sofiaglobe.com/2016/07/09/bulgarian-pm-borissov-black-sea-should-be-a-demilitarised-zone/ 20.08.2016

David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, 2016, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf

About the author

Bibliography


integrate cyber threats into NATO’s operational

capacity. Beyond sole cooperation, it has been deemed

crucial that each member states have the capacity to

effectively and adequately respond to cyber threats.

By working with government and non-government

institutions such as the European Union, NATO

intends to strengthen cooperation in the following

directions: education, cyber trainings/ exercises,

information and situation awareness and etc. Based on

international legal norms the Alliance is planning to

create mechanisms that will ensure NATO’s broader

deterrence and defense policy.

It is worth noting that the NATO Warsaw Summit

communiqué stressed that Russia's aggressive actions

and willingness to achieve its political goals by the use

of force are a source of regional instability. Russia's

unpredictable nature leads the Alliance to enhance

cooperation with member and partner countries, in

order to achieve a stable and secure environment for

the Euro-Atlantic space.

Russia and Cyber Warfare

Confrontation between Russia and Georgia in 2008

was the starting point for the modernization of Russia’s

military capacity. The conflict acted as the final step in

Russia’s long planned upgrading plan.

With Russia’s military incursions in Georgia in 2008

and Ukraine since 2014, one can notice that both

interventions have also been the occasions for the

Russian military to test and perfect hybrid methods,

and more particularly cyber attacks. The six years that

happened between the two military deployments of the

Russia’s Use of Cyber Warfare in the Conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine

By Luka Mgeladze

ith the development of

information technologies, the

importance of cyber security has

exponentially increased, making nations more and

more dependent on communication systems, now

used in all sectors. The most crucial elements to

protect are critical infrastructures, being

communication hubs, energy plants and so forth,

which have been largely computerized. Whereas a

kinetic attack used to be the most potentially damaging

form of threat, cyber attacks, in the form of

unauthorized access could be the source of important

problems for national security.

Cyber warfare is only one of many components of

hybrid warfare which has become more and more

frequent in today’s political and military landscape. In

light of the increasing uncertainty caused by the new

methods, states have needed to adapt their security

environments and defense mechanisms to address the

attacks that may emerge on the cyberspace.

NATO Warsaw Summit

During the NATO Warsaw Summit, the Heads of

State and Government of the member countries

recognized the cyber sphere as the fifth operative

domain. The Allies highlighted the need to address this

issue by stating the following in the official Summit

communiqué: “Cyber attacks present a clear challenge

to the security of the Alliance and could be as harmful

to modern societies as a conventional attack.”

The Allies publicly acknowledged the urgency to

strengthen cooperation amongst them in order to fully


Russian military apparatus also enabled the Kremlin to

perfect some of the newly developed hybrid attacks. On

February 27, 2013 Valeri Gerasimov, Head of the

General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, published an

article which clearly draws a parallel between the

development of hybrid methods and the protection of

Russia’s interests. The arguments of this paper were

later renamed the “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Gerasimov

stated that war had

undergone

modifications:

“The role of

nonmilitary means

of achieving

political and

strategic goals has

grown, and in many

cases, they have

exceeded the

power of force of

weapons in their effectiveness.”

These lines clearly underline the importance of

hybrid methods in Russia’s strategy to carry out their

national interests.

The Russian-Georgian Conflict

During the war of August 2008, Russia, in parallel

with land, marine and air attacks targeted the Georgian’s

cyberspace. As a result, a significant part of the critical

infrastructure of the country was trapped in information

blockage, crippling any coordinated response and

increasing the vulnerability of the country.

Cyber-attacks started before the deployment of

conventional operations. In July 2008, Distributed

Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks happened against the

official web resource of the President of Georgia. The

platform’s interface was changed and perpetrators

started to distribute propaganda content. As a

consequence, the official web site of the President was

moved to servers in the United States in order to

guarantee the security of the webpage. Similar

protection was extended to one of the most influential

TV channel, Rustavi 2, in order to avoid any tempering

with the information broadcasted. Other cyber attacks

were reported on the websites of the Georgian

Ministries of

Foreign Affairs

and Defense

where propaganda

messages were

also displayed.

The private news

agency, Civil.ge

came under DDos

attack. The agency

shifted recourse

to a Blogger

account in case

the web site remained unavailable.

As a result of cyber-attacks, official sources were not

able to distribute news on the situation in Georgia,

leaving the possibility to pro-Russian information

sources used to spread disinformation. One of the many

false stories that was broadcasted by Russian propaganda

services was the story of the bombing of sleeping

Tskhinvali, capital city of the unrecognized state of

South Ossetia, by Georgian forces. The bombing

allegedly caused the death of thousands of individuals,

including women and children. This was totally false

information aimed to influence people psychologically

and to disseminate the image of Georgia as an aggressor.

Georgia, however, managed to deflate the impact of

these attacks on the cyber space thanks to international

support. In addition, because of security threats, banks

On 10 February 2016, NATO and the European Union enhanced their cyber defense coopera-

tion by signing the Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence (Image: NATO)


limited internet access in order to prevent hackers

from attacking the financial infrastructures of the

country. The cyber-attacks that occurred during the

period of the August war clearly outlined the danger

they can cause to national security.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Similarly, Ukraine has also been the victim of

cyber attacks in times when the country was leaning

towards building stronger relations with the West;

the government backed out under the pressure from

Moscow.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been

saturated with elements of hybrid warfare. It is

notable that pro-Russian groups having pseudo-

patriotic motives were leading an active information

war directed at the Ukrainian population in order to

form a negative perception of the West and to

marginalize the new Ukrainian Government.

Russia and its affiliated groups in Ukraine launched

cyber-attacks after the annexation of Crimea; it is

believed by some that the cyber-attacks were already

initiated from the period of “Euromaidan”. Attacks

were led against government and telecommunication

systems in order to trigger the malfunction of

information communication systems and distribute

disinformation.

Cyber-attacks were carried out in different

intervals of time:

• In November 2013, Russian hackers, through

DDoS attack, defaced the web resources of news

agencies. This resulted in information

misunderstanding that strengthened the sense of panic

among the Ukrainian population; they also attacked

the personal data of politicians;

• In February 2014, pro-Russian groups damaged

the fiber-optic cables of Ukraine and blocked

“Ukrtelecom”; as a result, internet and telephone

communication with Crimea, as well as with the nearby

territories was lost. These attacks used conventional

methods but served to highlight the importance of

telecommunication resources. These actions aimed to

create information blockade;

• In March 2014, DDoS attacks were carried out

against governmental and other media web-resources;

the mobile phones of Members of Parliament of Ukraine

were also hacked;

• During the Presidential election of 2014, the pro-

Russian group “CyberBerkut” tried to annihilate the

central election commission of Ukraine by using

dangerous software, in an effort to delete the results of

the election.

This is only a partial list of all the cyber attacks that

have been carried out since the summer of 2014 in

Ukraine. The public sector at large was particularly

targeted by these kinds of attacks and managed to hinder

the functioning of information and communications

technology through the wide spread of viruses within

Ukraine, some of them also reaching Poland.

Conclusion

The cyber attacks launched by Russia and its affiliates

against Georgia and Ukraine made it clear once again

that the cyber sphere requires significant attention in

order to help countries adapt to the new modern threats

which are no longer solely conventional. With NATO’s

recognition of the cyber sphere as the fifth operative

domain, it seems like the Alliance may be on the right

track.

Of course, the potential losses resulting from cyber-

attacks depend on the level of computerization of a

country and the reliance of its critical infrastructure on


information technologies and communication systems.

It is clear that the situation of Georgia and Ukraine in

this regard is significantly different from other large

countries, e.g. USA, China, European countries and

Russia whose larger resources enable them to ensure

the better protection of their communication systems.

In order to provide effective cyber security, the

following actions ought to be taken:

It is important that each states’ cyber agencies

implement and strengthen their information security

standards, as well as develop emergency responses in

case of crisis.

In terms of technology and software, procurement

of protected systems is of a great importance and must

be developed only with trustworthy companies and

countries.

Conventional forces must incorporate cyber

protection elements in order to ensure that their

communications are not interrupted in case of cyber

attack.

Only strong cooperation can help countries develop

stronger defense systems, like NATO member states

have increasingly been doing with information sharing.

It should be noted that the involvement of partner

countries such as Georgia, Ukraine and others in this

process, would greatly contribute to global security.

Many of the critical services are owned by the

private sector; their security thus has impacts on that of

the larger society. Accordingly, integrating the private

sector into the discussion on securing information

systems and critical infrastructures is of the utmost

important issue.

For NATO, and as outlined during the Warsaw

Summit, it will be crucial to focus on the cyber space in

order to kick start a large modernization process. It

will also be important to integrate it into its already

existing defense systems in order to make the Allies

stand strong on the five operative domains.

Luka Mgeladze is International Relations Manager at

Cyber Security Bureau of the Ministry of Defense of

Georgia. He is also member of the executive board of

YATA Georgia. His interests include defence and

security issues.

Giles Keir Russia’s new tools for Confronting the West

Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power

Chatham House/ Research paper Russia and Eurasia

program/March 2016

Geers Kenneth Cyber War in Perspective Russian

Aggression against Ukraine NATO CCD COE 2015

Connel Mary Ellen and Evans Ryan Russia’s “Ambigious

Warfare” and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps CAN

Analysis and Solutions 2015

Danchev Dancho Coordinated Russia vs Georgia Cyber

Attack in Progress ZDNet 2008

Gotsiridze Andria Cyber Aspects of the Post-Soviet Space

Conflicts and Georgia Atlantic Council of Georgia 2015

Mgaloblishvili Grigol, Kutelia Batu, Guruli Irina, Evgenidze

Nino, Hybrid war and changes of Euro-Atlantic security

landscape. Political and Economic consequences Economic

Policy Research Center 2016

About the author

Bibliography


order to be capable to tackle with the new risks to

security.

As stated in the London Declaration (1990)“(…) in

the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably

linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an

institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work

together not only for the common defense, but to build new

partnerships with all the nations of Europe”. This wording

was a precursor of what was to come.

The shifting nature of the current threats and

challenges, as seen in the emergence of hybrid and

cyber threats and the proliferation of non-state actors

that in recent years have seriously affected the new

security landscape, have also unambiguously challenged

the Alliance’s traditional approach in countering them.

The Alliance has found itself confronted with the

necessity to adapt itself to the new security reality. The

necessity to readjust implied refocusing its agenda and

redirecting its actions and policies toward a more

flexible and broader approach to security.

The change of security environment encompassed

by the emergence of new and unconventional threats

such as the rise of terrorism, the emergence of non-

state actors, nuclear proliferation and cyber threats

indicated the need of more globalized approach in

dealing with the new security challenges. NATO

successfully managed to adapt itself to the changed

security environment realizing the necessity of

expanding its network by creating partnerships with

countries that are not formally member states. The

Alliance has gradually transformed itself moving from a

strictly formalized to a more flexible and inclusive

Cooperative Security After the Summit—Prospects and Expectations for Macedonia

By Marija Jankuloska & Ilija Djugumanov

he 2016 NATO Summit held in

Warsaw once again reiterated and

reaffirmed the importance of NATO

and its partnerships as platforms for cooperation,

consultations and political dialogue. NATO’s

Partnership Policy directly contributes to the

Alliance’s open door policy enshrined in article 10 of

the North Atlantic Treaty as it assists and prepares

countries to accomplish full-fledged membership. At

the same time, the cooperative security remains a key

opportunity for countries like Macedonia that aspire

toward integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Revamping the Alliance

Although many predicted that the fall of the ‘Iron

Curtain’ would also mean the downfall of the Alliance,

the latter survive the paradigm shift. However, the

new security reality meant that the reconstruction was

more than necessary in order to effectively address the

challenges generated by the newly emerged political

and security landscapes and the void left by the

collapse of the USSR

Over the course of time the Alliance has undergone

a variety of structural, political and substantial changes

that shaped and defined its present role as a global

security actor on the international scene. The collapse

of the Eastern Block and the disintegration of the

Soviet Union marked a new era of the Alliance’s

functioning. The global disorder accompanied by the

complexity of the contemporary threats and challenges

that ensued in the Post-Cold War environment have

signaled the necessity of reforming the Alliance in


structure.

What Has Been Done so Far?

The tendency toward reconstruction, re-organization

and transformation that was anchored by the adoption of

the New Strategic Concept of 2010 offered new

opportunities for the aspiring countries. By listing

cooperative security as one of its core tasks besides

collective defense and crisis management, NATO

affirmed its aspirations toward a more decentralized and

partner-oriented structure. The New Strategic Concept

demonstrated once again the Alliance’s determination to

continue in the same direction by building sustainable

partnerships with countries that show willingness and

preparedness to act toward achieving the goals put

forward by the Allies.

The Lisbon Summit

(2010) reaffirmed

NATO's new role that

has been rebuilt and

redefined after the

collapse of the bipolar

world as an Alliance

with a wide range of

tasks that are not limited

solely to security and

defense related issues. It

is not anymore a

classical military alliance

that served as a counterbalance to the Warsaw Pact with

sole defense objectives. This integration-driven process

helped to build confidence, increased the active

contributors in NATO-led operations and reinforced the

Alliance itself.

Until now, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program

from 1994 under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council (EAPC) - centered on Central and

Southeastern European countries, as well as Central Asia

- has proven to be most effective of all partnership

initiatives which resulted with 12 countries being

integrated in NATO. Montenegro is another successful

story due in part of its PfP membership. The other

partnership networks are concentrated outside Europe

and include: (1) the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

initiated in 1994 is predominantly focused on

Mediterranean States and its network includes Algeria,

Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia;

(2) the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched in

2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul which covers the region

of Gulf States includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and

United Arab Emirates with Saudi Arabia and Oman

expected to join; and (3) the Partners around the Globe

consisted of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New

Zealand.

Simply put, NATO’s

Partnership Policy

offers benefits for both

sides. On one hand,

NATO receives

support in its military

missions, while the

partners obtain

assistance in enhancing

their military and non-

military capabilities

through trainings,

education and cooperation. Although the utility of the

partnerships is indisputable, as well as the advantages

that the NATO partnership policy offer, there are

certain questions and dilemmas that have to be

addressed.

First, the problem with the heterogeneity of the

countries covered by NATO’s partnership network

cannot be ignored. The differences that exist are largely

shaped by different political realities, different threat

NATO Secretary General meets with President Gjorge Ivanov of the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia on 25. November 2015 (Image: NATO)


perceptions and different national interests of the

partner countries which usually have their own

preferences how to deal with the challenges they face

and how to cooperate with NATO. Second, although

these partnerships are individually-based and the

cooperation is on bilateral level (NATO-partner

country), one should keep in mind the resources

required to ensure their sustainability in times of

austerity and budget cuts.

It is indisputable that the new approach to defense

introduced by the New Strategic Concept brings

advantages and benefits to NATO and its partners,

but it also has its drawbacks. It presents new

challenges that need to be addressed. There are still

questions whether NATO can provide effective

management for its partnership network and whether

it has capacity to adequately address the different

demands and expectations from its partners.

Another question is whether the ‘uniformity’ formula

can be operable in a complex security environment

converged by the sometimes incompatible interests

and expectations of the partners and their different

threat perceptions. It is important to remember,

however, that NATO’s partnership policy has positive

impact on the whole perception toward NATO and

its activities. It proved the importance of cooperation

between states in fields that are of common interest.

Perspectives on Macedonia

Given its aspiration toward full-fledged

membership, cooperative security is the key point

which Macedonia can benefit from. It is perceived as a

framework that would include a broad range of

activities and different areas of cooperation with the

primary goal to strengthen the cooperation between

countries that aspire toward the same goals and share

the same democratic values. It can be argued that

NATO’s new approach to defense and reliance on

partners in attaining the defined goals is beneficial for

Macedonia being assisted in implementing reforms and

reinforcing its military capabilities. Macedonia became

part of the Partnership for Peace program in 1995.

Blocked in its efforts to acquire full-fledged membership

due to its bilateral dispute with Greece, Macedonia has

been forced to remain a NATO partner-country.

The benefits for the Republic of Macedonia from the

transformation of the Alliance are irrefutable and they

have never been questioned. Aside from declarative

political commitment, Macedonia has undertaken an

active role in the NATO-led operations, including in the

International Support Assistance Force (ISAF) in

Afghanistan and the support operations in Kosovo. It has

proven its commitment and dedication to NATO

integration not only through active participation in cross

-border operations, but also through a successful

implementation of the Membership Action Plan. To

date, Macedonia has undergone structural and

institutional reforms in variety of sectors and has made

significant progress regarding NATO integration

criteria. Macedonia successfully completed the process

of defense and judiciary reforms, normative and

legislative changes, transformation and

professionalization of the armed forces and

modernization and standardization of the equipment in

accordance with NATO standards. By taking these steps,

Macedonia demonstrated a capacity and will to

contribute to the Alliance, despite not being a member

state.

Viewed from this perspective, the Republic of

Macedonia should posit itself as a proactive contributor

to international peace and stability continuing with the

tempo of reforming itself. Active partnership should

include greater efforts in ensuring the internal stability

by building political, economic and social stability, and

through stabilization of inter-ethnic relations and greater


promotion of human rights. Macedonia, on its way to

NATO, should consider active endeavor by building

military capabilities and cooperation platform intended

to intercept the new security challenges. Part of the

endeavors should entail development of the national

capabilities for crisis management, strengthening the

interoperability of the armed forces and the military

equipment with proper and optimal use of military

resources aligned with NATO’s Smart Defense

Initiative. The imperative should remain reinforcement

of good neighborly relations through regional

cooperation and the strengthening of cooperation at the

bilateral level. Although the Republic of Macedonia has

continuously demonstrated consistency in its

commitment to NATO integration, regular

reassessment and reconsideration of the current

policies to meet the integration requirements are also

needed. The Republic of Macedonia should also aim at

using its experience as a troop contributing country in

order to take a leading role in the region with greater

involvement in training and education activities and

proactive engagement in the wider range of PfP

activities.

The Way Forward

In light of the recently concluded Warsaw

Summit there are several important points that

should be considered:

1) Boosting partnerships and establishing more solid

bonds with partners is essential for NATO in order to

preserve the balance and to solidify its role as a global

player on the international stage.

2) Expanding its network and introducing new

forms of partnerships is also important in order to fill

the security vacuum in areas that are out of the reach of

NATO’s formal borders.

3) As for Macedonia, it is worth noting that

Macedonia should continue to prioritize further

pragmatic cooperation and proactive action in direction

of strengthening the partnership and fostering closer ties

with NATO. As already noted and elaborated in the text

only a committed partnership and active cooperation in

the fields of common interest can lead to integration.

Ilija Djugumanov is currently pursuing a Master’s

degreein International Relations – Conflict Resolution at

the University of Skopje and as part of a joint program

withthe University of Goteborg, Sweden (TEMPUS

Joint Program). Ilija is a member of the board of ATA

Macedonia and President of YATA Macedonia.

Marija Jankuloska holds a Master’s degree in

International Law and International Relations from the

University of St. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje She is

currently a researcher and member the Euro-Atlantic

Council of Macedonia. Her research interests are at the

intersection of public international law, international

relations, human rights, and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing World”, DIIS Report, 2014, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24491/uploads

Vivien Pertusot, “NATO Partnerships: Shaking Hands or Shaking the System?”, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/enotes/focus-strategique/nato-partnerships-shaking-hands-or-shaking-system

London Declaration, 1990, On A Transformed North

Atlantic Alliance, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-

95/c900706a.htm

NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, http://www.nato.int/

cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), http://

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_58787.htm

About the authors

Bibliography

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ATA Programs Created twenty-one years ago, in 1994, The Mediterranean Dialogue

reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely linked to

security and stability in the Mediterranean. Inspired by this initiative,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Organization of Spain (COAJE), will host,

again this year, the Youth Mediterranean Dialogue in Madrid, Spain on

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