atlantic voices, vol. 4, no. 7
TRANSCRIPT
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7
Since the establishment of NATO and the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 the Transat-
lantic Bond served as a security and commu-
nication bond between North America and
Europe based on shared norms and values
such as freedom, peace and prosperity.
Despite being the foundation of Euro-
Atlantic security, different perceptions of
security challenges, various priorities in na-
tional policies and strategies and an unequal
distribution to defense capabilities of the two
North Atlantic continents have lead to inse-
curities on both sides. Without a doubt the
Transatlantic Bond is crucial for both sides of
the Atlantic Ocean and has to include all
Parties to strengthen the collaboration and
trust between Western Allies.
This edition of Atlantic Voices will exam-
ine two views on the cooperation within
NATO and the Transatlantic Bond by ex-
ploring how current events, economic part-
nerships and joint military exercises are in-
fluencing the future Allied defence policies.
Edited By: Martha A. Scheja
171st NATO Chiefs of Defence meeting—General Philip Breedlove (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and General Volker Wieker (Chief of
The Transatlantic Bond:
Facing Security Threats Together
Volume 4 - Issue 7 July 2014
Defence, Germany) (Photo: NATO)
Contents:
The Transatlantic Relationship in an Age of Austerity and
Change
Philip Ulrich illustrates the gaps in governance as well as recent events that
threaten the strength and integrity of the Transatlantic Bond. He argues that
shifts in foreign and economic policy on both sides of the Atlantic call for an
increase in the role of Europe in order to keep the United States involved.
Transatlantic Bond: Strength in Years to Come
Nathan Turregano examines the Transatlantic Bond regarding NATO’s reassur-
ance as a politically unifying and militarily cohesive force. Additionally, he ex-
plores the role economic ties like TTIP can play to strengthen NATO and the
connection and cooperation between the transatlantic partners.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 2
The Transatlantic Relationship in an Age of Austerity and Change
By Philip Chr. Ulrich
A s the NATO Alliance withdraws from its
mission in Afghanistan, it moves into a pe-
riod where the Alliance and the transatlan-
tic relationship have to be defined to match the devel-
oping world order. The crisis in Ukraine in the spring
of 2014 has shown that Europe still needs the United
States. However, the relationship has to be defined in
a time where the United States is redefining its for-
eign policy and defense budgets are being cut on both
sides of the Atlantic.
The challenge for the European Allies is two-
fold in regard to defining the future of the transatlan-
tic relationship. On the one hand, Europe must try to
keep the United States engaged in European affairs,
prompted by situations such as
the crisis in Ukraine, and on
the other hand, find a way to
meet the US demands for
greater European contributions
to meet common challenges.
Three factors are going
to be influencing the transatlantic relationship both in
the long- and near-term future:
The US ”pivot”/”rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific
region
Russian behavior towards Eastern Europe
Declining defense budgets on both sides of the
Atlantic
The Withdrawal From Afghanistan
The end of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan is
the reason for the existential questions arising within
the Alliance. The Allies are faced with the challenge
of defining the future role for the Alliance.
Since 2003, NATO has had the leadership role over
the ISAF mission, which has served as the primary
focus of the Alliance ever since. This has not meant
that the Alliance has not carried out other operations
simultaneously; however, the greatest commitment of
resources from the Alliance has gone to the ISAF mis-
sion.
As the mission ends at the end of 2014, the Al-
liance needs a new mission for the future. The two
options for the Alliance are: a move back to a Cold
War-like stance focusing on territorial defense, or a
continued active Alliance with a global perspective
engaged in out-of-area missions. Given the global in-
terests of the NATO members, the second option
seems the most likely; however, the recent crisis in
Ukraine has prompted the question of whether an
entirely global focus is necessary.
Continued out-of-area engagement would help
the United States maintain a leading role in the global
security environment, which is a central aspiration of
the Obama-administration’s
foreign and defense policy. On
the other hand, continued out-
of-area engagement would en-
sure a continued, and potential-
ly increasing, global role for the
European Allies, either in a
NATO or EU setting.
Defining a new role for the NATO Alliance
following 2014 will also require a revision of the bur-
den sharing aspects of the transatlantic relationship.
Are the European Allies going to have to take on a
larger role in the future, prompted by declining US
defense budgets, and new US foreign policy objec-
tives and priorities? This is an important part of the
discussion which must be defined.
As the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey, said in a recent interview:
“The NATO Alliance has done a great job in partner-
ing with us in Afghanistan. That showed the Alliance
was willing to look beyond its own borders and be-
come a regional force for good and stability. Now I
think the crisis in Ukraine is causing NATO to look
Europe must try and keep the United States engaged in European affairs...while on the
other hand meet the US demands for greater European contributions.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 3
back to its own backyard, and forcing it to decide wheth-
er it still has the capability and capacity to reassure its
member states – especially those Eastern countries that
embraced NATO as
it enlarged in the
1990s – that the Al-
liance remains credi-
ble. So the Ukraine
crisis is a challenge
to the international
order, and we
should respond to it
as part of our
NATO Alliance.”
Th i s ve ry
clearly sums up the
setting for the dis-
cussion of NATO’s
future role following
the withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
US Pivot/Rebalance to Asia-Pacific
Since 2012, a major priority for the Obama-
administration has been to commit more efforts, both
diplomatically, economically and militarily to the Asia-
Pacific region in order to counter the declining US pres-
ence in the region for the previous decade. This ambition
of rebalancing towards this strategically important region
was reaffirmed in the 2014 version of the US Department
of Defense’s “Quadrennial Defense Review”, emphasizing
the deep desire of the Obama-administration to re-
balance, as well as the longer-term strategic interest for
the United States in carrying out this strategy. Since
2001, the United States has been unable to commit re-
sources to the Asia-Pacific region, proportional to the
region’s growing strategic importance. The Obama-
administration’s “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific is an effort
to reverse this tendency.
This is the third time an American administration
has attempted to increase strategic focus on the Asia-
Pacific region since the end of the Cold War, however,
earlier attempts have been hindered by unforeseen inter-
national events, requiring US attention. These were
events like the civil wars in the Balkans in the 1990s
which moved the Clinton-administration away from
the Asia-Pacific, and the terrorist attacks on September
11 2001 which moved the Bush-administration’s atten-
tion to the Middle
East. The fact that
it is the third at-
tempt by the Unit-
ed States in 20
years, means that it
is something which
has a very high pri-
ority for the United
States, and some-
thing to which the
European Allies
will have to get
used to.
To achieve this
ambition of a more
balanced foreign
policy which also focuses on the Asia-Pacific, the
Obama-administration has led a very withdrawn for-
eign policy, making great efforts to avoid becoming
engaged in potentially new and long-term military
commitments, such as Libya or Syria. This has been
done in order to avoid US foreign policy from once
again being diverted by unforeseen global events be-
yond the control of the United States.
For the European Allies, this means a smaller
room to maneuver, as it is given beforehand that the
United States is very unlikely to commit forces in tra-
ditional proportions, to any mission which might turn
into a long-term stability operation. The fact that the
United States is unlikely to commit forces on the usual
scale means that a military option will rest in large part
on the European Allies, which in turn makes a military
option less likely.
The withdrawn US foreign policy has also meant
that the United States has been more reluctant to com-
mit forces to out of area missions such as Mali. There-
fore the European Allies have to commit more to in-
ternational missions, in order to compensate for de-
creased US contribution of forces.
In all, the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific gives
The US continues to emphasize its “rebalance” towards the Asia-
Pacific. The European Allies will have to find a way to adapt to this fact.
(Photo: Washington Post)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 4
far less diplomatic room to maneuver as the major
ally is unlikely to commit military resources, as
well as requires a greater role from the European
Allies, prompting a revision of the transatlantic
relationship when it comes to commitment of
military forces to any future missions.
Russian Behavior Towards Eastern Europe
Russian behavior in the early part of 2014,
has shown that the changing world order also has
effects on the immediate European perimeter.
The status of the United States as the world’s
leading super power is being challenged these
years, and Russian behavior towards Ukraine, is
part of this tendency.
The situation has prompted a reassurance
from the Obama-administration to its European
Allies, that the United States is committed to hon-
oring its treaty obligations under the NATO Pact.
This has also been shown in the form of increased
numbers of US military aircraft sent to the Baltics,
as well as increased commitment of US personnel
to a joint exercise in Po-
land.
The challenge for
both the European Allies
and the United States is to
find a common way to con-
front Russian behavior in
the region. The options, however, are very lim-
ited. As a military option is off the table to
reestablish Ukraine’s territory.
While the crisis in the Ukraine has meant a
confirmation of US commitment to the NATO
Alliance, it does also present a challenge in that it
goes to the center of the existential question that
the NATO Alliance is asking itself at the moment.
No one doubts that NATO continues to be im-
portant for the transatlantic relationship - that is
not the existential question. The question is what
the role of NATO should be in the future. Should
it be primarily focused on the territorial integrity
of the NATO Members, its traditional Cold War
role, or should it continue to focus on out-of-area
missions like the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan and the counter-
piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of
Aden.
There is, however, one major challenge which
is currently defining the strategic debates on both
sides of the Atlantic - declining defense budgets.
Declining Defense Budgets on Both Sides of
the Atlantic
As a consequence of the ongoing financial cri-
sis, defense budgets have become the target of in-
creased attention and cuts. This tendency has been
prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic.
The reasoning behind major parts of the de-
fense cuts in many European countries has been that
with the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan the
nations can get a “peace dividend”. This means mov-
ing money from defense budgets to other budgets (or
remove them altogether), because the money is no
longer needed to sustain the mission in Afghanistan.
The decline in European defense budgets is
clear when looking at global
tendencies in defense budgets. In
2013, defense budgets in Europe
decreased, and for the first time
“Asia and Australasia” have over-
taken the position as the world’s
second biggest spenders, behind
the United States. These num-
bers are subject to debate of how one defines the geo-
graphic limits of Europe, as well as what is counted
under defense expenditures. However, the tendency
in later years has been a decrease in European defense
budgets. As Olivier de France says in a Brief Issue
from the European Union Institute for Security Stud-
ies: “Not unlike France in 1939, Europe in 2014 is
confronted with a ‘growing gap between security de-
mand and capability supply,’ as the IISS recently put
it.”
The argument on the American side of the At-
lantic has not only focused on the end of the mission
in Afghanistan, but the broader ending of the post-
9/11 conflicts. This is the culmination of the Obama-
administration’s efforts to bring the United States out
Europe in 2014 is confronted with a gap between security demand and ca-
pability to supply.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 5
of the constant state of war in which the country has
found itself since 2001. By ending the post-9/11 con-
flicts, the Obama-administration’s goal is to focus on
domestic issues,
both politically and
financially.
The imple-
mentation of the
proposed budget
cuts will mean a
decreased US Ar-
my, and a greater
focus on the US
Navy and Air Force,
the two branches
most relevant to the
US rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific region.
This development
has for instance
shown itself through the withdrawal of the permanent
US Army presence in Europe.
The US defense budget can potentially be hit
harder than the current level of cuts, if
“Sequestration” returns for the fiscal year of 2016.
“Sequestration” has been put on hold for 2014 and
2015 as part of a budget agreement made in late 2013
in the US Congress.
This could mean further reductions in the size
of the US Army and Marine Corps, as well as have a
more limited impact on the US Navy and Air Force.
This could further limit the foreign policy options on
which the US administration can rely.
The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,
declining defense budgets, combined with a declining
political will in the United States, are resulting in the
more withdrawn US foreign policy observed in these
years. The trend of declining defense budgets on both
sides of the Atlantic, means a strain on the transatlan-
tic relationship.
Potential Strain on the Transatlantic Relation-
ship
The declining defense budgets go to the center
of the discussion of burden sharing between the Euro-
pean Allies and the United States. For years, the Unit-
ed States has called on European countries to contrib-
ute more to their common defense. This request has
been intensified due
to the US budget
cuts.
As European
Allies are also cutting
defense budgets, it
becomes difficult for
the Europeans to
meet the US request.
This means that Eu-
ropean Allies are una-
ble to increase their
contribution to the
NATO budgets, as
well as being unable
to increase their con-
tributions to interna-
tional missions or to possible future missions that might
arise.
As this debate has increased in recent years,
many American politicians have increasingly become
weary of the European Allies and their contributions to
common defense. Such weariness is potentially danger-
ous, as it can strain the transatlantic relationship, and
potentially provoke a decline in US contribution to the
NATO Alliance. This is an absolute worst-case scenar-
io, but is a threat which must be considered by NATO
members and partners.
This could mean further reductions in the size of
the US Army and Marine Corps, as well as have a more
limited impact on the US Navy and Air Force. This
could further limit the foreign policy options on which
the US administration can rely on.
The US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, de-
clining defense budgets, combined with a declining
political will in the United States, are resulting in the
more withdrawn US foreign policy observed in these
years. The trend of declining defense budgets on both
sides of the Atlantic means a strain on the transatlantic
relationship.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called on European Allies
in 2011 to contribute more to the common defense or face an uncertain
future for European security. (Photo: StarMedia)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 6
the burden-sharing falling on the European Allies will
be for them to address the “growing gap between secu-
rity demand and capability supply”, mentioned before.
If the European Allies can address this issue, it will help
them in both keeping the United States engaged as well
as secure a larger role for the European nations in the
new world order which is forming these years, as a re-
sult of a withdrawing United States, decreased defense
budgets in the West,
as well as rising (or
reemerging) powers
around the world
claiming their spot at
the head of interna-
tional relations.
How the Euro-
pean Allies handle the
changing security
challenges will poten-
tially define the future
of the transatlantic
relationship. The re-
definition of this rela-
tionship will in turn
be closely linked to
the definition of
NATO’s future role
post-2014.
About the author
Philip Chr. Ulrich holds an M.A. in American Stud-
ies from the University of Southern Denmark. He ana-
lyzes American foreign and defense policy for the Dan-
ish website Kongressen.com. He has previously
worked as head of section at the Royal Danish Defence
College, where he published several briefs on US de-
fense and foreign policy. He has also completed an in-
ternship at the Lessons Learned / Development Section
at the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
in Enschede, the Netherlands.
A Need for Europe to Step Up to the Plate
The withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghani-
stan has prompted this need to redefine NATO’s fu-
ture mission and consequently might alter the transat-
lantic relationship. What will impact the way forward
for the transatlantic relationship will be the declining
defense budgets, the US rebalance to Asia-Pacific, as
well as the need to figure out a way to stand united
against Russia’s
behavior in East-
ern Europe.
T h e s e
factors will re-
quire the Euro-
pean Allies to
take on a greater
role in the trans-
atlantic relation-
ship. The most
pressing and
influential of
these factors is
the declining
budgets, as they
influence the
political will to
commi t re -
sources to po-
tential missions, as well as the resources which can be
committed in case a mission is decided upon.
Central to defining the transatlantic relation-
ship for the post-Afghanistan period will be the issue
of burden-sharing. The United States is reprioritizing
its foreign policy to adapt to fit the budgetary situa-
tion and a strategic need to focus on the Asia-Pacific.
This means an opportunity, as well as a need, for the
European Allies to take on greater responsibility in
the Alliance. Whether this can be done is very much
dependent on how the Allies handle the ongoing de-
fense cuts, and how the political as well as public will,
develop in regards to committing military forces to
international missions.
The clear issue in regards to a greater part of
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry,
Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's Foreign Minister Fumio Ki-
shida and Japan's Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera pose for photos in
Tokyo on October 3, 2013.(Photo: Koji Sasahara/Courtesy Reuters)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 7
By Nathan Turregano
W ith growing threats on the Eastern bor-
der of Europe and with extremism in the
Arab World on the rise, the Transatlan-
tic Bond is more crucial than ever. This relationship
among the North Atlantic countries acts as one of the
strongest alliances in the free world. This relationship has
existed since the First World War and has had its fair
share of prosperity along with its times of peril. These
times of strife over the years have led to an unfortunate
but natural fading of trust among the Allies. Lack of ac-
tion from NATO in conflicts has caused ripples in the
security community and among its member states. The
United States’ shift towards Asia has made its investment
of military and economic entities in the European region
decline in recent decades. These breaks in trust across the
Atlantic need to be repaired in order for the region to
present a strong, cooperative, and
cohesive West. In each of these sec-
tors there are legislative directives
and approaches that need to be or
are currently being implemented.
Within the political aspect of the
situation, NATO reassurance is the
key to promoting a united front of
upholding Article 5 and the integrity of the Alliance. The
military cohesion comes with an increase in joint training
exercises among countries contributing troops to NATO.
Within the economic field, the adoption of the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agree-
ment is the key to further linking North America and Eu-
rope. These will solidify the Transatlantic bond for years
to come and help it face adversaries on all fronts.
NATO Reassurance as Political Solidification
The strength of the Transatlantic Bond in the com-
ing months and years will be based on the strength of the
basic values of NATO and how they stand in its member
nations, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
After Russia’s actions towards Ukraine, NATO’s foun-
dation of cooperative defense has once again become
relevant, but long out of practice. After the Cold War
NATO strayed from this keystone in the Alliance and
began other security and humanitarian measures in or-
der to maintain relevance within the modern world.
With its ventures outside of Europe and its lack of re-
sponse in the Russo-Georgian conflict, the cohesion of
the Alliance has come into question further. This re-
turn to the core of the Alliance will take some read-
justment among the organization, which begins with
reassurance of member states.
With Russia challenging the European continent
and the United States with its growing military and
economic power, NATO must be able to uphold Arti-
cle 5 at any cost. Countries in Eastern Europe such as
Moldova and Lithuania are suspected to be in Russia’s
line of sight for future cam-
paigns. NATO must be able, if
a member state is attacked, to
rally all member states to come
to assistance militarily in the
prevention of Russian advance-
ment into Europe or its pe-
riphery.
The reassurance must encompass multiple stra-
tegic policy areas, the first being a more in depth and
comprehensive crisis management plan for each and
every member state. Individual contingency plans must
be drafted, for each member state, that address the
possibility of future aggression within a member state
of NATO. These plans show the nations that NATO
officials and military personnel can work together co-
hesively in order to enact the security force of NATO.
Probably the most crucial element of reassur-
ance that plays into the strengthening of the Transat-
lantic Bond is the further engagement and cooperation
Transatlantic Bond: Strength in Years to Come
The strength of the Transatlantic Bond in the coming months and years will be based on the strength of the basic values of NATO and how they stand
in its member nations.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 8
among international organizations such as the EU
and the UN, along with national governments
themselves. NATO itself cannot handle the politi-
cal and economic burden of the crises completely
on its own. Defense budgets on both sides of the
Atlantic are declining while the forces needed in
Eastern Europe are increasing in demand. With
the partnership of NATO and the European Un-
ion, the EU plays an important role of evaluating
the economic and political impact of Russia’s ac-
tions within Europe. The partnership can act as a
seamless continuum in order to combat threats of
both military and non-military nature. The new
member states’ relationship with NATO is where
improvements need to be made in order to im-
prove the overall strength of the Alliance. Instead
of asking for military assistance from older or
more Western member states, these new mem-
bers need to
secure their
own military
reforms.
T h e s e
r e a s s u r a n c e
policies will
impact the
strength of the
Transatlantic
Bond in multi-
ple ways. The
first being the
r e e s t a b l i s h -
ment of the
true political
nature of cooperative defense. Instead of individual
states coming up with personal agendas and securi-
ty policies, it gives a common contingency plan
that brings each member state closer and more
interdependent upon one another. The second is
an increase in cooperation among non-NATO or-
ganizations, which increases support in future po-
litical and operational endeavors. These partner-
ships will also be beneficial in solidifying cohesion
among member states’ national governments with
increased coordination and cooperation on a political
level rather than a security one. Reassurance is the
key to future political cooperation of the Alliance and
the Transatlantic Bond as a political entity.
Military Cohesion
The military acts as the backbone of the policy
enacted by NATO and therefore must be cohesive and
rapidly deployable. Although defense spending on
both sides of the Atlantic are declining, it is crucial to
have operational presence in at risk areas and member
nations. This would include the continuation of mili-
tary exercises and joint training in order to further the
cohesion among different NATO military factions.
Also, the continued surveillance and intelligence gath-
ering in Central and Eastern Europe with the contin-
ued operational assistance of both equipment and
troops to Central and Eastern Europe as further de-
terrence.
2014 marks a major shift in NATO policy.
First and foremost, it
marks the cease of
major operations with-
in Afghanistan. This
withdrawal of a sizable
number of NATO
troops has a much
more sizable impact on
the strength of the
Transatlantic Bond in
terms of member
states’ military cohe-
sion. Operations in
Afghanistan were not
only beneficial to the
Afghan people and the country as a whole, but also
acted as an outlet for NATO member militaries to
work together at an operational capability level on a
day to day basis. This interaction increased the trust
and bond between NATO military entities that should
exist without the need of major operations such as
Afghanistan. Since the Alliance is withdrawing a ma-
jority of the troops from this operation and switching
to operation Resolute Support, it is feared that the
cohesion between militaries will fade away and lead to
Joint Training Exercises of the NATO Allies
(Photo: Allied Command Operations)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 9
complications further down the road.
These complications between militaries have
potential to tear at the very seams of NATO and its
cooperative security agenda and thus the Transatlantic
Bond as a whole. In future operations, military enti-
ties from separate countries will be in lack of informal
and formal information and intelligence sharing,
knowledge and trust of each others’ capabilities as a
military force, and potential distrust between person-
nel. These factors are a recipe for disaster if NATO is
needed to make future military operations requiring
multiple member armies. This is the main concern in
regards to the Russian
threat to the West and
upholding Article 5.
The solution to this
issue can be found in the
increase of joint training
exercises across Europe.
These exercises will pro-
vide a way for militaries
to work together in a non
lethal environment in or-
der to establish trust in
one another, working
effectively together in the
future. Operations such
as Steadfast Javelin are especially effective in light of
recent events. Namely, Steadfast Javelin allowed for
more major powers to establish a relationship with
smaller militaries, which in this case it were the Esto-
nians. It is critical for major super powers to enhance
their operational capabilities with smaller nations on
the eastern border of Europe. The cooperation be-
tween major military superpowers happens on a day
to day basis in bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations
outside of NATO. Thus, the focus should be shifted
towards joint exercises that include major NATO
forces with a smaller less powerful NATO military,
especially in the Eastern nations. These operations
will show major military support for Article 5 in the
Eastern member states as well as show that major mil-
itary entities are capable of acting as a further deter-
rence to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.
Further Economic Ties
The Transatlantic Bond spreads beyond just
NATO and collective military capabilities. The econ-
omy plays a large role in the strength among nations
across the North Atlantic. The European Union has
progressed Europe by leaps and bounds as a single
economic entity, thus boosting the economies of each
and every member state. Europe now competes with
China and the United States in terms of level of eco-
nomic output compared to each individual European
state competing individually against major superpow-
ers. The Transatlantic Bond needs strong economic
ties in order to main-
tain its beneficial and
close relationship,
especially the case
between the US and
Europe. With the
recent Transatlantic
Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP)
agreement, the eco-
nomic ties across the
ocean will be even
greater than before.
TTIP encom-
passes multiple re-
forms in trade between Europe and the Untied States.
First and foremost, it seeks to remove trade barriers
in a wide range of economic sectors in efforts to make
it easier to buy and sell goods between the EU and the
US. In addition to the elimination of tariff barriers,
TTIP aims to tackle issues associated with customs
barriers, which include technical regulations, stand-
ards and approval procedures. It claims that these bar-
riers usually mean extra time and costs to buyers and
sellers who participate in both the US and the Europe-
an markets. Another reason TTIP seeks to reform
regulatory policies is because closer relations with the
US would make regulation more effective, by only
taking the best ideas from both laws and implement-
ing them as a common policy, improving cohesion
across the pond furthering the already large economic
and political implications of this agreement.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
(Photo: NATO International)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 10
TTIP is in its 6th round of negotiations be-
tween the EU and the US. Although the negotiations
are working towards producing an effective and bene-
ficial agreement for both parties, the negative effects
of TTIP are difficult to work around. The looming
problem associated with TTIP is how this regional
trade agreement will affect global trade. First and
foremost, it will make integration of current US and
EU trading partners even more difficult than before.
This exclusive agreement will, by association, in-
crease the regulatory standards of countries such as
Mexico and Turkey in order for their products to be
accepted into the TTIP market. Another global impli-
cation of TTIP is that it appears as an act of solidarity
within the West. In a geopolitical scheme, China feels
being the direct target of TTIP and that this economic
bond is exclusively to rival it as an upcoming global
economic powerhouse. This is, of course, dispelled by
the West who claims that this is purely for the growth
of the European and US economies through less regu-
lated trade.
The Transatlantic Bond as a whole will greatly
be affected by this trade partnership. For an obvious
reason, it will bring the North Atlantic together as a
whole through increasing cohesion of regulatory and
tariff policies, forcing cooperation of policy makers
from both sides of the sea. The current NATO Secre-
tary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has stated in the
past that he believes TTIP is critical to creating an
“Integrated Transatlantic Community”. The Transat-
lantic Bond is one of the most important transnational
relationships in the free world with trade being the
lifeblood. Anything to boost the solidarity and effi-
ciency will lead to a bolstering in all aspects of the
relationship, including security and political agendas.
Concluding Thoughts
NATO, of course, as a transatlantic organiza-
tion, is obviously in favor of strengthening the Trans-
atlantic Bond. Probably one of the biggest supporters
of closer ties is the NATO Secretary General himself
who has pushed and supported a strong transatlantic
community throughout his entire political career. In
the recent “Strengthening the Transatlantic Bond”
conference, he made it clear what needs to be done in
order to further bolster relations across the Atlantic.
He expressed his support for the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership and its key role in
strengthening the economic ties of North America
and Europe. He addressed how NATO itself needs to
be strengthened in order to accomplish closer ties
across the Atlantic. He also stressed the importance of
public support to Transatlantic Bond in order to fur-
ther progress policy and establish security for future
generations. This led him to discussing the im-
portance of incorporating young leaders and profes-
sionals in research and policy ideas. This will lead to
the future ideas and outlook of the Alliance and how
its role and activities will affect the future of regional
security and the Transatlantic Bond.
Secretary General Rasmussen understands that
NATO plays a critical role in the Transatlantic Bond
but also that this is not the core of the relationship.
With the ongoing reassurance, the security agenda at
a political level will present a cooperative defense that
has not been seen since the founding of NATO in
1949. This cooperative security will have some of the
most integrated and cohesive troops at its disposal in
case of any kind of Article 5 emergencies. All of these
political and military structures will be backed by the
solid TTIP agreement allowing for more uniformity
in the trade across the North Atlantic. The Transat-
lantic Bond in the coming years will be stronger than
ever with the ability to combat any form of threats
whether it is a nation state, radical political agenda or
an economic crisis.
About the author
Nathan Turregano is a BA student at the American
University in Washington D.C., studying Internation-
al Relations and Arabic. He is currently a Program
Assistant at the Atlantic Treaty Association Secretariat
in Brussels, Belgium. He will be studying Intensive
Arabic in Amman, Jordan, for the next two collegiate
semesters.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 7 11
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