YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07

- Flora Pidoux

Located at the crossroad between

Europe , Russia and the Middle East, and in

between the Caspian and the Black Sea, the

Caucasus is in a very advantageous location,

which has encouraged regional powers from

both the East and the West to influence it.

Traditionally in Russia’s sphere of influence,

Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are today

split between two worlds. To the West,

NATO offers stability and development,

while Moscow appeals to their historical

connection.

Political instability and regional tensions

make this region unstable as well as very

heterogeneous. Each of the countries seem

to have built their own models of

development and political systems. Borders

are also contested in the regions, as

illustrated by the two frozen conflicts of

Nagorno Karabakh between Azerbaijan and

Armenia, and the secessionist regions of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

This issue explores the complexity of the

region: the first article focuses on the frozen

conflicts; the second on Georgia’s halted

access to the Alliance despite strong

commitment; the third one focuses on the

implications of the region for Europe’s

energy security.

NATO & the South Caucasus

Volume 6 - Issue 07 July 2016

Contents:

The South Caucasus’s Still Frozen Conflits

Mr. Xavier Follebouckt explores the frozen conflicts of the region and how

they are utilized by Moscow to prevent the countries from joining NATO.

Welcoming a Caucasian Guest to the Alliance?

Mr. Roger Hilton focuses on Georgia, which has widely contributed to

NATO’s operations and abided to its policies but whose accession to

membership to the Alliance remains uncertain due to political constraints.

Energy Security in the South Caucasus

Ms. Kamilla Solieva analyzes the importance of the South Caucasus for

Europe’s energy security in times of increasing tensions with their traditional

energy provider, Russia

Forer NATO Secrretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during a visit to the South Caucasus in September 2013 (Photo:NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 2

populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh rose up against

the central authorities in Baku with the support of

neighbouring Armenia. In all three cases, the violent

wars which erupted in 1991-1992 ended with the

victory of the separatist forces. However, the military

successes were not followed by a political victory: the

separatists fought for their independence which was

never recognized by the international community.

Since then, the secessionist regions have been stuck in a

diplomatic limbo, with three unrecognized de facto

states maintaining their hold on the contested

territories with Russia’s direct or indirect support. In

2008, Russia’s victory over Georgia during the August

War confirmed its regional hegemony and illustrated

the tools at its disposal to forcefully ensure a favourable

status quo.

For the past 25 years, these “frozen” conflicts have

contributed to the instability of an already fragile

region. The separatist issues in the South Caucasus

were, unlike the conflict in Ukraine, not created by

Russia – or the USSR at the time – but have been

systematically exploited as tools of its foreign policy to

maximise its influence on a strategic region.

Russia’s Role in the South Caucasus

Since the aftermath of the separatist wars, in the

early 1990s, Russia has imposed itself as the principal

mediator in the region, but the lack of progress over

the past two decades belies Russia’s professed claim to

be actively seeking a return to peace. Indeed, the

current status quo is clearly beneficial to Russia’s

interests, preserving an economic and military sphere

The South Caucasus’s Still Frozen Conflicts

By Xavier Follebouckt

T he conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s role

in its inception has shed a new light on

an old issue: the frozen conflicts of the

South Caucasus. Indeed, Russia seems to be applying

to the Donbas the lessons it has learned from more

than twenty years of meddling in the secessionist

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and,

to a lesser extent, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan

(and, for that matter, Transnistria in Moldova).

Moscow’s policy in Ukraine has been defined based on

its past experience in the South Caucasus. The

Kremlin’s strategy aims at creating or exploiting

conflict situations, freezing the violence and

maintaining the status quo in order to preserve its

influence and leverage on the entire region at a lesser

material and diplomatic cost. The South Caucasus is a

strategic region for Russia: it is a passageway to the

Middle East, as well as an important energy transit hub

and a buffer zone to protect its vulnerable southern

flank. Therefore, in the South Caucasus as in Ukraine

and Moldova, Russia intends to safeguard its interests

across its borders by keeping foreign influence, and

especially NATO’s, out of its coveted sphere of

influence.

“Frozen” Conflicts

The disputes in the South Caucasus erupted in the

early 1990s, as the Soviet Union was breaking down.

In Georgia, the formerly autonomous regions of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia both declared

independence and took up arms to counter any

reaction from Tbilisi. In Azerbaijan, the Armenian-

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 3

of influence while preventing any of the South Caucasian

states from looking West.

This support is also visible at the economic level:

Russia directly subsidizes the de facto states. After the

August 2008 war in Georgia, Russia has been the sole

guarantor of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s survival,

increasing its hold on all the sectors of their economic

and political life. Russia has also deployed thousands of

troops in the region – under the guise of peacekeepers

until 2008 but without pretence since then. The Russo-

Georgian war of August 2008

was the most direct proof of

Russia’s continued interest in

Georgia’s frozen conflicts

and of its intent to

unilaterally control their

evolution. That Georgia fired

the first shot on August 7,

2008, is not disputed

anymore but Russia holds a

major responsibility in the war nevertheless, having

provoked its Southern neighbour for many months and

having patiently waited for Georgia to make a mistake in

order to react.

The August War as a Turning-Point

The crisis was spurred on by the NATO Summit in

Bucharest, in April 2008. Then, as now, Georgia and

Ukraine were both hoping to be welcomed into a

Membership Action Plan (MAP), signalling their

irreversible progress towards the Atlantic Alliance and

the West. The main obstacle to these countries’

accession was Russia, which deems NATO enlargement

towards its borders to be a grave threat to its national

security. The Bucharest Summit did not in fact decide on

the matter of Georgia’s MAP but the final declaration

stressed the Alliance’s support to Ukraine and Georgia,

promising them a “direct way to membership” as the

next step. As a result, Georgia felt emboldened to try

and resolve the frozen conflicts by any means as a

prerequisite to its future NATO membership, while

Russia increased its military presence in Abkhazia and

South Ossetia to prevent any change to the status quo.

On August 7, after a several tense months, Georgian

troops launched an armed assault on South Ossetia to try

and “restore constitutional order” in the region. Russia

immediately reacted by sending troops into South

Ossetia and Abkhazia in order to

secure the territories and “enforce

peace”. The Russian counterattack

had been well prepared and

proved irresistible, leading to a

complete occupation of the

separatist territories and a

favourable ceasefire, followed by

Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia

and South Ossetia as independent

states.

The war in Georgia made a peaceful solution to the

separatist disputes even less likely. With Russia now in

firm military control of the enclaves – and increasing its

territorial hold on Georgia year after year – it can

maintain its influence on the strategic South Caucasus

and prevent a future NATO enlargement to Georgia.

Indeed, ever since the Alliance’s 2008 promise, Georgia

has deepened its cooperation with the organisation and

come ever closer to meeting NATO standards without

being allowed to join its ranks. The August war was thus

instrumental in meeting one of Russia’s main foreign

policy objectives: to stop the Alliance from expanding

further eastwards. In 2008 in Georgia, as in 2014 in

Ukraine, Russia did not shy away from using military

means to further its aims, to forcefully maintain or

restore its influence, and to weaken NATO’s resolve.

Map showing the disputed areas near Russia in red (Image:

Laris Karklis The Washington Post)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 4

Russia’s Implication towards Nagorno-

Karabakh

In Armenia as well, Russia’s influence is felt.

Yerevan, hoping for a favourable outcome to the

Nagorno-Karabakh issue and seeking protection

against a potential Azerbaijani offensive, clearly aligns

itself with Moscow. The country is a member of the

Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military

alliance led by Russia, and currently hosts several

Russian military bases and more than 5000 Russian

troops by its border with Turkey. Armenia is also a

major recipient of Russian military supplies, which

has intensified the arms race with Azerbaijan. In 2010,

Russia and Armenia signed a military cooperation

agreement that confirmed their alliance and deepened

Yerevan’s dependence on Russian arms. More

recently, in December 2015, after Turkey downed a

Russian Su-24 near Syria, Russia and Armenia signed

an agreement to create a joint air defence system. In

the wake of the Russo-Turkish clash, Moscow

increased its military presence in Armenia and staged

a massive military exercise in February 2016 to test its

troops’ combat readiness next door to an important

NATO ally. The importance of Russia’s alliance for

Armenia and its link to the frozen conflict of Nagorno

-Karabakh is evident in Yerevan’s surprise decision, in

September 2013, to forgo an Association Agreement

with the EU, preferring instead to join the Russian-

led Eurasian Economic Union. This move was, at the

time, widely criticized inside Armenia as bowing to

Russian pressures. Indeed, before this decision,

Moscow had hinted at the possibility of increasing

arms sales to Azerbaijan if Armenia decided to stray

from its principal ally. Thus, security considerations

and the continuing state of war are a central issue in

Armenia’s continuing alignment with Russia. The

status quo over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is thus

beneficial to Russia, wishing to increase its influence

over Armenia and Azerbaijan as long as peace remains

elusive.

The recent outbreak of violence along the ceasefire

line in Nagorno-Karabakh in March left more than 60

people dead and acted as a reminder of the intrinsically

volatile nature of this long “frozen” conflict. Since the

war ended in 1994, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have

been stockpiling arms and reinforcing their armies to

prepare for the next showdown. Azerbaijan, in

particular, aided by its oil revenue, has increased its

defence spending ten-fold over the last decade and

seems to regard the military option as its only solution

to recovering the separatist enclave. Likewise, Armenia

is relying on its armed forces – though with more

limited resources – as well as on Russia’s military

presence as a trump card in a potential war with Baku.

Prospects for peace in Karabakh seem dim as long as

both parties stake their success on military force and can

rely on outside support, Russia for Armenia and Turkey

for Azerbaijan. The interplay of foreign actors serves to

highlight the potential far-ranging consequences of a

new outbreak of violence in the Caucasus. Should a war

erupt between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it could very

easily, by the logic of the alliances at play, involve a

military confrontation between Russia and Turkey, a

member of NATO. This scenario is growing likelier

with the increasing tension in Russo-Turkish relations

and the continuing arms build-up in the region. Faced

with such a grim outlook, it is important for NATO to

pay a closer look to this long-forgotten but still very

much alive conflict on its southeast borders.

NATO’s Borderlands

NATO has been only marginally invested in the issue

of the South Caucasus’ frozen conflicts. Officially,

NATO has no direct stake in the problem, merely

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 5

urging the parties to find a solution and to bring peace

back to a strategic region. The Alliance also cannot take

sides on these issues and officially supports the

territorial integrity of the countries of the South

Caucasus. Despite this limited implication, the

Caucasian countries themselves are keen to enlist the

support of the Alliance to make progress on these

conflict issues. Georgia, in particular, has been looking

westwards for help in dealing with its separatist

disputes and its troubled relationship with Russia.

However, it is no closer to membership than it was 8

years ago, before the August war, despite a strong

presence in NATO operations and solid credentials in

meeting the Alliance’s military and political standards.

NATO’s already limited partnership with Armenia

looks set to remain restricted as long as tensions

between Russia and the West continue, as they likely

will. As for Azerbaijan relations with NATO,

cooperation should endure but it will be hard to see it

as an avenue towards peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This, however, does not mean that NATO should stay

on the side-lines on the issue of the frozen conflicts.

Considering their proximity to the Alliance’s borders

and the strategic nature of the region involved, NATO

should keep a close eye on developments in the South

Caucasus. In addition, Russia has shown that it uses the

frozen conflicts as tools in its ambition to carve up

spheres of influence in the Caucasus, in Moldova and,

now, in Ukraine. These disputes are useful weapons for

the Kremlin to push NATO away from its borders and

to weaken its cohesion. Even though the frozen

conflicts of the South Caucasus have been deadlocked

for 25 years, their continued existence is thus an

important issue for NATO and for the European

security architecture as a whole.

Xavier Follebouckt is a Research Fellow at the Baillet

Latour Chair on EU-Russia relations at the Université

catholique de Louvain, in Belgium. His research focuses

on Russia’s foreign policy and on the EU-Russia

partnership. He is currently preparing a PhD on the

European Parliament’s position towards Russia.

Cecire, Michael; “NATO’s Endless Caucasian Courtship”, Foreign Policy, 24 September 2015 [Available at:] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/24/natos-endless-caucasian-courtship/

Ereli, Adam; “Putin's Newest Satellite State”, Forbes, 24 February 2016 [Available at:] http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/02/24/putins-newest-satellite-state/#63c5edd63549

Follebouckt, Xavier; Les conflits gelés de l’espace postsoviétique,

PUL, 2012

“Medvedev: August War Stopped Georgia's NATO

Membership”, Civil.ge, 21 November 2011 [Available at:]

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24168

NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration”, 3 April 2008

[Available at:] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_8443.htm

Orttung, Robert and Walker, Christopher; “Putin’s Frozen

Conflicts”, Foreign Policy, 13 February 2015 [Available at:]

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-

conflicts/

Seputyte, Milda and Ummelas, Ott; “Oil Riches Help

Azerbaijan Outgun Armenia in Military Spending”, Bloomberg

News, 6 April 2016 [Available at:] http://

www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/oil-riches-

help-azerbaijan-outgun-armenia-in-military-spending

Shiriyev, Zaur; “NATO’s South Caucasus paradigm: beyond

2014”, in The South Caucasus. Between integration and fragmentation,

EPC, May 2015 [Available at:] http://www.epc.eu/

documents/uploads/pub_5598_the_south_caucasus_-

_low_res.pdf

Zasztowt, Konrad; “The South Caucasus in the Shadow of the

Russian-Turkish Crisis”, PISM Bulletin, n°14(864), 11 February

2016 [Available at:] http://www.pism.pl/publications/

bulletin/no-14-864#

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 6

By Roger Hilton

T here is a Georgian proverb that states “A

guest is a gift from God”. Located in the

mountainous southern Caucasus, Georgia is a

nascent democracy that has actively been looking for

opportunities to intensify bilateral relations and vying for

NATO membership since 2003. Today, when gauging the

geopolitical situation of the Caucasus, the Alliance would

do well to reflect on the merits of this proverb. While the

Caucasus has a familiarity with volatility, the resurgence of

hostile activities is an unwelcomed advent. From the

deterioration of regional political dialogue to miscreant

Russian foreign policy, NATO’s ability to safeguard its

interests and project

stability in the Caucasus

a r e b e i n g t e s t e d .

Underlining this barrage

of challenges, is its adverse

impact on a fragile

regional and global

security architecture that could produce a cascade of

unintended escalation. Nowhere is this more evident than

with the risk of spillover effects from the resurgence of the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Consequently, there is little to

suggest that the region will soon return to a calmer state in

the near future. Against this backdrop the Alliance must

revisit its strategic priorities in the Caucasus and attempt to

restore its influence in order to deescalate the potentially

combustible security situation; welcoming Georgia into the

Alliance could do just that.

Unwelcomed Western Influence

While Russia has traditionally held a monopoly of

influence on the region, NATO has made significant inroads

since the end of the Cold War. Through a combination of

political outreach and Individual Partnership Action Plans

(IPAP), the Alliance has deepened practical cooperation with

the region and now assumes a functional dialogue with

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Despite its defensive

nature, the Alliance’s interest in the region has been received

with great skepticism by the Russian security apparatus

perceiving it as an attempt to ferment political change from

abroad. The crux of the disaccord is best understood when

considering the dichotomy of NATO’s “Open Door Policy”

and Russia’s “Near Abroad” concept, which is a foundational

element of Russia’s foreign policy to dominate its perimeter

and discourage actions of states that contradict their national

interests.

Consequently, Russia

perceived the potential

enlargement of NATO in

the Caucuses as a

premeditated attempt to

reduce their strategic

depth and dilute their historic influence. This toxic rhetoric

has been matched by arms and expressed through military

exercises being held both in the North and South Caucuses.

Underlining this aggressive bravado is the Kremlin’s desire

to return the South Caucuses states to their Soviet Union

vassal status.

Georgia as a NATO Linchpin

Despite such bellicose public declarations, the Alliance

must continue to make contributions to the region in order

to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

the emergence of failed states. At the heart of this policy is

Georgia who has been a cemented ally since the Rose

Revolution of 2003. Their commitment to join is

unparalleled, with Tbilisi taking part in both civilian and

military operations under NATO auspices. None of which is

Welcoming a Caucasian Guest to the Alliance?

The Alliance must revisit its strategic priorities in the

Caucasus and attempt to restore its influence in order to

deescalate the potentially combustible security

situation; welcoming Georgia into the Alliance could do

just that.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 7

more impressive than their deployment of troops without

caveats to Afghanistan as part of the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF). Since 2010, Tbilisi has deployed

12,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, making it the second biggest

contributor after America. Despite not being a NATO

member, it has consistently met the two percent threshold for

defense spending, of which only five members can attest to.

Caucasus Troika

Despite their military and political reforms, Georgia’s

membership prospects are inextricably linked to the

occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The frequent bouts

of escalation when deemed appropriate by the Kremlin are

designed to make Georgia’s membership incompatible with

NATO integration. In contrast, Armenia, for the foreseeable

future, looks to remain permanently under the thumb of the

Kremlin. Although Yerevan has entered into various NATO

programs including the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and is a

member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),

their preference towards Russia will endure as long as it

continues to act as its ultimate

guarantor of security.

Of the South Caucus states

none is more split towards

NATO than Azerbaijan. Baku

has had the unenviable task of

balancing competing interest

from the West and East, and

have done their best to chart an

independent foreign policy

through its chameleon charm.

Any assessment of Azerbaijan

would be incomplete without

mentioning the volatile situation in Nagorno Karabakh which

continues to dangerously straddle the line of a full armed

conflict. Despite possessing overwhelmingly military

superiority, the installment of Russia Spetsnaz forces in

Armenia acts as an mechanism to deter a full on recapturing

operation. It is however, too premature to evaluate the peace

package settlement currently being negotiated by both parties

in St. Petersburg.

Oddly enough, while Baku continues to be a reliable

buyer of arms from Moscow, lobbying by the West to court

Azerbaijan has continued. In March of this year, Georgian

Defence Minister Khidasheli floated the idea of Azerbaijan

participating in exercises under the NATO umbrella to take

place in 2017 which were taken under consideration by her

Azeri counterpart Zakir Hasanov. In addition to sharing

intelligence against transnational terrorism through the

Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), Azerbaijan

represents a significant strategic asset for NATO due to it

being the primary source of energy for the Baku-Tbilisi-

Ceyhan pipeline. This fact should not be discounted when

reviewing NATO’s policy in the Caucasus as the constant

delivery of energy represents the lifeline of many member

states.

NATO’s Regional Objectives

When reflecting on the current geostrategic balance of the

region NATO cannot remain

inactive. There are two major

priorities that the Alliance must

defend: shielding Georgia from

Russ ian subvers ion and

facilitating the flow of energy

from the Caspian Sea to

Europe. NATO has a binary

choice in terms of securing

their interests. They can either

opt for the status quo, or

consider expanding their

regional outreach. Against this

policy quagmire, NATO must

reflect on which policy is best suited to preserve their

political and energetic interests and be willing, if necessary,

to make adjustments to their current course of action.

To date, NATO’s current policy in the region has

produced underwhelming results. While military reform and

training has been undertaken among the Caucuses, it is failing

at countering Russian influence in Tbilisi. This is a major

The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was established in September

2008 to serve as a forum for both political consultations and practical

cooperation to help Georgia achieve its goal of membership in NATO.

(Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 8

cause for concern for the Alliance’s regional strategy and

should not be discounted. Although it does not fall into the

security realm, the surge of support for Russia’s Eurasia

Economic Union (EEU) and rise of the Alliance of Patriots

Party (APP) in Georgia are all threats to breaking the once

cemented Euro-Atlantic consensus and confirm the Kremlin’s

creeping influence. Where the Alliance has failed even more

spectacularly is at enhancing the securitization of the flow of

energy resources from the BTC pipeline. This deficiency was

confirmed in July of 2015 when separatist forces in South

Ossetia advanced their “boarder” into Georgia, rendering a 1.5

km stretch of pipeline out of the administrative control of

British Petroleum. With no form of deterrence available for

Georgia, it is clear that this

weakness invites further

aggression and should be

expected again.

Against this precedent,

NATO would do well to create

a more robust position to

discourage the further seizure

of strategically vulnerable

territory. Based on the facts, it

would be safe to assume that

NATO’s cautious policy in the

Caucuses has outlived its

utility. In light of a new assertive neighborhood policy from

Moscow, the Alliance must match its energy to preserve

democratic principles and the unobstructed movement of

energy back to the European continent. When considering

adjustments, NATO must anchor their policy around Tbilisi

and provide them with the resources needed to execute their

mandate. This unfortunately is much easier in theory than in

practice, as any elevated status for Georgia would require an in

-depth review by the Alliance of its current membership

policy.

Treaty Eligibility

To state NATO’s Open Door Policy needs clarification is

an understatement, especially in regards its bastion ally in the

Caucuses. For too long now, the Alliance’s policy towards

Georgia has been embarrassing and riddled with inconsistency.

Despite promising eventually membership at the now infamous

2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO has acted with impotency in

regards to following through on its promises. The inaction of

the Alliance to cement Georgia’s membership through

providing a Membership Action Plan (MAP) was unsurprisingly

exploited by the Kremlin who dismembered 20% of the

country to obstruct the prospect of membership. This position

is inaccurate and provides a convenient narrative for

governments to save face when justifying to Georgia why they

still remain a second tier candidate despite their unrivalled

contributions.

When reviewing the literature overseeing NATO’s

enlargement, it is a blanket

misperception to claim that

NATO’s founding treaty, the

North Atlantic Treaty,

prohibits the organization

from accepting candidates

involved in a territorial

dispute. This apparent

i m p a i r m e n t i s

m i s r e pr es en te d wh e n

juxtaposing it to interpreting

Article 10, “invite any other

European State in a position to

further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of

the North Atlantic area”. Nowhere in this reading does it make

explicitly clear that states with a territorial dispute are

ineligible for membership. Adhering to such a policy in practice

is farcical when considering the territorial dispute West

Germany had with the Soviet Union that did not render their

prospects invalid in 1955.

Despite this ambiguous interpretation of Article 10, the

Alliance sought further clarification for membership after the

Cold War. It was expressed through a comprehensive Study on

NATO Enlargement conducted in 1995.The findings of the

report only served to advance for why Georgia would be

eligible for membership. The body of argument supporting

Georgian Army ends mission in Helmand Afghanistan

(Photo: taff Sgt. Jessica Ostroska )

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 9

Georgia’s proposed candidacy is centered on Chapter 1,

Paragraph 7 of the study, “There is no fixed or rigid list of

criteria for inviting new member states to join the Alliance.

Enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and some

nations may attain membership before others.” This ad-hoc

approach to evaluating membership as oppose to a narrow

interpretation of the North Atlantic Treaty provides the

Alliance more flexibility in assessing the merits of

prospective members. This assessment model raises the

prospect of Georgia’s membership based on its Western

style political governance

and fore ign a f f a i rs

c o m m i t m e n t t o

transatlantic security.

Additionally, any survey of

Georgia’s membership

would be incomplete

without recognizing their

commitment to resolving

their border dispute

through peaceful means

which are in line with the

remedies prescribed in

Chapter 1, Paragraph 6 of

the same study. Based on

the 1995 report it is hard

to refute, from a treaty perspective, that Georgia does not

qualify for membership.

Strategic Competencies

If the treaty findings were not enough, there is

overwhelming research that Georgia’s inclusion in the

Alliance would raise their military and political

competencies. This argument was echoed by Deputy

Secretary General Vershbow in January 2015, who claimed

that Georgia was a model for the region, and an exporter of

security, and not an importer. From an ideological

perspective, Georgia is the bull work of democratic and free

market values in the region that stands in stark contrast to

Moscow’s desired regional design. As experience has

confirmed, the Kremlin has made frequent attempts to

splinter Western unity through mainstream disinformation

campaigns. This free license to promote false narratives

must be confronted. Consequently, Georgia, through

NATO’s Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence in

Riga could play a paramount role in countering this regional

disinformation that would help install some communication

parity.

On a military level, the Georgian armed forces have

proven able to handle diverse operational responsibilities

that range from peace keeping in Kosovo to counter-

terrorism in Afghanistan. Not

only are Georgia’s troops

battle tested but now have a

wealth of collaboration with

NATO forces which has

translated into sophisticated

levels of interoperability.

Consequently, their admission

would make for a seamless

transition with virtually no

learning curve. Additionally,

Georg i a ’ s geogr aph i ca l

proximity next to the Black

Sea should not be discounted

either. The 2014 annexation of

Crimea by Russia reconfigured

the balance of maritime power around the Black Sea that has

yet to be reset in NATO’s favor. While NATO counts the

ports of its members, it is still restricted due to the

preconditions of the Montreux Convention that limits non-

Black Sea states to only 21 days at sea. NATO’s permanent

access to the Georgian port of Batumi would provide for a

higher rotation of member navies as well as allow for better

patrolling of arms and narcotic trafficking.

Political Impotency

Upon closer inspection, Georgia remains the victim of

the Alliance’s unclear and politically-tainted membership

policy. It is believed today that Tbilisi has not been invited

for fear that it would provoke the Kremlin. NATO’s

cautious position has been reflecting in their inconsistent

Visiting Georgia on 10 November 2011, members of the North Atlantic

Council were welcomed on the second day of their visit by President Mikheil

Saakashvili in the port city of Batumi. They thanked the President for Geor-

gia’s role as a valuable contributor to Alliance operations and for Georgia’s

commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. (Photo: NATO )

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 10

declarations on the topic. President Obama’s, as candidate

in 2008, publically endorsed the idea of Georgia joining as

to not appear too dovish on foreign policy but has since

then backpedaled on his commitment and stated in March

of 2014, after an EU-US summit, that there were “no

immediate plans” to include Georgia or Ukraine into

NATO. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin can revel in satisfaction

knowing their policy of installing a frozen conflict possess

some legitimate obstruction value that can recreated on ad-

hoc basis, as in Ukraine to dissuade enlargement. This is a

completely unsatisfactory feature for NATO to accept as it

essentially provides Moscow a veto over membership

prospects in the future. The same can be said of the EU,

and of Germany

e s p e c i a l l y w h i c h

delayed accepting the

E u r o p e a n

Commission’s request

t o g r a n t v i s a

l i b e r a l i z a t i o n t o

Georgian despite having

f u l f i l l e d t h e

Commission’s technical

requirements.

T h e i s s u e o f

en l a r ge men t wi th

Georgia was re-visited in

2015 by NATO Foreign

Ministers. Despite the positive nature of the statements,

“[They] welcome the significant progress realised since

2008. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all

the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership”, it

would be premature for Tbilisi to expect an approval to

join, or even a MAP. The declaration was clouded in

empty semantics that still did not provide a clear pathway

to membership for Georgia. Unlike other examples of lip

service by NATO towards Georgia, this inaction might

produce adverse consequences to their standing.

Georgia will hold parliamentary elections in October.

The current ruling government, Georgia Dream, has

staked a lot on the Summit and any inability by NATO to

deliver something concrete would only be to the advantage

to the Pro-Russian party. Consequently, with that specter

looming over Tbilisi, the Alliance, when delivering their

recommendation in July, would do well recognize that the

patience of Georgians to join is not infinite.

Inviting a Guest In

Despite their omission from the Alliance, Georgia’s

vigor to join has remained which has gradually been

rewarded. The establishment of the Energy Security Centre

of Excellence as a Contributing Partner Nation in 2014 as

well as the inauguration of the NATO-Georgia Joint

Training and Evaluation Center in August of 2015 have

f u r t h e r e d

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d

relations that have

served to increase

capacity bui lding.

Following the Wales

Summit in 2014, the

Substantial NATO-

G e o r g i a P a c k a g e

(SNGP) was delivered

to Tbilisi across all three

military domains that

supported 13 areas of

the defense and security

-related sectors. Most importantly the SNGP looked to raise

interoperability of forces and improve their ability to self-

defence. Despite these advancements, it fails to deliver what

Georgia covets most; the deterrence and protection of

Article 5. What is most frustrating about NATO’s position

towards Georgia is that they are neglecting to maximize all

of its versatility both in the Caucuses and the Euro-Atlantic

area.

Georgia has been a model candidate country for NATO

membership. It has at every turn exceeded expectations

asked from it and proven to be an unshakeable ally. Not

only does Georgia’s member prospectus satisfy NATO’s

treaty obligations, it has literally scarified blood and treasure

During a visit to Georgia in August 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

inaugurates the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre at the Krt-

sanisi Military Facility (Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 11

in the search for membership. For these reasons alone it seems

hypocritical of the Alliance to impose different standards on

Georgia than it did to West Germany for example. This delay

in accession will not only play into the hands of the Kremlin

but slowly reverse any gains made in the region at times when

NATO leadership is needed. Additionally, the lack of

reinforcement from NATO in Georgia will only make Russia’s

creeping annexation more attractive and further compromise

the flow of energy resources. It is not unfair to deduce that

because NATO has only treated Georgia as guest and not a

member their influence in the region has suffered the same lack

of influence. Against this, NATO must not lose sight of its

priorities in the Caucuses and do its upmost to welcome

Georgia not as a guest but as a permanent member. Until they

correct their complacent attitude, the Alliance shouldn’t be

surprised at their eroding influence in the region, after all

guests are supposed to leave eventually.

Roger Hilton is from Canada and is an international

affairs professional. Roger has previous experience at the

Office of the State Minister of Georgia for European and

Euro-Atlantic Integration as well as with the delegation of

the Kingdom of Belgium at the Organization for Security

and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE). Prior to relocating to

Europe, Roger worked as a government and public relations

consultant. He is a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of

Vienna where he holds a Masters in Advanced International

Studies.

Elene Gotsadze “Georgia in International Peacekeeping Missions”, Information Center on NATO and EU, Tbilisi, 2014.

“NATO Backgrounder: Deepening relations with Georgia”, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011.

Tornike Zurabashvi “Let Georgia Join NATO”, Foreign Affairs, April 12, 2016.

“Study on NATO Enlargement”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 3, 1995.

“Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers on Open Door Policy”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 2, 2015.

Michael Hikari Cecire “Yes, Putin may be starting to win Georgia away from the West. Here’s why that matters”, The Washington Post, January 25, 2015

Judy Dempsey “NATO and the EU desert Georgia”, The Washington Post, June 16, 2016.

Gabriela Baczynska “Georgia hopes for visa-free travel to EU despite German objections”, Reuters, June 3, 2016.

About the author

Bibliography

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 12

imports in order to satisfy an ever growing demand. In

2014, Europe imported 53% of the energy it consumed

– including 90% of its crude oil and 66% of its natural

gas – which are estimated to go up to 74% by 2030.

Europe has been heavily dependent on one single

supplier, Russia, responsible for a third of oil imports,

39% of natural gas and 29% of solid fuels. This

growing dependency on the unstable supply of energy

from Russia, combined with the growing tension

between the Euro-Atlantic community and Moscow,

generated a debate on Europe’s dependency to Russian

energy. The annexation of Crimea further resulted in

security implications for Europe, which has since been

looking for new and more reliable energy suppliers.

Gazprom’s, Russian state-owned gas company,

blatant attempt to use the flow of energy as a foreign

policy tool in January 2006 and January 2009, during

the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute over the price of natural

gas supplied and the cost of transit, temporarily

disrupted all gas supplies to Europe that was passing

through Ukraine. This significantly decreased the gas

flow to several Eastern European countries, including

Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and the Czech

Republic. In June 2014, Russia terminated gas supplies

to Ukraine over a price dispute. The Russia-Ukraine

gas crises not only demonstrated to the Euro-Atlantic

community how strongly they were dependent on

Russian gas, but also emphasised their need to diversify

their energy supply, as the flow of gas from Moscow

can be found unstable.

Energy Routes through the Caspian

Europe’s energy security strategy recognises the

Energy Security in the South Caucasus

By Kamilla Solieva

T he geo-strategic importance of the

South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan

and Georgia – is linked to its position at

the crossroads of East-West and North-South energy

corridors which is made of the existing oil and gas

pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-

Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE), as well as the planned

Southern Gas Corridor. Opportunities brought about

by these regional geopolitical advantages have been

playing an important role in the domestic and foreign

policy of the region, with energy security at the heart

of the nations’ policy to build sovereign and

prosperous states. Defined as “the uninterrupted

availability of energy sources at an affordable price” by

the International Energy Agency, energy security has

been key to the political and economic development of

the Caspian region since the collapse of the Soviet

Union.

Oil and gas in the Caspian and its transportation

routes are the objects not only of competition among

companies, but also of intense political rivalry between

powerful nations. Yet, for the transatlantic

community, the importance of energy security on a

higher political level has been more recent, and closely

linked to Russia’s increasingly assertive policies. The

disruptions of gas flow to Europe in 2006 and 2009

demanded that other energy providers were found,

opening the field of possibilities for the tightening of

relations between NATO and the South Caucasus.

European Energy Dependency

The downturn in its own production of hard coal,

crude oil, natural gas and, more recently, nuclear

energy has increased Europe reliance on energy

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 13

Caspian region as a means to diversify its energy

supplies, and the South Caucasus corridor as a strategic

transit route connecting Caspian energy resources to

European markets.

Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s strive for independence

from their Soviet past is evident in their foreign policy

approaches: they are not only seeking to secure

diversified energy exports with Western energy

companies, but they also serve as transit routes that

provide energy to Turkey and beyond. The signing of

the “contract of the century” between Azerbaijan’s

president and Western oil investors, as a result of which

the BTC oil pipeline was opened, represented a major

step forward in the consolidation of the independence,

both economic and political, of Georgia and Azerbaijan,

and marked the

increasing role of

Turkey in the region.

The pipeline has

come to be the most

important pipeline in

the region, not only

for Georgia, whose

reliance on Russian

oil has diminished,

but also for Europe.

This was further

enhanced by the opening of a similar project, the BTE

pipeline, aimed at bringing gas from the Caspian Sea,

through Georgia and into Turkey. Both the BTC and

BTE have played an important role in connecting the

Caspian Sea to the international market and offering the

Caucasus more business opportunities.

Nevertheless, the two pipelines provide a moderate

diversification of energy for Europe and many more

projects still have not come to life. The European

Commission initiated the Southern Gas Corridor to

diversify the EU’s supply of gas and develop the

necessary infrastructure to transport gas from the

Caspian region and Middle East – primarily Azerbaijan,

Turkmenistan, Iran, and Iraq – to Europe. However,

due to political and economic concerns as well as a lack

of developed gas resources and infrastructure,

Azerbaijan remains the sole partner of this policy. One

of the world’s largest gas and condensate field,

Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz, was slated to be the main

contributor to many contested pipeline projects:

Nabucco West, the South East European Pipeline

(SEEP), the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Trans

Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). The decrease

in gas demand forecasts in Europe due to the economic

crisis as well as uncertainties in terms of gas supplier

countries had a

negative effect on the

frontrunner in the

race, the Nabucco

West pipeline. As a

result of the selection

process in June

2013, the Shah Deniz

Consotrium selected

the TAP to transport

gas from the Turkish

border through Greece

and Albania to Italy. The TANAP gas infrastructure,

which is due to be completed in 2018, will directly link

the existing BTE pipeline to Europe. This would help

Europe to meet the demand of its citizens, while

providing alternative routes and decreasing the

continent’s dependency on a sole supplier.

The TANAP and TAP will not fully address the issue

of energy security in Europe as these projects depend on

a sole source, Shah Deniz Phase 2 production, and a 10

billion of cubic meters supply for European markets

Map of the Southern Gap Corridor (Image: BP)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 14

represents a small proportion of the total European

demand. However, this is an important step forward

towards diversification of the energy market, as both

pipelines will be able to host future gas supplies for

Europe.

Threats to Energy Security

Several threats are posed to the energy

infrastructure of the South Caucasus energy route,

directly posing a challenge to NATO Members’

energy supply.

The region’s protracted territorial conflicts of

Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia pose

a real threat to Europe’s energy supply as the

separatist forces of the ‘de facto’ breakaway regions

can take control of the areas where the pipelines pass.

Additionally, one of the major threats to vital

energy infrastructures is the disruption of resource

supply by terrorist attacks. Pipelines running above

the ground are especially vulnerable; underground

pipelines are not entirely safe as they can be targeted

when exposed in pumping stations, river crossings

and terminals. For instance, in 2008, just before the

Russia-Georgia war, the Kurdistan’s Workers’ Party,

or PKK, launched a terrorist attack on the BTC

pipeline. Recent Turkish airstrikes against the PKK in

Northern Iraq further have threatened the stability

and security of the BTE pipeline.

Russia is widely perceived as a source of risk and

threat to energy security and development in the

South Caucasus. Apart from its use of energy as a

foreign policy weapon, Russia has challenged energy

infrastructure projects, which are aimed to bypass the

country and diversify the gas supply to Europe.

Moscow seems eager to maintain influence in the

region by playing the energy card. For instance,

Russian policymakers are determined to preserve

control over various energy transportation routes.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a

dispute over the definition of the legal status of the

Caspian Sea has emerged. The current legal status of the

Caspian is based both on the Soviet-Iranian treaties and

on earlier state practice and agreements. Previously

uncontested, the status of the Caspian has been

challenged by independent Caspian states, Azerbaijan,

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Disputes over the legality

made it difficult for the five concerned states to

apportion the ownerships of specific fields among

themselves, which has prevented the full development of

the Caspian energy. Russian and Iranian officials also

contend that the construction of such pipelines would

not be environmentally safe because of seismic

disturbances in the sea, trying to further hinder the

development of alternative energy sources for Europe.

NATO’s Role in the Caspian

Only several months after Gazprom’s energy cut-

offs, NATO officially recognised for the first time the

importance of the energy security to the Alliance at the

Riga Summit in November 2006. The Riga declaration

states, “Alliance security interests can also be affected by

the disruption of the flow of vital resources” and the

Council in Permanent Session should “consult on the

most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in

order to define those areas where NATO may add value

to safeguard the security interests of the Allies.”

In 2008, NATO’s contribution to energy security

was further defined as cooperation in information and

intelligence sharing, projecting stability, advancing

international and regional cooperation, and supporting

critical energy infrastructure protection. Importantly,

NATO’s Strategic Concept asserted that the Alliance

would “develop the capacity to contribute to energy

security, including protection of critical energy

infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation

with partners, and consultations among Allies on the

Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 07 15

basis of strategic assessments and contingency

planning.” At the Wales Summit, NATO reaffirmed its

commitment to continue adding value to energy

security.

The protection of energy infrastructures is primarily

a national prerogative and stands within the

responsibility of individual states, as stated at the

Chicago Declaration. However, since transit routes do

not solely pass through only one country, but rather

cross the national borders of a number of states, their

protection may rest in the hands of a supranational

actor in order to ensure the energy supply to all its

destinations. Therefore, as highlighted in the NATO’s

Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC) report

(2012), both national and Alliance-level pro-active

strategies are required to ensure the security of the

objects of energy production and supply.

Conclusion

Since the Ukraine-Russia crises that led to the

temporary gas cut-off to several European countries,

Europe has been increasingly looking for alternative

routes to bypass its main external energy producer,

Russia. The resources-rich Caspian Sea has

demonstrated to be an important mean to diversify

European energy supply, while the South Caucasus

could serve as a strategic transit route. Apart from the

already existing pipelines, Europe is hoping to develop

similar projects that would be able to supply more

energy in order to meet its growing demand.

Due to protracted conflicts, the threat of terrorist

attacks, competing interests of international key

players, and the disputes over the legality of the

Caspian Sea, the transit routes that pass through the

South Caucasus may be endangered. The Alliance

recognises that the threats posed to energy

infrastructure in the South Caucasus energy, directly

challenge the energy security of the Alliance. With this

in mind, the Alliance has numerously states its

commitment to add value in energy security, through

providing consultation and training, to protect the

security interests of the Allies.

The combination of national and EU energy

strategies, with NATO adding value, should pave the

way towards energy security. The existing tools and

efforts for new initiatives towards the diversification of

energy supply should improve Europe’s energy security

and therefore the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Kamilla Solieva is a graduate from King’s College

London in International Peace and Security. She has

recently completed working as a Research Assistant at

the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where she focused

on Russia and the CIS, and Afghanistan.

Sebo Laszlo and Sipos-Kecskemethy, “Energy Security and

the Caucasian Region”, 8 (3), 2009 BP, “BP Energy Outlook 2030”, 2013 [Available at:]

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2011/STAGING/local_assets/pdf/BP_World_Energy_Outlook_booklet_2013.pdf

Cunningham Jennifer and Yetiv Steve, “NATO and the Caspian”, Journal of Energy Security, 2012

International Energy Agency (IEA), “World Energy Outlook 2010”, 2010 [Available at:] http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weao2010.pdf

European Commission, “EU Commission welcomes

decision on gas pipeline”, 2013 [Available at:] http://

www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-623_en.htm

Meister, Stefan, “Energy Security in the South Caucasus”,

2014

Centre for Social and Economic Development (CESD),

“Assessment of Effect of Declining Oil Prices on Azerbaijan

Economy”, 2014

Alieva, Leila and Shapovalova, Natalia, “Energy security in

the South Caucasus: views from the region”, Working Paper,

FRIDE, 2015

ENSEC, “Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection and

Potential Contribution of NATO ENSEC COE”, 4 (13), 2012

About the author

Bibliography

This publication is co-sponsored by the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, a subject expert or a professional and feel you have a valuable

contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of

importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your

work please see our website at: http://atahq.org/atlantic-voices/

Editor: Flora Pidoux

ATA Programs On July 23rd to 30th, YATA and the Portuguese Atlantic Youth

Association (PAYA) will host the 21st edition of he Portuguese Atlantic

Youth Seminar (PAYS). Titled “The Warsaw Era Defending the Alliance”,

the young participants and experts will discuss the most prominent topics

related to the Seminar's subject, such as Portugal’s role in the

Transatlantic Link; NATO - Russia Relations in the new Geopolitical

Agenda; Cyber-Warfare; Gender and Security; US Elections; Security in

the Mediterranean Region; NATO's Future Challenges.

40 participants from more than 25 different countries will be selected

to attend this Seminar. At least 1 participant from each NATO member

country will be chosen.

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global net-

works and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security.

By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media

representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set

forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace,

Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from

North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlan-

tic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the succes-

sor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understan-

ding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its inter-

national programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security

Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy acti-

vism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of internati-

onal policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.