atlantic voices vol. 4, no. 9 (september 2014)

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9 1

- Magda Kocianova & Maria Mundt

The growing imbalance between sup-

ply and demand in the energy market has

been confirmed by recent crises and will lead

to more instability in the supply chain by

developed economies.

This month’s edition of Atlantic Voices

will analyse NATO and the EU’s current

stance on future energy challenges and at-

tempt to identify the relevant energy issues

for transatlantic actors. Given the fact that

the majority of European states are depend-

ent on imports of energy supply from exter-

nal unstable suppliers, the energy policy has

recently dominated the political and security

debates.

The two articles will analyse the po-

tential risks that could affect the transatlantic

community’s energy security and contribute

to cumulative knowledge in a sphere of a

new but critical interests. This edition will

further analyse how transatlantic actors are

addressing the vulnerability of the world en-

ergy markets, whether these are disruptions

from geopolitical strives or natural disasters,

and how strategic energy policies should go

beyond the supply of oil, in order to prevent

disasters to affect multiple economies simul-

taneously.

Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection:

The Role of NATO and the EU

Volume 4 - Issue 9 September 2014

Contents:

Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on Current Energy Situation

Julian Gajo explains the significance of the recent energy security debate within the European Union amid the increased tensions in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, analysing the vulnerability of the EU Member States depend-ent on energy imports.

NATO and the EU’s Potential Role in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection

Alessandro Niglia focuses on different policies and approaches towards the Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection within the Euro-Atlantic sphere, spe-cifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, elab-orating on the prospects for future potential collaboration.

Solar panels and wind power plants are increasingly used by the European states to pro-mote renewable energy production.

(Photo: Institute of Energy for South-Eastern Europe)


energy sources. Both of these basic assertions approve

of the assumption that the increasing importance of

energy security touches upon the idea of interdepend-

ence.

This interdependence presumes a more or less

balanced relationship between two or more political

entities, which both have their tools or means of

demonstrating leverage and power over the other

(besides traditional military strength, which in times of

increasing global interconnectedness has been reduced

to a mere last resort of power). Interdependence is

however a very fragile state of a relationship and can

easily turn into an asymmetrical interdependence that

is then rather considered as a one-sided dependence of

one entity to another. Especially when looking at ener-

gy relations, this notion seems to hold true in the vast

majority of cases. The implications this has on the EU

are just as profound, as they are complex. This article

intends to give a succinct insight into the EU’s energy

situation with regards to this theoretical notion.

Recent Trends

So far, the year 2014 has revealed two major

trends in transnational energy relations. Although those

trends were not unexpected in their basic nature, they

have marked a dramatic intensification of transnational

energy relations in recent months. One trend is the

By Mr. Julian Gajo

I n recent years, energy security has incrementally

moved into the focus of public debate and up on

the national and international political agendas.

Especially when looking at the EU, it has furthermore

become increasingly important in the field of foreign

policy, given the Union’s over-reliance on imports

from non-EU energy producers. This is not least due

to the acknowledgment of the increasing nexus be-

tween energy security and political freedom of action

as an element of independence and sovereignty.

There are many reasons for these causally determined

tendencies and any investigation on this matter can

only capture a limited part of the greater image.

Amidst the often times arbitrarily used range of multi-

faceted terms, such as competitiveness, sustainability,

and the term energy security itself, identification or

articulation of a coherent argument is the first chal-

lenge when approaching issues related to energy poli-

cy. One of the most adequate theories that reflect the

current international discussion on energy security is

the complex interdependence theory. This article will

approach the present theme in an attempt to identify

the relevance of energy issues in contemporary poli-

tics, how this affects the EU and how this in turn is

linked to the EU’s transatlantic relations. As an exem-

plary energy resource, this article will center on gas

trade to limit and hence sharpen its focus.

The complex interdependence theory argues

that in the context of transnational relations, political

agendas lack hierarchy and nation states are not only

connected through official political elites, but through

numerous official and unofficial ties – as it is the case

with the energy sector, which includes (amongst oth-

ers) international organizations, multinational compa-

nies and NGOs. At the same time, the energy sector

is of varying relevance to different nation states, de-

pending on whether they are demanding or supplying

Gazprom’s Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas field.

(Gazprom)

Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on

Current Energy Situation


reaffirmation of the assertion that the EU’s energy sector

does not only heavily rely on non-EU energy providers,

but also that this asymmetrical interdependence creates a

gap between relying on energy imports and the ability to

demonstrate leverage towards non-EU actors in foreign

affairs, as the EU cannot afford the risk to lose key energy

providers. This holds especially true when looking at fos-

sil energy sources such as gas. The other trend is the one

of intensified efforts in minimizing possible dependence

on external or non-EU energy providers. Besides more

common strategies, which include measures such as di-

versification of providers or diversification of energy

sources, a more recent tool is what is commonly known

as hydraulic fracturing, or short ‘fracking’, which has the

potential of exploiting yet unexplored gas reserves. This

method is however highly controversial due to its un-

charted impacts on the environment. The new technology

represents one of the biggest differences between the US

and the EU in their approach of minimizing energy de-

pendence, as elaborated on below, and potentially repre-

sents a turn of the tides in transatlantic energy policies.

The intensified awareness of dependence on exter-

nal energy providers has not sprung from nowhere. With

a lagging, yet increasingly determined energy strategy of

approaching a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector,

which also includes a long-term phase-out of nuclear en-

ergy, the EU is especially dependent on the fossil re-

source gas, which is commonly considered to be a ‘bridge

-fuel’ – a necessary energy source that is to provide ener-

gy security in the transformation process of the EU’s en-

ergy sector. While simultaneously expanding ‘smart-

grids’ and promoting the development of renewable en-

ergies, it is undeniable that the EU’s energy sector is yet

characterized by a strong reliance on fossil fuels. Latest

figures from 2012 indicate that the EU-28 consumes

some 392.8 mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent), while

only producing around 133.4 mtoe. The EU’s net import

of gas is hence 258.6 mtoe, which roughly accounts for

66% of its gas consumption. This is mainly due to the

fact that fossils are extremely scarce within the EU, which

is why imports and hence import dependency rates re-

main high and in some cases even increase. Especially

with regards to gas imports (import dependency rate

2012: 65.8%), this dependency is treacherous. Not

only are the vast majority of gas resources in the hands

of only a few producing states world-wide, it is also

hard to transport – commonly through pipelines or

more expensively in form of LNG tankers. All of these

developments and characteristics, which determine the

EU’s current energy situation, provide ideal circum-

stances for dependence or interdependence to develop.

Recent dramatic political events in the European

neighborhood have shown how significant it is to deal

with this interdependence.

The Impact of the Arab Spring on the EU’s En-

ergy Sector

One of those events was the Arab Spring in early

2011, still overshadowing current situations in affected

countries. A popular uprising overthrew thitherto au-

tocratic or quasi-autocratic regimes and – for the sake

of democratic development – turned stable economic

partners into unstable neighboring countries with in-

terim governments. Whereas some countries, such as

Tunisia, were able to manage this drastic political

switch rather successfully, other countries, such as Lib-

ya, are still dealing with the aftermath, being strongly

characterized by armed conflict and domestic unrest.

To the EU’s energy sector, this is especially disadvanta-

geous, as Libya, rich in oil resources, represented one

of the most important energy partners in the region.

Although Europe’s most valuable gas trade partner in

the region, namely Algeria, managed to suppress a full-

scale national uprising, the EU did face a serious threat

to the stability of its gas imports, potentially being ex-

posed to an era of uncertainty in energy relations to-

FRACKING: Hydraulic fracturing is a high-tech method of retrieving natural gas or petroleum

from deep rock formations comprising unexplored fossil energy resources by injecting high-pressure fluids (usually consisting of water, chemicals and

sand). Although this technique is ecologically highly questionable, it does offer the advantage of increasing domestic gas production temporarily.


wards the region. A recent terrorist attack on an

Algerian oil field in January 2013 is only one con-

crete example of the fragile security state the EU’s

foreign fossil sources are in. Despite the fear of

disrupted supply of fossil resources, the Arab

Spring also represented a major challenge to large-

scale international projects in the field of renewa-

ble energies. Bilateral and multilateral agreements

and contracts concluded – e.g. – within the con-

text of the Mediterranean Solar Plan had to be re-

assured of validity, while at the same time major

investors backed out of financial commitment due

to the regional political instability. Especially in

the early stages of the Arab Spring, the EU found

itself in a position in which both supply of tradi-

tional energy sources and future potential supply

of alternative energy sources were endangered,

revealing the EU’s strong vulnerability towards

energy partner countries, as the EU’s policy

framework cannot, or at best, can only slowly,

adapt to drastic external changes.

The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on the

EU’s Energy Sector

Besides the Southern neighborhood, the

Eastern one is at least of equal importance to the

EU’s energy sector and in terms of fossil energy

sources even more important, with Russia still being

the biggest gas supplier to the EU, providing 32% of

all extra-EU natural gas imports. While in recent

years post-Cold-War tensions have been very low,

increasing hopes for long-term stability in EU-Russian

relations, 2014 with the newly revived Ukraine Crisis

has proved these hopes wrong. Using gas supply as a

political tool to counter political sanctions put forth

by the EU, Russia uses the presumably asymmetrical

interdependent relationship to make leeway for its

foreign policy. This rather unforeseen supra-regional

conflict seriously compromises EU’s foreign policy

with its domestic needs for energy. The spiral of sanc-

tions that developed in the aftermath of the Ukraine

Crisis of 2014 was of an economic, financial and dip-

lomatic nature. Russia’s response, however, focused

on the energy sector, as it represents its most valuable

asset.

Both the EU’s sanctions and Russia’s energy

supply threat were not related to the original conflict

that emanated from Ukraine’s revolution and the

EU’s and Russia’s roles in it. In fact, it had nothing to

do with it except for fulfilling the purpose of demon-

strating leverage towards the respective other party.

At first sight, this scenario seems like the revival of a

state last experienced in the times of the Cold War,

which was until recently unthinkable. In reality, how-

ever, what this situation displays is an exemplary cross

-sectoral, reciprocal influence of transnational issues

due to a well-developed and distinct complex interde-

pendence in international relations. The EU is subject

to this interdependence. This fact has been reaffirmed

clearer than ever in recent history. Although the US

takes part in tightening sanctions towards Russia, it

suffers less from Russia’s counter-sanctions than the

EU. Yet again, an extra-EU conflict turned out to

reveal EU’s high vulnerability and sensitivity when it

comes to energy-related issues. The EU has to be-

come aware of its unique position in geopolitical en-

ergy disputes and cannot rely on third parties to re-

solve the conflict that it is by proxy involved in, but

has to take immediate action itself.

German nuclear power plant Isar 2. On its way to a se-cure, sustainable and competitive energy sector, the EU will eventually engage in a nuclear phase-out, increasing natural gas’ relevance as a ‘bridge-fuel’ in the Union’s energy mix.

(E.ON Kernkraft GmbH)


Aggregated Energy and Foreign Policy Crisis

for the EU

Both conflicts rest upon the fact that the EU,

from the early beginnings of modern energy markets

on, has pursued a strongly integrative energy policy,

linking it directly to its neighbourhood and foreign

policy. This was not least due to the fact that virtually

all conventional energy sources were characterized by

scarcity within the EU. Tough nuclear energy did

seem to promise a loophole in the later half of the 20th

century, as it guaranteed domestic electricity genera-

tion; incidents such as Chernobyl and more recently

Fukushima have triggered an intense public debate

about serious security issues with the nowadays rela-

tively unpopular energy source. Many national gov-

ernments, above all the German one, have agreed on

nuclear phase-out, which bolstered the relevance of

fossil fuels, once again making the EU depend strong-

er on external energy providers. This most profound

substructure of the EU’s energy sector does not only

explain why a foreign policy issue can easily turn into

an energy issue and vice-versa, but already presuppos-

es the Union’s entanglement in complex interdepend-

ent relations.

The EU’s Policy Response

To manage this (asymmetrical) interdepend-

ence, the EU has engaged in several methods. To

minimize dependence on single gas providers, the EU

has started diversifying its gas suppliers, which de-

creases the exclusiveness of energy relations to major

gas providers, such as Russia, as the EU is now able to

consume gas from a range of different countries. Oth-

er extra-EU gas suppliers are mainly Norway (31% of

gas imports) and Algeria (13%), but more recently

also smaller ones, such as (among others) Qatar (8%)

and Nigeria (4%). The EU has also increased its ef-

forts in promoting renewable energy with large-scale

projects within and outside the EU, which ultimately

diversifies the EU’s energy mix eventually decreasing

the gas share in said mix. Other ways of directly and

indirectly managing asymmetrical interdependence

also include (among others) the promotion of energy

efficiency and the domestic gas production. In the

context of the latter tool, hydraulic fracturing has be-

come a very attractive concept, as it could potentially,

but also only temporarily, increase domestic gas pro-

duction, in turn making the EU’s energy sector less

dependent on extra-EU gas supply. Since ’fracking’ is,

however, highly disputable in terms of its impacts on

the environment, its use within the EU remains rather

unclear. At this point, shale gas production seems to

directly disagree with the EU’s dictum of developing

a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector. The EU

itself has not managed to implement a binding agree-

ment on it and hence left the responsibility of shale

gas production up to national governments. Whereas

some EU member states have decided to start shale

gas exploration, such as Great Britain and Poland,

other countries are more inclined to prohibiting

‘fracking’, as is the case in Germany. This in turn

leads to an asymmetrical ‘energy exposure’ among

EU member states, causing policy-making on EU lev-

el to become yet more difficult than it already is in the

energy sector.

Projecting this situation onto the transatlantic

relations, there appear to be two main paradigms that

differentiate the EU’s approach to the one of the US.

Whereas the EU has made sustainability its basic and

most desirable long-term aim, the US has implied

independence as its main goal. Engaging in large-scale

‘fracking’ operations, the US has recently declared

Carrier ships are the only alternative to conventional gas pipe-lines to trade gas. Although the transport is very costly, it offers the potential of receiving gas from geographically distant loca-

tions. (QatarGas)


this independence in the gas sector. Although con-

crete predictions of future gas production do differ

in volume and time span, the US could indeed be

independent of gas imports for about the next dec-

ade and could in fact become a gas exporter to oth-

er countries. As some academics have suggested,

this current situation of contradicting paradigms

pursued by the EU and the US could turn out to be

a major parting of their ways. Whereas in the past,

global energy politics have often been influenced

under the same fundamental idea – namely of se-

curing world fossil resources and ensuring access

to them within a global energy market – the EU

could now find itself alone in this endeavor, as the

US is a self-providing gas producer. Although this

idea is nothing but mere speculation at this point,

the near future’s developments in this regard need

to be closely observed.

The EU has to become aware of the gravity

of this change in world energy politics. It also

needs to decide whether it wants to pursue energy

politics of ‘Eurogaullism’ or ‘Euroatlanticism’. In

times of supply uncertainty, an EU solo attempt in

global energy politics is highly risky. Especially

when considering newly arising tension in the

Eastern neighborhood, a more than fragile Near

and Middle East, and a Southern neighborhood

undergoing major political transformation, old

alliances need to be maintained, if not intensified.

The transatlantic relations need to be inclusive of

the energetic dimension. Diverging paths on a

transatlantic level could very well be of short-term

interest, but might turn out to be counter-

productive in the long-run. Equally, the US has to

become more aware of its global role in energy

politics. It cannot withdraw from international

disputes over fossil resources, as it is now more

than ever in recent history independent of gas im-

ports. Unless the US decides to offer its newly

found gas production for transatlantic trade oppor-

tunities – which will be costly and difficult due to

the rather elaborate transport-efforts for gas –

transatlantic energy relations and interests might

be at the turn of the tides. In light of recent efforts in

promoting transatlantic economic agreements, in

form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-

nership (TTIP), it remains to be seen if and to what

extent energy politics will play a role in transatlantic

relations.

About the author

Julian Gajo studied Communication and Cultural

Management (BA) at Zeppelin University, focusing on

the understanding and communication of the concept

of sustainability by German energy companies. As an

external consultant to different German Ministries, he

engaged in several projects in the field of renewable

energy politics. Mr. Gajo specialized in Political Strat-

egy and Communication at the University of Kent’s

Brussels School of International Studies, investigating

on the interdependence between the EU and non-EU

energy providers by analyzing and identifying ways of

managing and minimizing the Union’s possible de-

pendence on foreign gas supplies.

Bibliography

Eurostat – European Commission (2014), EU Energy in

Figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2014, Luxembourg: Publica-

tions Office of the European Union.

Goldthau, A (2012), The Politics of Natural Gas Develop-

ment in the European Union. [Online], Available from:

<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MO-CES-

pub-GeoGasEU-102513.pdf>.

Kaveshnikov, N (2010), “The issue of energy security

in relations between Russia and the European Union.” Eu-

ropean Security, vol.19, no.4, pp.585-605.

Keohane, R and J Nye Jr. (2012), Power and Interdepend-

ence, 4th edition, Cambridge: Pearson Publishing.

Youngs, R (2009), Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign

Policy Challenge, New York: Routledge.


NATO and the EU’s Potential Role in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection

By Mr. Alessandro Niglia

E nergy resources are of crucial and vital im-

portance for any country to work properly

(e.g. to generate the electricity needed for

households, schools, businesses and factories). The

developing economies in particular demand a strong

increase in energy supply according to recent studies

released by the International Energy Agency (IEA). As

a result, a growing imbalance between supply and

demand in the energy market might lead to more in-

stability in the supply chain by developed economies.

This offers the foundation to review the policies and

strategies on future energy challenges. On one hand,

drawing more attention and investment towards re-

newable energy sources might easily solve such a re-

view. On the other hand, Critical Energy Infrastruc-

ture Protection (CEIP) now becomes an issue of in-

ternational concern, as most countries in the transat-

lantic area are not fully energy independent; e.g. Lith-

uania (100%), Germany (38%), Italy (31%), Hungary

(31%) are strongly dependent on the gas supply com-

ing from Russia.

Due to the call for a strong diversification of

energy supplies, most NATO countries still have to

rely on oil and gas (from Russia) to provide basic ser-

vices (from transportation to communication, to se-

curity and health infrastructure). In addition, in the

last ten years, terrorist attacks, maritime piracy,

cyber-attacks, and political sabotage against interde-

pendent energy infrastructures have resulted in mak-

ing production and transportation of energy more

complicated, causing instability in the financial energy

market. This means that the vulnerability of the ener-

gy supply system must be viewed as a global question.

NATO’s progression in energy security is not

entirely based on the strategic concept, which is an

official document that outlines NATO’s enduring

purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks.

It also identifies the central features of the new securi-

ty environment, specifies the elements of the Alli-

ance’s approach to security and provides guidelines

for the adaptation of its military forces.

The NATO Strategic Concept in 1999 stressed

that “Alliance security can be affected by […] the dis-

ruption of the flow of vital resources.” Since the 2008

NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, CEIP has been

one of the top subjects for discussion and the Alliance

is considered a relevant player for the defense of criti-

cal energy infrastructures at large. As outlined by Mr.

Michael Rühle, the Head of Energy Security Section

in NATO HQ, “NATO has a legitimate role to play in

energy security” and “assuring energy supply may not

be a straightforward military challenge, yet it clearly

has a security dimension.” The new Strategic Concept

(November 2010) affirms NATO’s commitment to

"develop the capacity to contribute to energy securi-

ty, including protection of critical infrastructure and

transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and

consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic

assessments and contingency planning.” Despite this

Protecting the CEIP is essential to guarantee political stability and security.

(Intelligent Security Systems)


innovative impetus, NATO hesitates to approach

the energy security subject for two main following

reasons:

First, the diverging national interests on the

matter justify this hesitation. Before the Bucharest

Summit took place in 2008, a very heated discus-

sion on NATO’s role in energy security was car-

ried out. On the one hand, Poland and Baltic states

called for NATO’s active role in defending vital

energy infrastructures such as pipeline and marine

oil terminals, in order to be more independent

from Russia. On the other hand, many NATO

Member States were afraid of an overlap between

NATO and the EU policies as the latter is already

committed to protecting energy infrastructure in

the framework of the Common Security and De-

fense Policy. Basically, these States wanted NATO

to have a more limited role on the control of mari-

time security.

Second, there are already a high number of

players involved in the energy security arena, such

as the EU itself, IEA, Organisation for Security and

Cooperation in Europe and the private sector.

Therefore, diverging national political and eco-

nomic interests and NATO’s structural limitations

obstruct the clarity and importance of NATO’s

added value in the energy security debate. Thus,

many European states are reluctant to discuss this

delicate issue in international forums. This re-

quires NATO to put more effort in addressing the

challenges in the following 5 key areas where rele-

vant added value could be provided: 1. Intelligence

and information sharing; 2. Projecting stability; 3.

Advancing international and regional stability; 4.

Supporting consequence management; and 5. Sup-

porting the critical protection of infrastructure.

With specific regard to the Critical Energy

Infrastructure , NATO outlines the importance to

carry out a particular policy to protect energy in-

frastructure, as it is a critical part of global energy

security, which is a subject to a number of threats.

According to recent statistics (Word Oil Transit

Chokepoints Report, U.S Energy Information Admin-

istration), almost half of the total global oil produc-

tion is transferred by oil tankers on permanent mari-

time routes with a high number of critical choke

points. This means that port facilities are being more

critical and difficult to be managed than before. The

current situation is extremely complicated as the

cyber systems (meaning the intense link between the

computational and physical elements) are essential to

make some critical energy infrastructure work

properly. This requires the preparedness and readi-

ness to face potential cyber-attacks.

Furthermore, hundreds of terrorists attacks,

such as bombing of gas and oil pipelines, attacks on

fuel trucks, killing and kidnapping associated person-

nel, disrupting of electrical power systems, occur

every year on energy-related targets. West Africa is

the area where the most of these attacks are carried

out. Nonetheless, one of the most critical problems to

be addressed is the consequence of an attack on ener-

gy infrastructure, which can reverberate far beyond

the point of origin. The attack can result in the inter-

ruption of the flow of energy, which might lead to

ripple effects. As a consequence, energy markets are

not immune and prices are strongly influenced even

from the result coming from one single attack if the

duration and extent of the attack itself are significant.

The rise in the energy prices is just one of the several

features that make the energy security a global issue

that no Ally can ignore.

At the latest NATO Summit, energy security

has been one of the prominent topics discussed. Once

again NATO has affirmed its role in the energy securi-

ty area in the Wales Summit Declaration (Article

109): “A stable and reliable energy supply, the diver-

sification of routes, suppliers and energy resources,

and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain

of critical importance(…)we will enhance our aware-

ness of energy developments with security implica-

tions for Allies and the Alliance; further develop

NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of

critical energy infrastructure; (…)We will also en-

hance training and education efforts, continue to en-


gage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis,

and consult with relevant international organizations,

including the EU, as appropriate”.

With the aim to provide the Allies with the

most appropriate support in the scope of energy sec-

tor, the NATO’s Center of Excellence for Energy

Security (ENSEC COE) was inaugurated in Vilnius,

Lithuania, in October 2013. This NATO ENSEC

COE, supported by Lithuania, Estonia, France, Italy,

Latvia and Turkey, has been tasked to provide both

NATO HQ and Members with analyses on energy

developments. At this Center of Excellence, other

relevant activities such as education, training, strate-

gic planning and technical and academic research are

conducted. As outlined by NATO Secretary General

Anders Fogh Rasmussen over the inauguration of the

Center on 6 September 2013: “Energy security is not

a call to arms. But when it comes to understanding

the security implications of global resource develop-

ments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.” This Cen-

ter of Excellence has an important mission, which is

to assist Strategic Commands, nations, partners, and

other civil and military bodies by supporting NATO’s

capability development process, mission effectiveness,

and interoperability in the near, mid and long term by

providing comprehensive and timely subject matter

expertise on all aspects of energy security. The mis-

sion includes cost effective solutions to support mili-

tary requirements, energy efficiency in the operation-

al field and interaction with academia and industry.

EU’s Role in Energy Security

Recalling the Article 109 in the NATO Summit

Declaration just mentioned above, the cooperation

between NATO and the EU and the role of the latter

in the energy security field is a strategic asset. The

Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon is considered the

legal basis for a new energy policy at the EU level. In

particular, four objectives are affirmed: 1. Ensure the

functioning of the energy market; 2. Ensure security

of energy supply in the Union; 3. Promote energy

efficiency and energy saving and the development of

new and renewable forms of energy; and 4. Promote

the interconnection of energy networks.

In order to achieve objectives number 1 and 2,

the European Commission established strict priorities

to make the energy infrastructure stable and secure

for the years to come; the most relevant being the

identification of European Critical Infrastructures

(ECI) in different energy sub-sectors: electricity, oil

and gas. Directive 2008/114/EC is the first legal in-

strument of an EU dimension on the subject of critical

infrastructure protection and is focused on the energy

and transport sectors. In particular, this directive con-

siders the role that EU Member States and owners/

operators of European Critical Infrastructures have in

identifying whether or not a particular ECI is a likely

target for an attack. Key criteria for identification in-

clude: casualties, economic impact and public opin-

ion. Once an ECI is identified through the criteria

mentioned above, each EU Member State will have

the duty to inform the others that might be signifi-

cantly affected by a potential attack, its identity, point

of origin and the reasons for designating it as a poten-

tial ECI target.

Moreover, an Operator Security Plan (OSP) has

been created in order to provide and implement solu-

tions for the protection of the ECI identified. In addi-

tion, each EU Member State will possess a Security

Liaison Officer or equivalent as the point of contact

for security related issues between the owners/

operators and the Member State authority. Through a

proper collaborative mechanism the relevant Member

State and the Security Liaison Officer identify the

NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO)


risks and threats in relation to the ECI concerned.

Last but not least, the European Commission will

also play a relevant role by providing the Member

State authority and the owner/operators of a des-

ignated ECI all the technologies and best practices

related to critical infrastructure protection.

The Directive 2008/114 is now under revi-

sion and a heated discussion is taking place

amongst European governments. The Thematic

Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protec-

tion (TNCEIP), made up of the European owners

and operators of energy infrastructure in the elec-

tricity, gas and oil sectors, are contributing to the

debate on the revision of the Directive with the

aim of raising awareness and sharing the best prac-

tices for improving the protection system of the

designated ECI. Resulting from the debate of this

revision of the Directive, TNCEIP has moved to

strengthening private-public partnership between

the European Commission, Member States and

relevant stakeholders, reinforcing contingency

plans, setting a common methodology for assessing

risks and threats and improving the technology on

information security.

Private Sector Role in Securing Energy

Besides the regulatory role played by the

EU, the private sector is supposed to play a more

relevant role in the CEIP. In particular, many en-

ergy companies, which own and operate energy as-

sets, should take under their consideration the finan-

cial impacts caused by a potential threat, be it either a

terrorist attack or vandalism. Moreover, other rele-

vant threats such as natural hazards, accidental haz-

ards, and consequential hazards might have a wide

financial impact on the energy company’s functioning.

Often a specific analysis of the security risk is not car-

ried out by the private sector. In doing so, the safety

of energy infrastructure and the well-being of all citi-

zens are more vulnerable. In order to analyze, miti-

gate, and minimize the security risks associated with

energy infrastructure, a set of guidelines has been pre-

pared by the Harnser Group for the European Com-

mission. These guidelines serve as an innovative tool

at the disposal of private companies, in which a de-

tailed analysis of the potential damaging effects result-

ing from a lack of experience and poor consideration

of the issues are provided. The vital importance of a

methodology for assessing risks and threats is affirmed

by two strategic documents prepared by the Harnser

Group. The first, published in summer 2010, titled:

“A Reference Security Management Plan for Energy

Infrastructure” considers the owners/operators ener-

gy perspective, giving them a useful blueprint to com-

ply with the national and/or international legal and

technical background. This document is intended to

provide an overall strategy for making an effective

Operator Security Plan under the Directive 2008/114

provisions. The second, published in autumn 2012,

titled: “The Financial Aspects of the Security of Assets

and Infrastructures in the Energy Sector” is a set of

guidelines for owners/operators of energy infrastruc-

tures aiming to solicit them to take into major consid-

eration the financial consequences of managing the

security risks on energy assets. This innovative docu-

ment contributes to raising awareness about the high

financial value resulting from the protection of critical

energy infrastructure.

CEIP: What’s Next?

Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is a

joint issue for the EU and NATO since many coun-

Energy security has been on the agenda of NATO and the Allies for several years

(NATO)


tries involved are members to both organizations. With

the Directive 2008/114, now under revision, the EU has

a certain role in securing the flow of vital energy sources.

However, due to a lack of coordinated European energy

policies, the preeminent role of the European states re-

mains untouched, ignoring an important component for

an EU energy-related body that would specialize in the

foreign relations component of providing CEIP for the

Euro-Atlantic region. This has unfortunately resulted in a

weak European cooperation, allowing further complica-

tions between NATO-EU relations to arise.

Despite this complicated collaboration, some steps

forward are being taken by NATO. Since 2008, after the

NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, the Alliance has

effectively provided its contribution through strategic

agreements such as the Partnership for Peace and the Is-

tanbul Cooperation Initiative within the framework of

Science for Peace and Security Programme. However,

NATO’s leading role in energy security is difficult to car-

ry out for three reasons. First, many countries refuse the

potential overstretching to which NATO might be ex-

posed. Second, other international organizations exist

that are better designed and mandated to address issues of

energy security. Third, several threats in diverse fields are

considered more relevant for the Alliance. Thus, NATO

should consider the energy security area as a potential

field, in which a specific added value might be provided in

mitigating risks to energy critical infrastructure. NATO

has wide access to the best available systems of surveil-

lance including satellite feeds, electronic intercepts and

on-the-ground representation, allowing NATO to con-

tribute securing attractive and vulnerable energy infra-

structure with a very high-level of support. For example,

information and intelligence sharing might represent a

further strategic way to contribute effectively to global

energy security.

Therefore, a comprehensive new approach could

look as followed: NATO should support the Member

States by giving access to the best practices for managing

both risks and threats to CEIP worldwide. This is the spe-

cific added value that might be extremely relevant for

securing energy supply from countries facing political

instability and a lack of security. On the EU side, first of

all, the problems in the designation of the European

Critical Infrastructure on each EU country should be

overcome by reinforcing the role of the EU Commis-

sion, which is only informed annually of the number of

ECI by sector, among which is also the energy sector.

Therefore, the Commission should play a stronger role

of guidance even if the Member States remain primari-

ly responsible for implementing and assessing the need

to enhance protection of critical infrastructure.

In order to implement the CEIP policies, the

dialogue with the private sector should be facilitated by

both NATO and the EU. This will lead to the involve-

ment of companies in the evaluation of the threats and

challenges facing the CEIP as well as a contribution to

the reduction of the likelihood of potential attacks.

This would create a sustainable long-term approach

that would increase security, lower expenses, and for-

mally develop an integrated system between the inter-

national organization and the private sector.

About the author

Alessandro Niglia is Program Manager at the Atlan-

tic Treaty Association focusing on the NATO-EU rela-

tions in the field of energy security. He is a Co-

Director of the NATO Advanced Research Work-

shop on the protection of critical energy infrastruc-

tures, contributing to an enhanced cooperation be-

tween both the public and private sectors. He

has graduated cum laude in Political Science and Euro-

pean Studies and holds a Post-Graduate Master in Geo-

politics and Global Security.

Bibliography

Cornell, P (2012), “Regional and International Energy Security Dynamics: Consequences for NATO’s Search for an Energy Security Role.” GCSP Geneva Paper, Research Se-ries no.5.

NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2008), Energy Security: Co-Operating to Enhance the Protection of Critical Energy Infra-structures.

North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, NATO’s Role in Energy Security. [Online] Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm.

Rapisarda, A (2007), “Risk Assessment in the Private Sector.” Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security.

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atlantic voices vol. 4, no. 9 (september 2014)

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