< 1> Friday, 18th September 1998 < 2> DAY 59 < 3> Submissions by MR McDONALD < 4> THE CHAIRMAN: We had two versions. < 5> MR MCDONALD: Yes, the second version is merely < 6> typing errors been corrected, nothing more. Layout < 7> is slightly different, but that is what the word < 8> processor does. < 9> THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Do the shorthand <10> writers have a copy, Mr McDonald? <11> MR MCDONALD: I hope so, sir. <12> THE CHAIRMAN: Are you going to use documents? <13> MR MCDONALD: No, I don't think I will be. I shall <14> do everything orally. <15> Duwayne Brooks was a key witness and the <16> surviving victim of this racist attack and murder. <17> He cooperated fully with the police and continued to <18> cooperate long after other key witnesses gave up. <19> He was, in our submission, helpful and <20> straightforward. He provided nine witness <21> statements, attended three identity parades, two <22> court hearings and three inquest hearings, yet he was <23> treated with suspicion and disrespect. He was <24> falsely accused of breaking a window in Plumstead <25> police station. He was charged with events at the . P-11338

< 1> Welling demonstration long after he had been < 2> identified by PC Bull and the CPS persisted in his < 3> prosecution despite strong representations by his < 4> solicitor, by very senior police officers and < 5> indications of the trial judge. In that sense, he < 6> was literally criminalised. It is our main < 7> submission, sir, that this is primarily because he < 8> was a young, black man; because of the nature of the < 9> crime, a racist attack; and the state of police <10> service disabled by racism. <11> Before I come on to the substance of our <12> submissions, may I briefly refer to a matter which <13> was submitted to the Inquiry yesterday by Mr Gompertz <14> on behalf of the Metropolitan Police. <15> He asked that, so far as findings which your <16> Inquiry may make about police officers, the criminal <17> standard of proof should be applied. Of course, as <18> is well-known to you, sir, in crime we do not convict <19> people or punish them unless at the end of the day <20> the prosecution can bring sufficient evidence to <21> prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. <22> The criminal standard of proof is based upon a <23> presumption of innocence. When the Metropolitan <24> Police request that no adverse findings be made by <25> your Inquiry against police officers, in our . P-11339

< 1> submission, sir, he seriously misjudges the nature of < 2> an inquiry of this kind under the Police Act. < 3> He is, in our submission, in effect seeking for < 4> the police not just of a presumption of innocence, < 5> but a presumption of rectitude, which was referred to < 6> in Mr Egan's written submissions, a presumption of < 7> competence, a presumption that they do not stereotype < 8> on racial grounds and that they do not discriminate < 9> on grounds of race or sex. <10> This plea, in our submission, if it was accepted <11> would put the police in a position of extraordinary <12> privilege, and it is partly in relation to that, and <13> partly arising out of the events here, that we have <14> drafted certain recommendations to this Inquiry which <15> I will deal with later on. <16> In our written submissions to the Inquiry, sir, <17> we deal with the evidence in time sequence -- at the <18> scene; in the hospital; at the police station; the <19> question of the identity parades and Sergeant <20> Crowley; the kind of support and treatment which <21> Mr Brooks had, both as a victim and as a witness; we <22> have a section on the CPS, a very short piece on <23> corruption. <24> But the principal theme running through our <25> submissions is racism. First, the stereotyping of . P-11340

< 1> Mr Brooks and the consequences that that had for the < 2> unfolding of the police investigation. Secondly, we < 3> deal in our submissions with the difficulties which, < 4> in our submission, the police had in coping with the < 5> concept of a racially motivated murder, and thirdly, < 6> and importantly, with institutional racism. < 7> Racial stereotyping and institutional racism, in < 8> our submission, are not purely academic subjects or < 9> distant, faraway things. A little bit like diptheria <10> or scarlet fever, they have to be inoculated against, <11> they have to be abhorred. But once you have done <12> these relatively easy things, you can put them to one <13> side and forget about them. Yet in our submission, <14> regrettably, that is how the Metropolitan Police have <15> chosen to deal with both of these things. <16> Our detailed factual submissions on the racial <17> stereotyping of Mr Brooks are dismissed in the <18> submissions of the Metropolitan Police as emotive and <19> unproven assertions, so that at the end of the day <20> racial stereotyping can be confined to a theoretical <21> concept referred to politely in Dr Robin Oakly's <22> advice to police on the subject, but of no practical <23> application on the frontline where the real policing <24> takes place. <25> Institutional racism gets the same short . P-11341

< 1> shrift. It is dismissed as emotive and open to < 2> misinterpretation -- paragraph 1980 of the police < 3> submissions. < 4> In our submission, it is a cause for very < 5> considerable concern that at the end of this Inquiry < 6> the Metropolitan Police remain in denial about two of < 7> the major issues thrown up by this Inquiry -- racial < 8> stereotyping and institutional racism. < 9> In our submission, what happened to Mr Duwayne <10> Brooks offers a unique opportunity to see how racial <11> stereotyping and institutional racism work in <12> practice during the course of a live murder <13> investigation and, more importantly, offers a unique <14> opportunity, in our submission, to learn important <15> lessons from it. <16> We have tried to make clear in our submissions <17> that we are not here dealing with the violent racism, <18> the almost pathological racism, of the racist thugs <19> who killed Stephen Lawrence all with blatant, overt <20> prejudice. We are not dealing with something which <21> is morally reprehensible in the way both those kinds <22> of racism clearly are, and that was not, in our <23> submission, the situation of the officers who dealt <24> with Duwayne Brooks. They were a million miles from <25> the violent racism of the attackers and they were not . P-11342

< 1> people fueled by prejudice and hatred against black < 2> people. But that is not the point. < 3> At paragraph 1.9 of our submissions, page 4, we < 4> make this point: acting out racial prejudices by < 5> blatant discrimination or by resort to racial < 6> harassment is morally repugnant. During the Inquiry, < 7> the police witnesses, not surprisingly, rejected any < 8> suggestion that they had done so. But racism, we < 9> say, is much wider and more complex and operates more <10> subtly. <11> And we draw your Inquiry's attention to the <12> report on racial stereotyping which was submitted to <13> the Inquiry by Professor Stuart Hall for part 2. We <14> say this: all of us, all of us are prone to <15> stereotyping, often quite unaware that we are doing <16> so. Recognition that Mr Duwayne Brooks has been <17> racially stereotyped in the course of the police <18> investigation is something that has developed during <19> this Inquiry. <20> We say, in addition to what we have put in the <21> written submissions, that until we recognise <22> prejudices, attitudes and stereotypes which we all <23> hold, then we can not begin to deal with them. It is <24> no good, in our submission, for the Metropolitan <25> Police to stand like an ostrich with its head in the . P-11343

< 1> hand and its bottom in the air and let racial < 2> stereotyping and institutional racism pass it by. It < 3> is not a pretty sight. < 4> Lord Scarman, in his report in 1981, was very < 5> ambivalent about institutional racism and focused < 6> instead on the individual bad apples, but times have < 7> moved on since then and you will be receiving, we < 8> know, in part 2 a number of important submissions on < 9> how the times have moved on and what the implications <10> of that are. <11> The fact is that a great number of studies have <12> been done since the Scarman report on racial <13> stereotyping within the police service. They are <14> referred to in the report which we have submitted for <15> part 2 of this Inquiry by Professor Stuart Hall. <16> Nowadays I think it is right to say that we all have <17> a much clearer idea, or should have, of how these are <18> reflected in large institutions like the police. <19> In our submission, what this Inquiry has which <20> is different is that this time it is not survey <21> evidence, but what happened to Duwayne Brooks in an <22> ongoing murder investigation, and we feel sure that <23> the Inquiry will not miss the opportunity to analyse <24> the situation, reach conclusions from it and <25> hopefully to draw important lessons for the future of . P-11344

< 1> policing. < 2> I have already, sir, referred to different kinds < 3> of racism which we have heard about in the course of < 4> this Inquiry. There has been the clear evidence of < 5> the obsessive, pathological and violent prejudice and < 6> hatred of the five suspects. There has been, what < 7> Mr Gompertz described as the express conscious racism < 8> which lies at the core of his submissions to the < 9> Inquiry, his paragraph 19.5. <10> Thirdly, there is the racism which is involved <11> in indirect discrimination where everyone is treated <12> equally, where the intention is to treat everyone <13> equally but where conditions and requirements are <14> applied which have a disproportionate adverse impact <15> upon a particular racial group. Fourthly, we have <16> heard about racial stereotyping and fifthly about <17> institutional racism. <18> The racism which is behind or may lie behind <19> acts of racial discrimination may, in fact, be any of <20> those: it may be blatant; it may be based on hatred <21> and prejudice; it may be unconscious; it may be <22> indirect; it may be based on racial stereotyping; it <23> may be individual racism or institutional racism. <24> The main thrust, as we have understood it, sir, <25> of the police submissions to this Inquiry on racism . P-11345

< 1> are dealing with one, and one only, of those forms of < 2> racism, the express conscious racism, which according < 3> to a footnote in Mr Gompertz's written submissions < 4> involves explicit racist comments and behaviour which < 5> is unequivocally prejudiced. < 6> In our submission it is a pity that the focus is < 7> on such a narrow issue and, in our submission, does < 8> not deal adequately with what we have indicated are < 9> the key issues in your Inquiry, stereotyping and <10> institutional racism and the effect that these have <11> or may have had in this Inquiry upon competent and <12> effective policing. In a sense, the focus of this <13> Inquiry is not about what police call black people, <14> it is not about language; it is not about whether the <15> police will not promote a black PC to Sergeant, it is <16> about the more complex and subtle forms of <17> stereotyping, running throughout a particular <18> institution. <19> May I then come, sir, to our submissions, "at <20> the scene". That is in paragraph 2. <21> THE CHAIRMAN: Page 3. <22> MR MCDONALD: Page 3. We set out with some degree, <23> we would submit, of care the evidence and the basis <24> upon which we say that Duwayne Brooks was racially <25> stereotyped and allude to the consequences of doing . P-11346

< 1> so. I have no intention of repeating it or going < 2> over it in detail. The process involves an < 3> examination of what Duwayne Brooks said in his < 4> evidence about what happened at the scene, < 5> particularly when Mr & Mrs Taaffe and Mr & Mrs Geddis < 6> and then the first police officers on duty arrived < 7> there. He describes his feelings and how he < 8> reacted. Our submission, having carefully gone < 9> through the transcripts of the evidence, is that his <10> account is largely corroborated, we say, by the other <11> eyewitness' and, indeed, by the initial accounts of <12> the police officers. <13> But then what is clear is that as time goes by <14> there emerges from the police officers what may have <15> been their true perception of Mr Brooks on the night <16> in question. We trace that through the pro forma <17> questionnaires, which were prepared and filled in by <18> police officers without any prompting or witness <19> statement taking, during the course of the Croydon <20> prosecution of Mr Brooks, through their evidence to <21> the Kent Inquiry and through their evidence to this <22> Inquiry. Our conclusion, which we invite your <23> Inquiry to endorse, is that that amounts to the <24> clearest possible evidence from which you can infer <25> that Duwayne Brooks was racially stereotyped by the . P-11347

< 1> police officers. < 2> If I can go to paragraph 2.10 at page 10, where < 3> we say this: it should be noted that whilst the < 4> officers were racially stereotyping Duwayne Brooks < 5> there were elements of their description of him which < 6> were accurate. Even stereotypical descriptions < 7> contain elements of the truth, but it is the < 8> distortions and embellishments which makes a < 9> stereotype. Thus, for example, even WPC Bethal and <10> WPC Smith accepted that Duwayne Brooks was upset and <11> distressed, transcript page 279 to 80 and page 543. <12> It is not this but the distortions and embellishments <13> to which we object. In our submission the volatility <14> and lack of control described to Duwayne Brooks <15> simply belie the evidence and common sense. <16> The consequences of regarding Duwayne Brooks in <17> that stereotypical fashion was that he was never <18> asked or given an opportunity to hop in a police car <19> and go round the area with a view to spotting <20> suspects who may still be lurking there. In his <21> submissions to you, sir, Mr Gompertz, on behalf of <22> the police, says that submission is wholly <23> unrealistic because, he says, if I have understood <24> his submission, that Mr Brooks was only concerned <25> with the arrival of the ambulance and going to . P-11348

< 1> hospital with his friend. In our submission that < 2> wholly misses the point. Mr Brooks was never asked, < 3> he was never given an opportunity to go and assist < 4> the police in searching for the suspects and the < 5> reasons given by Mr Gompertz are not the same as the < 6> reasons which were given by the police officers < 7> involved in cross-examination. < 8> Their reasons are set out in paragraph 2.13 at < 9> page 14 of our submissions. We say this: each of the <10> three acting police officers at the scene was asked <11> about this, why he was not given the chance to go <12> round the area with them, and their answers <13> confirmed, in our submission, their stereotyping. <14> PC Gleason said, "it was impossible due to <15> Duwayne Brooks's highly excitable state", transcript <16> page 585. WPC Smith said that it had not occurred to <17> her but that in any event Duwayne Brooks was quote, <18> "in no fit state to go round looking for suspects", <19> transcript 574 to 5. WPC Bethal said that it had <20> never occurred to her until the Kent Police brought <21> the matter up in interview, nevertheless, she said, <22> it would not have been possible or appropriate given <23> that Duwayne Brooks was, "very agitated" and <24> "uncontrolable", and could not describe the <25> individual attackers. She added that: "If we had . P-11349

< 1> found those youths, goodness knows who he would have < 2> done", transcript page 321 to 322. She had, < 3> apparently, driven herself into a position of < 4> admitting that she had avoided the search in case it < 5> was successful. < 6> Thirdly, of course, the submission of < 7> Mr Gompertz that it was wholly unrealistic < 8> contradicts what Mr Brooks has said in his own < 9> evidence, to the effect that he would have jumped at <10> the chance of doing so. Of course he would, it makes <11> sense, in our submission. <12> Another consequence which we advert to in <13> paragraph 2.14 of stereotyping Mr Brooks at the scene <14> is that it meant that the conduct of the <15> house-to-house searches were without the benefit of <16> his descriptions and, of course, the consequences for <17> Mr Brooks were to demean and belittle him at a time <18> when respect and comfort were called for. Having <19> read out to you the way in which the police officers <20> immediately concerned with Mr Brooks have described <21> him over time, let me draw by way of contrast the way <22> in which Katherine Avery, a 15-year-old girl, who was <23> in her house, her parents' house, adjacent to the <24> pavement where Stephen Lawrence was lying. She was <25> watching from her window and she saw Stephen Lawrence . P-11350

< 1> staggering before falling in front of her house on < 2> the pavement. < 3> She paints a very different pictures of Duwayne < 4> Brooks from the uncontrollable, aggressive, < 5> excitable, anti-police person described by the < 6> officers. She was young, white, and without any < 7> attempt to load her descriptions. < 8> I read from the transcript on day 5 at page 740: < 9> Answer: "As I remember, Stephen collapsed to the <10> floor, Duwayne was obviously trying to get some form <11> of attention, so obviously, yes, he was waving his <12> hands around." <13> Question: "But he was obviously distraught?" <14> Answer: "Yes." <15> Question: "And then you saw him crossing the road to <16> the phone box?" <17> Answer: "That is correct." <18> Question: "And talking to someone on the phone?" <19> Answer: "Yes, I could hear him -- I could hear his <20> voice quite raised." <21> Question: "Again, you saw him in a frustrated way <22> bashing the receiver on the phone box." <23> Answer: "That is correct." <24> Question: "Before leaving it dangling in the phone <25> box. This is all before any police officers . P-11351

< 1> arrived?" < 2> Answer: "That's correct." < 3> Question: "In your witness statement you say Duwayne < 4> was crying?" < 5> Answer: "Yes, he was crying and he was -- obviously < 6> his demeanour rose. He got upset and then he would < 7> be quiet again but all the time he was, I believe -- < 8> as I remember, he was with the male policeman." < 9> May I then move to the hospital -- it is dealt <10> with in our written submissions at paragraph 3. It <11> was at the hospital where Duwayne Brooks made his <12> first witness statement which was copied into the <13> notebook of PC Gleason. <14> I do not think there is any dispute about this <15> throughout the whole of this Inquiry that this was a <16> crucial, critical document, not just for its <17> contents, but because of the time at which it was <18> produced, so quickly after the event. That puts <19> paid, we submit, to all the nonsense about Duwayne <20> Brooks being confused and out of control and <21> uncooperative. It also gives a description, <22> including the hair colour, of one of the attackers, <23> yet this statement never got on to the CAD system. <24> It does not appear that the description he gave was <25> ever circulated to police officers who had come on to . P-11352

< 1> the scene by this time. In short, it got lost < 2> somewhere in the system and in our section 3 we < 3> summarise that evidence. < 4> THE CHAIRMAN: When do you say it did emerge; is < 5> there a reference to that? You said lost for many < 6> years. It is just something that struck me reading < 7> -- whether it is a very good point but I cannot < 8> remember what the time was when it reappeared. < 9> MR MCDONALD: It re-emerged during the Kent inquiry. <10> THE CHAIRMAN: Not until Kent. <11> MR MCDONALD: The extraordinary thing is that the CPS <12> did not even know about it. But we say at 3.6: We <13> will probably never know how PC Gleason's notebook <14> was lost for so many years or whether it was he or <15> another officer who was responsible for failing to <16> convey its contents to DC Cooper and the <17> investigating officers. The consequences of this <18> were to undermine Duwayne Brooks' credibility as an <19> identification witness. Defence counsel made <20> effective use of this misconception about when <21> Duwayne Brooks had first described the main <22> attacker's hair colour when they cross-examined him <23> both at the committal of their clients and at the <24> private prosecution at the Old Bailey. <25> 3.7 -- why was this evidence lost? It is . P-11353

< 1> consistent with the early failures described above to < 2> treat Duwayne Brooks and the information he had with < 3> appropriate seriousness. 3.8 -- he told the Inquiry < 4> that PC Gleason did not seem to believe him when he < 5> said the main attacker had said, "What, what nigger" < 6> before attacking Stephen Lawrence, transcript page < 7> 5071. PC Gleason appears to so agree. He admitted < 8> that it was more than likely that he would have < 9> wanted to double or treble check this kind of <10> statement, transcript page 534. <11> It is inconceivable that an officer would treble <12> check abuse in a non-racial attack -- for example, if <13> a witness heard an attacker, "Shout take this you <14> c**t." In the circumstances, it is further evidence, <15> we submit, that the police had difficulty accepting <16> that the murder of Stephen Lawrence was racially <17> motivated. <18> If I can then move to the police station, which <19> is our section 4. Here Mr Brooks made the very <20> important first written witness statement. It took a <21> long time and at the end of it he had been up for <22> more than 24 hours; he had seen his best friend <23> murdered; he had been treated as a suspect; he had <24> been treated as a potential mugger; he had been <25> described as virtually out of control; and he had . P-11354

< 1> been made to wait for what appeared to him at least < 2> hours in a police car outside the hospital before he < 3> was eventually taken to the police station in order < 4> to make his statement. We ask: Was this the image < 5> of a surly, uncooperating and agitated person causing < 6> a lot of problems and aggravation? < 7> At the police station Detective Inspector Jeynes < 8> seemed to think so. He set out his view of Duwayne < 9> Brooks at -- we have set it out at our paragraph <10> 4.2. DI Jeynes described him as "surly and <11> non-cooperative", agitated, causing a lot of problems <12> and aggravation. Not surprisingly, he would not <13> accept that he was racially stereotyping Duwayne <14> Brooks. <15> Fortunately, two officers with no such <16> stereotypical view of a young black man in a police <17> station were also there and we draw the Inquiry's <18> attention to the evidence of DC Cooper and Detective <19> Superintendent Crampton, both of whom spoke of <20> Mr Brooks in glowing terms. <21> DC Cooper said that he was remarkably together, <22> perceptive and intelligent, that is in his statement <23> at page 138 of (PCA0030). Detective Superintendent <24> Crampton described Mr Brooks as very calm, a little <25> bit shocked, truthful and helpful, and that is in his . P-11355

< 1> statement (PCA0049) at page 233. < 2> In our submission, that is more evidence of the < 3> stereotyping of Duwayne Brooks at the police station, < 4> but it does not just end there, because there arose a < 5> complete false misconception that Mr Brooks had < 6> broken a window downstairs in the police station. We < 7> deal with this in 4.4. < 8> In his submissions yesterday to the Inquiry, < 9> Mr Gompertz dealt with the incident of breaking the <10> window and said that it could easily be explained as <11> being simply a mistake having been made by <12> PC Pennington. We have drawn the Inquiry's attention <13> to what we think is a matter to the credit of <14> PC Pennington, but having discovered a <15> contemporaneous note by a custody officer which <16> completely exonerated Mr Brooks he brought this to <17> the Inquiry and accepted under oath that Mr Brooks <18> was never in the front office and could not possibly <19> have broken the window,, transcript page 4041. <20> But why we say it cannot simply be dismissed as <21> a mistake is because the same accusation, the same <22> false accusation was repeated in the pro forma <23> questionnaire filled in by PC Gleason for the <24> purposes of the Croydon prosecution. In our <25> submission, it is quite clear from that that this was . P-11356

< 1> part of the canteen gossip about Duwayne Brooks, that < 2> he had smashed a window in the police station on the < 3> night, when in fact he was cooperating with the < 4> police over a period of three to four hours writing < 5> out his witness statement. < 6> So it had obviously got round the police < 7> canteen. That is not just a mistake. Mr Gompertz < 8> says, "Well, you cannot use that as evidence of < 9> stereotyping because the crime of breaking the window <10> was in fact committed by another young black man." <11> In our submission, that simply will not do. <12> It is assuming that one young black man is as <13> good as another when it comes to ascribing criminal <14> characteristics. That is a classic case in our <15> submission of how young black men are racially <16> stereotyped. <17> To some extent, it is on a par with the evidence <18> which Mr Taaffe gave to the Inquiry, very honestly, <19> that when he first saw Stephen Lawrence staggering <20> down the road and Mr Brooks he was afraid that it was <21> some kind of ruse in order to mug him and his wife. <22> Fortunately, he was a man of sufficient honesty and <23> conscience that he quickly overcame his fear, but he <24> was honest enough to say that that was his first <25> perception of two young men walking, staggering down . P-11357

< 1> the road, that they were in fact muggers, or might < 2> be. < 3> That is the clearest example of how racial < 4> stereotyping arises, and one of the factors behind it < 5> is that young black males are thought of as criminals < 6> rather than as victims. We say that that is an < 7> important element in the way in which Mr Brooks was < 8> treated by the police. < 9> In his account, at the police station the <10> witness statement contained all the main elements of <11> the attack. In 1.5 of our written submissions we say <12> this: our submissions on Duwayne Brooks' behalf are <13> premised on the assertion that whatever view is taken <14> of his identification evidence, his core account <15> given within hours of the attack of the way in which <16> the attack took place, the people involved, and their <17> racist motive, was and remains a true and accurate <18> account, except that he clearly mistook a knife for <19> an iron bar. <20> In our submission, if speedy arrests had been <21> made of the suspects -- this is what we say at 1.6 -- <22> we have no doubt at all that Mr Brooks would have <23> been in a far better position to make <24> identifications, as also would the bus stop <25> witnesses, the identifications would have been closer . P-11358

< 1> to the event and, in his case, they would have been < 2> before the full onset of his post-traumatic stress < 3> disorder. < 4> In the event, the credibility of Mr Brooks' < 5> identification evidence was seriously undermined by < 6> DS Crowley's account of the identification parade of < 7> the 3rd June. Our submission is that DS Crowley was < 8> either lying about or seriously misunderstood much of < 9> what Duwayne Brooks told him and that the police <10> investigation into this whole saga was incomplete and <11> inadequate. <12> Unfortunately, this Inquiry has also not <13> unearthed the whole truth about DS Crowley, and we <14> develop that in the section in which we deal with DS <15> Crowley. Our submissions on him are set out in <16> section 5.1 to 5.11. <17> In brief, developing what I have just outlined, <18> our submission is, first of all, that on those narrow <19> but quite crucial areas of disagreement between <20> DS Crowley and Mr Brooks, there is the possibility <21> that he might be mistaken or has misunderstood what <22> has been said. The Metropolitan Police acknowledge <23> that DS Crowley has got it wrong about the school, <24> the point about Duwayne Brooks being at the same <25> school as one of the suspects. They accept that he . P-11359

< 1> has got it wrong there. < 2> He also made mistakes, as the evidence < 3> indicates, in his own witness statement about the < 4> date. He made mistakes about the age and occupation < 5> of Colin Cattini, and we deal with that at paragraph < 6> 5.7.10 of our written submissions. But much more < 7> importantly, he did not make any record of the < 8> alleged conversation until he had got back to the < 9> police station, I believe it is something like three <10> hours later, and, of course, as far as that part of <11> our submission is concerned, although that was <12> Mr Weeden's view, as Ms Woodley has pointed out in <13> her closing submissions to you, sir, it is not <14> addressed at all in Mr Gompertz' submissions to this <15> Inquiry. <16> Our alternative submission is that PC Crowley <17> lied. In our submission, but it is entirely a matter <18> for you, sir, he did not come over well as a witness <19> in cross-examination. More importantly, we ask, is <20> he to be believed when he says that it was not a <21> conversation he had with Mr Brooks but rather he <22> heard a monologue or speech from Mr Brooks which <23> flowed from his mouth without any interruption at <24> all? We suggest that that description is almost <25> beyond belief. We accept that on the evidence that . P-11360

< 1> is before the Tribunal we have not enough to prove a < 2> racial motive or a corrupt motive, but there is < 3> enough upon which you can find that he may well have < 4> sugared the pill because he did not like Mr Brooks or < 5> his attitude. He may well have taken the same view < 6> that all these other police officers took of him, of < 7> being surly and uncooperative, and all the rest of < 8> it, all because Mr Brooks told him, which is the < 9> evidence of Mr Brooks, to fuck off when Mr Brooks got <10> out of the car. That may have spurred him into <11> embellishing and sugaring the pill. <12> We also accept that on the evidence that is <13> before this Inquiry that no assistance on this matter <14> can be derived from PC Crowley's role in the Adams' <15> investigation but it is part of our submission that <16> there is more to DS Crowley than this Inquiry has <17> been able to unearth. The Selwood Report, which was <18> commissioned by Mr Nove, was neither thorough nor <19> complete. Indeed, that was accepted by both Mr Nove <20> and Mr Johnston in their evidence to the Inquiry. <21> That was because speed was of the essence. <22> Notwithstanding that, we have indicated, and we have <23> put it in the form of a further written submission to <24> the Inquiry, that there are errors in the way that <25> the Metropolitan Police put their case and rather . P-11361

< 1> than weary your ears with it we have chosen to weary < 2> your eyes with it. < 3> THE CHAIRMAN: We have it. < 4> MR MCDONALD: The next section deals with Mr Brooks < 5> and his treatment as a victim and a witness, that is < 6> our section 6. < 7> To some extent we need say very little about < 8> this in the light of concessions which have been made < 9> regarding his treatment, particularly by the police. <10> But we would like to emphasise three points arising <11> from the matters which are in our written <12> submissions: <13> We say in paragraph 6.1 that Mr Brooks should <14> have been treated in accordance with the principles <15> of the victims' charter. We say that, sir, <16> appreciating that that particular charter was not <17> adopted by the Metropolitan Police in 1993, it was <18> adopted much later, but the principles, which are set <19> out in it, were already well-known and were operating <20> and in practice, as we understand it. So we are <21> using that as a shorthand way of describing how he <22> ought to have been treated. <23> The second point that we wish to make arises <24> from paragraph 6.4 and the action which has been <25> referred to time and time again in the evidence, . P-11362

< 1> (MET00820156) and we simply say this, sir: if, as < 2> that action indicates, DS Bevan did alert victim < 3> support in order to seek help for Mr Brooks, he < 4> himself was never contacted. We find it astonishing < 5> that so many crucial contacts and arrangements were < 6> not made through Mr Brooks himself but through < 7> someone else, through his parents, for example. He < 8> was 18, he was an adult at the time. < 9> We know that he made arrangements that he should <10> be contacted by the police through his mother, but it <11> was he and not his mother who needed to know of the <12> progress of the case, who needed victim support and <13> it was he who should have been told by Mr Weeden that <14> he was not a suspect. That was a very nice letter <15> that Mr Weeden wrote, and we appreciate it, but it <16> was written to both his parents, not to him. Why was <17> it not written to him? Was it because he was a <18> young, black male and somewhere in the police psyche <19> they did not think that such people were responsible <20> enough to get important information direct? Is it <21> another instance, we ask, of racial stereotypical <22> views being applied in the dealings with Duwayne <23> Brooks? <24> The third thing that we would draw or highlight <25> in our submissions is the demand which was made, and . P-11363

< 1> we deal with this at 6.9.1, of Duwayne Brooks for a < 2> photograph. Requiring him to give a photograph of < 3> himself could only be used for two things: either to < 4> give it to the press, and if that happened and it was < 5> published that would expose him to risk and danger; < 6> or, as was indicated by Mr Bullock in his evidence, < 7> to give to witnesses and suspects. Giving a < 8> photograph of the man who got away from this brutal, < 9> racist murder to suspects is not, in our submission, <10> just regrettable but potentially life threatening. <11> We hope that no-one in Mr Brooks position will ever <12> be asked for a photograph in those circumstances. <13> That is a matter, sir, on which we would ask that <14> this Inquiry makes an express finding. <15> Can I then come to the section on -- and I am <16> going to speed through it -- the Crown Prosecution <17> Service. We set out our submissions in section 7. I <18> have already indicated in the very first matter that <19> I addressed to you that we have expressed a strong <20> concern that, first of all, Mr Brooks was charged <21> with the events at the Welling demonstration, long <22> after he had been identified by PC Bull. Perhaps the <23> significant thing is that on the bit of paper in <24> which PC Bull sets out his identification someone has <25> marked that "for intelligence purposes only" . P-11364

< 1> indicating, in our submission, a clear view taken at < 2> that time that this was something not for prosecution < 3> but for intelligence purposes. Yet after he had < 4> been, in our submission, junked as a witness he was < 5> then charged and we do not accept that that was < 6> because it took an awful lot of time for officers to < 7> see video footage, and all the rest of it. < 8> Having been charged it is our submission that < 9> the CPS persisted in that prosecution going ahead. <10> That was, notwithstanding the strong representations <11> which were made persistently and, perhaps, sometimes <12> annoyingly by his solicitor, but rightly, in our <13> submission, by very strong representations which were <14> made by very senior police officers, and we are <15> grateful to the matters on this occasion which <16> Mr Gompertz has drawn attention to in his submissions <17> to the Inquiry. Finally, by the indication of the <18> trial judge which were ignored by the CPS. <19> Of course, what we say is that there was ample <20> reason: <21> A. Because of the fact that Mr Brooks was by <22> then suffering from post traumatic stress disorder <23> and; <24> B. By the kind of public interest <25> representations which senior police officers drew to . P-11365

< 1> the CPS's attention. This was a pointless < 2> prosecution to proceed with. We differ in one < 3> respect only with the submissions on this that are < 4> made by Mr Gompertz and that is, in our submission < 5> the code, and I am not going to refer it to it or < 6> draw it up, of practice for prosecutions did < 7> incorporate in effect the very wide words that < 8> Sir Hartly Shawcross, as he then was, had indicated < 9> when he was Attorney General: there was a very wide <10> discretion to stop prosecutions in the public <11> interest. And, in our submission, that wide <12> discretion ought to have been exercised here but was <13> not. <14> We have embellished, to some extent, what I have <15> said in a short further written submission, which I <16> think you have. <17> THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we have it. <18> MR MCDONALD: We refer briefly to corruption. We <19> would endorse the submissions that have already been <20> made to the Inquiry by Mr Mansfield on this subject. <21> He also makes submissions with regard to what he <22> calls institutional lethargy and again those are <23> submissions with which we would associate ourselves. <24> On this subject of corrupt relationships between <25> organised criminals and police we would also add . P-11366

< 1> this: the issue of Clifford Norris and of the Stuarts < 2> -- that is both the suspect Norris and the suspect < 3> Acourts -- linked as they are to organised criminal < 4> families, also raises the much more worrying < 5> possibility of an organisational link between < 6> organised crime and racist extremists. < 7> It is quite clear from the evidence before your < 8> Inquiry, sir, that the police had no intelligence on < 9> this at the time of Stephen Lawrence's murder. The <10> Inquiry by Detective Superintendent Mellish may have <11> lifted the lid on it, but there is no evidence that <12> the full implications have been taken on board or <13> will be by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Grieve in <14> his newly allotted task. We would simply say that <15> that is a very worrying possible trend that this <16> Inquiry has raised. <17> We then come to our section on marginalisation <18> of Mr Brooks' evidence and racism. Mr Brooks gave <19> crucial information very shortly after the murder and <20> then that same evening in more detail in his witness <21> statement. I have already dealt with, and our <22> written submissions have dealt with, the stereotyping <23> of Mr Brooks and the effect that that has had on the <24> weight that the police have given to his account, the <25> core of which we have indicated has been accepted by . P-11367

< 1> all parties as setting out the nature of this < 2> attack. < 3> He described it very, very quickly and both to < 4> police officers at the scene and in those statements, < 5> made it quite clear that it was an unprovoked attack < 6> by unknown assailants with a racial motive, that it < 7> was violent racism. < 8> We have read the submissions which are about to < 9> be made to you, sir, by the Commission for Racial <10> Equality, particularly dealing with the fallout from <11> that. We support those submissions, except that we <12> would like to correct what we think is one mistake, <13> and that is that the reaction of the police does not <14> show that they disbelieved Mr Brooks' account; that <15> is not the evidence. There may have been initial <16> disbelief and scepticism, it is certainly his view <17> that there was. <18> It has been corroborated, as I have already <19> indicated, by the answers which one of those police <20> officers who took a first statement, PC Gleason, has <21> said. But it is also clear from the evidence that by <22> 5 o'clock in the morning senior police officers had <23> accepted that this was a racially motivated murder -- <24> Mr Crampton, Mr McIvor -- and they also accepted, as <25> Mr Crampton made clear in his evidence and indeed . P-11368

< 1> later Mr Weeden and Mr Bullock, that Mr Brooks was a < 2> crucial and believable and credible witness. < 3> In our submission, the real point is not that < 4> they disbelieved him, but first of all that they did < 5> not take seriously what he was telling them, and < 6> secondly, that they did not understand the full < 7> implications and ramifications of his account of an < 8> unprovoked piece of violent racism committed by < 9> people who are completely unknown to the victims. We <10> deal with that in our written submissions, so do <11> others, and we do not repeat in full what we have <12> said. <13> What we would like to highlight, however, is <14> that the evidence before your Inquiry, sir, indicates <15> in our submission that when the police machinery <16> swung into action after realising it was a racial <17> murder, it was geared to and focused upon the <18> question of public order and that was the very clear <19> evidence which was given by Mr McIvor who visited the <20> scene at about 3 o'clock in the morning. He was the <21> Northern Irish officer. <22> And secondly, of keeping black community leaders <23> informed of what the police were doing in order to <24> ensure there would be no comeback from within the <25> black community, and evidence of that has been given . P-11369

< 1> to you, again, by a number of officers. < 2> So the clear, immediate police response to the < 3> need to beware of public order, and indeed PC Fisher, < 4> the racial incidents officer, was taken off the < 5> inquiry, the investigation, because it was known that < 6> there was going to be a large demonstration against < 7> the presence of the BNP head quarters in Welling < 8> around the beginning of May. He was taken off the < 9> police inquiry into Stephen Lawrence's death so that <10> he could deal with those matters. That structured, <11> organised response to a racist murder contrasts <12> starkly with the almost complete absence of any <13> notion that an incident of violent racism required <14> active use of police intelligence and had <15> investigative and operational consequences and not <16> just public relations and public order consequences. <17> To some extent, the matters that I allude to have <18> been dealt with already in the submissions of <19> Mr Mansfield and are dealt with quite fully in the <20> submissions which are to come from the Commission for <21> Racial Equality. <22> The evidence, in our submission, suggests an <23> absence of procedures and structures for responding <24> to the specific requirements of crimes which involve <25> violent racism. That seems to us, if that submission . P-11370

< 1> is right, to be an institutional fault. Perhaps in < 2> the light of the absence of procedures and structures < 3> and a readiness to deal with violent racism it is not < 4> surprising that operational officers with as much < 5> experience as those CID officers we heard from and < 6> which Mr Mansfield has dealt with, those operational < 7> officers, the CID officers on the ground, saw no need < 8> to see this murder as racially motivated. < 9> It is perhaps not surprising that the <10> investigators missed the significance of the red <11> Astra filled, as it was, with all these known racists <12> coming from that well-known pub going up the road and <13> down the road as you have heard. Perhaps it is not <14> surprising, therefore, in view of the absence of <15> structures, procedures and a readiness and perhaps a <16> willingness to deal with crimes of violent racism, <17> that Mr Brooks' initial account was received with a <18> degree of disbelief, and even when it was accepted <19> that he was an accurate and credible witness, that <20> the police missed the full significance of what he <21> was saying. <22> In our submission, the focus of the policing as <23> revealed in this Inquiry is too much on how the black <24> community will react and too little on how to catch <25> the criminals, how to put in place the necessary . P-11371

< 1> intelligence gathering, the necessary structures and < 2> procedures for catching the criminals involved in < 3> violent racism. < 4> It seems to us that within the black community < 5> there is the clearest possible understanding of the < 6> implications of violent racism, and it is clear from < 7> what has happened during the course of this Inquiry < 8> that members of that community can immediately < 9> associate with what has happened to Stephen Lawrence <10> and to Mr Brooks. <11> If you have an organisation in the middle of a <12> police district, as we have had here, pumping out <13> racist propaganda and seeking to organise racial <14> exclusiveness and racial hatred, it should come as no <15> surprise that sooner or later violent racism <16> produces, in this case, one, two, three, murders in <17> one police district. Yet the prime concern of the <18> police was public order and whether these racist <19> murders would produce a backlash of violent reaction <20> in the black community and sympathetic sections of <21> the white. <22> Stephen Lawrence died as a result of these <23> forces, but Mr Brooks became a triple victim. He was <24> a victim first of all of the violent racism of the <25> attack. He was lucky that he managed to escape. He . P-11372

< 1> was a victim of the police failure, in our < 2> submission, to take seriously or understand the < 3> implications of his account of the awful racial < 4> nature of the attack, and he was the victim of police < 5> and CPS attempts to turn him into a criminal at < 6> Croydon Crown court. < 7> If the police had been properly dealing with < 8> violent racism, Mr Brooks would not have felt any < 9> need to go to the demonstration that eventually led <10> to his arrest. Indeed, there would have been no need <11> for such a demonstration. <12> I turn now to paragraph 10.2.1. We submit that <13> so shocking was the police treatment of Duwayne <14> Brooks and so sad its consequences that many people <15> in the public gallery -- public and press alike -- <16> wept when they heard his account. We suspect that <17> many of those people were not expecting to be <18> sympathetic. They had been led to expect to hear <19> from the stereotype of Duwayne Brooks, the phantom <20> fall guy created by the police and the CPS. In our <21> submission, they heard from the real person. <22> In his submissions yesterday, Mr Egan sought to <23> attack the statement which Mr Brooks made to this <24> Inquiry as being carefully drafted. It was. In it <25> Mr Brooks accurately, painstakingly and in detail . P-11373

< 1> gives his full account of his experience. The < 2> statement was signed by him and he confirmed its < 3> truth to the Inquiry. He asked, indeed, if he could < 4> go on oath but it was decided that this should not be < 5> so in the light of the medical report before the < 6> Inquiry. < 7> In our submission it is a measure of how little < 8> the police and the police federated ranks have < 9> understood the full implications of what he is saying <10> in order to rebut the suggestion that particular <11> police officers have racially stereotyped Duwayne. <12> They now have to suggest that somehow that moving <13> statement that produced so many tears in this court <14> is something which has been concocted on his behalf. <15> In our submission that is an outrageous allegation. <16> What we submit, and I return to 10.2.2, is that <17> in many respects Mr Brooks treatment at the hands of <18> the police provides the Inquiry with a microcosm of <19> how institutionalised racism can have such a <20> devastating impact on a person's life and reputation, <21> as well as on the police work itself. Yet it was not <22> until 17th June of this year when Assistant <23> Commissioner Johnston gave evidence to the Inquiry <24> that Duwayne Brooks received an apology on behalf of <25> the Metropolitan Police Commissioner for the way he . P-11374

< 1> had been treated, transcript page 8758. This apology < 2> was not offered voluntarily by the police, but was < 3> only given when requested during cross-examination. < 4> In our submission this Inquiry has exposed the < 5> institutional and racist nature of the police failure < 6> to treat Mr Brooks as a victim of serious crime and < 7> has demonstrated that he is central to any informed < 8> understanding of the failures of the Stephen Lawrence < 9> murder investigation. <10> We ask you, sir, not to equivocate in reaching <11> your findings about Mr Brooks. Like Mr & Mrs <12> Lawrence, he has waited five long years for clear <13> answers and decisive actions. He is here today at <14> the Inquiry for the second time. In our submission <15> that time has now come. <16> The only other matters I have to deal with and <17> perhaps I can deal with these after the break -- and <18> I can do it very, very shortly -- is the <19> recommendations that we have submitted. <20> THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McDonald, if you feel that is <21> necessary. You have kindly given them to us in full <22> and they will be available to anybody and, of course, <23> we will read them. If you wish to add something <24> after the break then please do so. <25> MR MCDONALD: I was going to because the public was . P-11375

< 1> here. < 2> THE CHAIRMAN: As to the burden of proof, I can deal < 3> with that very simply, it seems to me just right to < 4> mention it, there is no question of imposing an < 5> overall burden of proof in a report from an Inquiry < 6> of this kind. There may be instances, such as a < 7> direct allegation of corruption against an individual < 8> officer where I would, of course, have to apply a < 9> higher burden of proof but the burden of proof must <10> switch and change and there may well be findings <11> which may be more tentative than certain findings in <12> an inquiry. I am sure you will all understand what I <13> am saying. I will, of course, as a lawyer look at <14> questions of burden of proof as the report is <15> written. But I can assure you that I am not going to <16> shrink from making findings because I am bound by <17> some particular of burden of proof which may be <18> applicable in a court of law. <19> We will rise now until it 11.40. <20> (Short adjournment). <21> MR MCDONALD: Sir, I can be very short on this. <22> THE CHAIRMAN: We will consider it primarily when we <23> look at all the recommendations but say what you <24> wish. <25> MR MCDONALD: In a sense really recommendations, to . P-11376

< 1> some extent, fall into part two. < 2> Underlying our submissions, I think, it is to < 3> ensure that the police have made accountable and < 4> controlled and in a sense we are saying there should < 5> be one law for all, not one law for black and one law < 6> for blue, for example. < 7> The first area that we make a submission on is < 8> on employment law, because currently police officers < 9> are in a special protected employment situation and <10> we say that they should be employees in no different <11> position from, for example, customs officers or <12> immigration officers. That would mean that <13> disciplinary procedures would become the same as for <14> other employees in other walks of life, and we spell <15> out some of the ramifications. <16> We recommend, secondly, that there is no <17> rational basis for exempting the Commissioner from <18> the Race Relations Act and he should be brought under <19> its control, just like any other service provider. <20> Thirdly, our submissions on the criminal law are <21> pretty obvious, that officers who break the criminal <22> law should risk prosecution to the same degree as <23> other members of the public. <24> On the complaints procedure we recommend a <25> radical overhaul of the police complaints system so . P-11377

< 1> that it is fully independent of the police, with a < 2> view to encouraging people to use it and to make < 3> complaints. < 4> Finally, a number of training proposals have < 5> been put forward by other parties and it is not that < 6> we dissent from that but our view is that these, to < 7> some extent, are of secondary importance to the < 8> police officers being under the normal disciplinary < 9> and competency procedures that other employees are <10> subjected to. <11> That, in summary, is what we recommend, although <12> we have spelt it out much more fully in the document <13> which your Inquiry now has. <14> THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your sensitive and <15> helpful address. <16> Submissions by MR PANTON <17> MR PANTON: Sir, in addition to the submissions set <18> out in the document the Inquiry have before it a <19> number of documents submitted by the <20> London Borough of Greenwich. There is the written <21> submissions of Mr Harcourt Alayne and in addition <22> there is the document dealing with the background to <23> the joint Racial Incident Unit which was submitted to <24> the Inquiry in June. <25> THE CHAIRMAN: We have both of those. . P-11378

< 1> MR PANTON: Sir, there are really two additional < 2> points that I would wish to make in relation to the < 3> submissions. The first one is touched on at < 4> paragraph three of my written submissions. < 5> Sir, a lot of time has been spent criticising < 6> the operation of the Racial Incident Unit. In my < 7> respectful submission that is missing the point. The < 8> issue for your consideration is this: where a senior < 9> officer like Dak Osland says to you: in Greenwich we <10> gave high priority to the issue of racial incidents <11> and racial discrimination; where he said in evidence <12> that Greenwich had the highest number of such <13> incidents in the Metropolitan Police area; where you <14> have evidence of at least three racially motivated <15> murders within a period of 3 years; where you have <16> the Eltham Krays operating; where you have the BNP <17> operating on the borders of Greenwich, from offices <18> on the borders of Greenwich, you must ask yourself <19> why is it that 3 Area was not in a position to <20> provide any information to the AMIP team coming in to <21> investigate the death or murder of Stephen Lawrence. <22> In my respectful submission that is the issue <23> and not the fact that the Racial Incident Unit was <24> not able to provide information because it was not <25> designed to deal with issues as serious as the murder . P-11379

< 1> of Stephen Lawrence. < 2> Sir, the second point is in relation to race < 3> discrimination. I have passed up an extract from the < 4> Race Relations Act, and I think it is important to < 5> bear in mind the provisions of section 1.1(A) of the < 6> Act and it reads: < 7> "A person discriminates against another in any < 8> circumstances relevant for the purposes of any < 9> provision of this Act if: <10> A. On racial grounds he treats that other less <11> favourably than he treats or would treat other <12> persons." <13> Sir, looking at the evidence relating to what <14> happened at the scene on the night of the 22nd/23rd <15> April 1993, in my respectful submission, you need to <16> bear in mind the final part of section 1.1(A), that <17> is the words, "would treat other persons". <18> In my respectful submission you may want to <19> consider a change in the scene. Let us assume that <20> the two victims were white. Let us assume that the <21> five or six persons responsible were also white. Let <22> us assume that this was probably an estate with a <23> majority of people from ethnic minority occupying <24> those premises. Let us look at the police reaction <25> in relation to what happened on the Brook Estate and . P-11380

< 1> what we know about the history of relationships < 2> between black people and police, particularly in the < 3> Metropolitan area. < 4> Would the police officers have been behaved in < 5> exactly the same way? Would they have stood by and < 6> waited for the ambulance to arrive? Or would you < 7> expect them to busy themselves around the person on < 8> the pavement providing assistance? Imagine five < 9> black youths driving up and down passed the scene, <10> ten minutes after the incident, laughing. Imagine <11> the police reaction to those youths. You also need <12> to consider whether had this been a black estate or <13> predominantly a black estate the residents would have <14> been disturbed that night. <15> In my respectful submission in considering <16> issues of racial discrimination you need to look at <17> how police react to black people and how they reacted <18> on this particular occasion where the victims were <19> black. In my respectful submission history suggests <20> that the police would have probably swamped the <21> estate that night and they would remain there, <22> probably for the next however long it took, to ensure <23> that if the culprits were on that estate something <24> would be done about the situation. <25> So, in my respectful submission, the . P-11381

< 1> Race Relations Act does provide a way of looking at < 2> the evidence that you have heard in relation to these < 3> matters. The House of Lords has made it clear that < 4> intention or the motivation of the discriminator is < 5> irrelevant when you look at the issue of race < 6> discrimination. < 7> Sir, I did say there are two points that I wish < 8> to raise in addition to the matters set out in my < 9> written submission. We have said at the end that <10> certainly it is not unreasonable in the circumstances <11> that you could conclude that racial discrimination <12> did play a part in the way the police behaved. It is <13> important to bear in mind that it need not be the <14> only factor, so long as it is an important factor <15> determining their behaviour, that is sufficient to <16> prove race discrimination. Sir, those are my <17> submissions. <18> THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Panton. <19> Submissions by Mr YEARWOOD <20> MR YEARWOOD: Sir, can I say this before I go into my <21> submissions in full, that the copy, which I believe <22> you have now been served with, is an amended copy, <23> only slight amendments, it is really in respect of <24> minor errors, and I believe at the end of it some of <25> the recommendations which we referred to in our part . P-11382

< 1> two submissions, the more important ones we have, in < 2> fact, listed there. I hope by doing that those who < 3> do not, in fact, have the latest edition do not in < 4> anyway feel they have been left out, because the < 5> differences are only minor. < 6> Can I say this, which may answer a question for < 7> Mr Stone, a question which was asked of Mr Panton a < 8> moment ago, I do intend to come from the text. < 9> I start with our introduction, which outlines <10> the role as the Commission for Racial Equality see <11> itself having in this Inquiry. The Commission for <12> Racial Equality saw the role at the outset of this <13> Inquiry as essentially one of assisting the Inquiry <14> to examine the impact of race and the unique nature <15> of racist violence at each stage in the process which <16> are identified as being within the Inquiry's broad <17> terms of reference. <18> The Commission's aim was to explore in <19> particular whether the errors or omissions on the <20> part of the Metropolitan Police Service, as <21> identified by Kent Police, and indeed those which <22> were not, were influenced by the fact of race and, <23> indeed, the very nature of the offence itself. <24> The Commission's view at the outset was, and <25> still is, that the approach taken to issues of race . P-11383

< 1> by the Kent Police was wholly inadequate. < 2> Can I go back a moment, the Commission's view at < 3> the outset, and still is, that the approach taken to < 4> issues of race by the Kent Police was wholly < 5> inadequate, in that in their investigation of the < 6> Lawrence family's complaint of racism they focused < 7> solely on the acts and belief systems of individual < 8> police officers. < 9> The Commission submits that that approach <10> excludes any examination of the values and norms of <11> the culture within which individual police officers <12> operate. To that extent the findings of Kent cannot <13> and should not be relied upon. <14> The Commission notes that Assistant Commissioner <15> Johnston in his evidence to the Inquiry expressed his <16> support for Kent methodology and the finding in <17> respect of the role of racism in the investigation <18> into the death of Stephen Lawrence. We submit that <19> this in itself demonstrates the deep lack of <20> understanding and the complexities of racism by the <21> Metropolitan Police Service. <22> The evidence that we have heard makes it clear <23> that an institutional culture of racism exists within <24> the Metropolitan Police Service. We shall, of <25> course, be highlighting the evidence which supports . P-11384

< 1> this view during the course of the submissions. < 2> It is, however, imperative to point out from the < 3> outset that the commissions view is that often < 4> well-intended actions may have unintended < 5> consequences of being racially discriminatory or < 6> indeed racist. < 7> The Commission accepts that there are a number < 8> of officers who gave evidence to the Inquiry who are < 9> not intentionally racist and have expressed hurt, <10> anger and resentment at being so described. That <11> being said, the Commission does not accept that the <12> absence of intention removes the existence of racism <13> or excludes the possibility of racial <14> discrimination. <15> The courts have made this clear for the purpose <16> of the civil law where it has been established that <17> unlawful discrimination can occur without the <18> discriminator intending to treat members of one <19> racial group, or indeed sex, less favourably. We <20> direct the Inquiry's attention to the case of James v <21> Eastleigh Borough Council. It is a 1990 case, appeal <22> cases, page 554. <23> The Commission also does not accept the view <24> expressed by senior officers at the Inquiry that if <25> there is racism within the Metropolitan Police . P-11385

< 1> Service it is confined to the odd constable. Indeed, < 2> that was a view expressed by Deputy Assistant < 3> Commander Osland. That went on to say, in fact, that < 4> the rest of the police service is quite simply not < 5> racist. < 6> This view fails to address, in our submission, < 7> the systemic and institutional racism which exists in < 8> the Metropolitan Police Service and which impacts < 9> profoundly and negatively upon the communities which <10> it serves. The Commission refers the Inquiry to <11> Sir Herman Osley's detailed analysis of the workings <12> of institutional racism in his letter attached to the <13> Commission's part 2 submissions. <14> For the purpose of these submissions, we adopt <15> the definition of institutional racism in Sir Herman <16> letter, namely: "Organisational structures, <17> policies, processes and practices which result in <18> ethnic minorities being treated unfairly and unless <19> equally often without intention or knowledge." <20> In doing so, we reject any definition of <21> institutional racism which requires intention or <22> knowledge, such as the one relied upon by the <23> Metropolitan Police Service in their closing <24> submission. <25> The Commission submits that one of the . P-11386

< 1> fundamental reasons this investigation failed was < 2> precisely because the Metropolitan Police Service has < 3> historically failed to acknowledge and act upon this < 4> kind of racism which, in our view, deeply affects the < 5> action and responses of the investigating team as a < 6> whole. < 7> The Commission further submits that the failure < 8> by those in leadership roles within the Metropolitan < 9> Police Service to recognise the need to change the <10> culture of racism both by appropriate, relevant <11> training of officers and by effective management, <12> including disciplinary action, in itself reflects the <13> influence of this culture. <14> I turn to a subheading "Responding Appropriately <15> to a Racially Motivated Crime". The Commission <16> submits, as already indicated, that despite <17> historical promises of effective action against <18> racial attacks by the Metropolitan Police Service and <19> the publishing of good practice guidelines in <20> relation to racial incidents -- 1986, 1989, 1990 and, <21> indeed, as recent as 1997 -- the evidence given by <22> police officers shows that these officers, without <23> exception, have not been trained to identify or <24> respond effectively to such attacks. <25> A number of lower ranking officers have . P-11387

< 1> displayed, in our submission, a shocking inability to < 2> identify a racially motivated crime, to understand < 3> the implication of so identifying the crime, and to < 4> respond appropriately and in accordance with < 5> Metropolitan Police policy guidelines. < 6> Whilst it appeared both the senior investigating < 7> officers have given only critical evidence, this < 8> crime was recognised as a racially motivated one from < 9> the outset, an examination of the actions, or lack of <10> it, reveal that they must themselves have been <11> unclear about the ramifications of such a crime for <12> their policing role. <13> We refer now to a number of officers, and in <14> fact their responses, as examples of the submission <15> we have just made. Detective Superintendent <16> Crampton, senior investigating officer of this <17> investigation, first officer from 23rd to 26th <18> April. He was unaware of the 1994 directives <19> relating to recording of racial incidents which <20> resulted in his failure to properly fill out the <21> crime report. <22> Further, there is no evidence presented to the <23> Inquiry which supports his contention that he must <24> have sent a race inc. message to area head quarters. <25> Indeed, it became clear as the Inquiry progressed . P-11388

< 1> that the race inc. reference number which later < 2> appeared on the crime report matched the referencing < 3> system to the Plumstead racial incident unit. And < 4> indeed the spectrum message which he made reference < 5> to which was sent to New Scotland Yard for < 6> intelligence purposes make no reference whatsoever to < 7> the racial nature of the crime. < 8> He, that is Detective Superintendent Crampton, < 9> had no training whatsoever as far as race issues are <10> concerned. He also had no training whatsoever in the <11> investigation of racial incidents. Inspector McIvor <12> who was in fact the night duty officer of the <13> Plumstead division on the night, special <14> responsibilities for public order, he was not <15> specifically briefed about racial incidents on the <16> division. In his opinion, the only difference with a <17> racial incident is that they are classified <18> differently and their effect upon the community's <19> stability. <20> Inspector Little, he does not think it is <21> important to categorise a murder as racial. A murder <22> is a murder. Race, in his opinion, makes no <23> difference to the way in which a case is approached <24> or indeed investigated. <25> Detective Sergeant Fluke, the bag carrier, as he . P-11389

< 1> has come to be known, he thinks that he must have had < 2> some racial incident training at detective training < 3> school some 27 years earlier, but is quite unable to < 4> elaborate on its context. Clearly, in our < 5> submission, such training is unlikely to have had any < 6> impact whatsoever upon him. < 7> Detective Constable Tomlin has never had any < 8> training in respect of the dealing with victims of < 9> racial attacks, is unaware of any guidelines in <10> respect of such victims, unaware of the AGPO <11> definition of racial incidents and does not think <12> when one is dealing with a racial incident anything <13> different should be done. <14> Detective Sergeant Davidson in these <15> submissions, we have heard much about him, he does <16> not know the AGPO definition of a racial incident and <17> refuses, as we know, to recognise that Stephen was <18> killed because he was black. As far as this officer <19> was concerned it is simply a question of thugs, not <20> racism. <21> Detective Constable Budgen, does not believe <22> Stephen was attacked because he was black, does not <23> see how classifying a murder as racial assists in its <24> investigation. <25> Detective Constable Martin Hughes, aware that . P-11390

< 1> racial incidents are treated differently, also with < 2> sensitivity. Also that they are indexed in a < 3> separate index to a normal crime. Other than that he < 4> does not know. Although it is technically a racial < 5> incident he does not think that Stephen was killed < 6> because of his colour. He neither accepts that the < 7> incident was racist but still believes that the < 8> reason, "poor Stephen Lawrence was killed was not < 9> because he was black. I think he was killed, he was <10> a youth on the street at the time. I have no doubt <11> that the youths involved in killing him were racists <12> but that was not", in his opinion, "the primary <13> reason for the killing." <14> Detective Sergeant Bevan, he says: <15> "Within our investigation it was commonly felt <16> and felt by me that Stephen was murdered because he <17> was there. Had white youths been there, there is a <18> possibility that they would have been murdered too." <19> Likewise Detective Constable Holden: "On the <20> night I was not there so I could not say what their <21> motive for killing him was." <22> Detective Constable Crane, he was the officer, <23> you recall, who told us that approximately, as he <24> estimates, some 50% of the investigating team held <25> the same view as he did, namely, that . P-11391

< 1> Stephen Lawrence's murder was not a racist one. < 2> The Commission submit that the above evidence < 3> clearly highlights the unexplained failure by senior < 4> officer within the Metropolitan Police Service to < 5> prioritise the dissemination of policy on racial < 6> incidents down the chain of command. This failure < 7> leaves intact the operational police culture which < 8> refuses to recognise the gravity of racially < 9> motivated crime. The Commission invites the Inquiry <10> to find that not only did this failure contribute <11> directly to the failure of the investigation as a <12> whole, but it is in itself indicative of the strength <13> of racist culture of the senior remember ranks. <14> The Commission further submits that even this <15> race awareness training, which was supposed to be an <16> intrical part of police training, had little or no <17> effect on the majority of police officers who gave <18> evidence. This, we submit, was illustrated by the <19> fact that the majority did not recall any such <20> training and even if they did they still used <21> inappropriate language, such as the word coloured. <22> The Commission does not in itself wish to focus <23> on the individual racism of officers in their use of <24> such language, but instead submits that the continued <25> use of such language by officers of all ranks, . P-11392

< 1> including Assistant Commissioner Johnston is once nor < 2> indicative of the racist culture of the < 3> Metropolitan Police Service. < 4> We do, however, note in passing the extensive < 5> lengths to which the Metropolitan Police Service has < 6> gone to offer justification for the use of this word < 7> by their officers. We would simply wish to draw the < 8> Inquiry's attention to the < 9> Metropolitan Police Service 1992 handbook focusing on <10> fair treatment for all, which describes the word <11> coloured as, "at best patronising and at worst <12> racist". <13> The explanation provided by Detective Sergeant <14> Davidson and then echoed by Detective Constable <15> Hughes, Budgen and Crane for not accepting the only <16> motive for the murder as racist was the fact that the <17> suspects were implicated in attacks on white victims, <18> and particularly Lee Pearson and Stacey Benefield. <19> By focusing on the general thuggery of these suspects <20> police officers, we submit, not only were embarking <21> on a process of de-racialisation of the crime but <22> displaying a clear lack of understanding of the <23> nature of racially motivated crime. <24> The Commission notes that counsel for the <25> Inquiry stated in his opening that the suspects were, . P-11393

< 1> "violent thugs who did not limit the gratuitous < 2> violence of violent attacks to black victims". Whilst < 3> the Commission, of course, recognises that the < 4> suspects were, indeed, violent thugs, we submit that < 5> the evidence before the Inquiry showed that there < 6> were crucial differences between the attack on white < 7> victims and those of black victims, the most < 8> important being that the attacks on white victims < 9> were not stranger or indeed random attacks. <10> Pearson and Benefield, even the Witham brothers, <11> were known to one or all of the five suspects. <12> Lee Pearson was able to name the Acourts as his <13> assailants. Stacey Benefield was also able to name <14> his assailants in his witness statements and reveal <15> at the time of the attack that he knew Neil Acourt <16> for some 6 years and that they had been to secondary <17> school together and that he had known David Norris <18> for a few months. <19> Further, the Kent Police found that the <20> Benefield assault was over a drugs deal, the <21> purchasing of E tablets, that is by Matthew Farnham <22> and that Farnham did, in fact, owe money for these <23> drugs and had reneged on the deal. Farnham was the <24> target for the assault but having managed to run away <25> Benefield was then stabbed. The reference which we . P-11394

< 1> give for that is, in fact, the Newman Report on James < 2> Grant, which is unscanned, but which we know is in < 3> possession of the Inquiry. < 4> This also was accepted in cross-examination of < 5> Detective Sergeant Davidson. He also agreed that in < 6> the case of Lee Pearson it related to a history of < 7> animosity of Neil Acourt and Alec Ross, who was with < 8> Lee Pearson when they were both confronted by the < 9> group of youths, which included the Acourt brothers. <10> The Commission submits that given the historical <11> connections between the attackers and the victims of <12> these cases there is a range of possible motives for <13> the attacks, be it drugs, be it personal or indeed <14> territorial issues. <15> In contrast the black victims, namely <16> Stephen Lawrence, Kevin Lunden and indeed Kurdip <17> Bangal had no connection, association or ties with <18> the persons suspected of assaulting them or indeed <19> stabbing them. Therefore the only inference, in all <20> the circumstances, was that their attack was solely <21> because of their race. <22> The failure of these officers to apply the AGPO <23> definition of a racial incident, to make a <24> differentiation, referred to above, in our <25> submission, clearly exemplifies how the occupational . P-11395

< 1> culture of the lower ranking officers, especially CID < 2> officers, moves policy and practice to accord with < 3> what those officers regard as common sense policing. < 4> The Commission invites the Inquiry to refer to < 5> the expert evidence of Professor Simon Holdaway, < 6> which addresses in some detail the reasons for the < 7> gap in policy and practice. < 8> I move to my next subheading, community < 9> intelligence. Ultimately the failure by the <10> investigating team to focus on the racial motive <11> itself resulted in vital sources of information not <12> being accessed or being accessed too late to be <13> useful. <14> Informants and witnesses, such as James Grant, <15> Michelle Casserly, Emma Cook, witness E, EE, DD and <16> K, who were all connected or close to the suspects, <17> could have been resources to establish the racist <18> antecedents of the suspects at the outset of this <19> investigation. <20> It should be noted, we submit, that JR Jones in <21> the course of their private prosecution interviewed <22> Michelle Casserly in November 1995 and obtained <23> relatively detailed insights into the suspects racist <24> behaviour and attitudes. <25> Stacey Benefield and Matthew Farnham, again we . P-11396

< 1> submit, could similarly have been used as sources of < 2> information. Further, we submit that once the < 3> criminal intelligence sources, for example Special < 4> Branch, the local collators office, the Racial < 5> Incident Unit card index had been exhausted an < 6> understanding of the unique nature of racially < 7> motivated crime should have directed the < 8> investigating team towards community intelligence, < 9> that is schools, youth clubs and local <10> organisations. This should have been a matter of <11> priority. <12> It is to be observed that it was not until <13> 27th July that Detective Superintendent Weeden wrote <14> to Greenwich Council requesting educational records <15> which revealed the long-standing racial views of <16> suspects. That, we submit, only occurred as a result <17> of the intervention of Noel Penstone from the <18> Race and Equality unit at Greenwich Council. <19> I move to observations in respect of the <20> Racial Incident Unit. The Commission notes that the <21> Plumstead division in general and the <22> Racial Incident Unit, in particular, played little or <23> no role in this investigation. The role of PC Fisher <24> in the investigation was unclear. He was got in by <25> the AMIP team for a period of some 10 days. Although . P-11397

< 1> he was described as a race relations officer he was < 2> never asked to carry out the research relating to < 3> race or racial incidents in the locality. The role < 4> of the Racial Incident Unit in the investigation < 5> should have been so marginal is both surprising and < 6> disappointing given the positive image which was < 7> promoted for the Racial Incident Unit. < 8> The information which the Inquiry was ultimately < 9> able to obtain and analyse exposed the weaknesses of <10> the Plumstead Racial Incident Unit as it operated in <11> 1993 and demonstrated why it was not capable of <12> assisting this investigation in any significant way <13> and raised questions as to its purpose. <14> In our submission the evidence heard by the <15> Inquiry makes clear that the Plumstead Racial <16> Incident Unit was set up on an ad hoc basis as a <17> visible response to increase the local concerns about <18> racial violence and harassment. Little or no <19> research preceded its establishment and it began its <20> work without written policies or guidelines. <21> Although Police Sergeant Solley stated that he <22> conducted some research by visiting a Racial Incident <23> unit in Newham Chief Superintendent Philpot accepted <24> no research whatsoever was done into how such a unit <25> should be set out. Again, Chief Superintendent . P-11398

< 1> Philpot's evidence is supported by that of < 2> Detective Constable, as he now is, Fisher who had no < 3> knowledge of any such research being done or ever < 4> been told about it. < 5> Police Sergeant Solly also insisted that the < 6> divisional, that is Mr Philpot, issued local < 7> instructions in 1990 on the establishment of the unit < 8> and its role. However, neither Detective Constable < 9> Fisher or indeed Chief Superintendent Philpot made <10> any mention of such instructions, nor were copies of <11> those instructions provided to the Inquiry, despite <12> written requests in the Commission for all documents <13> relating to the Racial Incident Unit. <14> As a consequence neither within the <15> Racial Incidents Unit nor within the rest of the <16> division was there any clear and consistent view of <17> the functions and the role of the Racial Incident <18> Unit and how it was to work or could or should <19> integrate within the work of the division and of the <20> CID. <21> In our submission one of the functions which a <22> specialist unit focusing on racial incidents could <23> reasonably be expected to perform is to provide good <24> systems for gathering and storing relevant <25> information and intelligence. From the evidence the . P-11399

< 1> Plumstead Racial Incident Unit could have been of < 2> little assistance to the AMIP team, particularly as < 3> its intelligence gathering function in 1993 was, it < 4> seems, limited to the keeping of the card index in < 5> relation to suspects who had been identified and < 6> investigated in relation to criminal offences. < 7> Chief Superintendent Philpot was strongly of the < 8> view that he did not want rumour and tittle tattle < 9> appearing on there. There did not appear to be any <10> recognised relationship within the home beat officers <11> or indeed the borough liaison officer to build <12> community intelligence into the work of the <13> Racial Incident Unit. <14> The Commission submits that this narrow and <15> uninformed view of intelligence would go some way to <16> explain why the five suspects in this investigation <17> were unknown to the police despite their obvious <18> notoriety in the area. <19> The Commission submits the community <20> intelligence is as important as criminal intelligence <21> and we clearly agree and adopt those sentiments <22> expressed in the Himlich (?) Inspection report, <23> "Winning the Race: Police and Criminal Societies <24> 1997". In particular, the importance which is <25> attached to the proper policing of racially motivated . P-11400

< 1> crime. < 2> The Commission notes that the job description < 3> for the racial incident unit, even in its most < 4> current form, excludes any reference to race, racial < 5> incident, racial groups, and submits that this fact < 6> could be seen as confirming the absence of real < 7> commitment to make the Plumstead racial incident unit < 8> truly effective as a community resource to deal with < 9> racial violence and harassment. <10> The Commission further submits that it is wholly <11> inappropriate for officers who have no formal racial <12> incident training to be fulfilling the role of racial <13> incident officers, or indeed to be invited to provide <14> training to other officers on the division as was and <15> continues to be the case in Plumstead. <16> Police Sergeant Solley gave evidence that he had <17> no specific training in race issues. Detective <18> Constable Fisher stated that he had not been <19> specially trained as a racial incident officer, that <20> he had no formal training on race crime whatsoever. <21> Chief Superintendent Philpot stated to the Inquiry <22> that he did nothing at all to ensure that Fisher got <23> appropriate training. <24> We move to examine police action at the scene, <25> treatment of Stephen himself, for reference to first . P-11401

< 1> aid. The statement by the Lawrence family that < 2> officers failed to provide adequate and appropriate < 3> first aid to Stephen because he was black was < 4> strongly resisted by the six principal police < 5> officers who gave evidence on this issue. < 6> The evidence reveals that the officers, having < 7> found Stephen in the semi-recovery position and < 8> having been told he has been struck on the head with < 9> a metal bar, left him untouched, or maybe one might <10> say unattended, in that position. Dr Graham Cook and <11> Mr David Sadler, PC Stephen Hughes, the first aid <12> experts who were called to give evidence before this <13> Inquiry, all agreed that where the casualty is <14> bleeding the wound should be located, the flow of <15> blood stopped by applying pressure. It was generally <16> agreed by these witnesses that this was basic first <17> aid and well within the ability of any trained first <18> aider. <19> We draw particular reference to the evidence of <20> Helen Avery, the 14-year-old girl, who I believe had <21> in fact begun training first aid at the age of 11. <22> In fact, in respect of her observations, clearly <23> first aid was needed but none was being given. <24> There is, in our submission, no white <25> comparator; that is, no incident with the same white . P-11402

< 1> officers confronting an equally serious wounded white < 2> boy. There was no explanation why any one of the six < 3> officers at the scene, all of whom had some first aid < 4> training, did not attend to Stephen; that is, attempt < 5> to turn him sufficiently to locate the source of his < 6> bleeding. < 7> It is uncontrovertible that in every case no < 8> police officer intending to help would want to cause < 9> further harm to an injured victim. But where the <10> victim is black, we submit that there may be other <11> factors which may operate to inhibit an attempt to <12> act. <13> We refer below to the general concern of <14> officers regarding the possible public order <15> implications of this case. We submit that it is not <16> impossible that such concerns also arise when <17> officers are confronted by a severely wounded black <18> victim, that is, a fear of hostile community reaction <19> if a well-intentioned attempt to administer first aid <20> were to go wrong while there may not be the same <21> reference to community reaction if the victim were <22> white. <23> We submit that one inference which must be <24> available to the Inquiry is that officers at the <25> scene took race into account when they refrained from . P-11403

< 1> acting when there was something which, according to < 2> basic first aid principles, they could have done. < 3> We touch upon the treatment of Duwayne Brooks. < 4> The Commission submits that the treatment of Duwayne < 5> Brooks by the Metropolitan Police Service was wholly < 6> inadequate in that his victimised status was ignored < 7> at the scene. Further, he was not provided with the < 8> physical and emotional support that a victim of a < 9> crime, and in particular a racially motivated crime, <10> should have been given. <11> The Commission submits that Duwayne Brooks was <12> so treated because the police officers were <13> influenced by racial stereotypes of young black <14> males. This stereotype, we submit, shaped the <15> actions and perceptions of officers at the scene and <16> how they made sense of the situation they saw before <17> them, thereby leading to a failure to believe his <18> account, or at least be reluctant to believe his <19> account, and to treat him as a victim in need of <20> support at the scene and throughout the <21> investigation. <22> We submit that had Duwayne Brooks' account of <23> the incident been accepted from the outset by the <24> officers at the scene, it would have been reasonable <25> to assume that they would have acted promptly on the . P-11404

< 1> information he provided, in particular on where the < 2> suspects went and what they looked like. Further, < 3> had his account been believed by officers at the < 4> scene, that it was a stranger attack by five or six < 5> white youths on himself and Stephen, preceded by < 6> racist remarks, the significance of the red Astra < 7> could not possibly have been missed or ignored in the < 8> way that it was. < 9> The fact that by implication Duwayne Brooks' <10> account was not believed by a number of police <11> officers who failed to accept that the murder of <12> Stephen Lawrence was racially motivated, it is the <13> case that from the outset he was not regarded as a <14> credible witness by the investigating team. The <15> racial stereotyping, we submit, is part and parcel of <16> institutional racism. <17> The Commission does not wish to rehearse the <18> evidence elicited at this Inquiry which supports this <19> view, but instead adopt those submissions you have <20> recently heard eloquently put on behalf of Duwayne <21> Brooks. <22> I move to police action. The Commission submits <23> had any of the officers at the scene, and <24> particularly those in a managerial role, brought with <25> them any knowledge of the area and a history of . P-11405

< 1> racial attacks, Duwayne Brooks' account of being < 2> attacked by a gang of white youths who ran off on < 3> foot along Dickson Road would have resulted in the < 4> first assumption that the attack was racially < 5> motivated, not as a last option after all possible < 6> motives were eliminated. < 7> I move to the timing of arrests. From the date < 8> of Stephen Lawrence's murder it was clear that in the < 9> eyes of the Metropolitan Police Service, particularly <10> Plumstead division, this case was likely to have <11> major community implications and public order <12> considerations that must not be ignored. The swift <13> arrangement by the Metropolitan Police Service for a <14> press conference supports this. <15> The statement to the Inquiry, Chief Inspector <16> McIvor, whose responsibility in the division included <17> public order, stated: "A racist murder carries <18> greater and different implications compared with a <19> murder where race is not an issue. In particular, it <20> is likely to destabilise the community. I was <21> therefore influenced by Stephen Lawrence's colour to <22> give particular attention to the community <23> implications." Similarly, we submit that Chief <24> Superintendent Philpot indicated that immediately on <25> learning of the murder he considered the likely . P-11406

< 1> community response and the prospects of public order < 2> problems arising. < 3> The issues relating to the failure by the police < 4> to arrest the suspects within the first hours when < 5> relevant evidence could have been found at the < 6> suspects' home have been well canvassed during this < 7> part of the inquiry. < 8> It is submitted that early arrests of the < 9> suspects could have reduced the risk of public order <10> as an additional police concern. The Commission <11> further submits that the failure to make further any <12> arrests and the continuing failure to pursue the <13> racist motives left the investigation under Detective <14> Superintendent Weeden stagnated and exposed to <15> considerations outside the investigation, the <16> principal one being community reaction and public <17> order. <18> This, we submit, was demonstrated by Detective <19> Superintendent Weeden's explanation of his decision <20> not to arrest Neil Acourt and/or David Norris on or <21> soon after 26th April after statements which <22> implicated them in the Stacey Benefield case. That <23> Detective Superintendent Weeden lost an opportunity <24> to arrest and interview two suspects in the <25> Stephen Lawrence case because he feared that arrests . P-11407

< 1> on behalf of a white complainant may be misunderstood < 2> by a black community is, in our submission, a grave < 3> indication of the Metropolitan Police Service < 4> stereotyping mistrust and a lack of understanding of < 5> the black community. < 6> We pose the question: Why do the police see < 7> black people only in terms of confrontation? Why do < 8> they see black people as beyond reason? < 9> We submit that the timing of the arrests of the <10> three suspects on 7th May when the evidence against <11> the five suspects supporting arrests was not stronger <12> than it had been on 26th April was triggered by two <13> events external to the investigation: firstly, the <14> publicised meeting between Nelson Mandela and the <15> Lawrence family on 6th May which drew international <16> attention to this unsolved racist murder; and <17> secondly, the protest manner from Plumstead to <18> Welling arranged for 8th May. <19> We submit that the Metropolitan Police Service <20> feared the worst in relations with the black <21> community and that that was the main factor which <22> influenced the decision to carry out arrests on 7th <23> May. <24> The evidence makes it clear that these arrests <25> had not been adequately planned and, in reality, were . P-11408

< 1> unlikely to lead to prosecutions. The evidence we < 2> refer to is this: the arrangements for the arrests < 3> were quickly put together on the evening of 6th May. < 4> Arresting and interviewing officers were taken by < 5> surprise -- and we refer to the evidence of Detective < 6> Constable Budgen, who speaks of the arrests coming < 7> out of the blue. < 8> No surveillance had be carried out on the < 9> suspects to make sure that they were available for <10> arrest, and we point to the failure to arrest Norris <11> on the 7th because he was not at home. Interviews <12> were ill-prepared and executed, as described by <13> Detective Sergeant Nove, the expert called to the <14> Inquiry. And although it was clear that <15> identification parades were likely, no arrangement, <16> whatsoever, had been made in respect of such parades <17> before the date itself, 7th May. <18> If, as it appears to be the case, the arrest on <19> 7th and 10th May and the interviews and <20> identification processes which followed were doomed <21> to fail, then we submit this whole exercise was <22> mainly cosmetic to mask from public scrutiny the <23> still unproductive investigation. <24> We suggest that the explanation for such a <25> wasted effort derives from the institutional racist . P-11409

< 1> culture in the Metropolitan Police and the belief of < 2> officers that hollow gestures will be sufficient to < 3> placate the growing frustration and dissatisfaction < 4> of the Lawrence family and a larger community. < 5> I move to family liaison. The treatment of the < 6> Lawrence family throughout the investigation, in our < 7> submission, is symptomatic of what we have described < 8> as institutional racism. Doreen Lawrence has stated < 9> in her evidence to the Inquiry that the family <10> liaison officers, DS Bevan and WDC Holden, never <11> actually told her what their role was. They were <12> never given any information. They were constantly <13> asked about the people in their house and that by the <14> end of the first week she felt disappointment with <15> the family liaison officers. It is her view that the <16> family liaison were more concerned with the people in <17> the house than they were with us. <18> Neville Lawrence evidence supports this view. <19> He further stated that he felt unsupported, that the <20> way the family liaison spoke to him made him feel <21> that those officers saw him as a nuisance and <22> resented them wanting to know what was happening with <23> the investigation. <24> It is clear that the Lawrence family became <25> quite quickly disenchanted with the police attitude, . P-11410

< 1> as they perceived it, and looked for support and < 2> guidance to their solicitor Imran Khan and initially < 3> the area, as well as members of their own family and < 4> indeed the black community. < 5> The Lawrence family's most consistent complaint, < 6> particularly within the first two weeks of the < 7> investigation, is that they were not kept up-to-date < 8> with the progress of the investigation. The evidence < 9> to the Inquiry from police officers, in our view, has <10> shown this complaint to be a valid one. The evidence <11> has shown that the family were not visited on the <12> night of the murder and Chief Inspector McIvor <13> accepts that this was indeed a failing. They were <14> not given adequate or any information at the <15> hospital. The evidence of the family liaison in <16> respect of the level of information imparted was at <17> best equivocal and suggested that the standard of <18> information in line with the AMIP guidelines was not <19> given to the family. <20> Detective Sergeant Bevan concedes that he gave <21> them very, very few specifics. <22> Detective Superintendent Weeden did not visit <23> the family personally until almost a year later and <24> relied wholly on the feedback and assurances of the <25> family liaison officers that they were imparting . P-11411

< 1> relevant information. < 2> Detective Chief Superintendent Illsley was < 3> unable to recollect what, if anything, he told the < 4> family about the impending arrests in his meeting < 5> with them on 6th May, just prior to the arrest which < 6> occurred, in fact, the next day. < 7> This failure, in our submission, to provide < 8> information is explained by < 9> Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osland in the following <10> terms: it was not normal for a victims family to <11> have a legal representative. It was not normal for a <12> victims family to have, if you like, informal <13> advisors, such as those from GACARA and the ARA. <14> This did, in fact, create a situation that was not <15> normal and because it was not normal, I suppose, it <16> was a bit intimidating and therefore impacted on the <17> sort of exchange of information that one would <18> normally expect. <19> The Commission submits that it is precisely this <20> failure to acknowledge and understand the specific <21> needs of victims of racially motivated crime or, as <22> in this case, families of such a victim which <23> exemplifies the institutional racism we have already <24> alluded to. <25> The fact that one of the most senior officers in . P-11412

< 1> the Metropolitan Police Service at the time should < 2> refer to situation as not normal portrays a failure < 3> to recognise the unique nature of racial crimes. < 4> This lack of understanding was clearly displayed < 5> by the family liaison officers themselves. < 6> Detective Sergeant Bevan gave evidence of < 7> Mrs Lawrence's stance as being aggressive he says. < 8> Mr Khan, a barrier to communication. That it was a < 9> view from the early stage within the Inquiry team <10> that there would be political factions endeavoring to <11> capitalise on the Inquiry. Similarly, <12> Detective Constable Holden, there seemed to be a lot <13> of barriers up, she says. Most people started to <14> become involved with the family. More people started <15> getting involved with the family and John and I <16> unfortunately did not know who was who and sometimes <17> we were not able to establish that. <18> Further, the evidence of the family liaison <19> officers has shown that they either do not accept or <20> understand the concept of racially motivated crime. <21> The Commission submit this is the clearest evidence <22> the family liaison officers did not treat the death <23> of Stephen Lawrence as a racially motivated crime and <24> therefore could not have understood the support <25> needed of the Lawrence family, nor could they have . P-11413

< 1> responded appropriately to the situations that arose < 2> in the crucial periods immediately following the < 3> murder. < 4> The mistrust and suspicion which < 5> Detective Sergeant Bevan has stated the Lawrence < 6> family viewed the family liaison officers with was in < 7> our view obviously displayed by the family liaison < 8> and senior officers towards the Lawrence family. < 9> Imran Khan was viewed with suspicion and <10> initially denied an invitation to the Incident Room, <11> despite the fact he was the Lawrence family <12> solicitor. Visitors to the family home were <13> questioned as to their identity by the family liaison <14> officers. <15> Had the impact and unique nature of this crime <16> been recognised by the senior investigating officer <17> and indeed those more senior to him the family <18> liaison officers would have been carefully selected, <19> in our submission, properly trained, meticulously <20> briefed and closely supervised. This, in our <21> submission, was not a normal crime and had that been <22> recognised from the outset by senior officers the <23> family would have been properly supported and the <24> instructing of a solicitor by the family and the <25> support by the wider black community need not have . P-11414

< 1> been perceived as insurmountable barriers by the < 2> Metropolitan Police Service. < 3> In concluding the Commission for Racial Equality < 4> recognises with humility the enormous task which the < 5> Inquiry now face in trying to make explicit findings < 6> and draw collusions from the huge quantity of written < 7> and oral evidence which has been presented during < 8> part one of this Inquiry. < 9> What the Commission has attempted to do in these <10> submissions is to focus on one measure, namely race, <11> against which the actions of the Metropolitan Police <12> Service can be evaluated. <13> We do not assert that there are no other issues <14> which should be examined in order to fully understand <15> why the investigation was so seriously flawed. We do <16> assert, however, and believe that an analysis of the <17> evidence supports this assertion that race did <18> operate as an influential factor in respect of most <19> aspects of the police investigation and related <20> actions. <21> We submit that race should be recognised as an <22> essential element in the policing of the people of <23> London. As we have attempted to illustrate, it is <24> interwoven into every part of the police response to <25> racially motivated crime, it is the litmus test of . P-11415

< 1> how well or how poorly the police performed. < 2> In applying the race test what we have found is < 3> a service which prevents itself in performing at the < 4> highest standard by failing to recognise its own < 5> racist culture and by further failing to take < 6> effectively action radically to change that culture. < 7> We are, of course, aware that the evidence which < 8> has been considered during part one relates to < 9> practices of the Metropolitan Police Service five <10> years ago. We have seen more recent Metropolitan <11> Police guidance on racial incidents and have heard of <12> changes being made to training. We are also aware <13> that during the course of this Inquiry the <14> Metropolitan Police Service has committed itself to <15> prioritising racial crimes and to making changes to <16> aspects of their work which have been scrutinised by <17> this Inquiry. <18> Clearly policing or the operation of the <19> criminal justice system is never static. The Inquiry <20> has provided an unique opportunity to examine in <21> exceptional detail a range of police conduct which <22> occurs within a limited period. <23> It has been possible, therefore, not only to <24> look at actions and procedures of the Metropolitan <25> Police Service but also at its structures and the . P-11416

< 1> relationship which provides the context and creates < 2> the culture within which action is taken and < 3> procedures followed. < 4> We submit that many of these structures and < 5> relationships will persist with only slight < 6> modification unless the Metropolitan Police Service < 7> fully accepts the need for radical change. < 8> Given the pervasive influence of both structures < 9> and relationships on the practice and outcome of <10> policing we submit that the Inquiry should regard <11> them as central to the findings they make in part <12> one. <13> We refer to the Commission's written evidence <14> submitted in part two of the Inquiry with <15> recommendations for future action, to investigate and <16> prevent racially motivated crime. We have <17> recommended as an essential precondition that the <18> Metropolitan Police Service, together with other <19> organisations working in the area of policing and of <20> criminal justice must accept the existence of <21> institutional culture of racism and the urgent need <22> to eradicate it at every level. To that end we refer <23> the Inquiry to Sir Herman Osley's nine point plan to <24> eradicate institutional racism. Of course the <25> Inquiry will be aware that that is to be found in the . P-11417

< 1> letter which accompanies the submissions in part < 2> two. < 3> The recommendations to part 2 of the inquiry are < 4> lengthy involving detailed proposals for change at < 5> every level in relation to investigation, < 6> prosecution, prevention of racial incidents. We < 7> shall not repeat them here, except to say that they < 8> include, firstly, an amendment to the Race Relation < 9> Act which would make it unlawful for the police to <10> discriminate in any aspect of their work and to make <11> chief officers of the police, and indeed of police <12> authorities, vicariously liable for the acts of <13> discrimination by officers within their force. <14> Secondly, that the Police Complaints Authority <15> employ its own independent investigators and that the <16> civil standard of proof should apply when officers <17> are subject to complaint. <18> Thirdly, that the home secretary should make the <19> effective policing of racist crimes a priority, <20> including announcing key objectives for all police <21> forces. <22> We suggest that a fitting conclusion for these <23> submissions is a quotation, referred to by Sir Herman <24> Osley in his covering letter to part 2 of our <25> submissions. There he refers to Frank Williamson, . P-11418

< 1> the former senior policeman brought in to clean up < 2> the Metropolitan Police in 1969 but resigning three < 3> years later because of lack of support from the home < 4> office. He was to say this: "To tackle an illness < 5> one must first accept one is ill. If one keeps < 6> saying there is only a few rotten apples and < 7> everything else is fine, one is missing the point. I < 8> hope the problem will be tackled, but I am not < 9> optimistic." That concludes our submissions. <10> MR CHAWLA: Sir, I hope you have a copy of the <11> written submission, which I do not propose to recite, <12> a copy of a document headed "Operation Kimble", which <13> we asked for some months ago and finally received <14> yesterday. You have also been referred, in the <15> substance of the written submission, to Sir Richard <16> Scott's lecture to the Chancery Bar Association. I <17> know you made mention of that yesterday, sir. <18> However much one is tempted to review the events <19> of the last six months, experience dictates that one <20> should be slow to volunteer for such a task. You, as <21> the tribunal, are looking for a path to steer you <22> through the myriad of inquiries that you have been <23> asked to consider and, in some instances, forced to <24> endure. Yours is an unenviable task. It is one <25> which inevitably produces enormous public pressure . P-11419

< 1> caused by the weight of publicly expressed opinion, < 2> some well-informed and some not so well-informed, and < 3> caused in addition by evergrowing public < 4> expectation. There has been nothing subtle about < 5> that pressure. All of us, and I mean all of us, < 6> sitting in this Inquiry have seen it for ourselves. < 7> That pressure, you may conclude, is comparable < 8> at least to that which a witness coming to this < 9> Inquiry and knowing that his conduct is being <10> questioned, in whatever form, has to endure. You <11> should, in my submission, be slow to underestimate <12> its effect. <13> In our written submissions, which, as I have <14> indicated, because they are available to you and to <15> the public, I do not intend to recite, we have set <16> out a number of observations of the Vice-Chancellor, <17> Sir Richard Scott in the Lecture in 1995. May I take <18> you to but one of those observations which we have <19> set out at the foot of page 2 of our written <20> submissions. <21> "A public hearing, particularly where the <22> circumstances that have led to the setting up of the <23> inquiry have been the subject of publicity and media <24> interest, exposes witnesses to considerable <25> pressures. Their evidence which, as I have said, may . P-11420

< 1> at the end of the day be of only marginal relevance < 2> or weight, may be picked over, analysed and < 3> criticised by news reporters and others whose < 4> purposes in doing so may have little in common with < 5> the Inquiry's purposes. Is that fair to the < 6> witnesses?" This is my emphasis, sir. "The weight on < 7> witnesses, particularly those who, for whatever < 8> reason, have a high public profile of the pressures < 9> of a public hearing should not be underestimated." <10> Mr Barker fell squarely within that category. <11> It is our submission that in its treatment of <12> Mr Barker this Inquiry failed. It failed not through <13> any improper motive, but by a desire to act according <14> to its remit, a desire to prevent unnecessary <15> cross-examination, to expend time needlessly and to <16> try to focus upon the issues that matter. <17> May I gratefully adopt eight words, and <18> important words they were, used by Mr Yearwood some <19> minutes ago. They were these: "Well intended actions <20> often have unintended consequences." He used them <21> in a different context, but the meaning is plain. <22> Mr Barker in his review failed. I make no bones <23> about it and he made no bones about it. As you know, <24> from the first lengthy statement submitted to you, <25> Mr Barker has not suggested that his review was not . P-11421

< 1> flawed. He recognised the force of some of the < 2> highly critical observations made by the Kent report, < 3> but he must have left this Inquiry feeling that he < 4> had been pilloried, feeling that he had been set-up, < 5> feeling that he had been unfairly treated. He was < 6> condemned, as the press put it, summarily dismissed < 7> from the Inquiry before, we submit, he had the < 8> opportunity to be properly heard. < 9> Of course, that was as a result of cross-examination <10> that can best be described as hostile and, as it <11> turned out, in part, and in important part, was based <12> upon a mistake. We have referred at paragraph 2.7 on <13> page 4 to that mistake. The example I have given of <14> the unfairness caused by the premature, in my <15> submission, intervention can be found by reference to <16> the questioning about James Grant. <17> Counsel for Mr and Mrs Lawrence suggested that <18> Mr Barker had entirely missed the existence of Grant, <19> suggested that there was no follow-up in relation to <20> him, and suggested that Mr Barker was lying in <21> relation to his evidence. I have set out the <22> references, so I hope I do not need to set them out <23> again. Counsel suggested in addition that there was <24> no evidence of any contact whatsoever with Mr Grant <25> in September and October of 1993. This was a long . P-11422

< 1> passage of cross-examination going to the very heart < 2> you may think of the issue. < 3> Regrettably, counsel for Mr and Mrs Lawrence had < 4> entirely failed to appreciate that on 13th September 1993, < 5> as shown by action 822, a statement had been asked < 6> for in form NG11 from Grant. Thus, at the time of < 7> the Inquiry's intervention the Inquiry may have taken < 8> the view that the cross-examination was based on < 9> sound, factual grounds, when in reality the converse <10> was true. Of course, by the time that the converse <11> was pointed out as it was later, the intervention had <12> taken place and the damage had been done. <13> I will just deal with 2.8. Undoubtedly, and <14> again I make no bones about this, the Inquiry's <15> intervention was well intentioned and sought only to <16> deal properly with its remit. In that, we submit, it <17> showed much with Barker's review. Its execution, <18> however, was flawed and ironically that also had much <19> in common with Barker's review. <20> We submit that his review was well-intentioned <21> but was flawed. There are reasons for it, and it may <22> be that these reasons are made with the benefit of <23> hindsight, but they include, or may include, the time <24> scales involved for the review, bearing in mind the <25> mass of material that there was to deal with; the . P-11423

< 1> manpower; the fact that Mr Barker and other members < 2> of his team were dealing with the review on a < 3> part-time basis. It may be that there were < 4> additional areas, and properly discreet areas, which < 5> he was required to deal with such as family liaison < 6> and communication of the media, which perhaps ought < 7> to be dealt with by other parties. < 8> If one compares, for example, the terms of < 9> reference that he had, whoever drafted them, to that <10> contained in the West Yorkshire Review -- and I have <11> set that out at paragraph 3.5 of my written <12> submission -- one can see how in contrast to the West <13> Yorkshire Review, Barker's terms of reference were <14> considerably more defuse. <15> May I refer to you to the more recent review <16> headed "Operation Kimble". Conducted by members of <17> the National Crime Faculty in July and August of 1996 <18> I do not seek to comment about it, but simply pose <19> this question: You can see what we have been given <20> in relation to that, and you may wonder how that <21> review would have stood up to the sort of scrutiny <22> that Barker's has in these proceedings. <23> It goes a little further, sir. We submit that <24> Mr Barker had flagged up exactly what he was doing <25> and the approach that he was taking. He did that in . P-11424

< 1> the interim document. If there were concerns from < 2> those, and there were those who knew better, he < 3> should have been told; but he was not. Mr Barker < 4> wanted to do his best for Mr and Mrs Lawrence and for < 5> Stephen. As he put it at page 7332: "We had one < 6> sole objective, and that objective was to identify < 7> and bring to justice the people who murdered < 8> Stephen Lawrence." The fact that he could not help < 9> to do so is his greatest regret. <10> MR BARKER: Finally, sir, on behalf of the Crown <11> Prosecution Service we submitted this morning a <12> slightly enlarged bundle, which I hope is now freely <13> available and which I hope, sir, you and your <14> colleagues have in front of you. <15> Sir, we rely on that and we do not feel at this <16> stage that it is going to be particularly fruitful to <17> repeat the detail that is contained within. However, <18> on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions and <19> the Crown Prosecution Service we would like to <20> succinctly highlight one or two matters, really the <21> basis of our participation and our submissions and I <22> would like to refer to pages 2 to 5 inclusive and <23> then finally pages 20 and 21. <24> Sir, bearing in mind the terms of reference of <25> the inquiry, inevitably the focus has been on the . P-11425

< 1> role of the police and the police service. < 2> Nevertheless it has always been recognised by us that < 3> the role played by the Crown Prosecution Service, < 4> although small, was a significant and an important < 5> part of the picture. To that end the Director < 6> instructed that her staff and her representatives < 7> throughout the Inquiry should assist as much as < 8> possible, and this has been done by firstly making < 9> available all the preserved documentation and files <10> for use of the Inquiry and to the best of my <11> knowledge every single document has been provided to <12> the Inquiry that exists and it looks as if <13> practically every document that came into existence <14> was preserved and has been placed before the <15> Inquiry. <16> Secondly, by cooperating throughout with any <17> matters that arose during the Inquiry that we could <18> assist with, and it is to be noted in passing that in <19> the preliminary discussions before the Inquiry got <20> into full swing we volunteered additional witnesses, <21> for example, Mr Anthony Connell that it was felt <22> might be helpful over and above those already <23> requested by counsel for the Inquiry. <24> The written submissions are an attempt by us to <25> summarise and to address the significant matters that . P-11426

< 1> have arisen upon which the service is qualified to < 2> comment. The Crown Prosecution Service welcomes this < 3> opportunity and hopes it will be of some assistance < 4> and can ensure the Inquiry they will in future give < 5> the final conclusions the most full attention and < 6> consideration. < 7> The timetable is significant. Stephen Lawrence < 8> was murdered on April, 22nd. The arrest of three of < 9> the suspects was made the 7th, and the first contact <10> with the service was probably made the 13th. The <11> first papers were delivered to the service on May, <12> 14th. Sadly, it would seem, by everything that we <13> have heard that by that date the die was firmly <14> cast. In general and in the particular the strategy <15> of investigation in the early stages is the <16> responsibility of the police and whilst the Crown <17> Prosecution Service offers advice on legal matters <18> when requested, they should not and cannot be <19> involved in directing the scope of the <20> investigation. That, we say, applies to this case <21> and to all others. <22> The crucial factors which have emerged and that <23> have required examination are the actions it seems to <24> us, firstly, in the day following the murder and <25> secondly, the wider and consequent actions in the . P-11427

< 1> next 10 days or so. < 2> May I please make five general points. The < 3> first is this: that the written and oral evidence < 4> that has been provided to the Inquiry by the service < 5> has as its foundation the structured contemporaneous < 6> and still available records. < 7> Secondly, our task throughout has been to < 8> provide the Inquiry with fact rather than argument < 9> and to illustrate where we can, and often we say we <10> can, the professional judgements that were taken at <11> the time. <12> Thirdly, the Crown Prosecution Service has <13> always recognised and proceeded on the basis that <14> this murder was racially motivated. This is evidence <15> from documents within the case papers and was made <16> clear in statements made publicly by the service <17> since the summer of 1993 and has been reinforced by <18> the evidence presented to the Inquiry. <19> Fourthly, the decision to discontinue in July <20> 1993 was the sad, but inevitable duty of a <21> professional and independent service. The decision <22> was intended to be reviewable and in practice it was <23> reviewed on a number of occasions when appropriate. <24> Fifthly, it has now been acknowledged that some <25> avenues in relation to the conviction and punishment . P-11428

< 1> have during the intervening years been completely < 2> closed. Nevertheless, it is the continuing intention < 3> of the Crown Prosecution Service to consider any < 4> fresh information and evidence that may be put before < 5> it with a view, if ever possible, of mounting a < 6> successful prosecution. < 7> Our basic submissions are these and I do it in < 8> the briefest possible outline: Firstly, in relation < 9> to discontinuance; the evidence that was available, a <10> reasonable time after charging, was in fact <11> insufficient for proper committal and subsequent <12> conviction and acquittal would have been inevitable. <13> Secondly, the evidence presented upon analysis <14> has showed this case to be a single area of evidence <15> case. It was, in fact, what is called a fleeting <16> glance identification case in a category identified <17> by lawyers as being the weak overall category. <18> At the time of the decision to discontinue there <19> was no prospect of any further significant evidence <20> becoming available in the foreseeable future. The <21> best course in those circumstances was to <22> discontinue, but, nevertheless, to encourage further <23> investigations in the hope that sufficient evidence <24> might emerge. <25> We wish to make it clear that the case was not . P-11429

< 1> dropped and it was made clear that the door to the < 2> prosecution process remained firmly open. < 3> As far as the situation after discontinuance is < 4> concerned, the growing file was regularly monitored < 5> by a senior prosecutor, by Mr Youngerwood, that this < 6> Inquiry saw and heard and he took a continuing and < 7> active interest in the hope of being able to build < 8> and then present a proper case. < 9> Mr Duwayne Brooks: There was clear evidence on <10> video that Mr Brooks had committed a serious <11> offence. The subsequent prosecution was dealt with <12> independently by a different branch of the Crown <13> Prosecution Service, that is the Bexley Bromley <14> Branch. It will be remembered that the <15> Stephen Lawrence prosecution was dealt with, in fact, <16> by the Youth and Eastern Branch which was based at <17> the Cooperage in Southwark. <18> The Branch Crown Prosecutor at Bexley and <19> Bromley was fully aware of the issues. Counsel's <20> advice was taken on the merits of the case, indeed <21> two separate counsel gave advice on the potential <22> medical problems and on the ensuing disclosure <23> issues. After repeated representations to withdraw <24> the case the Branch Crown Prosecutor again reviewed <25> all matters before deciding that this unusual course . P-11430

< 1> was not appropriate. < 2> May I now move on to page 20 and the outline < 3> conclusions which we would invite the Inquiry to < 4> draw. < 5> It is our respectful submission that there is no < 6> evidence to suggest, firstly, that there was any < 7> unreasonableness; secondly, any bad faith; thirdly, < 8> any racism, and fourthly any other improper motive in < 9> any of the decisions by the Crown Prosecution Service <10> concerning matters arising from the sad death of <11> Stephen Lawrence. <12> The evidence placed before the Inquiry suggested <13> that decisions were taken in good faith, following <14> careful and rigorous analysis of the evidence and the <15> issues involved. <16> The justification for them has been given and <17> were felt necessary tested. It is always open to <18> criticise professional judgement, but in this case <19> that these judgements individually and collectively <20> have stood up to considered and sometimes intensive <21> scrutiny. <22> May we finally say this: We recognise, as did <23> Mr Youngerwood and Mr Medwinter when giving evidence, <24> the tragedy of the situation of the Lawrence family <25> and for their friends. We hope this process, which . P-11431

< 1> we have all taken part in, will generate some good as < 2> well as some guidance to the future. Lessons must be < 3> learned so that no other families suffer similar < 4> horrific experiences. < 5> The task of the Crown Prosecution Service, as a < 6> creature of statute and an independent agency, is to < 7> review cases that are submitted by the police in < 8> accordance with the code of crown prosecutors. < 9> The service has, however, been aware of the need <10> for change and better understanding. This will be <11> dealt with specifically in the Crown Prosecution <12> Service submission to the second part of your <13> Inquiry. <14> What we can say now is that there is a need for <15> continuing process, of raising of the awareness of <16> all staff, particularly in issues concerning the <17> prosecution of racially motivated crime, training is <18> vital and training is continuing and I can give three <19> examples: <20> A comprehensive training course for all staff <21> was introduced in 1995, relating directly to racially <22> motivated crime. There is in existence, both in <23> Greater London and both throughout the country, local <24> participation in a variety of multi-agency <25> initiatives into issues arising out of the . P-11432

< 1> prosecution of racially motivated crime and plans are < 2> already in place for training to take into account < 3> the new requirements on racially aggravated offences < 4> highlighted in the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, < 5> which will be implemented later on this year. < 6> This process will continue and this process must < 7> continue if the Crown Prosecution Service is to move < 8> forward and to meet the demands of the entire public < 9> with its strive to serve. <10> THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Mansfield, we have finished <11> unexpectedly at lunchtime rather than later this <12> afternoon. I had decided that there was really <13> little for me to say at this stage. We have an <14> enormous task to perform, I with the help of my <15> advisers and staff, and we have the second part of <16> the Inquiry to conclude before the report is of <17> course written. I rather doubt whether it will be <18> finished by the end of the year but it will certainly <19> be done early in the new year because obviously I <20> want everybody to have the words of the report as <21> soon after the conclusion of the Inquiry as <22> possible. <23> We have a mass of written submissions available <24> in part two and there will be hearings at which the <25> people, particularly those who may be involved in . P-11433

< 1> implementing future recommendations, will expand on < 2> what they have told us, but I hope everyone will rest < 3> assured that every written document that we have will < 4> be given the fullest and equal consideration, < 5> together with the recommendations and the reports of < 6> all parties involved. < 7> It only remains for me to thank you and all < 8> counsel and solicitors and indeed everyone who has < 9> been involved in the presentation of this case to us <10> during the last five or six months. Sometimes it has <11> been a searing experience, inevitably there has been <12> little humour in it, but everybody has been patient <13> with me in my sometimes impatient moments and I hope <14> that good will come indeed from the consideration of <15> the terrible things with which we have been concerned <16> over these months. <17> I finish simply by paying a tribute at this <18> stage again to Mr & Mrs Lawrence who have withstood <19> what must have been for them an appalling experience <20> and also for young Duwayne Brooks in having to deal <21> with the issues here over this long period of time in <22> the glare of the publicity which this Inquiry has <23> engendered. I thank you all and the public who have <24> attended so religiously throughout these months for <25> their assistance, for their support and for their . P-11434

< 1> cooperation. < 2> MR MANSFIELD: May I say one word, I hope, on behalf < 3> of all counsel and other parties that we would like < 4> to thank the Inquiry, yourself and your advisers, and < 5> particularly all the staff, I am not intending to < 6> name them all, who have enabled us all to attend < 7> without fear of hindrance on many days, and there < 8> have been some very difficult days, as you are aware, < 9> throughout this Inquiry and have facilitated <10> information and materials whenever requested and they <11> I think are often hidden on the floor below, but they <12> do require thanks from us and we gladly give it. <13> THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I had not <14> forgotten them, but it is my intention of course to <15> thank them when the whole of this heavy burden is <16> completed, but they are in the room and I know that <17> everyone who has had anything to do with Miss Folds, <18> Mr Wells, Mr Whitehouse and all the staff and the <19> girls and the secretaries involved have had the <20> utmost help and we do thank you them ourselves as <21> well. <22> (The Inquiry Adjourned at 1.25 pm) <23> <24> <25> . P-11435