vanzo kant on experiment 2012

8/10/2019 Vanzo Kant on Experiment 2012

1/36

Alberto Vanzo

Kant on Experiment

Chapter 7 ofRationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne,ed. James

Maclaurin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, 7!"#$. D%&: 10.1007'#7)#*)007)+#+)

+7

&n this paper & illustrate the relations in -hich eperiments stand to h/potheses, la-s, and

principles in &mmanuel ants natural philosophical methodolog/. M/ aim is not to proide a

rational reconstruction of ants philosoph/ of eperiment or to assess its internal coherence,

3ut to illustrate it 3/ contrasting it -ith an alternatie conception of eperiment that had a

-idespread follo-ing in the earl/ modern period. 4his is the philosoph/ of eperiment that

-as first s5etched 3/ 6rancis acon and later deeloped 3/ 8o3ert o/le and 8o3ert 9oo5e.

eedless to sa/, acon, o/le, and 9oo5e are neither the first, nor the onl/ philosophers to

comment on the nature and functions of eperiments 3efore ant. 9o-eer, acon, o/le,

and 9oo5e proided a fairl/ ela3orated and etremel/ influential set of reflections on the

nature, t/pes, and functions of eperiments. 4heir philosoph/ of eperiment em3odies a set

of 3eliefs and attitudes such as the focus on fact)gathering and the re;ection of h/potheses

that -ere -idel/ held in the second half of the seenteenth centur/, among others, 3/ man/

es the acon)o/le)9oo5e

ie- of eperiment, ?arr/ ?audan claims that it -as endorsed 3/ @most scientists and

1


2/36

epistemologistsA from the 1720s to the end of the eighteenth centur/. ?audan mentions ant

as one of the authors for -hom @the method of h/pothesis is fraught -ith difficultiesA

(?audan 1#1, p. 10. &n contrast to ?audan, & -ill argue that ants ie- on the relations

3et-een eperiments on the one hand and h/potheses, la-s, and theories on the other hand, is

3est seen as an alternatie to the aersion to h/potheses and sharp contrast 3et-een

eperiments and speculations that characteri>es the acon)9o/le)9oo5e ie- of eperiment.

ant often emphasi>es the importance of eperiments for natural science.


3/36

scienceA (ant 171'177, i on -hich ph/sics entered than5s to alileos and 4orricellis

eperiments. &n the theoretical field, the eperiment of pure reason -ill ena3le ant to

eplain the nature, etent, and limits of a priori 5no-ledge (ant 171'177, $, =+'7,

=!7'1E 17+, p. 27$E Seigfried 1##. &n the practical field, that eperiment -ill clear the

ground for the ne- foundations of moralit/ -hich ant articulates in the Critique of

Practical Reason (ant 171'177, iE Sato, 200.

Despite his claims on the importance of eperiments, ant -as not an eperimenter (=dic5es

1#2* 2!, ol. 1, pp. $ 11E ol. 2, pp. ** and *7, ialthough he -as a-are of man/ results

of the eperimental sciences of his da/. ants -ritings do not contain an/ accurate

eperimental report or discussion of the practical aspects of eperiments. 4he antian corpus

does not proide an/ detailed, self)contained discussion of -hat an eperiment is, ecept for

a claim that -as customar/ among ants erman contemporaries (?am3ert 17$*, ol. 1, pp.

+!1 !+E


4/36

7.1 Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke

=ccording to acon, o/le, and 9oo5e, the main function of eperiments is not testing

theories or ena3ling us to discoer the la-s of nature. &t is proiding data, factual information

on the properties and 3ehaiour of 3odies in determinate circumstances.

ation, o3sered to 3e true in specific places, 3ut he -as reticent to sa/ that it is

uniersall/ alid (o/le 1$$2, p.$0.

acon, o/le, and 9oo5e held that one should perform eperiments in a state of mind -hich

is as free from theoretical assumptions as possi3le (e.g. 9oo5e, 170!, p. 20. %ther-ise, one

-ill easil/ fall pre/ to the pre;udices (the famous aconian idola (acon 1$20, part 1, H$1.

*


5/36

-hich often th-art our endeaors to discoer truth. =ccordingl/, o/le and 9oo5e professed

themseles adherents of eperimental philosoph/.i4he/ counseled against the premature

formulation of theories, s/stems, and h/potheses (e.g. 9oo5e 1$$!, sig. =*.ii4hese -ere

distinctie mar5s of speculatie philosoph/, as the adersar/ of eperimental philosoph/ -as

called (o/le 1$$2, p. 12E 9oo5e 1$$!, sig. a+, 31E Sprat 1$$7, p. +*1E =nste/ 200!E

au5roger 200$, pp. +!2 *!1.

4he most freGuent eamples of speculatie philosoph/ -ere =ristotelian and


6/36

acons or o/les natural philosophical pro;ects. e-ton claimed that the principles and

la-s -hich are the core of natural philosophical theories are deduced or induced from the

phenomena. 9o-eer, e-ton did not spell out in detail ho- this deduction or induction

ta5es place. Moreoer, e-ton continued to decr/ h/potheses and speculation. ?i5e acon,

o/le, and 9oo5e, e-ton @did not feign h/pothesesA.i6or e-ton, as for acon and

o/le, eperiments and h/potheses @-ere on different sides of the methodological diideA

(=nste/ unpu3lished. / contrast, according to ant, eperimental actiit/ starts -ith the

formulation of a h/pothesis.

7.2 Experiments and Hypotheses

7.2.1 Experiments, Hypotheses, and Preliminary Judgements

Discussing @ho- -e can discoer the hidden Gualities of natural 3odies 3/ means of

eperimentA, ant states:

-e must al-a/s first presuppose something here (begin with a hy!othesis from -hich to 3egin

our course of inestigation B... 6or to enture forth 3lindl/, trusting good luc5 until one

stum3les oer a stone and finds a piece of ore and su3seGuentl/ a lode as -ell, is indeed 3ad

adice for inGuir/ (ant 17#a, pp. 22+2*, italics added.

nli5e acon, o/le, and 9oo5e, ant holds that -e neither can, nor should perform

eperiments in a theoretical oid. Starting -ith a h/pothesis is not onl/ good eperimental

practice. &t is also -hat eer/ eperimenter, more or less consciousl/, actuall/ does: @Beer/

man -ho ma5es eperiments first ma5es h/potheses, in that he 3eliees that this or that

eperiment -ill hae these conseGuencesA (ant 1#$$f, p. #.

$


7/36

9/potheses are not onl/ important for eperiments. 4he/ are the starting point of eer/

actiit/ -hich reGuires one to ma5e ;udgements on the 3asis of uncertain grounds. @4hus a

doctor ma5es h/potheses -hen he cures the sic5BE he has to su3sume eer/thing under

h/potheses, and see -hether the conseGuences that he no- has 3efore his e/es follo-

therefromA (ant 1#$$a, p. 220. = 3usinessman ma5es a h/pothesis -hen he @finds a ground

that is sufficient for underta5ing somethingA (ant 1#$$c, pp. 7!0 !1. = general facing the

enem/ @must necessaril/ ;udge and decide somethingA on the 3asis of h/potheses (ant

1#$$c, pp. 7!0 !1.

acon or o/le could o3;ect that h/potheses ma/ derie from pre;udices and therefore the/

must 3e esche-ed. ant -ould agree that h/potheses derie from pre;udices. 9o-eer, he

-ould add that, in line of principle, there is nothing -rong in haing pre);udices, understood

in the et/mological sense of preliminar/ ;udgements. %n the contrar/, preliminar/

;udgements are necessar/ for inention and discoer/:

4here has neer 3een an inentor in the -orld, and there has neer 3een an/one -ho inented

something, -ho did not at the same time ma5e a preliminar/ ;udgement concerning his

inention and the inented thing. 9e -as not certain of the thing, 3ut the #udgement cleared the

!ath for him to try$ and to e!eriment (ant 1#$$a, p. 1$2, trans. modified and italics added.i

4he h/potheses to 3e tested 3/ means of eperiments are @half);udgementsA (ant 1#$$f, p.

$2, suppositions, and tentatie assumptions a3out the properties and eistence of o3;ects

and the la-s and forces to -hich the/ are su3;ected.

Fh/ should -e 3eliee that our inGuiries al-a/s start -ith h/potheses and preliminar/

;udgementsK ants tets contain t-o sets of considerations in support of this claim. 6irst,

ant formulates pragmatic considerations, -hich are independent from his transcendental

philosoph/. ant s5etches seeral 3rief descriptions of the actiities of doctors, ;udges,

7


8/36

miners, inentors, and eperimenters. 4hese descriptions are aimed to /ield plausi3ilit/ to the

ie- that inGuiries in all these fields are 3ased on h/potheses and preliminar/ ;udgements.

Second, ants conception of the mind places a great emphasis on the actie role of the

human su3;ect in shaping our eperience of the -orld (ant 171'177, =12$. &n ants

ie-, -e continuousl/ su3sume the o3;ects that -e come 3/ under concepts, such as those of

su3stance and causalit/ (1$1, 1$*. Fe do this 3/ formulating ;udgements a3out those

o3;ects (1*+, een though -e are normall/ una-are of this mental actiit/. &f one endorses

this ie- of the mind, it -ill 3e much easier to admit that -e constantl/ frame h/potheses

and preliminar/ ;udgements than it -ould 3e for those philosophers -ho den/ the eistence

of unconscious mental contents. =ccording to ant, the preliminar/ ;udgements and

h/potheses -hich are at the 3asis of our eperiments are part of the continuous flo- of our

spontaneous actiit/ of ;udgement (ant 1#$1, p. 2*+2 ++,+$ E 1##3, +!#1# #0 .

7.2.2 Hypotheses and induction

ants concise eplanations of the notion of h/pothesis emplo/ seeral technical terms. &t is

helpful to unpac5 them in three steps:

1. 9/potheses are ;udgements that -e regard as true: the/ are @a holding to 3e trueA

B%&rwahrhalten.

2. Fe hold them to 3e true 3ecause the/ eplain the reasons for gien phenomena. 4he

metaph/sics treatises of ants eighteenth centur/ erman predecessors proided

detailed treatments of the notion of reason in connection -ith the principle of

sufficient reason (e.g. Crusius 17*7, HH1+#!*. =dopting their terminolog/, ant

states that h/potheses illustrate the Gr&nde, that is, the causes or reasons of gien


9/36

phenomena. 9aing in mind the distinction 3et-een sufficient and insufficient reasons

(e.g. Crusius 17*7, H1*+, ant states that the reason epressed 3/ a h/pothesis must

3e sufficient to eplain -h/ the phenomena ta5e place.

+. 9/potheses descri3e presuppositions B'orausset(ungen (ant 1#$$c, p. 7*$!E 1##a,

p. 1*$1*E 100a, p. *. 4he/ descri3e -hat must 3e preliminaril/ B"oraus posited

Bgeset(t, that is, eist or ta5e place, for certain phenomena to ta5e place.

4he)*sche +ogic epresses all this as follo-s:

, hy!othesis is a holding-to-be-true of the #udgement of the truth of a ground for the sa.e of its

sufficiency for gi"en consequences, or more 3riefl/, the holding-to-be-true of a !resu!!osition

as a ground.

=ll holding)to)3e)true in h/potheses is thus grounded on the fact that the presupposition, as

ground, is sufficient to eplain other cognitions as conseGuences (100a, pp. * !. ii

6or eample, @& suppose that the earth has caities, 3ecause on the 3asis of this Bsupposition

it is possi3le to eplain ho- alle/s aroseE then & suppose the ground, 3ecause on the 3asis of

it one can eplain Bits conseGuences. 4his is a h/pothesisA (ant 1#$$d, p. **0.

4he eample ma5es clear that, -hen -e formulate h/potheses, -e follo- a pattern of

reasoning -hich leads us from certain eents (the conseGuences to their ground (R2$7

B177$"#K, ol. 1$, p. *71E ant 1#$$c, p. 7*$!"7. %n the face of it, this pattern of reasoning

-ould seem to 3e an a3duction or an inference to the 3est eplanation. &nstead, ants

discussions of h/potheses mention induction. 9/potheses @are not ta5en to 3e true

apodicticall/, 3ut!er inductionemA (ant 1#$$e, p. !!.iii@&nductionA is a technical term

for ant. &t designates the ascription of a propert/ to all mem3ers of a class, on the ground

that it 3elongs to some of them.i

#


10/36

Since ant claims that h/potheses are the result of inductions, and the conclusions of

inductions are uniersal ;udgements, ant must hold that h/potheses are uniersal

;udgements. 4hese are ;udgements of the form @all SarePA. 9o-eer, this claim is

implausi3le. ant himself ma5es man/ h/potheses on the constitution of indiidual o3;ects or

on the causes of ;ust one eent: for instance, the h/pothesis that there is heated matter at the

centre of the


11/36


12/36

3e sure that -hateer state of affairs the h/pothesis adduces as an eplanation for gien

phenomena can actuall/ ta5e place (ant 171'177, =770'7#. 4o this end, the h/pothesis

must 3e consistent -ith the 3od/ of our 5no-ledge. @&f, for eample, to eplain earthGua5es

and olcanoes -e assume a su3terranean fire, then such a fire must 3e possi3le, if not as a

flaming 3od/, /et as a hot one (ant 100a, p. *E see ant 1##3, p. +77. 9ence, -e should

not ma5e the h/pothesis that there are flames at the centre of the earth, 3ecause com3ustion

-ould 3e impossi3le due to the lac5 of air (ant 1003, pp. 2!# $0. 9o-eer, -e can ma5e

the h/pothesis that the centre of the earth is composed of heated matter, 3ecause a 3od/ can

3e heated in a3sence of air.iii

&n the second place, -e must ma5e sure that the eents to 3e eplained reall/ follo- from the

assumed h/pothesis. %ther-ise, the h/pothesis is @a mere chimeraA (ant 100a, p. !E see

1#$$e, p. !!#$ 7 E 1##3, p. +7$+! +7 .i

&n the third place, a h/pothesis must 3e sufficient to eplain a -hole set of phenomena,

-ithout the need to integrate it -ith further h/potheses.

4hus Tycho rahes h/pothesis, for eample, did not suffice for the eplanation of man/

appearancesE hence he assumed seeral ne- h/potheses to complete it. o- here it is to 3e

surmised that the assumed h/pothesis cannot 3e the real ground. 4he Copernican s/stem, on

the other hand, is a h/pothesis from -hich eer/thing can 3e eplained that ought to 3e

eplained therefrom,so far as it has yet occurred to us. 9ere -e do not need an/subsidiary

hy!otheses(hy!otheses subsidiarias (ant 100a, pp. ! $E see ant 171'177,

=77*'02E 1#$$e, p. !!#.

4he prohi3ition to use su3sidiar/ h/potheses preents natural scientists from framing a -hole

s/stem out of h/potheses -hich integrate each other to form comprehensie eplanations, 3ut

are not s/stematicall/ related to eperiments and o3serations. =n eample of such a s/stem

is Descartes orte theor/, -hich for ?oc5e and e-ton -as a paradigm eample of an

12


13/36

unfounded speculatie h/pothesis (=nste/ 200!, pp. 22# +1. &t is occasionall/ targeted in

the antian corpus as -ell (ant 1#$$a, p. 222E 17$+, p. 1**.

Compliance -ith the three criteria ensures that -e do not assume @mere chimerasA (ant

1#$$f, p. 2+, @empt/ figments of the 3rainA (17#0, p. *$$1, @empt/ fictionsA (1#$$c, p.

7*$1#, @romances of reasonA (1#$$a, p. 220++ or @daring adentureBs of reasonA (17#0, p.

*1# n. as h/potheses. 4hese are t/pical epressions of the anti)h/pothetical rhetoric to 3e

found in the -ritings 3/ o/le, 9oo5e, or ?oc5e (e.g. ?oc5e 1#7$ # , ol. *, p. $2. 4he/

emplo/ed those epressions in their -holesale re;ection of an/ h/pothesis from the current

stage of natural philosoph/.

ant, li5e his erman contemporaries (e.g.


14/36

necessar/ statements. ant regards this as an anal/tic truth: to sa/ that something is a la- is

to sa/ that it is necessar/.i=ccordingl/, in order to 5no- that a statement epresses a la- of

nature, -e must 5no- that it is necessaril/ true. 9o-eer, eperiments cannot confer

certaint/ to a h/pothesis, 3ecause eperience cannot esta3lish that a statement is necessaril/

true.ii4herefore, ;ust 3/ means of eperiments, -e cannot proe that a h/pothesis is a la-

of nature (ant 17+, p. 2#*.

Does this mean that eperiments -ill neer ena3le us to achiee the purpose the/ are meant

to sere, that is, discoering the la-s of natureK ant does not dra- such a pessimistic

conclusion. 9e holds that testing h/potheses 3/ means of eperiments is necessar/, 3ut not

sufficient, to discoer the la-s of nature.


15/36

4he same applies to the h/potheses that are confirmed 3/ eperiments.


16/36

of material o3;ects. &t also applies to mental states.


17/36

9o-eer, those eperiments are not sufficient for us to!ro"ethe metaph/sical principles.

4he/ cannot 3e, to use ?oc5es famous epression, @Irinciples that Matter of 6act ;ustifieA

(?oc5e 1$#+, p. 2*. 4his is 3ecause, 3eing la-s, the/ appl/ necessaril/ to eer/ o3;ect that

eists in space and time. Let eperience, eperiments, and matters of fact cannot confer

necessit/ to an/ ;udgement.


18/36

addition to empirical premises.?et us consider three eamples to see ho- this process

unfolds.

1. Fe hae determined certain empirical regularities concerning the melting of -a and

-e -ant to formulate an empirical la- of nature. Fe could then proe that the

statements descri3ing those regularities follo- from a priori principles, such as the

causal la- and the la- of action and reaction, together -ith empirical statements

descri3ing properties of -a.

2. Fe hae formulated statements descri3ing ho- a 3illiard 3all moes -hen it is hit 3/

other 3alls. Fe could then derie those statements from the causal principle,

metaph/sical principles, and information on the -eight and shape of 3illiard 3alls.

+. 6aced -ith eplers la-s of planetar/ motion, -e could proe that the/ follo- from

metaph/sical principles such as the la- of inertia and the la- of action and reaction

(6riedman 1##2, pp. 17!

0.

&n each of these cases, -e start from empirical regularities -hich -e hae esta3lished a

posteriori. 4hen -e attempt to su3sume them under a priori principles. &f -e succeed in this

attempt, -e -ill hae reason to regard the statements descri3ing those regularities as

@something radicall/ ne-A (6riedman 1##2, p. 17, that is, as descriptions of necessar/

features of realit/.i

4he process -hich leads from a h/pothesis to an empirical la- of nature is represented in

6ig. 7.1. 4he point of departure for this process is a h/pothesis -hich is deried 3/ induction.

4o 3egin -ith, -e should assess -hether the h/pothesis satisfies the three reGuirements

discussed in Section 7.2.*. &f it does not, -e must a3andon it. %ther-ise, -e must approach it

holding, in ants -ords, eperiments in one hand and principles in the other (ant

1


19/36

171'177, iii. 6irst, -e must perform eperiments or carr/ out o3serations to confirm

or disproe the h/pothesis. 4hen, if the h/pothesis is confirmed, -e must attempt to relate it

to the principles -hich are the 3asis of natural science. &f -e succeed in doing so, then the

h/pothesis could 3e an empirical la- of nature.

6ig. 7.1: Irocess from h/potheses to empirical la-s

1#


20/36

& stated that it could3e a la- of nature, and not that it -ill certainl/ 3e a la- of nature,

3ecause other operations ma/ 3e inoled in our search for natural la-s. 6or instance, -e

ma/ hae to choose 3et-een t-o incompati3le h/potheses, 3oth of -hich are confirmed 3/

the o3serational eidence and can 3e integrated -ith a priori principles. =lternatiel/, -e

ma/ hae to su3mit our eperiments, h/potheses, and eplanations to the scientific

communit/. Fe ma/ 3e entitled to claim that a h/pothesis is a la- of nature onl/ -hen some

degree of intersu3;ectie agreement is reached. 4his -ould conform to ants repeated claim

that peoples agreement, and especiall/ the agreement of the learned communit/, -ith our

opinions proides a reason to hold them true (ant 171'177, =20 21'* *#E

17+, p.

2#.

7." Experiments and Heuristic Principles

&n the preious section -e hae seen that, for ant, principles pla/ a role after-e perform

eperiments. 4he/ ena3le us to conert eperimentall/ confirmed h/potheses into la-s of

nature. 9o-eer, there are also principles -hich pla/ a role before-e perform eperiments.

4he/ are principles that -e follo- in order to formulate h/potheses to 3e tested 3/ means of

eperiments. Fhen -e perform eperiments, @-e must al-a/s first presuppose something

here (3egin -ith a h/pothesis from -hich to 3egin our course of inestigation, and this must

come about as a result of !rinci!lesA (ant 17#a, p. 22+ " italics addedE see 1#*2, p. 1##1 + .

Fhat principles is ant referring toK 4o the etent that -e are a-are of them, the

transcendental and metaph/sical principles are inoled in the formulation and assessment of

h/potheses. Fe should onl/ accept h/potheses that are consistent -ith those principles. &n

addition, three other principles guide the formulation of h/potheses. 4he/ are the principles

20


21/36

of homogeneit/, specification, and affinit/. ant calls them the principles of the h/pothetical

use of reason.

4he principle of homogeneit/ states that @one should not multipl/ 3eginnings (principles

-ithout necessit/A (ant 171'177, =$!2'$0. ant ta5es it to mean that one must al-a/s

search for higher genera for all the species that one 5no-s. =s an eample, ant mentions the

h/pothesis that eer/ salt is either an acid, or an al5ali, and the attempts @to regard this

distinction as merel/ a ariet/ or aried epression of one and the same fundamental

materialA (=$!2!+'$01. 4he principle of homogeneit/ is a methodological principle

-hich presupposes a metaph/sical principle: namel/, that natural entities 3elong to common

5inds.

4he principle of specification prohi3its one from assuming that there are lo-est species, that

is, species -hich cannot in turn hae su3)species. 4his is a presupposition of natural inGuir/,

as ant eplains 3/ ta5ing different t/pes of soil as an eample:

4hat there are a3sor3ent earths of different species (chal5/ earths and muriatic earths needed

for its discoer/ a foregoing rule of reason that made it a tas5 for the understanding to see5 for

arieties, 3/ presupposing nature to 3e so a3undant that it presumes them. 6or -e hae an

understanding onl/ under the presupposition of arieties in nature, ;ust as -e hae one onl/

under the condition that natures o3;ects hae in themseles a sameness of 5ind, 3ecause it is

;ust the manifoldness of -hat can 3e grasped together under a concept that constitutes use of

this concept and the 3usiness of the understanding. (=$!7'$!

4he principle of affinit/ deries from the com3ination of the principles of homogeneit/ and

specification. &t states that @there is a continuum of formsA (=$!#'$7: @there are no

species or su3species that are proimate B..., 3ut interening species are al-a/s possi3le,

-hose difference from the first and second species is smaller than their difference from each

otherA (=$!#$0'$7E see =222#'21. 4his appears to 3e a metaph/sical

21


22/36

principle, 3ut it has a methodological significance: one must al-a/s allo- for the possi3ilit/

that there are intermediate species 3et-een the species that one alread/ 5no-s. &n this

instance, as -as the case for the t-o preious principles, -e hae a methodological

prescription (al-a/s loo5 for intermediate species, -hich depends on a metaph/sical

presupposition (there is a continuum of forms.

4he principles of the h/pothetical use of reason, li5e the metaph/sical principles of natural

science, are not inductie generali>ations that -e form on the 3asis of eperience. Fe do not

derie them from the discoer/ that 5no-n genera hae lo-er species, that lo-er species

3elong to higher genera, and that there are intermediate species 3et-een an/ t-o 5no-n

species. &n ants ie-, -e -ould not find higher genera, lo-er species, and intermediate

species in the first place, unless -e preiousl/ assumed the principles of the h/pothetical use

of reason as guides for the formulation of h/potheses (=$$0'$. 6or instance, -e perform

eperiments to test the h/pothesis that seeral phenomena o3e/ the same la- 3ecause -e

assume that there is a higher genus for eer/ gien set of phenomena. ii

Fe do not hae to 3e full/ conscious of this assumption in order to formulate h/potheses and

to test them -ith eperiments. Fe often eercise our mental po-ers according to rules of

-hich -e are una-are. @4he eercise of our po-ers B... ta5es place according to certain rules

that -e follo-, unconsciousof them as first, until -e graduall/ arrie at cognition of them

through eperiments and length/ use of our po-ersA (ant 100a, p. 11E see 1#$$e, p. !02E

1#$$f, p. 7#0. 4his applies, for instance, to the rules of grammar, -hich -e discoer long

time after -e started follo-ing them. 4he same applies to the principles of the h/pothetical

use of reason.

=lthough -e often follo- these principles unconsciousl/, ant does not thin5 that -e al-a/s

follo- them (ant 17$, p. *72. 4he/ @do not sa/ -hat happens, i.e., in accordance -ith

22


23/36

-hich rule our po-ers of cognition actuall/ perform their role and ho- things are ;udged, 3ut

rather ho- the/ ought to 3e ;udgedA (ant 17#0, p. 12. 4he/ are rules or maims that must

guide the formulation of h/potheses (ant 171'177, =$$$'$#*. ?i5e h/potheses, the

principles of the h/pothetical use of reason are @heuristic fictionsA (=$$1'$# -hich

precede and guide eperimental actiit/.

4o 3e sure, the principles of the h/pothetical use of reason are not the sole presuppositions of

eperimental actiit/. ant argues for the eistence of other regulatie principles that direct

empirical research. 4he/ are: the assumption that -e cannot hae sensor/ perceptions of an/

a3solute or insurmounta3le temporal or spatial limits (=!0 #'!+$ +7E the assumption

that nature is organi>ed as if it -ere designed 3/ an intelligent 3eing (=2$'!*E and the

assumption that liing 3eings are constituted as if the/ o3e/ed final causes (ant 17#0, p.

+7.iii Moreoer, the principles of the h/pothetical use of reason are not only

presuppositions of eperimental actiit/. 4he/ also underlie the s/stematic organi>ation of

cognitions. Fe emplo/ those principles -hen -e formulate a h/pothesis -hich eplains

seeral phenomena, een if -e are una3le to perform eperiments or o3serations to test it. &f

the h/pothesis proides the 3est eplanation of the phenomena, -e should accept it despite

the a3sence of eperimental or o3serational confirmation. 9o-eer, if eperiments confirm

the h/pothesis, -e hae @a po-erful reason to ta5e as -ell grounded the unit/ that is

h/potheticall/ thought)outA (ant 171'177, =$$1'$#.

7.+ onclusion

=ccording to acon, o/le, and 9oo5e, eperiments sere mainl/ to collect data in ie- of

the future construction of natural philosophical theories.


24/36

assigned the function of testing theories and h/potheses. %n the contrar/, the eperimenters

prior natural philosophical 3eliefs and persuasions -ere loo5ed upon -ith suspicion, as

potential sources of pre;udices -hich could contaminate his eperimental actiit/. %n the

-hole, data collection and eperimentation -ere seen as theor/)free actiities.

/ contrast, according to ant, eperiments cannot sere to 3uild a 3ase of data -hich are

independent from theories. 4his is 3ecause eperiments are al-a/s conceied of and carried

out in the light of our assumptions, epectations, and heuristic principles. 4hese assumptions

and principles depend in part on the nature of the human mind and in part on the

eperimenters conictions and purposes. 4he/ gie rise to preliminar/ ;udgements and

h/potheses -hich guide us in the design and performance of eperiments.

ants emphasis on the importance of preliminar/ ;udgements and h/potheses for

eperiments goes hand in hand -ith his denial of the aconian ie- that pre;udices al-a/s

pla/ a negatie function. =ccording to ant, pre;udices (or more precisel/, preliminar/

;udgements are indispensa3le for man/ human actiities, including eperimentation.

9o-eer, it is necessar/ to test and assess them in order to either re;ect them as false, or else

to transform them from mere opinions to certain truths.

%n the -hole, compared -ith acon, o/le, and 9oo5e, ant has ela3orate ie-s on the one

hand, on ho- our theoretical and pre)theoretical assumptions 3ear on eperimental practice,

and on the other hand, on ho- the results of eperimental actiit/ can 3e integrated -ithin

the 3od/ of our theories in order to adance our 5no-ledge of nature. 9o-eer, ant seems

to hae oerstated the dependence of eperiments on theories.

6irst,!ace ant, some eperiments are performed in a3sence of a clear theoretical

frame-or5. 4heir aim is not testing h/potheses, 3ut eploring ne- areas of inGuir/ or

circumscri3ing ne- phenomena (Steinle 1##7. ant must hae read the discussion of these

2*


25/36

e!loratory eperiments in a -or5 that he 5ne- -ell, Johann 9einrich ?am3erts/ew

1rganon(17$*, ol. 1, p. +!!. 9o-eer, ant neer discusses eplorator/ eperiments.

Second, as a conseGuence of his disregard for eplorator/ eperiments, ant oerloo5s the

3enefits of the creatie interpla/ of eperiments designed to test theories and h/potheses -ith

eperiments -hich hae a life of their o-n. acon, o/le, and 9oo5e also oerloo5ed the

3enefits of that interpla/, 3ut for the opposite reason: namel/, 3ecause the/ focused too much

on eperiments haing a life of their o-n.

4hird, some eperiments test h/potheses -hich contrast -ith our currentl/ accepted theories.

4he/ lead us to replace them -ith ne- theories, incompati3le -ith the preious ones. ant

does not proide an/ account of ho- these re"olutionaryeperiments lead to theor/ change

or reision.i%n the contrar/, he reGuires that our h/potheses are coherent -ith the 3od/ of

our preious 5no-ledgeand that eperimental results are integrated -ithin a gien s/stem,

3ased on the a priori foundations of natural science.i

&n response to this criticism, ant could emphasi>e that eplorator/ and reolutionar/

eperiments are neer -holl/ independent from our theoretical and pre)theoretical 3eliefs

and h/potheses. 9o-eer, he should hae ac5no-ledged that the/ en;o/ a certain degree of

freedom from our theoretical assumptions. 4his ma5es them more than handmaids to theor/,

h/pothesis)testing procedures, or preliminaries to the addition of ne- la-s of nature to a

static, eer)gro-ing 3od/ of natural philosophical 5no-ledge, firml/ resting on unsha5a3le

e-tonian foundations.

=s is -ell 5no-n, deelopments in science hae sha5en those foundations and made space

for more d/namic conceptions of scientific progress. 4hese conceptions ma5e it easier than it

-ould hae 3een for ant to accommodate the interaction 3et-een theor/)testing

eperiments and eplorator/ eperiments and to eplain the roles of eperiments for theor/

2!


26/36

change and reision. =rgua3l/, the eolution of ants philosophical ie-s points in this

direction. 4he completeness and coherence of the s/stem of natural science 3ecomes more

and more a regulatie ideal -hen ant moes from the e-tonian focus of the 0eta!hysical

%oundations of /atural Scienceto the thorn/ status of teleological 3iological eplanations in

the Critique of the Power of )udgementand the reconsideration of chemistr/ in the 1!us

Postumum. Let despite these deelopments, ant neer retracted the claim that he uncoered

and enumerated the definitie a priori foundations of natural science.

=t an/ rate, in order to ac5no-ledge the roles of eperiments for eploring ne- territories

and esta3lishing ne- theories, it -as necessar/ to highlight the eistence of fecund relations

3et-een eperiments and theories. 9ighlighting these relations is a significant contri3ution of

ants philosoph/ of eperiment, especiall/ if compared -ith the ie-s of his ritish

predecessors.ii

$e&erences

=dic5es,


27/36

irch, 4. 17!$ !7. The History of the Royal Society of +ondon for im!ro"ing of natural

.nowledge$ from its first rise, * ols. ?ondon.

o/le, 8. 1$$2. Defence against ?inus.The wor.s of Robert 3oyle, ed. M. 9unter and ig: leditsch.

D=lem3ert, J. 17!1. Discours IrOliminaire. &nEncyclo!7die$ ou Dictionnaire raisonn7 des

sciences$ des arts et des m7tiers,ol. 1, ed. D. Diderot and J. d=lem3ert (17!1 77, i)

27


28/36

l. Iaris: riasson.

Daries, J.. 177$. 4eg (ur 4ahrheit. 6ran5furt a.%.: StrauP.


29/36

en;. Falford.

9ume, D. 17*0. =n a3stract of a 3oo5 latel/ pu3lishedE entituled, a treatise of human nature @

&n, treatise of human nature, ed. D.6. orton and M.J. orton (2000. %ford: %ford

niersit/ Iress.

ant, &. 17*7. edan5en on der -ahren Scht>ung der le3endigen rfte. &n2ant 1#00 ,

ol. 1, 1 11.

ant, &. 17$+. Der ein>ig mQgliche e-eisgrund >u einer Demonstration des Daseins ottes.

&n2ant 1#00 ,

ol. 2, $+ 1$+.

ant, &. 171'177.2riti. der reinen 'ernunft, ed. J. 4immermann (1##$. 9am3urg: Meiner.

ant, &. 17+. Irolegomena >u einer ;eden 5Rnftigen Metaph/si5, die als Fissenschaft -ird

auftreten 5Qnnen. &n2ant 1#00 , ol. *, 2!+++.

ant, &. 17$. Metaph/sische =nfangsgrRnde der atur-issenschaft. &n2ant 1#00, ol. *,

*$!!$!.

ant, &. 17#0.riti5 der rteils5raft. &n2ant 1#00, ol. !, 1$!*!.

ant, &. 17#+. Felches sind die -ir5lichen 6ortschritte, die die Metaph/si5 seit ?ei3ni>ens

und Folfs Teiten in Deutschland gemacht hatK &n2ant 1#00, ol. 20, 2!++!1.

ant, &. 17#a. =nthropologie in pragmatischer 9insicht. &n2ant1#00 , ol. 7, 117+++.

ant, &. 17#3. Der Streit der 6a5ultten. &n2ant1#00 , ol. 7, 111!.

ant, &. 100a. &mmanuel ants ?ogi5: u orlesungen. &n2ant1#00 ,

ol.

#, 11!0.

ant, &. 1003. &mmanuel ants ph/sische eographie. &n2ant 1#00 , ol. #, 1!1 *+$ .

ant, &. 1#00 . 2antAs gesammelte Schriften, ed. Qniglich IreuPische (Deutsche =5ademie

der Fissenschaften, erlin: 8eimer (later: de ru/ter.

ant, &. 1#22. rief-echsel. &n2ant 1#00", ols. 10"1+.

2#


30/36

ant, &. 1#+$ 1#+ . %pus postumum. &n2ant 1#00 , ols. 21, 22.

ant, &. 1#*2. iger Ih/si5. &n2ant 1#00 , ol. 2#, #71$#.

ant, &. 1##a. ?ogi5 auch. &n+ogi.-'orlesung@ Bn"erffentlichte /achschriften, ed. 4.

Iinder, ol. 1. 9am3urg: Meiner.

ant, &. 1##3. ?ogi5 9echsel. &n+ogi.-'orlesung@ Bn"erffentlichte /achschriften, ed. 4.

Iinder, ol. 2, 2$#*##. 9am3urg: Meiner.

itcher, I. 2000.2antAs transcendental !sychology. e- Lor5: %ford niersit/ Iress.

reines, J. 200. ant on the la-s of nature: ?a-s, necessitation, and the limitation of our

5no-ledge.Euro!ean )ournal of Philoso!hy17: !27 !.

?a 8occa, C. 200+. iudi>i proisori: Sulla logica euristica del processo conoscitio.

Soggetto e mondo: Studi su 2ant, 7# 11#. enice: Marsilio.

?am3ert, J.9. 17$*./eues 1rganon oder Gedan.en &ber die Erforschung und 3e(eichnung

des 4ahren und dessen Bnterscheidung "om >rrthum und Schein, 2 ols. ?eip>ig:

Fendler.

?audan, ?. 1#1. 4he sources of modern methodolog/: 4-o models of change. &n Science

and hy!othesis: Historical essays on scientific methodology. Dordrecht: 8eidel.

+0


31/36

?oc5e, J. 1$#+. Some thoughts concerning education, ed. J.F. Lolton and J.S. Lolton (1##.

%ford: %ford niersit/ Iress.

?oc5e, J. 1#7$#. The corres!ondence of )ohn +oc.e, ed. S. De eer. %ford: Clarendon.

Mal>5orn, F. 2000. ant and the d/namics of science.Philoso!hia naturalis+7: 77 #!.

e-ton, &. 1$7. The Princi!ia: 0athematical !rinci!les of batural !hiloso!hy, ed. &..

Cohen and =.M. Fhitman (1###. er5ele/: niersit/ of California Iress.

e-ton, &. 171*'1!. =n =ccount of the oo5


32/36

go"ernment of the moral world. ?ondon: J. oon.

Falch, J.. 177!.Philoso!hisches +eicon, *th ed., ed. J.C. 9ennings. ?eip>ig: leditsch.

Farten3erg, 4.


33/36

i 6or instance, acons, o/les, and 9oo5es attitude to-ards h/potheses -as shared, among others, 3/ ?oc5e,

e-ton, 9ume, 4urn3ull, d=lem3ert, and 8eid. See ?oc5e (1#7$)#, ol. *, pp. !$+, $2#, e-ton (1$7,

pp.#+#)#**E 171*'1!, pp. 222)2*. 9ume (17*0, H2, 4urn3ull (17*0, p. 2E d=lem3ert (17!1)77, pp. i, , i,

E 8eid, 2001, p. !0.

ii 4ranslations are m/ o-n for those -ritings of ant -hich hae not 3een translated into mmanuel 2ant. & hae replaced =merican

spelling -ith ritish spelling in Guotations.

iii See ant (1#+$1#+, ol. 22, pp. 2##12and +2#+2++0+. 4he epression @stud/ of natureA in the 1!us

!ostumumis often follo-ed 3/ the eplanation: @through o3seration and eperimentA (see e.g. ant 1#+$

1#+, ol. 22, pp. +22171, +21$, +**1!, and +*$2!2$.

i ant 3riefl/ descri3es an eperiment that he performed in (17*7, p. 1!+.

4his tet classifies seeral t/pes of eperience, follo-ing a schema similar to those of 9ennings (177*, pp.

1!1 !2 and Falch (177!, cols. 10+ *.

i eertheless, ant often mentions o3serations and eperiments in one 3reath. See e.g. ant (1#22, ol. 11,

p. 1*2+$ERefleion (henceforthR !$*! (170 K, ol. 1, p. 2 +E ant (1#+$ 1#+ , ol. 21, pp. 1!1$ 17 and

7$2 2# . ant often emplo/s the term @eperimentA in a loose sense, to refer to o3serations, e.g. in ( 17#3, p.

#E 1#$$3, p. $11.

ii ant also has interesting ie-s on the role of theoretical concepts for eperimentation. & -ill not comment on

this topic, as it is discussed in Farten3erg (1##2, pp. 2*2 *!. & -ill not discuss ants ie-s on the role of

eperiments for the a priori inGuiries that he deelops in the first t-o Critiques. %n this issue, see esp.

Seigfried (1##, lo/ (1##$, 200#, Sato (200.

iii & follo- Ieter =nste/ (200!, unpu3lished.

i &n reconstructing ants ie-s, & -ill dra- not onl/ on the tets that ant pu3lished, 3ut also on his

manuscript notes (the so)called Refleionen and on the notes of his lectures. 4hese materials raise seeral

philological pro3lems: see Conrad (1##*. &n the face of those pro3lems, -hen citing Refleionenand lecture

transcripts, & -ill mostl/ rel/ on statements -hich can 3e found in more than one source: seeral Refleionen


34/36

or lecture transcripts, orRefleionen alongside ants -or5s and letters. 4he follo-ing datings are assumed for

the lectures on -hich the lecture transcripts are 3ased. 1#$$c, 1#$$e, 1#$$f, 1#0, and 1##3 are 3ased on

lectures gien from the earl/ 170s on-ards. 1#$1 is 3ased on lectures gien 3et-een 1777 and 172. 1#$$3

and 1##a are 3ased on lectures gien in seeral different /ears, pro3a3l/ including pre)Critical materials.

1#$$a and 1#$$d are 3ased on lecture gien in the earl/ 1770s.

o/les la- states there is an inerse proportional relationship 3et-een the pressure and olume of a gas in a

closed s/stem -here the temperature is constant.

i acon -as posthumousl/ recruited as the @Iatriar5 of


35/36

i See (ant 1#$$e, p. !17: certaint/ @is a-areness of the necessit/ of truthA. See also (ant 1#$$e, p. !+0E

100a, p. $$.

ii ased on ant (1#$$e, p. !!E seeR 2$1 (177$ #K, ol. 1$, p. *$#.

iii ant emphasi>es that h/potheses must 3e consistent especiall/ -ith that particular 3od/ of 5no-ledge -hich

is constituted 3/ the @conditions of possi3le eperienceA (ant 171'177, =771'7##, outlined in the first

Critique.

i 4he first Critiqueadds that -e should 3e a3le to determine the conseGuences of a gien h/pothesis a priori

(ant 171'177, =77*'02. & ta5e this to mean that, -hen -e eplain ho- certain eents follo- from the

assumed h/pothesis, -e should sho- that the/ follo- from it on the 3asis of a priori principles, such as the

causal la- and the la- of action and reaction (see utts 1#$1, p. 1$!. ations of

chemistr/ can achiee the status of la-s (17$, p. *$.

i


36/36

i 4/picall/, empirical la-s outline necessar/ features of specific natural 5inds: see reines (200.

ii ant argues that, in order to discoer natural la-s, -e must assume that nature is ordered into genera and

species, in conformit/ -ith the principles of the h/pothetical use of reason (17#0, p. 1!. 4o sho- this, ant

eplains ho- the principle of affinit/ -as at -or5 in the reasonings that lead to e-tons discoer/ of

uniersal graitation (ant 171'177, =$$2 $+'$#0 #1.

iii See u/er (1##0.

i %n the forms of scientific progress that are compati3le -ith ants ie-s, see Mal>5orn (2000.

See Sect. 7.2.*.

i See Sect. 7.+.

ii &n ac5no-ledging these relations, ant could rel/ on the reflections of his erman predecessors, from Folff

to ?am3ert. 8econstructing them and the etent to -hich the/ anticipate ants reflections is a tas5 that & hope

to ta5e up on another occasion. 6or alua3le comments on preious ersions of this paper, & -ould li5e to

than5 Ieter =nste/, Juan Manuel ome>, =lan Musgrae, and irsten Falsh. 4he paper 3enefited from er/

helpful discussions of audiences at udapest, Iadua, and S/dne/.

vanzo kant on experiment 2012

Documents