u 2 1 1965 - oclc

5 THE loth US ARMCRID DIVISlm IN THE

SAAR-MOSELLE TRIANGLE

A RESEARCH ~PORT PREPARED

BY

COlliuTTEE 15 OFFICERS ADVAIGED COURSE

THE ARtI_ORED SC HOOL

194 - 1949

MAJOR J CAJTLY ARTY (Chai rman)

UJOR J R SYKES INF

1AJm J L PEITCN CAV

JOR C C ED~OIIDSO CAV

LAJCR J C NOEL DIF

AJ OR R 1 DHEiS CI V

CEPTAl t H J CROttC H INF

CAPTAIi~ J B STOCKTON CAV

FORT KNOX liliNTUC KY

AY 1949

U 2 1 1965

--

PREFACE

As is known to most professional and some amashy

teur military historians troops of the Third US Army

were making a concentrated effort to crack the vaunted

SIEGtlRIED Line north and south of SAARBRUCKEN in Decemshy

ber 1944 when the urgency of the German counterattack

through the ARDEN~lliS caused a temporary halt to this

effort The operation had begun early in November and

had been primarily successful in its first objective - shy

the capture of the heavily defended METZ fortified area

As soon as possible after the ARDENNES thru~t had been

repulsed General PATTON directed his forces to resume

the task which had been left uncompleted In midshy

February the attack was again launched

The SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle lay in the zone of

XX Corps during both the November-December and February

phases of the operation Of the many units wtich partici shy

pated in one or the other of thesE phases only one of

division size took part in botr This unit was tbe

lOth Armored Division commanded by lYajor General

W H H MORRIS JR

The authors of this report have undertakm to - make a study of the loth Armored Division in both

phases Our decision was based on several factors

ii

_------------__-__ ___---shy

First we are all students of the Officers Advanced

Cours~ at The Armored School at present (September

1948 to June 1949) and although we represent most

of the ground combat arms our principal current inshy

terest is armor Second we considered the problems

confronted by an armored division in its battle inshy

doctrination to be of especial interest to us as potcnshy

tial commanders or staff officers of large armored units

Such was the case with the 10th Armored in Novembershy

December Finally our study showed that thorebruary

attack was a near-classical example of the attack by an

armored unit through infantry to seize a deCisive obshy

jective deep in tho erpound~v rear area)

Now to the actual scope of our report We shall

first consider the actions of our Divisio~l frem about

the 8th of November when XX Corps of Third Army started

in its attack on W~TZ to the night of 16-17th of Decemshy

ber when the Division was recalled by 12th Army Group

to meGt the German HIDENNES thrust Following a very-

brief account of the Division 8 actions in tpo Bulge

we shall take up the February attack which ended on

the 2nd of March with the capture of TRIER In conclushy

sian we will compare the operations and doctrine of

the Division wi th present-day dcctrine as taught at The

Jrmored School

iii

It would not be fitting to conclude this preface

without acknowlec1gIrent of the outstanding contributions

to the ccrrpl~tion of this report made by JlIlrS C C

EdmondsCll and trs R E Drews (wives of members of the

Committee) Their unflagging interest in our mrk coupled

with their yeomanlike efforts in typing referenc6 cards

notes and manuscript have been invaluable Also of grbat

assistance to us has been the service rendered by Major

General WRRIS who corrected our draft am wrote the

following foreword

iv

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~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I INTRODUCTION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 1

II ENEMY SITUATION AND DEFENSIVE PLANS FOR THE EXPECTED A1ERICAN AT~CK bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 8

III 10th iillMORED DIVISION BATTLE UIDOCTRINiTION AND INITIAL ROLE IN THE SAAR-liOSELLE OFFENSIVE bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 13

IV CCA - NOVEMBER 14th TO DECEtBER 16th bull bull 20 Plans for tho Employment of CCA bull bull bull bull bull 20 The Attack on Bouzonville bull bull bull bull bull bull 23 CGA Hits the Switch Line bullbullbullbullbullbullbull 30

V CCB THRUSTS EhST bull bull 41middot middot middot bull

VI Sm~r-~RY OF FIRST PHhSE 46middot middot bull middot VII DECEAlBER 16th to FEBRUi~HY 9th bull bull 52

CC1~ -- Brigadi er General Piburn middot middot 53middot middot middot middot bull CCE - Colonel W 1- Roberts middot middot bull 54middot

VIII AN tTT iCE IS PLiiNNED bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 57 Conference Between CG XX Corps and CG 94tL Division February 81945 57 Intelligenco Data bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 57 A Near Hitch in Plans bullbullbull bull 58 The Corps Plan bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 59 Jrti llery Fire Plan bull bull bull 60

IX THE hTTCK OF THE SWITCH LUJE bull bull bull 63 l~h j~rmored Di vi sion--February 1-19 1945 63 The Infantry ittack--February 19 19h5 bull bull 64 Exploitation by the lOth Armored Division 65

x DEThILED kOV2IiENTS OF THE 10TH mhOilED DIVISION reOk TFE CllPTURE OF THE DIVISION OBJECTIVE 1T TJpoundHN TO INCLUDE THE srhR RIVER CROSSING bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 70- Plans and Preparations 70middot

Plans for the Crossing 73 The First ittempt 74

vi

shyChapter Page

The Second bttempt bull middot 75 The Crossing bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 77 Actions of CCA bull bull bull bull 79 The Diversionary Attampck bull bull bull bull bull 8a Change in Plans bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 83 Intelligence Data bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 84 The brmored Infantry Cros ses bull bull bull bull bull 84 Armored Infantry and Pillboxes bull bull bull bull bull bull as hrmor kust Hcve Bridges bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 89

XI THE FALL OF TRIER middot middot bull bull bull bull 93 Team J Takes Zerf bull bull bull bull 95 CCB Move s North bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 95 CCB Start s to Drive on Trier bull bull bull bull bull 97 Trier is Entered bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbullbullbull bull bull 103

XII SUiidiRY OF SECOrD PHASE middot middot middot middot bull 107

XIII CONCLUSION bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 113

hPPENDICES bull bull bull bull middot bull bull

I ~aps bull middot middot middot bull middot middot middot middot bull middot XX Corps Operations Nov-Dec 44 middot XX Corps Operations Feb-Ear45 middot II Tcrrai n Analw-sis middot middot middot middot middot middot III Order of Bottle bull middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot bull

IV Operations Orders of xx Corps middot middot middot middot middot V Personalities middot bullmiddot middot bull middot middot bull middot VI Bibliography

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vii

bull bull bull

-St_____ t middot tm 1Tf11- P_ m ~__ ~ _ __ middot ____________---~--___

TABLE OF EfPS CHfRTS rlND ILLUSTRT10NS

Opposite Page

vUAJOR GENERhL W H H MORRIS JR middot Map showing Third Army Front Lines on November 1 1944shy

location of Divisions of Third Jrmy on November 1 1944 and enerrlf situation as it existed at the start of the November offensive bullbullbull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 4

Map st-owing XX Corps Plan of 10 ttack 6

Chart showing Organization an Task Force Breakdown of 10th hrmored Di vision November 8th to December 16tb bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull 13

Map showing Movements of CCA November 16th to December 16th bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull 24

Map showing 11overoents of CeE NOVeuroIrber 15th to Dec ember 16th bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull 41

Map showing Third J_rmy Front Line s on Fe bruary 19 1945 locations of Divisions of XX Corps Dn February 19 1945 and enemy situation as it existed at the start of the Febrll9 ry offensive bullbull 59

Chart showing Organization ~d Task Force Breakdown of 10th Armored Division February 19th to March 2nd 63

Map showing ittack on February 19th to 21st 66

1iap showing Jttack on Februpry 21st to 26th 70

Map sbowing 376th RCT Crossing at OCKFEN [nd Armored Infantry Batt~ions from OCKFEN to lFiSCH bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot 77

liap showing Attack on Februg ry 26tr to ~arct 2nd 93

lap showing i ssault on TRIER bull bull 103

Map showing Third 1rmy Si tupoundtion on Uarch 2nd bull bull 106

viii

--

Map showing xx Corps O~ration Nov-Dec 44 App i

Map showing XX Corps Gperat ion FelHIar 45 App i

Map showing Terrain of SAAR-MOSELlE Triangle App ii

llap sham ng Wooded Area in ShAR-OSELLE Triangle App ii

showing Third Jrmy Order of Battle Nov-Dec 44 ApP iiiChart

Chart showing Third Army Order of Battle Feb 45 App iii

Chart showing Troop Ust of 10th itrmored Division App iii

ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is a story of the 10th Armored Division

In particular this is a story about what the Division

did in the SAJR~OSELLE Triangle during November am

December of 1944 and again in February 1945

Strictly sIXlaking the SAAR~OSELLE Triangle

is the name given to a small slice of C18rmany bounded

on the west by the MOSELLE River on the east by the

ShAR River and across the bottom bv an fJlst-west adshy

junct of the SIEGERIED Line constructed before the last

war Generally spGr-tking the two legs of tre Triangle

(th~ rivers) could bE exterrled south as far as the

vicinity of EETZ on the 1Jest and SJuRBRUCKEN on the

east As extended the Triangle ltlso takes in a portion

of the northeastern c orner of France The SidJi end

MOSELLE intersect at the northern tip of the Trhngle

just east of the Duchy of LUXEBOURG and a few miles

to the southwest of the German city of TRIER

This entire area from TRIER south to and inshy

cluding ~~TZ was of greatest tactical importanc0 to our

forces during the autumn of 1944 If the rerder will-recall German resistance began to stiffen in October

of that year following the nllied sweep across France

1

shy

By the ilrst week of ~ovembr it had stalled our cd-

VlCmces from tummiddotBOURG to the North Sea And the

extremely rough terrain from the Swiss border to a

point somewhere south am east of l~ETZ precluded a

blitz-type attack in thBt zone This left thltl TRIERshy

lElZ area as one of the few logical cpproltch0S into

the heart of GerlllEny which afforded a reasonlble chance

of being exploited To take TRIER the Triangle had to

be taken To take the Triangle MSrZ had to be tqkcn

General PATTON pound00 hi s Trird US Army had been

in front of r1ETZ since September Not only was he

extremely short of supplies as a partial result of the unshy

interrupted drive to his present location from the breakshy

out at bVliiNCHES in western France but he hpoundod been

ordered by SHJEF on tho 23rd of Sept ember to take up

an lIoffensive ll defGns as e part of the large-scale plan

for the fJlled Winter Offensi ve which c onVclmpla ted a

1 main effort to the north

On the same day that Gcne-al pjTTON receiwd these

orders thE lOth irmored Division landed on the continent

at CHERBOURG Jt the very moment tho t the units of the

Division were setting up billets in the port 2rG8 General

Pi-TTON and his Corps Conm8nders - LieutenCnt General

(thfn krjor Ceneral) W H WALKER of XX Corps arrl Major

General M S EDDY of XII Corps --~were planning Rt Army

2

heCldquarters in NANCY to extend the imposed defensive

to include the capture of METZ and a subsequent drive

to gcin bridgeheads across the SAAR in the SAJJlBURGshy

SAMffiUCKEN arGa 2 The unexpressed purpose of this

operation las of course to captur~ TRIER cross the

RHINE and continue into Germany (with perhaps BERLIN

or MUNICH as the final objectivet)

While the loth drew equipmmt tested it and

reconditioned itself in the fields around CHERBOURG

General WALKms XX Corps was making tentdive attacks

across the MOSELLE south of EETZ am on some of the

forts of the MErz area which were on the west aide of

the river One result of these probing operatins was

the establishment of OJ bridgehead across the river in

the vicinity of a town named ARNiVILLE some ten miles

south of 1ETZ which was to prove quite valuable in

weeks to middotcome rinother result was the realization ~

all concerned that 1ZTZ could not be taken by frontal

assault without an undue concentration of forces bull

By mid-0ctober the lOth was ready to (ntcr combat

Units were once more in fighting shape following the

Atlantic crossing guns had been test-fired em theuro

officers and men of the Division were eager to get into - the middle of things ILeanwhile Third Army had formushy

lcted the final plan for the attack (disposition of

3

cpound r At poundt OPL

M

--

shy

troops by November 1st was as sbown in the map on the

opposite page) To the soutb XII Corps was to attack

in a generally easterly direction toward the SruRBRUCKENshy

SMREGUEMlNES area and maintain contact with and asshy

sist xx Corps to its north XX Corps was giVeuron the

dual missicn of c~pturing METZ aOO securing a bridgeshy

hcltd across the SAAR in the area of SMRBURG To do this

job properly General WALKER needed at least one em

preferably two addition~l infantry divisicns and an

arrrored divisLm The 95tr Divisicn was assigned am

plans were made to use the 83rd Division at that tine

a part of VIII Corps in the First Army zone to the ncrth

hS to the Armored D1 vision Of cours~

On tht 26th of October the 10th Arrored Division

cleared the CHERBOURG area and heeded for 1lETZ It had

realized the tankers dream - assignment to Third Army

On October 30th it arrived at its destinetion and W0S

placed nenr lpoundARS-U-TOUR on ttl southwest side of the

German salient west of the MOSELLE from ZTZ This

placement was pre-planned The 4th and 6th Armored

Di visions of Xli Corps were already located in the same

general area and it was hoped tha t the Gennans would

interpret this ~JJparent concentration of armor as an

indication of ( tcnk thrust south and east of ETZ

and would di splce troops to llEet it thus weakening

his defenses to the north of t he fortress) Evidence

later proved thEt this ruse wamps successful

xx Corps now consisted of the following units

1 The 5th 90th and 95th Divisions

2 The loth Armored Division

3 The 3rd Cavalry Group reinforced (approximately brigade size)

4 Corps Artillery comprising 18 plus battalions

5 Corps Tr~ops 5 TO Batt8lions

4 AAAW Battalions

2 Engineer Combat Gr)UPS an

other supporting units

(Although the 83rd Division h[d been pr)mised it

was not released from VIn Corps and played no part in

this ph2se of operations by XX Corps The mission

originally intended for it WJS given to the 3rc Cavclry

Group) bull

Generd WALKER planned to destrJY or c2pture

the ~ETZ garrisC)n without the investure Or seige

of the 1ETZ forts 4 To accomplish tbis tusk he intended

that too 90th Division from the viciJlity at THIONVILLE

to the north and the 5th Division fran the JtNlVILIE

bridgehead to the south would be the prongs of e giant

pincer which would close on BOULAY Gnd tJus isolate

rLTZ and prevent its inhpbitonts from being reinforced

5

-shy

or escaping Concurrently the 95tb Division wCs tJ

contein the enemy in front of ILETZ and to estrblish

a bridgehead at LAIZIERES-LES-rETZ on D - 1 to lure

troops of the enemy into believing that this wns the

mdn crossing Then when the pincers had met at PULhY

the 95th was to assault METZ from the northwest After

thEgt 90th had GatEblished t firm bridgeh3ad in the

THIONVILLE area the 10th ArmorEd was tel cross And be

comrrdtted in two forces -- Combat Command A to ~ttack

parallel to the 9Otr Division on its left flank Gamet

Corrrnand B to drive due east to seize crossings of the

SAAR at or near MERZIG Once the 10th Armorlld had cleared

the bridgehead the 3rd Cevalry was to cross and att8ck

northeast to seize S~P~URG and establish a bridgehead

in that area (Se~ map on opposite page)

IX Corps Field Order 12 was published on the

3rd of Novembor 1944 (See Annex IV) During the period

just prior to its issuance troops hrgtd been reshuffled to

be in place for the coming operatims and the 5th am

90th Divisions hgd been given time to conduct training

on the assault of fortified area s The gtperation called

for close timing and mfximum effort by every lIIln who was

to pr~ticip~tc in the attack

By the 8th of Novenbr the stnge vas set ERrly

that morning the feint crossing by a batta~bn of the 95th

6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---

Di visLm WBS launched ~cross the lOSELLE at lfAI2IERES

But before going further it is perhaps appropriate

to consider the ene~ situation

NOTES FeR CHAPTER I

lThe Invasion of est6rn Europe Part I (UStj Departmltn t of Military Art mld Engineering 1946) p 57 amp p 65

2Jfter Action R~rt Trird US hrll Volume I The Operations (l hUg 44 - 9 l~ay 45) p 107

3The R~uction of Fortress lclITZ XX Corps Operctional Report (1 Sep - 6 Dec 44) p 14

4c1eld Order Number Twdve rcedqll3rters XX Corps (3 Nov 44) para 3x( 1)

7

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-CHAPTER II

ENE11Y SITUhTla hND DEffiNSIVi PLi-~S FOR THE EXPECTED AIERICiJJ hTIl-ltCK (see map opposite page 4)

The German C omrranier immedia tely concerned with

stopping C ny further advcnce along the US Third frir3

front was General BALCK commanding hrmy Group G BALCK

according to postwgtr rlocumentcry prepampred by hirrself

must have understoxl tbe US offensi ve plans 21most as

well as did General PhTTm His statements to higher

headquarters - OBW and his moves to ClUnter tbe Third

hrmy and XX Corps prE)parati ons were almost psychic in

analysis Had BALCK bcen able to wrangle the necessary

troops end equipment 1rtird hrmy might never have brought

its Nov6lEber offensive to g successful conclusion

Generc~l KNOBELSDORFF cOlTlllcnding the Gerrcan ~

Army nd the c orrmcmder who should ha vo most directly inshy

fluenced the ~ETZ ltlOd SAAR-KOSELLE acti on must heve been

somewhat weak and ineffective for frDm 211 Cv~ilc~ble

accounts he did little more than tronsmi t orders froo

BALCK to the subordincgtte Corps Corrmanders ~~nd forward

their requests up to hrrry Group G Early in Decsmber

KNOBELSDORFF went thIS way of a11 unslccessful comrnanders

8

shyhe Vias relieved frorr c)nrrcnd of first hrfll and was

gi Vel1 8 fortrmiddotss C oirmnd in Geurormany His II ret irement II

(night have beurogtGl1 extr serious had not BhLCK intershy

ceded for him at figher heEdaurters

LXXXII Corps COfillllHnded by Gerer~l Lieuteppoundnt

HOERNLEIN had r61iev~d XIII 58 Corps in the right

(northern) sector of first Jrrrv on the 1st of ovember

and assumed resp~)fisiliility for the sector frJJ1l

GRbVpoundl~8~JCI-IER in the n)rth along the 1DSELLE including

the YETZ salient to c few kilometers south of kETZ

LXXXII Corps consisted )f a~)proxirmtely thirty thousend

troops assignBCl t J four elivisions Clnd nd laneous

corps orgltmizutions including housekeeping and officer

candidampte units

The northern pOltion fron AETRICH to tTJ VENSLtCPER

was defended by ths 4l6tr Inffmtrl Division with 8300

troops These tr 0 ps Jverltged thirty-eiglt Tars ~xf

ago and had 1i ttl or 11) bet tle cxperienc 0 Ca1l6d

the Whipped Crean Divisicn ll b~r first Army units it

was rded a lIDi tGd defensive division

South of the 4l6tb ani in the north cpoundn ter

sect~r stOO the 19th Infantrr Division with an ~Dpr

mate strength cf SCCX) offi3ers cnr 1lGI1 Jlth-gtugh cmshy

sirlered better thm the 416th it tJ) carrit-1 [ r1 ting

as E defensive (1i visicIl The 19th was di vided into three

9

regiments three crtillery battalions and Cl company of

eleven new assault guns Its s8ctor wCs frgtlii KOENIGS1lACHER

to HhUCOICOURT

Occupying rETZ and its perimeter fortrf3sses from

HiUCONCOURTscuth t brollgh kETZ to the vicinity of

JOUY-UX-JlRCHES WS th8 462nd Volksgrenadier Division

Genera1 Lieutemnt KITTEL an expert in fgtrtrcss defense

had been brought frmiddotrr the enstern frent to t2ke co~mqnd

of this unit cib-llt the 1st of November His orrivpl

was d61Ryed and XX Corps had hlreadV penctr[ted the outer

shell of defenses before he was 2ble to reorgani ze the

di visi0n sector riG did what he could t) better the

Geurormltln position by rdocnting the 9000 men including

an officer candidetG schc)l clOd special fortress troops

to meet the [ssault which was already unltierw1Y 3gainst

LETZ

To the suth of l-ETZ ~nd astride the boundary

between XX and XII Corps WCS tbl bth SS enzer GrGnarlier

Di visi on of apprcxinB tel y 6000 men plrccd to meet the

expectect armsled attack fr~)m the vic ini ty of PONT-J-LOUSSON

Gersan intelligence WeS fairly ac~ur2te It

loc[ted the 90th 2nr 5tr Divisbns opposing the ETZ

defenses the 95th Division nrth uf ~EIZ along the

1~OSELili clOd ths 3rd Cavalry Grcup in the vininity of - THIONVILLE The 83rd Divisbn WCiS also lOC3ted as a

10

reserve unit OB West cnrried ampn unidentified nrmored

division believed t) be thE 14tb not yet in line end

sDffiewhere in XX Corps reserve

GenercJl BhLCK had decided in OctJb8r that the

Third Jrmy offensive would be a twC)-prDnged attck

north and south of THIONVILLE across tbe l~OSELLE wit h a

supporting advance to be lEunched in the north ageinst

TRIER Accordingly he disposed his troops in strength

in the center and adjusted his artillery t~ leet a threat

issuing fr~m the vicinity of THIONVILLE Since the only

repl mtural defense in the sector was the hirrier of

the EOSELLE River BALCK ordered lt1 tremendous nUflber

of mines placed to block the expected crossing sites

(eg the 19th Infantry Division al)ne lcid 40000

mines) He also concentrated his limited anti-tank

riefenses the 486tl PJK Bcttalion wi th forty t~

fifty anti-tenk guns in the vicinity of DALSTEIN wherE

they coulr] be Employed ampgainst tank threats from either

sector In sddition BALCK hed thooreticl contlJl over

the 11th Panzer Division as a m)bile rGservc although

it W~lS tieri by 2 string t) OB West 2nd ws subsequently

lost when it wcs sent t the south to help stbm the

Americcm XII Ccrps attack wLich c ommencect )no d~y before

the XX Corps attnck -General BiLCK desired to c~Jnctuct 2 delaying action

11

from the MOSELLE to the SAhli meanwhilE cJn serving his

f~)rces and concentrating them behind the defenseuros of

the West Wall However the sacred soil of Gerffiny lay

betw6en the SIJR and ~iOSELIE an-1 Hi tIer decreerl that

the enemy would pay dearly to reampch the GeurorrrlfJi border

Theref3re the German High Command forcefully ordered

BhLCK t) defenr the) UoampLIE River line et ell costs

despi te BhLCK I S person-ll feelings in the metter

Regardless Jf thE Jrders he reCeiVGd R~LCK

found himsGlf equipped to perform 1ittle llJr th~n a

delaying Clctim His divisions were woefully bwlow

strength the indivictu(l soldiers were of ti( pDorest

t~pe nd he had nothing which he c)u11 hurl d thJ

American armored thrusts oree they commenced

NOTES FOH CHAPTE~ II

~r H M Cole untitled mcnuscri~t on Third Army Operations in ETO (Hi st oricl Di visLm DepartIneuront of the Army) chep S and chap 13

~~ The Reduction of FJrtress ~ETZ

12

o R G A N I Z A T ION 0 F COM 8 ATE LIM T S

( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y

6J()~ A21 cQ] l~ ~ 1011 I [Q]ZAftS [ffi]

e ~5it-)LQJzallllDJ3Aj55

IOfV RESI GATCHELL

NOT E OUY TANK NffANTlfy litO ItNIlIIpound1f IJItITS-CMPDNpoundNTS oC~r OIfItfATON$- AliI SHOttNo OTN~1t O~GIfll fIItD IITrMI4~ cJlI18 ~AAJtfltt~D NMMII~ ~UPPt1lfr I)fln1olV$

-

011 klr~r IIY PtMIJN HES~AYpound

CHAPTER III

10th IJ1EORED DIVISION BriTTLE INDCCTRINTION ND

INITHL ROlli IN THE SAAR-kOSELLE OFFENSIVE

Note For a pictorial representation 0middotpound the entire XX Corps offensive during this period see Lap h 1nnex I

The lOth jrrl1oreri Division closed into i ts fir~t

assenbly area in the Combat Zone at rARS-LJ-TOUR twenty-

two kilorrcters west of lErZ when ttB trailing dements

of CCA rolled in nt 2130 October 31st 1944 111 its

trDining was oohinrl bull The tro opa were hDrdene poundtnrl eager

to tiisplay their abilities to the battle veterans of

Thirc1 rmy The 10th jrmor~ Division WetS rea-ly to

fight

As November 1st nawneo elements of CCB com

menced relief of a portion of the 90th Division which

was in contact with the eneny

The lOth hrmorec DivisLm entered a quiet sector

ffcirg the fortress of lETZ For tre men who ~vere placed

in the line the actLm was terrific but in cOJparison

with the bettle raging elsewhere the sector w~s a summer

idyll

As menti)nen in the first chapter ~ thE 4th end

6th Armore0 DivisLms were not too far south am the

13

merican COflmicniers hgtpcd trtE 3rriv01 1 th 10th

rm)ed Divi sian in this sector woulci rlecciV6 the

Gern~(Jns causing tilcm to shuffle troops and anti-tank

defenses to meet rTl aXrrDIEO attack froI tms area

is WIlS sbown in the precedirg chapta- the manGuvcr

was successful for tho n1y Panzer unit avrilable

the 17th SS tanzel Grenr~izr DivisioI was plLCEr1 t)

df(nd the scuthern sEctr below middotI~iiJTZ lJbil in ttis

sector the 10th ll~ore(l coulr c)ntinue proprations

for c--bflt

ThO modific[tic)ns rocently innovrtad by Third

hrmy technicLms WEire adden to the tanks of tie Division

during this perioti ThG first of ths were IIduck bills

- five inch extensive s on the tank trends 13signeurod to

permit tank lrencuvers off the roltlUS end over the swarrpy

and muddy terrain b6tWCn trl( rOSELIE and S~q to verso

These rluck bil Ls pr ovtrI extremely valu[blc Ill second

mdificatL)n servod a sinil1r purp)si iu 2 rlifferEnt way

Selected tanks rec)ilred five to six inchcs of ermor plate

on prticularly vulnerable spots Ttcs tnks when

EncoWltering a roar block whrc the trrain prhibi tri

frce r8neuver cJulrl adv~nce Clgainst tre dreaded BBI s

with relativ( immmity thereby avoiding tc custoR1ry

losses em Gclrys usuFlly experienc0r1 at tLcso roadblocks

On LtG 2n1 of November 1944 eGBs 54th Armored

14

Infentry Battelion reportect firstmiddot positive c mtact with

the enemy bull i All ctivity Was limi ten to patrol and

harassireuro actiegtn against the German s of the 462nrl

Volksgrenar1i~r Division rlefenrling rETZ

On l~ovember 4th the learling elements of the

Divi si on le ft LAliS-lJ -TOUR to rr) lie no rt h to the vicinity

of THIONVILLE Division artillery less one battalion

WfS withdrawn on XX Corps order and sent north to supper t

the orossings of the 90th Division in its assault on the

rOSELLE Hiver line

General EDWIN PIBURN assume cOlrunenn of CCB on

the 6th of November 1944 (He led CCB across the

10SELLE to t he heigh ts overlooking t he SAi~R befor (3 he

relinquished this CJrfman(~ to Colonel HOBEHTS anct took

commanr1 of CCh)

During this perid eel prepu-el counterattack

plans tJ meet any possi ble enemy essault from the LETZ

defenses Concurrently the combampt comranI st8ff mde

plampns enr cCJn0uct(r[ reconnaissance fgtr movement )f the

units to a forward assembly area behinct the 90th Divisin

from which to launch the arm0red assault planner by

Ge Il9 ral WALKER

CCB ccntinueuro1 its c0ntaining mission against tre

Gerrran s until relieved by the 95th DiviBi)n on the 8th

of November LeantiIrfl General IBURlII ani his staff

15

also planner anti reconnoitered tJ enter the 90th Division

bridgehead from forward assembly areas behind THIONV1LLE

On -the 9th of Novenber the Divisi on commencer]

the move to the MALVlNGE and RUnUIgtjGE asslSrrbly areas

General PATTON in his oook WiIR AS I KNEW 1TII

makes his first mention cf the 10th Armorcrl Divisim

on the 9th (If November (p 167) The General was SOIrewhat

rliso~)uraged by the progress of XX Cmiddot)rps attacks and the

usual snafus of a river crossing But as he states

On the other hand I ran into Gmbat Comani B of the 10th ArmJreci Divisbn Brigarier General E W P1BUIlN near ~JHS-Li-TOUn the scene of the great cavalry battle of 1870 an they were looking fine anr moving right int() actiun with beautiful iiscipline

The Divi siGn closed into it s forward assembly

area behind the 90th Divisicn ani awaited orders to

begin its push The infantry was making progress but

the order to move G1lt must wait until the briCges across

the i loaded EOSELLE were ready Let us briefly fallcw

the 90th Division as it builrs up the brLigehead

On the 8th of November the leampding elerrBnts of

the 90th Divisim began their assault acrcss the LOSELiE

in the CATTEN01-EALLING area to establish a bri(~gehead

as a springboard for the launching Df attacks by the

10th Armorec Division the 83ri1 Division~~ anr the Jri

- -l-See page 5

16

Cavalry Group The 90th Division )nce tris initial

missbn was COIrpleted was to swing soutreast outflank

the r~AGINar LinE and link up with the 5th Division

east of LETZ

HDwever the fall and early winter rains had

greatly swollen ttgte LOSELLE am it becane a far greater

obstacle than hart been expected when the early plannipg

was completed J-lS a result tbe crossing of the supshy

porting eleIrents of the 90th DivisLm was seriously

slcweri thereby delaying the DivisLm l s ability to

maintain resupply ani b enlarge the briigeheed The

enemy after a hesitant reacticm to the initial lanirg s

han begun limit counterattacks from his positions

in the ]IAGINOT Line But the real thorn in the side

of General VAN FLEET Commanding General of the 90th

Divi siun was th3 raging torrent of the YiOSELLE

By early morning of the 11th of ovel1bor all

three infantry regiments of the 90th Division were

across together with 00 me anti-tank anrl light support

weapon s Still no bridges had been completed Nonetheshy

less General VN FLEET decided not to wait since the

close couDat forces were across anrl resumErl his attack

to the southeast to exparrl the bridgehead anct complete

hi s missLm

- Just as the FhLLING brirge was completed on the

17

afternoon of the 11th and as the artillery was crossing

the Germans lau11chen a counterattack to push tJ the bridge

site ani destroy it The German force starting from

KEltLING consi stetj of ten tanks anrl about twel Vf3 a ssaul t

guns v f the 22th Panzer Grenadier Division Tbi s force

was initially successful due to the inability of the

Americans to bring much in the way of anti-t~k weapons

to bear The attack was still rolling strong pounds the

infantry rushed two tank destr)yers across the briclge

to plug the hele Their amprrival although at the

eleventh hour was in tir6 and before the Germms

coul- extricate themselves they had lost 400 near and

150 prisvners to the infantry I anri four tanks and five

2nssault guns to the tw) tank destroyers

vl1ith the bri(~ge saved the inf2ntry ru shed all

pOSSible reinforcemltnts across tro river to continue

the attack On tbe 13th of November tte bridge at

CJTTENO~~ was completed am the first junction with

troops from the 95th DivisLm tgt thE sooth had been

nade

By the 14th ~ll the fighting elements organic

Thi 8 bridge had been E stabli sllerl by D bptt2lion of the 95th Division on order of Gener8l WiLKEfi two dampys previ ously when inabili ty to complete the 1ALLING bricge was three1tening the success C)f the Gntire operatLn

-

18

-----------------------

and lttachcd of tbe 90th Division h71d erosscd intu

thtJ bridgehe-td and the w]y was clE[r for the 10th

Irnored Division

Thus bte on the afternoon of the 14th CCB

bcgn its r1uV( out of the 9ssembly aren rnd across the

OSELLE nt C TTlNOI whih CCh I1ovtd over the HALLLJG

bridgu

NOrJ2S FOR CHPTER III

lftcr fiction rtDport 10th Armored Division entry for 2 lJov 44

20p bull Cit Dr H L Cole chp VIII p 28

19

CHAPTERmiddotIV

eGA - NOVEABER 14th to DEOE BEa 16th

P1ltms for the Ecployrrent of CCA

By nightfall of Noverrber 14th all e1ement~ of

CCA had crossed over the LcsELLE Hiver at ALLING from

their position behind CieTTENOh FDrest The asserrhly

area for the 10th ArIlored Division in the KOENIGSfJCHER

bridgehead had been prepared and out posted by elements

of the 90th Division and was ready for occupation

In the XX Ccr ps plans for the employment of

armor in the Triangle it was cecided that CCh should

be given the initial ~~5sion of seizing the 10th l~mored

Divisions objective of BOUZONVILLE and the high ground

laround it

The XX Corps cOlTlnnder in formulating his plans

realized that an eer1y seizure of this vital terrain was

of the utmost importance in isolating the fortified area

of ampETZ from the east and northeast and thus preventing

its reinforcement by mobile enellY elements frlll east of

the ShR River In addition this terrain was the most

lobica1 location for a point of pivot for further operations

to the north With this L1 mind CCr was given the further

tentativa mission of being prepared to thrust north after

reaching BOUZONVILLE in order to secure a northern crossing

20

of the ~R fliver 2

The seizure and consolidation of the BOUZONVILLE

area was to be accompli shed in conjunct ion wi th the 90th

Division advancing on the right flank of CCli Thereshy

after it was planned that CCA should turn north pierce

the fortification in the vicinity of OOSCHOLZ end conshy

tinue its drive to SJARBURG in order to secuIf a crossing

over the SAAR River It was contemp-+ated that the 90th

Division after completing the encirclement of LETZ by

jOining forces with the 5th Divisionin the vicinity of

BOULAY would then continue its advance east to the SAAR

River to clear that area of remaining ene~ forces

although very little intelligence was available

at that time as to the tJue extent of the defenses in

the northern sector of the Triangle it was believed

that the Switch Line of fortifications anchored at

BESCH on the HOSELLE would be strongly held by determined

enemy el~~nts corr~itted to hold at all costs

These fortifications guarded the important comshy

municatio~ center of TRIER located in the center of the

Western German defense system From the standpoint of

XX Corps the destruction and penetration of the ORSCHOLZ

Switch Line offered three valuable prizes These were

(1) the capture of TRIER (2) northern crosaing of the

SfJR River and (3) the elimination of a potential enerny

21

threat against the Co~pSI left flank

In implementing the plan for the employment of

C~ toward BOUZONVILLE and thertee to the north initial

consideration was given the mO3t expedient means of

launching CCh from the congested area of the bridgehead

in coordination with tbe general drive to t he east

across the bltse of the Triangle

hlthough it was recognized tr~t available enemy

strength was not sufficient to undertake a successful

counter-offensive against the well-consolidated positions

within the bridgehead area it was however realized

that the enemy would exert a determined resistance in

order to contain any attempted breakthrough of armor

Such a breakthrough would of necessity have a devastatshy

ing effect upon his entire defense organization in the

liETZ area end wculd sumrferily doom his resistance

therein to failure

The elements comprising the organization of

CGA for its forthcoming operation included tanks armored

infantry mechanized cavalry combat engineers and tank

destroyers (SP) (See chart opposite page 13 for organizashy

tion of CGA 10th Armored Division during this pericxi)

The plan finally evolved by Brigadier Gene raJ

KENNETH G hLTHiUS commanding CClI for the tactical

employment of the Combat Corrm~nd called for the apportionshy

22

ing of cleGients into two henvily wGighted t-sk forces

and a less powerful reserve task force This division

of forces was dictated by the necessit of advancing on

twv sCpo rFttc routes

Task Force CHrBERLItr corrunpnded br Lieutenampnt

Colonel THOr lS G CHAmERLIN was ssigned the south(rn

rout( to be follt1wed closely by the R8serve T2sk Force

Task F(Jrc~ D~OBRY cOliJilI1ded by Lieuten(lnt Colonel

D~0BRY It 03 determined thDt T~sk Force CHAliIBB~IN

should eke the Dein effot In addition Task Ft)rc0

CH iBRLn~ was given th dded responsibility of mainshy

taining cont2ct with the 90th DivisLm dvancing southshy

00st to BOULY on its southern flank Task Force

S VDISH conmanded by Lieutennt Colonel STNDISH was

ordered to 8dvAnce on 11 northern routl~ perCillaling that

cf fsk Force CH iBERLHn in order to protect tht northern

fl~nk of XX Corps with rnrticll1ar attention to any at shy

teI1tlted enemJ thrust froGi the flanking fortifications

of the ORSCHOLZ Switch Line

The fttack en BOUZONVILLE

On the morning of tho 16th of lJovember CC jumped

off in the attlck to plow its way free of thEgt cungested

area of the bridgehead Once thlt pOnotratiun uf the

initil onem defenses hCd be~n nnde Tr~sk Force CHiJtBERlu1IN

23

OL _ c -t IN

CCA -16 NOV TO 6 DEC

~ 13-2~ I

followed by Task Force DESOBRY struck east toward the

town of LAUIvESELD As the point advanced on HAUTEshy

SIEHCK an undefended minefield was encountered exshy

tending to considerable breadth on ei tner side of the

road and with mine s exposed in its ceqter Hi th little

delay the attached engineers were brought forward and

employed in removing these rr~nes Shortly thereafter

the column was able to continue its advance

Js the column approached HAUTE-SIERCK machine

gun and rifle fire was received from the enemy occupyirig

the houses on the western limits of the village The

Reconnaissance Platoon which had been preceding the

colwnn had taken cover wi thin th e outskirts of the

village and having been pinned down by the enemy

machine gun and Ii fle fire ~ was hopefully awaiting reshy

lief by the heavier oeapons of the main body Their

presence greatly limited the utilization of the fire

of the 75mm tank guns attempting to blow the enemy out

of the houses However by infiltrating dismounted

infantry forward and carefully placing fire of the 75s

in the winiows of the occupied houses the attackers

overpowered the enemy and the town was cleared of

all enemy eleLlents -From this minor action undoubtedly a valuable

--- lesson can be drawn in the employment of light reconshy

24

ncissance elements operating directly in edvrnce of

a fast-moving mechanized column It is apparent that

these light elell1ents will inevitably be pinned down

when surprised by fire from well-emplaced automatic

weapons and their presence will naturally result in

limiting the employment of effective fragmentation fire

from the heavy weapons of the column As a result of

these assumptions it should therefore become established

doctrine that light elements will habitually be employed

on the forward flanks of a fast-rr~ving column rather

than in advance of tho direct line of rrzrch

At the conclusion of this lction at IDUTE-SIERGK

the column continuGd its advance on Li-imESFELD hS

IAlfllESFELD carre wi trin observation of the forward eleshy

ments amp preparation of mortar artillery and assault

gun fire was pleced on the town and the high ground

to the north of the railroad where resistance was beshy

lieved to be centered

This preparation as intended drew fire from

a battery of artillery and four 88rrun guns errplaced on

the high grcund flanking the town Tankinfantry teams

were hastily organized and a double envelopment of the

enemy positions was executed under the cover of heavy

artillery concentrations Stubborn resistance threw

- back these enveloping attacks resulting in the loss

25

of three tanks ann inflicting approximately a dozen

casu2lti es The enemy gun positions and pockets of

resistance were nonetheless by now well pinpointed I

A coordinated infantry-heavy attack was quickly organized

and launched under cover of all available massed artil shy

lory fire supplerrented by mortars and assault guns and

sted by an air strike of P-47s eIrploying nepalm

This attack was so violent in its execution that the

positions were practically annihilated Those few of

the enemy who were f()rtunate enough tJ escape destructLm

by the assault quickly surrendered The town 105 then

occupied with only a tbken resistance which ended in

surrender of the remaining elements

During this interval Task Force STANDISH had

been pushing steadily east on its parallel northern

axis encountering little serious resistance although

light enemy elements were met atterrpting to infiltrate

from the northern flank They were decisively repulsed

and forced to witlrlraw vdthin the protectiJl1 of the

Switch Line The two leading Task Forces were at this

stage approximetely abreast and easy cOIrmunicati~n was

being tBintained as the cd vancE c cntinued

Task Force CHM BERIUN on the morning of Novemrer

17th cittacked BECKERHOLZ on orders from Generel lLTHAUS bull3

~ Although sorre enerrw resistance was expected it was not

26

enc ountered and t he town was occupier va thout incident

As a result of this unexpecterl lack of resistance

p12ns were i~mediately pegun for the assault on BOUZONshy

VILLE the Division objective As BOUZONVILLE was also

an important center of corrununicaticnsior the area

and therefore could be considered of vi tal importance

to the enemy defenses as a delaying position in the

event of his forced withdrawal from liETZ it was conshy

templated that every effort would be made by the enemy

to defend it against attack

In the planning tank-heavy assault teams were

consti tutet1 to be employed in a strong cJorctinated

- assault ctesigned to take the town by storm Artillery

was placed on call and preparea to register It was

at this stage in the preparations that an officer

arri ven from CGA Headquarters with worc1 that orders

hari been raceived frem Divisi[Jn that the attack on

BOUZONVILLE would be cancelled and the town by-passed

Needless to say this was a considerable disappointment

to Colonel CllIIBERLiIN who was quite confident that

BOUZONVILLE could have been taken thus affording his

Task Force the first real test of its abilities

As a result of thi s action by Division plans

were changed and it VlaS decided that Task Force CHAMBERshy

LAIN should attempt iJ crossing of the NIED River sOI1l3wha t-- 27

to the northwest of BOUZONVILLE Information was ob

tained that the bridge at FILSTROFF which rad been

thought completely destroyed by the Germans in their

withdrawal was still partially intact sufficiently

SD at least to cross dismounted infantry Infantry

was therefore imnediately dispatched to seCure a bridgeshy

head am engineers were then ordered to proceed to

FILSTROFF without delay to repair the bridge for the

passage of vehicles

At this time Task Force DESOBRY was ordered

attached to Task Force CHA~EERLAIN for further operations

east of the NIED and was instructed to join Task Force

CHAiBERLAIN immediately from its location at COU-EN

This Task Force DESOERY attempted on the evening of

the 18th of November but found the road between COL~EN

and FILSTROFF impassable due to craters and mines and

was forces to withdraw to COUEN to await morning in

order to find a suitable route south

During the morning of the 19th of November the

FILSTROFF bridgehead became a I fai t accompli t and A

and B Troops (reinforced) of the 90th Cavalry Reconshy

mHss ance Squadron (rrechani zed) under the command

of Aajor LEYTON passed through the bridgehead ard

struck south toward BOUZONVILLE Tanks and infantry

were now being passed thrcugh the bridgehead and were

26

bull

beginning to thrust south to exploit the success of

the cavalry

It was at this point that an order arrived

from CCA that Was not entirely unexpected The order

read Cease all opera tio ns east oCthe NIED River 4

An amplification of this order gave instructions for

the wittrlrawal of all elements east of the NIED and the

destruc tion of the FILSTROFF bridge

Following orders Task Force CHJXBEFlIhIN began

the withdrawal of its forces from across the NIED

When this was acco~plisherl the bridge was destroyed

and the Task Force proceeoed to further withdraw to

the vicinity of LAUlESFELD where all elements of CCA

were assembling thus marking the close of the first

phase of Combat Command AI S operation within the SAhRshy

MOSELLE Triangle

Before continuing to the second and more imshy

portant phase of this historical narrative let us

pause to consider briefly the significance of sorre

of the tactical principles illustrated above especially

those that have gained recognition for merit in the

present doctrine of armored err~loyment

The employment of CGA to penetrate a well shy

defended area such as the eneIPy defenses containing

the KOENIGS1ACHEH bridgehead and themiddot further mission

29

of seizir~ BvJZONVILLE a vital objective deep in his

rear coupled with the attendant rHsruption of his rear

installations and the resulting shock to his will to

resi st has demonstrated once again the potency of

armor when properly employed ~s a decisive arm in modern

warfare This secondary mission of securing the XX Corps

northern flank in conjunction with the execution of its

primary mission demonstrates quite adequately the inshy

herent flexibility attributed to armor as a contingency

force embodying the versatility of a unit of horse

cavalry

CGA Hits the switch Line

Note See map opposite page 24

On the night of 19th-20th of November on orders

from Corps CCt began its nove north from its assembly

area in the vicinity of LAUEESFELD in order to relieve

the 3rd Cavalry Group along a line east and west from

BESCH to HALLENDORF On the night of November 20th

eCA arrived behind the 3rd Cavalry Group prepared to

take over it s posi tions and attack to the north in an

effort to penetrate the strong enemy resistance

The formidable dragons teeth of the Switch Line

fortifications heavily covered by fire from multiple

weapons of varying caliber had permitted the 3rd

___ Cavalry Group but limited success in this area After

30

~----

successive attempts only a small gap had been cleared

in the dragons teeth and a shallow salient of le ss

than a thousand yards had been penetrateg The 3rd

Cavalry Group hac been tenaciously holding this small

gain to the north of the village of BORG while awaiting

the arrival of CCA With its heavier tanks

As has been previously mentioned little was known

by our intelligence of the e~act outline or strength of

the ORSCHOLZ Line or the disposition of its fortifications

It was however realize~ that the Cavalry had been

stopped by a formidable line of field forti fica tions in

the NENNIG-TETTINGEN-oBERLEUKEN sector One thing had

- been quite definitely determined and this was that a

force other than the 3rd Cavalry Group with its thinshy

skinned vehicles would be needed before the strong enenw

position wquld be overcome

Since the axis for the continuation of the Third

Ar~s offensive now lay in a northeasterly direction

aimed at the seizure of the RHINE crossing between

WORMS and MAINZ General PATTON wished to establish a

bridgehead across the SAAR as far to the north as possi ble

in order to be able to continue his advance to the RHINE

with his left flank resting secure on the MOSELIE River

Confronted with this necessity General WALKER

- hact ordered eCA Vii th its heavier armor north to pass

31

---

through the 3rd Cavalry Group nnd secure a crDssing

over the ShAR Hiver at SkARBURG

On the mornbg or November 21st CClt ttacked

the Switch Line through the 3rd Cavalry Group allowing

this unit to disengage The attack was launched on a

six-mile front with Task Force CEA1BErtLAIN advancing in

its habitual pas tien on the right It was General

ALTHhUS plan to send Task Force CHAYBERUIN through

the gap made by the Cavalry to the north of BORG

Coordinated with this Tas Force STi1NDISH on the left

was to envelope around BESCH and strike at TETTIiGEN

Initially Task Force CHlABERLhINs advance was able to

overcome the light resistance The right team Team

EISBERG moving at an angle toward ORSCHOLZ was sudshy

denly brought to a halt by exceedingly accurate mortar

and artillery fire that caused tre vet-icles to disperse

and seek cover

The left column of the Task Force was advancing

along the road leading toward KIRF when it encountered

a large crater flanked by dragon IS teeth that barred tte

further advance of its vehicles Infantry was disshy

mcunted and braving the beavy fire from automatic

weapons which cOered the area was successful in

making a small perletration behind the barrier only

to be stopped by concentrations of well-placed artillery -shy

fire

32

It was n)t until the afternoon of the 22nd of

Novewber that these two colwrns were able to brea free

of the ORSCHOLZ Vioods which had afforded them cover

during the attack of the previous dpy Jnce having

broken free they were able to aflvance about 800 yards

into the enemys defenses In view of the enemys

appare nt strength and the di sposition in depth 0 f hi s

excellent defense fortifications this penetration

could at best be considered only negligible

On the left of Task Force CHA1J3Er1LAIN Task Force

STANDISH attacking with two teams abreast had met with

little more success The left attack W)s able to peneshy

trate only fj short distance beyond the line of departure

when it was confronted by a deep anti-ta1k ditch reshy

inforced by pillboxes and rlragon I s teeth Ti1roughout

the day this Team eIrploying engineers atempted to

bridge the ditch under extremely heovy enemy fire On

tr~ morning of the 22nd of November having renev~d

the attack in a well-planned effort it finally sucshy

ceeded in reaching NENNIG The attack had been deshy

signed to flank tte ORSCHOLZ position -Yn arriving

at NENNIG it Vias found that the line ran north arrl

south behin1 the town ani from the present position

was unassailable from the flank

_ In the late afternoon the Germans counterattacked in

33

considerable strength and were succltssful in inflicting

the loss of six tanks and causing fifty-five casualties

The right Team was somewtat more successful This

Tear riesigna ted Team EARDLY had penetrated the dragons

teeth ani had entered the village of TETTINGEN A

strong attack by the enew~ nevertheles~ soon drove it

back tD its original position inflicting heavy casualshy

ties 8nrJ tank losses

It was by now ruite evident that the attack

of eGA har seriously bogged down Gnd hd Ii ttle hope

of success without strong assistance from infantry

It was further believed that the Germans were siphoning

reserves into the area with e vay intention of holding

the line at all costs Intelligence had still been

unable to penetrate the 2cti ve counterreconnaissance

screen of the enemy to ctetermine the true craracter

of the fortifications anrJ the strengtr of the forces

defending the line It was known that the GerrrBn

416th Infantry was the main element in position It

was believed although without verification that

certain units of the renowned 21st Pcnz~r Grenodi5r

Divi sion harl but recently been moved into the area

when the threat became acute

On the morning of the 23rd of Noveffiber General

IWHJiIS cOHunanrling the Division decided to cancel the

34

----

renewal of CCAs schenula1 attack as a result of its

failure to make headway the previous ctay

It was ctecidect to COlJlmit the 358th Infantry

RCT of the 90th Division which had been attachect to

eGA on the 21st of November and hari followed it north

This regiment had been greatly weakened in the fight

for the KOENIGStlGHER bringehearl ane had

not as yet

receiverl replaccIents It was presently only at 37

strength 5

The 358th was to be con1llitted to lrJke the

initial penetration thus opening the way for the GGA to

drive through to SAJRBURG The infantry was given

the objective of SINZ and lUNZINGEN three ani four

thousanrt yards respectively behind tre center of the

Switch Line The direction of attack lay along Cl rioge

learling north in the direction of SAFliBUHG It was

hoped that once the infantry was firmly astride the

ridge tbe way would be clear for the armor to roll

north Through some 1i vergence in planning GCpound and ~ the artillery wro were ordered to closely support

tte attack were not sufficiently briefer in their

support wissions hS the infantry passed the line

of departQre and moved into the attack to gain tr-e

crest of the ridge the tanks of GGA from their flanking

position let loose a murrieroU6 fire from their 758 on

35

the infc1 ntry of the 358th passing through tbe wooded

area leading to the crest The artillery mistaking

the loc~tion of the infantry advanc e opened up simushy

taneously ith the massed fire of its batterles6 The

result was pandemonium Caught unexpectedly by fire

from the flank mn rear many of the infantry wae

killed Control for the ti me being was completely

lost When it was realized that they had been fired

on by their own forces feeling ran high Only by

the grectest effort was the infantry reorgani zed am

the attack resumed

It apJears worthy of mention in reference to

this inCident that when the 358th Infantry and cel

were later in the rest area feeling WaS still intense

and resulted in numerous fights aITDng personnel of the

two unit s Fights also broke out in the hospi tals

where casualties were unrlergoing medical threatment 7

To continue the 2nrl Battalion vihich han been

harrlest hit was unable to resume the attack until that

afternoon The 3rd Battalion on the other hand which

had suffered much less damage quickly reassembled ani

executed a flanKing movement into the CAMPHOLZ Woods

It was successful in spanning the anti-tank ditch with

ladders an~ the woods was eventually cleare~ of the

eneIll8 bull -

On the morning of the 24th of NDVEiuber the

358th Infantry continued the attack As the 2n~ Batshy

talion swept forward it was forced to halt by a hail

of machine gun fire from the huge bunker at the edge

of the village of OBERLiWKEN

Colonel CLXCiKE Regimental Comnnnder seeing

the battalion pinned don corrmitted the re serve the

1st Batta1ion to attack OBampiLEUKEN Thi s Battalion

was successful in gaining entrance to the limit of

the village but the fight for its possession continued

far int) the night

During this interval the Germans counterattacked

the 3rrl Battalion in the GAl PHOLZ Woods wi th ilaree

throwers This threat was howev5r eventually beaten

off but as a result the battalion failer to a~vance

out of the woorts until the early afternoon When the

attack finally got unner way Company K succeeded in

reaching BUTZDORF having knockc-l out sixteen pillboxes

in the line of its advance AS darkness closer in the

Genrns attempter to eject Company K from the houses it

had occupie~ The bdttle raged throughout the night

CHptain CcHOLLAND the company COI1llllnd5r was killed

and all officers were soon casualties The uni t noneshy

thelesa Was able to hold out until morning when relief

-- finally arrivec from the 3ril Battalion wrich had been

37

_ __)i _________ ~~__

Btriving desper8tely to take TEITINGEN

TETTlhGEN was finally taken after practically

every house in the village had sufferer a terrific

shelling by the 344th FA Battalion

In the meantime other arms had been brought

into play Fighter bombers from the Tacticd Air COffilIand

supporting the XII Army Group had successfully interdicted

the movement of German reserves in the area by dropping

nepalm and fragmentation bombs on SINZ and fUNZINGEN

CCh had by now bridged the anti-tank ditch

south of TEITIhGEN and han sent aplatoon of tanks into

the fight These tanks assisted greatly in the taking

of BUTZDORF A number of German prisoners were teken

here This force was however not strong enough to

hol(1 the exposed posi tion of this village BUTZDORF

was therefore evacuated When our forces had withdrawn

the artillery blasted it and the tanks and mortars in

TEITINGEN showered it with white phosphorus in order

to make it untenable for further enerrur occupationbull

On the right the battle for the possession of

OBERLBUKEN was still in progress The 1st Battalion

continued its house to house fighting after beating

off a foray of Gerrnan tanks anrl infantry

The 3rd Battalion malie some progress oe spi te

a withering fire frcm its front and finally succeeded

38

in taking Hill 388 500 yards northwest of OBERLEUKEN

This advance to say the least was c~stly By the

end of the day the strength of the 3rd Battalion numbered

less than a hundred rren in the line

The three-day battle to penetrnte the ORSCHOLZ

Line had drastically reduced the combat efficiency of

the 358th Infantry_ The exposure to the cold the murl

ann rain with only such shelter as could be found in

captured pillboxes had brought a mounting toll of

trench foot casualties On the evening of the 25th

of Noverrber General COiihIS and Colonel CLAHKE agreed

that the 358th was in no condition to continue the

attack General WALKER readily concurred in this

deci sion and on th e 26th of November the infantry

was relieved by units of the 10th Armored Division

in a highly successful dayligr~ withdrawal The 358th

then reverted to the control of its parent unit the

90th Division and entered the rest area of VICKERI~U

Barracks north of DALSTEIN

Although it could be seen that the fight at

tho Switch Line was dravling to a close it was as

yet not quite ended On the 27th of Noverrber the

Germans acting ~ith the tenacity characteristic of

their defense of the area began slowly filtering

back into TETTINGEN Having consolidated this position

39

they then drove on to attack BORG which had been in

American hands since the beginning of the operations

This final attempt to seal off the salient

originally rrade by the 3rd Cavalry Group was successshy

fully repelled and the Germans were driven back and

forc6d to evacuate TETTINGEN

At thispoint ~merican operations against the

Switch Line were halted OBERLEUKEN and NENNIG two

of the thr6e key posi tions in this sector still reshy

mained in German hands The operation to secure a bridgeshy

head at SAArtBURG was reluctantly abandoned

The Jrd Cavalry Group was now ordered to relieve shy

CGA in its positions along the ORSCHOLZ Line to mainshy

tain contact with the enemy and to protect the Corpsl

north flank CCh was ordered to withdraw and join

the lOth Armored Division to pssist in clearing the

enemy west of the SAAR in the lOth Armored Division

zone

NorES FOR CHAPTER IV

12pound Cit Dr H L Cole Chap VIII pJ8

20p bull ~ The Reduction of Fortress ~TZ p28~29

3Gp ~ The Reduction of Fortress l~Z P28

42pound Cit Dr H L Cole Chap VIII p41

5Qe Cit The Reduction of Fortress METZ_ p42

6Interview tqj C N Vaughan (formerly 3d Cav Gp) SrxTAS

7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $

PAllpound-4OI Rr~NNI

Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST

Northeast of the KOENIGStACHER bridgehead

CCE of the 10th Armored Division began thrusting

across the German border in an attempt tb reach its

objective at dawn on November 15th CCB had a

straight-line di stance of only eleven rtliles to travel

before it could fulfill its mi~sion of seizing a bridge

intact over the SftAR River at MERZIG

The Combat Corrmand was organized into two Task

Fo rce s Task Force CHERRY and Ta s k Force rIJE INER bull ( For

composition see chart opposite page 13)

Early on Noverrb er 15th CHERRY am WEINER drove

towards KEPLING The muddy terrain forced the teams

to stay on the roads and numerous roadblocks and heavy

enemy artillery concentrations made this method of

advance a slow process However by dark CCE had

gained control of the wooded high ground just three

wiles east of the town

The next morning CCE was unable to advance

since the Germans had blown the brirjges over the stream

at the foot of the high ridge they had taken the night

before Intense artillery interiiction fire prevented

the engineers from making any progress whatsoever during

41

the entire day of November 16th While the engineers

were assembling equipment to bridge the swollen stream

General PI BURN was making plan s to continue the at tack

Task Force CHERRY woul~ split into two columns to attack

lLAUNSTROFF and REUELING At the same time Task Force

VlliINER would strike southeast with the town of HALSTROFF

as its objective

The treadway bridge over the stream in front

of Task Force CHERty was completed during the night of

16th-17th of November At 0600 a Team rr~ved out headed

north toward RITZI~G with LAUNSTROFF as the objective

Going was extremely slow and the numerous roadblocks

kept the armored column fron attaining the enormous

momentwn pcssessed by armor when it gets rolling Losses

were inversely proportional to the speed of the attack

Nonetheless by-passing the strong point of RITZING

Colonel CHERRY was able to push this team on to UUNshy

STROFF by nightfall

The other Team of CHERRYs Task Force struck

east and after fighting trree delaying engagerrents

with the Germans reached a pcsition just south of

RE~1lJING At the same time Task Force WEINEli had

driven southeast against stubborn nemy resi stance

until it reached a blown bridge only about a hundred

yards from its objective the town of HALSTROFF

--

As Task Force lJIJEINER WaS pushing into the town

of SCHWERDOHFF Colonel ~iElNER was severly wounded by

enemy fire 2 Lieutenant Colonel HUSTEAD the armored

infantry battalion commander took over command of the

team and it was redesignated Task Force HUSTEAD

By the 20th of November all three columns of

CCB had crossed the GerlIan border Some minor streams

tributaries of the NIED cut across the American front

and with their bridges destroyed were potential sources

of delay and it was necessa~ for some elements of the

Combat Command to assume defensive positions

On November 21st the nortt colurrn of CCB receiverl

a heavy counterattack just west of BUDINGEN but it was

repulsed with heavy loss to tho enemy The 22nd and

23rd of November were spent in patrolling to the front

for the purpose of determining exact location of enemy

positions

On the 26th of November CCB cleared the woods

east of WALDWISSE arLd then entered the town of BETHINGEN

Although the town was taken by surprise heavy enemy

artillery concentrations soon necessitated a withdrawal

General PIBURN now had three columns within four

l1iles of his objecti ve the bridge of r[RZIG The head

of the northern column was just east of BUDINGEN with

a gOOQ road leading into the ci ty of LERZIG The center

43

C olurrn in ViALDYITSSE had an equally good road paralleling

the northern column and just two miles south The

southern colwnn east of Hi-~LSTROFF did not have an adeshy

quate road net but was favorably situated

The Germans had realized the importance of the

city of ~iNtZIG tre key to the SAAR Valley and had

taken extreme care to block all avenues of approach

The terrain along with the soft su~soil afforded the

defenrler an excellent positi on The roads the only

avenues of approach for armor were covered with numerous

roadblocks which mode going extremely slow However both

the northern and the center columns of eGB pushed to

the built-up area of HILBRINGEN only one mile west

of the bridge on the afternoon of the 29th of November

On the morning of November 30th as the elements

of CCB were preparing to complete their mission of seizing

the bridge intact over tre SAhR Hiver at MERZIG a tershy

rific explosion shook the erea The Germans had blown

the brirlge just as the engineers reached it 3

The next day GeB cleared HILB~INGEN just west

of ~nRZIG and ccmtinued to straighten its lines

The Division GOITM~nding General on the 2nd

of Decenber ordered eeA to relieve eGE 4

eGE assembled in an area north of nEkELING

and the weary tankers began the move to an assembly

44

area in the vicini ty of ONTENACH ten miles northeast

of TEIO-VILLE In two an a half weeks of incessant combat

they hlt1d reached their objective only to find their mission

the capture of a bridge across the SAAR in the vicinity of

1~ZIG - incapable of accomplishment Units however had

reccl ved their bapti sm of fire and had ironed out many kinks

in operating technique These and other lessons learned

proved invaluable in time to come

NOTE CGA continued to occupy positions overlooking

the SAki until just prior to th e Division

move to LUXEtBOUHG on the l7th ()f Decell~)er

It engaged in no serious co~bat and w~s used

primarily to beef up the depleted forces of

the 90th Di vision who were primarily responsible

for the zone CeE remained in the ~iONTENACH

area during the entire period)

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

~ ill The Reduction of Fortress LETZ 041

2Interview kej J L Balthis (formerly lath ~rmd Div) SOCTAS

3Ibid

4After Action Report CCA 10th Armorerl Di vi sionentry for 1 Dec 44

45

CHAPlER VI

SUMNARY OF FIRST PHASE

As we have seen the loth Armored Division

engaged in six major operations during its initial

campaign in the tETZ encirclement and the SAAR-MOSELlE

Triangle To mention them again~

(a) Battle Indoctrination west of lETZ

(b) Movement north to assembly area behind the iiOSELIE Bridgehead

(c) Breakout of bridgehead through the 90th Di vision

(d) Divergent colurr~s racing for objective

(e) Turnabout of CCA and attack against strongly fortified position

(f) Ioverrent to rear assembly areas for r-eshyorgani zation and rehabilitation

The battle indoctrination period was beneficial

to too Division for two primary reasons - it gave troops

experience unde r fire in a relatively quiet sector and

it gave the Division and Combat COFmand staffs a splendid

opportunity to iron out kinks in their organization and

opera tional practices wi thout the danger of costly

mistakes which could result in seriolls losses For

example the Division fund itself double banking columns

lmnediately in rear of the battle position where these

columns becane entangled with each other 3nd with other

46

vehicles of front line divisions using the route for a

main supply route1 lthough this kind of tie-up is

normal in training and may freouently be encountered

in cloudy combat situations in this ~nstance the situshy

ation was as clear as may ever be anticipated The

mixup can only be laid to poor staff planning at Division

level and failure to establish priority on roads through

coordination with the Corps G-3 and Provgtst tarshal

Had the enemy been willing or capable of taking offensive

action the 10th Armored Division might well hove ended

its combat career on the first night it came within

range of enemw artillery

(Comment Those who are entering combat for

the first time are considerably in awe of combat

experienced personnel regardless of their respective

rank and positigtn Accordingly failure to coordinate

at Corps level may well have been due to this sychoshy

logical factor and even though the members of the 10th

~rmored Division staff were aware that elements of the

Division might encounter difficulties on the inadequate

roads they may not have clarified the situation because

of the feeling that men who have seen combat cannot make

a mistake in combat)

The mov~~ent north to the area of CATTENOM

Forest behind the bridgehead was well planned and took

47

place with minimum confusion and maximum secrecy

German intelligence failed to locate the lOth Armored

Division prior to its breakout of the bridgehead alshy

though it was aware that an armored division was

present in the sector2 This type of lateral movement

in the face of an entrenched enemy is extremely diffishy

cult to bring to a successful conclusion even though

the route is covered by friendly troops The ability

to perform this movement without disclosure indicated

that previous mistakes and the action necessary to

correct the mistakes had been absorbed by the Division

staff and put into practice when the 10th Ar~Dred Division

moved north on the 8th of November

In the initiDl attempt at a breakout of the

infantry-held bridgehead both combat commands followed

a concept that was a hangover from peacetime training

and the tactial principles of World War r and earlier

wars This was to have cavalry reconnaissance elerrpoundnts

lead the columns out of the friendly lines and into the

enemy position to develop it to locate its flanks and

to determine the extent of enemy defensive positions)

The use of this cavalry reconnaissance against a well-

defended positim resulted in tLe attack of the 10th

Armored Division bogging down before it had actually

- left the protection of the infantry position This

formation was changed irrmediately and as soon as the

heavier armored tank and infantry battalions had been

passed through the cavalry the attack began to roll

It is interesting to note that present-day tactical

dcctrine and teaching at The Armored Sch)ol has

abandoned the old-time concet and now qssigns cavalry

reconnaissance elements the pri~Bry mission of security4

Although still classified as combat troJps reconnaisshy

sance units will seldom lead an attack in order to

find the enerr~ but will maintain flank nnd rear security

or contact between heavier fighting units ThGir name

could well be changed from cavalry reconnaissance troops

to Cavalry Security units

After clearing the bridgehead area the two

leading combat commands separated on different missions

and within two days were well beyond 13 point where they

could be considered mutually self-supporting Their

respective objectives -- BCUZONVILLE for CCA and lCERZIG

for CCB - were actually about fourteen airline miles

apart Over the exceedingly poor road net this distance

was almost doubled

As the reader learned the Combat Commands

after passing through the initial resistance beyond

the bridgehead fanned out into small armored colUmns

to present an imposing breadth to enemy resistance

49

but this formation lacked the force urn violence )f

armored combat because of its shallow depth and the

consequent ina~ility of commanders to react to enemy

movements and resistance As was stated by the Comshy

Mmding General of the German First Army the advance

from the LOSELIE to the ShAR should have been much

swifter and shculd have resulted in more disorganizashy

ti~n of the GerIT~n forces in the area than it did 5

The operation from the 8th of November to the 24th

-if NovembEr was trronsition from intense resistance

to exploitation and h~d it developed properly the

result to the Germn First Army could have been

catastrophic However the relative strength of the

combat corrurands in this operntion was such that they

found it necessary to fi ght and fight hard for every

foot of ground they gained because they were not

fieurohting in formations which allowed full exploitation

of their offensive capabilities and could not react

to enemy resistance as it was encountered It is

pointed ~ut that there were two reasons for the formashy

tLm adopted (1) The tactical prinei pIes of armor

at this time dictated the formation aQopted and (2)

the road net available was extremely poor for offensive

operations The poor road net it is believe~ did not

- preclurle the use of ltIrmor in c)lumn formation

When eGA reached th6 OaSCHOLZ Swi tch Line 8m

50

attempted to penetrate this heavily fortified end well-defended

--- urea its forIll2tion was wit h task forces abreast and tAO teams

per task force abreast This permitted t~e Combat Coromand to

launch its attack on an extremely broad front but such weakshy

ness resulted from its lack of depth that no appreciable penetra~middot

tion was made over a several-day period~ even though the tankers

took over a small gap in the line almost 1000 yards deep The

attack characterized by violent initial force dwindled quickly

and never succeeded in bringing off a successful penetration

because it was unable to maintain the necessary momentum As

its force died th Germans reacted with counter2ttacks and

heavy fire and in each case made things so hot for the attackshy

ers that they were forced to withdraw to their original posi tions

or at least give ground and tii g in when the counterattack ceased

Had these attacks been launched under present day principles

using the combat command massed insteactJf piecemeal~ with the

violence concentrated and a reserve of some size and great

mobility retained it is believed that the initial success

could have been exploiterl and the pressure continued so that

the initiative would heve been retained and a breakthrough

accompli shed bull

bull NOTES FOR CHhFTER VI

lAfter Action Report 10th f~nnored Dtvision 1 Nov - 1 Dec 44 Fha se II Lessons Learned

22pound ill Dr H L Cole Chap VIII p31

3~ p40

4Iechanizeri Cavalrv sturly 49 (Report of the General Board European rrheater) Lay 1946

52pound Ci t Dr H L Cole Chap XI p26

51

CHAPTER VU

DECEHBER 16th TO FEBRURY 9th

On the afternoon of the 16th of December 1944

all units of the Division were alerted for movement

north with the mission of counterattacking a major

German drive Little more thltgtll this was known at

Division Headquarters in the little town of PiICH on

the HOSELLE River just south of PERL it 0330 the

next day orders wer received qttaching the Division

to VIII Corps of First Arrnyland directing the Division

to fmrch tOWlrd LtJXI]mOlTRG CITY imncdiately By 0630

the Iflst unit of theuro Division clered the IP tnd the

colurm recrossed the HOSELLL at TdIONVILLE Along

tho route to LUXEBaJRG CITY th0 situation bGcame someshy

what clarified and the DivisiGn was split into two

major units to perform entirBly sepgtr9tt missions

While ceB moved to the vicinity of B5TOGNE to reinforce

the troops in that area CC tgtnd the rest of th Division

continued Almost due qorth from WXEMBOURG cr TY to proshy

t~ct tho town from the threat of being overrun by the

enemy Evel1Jone began to realize thAt the IIUajor

German Drive WlS a seriuus qffair indeed (incidntally

the 10th nnored Division was the first US unit to be

~ diverted from ltmother mission to reinforce troops in

the Bulge) 2

52

eGA - Brigadier GEneral PIBUR

GGA completed a seventy-fi ve mile march to an

area some twenty miles northeast of LUXEMBOURG CITY

in the early morning of the 18th and went into action

at once Their mission - to protect the city Their

plan to carry out this defense -- attack This attack

stopped German advances in LUX~~OURG The 12th RCT

of the 4th Division already in the area teamed up bull

with CCA in this action and when enemy advances in

the zone were completely stopped CC~ turned the area

over to the 12th On the morning of the 24th CCh was

ordererl to move to the vicinity of STEGEN with the

mission of attacking east to clear that part of LUXEMshy

BOURG south of the SAUER River of the enemy This

they did in twenty-four hours and on Christmas day

they were relieved by the l09th RCT of the 28th

Division On the 26th they returned to the kETZ area

arriving late in the afternoon From this date until

the 8th of February CCA had the primary mission of

acting as Corps Reserve for tre thinly-held front

on the SAAR During the period they were successively

attached to XX XXI (Seventh Army) and XV (also

Seventh Arrrw) Corps and made several short moves

all in the performance of the mission assigned No

major combat to~k place and the majority of the time

53

was eiven over initially to rest reht bilitation tnd

re-equipping and Ipter to small-unit training Freshy

quent corrtrjcmd inspections werE held and nWlerous

IIhousekeeping II details were a cC0mplished For GGE

it was an entirely different stor)_

GGE -- Golunel 1- L ROELRTS

(liOTE For -3 complett ltJIld detailed account (f the 10th ~reored Divisions CCB in the RDENNcS s(C 11in~or at BSTCGNEfI a research roport pIep~ed b~ Committee 4 Officers dvancc Course The Irmored School 1949)

Colmel ROBERTS led his colwm into thfJ tovm

of B STOGKE ht in the cfternoon of the 18th of Decemshy

ber TJhon he dispatched Teams DESOBFY CH8RRY cni

OHR to defensive positions north and east of the

tmm ln111ediately F11 hmds relllized that the sit uation

WaS even more serious than pound10st of thefl hld suspected

Tho next morning an lingering doubts weN resolved

The enemy launched his first attack on COB at dawn

and his ass~ult continued withuut ceese until the relief

of th lt city SOfl8 weekslator On the 20th CCS was

attached to tho lOlst Airborne Divisiun and on the

21st after th3 Germans liad completod tht encircleshy

ment of EiSTOG1 di Ttams W6re vithdrawn into the

city pr~pcr where tlley were co[lbined with eleGents

of thG 9th middotmorcc Division under Colonel ROBbRTS shy

54

co~nd t~ form a mobile reserve for the defense of

the area This conglomeration was called the nF1re

Brigade ll and was indispensible Where the going was

hottest they were sent to put out the flames All

supplies - but especially fuel -- were in short

supply and ct tirre s during the Dperation vehicles

were not fueled until after a counterattack order

had been issued naming which tanks were to be sent

out These tanks only would then be gassed with

enough reserve to allow them to get back into town

after cOIT~leting their mission On the 26th of December

elements of the 4th Armored Division reacha1 the beshy

- l

sieged town after having broken through the German

southern pincer This was undoubtedly one of the

great days of the war for Colonel ROBERTS and hi screw

as well as for the other defenders of BilSTOGNE A

few days later a corridor was opened up between US

forces to the s=mth and BASTOGNE itself Despite

this CeB remained in BhSTCGNE untU the 18th of

January by which time the original lines in that

area had been restored ( and ouite a few of the original

CCB personnel and vehicles had been destroyed) One

month to the day after their arrival all units of

CCB left BASTOGNE for return to the SAAH-AiOSELlE

~ area In recognition of their rleerls every man was

55

clecorateri - some individually ann all wi th the

Presidential Citation 4

Upon arrival in the t~TZ area the command

ilrrrediately set ablUt refitting itself and rehabilitatshy

ing its troops Replacements were received and inteshy

grated into units fresh clothing and equiprrent were

issued troops were given only minim~~ duties to pershy

form By the first week in Feoruary they were ready

to fight again

On the 8th Jf February Di visbn 1eac1quarters

publi shed Field Order No 29 orderin~ the Divi sbn to

assemble in th6 1ETZ area prepared to continue movereent

to the north or to counterattack any enemy penetration

in XX Corils zone which was again a1-proximately what

it har been prior to the 17th of December Some reshy

distributiJn f tr)ups was ordered

Rumors began t) circulate - Were going

back into the Triangle III

NarES FOn CPJlPTEii VII

12pound bull QU Third Army AhR entry on 17 Dec 44

2Robert E Merriam Dark December (Ziff-Davis Publi shing Co 1947) p 114

3eol SIA larshall BastoEne (Wash The Infantry Journal Press 1946) p 72

4GO 17 Yiar Dei)t 13 HRr 45

56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED

narE For p represertcction of this entire operation see ~1ap B [mnex II

Conference Between CG XX G~rps and CG 94th )ivision 7 februn Pi 8 1945

On the 8th of Februgt ry 194~ the CO1lllanding Gene ral of

xx Corps Lieutennt General (then tjor General) iILTO~J H hfALKER

held n conference with his staff [nd the Commanding General of the

94th Division They decided to launch fc full-scale dtnck with

thmiddot 94th to secure the corllTlnding ground in t1e vicinity uf MUNZIN

lGEU The attack if successful would result in the effective

-shy

reduction of that section of the Swit ch line still in enemy hands

Cnd would lay open the entire SJ~ R-HUSELLE Triangle The Triangle

was still a potential mnrshalling [-rea for Gorman nttacks southward

and hd served well s a protective scrLt)n while vmr liUNDSTDT

funnelled supplies aJ1d troups through TRIJI1 during his December

offensive

Intellig~nce Data

NOTE See jtlp opposite pgtg0 59

Interrogction of prisoners of war revealed that the Gcrman

256th Volksgrenbdier Division wqs in thto process of relieving tho

b~dlr bnttered 11th Panzer Division and that the enem~ hn-d commitshy

ted the reservG eleIlents IJf the seriously weakened 416th Infantry

-- Division Thl) lt56th Volksgrendier Divisiun w~s disposed with its

57

right fllnk on trc LOSELLE rli ver at THOm emf extclideri east to

CALPHOLZ WOOr1s The 416th Infant ry Di vision held the sector from

CA~PHOLZ kJod s east to OHSCHOLZ and the SAhR River These two

units were reinfcrcen by the usual assortment of fortress ~attalions

whose personnel were capable of little more than manning pillboxes

The ene~yen had n0 known local reserves except the 11th Panzer Divisshy

~ which might be recoITndtted at any time However this unit

was incapAble of functioning as a division wi thout considerable rest

and refitting No other reserves were close enough to intervene

effectively2

The bulk of the enerqy strength was disposed along the base

of the Triangle Visual arid photo reconnaissance flown over the

area showed ttat the ene~ positions were in considerable strength

but were lacking in depth No secondary or alternate line existed

to which the encrry might fall back under pressure Nothing the

enemy possessed could halt an explcitctbn accomplisred with speed

nd violenoe With these facts in mind General VlALKER decider to

comrui t the 10th ArrlOred Division through the gap he hoped the 94th

Di vision would create

A Near Hitch in Plans

The 10th Armored Division althoujh attaCled to XX Corps

was currently in SHiEF reserve at lIETZ and could not be tactically

employed withlut authority from SPJEF General JLKER sought

permission of Third Army to employ the Division but this recmest - was denied by SHjZF General PJTTON Thirrj Arrry Comman1er intershy

58

Ylned pers~nally in General WALKERs behalf ard )btained the use

of the lOth Armored- provided a clear breakthrough was achieved

by the 94th Division 3 Upon learning this situation General ACORHIS

immediately directed his staff to make a terrain study plan the

attack and prepare to move the Division from 1poundZ so as to be

in immediate reserve when the 94th Division launched its attack

The C orES Plan

Geocral 1fiALKEf s plan envisioned a concerted attack of all

regimental combat teams of the 94th Division to breach the Switch

Line fortifications Two Combat comnands of the 10th Armored

Division would pass through the breach a11d by moving along parallel

roads which flanke~ the crest of the dominant north-south ridge

would drive quickly to the north It was anticipated that by the

t~E the combat commend on the left attained the high ground at

the tip of the Triangle overlooking THIER and brought the city

under fire enemy resistance in tre Triangle would have collapsed

The cgtmbat corrmand on the right profiting by this confushy

sion wculd then he able to slip to the east and seize two bridges

over the SAAR River ~t KANZEM and WILTINGEN Which were knom to be

intact To enhance the chances of success a subsidiary operation

was cevised whereby a Task Force of XII Corps would move across the

10SELLE Hi ver and sei ze the town of WINCHEHINGEN Ttis diversionary

attack was tv jump nff simultaneously wi th the commitment Qf the

loth Arnnr6d Division The dispositbn )f )ur forces 8nd the fr~t

lines of opposing f)rces on the 19th of Fetruary are shewn on the

opposi te page

59

---

A massive artillery preparaticn was to preceQe the attack

of the 94thDivision Four battalions of Corps light artillery

plus one battery of medium artillery all under 5th Field Artillery

Group were to provide ir~tial support for the divisional artillery

fires All fires were to be controllerl by a carefully ~~rked-out

plan devised jointly by the Corps and the 94th Division Artillery

Artillery Fire Plan4

The 94th Division issued its Field Order outlining the ini shy

tial st~ges of the operation two days prior to the attack thus

insuring ample opportunity fgtr target analysis study of intelli

gence data and preparation of detaile~ plans Expert prisoner of

war interrogation hAn clarified the en~y order of battle to the

last netail In 8ddition to invaluable ground reconnaissance

captured maps pinpointeo not only individual fortificatbns am

obstacles of the Switch Line but also the defensive p)sitions of

the entire Triangle These factors together with complete coopershy

ation anr co)rdination beheen Corps Artillery and the 94th

Division Artillery staffs greatly facilitated the preparationof

a con~r~hensive and accurate plan of artillery support The plan

as formulated was as follows

An arbitrary line approx~Btely 5000 yards ahead of the

front lines wasdesignated Corps Artillery was to engage all

targets beyond this line and Divisional Artillery was to engage

all targets short of it To gain maximum surprise there was to

60

be no firing prior to H-Hour Commencing at H-Hour mF~ continuing

Wltil H plus fifteen minutes fires would be directed at all known

enemy Corrman1 p)sts then switched to engage all known artillery

batteries for thirty minutes wi th maxi~um volume of fire Thereshy

aft-er neutralization of enemY batteries was to be rnaintained for

a Jeriod of one hour Main routes of ap)roach would be neutrali shy

zed for a further period of ten hours Each of these phases was

to be sufficiently flexible to provide for on-call fire at targets

of opportunity

The la st rhase of the artillery plan bears noteworthy

stUdy as it contemplated isolation of tho bnttlefield As the

attnck was to be delivered into a corridor slightly Ie ss than ten

miles wide between the SAtR and uOSELLE Rivers it seemed practi shy

cal to place interdiction fires on every roampd leading into the

enemys main battle position The bulk of tb3se fires was to be

delivered upon towns at main road int~rsections so as to obtain

the added advantage of destroying or harassing eneIlW bivouacs

command posts rear echelons (md supply installations located

therein

The plan further provided for the integration of all

artillery means wi thin the 94th D1vision Infentry cannon comshy

paries were bttached to the light artillery battalions in direct

SUiportf the rrain eifcJrt Organic infantry anti-tank guns were

to ce empl-)yed initially as fidd artillerybull The 77l~th Tank

Destr0yer Brcttaliyn (towed) attacherl to the Division was placed

61

in an amprtillery general support role FDr the first thirty IJIinutes

after H-Hour these units were to fire at rraximum sustained rates

on enemy front line positions assembly areas routes of a~proach

mortar and machine gun locations Continued neutralization of

the mere critical of these targets was provided subject to intershy

ruption in favor of on-call fire missions requested by forward

observers or from grounrl and air observation posts All phases

of the artillerJ plan called for fire on targets actuClly located

in previous limi ted cbjective attacks or through verified intelli shy

gence channels

NarES FOH CHrtPTEh VIII

of Saarmiddot+ose11e Trian 1e gn~ Tl-UER XX Qlrp~ Operational 15 Dec 44-12 lar 45 p 7

2~ p 8

3Gen George S Patton Jr War As I Knew It (NY Houghton tufflin Co 1947) p 244

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62

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CHAPTER IX

ATTACK OF TPE SWITCH LINE

10th hIIored Division -- February 1-19 1945 4 a--shy

During the period frcm the l~t to the 19th of February

the 10th Armored Division was in XV C Jrps (Seventh Army) reserve

and was located in the general vicinity of FAULQUEMm~T An active

prograr of training together with the maintenance of a countershy

reconnai ssance screen Vlest of the SAAR River kept the Division

occupied during this period

Jf Corps alerted the Division on February 8th for movement

on short notice The order to move wns received the evening of the

9th of February and the Division started moving the rr~xt morning

to en assembly 5re~ in the vicinity of ripoundTZ for attachment to XX

Corps (Third jlrr1Y) The Division was assembled completely in the

new area by late ~f~ernoon of the 11th and an intensive training

program was initiated stressing discipline leadership teamwork

physica] fitness morale initiative technical and tactical profishy

ciency This ~rogram continued until the 17th of February when

the Division was notified of the 94th Divisions impending attack

and the contemplated employment of the armor t) exp18it the il1fanshy

trys gar in the German defenses along the Switch Line General

rORRIS was ordered to move his division to a ne~~ assembly area

near PEHL and BESCH and H-Hour was tentatively set for its attack

--- at 0700 on the- 20th of Fetruary

63

A detailed recmnai ssance )1 the road net and asserrbly area

was irrmediately r~de The Division c~~menced the move ~t noon on

the 19th and closed by 0500 the next rorniot It was nJw in an

advance pusi tim ready for employment at toe crucial moment to crush

the last remaining enerrw defenses in the entire SiR-tOSELLE

Triflngle

Tbe InfanttY Attack Febru8til 19 19t5

The ettack of theuro 94th Division got under way as scheduled

befJre dawn on the 19th supported bv sixteen tc eighteen batt~lions

of artillery Advancing on a narrsw frrmt the leuding elerrents

of the 376th Infantry riegiment reached the woods north of SINZ just

as it was getting faintly light fi light drizzle of rain was

falling Surprisingly light enemy resistanco was rret and by 0815

the long-c~ntested woods north of SINZ were at lpoundst in American

hands

The advance cCintinued egainst scattered enemy resistance

and by mid-morning the north half ~f 1JNZINGEN ridge was secured

ADENHOLZ and GEISEUSCH were cleared by 1130 At 1800 the 37bth RCT

was attached to the lOth Arm)red DiVision offiCially indicating

that an opening had been made through the Switch Line l

The one reKEining strong 00int in this sect~r was tne road

net around THOmi and KREUZ~LLER The 94th Divisions Reconnaissance

Trcnp was rderer t) reduce this objective The defenders at THOttN

put up only a token sh~w of resistance ann the town was captured in

- less than 8fl hour KREUZEILER on the other hand proved a more

64

difficult pr)positLn It was necessary tgt emlby the 2nd Bttelion

of the 376th Infantry Regiment to reduce the enemy in this well-deshy

fended prea A first hand account of the attack is given by Captain

FREDERICK ST1l-1ISH Company COrrllander of Company F

The LD was the edge of a deep d~aw tc the south of town just east of the THORN-SINZ road The attack with Companies F and G leading jumped off at 200600 and led across an open field towards the woods immediately south of the town Folloshywing an artillery barrage on the edge of the WJOOS which lit up the field vd th a cold white light in flashes the troops advanced at e s1ow run They were protected n both flanks by the heavy machine guns of H Company Just inside tte edge uf the w)ods the men in the two advance companies wro were new to combat some 120 in all momentarily froze The plan of attack called for marching fire tJ carve a swath through the woods and ~robably the intense hedlam of noise caused the men fear 1owever this was but a m_middotmentary reaction mrl again the column swept forward literelly tearing the trees and undergrowth to shreds by a continual hail of fire

It was imx)ssHle during the advance L) give orders signal or do anything but shout and run forward Almost beshyfore anyone knew it the flr erige of thG wJoas was reached am then it oecarre ltpprrcnt that it w)ulr be quite a task to actually find the town Jf KREUZWEILEd Fog anrt smoke had obUt-erated any trfCe of ci viUzation

Captain )ODSON (Commanrling Officer of Company G) and I agree that thl3 cJlumn had swung to) far b the west to be clirectly the town and bJth Companies F anr G had to m~ve t the right in ord er to get a straight shot at the village

As soon as the fog und smoke clt)areci the companies entered the toJl1 and cleared it but 6ven bef0Ie the last houses had been searched a task force )f the 10th Armored Division rol ed through the town tanks half-tracks two and a halfs and even jeeps Strangdly enDugh While snipers were still srraquoting down the streets I there lllpeared the Arm)red TJivisim COJfJl1c3nrier in his jeep followed by the C0rps Commander in his and followerl by another General in his Surely nw the Siegfried Line hai beuro6rt cracked and the whale XX Corps wauld pour through 2

Exploitation by the 10th hrmure( Division

To be snre CnJltain STANlIS1 had predicted what was to-65

hltppen So let us now look nt the role Jlayed by the 10th ArlOrei

Division in the days to follow the infantryls breakthrough

The Divisicn plan of attack was along two axes CCA on

the right Reserve Co~man~ on the left ann CCB in Reserve

CeA launched its attack at 0500 on the 20th in a two-prong

trrust with Task Force liICHARSSON on the right ampnd Task Force CHAIB

ERtAIN on the left Task Force RICHJiiDSQN attackine generally northshy

east mane contact with the enemy just before roaching KlrcF A

minefield stopper the columns but attached engineers blew a path

through the field all)wing the vehicles to prcceed Shgtrtly after

the colwrn was hit by assault guns anrl machine gun fire from the

arpr)8ches to KIRF The attackers (uickly overcame the resistance

and moved into tile tOWl

Team BILLETT of Task Force RICHbRi)SOl was ordered crossshy

country b the left of KIFiF to attack MEUiiICK from t he west Near

1EURICK the Tean met anti-tank fire and was unable to continue for

appruxima tely thirty minutes until the mortars of Headquarters Comshy

pany were brought tJ fire on thB ene~y positions EURICK then fell

wi thout furl her resis tanCe

1le remainrier of Task Force RICHiR1)SON mwed toward s KELSEN

where it clptlreI the cdlmanri post Jf the German 4~6th Infantry

RelZiment 256th Volkgrenadier Division and some ninety prisoners

ieanwhile Task Force CHllBEr1L11i~ on the left of eGA s

attack had cl)se1 in its attack positLm between ~ERSCHWEILErr and

EFT by 0100 on the 20th where Team Corrrranltiers were issued final

66

instructions for the coming nttBck The Task Force wos t=middot attack

the rODmiddot1 frgtm TETTmGEI~ to SINZ an1 seize the high ground between

BILZINGEN ni KOhliIG From there it wcllri dtack north along the

axis FISCH0NS-JORF-FELLEHICK to seize the high ground in the vicinity

of TfWEIN in the north tip )f the Triangle The Teams were to move

to the LD in colurnn with Team SHADDEhU leading followed by Teams

OGhAJY ancl HOIEHOUSE The two leariing Teams would contain the

bulk )f the tonks and were t-J be prepared to attack from the preshy

scribed Itarch c olrunn after crossing the LJ Team HOLEHOUSE conshy

tainin~ the bulk of the infantry would remain initielly at SINZ

The assault teams left tbe attack positIon tt 0600 but

were rielayed by e traffic jam nn~ inAbility t8 obtain exact informashy

tim of thc frmt lines of the 376th RCT It was especially diffi shy

cult to ascertain the location Jf an American-lain rr~nebelt known

to be in the area This lack ~f information resulted in the loss

of the lGhr tank as it neareli the LD3 The LD was crossen finally

at 0855 with Teefl SHAflDEAU in the lead Team 0 muDY however was

ordered tcl remain in SINZ Heavy enelP3 minefields and numerous

anti-tank emplacements along the road forced Team SHhGDEAU to proceed

cross-country wi_th Team OGRJ1DY overwatching from its position on

the outskirts 0

In thi s foshion Team SHADGCAU moved forWaro flushing

twenty enemy out )f foxholes on the eGge of a small woorls to its

left ani thirty-five IrDTe frum the wocrl s nrtheast of BUREN An

enemy artillery [-ositin of five 75rrm guns 2nd three half-tracks

67

W2S rc strayed in the S2Ilie locIItim OccClsiml smell arms mortar

anrl artillery fire met the advance However the dominating terrain

overlooking the town Jf rITTLINGEN was reached at 1400 withaut

difficulty_

TeuI 0 GRDY wa s ordered forward to take over from Team

SHiDDEAU whi ch had suffere-i four tank casualties Team HOLEHOUSE

mover from SINZ in order to mop up llong the route clearen by the

talKs and to freG the road network fcmiddotr passae of the Task Force

supply trains

Team otGRJY f[oved out on the road wi th Team SHiDuEAU owrshy

watching from en Dpen field position Near SOST contact was made

witb elements ()f the 2nd Cavalry Gr)up who according t) the Corps

Jlan hEd nade a diversionary attack across the 110SELLE River in the

vicinity ltd WINC1IERIt-GEN

Team OGRADYS prvgIess wa s slowed due to enerTY interdictory

artillery fire hilly terain nurrercus craters and roadblocks

However both Tear OGlU[Y anlti Team SHWJEAU reached and occupied

the D1 visbn s initial objective J the high grounrl in the vicinity

of TAWERN by 1700 hours

leara HOJEHOUSE hatl m~)Ved up the road by SINZ and cleared

DITTLINGEJ in [ tvic-hour scr~p whictmiddot netted forty-five priscmers

then swept ncrtC)ast anti cleared IERSKIRCHEN 1y 1830 taking an

adrlitional thirty pris)fers The SUlJlly trains attacherl tank ceshy

strgtyers and the sup~ortinh FA battllions closed on rITTLn~GEN

at 1915

68

ils) on t~le 20t h CCR on the left axi s the DivisLm

attack rewed out along the road paralfel to the MOSELIE River

meeting light enemy resistance The cclumn advanced to viLtJCHERINshy

G1N by 0200 hours vh ere it coiled for the niiSht The ct tack

was continued at CflOO the next mornini middotageinst crumbling resistance

cca reached the Division final objective nJrth of TAEhN that

night without incident

Thus in two days the lJnr-ccmtesterl Triangle proper

fell to our forces TRIER however still lay across the SAAR

River from the ivision And TRIER was the vitn1 point in the

zone of XX CJrps adv3nce

NOTrS FOR CHl~PTER IX

lHistory of the J76th nfantry Regiment (Car lJeddigen shy~u5pertal GerrknY--194J p 12

21l1d p 132

322_ ill TRIEfi ap~endix No 2

69

liap showing lttack on February 21st to 26th bull

shy

CHAPTEx X

DETAILED ~OVEl~ENTS OF THE 10TH AHHRED DIVISICN FROt THE CJ-lPTURE OF THE DIVISION OBJEcTIVE 1T TJVERN

TO INCLUDE THE SAAR ~VEB CaOSSING

Plans an~ PrePfrationt

Following the rapi~ success jf the 10th Armored Divisi0n

I

in capturing its initial )bjective TAYIEliN a new Fielr1 Order NQ 17

(see Annex IV) was issued by XX Corps on the afternoon of the 21st

of February 1945 orriering the lOth Arrrorerl Divisicm with 376th

aCT attached to attack east across the SnAii iiiver in the vicinity

of OCKFEN bull )rth of SA~RBuHG The 376th RCT would establish the

bridgehead ampt CCKFEN for the armor to cross in order to strike

northeast of the SMd- hiver to capture TRIEi The 376th RCT would

then follow the tankers on to TRIEH

Simultc-i1eously the 94th Division less the 376th l-CT

would make a riiversionltlry Clssault crossLng of the SAAR River south

of SiAHBlL-lG in the vicinity of SEl1RIG and TABEN The 94th Division

COUld then eX)2n~1 its own bririgehearl to include the 10th Armored

ivisi)ns bridgehead at OCKFEN The bririgeheac1 expansion would

be continued by the infantry while the 10th Armored drove on to

THIER

The r3ltult of this operatim WQud make available ore

large briribeheai stretching from ThBampJ to TrUErt which would pro-

vine ample space for future operations From this bridgehead an

attack could be launched with the mi ssion of linking XX Corps I

70

original bridtehcad at SAHLAUTERW to the TBEN-TRIER bridgehead

thereby providin~ a means for clearing the entire SAhR Basin l

General JUEFt supplemented the new order to call for the

errployment of th0 5th Hanger Battalion comrnanded by Lieutenant

Colonel RICHbJiD P SULliVAN The R8nger s were at tha t time

attache tl Co the 94th J1 vision Trey would cross behind the inshy

fantry pass thr)ugh the 302nd Ilfantry Regiment of the 94th

)1 visi)n anrJ infiltrate through the enemy lines wl_ th the mi saion

af seiztnc the hiid1 gr~)unc1 around ZERF If the Hangers could succeed

they would be able ta ~ominate the road network ann ~eny the enemy I

use of the ZEbF-SJAnBulW roac1 The possession of this critical

sup~ly route would ~)revent the enemy from bringing up reinforcements

from the sJUth WilicD =-n the early states would be the most wlshy

nerable corner )f the briclgeeuroad fJr an enemy cwun+-erattack

A sturJy Jf the terrain will sh)w at a glance that rrany

difficulties waul be encountereG in the proposed crossings (see

lap C Ann(x II) The western aproaches to the StiAR Rivet gave

corrmanding observation to the enooy located on the high ridges

which fJrrred the eastern bank At almust all p)ints tlis dominating

terrain was reinf~rced by the f-rtifications of the SIEGFRIEP Line

Like the Switch ~ine at the base of the Triangle the concrete

pillboxes -were positined to insure llilltual support am to cover the

likely avenues of a)rr)ach to the western lank The Germans had

carefully considered tilese no tural nvenues before c onstruc ting

their defenaive installations Where the river and the ridge toshy

71

ether were n~)t considered t) be Jf sufficient strength amprrti tional

concrete oefensi ve works har been added 60KFE~ was an example fJr

there the ~efenses were approximetely three kilometers in neth

forming a forIr~df 11e obstacle to any atterrtJted crJssings

However in the vicinity of TpoundBEN rmd 5fRRIG where the

eastern banks of the SAiR River forrred an almost )erpenrlicular

cliff the Germans believed additbnal field fJrtificati ons unshy

necessary The river was from 120 to 150 feet wide in the vicinity

of both crossinb sites2 The steep eastern banks made fording

impossible German pillbxes were able to cover the Ii ver by

direct small arms and llJ8chbe gun fire and observed artillery fire

Along the western b8nk the terrain was o)en with some scattered

wooned arepounds whit h di~ not provide sufficient concealment to

revent enemy ogt~ervation In aUtion there was consirlerable

IMrshy ground which w)ulrl confine all vehicular movement to the

roans

~he 10th hrmored anrt tbe 94th Divisions iHlrt little time

for detailert plannint of the attack or for reconnaissance of the

terrain surroun0inf the crossing sltes as h~d been the ease in the

initial penetration and breakthrough

stucy Jf 1e situation confrnting the 10th ArIIOred

Division at CXKllJ n_ set the picture for its proposed crossin_

The German rjefenses ai this point were mannen by three fortress

battalions in additi~n to the remains of twc ~ivisions which had

been badly battered in the Triangle 0ut had been able to make their

72

way back across the SARR River in small roups There were also

many hastily improvised formations of service and supporting tr~ops

along with the SAhRBURG Volkstrum AlthoUgh they were not first shy

class troops their primary mission -- sitting in pillboxes 6n0

keeJing machine guns trained on the rivev -- dilti not reQuire highly

trained personnel It Vies apiJarent that speed would be the essential

element of the propos ed crossing in order to deny the Germans time

to man an~ possibly to reinforce the al~eady well-fortified S~R

fdvel line

Plans for the Crossin2

The XX Corps orner was received by tho 10th firmored ~ivision

at noon on the 20th It callen for the attack 2crOS5 the SAAR River

to be mare durin tho 1ightJf the 21st of Februery k briefing was

heU for all comanr1ers in the Divisbn at 1900 and verbal orders

were issued which were later confirmeri by Di Ii st on Field Orr3er No

32

~s~eral fuOhRIS ordere1 the 376th RCT to make a typical

infantry river crossing employing engineer assault boats This

cros sing woulcl be supported by tank destroyer ann all available

automatic weapC)flmiddot fire t) insure that the mi ssbn of sel zing a

bridgehearl in t irity of OCKFEN woud be successful In the

meanwhile the C~)lrJ cJltrklnds ere to continue their attacks to

the SAlIi from their pruRent positions Uon arrival they weI

all ti yen aclditilnal F~sions t) relform CeB was to support the

376th RCTs river cros3ing Viith tank rlestroyer fire ani be prepared

73

-

to pass through the bringehead on Divisim ortier CCA in arldition

to supporting the crossing of the 376th FWT by tank destroyer fire

was given the all-important mission of seizing the brirlses at KANZE~1

and WILTHJGEN as had been originally planned by General WALKER

ani then was to be prepared to follow CCB through the bridgehean

The Heserve COII1lMni was b be prepared to pass through the bridgehead

on Division order

The 90th Cav~lry Reconnaissance Squ~dron (mechanized) han

been reUe ved from attachment to the )rd Cavalry Group at 0800 tbat

day (the 20th) bgain under 10th Armoroo )ivision contrC)l it was

given tte missions ~)f forming a cuunter-rec ormaissance screen am

of maintainine pc troIs observati on and cmtect with friendly forces

along the line SRBTJ~-middotIERTERT between the SJJrc and 10SELlE Rivers

he First Attempt

AS hEd teen stated the lath ArmJred Division crossing

initiated by the 376th hCT was riginally scheduled to be rrade on

the night Jf 2l-22nd of February When the oriinal SAAR-MOSELIE

Tricmgle OiJErdticJn was planned hjwever nJ engineer rrepara ti ons

hed been nBde for an assault crossinlS of the SAAR This lack of

planni~ proved to be a critical error for nc assault boa ts on which

to cross the inilty could be founn Had theuro assault boats been

available trat ILl rmiddot_JmiddotRIEh might hdie been c2ptured days earlier

To II12ke InS t ter S 10 Sl th) se engine er b)Q ts whi ch hed been scraped

up ct the lest minute 0r the crossing failed t) arriveuro on schedule

at he CCKFEN crOSSing site) Trere was no lt11 ternati ve but to postpone

74

the crossing until the f allowing morning February 22nd This

costly delay provided the enemy with the necessary time for tbe reshy

organization and manning of his prepared fortifications An

additional disadvantage was the fact that any daylight crossing would

have to be made under a smoke screen and preceded by an artillery

preparation thereby losing the valuable element of surprise

The Second

Attempt

The second plan of attack as outlined by the 376th ReT

was for the 3rd Battalion to cross directly east of AYL having for

its initial 0bjective the steep bluffs rising ahove the river just

nrth f OCKFEN Smultaneously the 1st Battalicm was to cross

the river several hun~rerl yards further south with the mission

of securing the L~h tOund south of CCKFEN The grounri assigned

as the 1st Battai~ns nbjective was a gradually sloping flat-

topped hill liberal~y sprinkled with pillboxes The Commander of

the 376U itCT Lad reason to believe that once these two objectives

had been sec-ured the town of OCKFEN would be outflanked and its

capture would be proportionately easier

The 2nct Bat tali Xl wes to cross behind the 3rd at AYL then

svnng around the -iOllccern ede )f the bluffs (the 1st Battalion

objective) and rrrmiddot)ve directly so uth to secure its aSSigned portion

of the Regimental ~bjective which was a large hill 1500 yarrls

south of OCKFEN Thi s would enable t~e 2nrl Battalion to ti e in

with the 1st and 3rct Battalions who in turn WDuld move on tQ

their assigned sectJrs of the Regimental objective The capture of

this hill would insure the success of the bridgehead which woulrt

75

have [5 i~s erimeter the commanding ground which almost enshy

circled the OCKFEN valley~

It was also planned that by this time the engineers would

have c0flstructed a bridge across the river between AYL and OCKFEN

OVer wtd ch the tanks am vehicle s of the 10th ilnnored Division

could cross Once over the tanks would fan out eastward enroute

to TRIEfi

Companies L anrl C were to initiate the attack for the two

leading battalions At 1630 on the 22nd as soon as the two comp~nies

moved out the Germansopened fire with all available weapons The

volume of this enemy fire made it extremely difficult forthe 81st

Cherrical Company supporting the crossins to Get to its smoke genershy

ators in order to refuel them ith the failure (if the smoke screen

the Germans cautht the oncoming clITlpanies in the open and immeriiately

pinned them ~own

Colonel JicCLUNE the Regimental COlIllrender had proceeded to

the flats below AYL where he could pers0nally observe and CO~Bnd

the river crossingM In a hail of machine bun fire he moved about on

the open flats urging the leading elements of the attacking companies

forward The withering autorratic fire made this impossible and it

now became clear that until darkness it would be useless and far too

costly to attempt any further advance So for the sec(~nrl time the

crossing was postponed -- until 2300 that same evening This again

pcgtints up the importance f the failure of the assault boats to

arrive in tirrpound for the initial crossing

76

The Crossing

C Company again led off for the 1st Battalion and thi s

time under the ~rotection of darkness the going was somewhat

eosier The Geurormans openerl up with tracer ammunition and

sup)rting artillery fire and marle the crossinEc site en impact

area ClS the infantry teams dragger their assault boats to the

waters edde

(It was at thi s tire that Colonel IcCLUNE again perronshy

ally directing the attack was seriously wounded in both legs

and was evacuated Lieutenant Colonel RAYNOR E ANDERSON assumed

command of the Task Force)4

Getting the boats into the water wes only the start of

their troubles The machine ~un fire was continuous but fortushy

nately the darkness of the night prohibited great accuracy

Severel yards from the far shore the assault bJats hung up on

partially submerged harted wire over which even these flat shy

bottomed craft could not pass The infantrymen had no choice

but to abandon the coats jump into the water and swim or wade

cshore as best they could This unexpEcted obstacle resulted in

further dis0rganization The Companies were facer with more

tr)llble in the stee) hill directly to their frmt which must be

climbed in order tmiddot) secure the battalion objective illl this

rendered the situation most tryinsect and cmfusing

In the wake Df the initial two-battalion 8ssaul t the

2nd Battalion crossed and was soon engaged in heavy fighting

It fought un throughout the Gay and the following ni~ht but

77

was unable to make the progress which had been ex~ected

The 3rd Battalion I s arlvance to the regimental objective

harj been unopposed not because of the absence of enemy in the

vicinity but because the ene~ had not detected the movement

and did not know it was there Hence the arlvance of the 3rd

Battalion amounted to an infi+tration

The si tun tion remained unimproved on t m 23rd of Fe brushy

ary Enemy artillery and small-ar~rs fire on the river rrede

1lrirlging impossible The 376th RCT was unable to enlarge its

small brid~ehead in the face of the fanatical German fire coming

from the SIEGFRIill fortlficatbns

If the 1st anrl 2nrl Battalions hd met as little resistance

as had the 3rd and had been able tJ cJntinue their arvance to tte

Regimental objective the 376th s position wuld have been more seshy

cure But it had not ~rker out that way The 1st Battalion had

been able to advance only southward and the 2nd Battalion had

been helq up in the vicinity of OCKFEN which left the 3rd Battal shy

ion in sole possession of the Regimental objective and in

arklition virtually surrounrled by Germans

Fortunately the Germans did not have the manpower to

counterattack enri catch the 3rd BattalLgtn in this wlnerable

position of reoroanization jside from the light but constant

artillery fire which continuer to harass the troops on the hill shy

t0P their position was not cri tical exceJt from the starn point

of su--plies For tre next three days it was necessary to keep

78

---

them supplied by twenty liai son planes which the COlnbat Team

harl borrowed from the supporting artillery

Actions of CCA Task Force RICH1RDSON unrer CCJl harl just cClmpleted

the capture and ~)Utposting of TAVvERN prior to the initial

attempted crossing of the 376th RCT

Task Force CHA1fBERLJIN to the south of TA~JhN was

now the stroneest in infantry support CCIl f)r this reason

gave Task Force CHfJLBERLAIN the mission of securing the bridges

at KNZE1_ awl WILTINGEN hOed priority was given through

OriNSDORF to speed the attack At 1220 on the 21st Colonel

CHAtBERLAIN ordered the Task Forc e t CJ move out wi th Team HOLEshy

HOUSE lear1ins J follOJed by Team HhVLOWITZ Team HOLEHOUSE had

secured DITTLINGEN and Team Hh VLOWITZ had clos ed UP on DITTLINGEN

from the south The column was to proceeri through KilNNEBACK

to the crossroads northeast of the town F~)m there Team HOLEshy

HOUSE would strike southeast to AYL turn northeast through

SEmEL-HAUSEN ani secure the bridge 500 yards south of W1LTINGEN

Team HAVLOWITZ would continue on throulh TAiEhl with the mission

of securing the brirle at KANZEI1 Teams OGhr DY ann SHADJEAU

were to remain on the original Division objective on the bigh

ground ovedooking TRIER

Team HOLEHCUSE enroute to the crossroads met scattered

resistance in a series of small-arms enc~aements v-hich resulted

in the capture of ahout twenty-five Germans Upon arrival at

the crossrC)rds at 1800 the lear tank was fired upon by a high

79

velocity anti-tank weapon Unable to determine the location of

the weapon Team HOLEHOUSE turned southeast to bYL disregarding

the fire of the gun

No furtter resistance was encountered until the lead tanks

arrived Wi thin I()O yarns of 1YL where they ran into a minefielci

emplacec ~n anrl to both sirles of the roenbull The extent of the mine~

field and the badly cratered road kept the attached engineers

busy clearing the ga throughout the night )f 2l-22nd February

The minefield was successfully breached at 0315 anrl tbe infantry

was just startin through the gap when the bridge at WILTINGEN was

blown by the Germans6 hlmOSt immediately thereafter the brirlge at

KANZE1 was destroyed With both Jf these obj~Ctives bloVll the

remainder of the day was occupied in patrolling along the SAAR

north of AYL

Team HAVLO~~TZ following Team HOLEHOUSE en~ountered the

SaITe anti-tank gun at the crossroads northeast of iANNEBACH which

had earlier troubled Captain HOLEHOUSE This time it was necessary

to send dismounted infantry to locate and knock out the weapon

The infantry was sucoessful The gun a 76mm anti-tank weapon

with its crew of eight men was captured

Task Force CHA~~BERLIN was invJlved in no further actions

until the 24th of February

leanwhile Task Force 7(ICHIJiJS()N J from its outposts n0lth

and east of TAWEllN moved tanks up to the commanding grcund south

of YiASSERLIESCH at the ti gtf the Trian~le on the morning of th e

80

--

22nd of February A heavy fog enabled the dismounted infantry to

make their way down the hill and into the town and it was taken

without resistance

Across the river the enemy was well emplaced in concrete

pillboxes supported by ample artillery Outposts were set up on

the high ground overlookins the river and were manned during dayshy

light hours These outposts moved down to the river banks by

ni ht to observe and listen They were rewarded by the capture

of a Germm patrol which crossed the river the night of the 22nd

of February The outposts ambushed the Germans and succeeded in

ca~)turing or killinf the entire pa trol

Task Force RICHARDSON remained in its area maintaining

observation until the 24th of February

The Diversionary Attack

Turning to the south the 94th DivisiDn having vn the

morning of the 21st of February at 0630 hours clDserl up to the SrAR

River continued its exploitations by making ~ surprise crOSSing in

the vicinity of TABEN This was the rliversionary attack to be conshy

ducted simultaneously with the 10th hrmored Divisions crossing to

the north Under a heavy cover of smoke the 301st and 302nd

Infantry Regiments established a bridgehead on the far bank and

cleared one-half the townJf SERBIG by the night of the 22nd of

February

The enenw opposed this crossing with everything it had inshy

clurling a Battnlbn of the 11th Panzer Division 7

81

The actions of the 94th Division ctUrin~ the next two nays

will furnish a better understanding of themiddotclOthArmored Division

in its river crossing to the north The two regiments across the

SAAR River cleared SERRIG in its entirety and established) bridpeshy

head from one to one and n half miles dee) and extending from a

point some 1500 yards north of SERRIG toa i)oint a few hundred yards

south of TABEN

The bridgehead was large enollgh to enable the engineers to

build a floating treadway bridge in the vicinity of TABEN and later

on the morning of February 25th to establish a second floating

treadway bridge at SERRIG This permitted the tanks tank destroyers

and met or transport of the 94th Division which had begun their

crossings at TbBEN to speed their movement into the bridgehead

utilizing both bridges

Lieutenant Colonel SULliVAN commanding the 5th Ranger

Battalion received his orders (to deny the enemy use of the ZERFshy

ShAREURG road) from the 94th Division Command Post at 1000 February

22nd The action of the 5th Ran8er Battalion in this operation is

an historical nerrative in itself The Battalion succeeded in

reaching its objective on the 23rd of February thereby completing

the mission f bi secting the main east-west supply route from ZERF

It had als0 succeeded in getting itself completely surrounded by

infiltrating Germans It was necessary to have supplies dropped by

air By continuous fighting and repelling innumerable countershy

attacks the Rangers succeeded in holdin~ the ground until they

were reached by advance elements of the 10th Armored Division on

the morning of February 25th 82

~nge in Plans

Operations of the 94th Division in establishinf its bridgeshy

hearl now made it clear to the Corps Commander that he possessed a

bridgehead of major importance As so often happens a sec~mdary

effurt now became the main effort by reason of its continued success

As orir-inally Jlanned the 94th Divisicn I s crossing was to be seconshy

dary to the 10th Armored Division I s crossini at OCKFEN Speed now

became of the utmost importance if the assault on THIEE was to be

successfuL To ain this speed the CorJs COInrr1nder rleciderl to

poss CC1 and CCB cf the 10th Armored 1Jivision throurh the TABEN

brirjgeheari rather than to wait for a briLlte to be built at CCKFEN

General LORRIS is carryins out the Corps order and to speed the

attack decided to corrrit the armored infantry as a unit into the

8bridgehead of the 376th iiCT under the commann of General PIBURN

Effective rlate of change was announced as of 0850 February 24th

The infantry battalbns wero to amplSBemble at AYL andmiddotr~ea the SAiAR

River in the vicinity of OCKFEN beginning at 1500 This operation

wculct place a(~rlitional infantry troops in the bridgehead and reinforce

the 376th HCT CCA anr1 CCB le ss their infantry battalions ould

~Jass through the TILBEN brin2ehead wi th CCl leading followed by

CCB The Reserve CorrmaDri woulr1 remain in place awaiting orders

The combat corrmmns left their armoreri infantry battalions

in the vicinity of iYL ann then struck south Jf TlLBEN where they

arri ved in time to betlin crossing the Sillii on the 25th of February

From here they were to push nurth up the east bank of the SAAR

83

Ri ver to DiSCH where they wQuldrejoin the armorerl infantry which

should by that time have ~arched south from OCKFEN Reorganization

was to te accoIn)lisher at IitSCH before striking east to ZERF

Intelligence Delta9

The enGmy oposing this operatton was made up of fortress

battaliofis rrachine poundun eroups and Volkatrum Thos6 same troops

had been employerl l)y the Germans in their unsucce ssful a ttempt to

resist the oriJinal crossings

The ~Yl 1ountain ni visim which hac~ suffered severe losses

at jLSACE arri vcr in the bri~itehearl area as reinforcements Tris

was discgtvererl m en contact was rna ie with an infantry battalion of

thi s rlJ vision on Fetrul3ry 25th On February 26th the remainder of

the German divisi~n arri ver after a f)rced march of 150 kilometers

True the 2nrl Lcuntain Division was n~ lOlliEr a first-class fighting

unit but unlike the 256th Volkslrenadier Jivision anrl the 416th

lnfantrYDivision it still functionerl as a rlivision

The arrival )f thi s unit marle it all the more clear to

General WALKER that tre speerl of the expl Ji b3tion must be regainerl

To bog down now w)uld result in the sacrifice )f all Us ini tial

success In ar1ctiti)n the terrain greatly fcgtvored the enemy defenses

and to allow the Gerrrans additional time to strenethen these defenses

woulr all but prevent the employment )f arm)r

The Armored Infantry Cr)sses

Task Force TIICHHiDSON of eCA was relieveri on February 24th

by the 90th C8valry ltec-mnaissance S-ua-iron (iecranized) north and

84

east of TAVjERN Colonel RICHhRDSON then assembleo the infantry at

AYL in preparation for the crossing of the SAAR at OCKFEN The move

was made as an armored irfantry battalion dismounted All other

elements such as tanks half-tracks and their personnel were at that

tiIT~ awaiting the construction of a bridge at CCKFEN over ~ich they

hoped to cross v~hen the Corps Commam er decided not to wait for

the brid6e at OCKFEN these element s were moved south in order to

cross at TitBEN anrt proceed north to IRSCH

At 1600 on the 24th the infantry of Task Force RICHiRDSON

began i ts crossin~ of the SAAR Hi ver in assault boats The 8lst

Chemical Company continuert to emplQY its snoke generetors provirling

8 smoke screen for the cressing The Germans on the eastern bank

resisted fiercely with continuous machine sun fire from their pillboxes

Heavy artillery concentratioLs falling on the crossing site forced

the infantry elements to deploy moving singly ann in small groups

across 800 yards of open ground

To sustain combat following the crossini mortars automatic

weapons and awmunition were han~-carried Tanks and personnel

carriers were of little use to these tro~ps now facing a river

crossing and they would be of no further use until they could be

rejoined at IRSCH on the eastern bank

Although the 376tn RCT had reachect the high bluffs overshy

looking the ri vcr above OCKfEN enemy machine guns continued to

concentrate on a iJOrtion vf the crossing site Despite the intensity -

of enenw firc which harassed all crossing elements the casualties

85

in Task Force RICHhRDSON WHe coml)aratiwly light

From CeB Task Force OHARA consisting of three infantry

companies of the 54th Armored Infantry Battalion also assembled at

AYL where it was briefed on the crossing It was then issue~ suffi shy

cient equipment and rations for two days fightinf without resupply -i

The Battalion like the others began its crossini in cssault

boats bull Despite heavy eremy fire it suffered only twenty c85ualties10

The Battalion reorganized after climbin~ the hill directly opposite

its crossing site and moved down the winding roarl into CCKFEN arri shy

ving at 0230 February 25th

hrmored Infantry and Pillboxes

NOTE See sketch opposite pae 77

The Armored Infantry Battali)ns of the 10th hrmored Division

continued their crossing of th6 SAAR River one kilorreter north of

OCKFENBy 1200 on the 25th the oferatLm was completed They reshy

organizer] on the far bank and pushed on into OCKFEN anrl by the

afterno)n of the 25th they har presser an attack throu~h the lines

of the 376th ReT Task Ferce STANDISH (61st Armored Infantry

Battalion) attacked east bwarri SCHi-tFENBUhG Hill Task Force

RILEY (20th Armorerl Infantry Battalion) attacked SQuth towaMs

IfiSCH Task Force OHhhJ (54th Armlrer1 Infpntry BattalLm) formed

the reserve Fightinf fgtr an ar-lvantaf-e that culrl be maintained only

by speecl the attack was continued into the night SThN~ISH was cble

to break through but found himself isolated on SCHAltFENBlJRG Hill

Task Force RILEY was continually held up by pillboxes to the south

86

These pillboxes were located sDuth of CCKFEN in a stafgered

formation There were eleven in all of which ten were marked on

the infantrys 125000 maps Teams were reorganized before setting

out to clear the pillboxes A detailed plan was devised vhich

called for coordinated assault s on e~ ch Jillbox This in turn

re(1uired a well-clefined plan of attack It was decided that Task

Force RILEY wou10 clear the pillboxes southeast of OCKFEN~ while

Task Force 0 HhhA muld move east initin~ly follo iI1f t he path

which had been taken by rask Force STl1NDISH in its move to SCHfHFENshy

BURG Hill Task Force OHAn~ woul~ then turn south ann fighting

ahreast of Tnsk Forct -lILEY clear the Jillboxes in its zone along

the rOnd leaiing- bwn t) IRSCH The attack WflS trJ tecentn at dusk

The clear-cut plan of cttack called for the dismounted

infantry to reduce eecr Lrtification met ~dically Two machine

gun sectiJns would be set u9 in rartirtl defilade on the flanks of

the pillboxe s and y firtn on the embrasures wculd force th e occushy

pents to close them Bazooka tearrs wJulrl then move forward anrl blow

off the ports Followin that the en~in5er teams would crawl up

nr place their satchel cbarces In the meantime J the artillery

on the west sirle of the SrtAR wouln be on c8ll to place fire on the

rem2inin~ rillboxes in order to keep them occupied An almost

inentical m tua tion hael been rehear sect by the infantry while they

were trainin[~ in the I~TZ area and this proved extrerrely helpfuL

The 54th Armored Infantry Battalion was assifned the

follcwin missions The first two pillbQxes were to be taken by

87

A Company the next four by C Company an~ the last two a~ain by

A Company At approximately 1830 A Company meJVed out towarcl the

first two pillboxes Very little resistance was offered after

artillery and machine gun fire had been placed on the boxes C

Company then passed through A Company an-i roved on to take the

next two pillboxes supported by nnchine gun and artillery fire

The Germans put up a dog~ed resistance and fired flares to light

up the area for spotting tar~ets Friendly artillery fire was

increased on the pillboxes anrl two tank destroyers which had been

ferried across the river during the clay firci direct fire on the

fortificatbns This was sifficient tJ force the GerJrbns to

surremer

However tbenext tw) pillboxes assigned to C COffipany were

far m~re difficuit to reduce As the assault team moved up the

Germans brought adriitional rrachine ~uns onto the slope to the east

and open fire to deny the approach In spite of this increased

automatic fire the aSSfult teams reacherl the pilltoxes and plE-ced

their satchel Charges But even after the charges were detonatei

the Germans continued fighting It was necessary for the company

t wi thdraw so tha t frienrly artillery and tank destroyer fire

could be placed on the boxes After two hours of this fire the

Germans surreniered

The tank C1estroyers then further assisted h Company in

the renuctim of the remaining pillboxes which fortunately fuickly

surrender ed bull

88

This gteratim had taken most )f the nLsht anrl resulterl ir

twenty enemy killed ann fifty-fJur prismers )f war taken

suffered only four casualties It had rlefinitely been proved that

pillboxes 00 not form insurmountable Dbst8cles to armored infantry

if the attacks have been carefully planneri anri carried out with

speed anri teamwork

Armor Eust Have Bridg~s

Lieutenant Colonel RILEY of CCB like RICHARDSON 7 r ec e1 ved

orders to move his tan~s anrl half-trcks to FriliU)ENWRG in order to

cross on tre TAEEN brirl[e Althouph the brid~e lJ1S unrier heavy

artillery fire the Task Force crossed with Com~jany 21st Tank

Battalion (reinfrced with a lisht tank platoon)f 1) Company) leading

followec by Headquarters Company and the empty half-tracks of the

infantry

SKtiiIG by thi s time was in our hancts am it was rere

that ~iILEY receiveo orrers from CCl t attack through the 94th Jivision

brirjgehead an(~ push on to IRSCH There he woult4 pick u~) the 6lat

Armorer Infantry Battalim )f Task Force STANJISH snr move east to

relieve the 5th Ranger Battalion and seize the high ground west

of ZErlF

While in SERRICi illLEY met Lieutenant GkBOSO of the 5th

Ranger Battali)1 8 had with him twenty-four men and two officers

These troops were loaned into the half-tracks f~llowing behinct A

ComiJsny RILEY with his S-3 Captain R V EAHKLEY moved forward

t~ the head of the column where the 94th Division was still engaged

89

in heavy fighting against enemy small arms morters and machine

Euns at the lind ts of the bridgehead near BEURIGmiddot In order not w

become involved in this action the annor was forced to take sec)nshy

dary roads mi ch were irrassable except for medium tanks The light

tanks therefore were attached by cables to the I 4 t s and the

llcolurrn continued intact

With the delay causen by this expecUent it was not until

late in the afternoon of Febrllary 24th that the C olum closed upon

the town of IRSCH from the west with the 1st Platoon of A Company

learling Lieutenant Colonel RILEY believed at that time that Task

Force STANDISH h)d cleareri the town with his 6lst rrrnored Infantry

Battalion This prJvcd a costly mistake since Task Force STtN)ISH

was still fightinz t) reach lliSCH frOID its SCHMiFENBUliG Hill

position

Lieutenant HANOVEIt conmanding the 1st Platoon of A Company

moved into the center of town To his immedi~te front he observed

a roadblock across a fork in the road The two lead tanks fired at

the block with 76rnm fire They then by-passed the rcablock to the

west am continued on thrugh town

However they fallen to observe that Ue roadblock was

coverei from either side by tw~ GerffiBn baz~oka teams one ground

mount 88mm gun and a Tiger tank When the thir~ tank in Lieutenshy

ant HANOVER I s column attempteri to pass the rklriblock it was fired

on by the 8ampnrn fun and set afire blockin the r8ad The fourth

tank was hit by the baz)oka team on the rLht The fifth tank was

90

hit by the other baZe)Ok team but dii not lurst into flames bieanshy

while the Tiger tank covering the roadblock opened up and hit twa

litht tanks of the second platoon further back in the column

Captain ampRDLEY commanding A Company i~meditely contacted

the men of the Ranger Battalion anrl organized them as an infantry

team in order to clear the obstacle The Ran~ers came forwnrrl a~

upon arrival at the roadhlock they flushed the enemy crews into

flight The aangers then proceeded on to contact the two tanks which

had succeeded in gettin~ beyond the roadblock They reached the tanks

and formal a flank guarri to Jrevent further bazooka fire from knockshy

ing them out while being escQrted back to the main column12

At 2030 B Company of Task Force RILEY (20th Armored Infantry

- Battalion) came into IRSCH from the northwest It immediately began

tc) clear the town taking 290 prismers of war from the 416th shy

VolksFrelladier )ivision The actic)fi up t-J Uis time had cost five

tanks ann apr)roxima tely five kille and twenty wounded

Captin HOLEHOU5E cOIl1IrIanrlin~ h Company 20ttgt Irmoren

Infmtry Battalion arrived fro XKFEN at 2240 and assisted in

clearing out the town takin5 250 prisoners of war When a TLer

Tank to th6 south of the town o~enerl up the prisoners of war started

to scatter One of Company A I S half-tracks covered the prisoners

of war an~ when the fracas was over fifteen of them wer~ rlead13

C Company 20th hrmoreo Infantry Battalion arrived almost on the

heels of CGptain HOLEHOUSE

The three Armored Infantry Battalions of the 10th Armored

Division hart succeeded in reaching IhSCH wit h the assistance of the

91

376th liGT The 376th RCT pusherl In south to make contact with the

302n(1 Infantry which was dri ving north from SERHIG BEURIG was

envelope~ in this maneuver an~ was captured 0n February 26th

Now it was possible to begin the construction of a heavy

penton bridge at SAhRBUFG which was just across the river from

BEURIG The bringe was completer] anti elements of the lOth Armored

Division be(~an crossing on the morning of February 27th A conshy

tinuous bri~gehean had been estab1isherl from a point just north

of CCKFEN to a point just south of TAEEN

NOTES FOR CPAPTampi X

12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13

4QlQll History of the 376th Infantry hed p lla 511amp1 p 148

60 gt ill TitLS1 p 25

7Ibid p 14-8Qe Cit J-v lOth lirmd )iv entry fJr 24 Feb 45

9~ Cit TRIER 15

lOInterview with taj W B Haskell at Trier 13 ar 45

llInterview with Lt Col J n hiley at Tritr 12-13 kar 45

12Ibid

13Interview with Lt Lonchar (21st Tk En) at Trier 13 ~ or 45

-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF

Elements of the 10th Armored Division in IRSCH were

hastily reorganized into a ten~orary Team A in order to cQmplete

the nssi~ned ~ission of relieving the 5th Ranger oattalion located

west of ZERF

Team A moved out upon reorganization As the leading

vehicles approached the eastern of IRSCH they were fired upon

by a Tiger Tank which knocked out the two 1681 tanks anc~ the three

following half-tracks This stopped th6 armored column The

dismounted troops of the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion Band

C Companies were sent out from IRSCH to clear the IaSCH-ZERF road

tel a point a mile and a half beyonri the town This maneuver was

accomplished to i ve the armor an opportunity to begin moving

Company B cleared the left of th6 road and C Company the risht

By 0930 on the 26th the task had been completed and the

armored colurr~ be~an ITDving again ~o~ress was slow due to

exceptionally heavy enemy artillery fire Tr~ee hours were taken in

reaching BIEDCHEN a small cluster of hous6s aout half-way between

IRSCH and ZERF At BIEDCHEN the colurr~ came under point-blank

fire aimed ltiown the road from a point west of ZEHF The tanks

however J continued on the rO3rl while the dismounted elements

maneuvered to a draw enerally parallelineuro the rOed at atout one

93

hundred yards and offering considercble protection from the artillery

fire It was at this time that initial contact was rEade wi th th e

erstwhile cut-off 5th Rangers yenho were in a woorlsalonglheroad

being travelled by the tanks 1 While the armored column was moving

along a messener from the Rangers appeared and asked for vehicles

to evacuate their wounded stating that this was their only need

at the time Colonel RICHlR)SON supplied them with five half-tracks

for this purpose

The artillery interdiction of the road by the enemy continuer

as did the point-blank fire estimated as 75mm However a fog which

carre up shortly after midday reduced visiLility to approximate~ fifty

yampros and rrJ2de the a(~vance much less difficult Just west of ZERF - 3 Company of the 20th Armored Infantry Battalion hooked southeast

to attack OBEH-ZEdF and C Company went northeast to take NIEnER-ZEnF

OBER-ZERF Was captured at 1700 hours with little resistance but

the force ettHckin NIELER-ZERF si~bted six Tiger tanks dnd wiUdrew

While these two actions were taking place the remainder of

Task Force RILEY1s vehicles -- half-tracks of the 54th Armored Infantry

Bampttclicn the tanks and crew of the 21st Tank B2ttalion and two

platoons of B Conpany 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion -- began collecshy

ting on the hi~h ground west of ZEnF Lieutenant Colonel RICHARDSON

assUlred contrDl of all these elerrents JrgClnized them into teams

and hurriedly sent th em out on mi ssions bull One team was to move out

and take the high ~round on either side af OEER-ZEhF another was to

push up and capture NIEDER-ZERF and the hi gh ground around it tb e

trirc team W1S to go into ZERF and seize the hith ground east of the

town 94

The attack on ZEEF jumped off at 18CO but rninefielcs in

front of the town stopped the attack While these were being cleared

a rlatoon of took destroyers moved to comman~in6 ground tpoundJ0 yards

from ZEHF anrl fired 76rrm high explosive shells directly on targets

in the town for a period of ten Ininutes Hhen the fire was lifted

ismounted infantry rroved in on ZERF A Tiger tank was sighted on

the outskirts of the town The bazooka teaw$ fired at it hitting

but not cti sablin~ it The tank withdrew ani ZE1F was cleared by

0100 on the 27th

Task fJrces were reorganizel ann Team it was isr-anded at

ZERF missions were assigned for the drive to the nurth to seize

TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North

Task F)rce RICHAiiDSCN was fi ven the nrl ssivn of blocking

against any possible counterattack at ZEiLF The remaim6r of

Combat Cowmand A moved out of ZERF toward TRIER with Task Force

CHhLBERLtIN leading The Task Force moverl in column wi tt the

infantry from Company A 21st Armored Jnfantry Battalion in

front of and on the flanks of Teams OGRhJY ani SHiillDEAU bull

iit 0200 on the 27th of February d~rect fire was received

from the woods on the left flank The woods were clearerl for a

depth of 1000 yards in a two-hour fifht and the Task Force coiled

in position until dawn The infantry of Captain EISBEhG started

forward at 0545 and immediately ran into a SP 82mm assault gun And

~-- a lark V tank lyin~middot in wait aroun~ a bend in the road The infantry

95

quickly disposed of this arrrvre ambush lnri the Task Force proshy

ceeded forward Cross-country employment of the force was not feasshy

ibie becaUse of the steep heavily wooded hills around which the

road north paSsed Progiess wa~ slow as four pillboxes enroute

as amp11 as a heaiily tlefended troop shelter at SlEINEACK were

stormed and destroyed However as soon as the woods had been

passed Team OIG~ihDY passed through the infantrJr of Captain EISBERG

in order to deploy and move forward across country Beyond

STEINBPCH the tanks ran into a lnineficl~ and two tanks were disabled

Simultaneously heavy c~rtillery an mortar fire was brought down

on the Task Force from e ridge 500 yard s to the front The infantry

dismounted anil de f~l)yerl to rou t the enemy tro OiJS frorr the le it

flank L the ditches and roarl foliae f)r cover and concealment

Any attenpt hcwever to advance beyonc4 the rid~e brought heavy shellinf

from direct fire weapons At 1500 Lieutenant Colonel CHAtBERLAIN

ordered forward r~s attached engineers the 3rd Platoon of

Company A 55th ArmJred Engineer Battalicn to clear the minefield

and thus permit the employment of his tank teams on the flanks of

the German position The minebelt 300 yards in depth was treached

by 0115 on the morning of the 28th and the tanks aeain moved forward

Lieutenant Colonel CIiUBEhLAIN planned to have Te~rr SHADDEAU stay

on the ridge Which dOmilWt the town of PELLINGEN anrj send Team

OGRADY aloni another rinfe 1000 yards to the ri2ht where its guns

could furthel~ assist from the right flank the infantry attack along

~ the road nortb into PELLn~GEN The attack jlffijJer off fit 0500 as

9-6

planned and the infantry worked its wy int~) PELLHiGEN after the

tanks had softened it up with cannon fire The enenw withdrew to

take U l ) positions along the high ground 750 yarcs northwest of

PELLINGEN They were routed from this p)sition by 1015

By 1130 Team EISBEHG har driven the enenw from the hifh

ground along which it was advancin At this point the mi ssion of

Task Force CHh-lBEltLilIN was changed - it was now tu clear KONZshy

KJJ1THAUS and protect the left flank of the 10th Armored Division

drive into TRIER2 Task Force NGIrtIS the reserve of CGA passed

through CHtJBEt1LdN at 1500 and drcve north on Tl1IEii

CCB Starts to Drive on ThIER

In the rreantime Tnsk Force 0 HAl1A followed Task Force

CHAiEEiiLA IN on the rno ve to ZERF from DiSCH on t he morning of the

27th of February and was subjected to the SPJIle type of shelling as

was CGA

The columns were turnin~ north on the road at the corner

west of ZERF when they were fired upon by an 88rrffi gun which the

enemy had zeroed in on the corner Having direct observation on

this corner the 88rrm gun was very effective Here the vehicle

car-ying Lieutenant Colonel ORhRA was hit and the Colonel killed

The mission of CCB was to attack TRIEF using the main road

which ran along a ridge line_

Task Force CHi~~Bamp1LAIN wt-ich preceded OHAliA took the

main route OHhRhs first ~ssion Was to clock on the right by

seizing PASCHJL and Hill 508 then to attack TfaEH on the ridge

road to the right of the zone of anvanc8

97

I

Team DEIEPEJUZ of Task Force OPJJil di smountee along the

roa~ at approximat~ly 1630 an~ moven into PASCHkL without opoosition

Then Team DEVFiLEAUZ attacken Hill 508 am seized it after a short

fire fight from a crew manninampgt a battery of direct fire weapons

158 prisoners were taken on the two ob~ectives und along the roans

leiing to t herr

CCB ordered 1~ajor WARREN B HASKELL Executive Officer of

the 54th Armored Infantry BattaliGI1 t) assume comtr2nd of the Task

Force that nLgtt 4 At 1100 Eajor HASKELL sent Team KAFKALAS to attack

OBEFtSEHR The town was attacked from the high ground to the south

while a platoon of tanks inched up along the road from the southwest

The enemy put up a defense with a battery of 80mm mortars and machine

gun positions errplaceri in the houses Team KAFKALJS closed in on

the town under cover of artillery and tank fire capturing the town

Eighty German soldiers surrendered themselves without much fight

Imnediately after the town was taken at about 1330 the enemy laid

down a barra of artillery and l05mm mortar fire on it from the

northeast and east

It lIas thought that OBEH5EH was the besinning of a switch

line that the Germans were trying to builr1 up as a defense bf TRIER

KAFKAUS pushed out reconnaissance from OBEfiSEHR ann fsurd

a defense tel t of mines covered by observed artillery am machine

gun fire This Lelt ran from just s)uth of PELUNGEN to OLLHITH

over the high grounr north of NEIlERSEHn KiFLLAS dispose1 his

--- infantry under cvver ~nrl went out with his enineer platoon to clear

a way thrcugh the minefield alon the roadway The enemy promptly

98

--

laid doWn heavy fire from machine ~uns a~ registered artillery

with air bursts Hlwever the platoon cleareci 8 pcth through the

minefield but in SJ doing KAFKiLhS and the enzineer platoon leader

were wounded as was 4($ of the platoon Lieutenant COOK then

took corrmand of the team ann pushed throu~~h to make a bridgehead

acrr)ss the minebelt While ching tbis Lieutenant COOK Was wounded

The rdnebelt was finally breached late in the afternom 5

Wi th t1is 0 tstacle cleared the mi ssi on of Task Force HjSKELL

was to m0V8 on to TiiIER Team Lj~NG passed through the minefield and

led what remained 8f the Task Force along the roa~ This route was

under observation and subject t) enemy artillery fire from both

the east and the west The comrr~nders csreed that t~us terrain

confr~nted the armor with one of the most 0ifficult tactical problems

There was not sufficient infantry to push out t the flanks of

the road or to secure the comrranding hill positions The enemy was

fighting with srrC1l1 rear guards manning batteries of antitank

weapons arr mortars which were well situated to take advantage of

the comrranding terrain It was necessary to push straight on keepshy

ing on the alert for the enemy artillery to disclose its positions

so that fire could be brought down on them

The column IIl0ved out along the ridbe line rJurine the late

afternoon and early eveninF )f the 27th Just south of Hill 433

the heamp(l middot)f the column received heavy rtillery fire from tie cast

which kn8cked out 0ne of the tanks an~ several of the half-tracks

Jespite this interruption it continued anrl reached positions

99

opposite Hill 427 at about 2200 where it coiled for the night

This position near Hill 427 was within a hundred yar1s of

a Gernan battery position which had not disclosed itself while

the colwrn was moving in6 The battery was in defilade on too

reverse slops of the hill to the east At 0300 the eneITif opened

fire on the bivouac but from their defilade positions the guns could

n~)t be depressed enough to bring effective fire on the vehicles

ftealizing this the enemy artillerymen set their fuses for air

bursts and these cause0 approximately fi fteen casualties While

the Task F-rce held its fire trying to locate specific targets the

enemy opened up with two machine guns firtng down the road and

launched an infantry attack on the Task Force from the east I~

rifle fire dispersed the infantry anrl two half-tracks trained their

50 caliber fire on the enerey machine gun positims Tlis broke up

the att~ck Tle two leading half-tracks h~jwever did not change

pcsitL1ns after the ccunterattack and had apparently been observed

from enemy positicns on the bigh grounc-1 t-J the northeast As soon

as there was visibility the following morninE2 the Germens opened

fire with 88mms on these half-trecks iestroyim both 7

HASKELL then maneuvered to attack tl-is enemy battery on

Hill 427 B Company 54th Armored Infantry Dattelion circlerj to

the right to get behinrl the hill while two tank destroyers maneuvered

to take the battery from its south flank The enerry guns were

spotted as ttey continued shooting to the west anrl the tank rlestroyers

- brought fire on them

100

The position som surrendered nnn fur 8ampnll anti-tankuns

twelve automatic guns 8nrl approximately thirty prisoners were taken

During the night HASKELL was orr1ered by CCB to continue on

tc TRIEH as scon as possi ble 8 At naybreak on the 28th tre Task Furce

with Team LANG lead in prepared to move out The plan called for

the main1xYiy t) p alcmg the ridge r)ai while teams peeled off to

the ri8ht int FILSCH ann TJRFORST These towns were located on

the east slDpe away froIl the r)ac and coulrl threaten the flank of the

colurrn by fire or counterattack if not blocked Just as the column

began to m~)ve fr)m its niEht positiun it came under direct fire

from the nJrthyest The enemy gun positicns were not definitely loshy

cated but were assumerl to be on the high f~rounrl just east of TRIEh

This fire frOIll a lattery)f 105rnm guns kn~)cked ~ut five hclf-trccks

and an armored car within five minutes The colWIU1 moved out as 600n

as the fire easemiddotj up and early em tbe morning of the 28th the

leading tanks were in FILSCH where a srrall enemy rear guard ~ut

up a short figtt and t heuron surrendered Although the column was

still under artillery fire B Company 54th ArmJred Infantry Battalion

deployed ani mpved out to TARFCJST While the enemy continued

placing heavy flrtillery fire on the attack there was little opposhy

siti~m on the grJunrl b COIT)any captured five 88mm glillS anr took

forty pris)ners on the slopes of the high groiilln east Cif TARFORST

at abcut 1630 )urint this attack Captain 8EVEREAUX and Lieutenant

GLE his executive officer were wvunrlErl by prtillery fire- Task Force HhSKELL had four tanks and five half-tracks in

101

--operation after this action The infantry losses had been he~vy

and the mission to capture TRIEn was not yet accomplisrpoundd HASKELL

used his wiremen extra men from the assault gun platoon and men

froIT the Headquarters Corrpany to act as infantrymen RemnantsJf

C Company B Company and the Heanquarters Detachment formen as

infantry suport under the command of Captain LANG

leanwhile the tanks and vehicles of CCR had crossed at

SAFR3URG on the 27th of Febr~ry and Task Force CHERRY was sent

fJrward on the rif~ht flank of the zone )f advance during the night

of February 28th ~ )arch 1st t) clear to the RUVVER Hiver an cover

the flank9

While this action was taking place around TRIER Task Fjrce

RICHnRDSON (of CCA) which ha1 been blocking abainst possible enemy

counterattacks at ZERF was relieve~ fro~ that mission by the 1st

Battalion 301st Infantry Thereup~n Lieutenant Colonel RICHARDSON

received orders t move (n to TRIER using the valley road through

10 OLEWIG betWeen Task Force HASIELL ani NOR~-US The column moved

from ZERF on thE afternoon of the 1st of 1arch to a crossroar west

of LiliPADEN where it was halted while orders were obtained at the

COlTmand Post of CCB at OBEHSEHR Here RICHAiiDSON was irforrned that

the rest of the lOth Armored Division was attacking TRIER that night

and the lission of Task Force hICHARJjSON was tc get int0 TRIER am

to seize intact if possi ble the twcmiddot brirlges over the KOSELIE River

11in te ci ty Jump-off time was 2200 ~arch 1st

102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered

On the eveniI~ of the 28th of February Team LANG of Task

Force HASKELL (CCE) ha~ move~ out to TRIER Its tanks arlvanced

rDpicly to seize the hill east of the city T~e barracks there were

filled with Allied prisoners and a nwnber of im~ressed laborers

This area was cleared by 1900 and an arrununition dump in the vici-middotmiddot

nity was set afire Li-NG decided to move on into THIEH in a night

attack with the tanks leamiddotiing clown the hill in rder to strike at the

town from the northeast There was little oposition until the

cCllumn hit a roamiddot-lblock just at the ej~~e )f tre town This was

dismantled by hand unier cver of the infantry which was moved

up fr the purp)se In order to maintain surprise demolitions

were not used

At 0400 the colurrn movej n int) TRIER proper The northshy

east section was entirely deserteC1 and hy 0830 a third of the

northern ~art of the city had been cleared

To turn back to CGA -- at 0800 n the morning of larch 1st

the tanks of Teams 0GRk1Y anr SHADDEAU of Task Force CHMfBmLAIN

positioned thems61ves )n the twin ileaics that overlooked KONZ-KARTHAUS

and the eastern banks Jf the L8SELIE River after its junct1ile with

the SfuR After an hours bmlbardment of the town the infantry

of Tear EISBEfiG entered and cleared the tgtWl1 of KONZ-KAitTHAUS The

Task FJrce thereafter protected the left flank without inci0ent

Task Force NJrlRIS meanwhile advanced on TRIE~ from the vicinity

of NEIDERtENNIG It reached the outskirts -Jf the city durinf the

103 bull

--afternon of Farch 1st and halted in place On the 2nd it moved

into TRIER in order to assist rtICHliftDSON in clearing the area

Now let us consider Task Force lUCHAH)SON which moved out

from the cro ssroods west of LAEPAD1N in column at 2200 on the last

of karch Team BILLET was in the lead followect by Team RILEY

anr Headquarters Company The night was clear with amp full moon

and excellent visibility The column shot UjJ to the village of

IhSCH where a rila~~lock consisting of three ullJ18nned German 88nun

uns were encountered The lead tank fired two 75rrm rounds at the

rcadblock and the German garrison in the village immedia tely surshy

rendered The prisoners were used to remove the rJadblock and the

colurrn continued threu6h OLEWIG an on into the city limits of TRIER

A fifteen minute halt GCcurred at the railrJad crossing within the

city limi ts mile a company cf surprisei German infantry am four

anti-tank guns were captured wi thad a round being fired f Evidently

the krnericans haC not been exected in that part of the city so

soon One of tre prisoners taken at tLe railroad crossing had beEn

detailed to notify an enemy demolition party on the far sile of

the bridge of the Arnerican s arrival as soon as they apJeared at

12the railroad crossing His mission remained unaccocplished

Feelinr that if he attacked tho nearer sDuth bri~ge directly

it WGuld in all likelihocc be ilmediately blown Lieutenant Colonel

RICHARDSON decided to attack the n)rthern brictge first Captain

LILLETs team was sent to take that bridge and Lieutenant RILEYs teamshy was to follow ready t cut through thE city and seize the remaining

104

(south) bridge At 0200 BILLET reported his brioge already deshy

molishert Lieutenant Colonel RICHARDSON then sent Team RILEY to

take the south bridge The team tock the avenue along the MOSELLE

River and shortly afterward Lieutenant filLEY reported by radio

to Lieutenant Colonel RICHARDSON Have reacher the bridge Bridge

intact Arr receivin~ small arms fire 13 Lieutenant Colonel RICHAl-tDshy

SON mowd hurriedly to the briltige and directed its seizure frDm

there Lieutenant nILEY I s ten were defenriints aainst srrall arms fire

and had dOne nothing about rlovint to the western side if the briae

50 cnliLer machine gun fire from the Colonels tank was directed onto

the western aJproaches of the span while a platoon of tanks ard

a Vlbon of cismcunteo infantry under Lieutenant FLETCHER crossed

the ~rirte ecpectinr to haVe i t disa~)pear from under them at any

morrent They crossed the bri~ge just in time to seize a German ~ajDr

and five enlistemiddoti men rushinz t)war~ the lJridce with ctetmating caps

and an exploder The Germ~n lraj)r was tirunk

A detail of men cut all the wires leariini to the bridge am

the remaining men and tanks whi c h had cr)ssed frmeC a s118l1 trid geshy

head at its appro8ches The German major worri6d ampbnut the fact

that he had failed in his duty and wishing to conceal that fact from

higher Gerlnan arnw cOllP1onders inforrred his captors toot seventeen

other Gerrrnn ~fficers were havin~ a party down the street The sevenshy

teeuroln were in tra3 house reporteJ abcut 200 yards from the western

entrnnce tl the bridge and were captured without incinent

105

CENTRAL EUROPpound sao 000

o I iiicw __ ~ Ml bull

os- 0

-By 1000 on the 2nlti of Larch Task Forcn RICHARDSON clearing

from the IfJSELLE River through the city had 800 prisoners on hand

wbo had emerged from houses dumbfounded to find American troops

already in the city The Command Post was establisheri in the eary

hours of the morning in the center of the city At the srure tirre a

jJRrty of Germans emerged frJffi a house across the street prepared

to aid in the defense of TRIER and were captured

Task Force RICHARDSON held the EOSELLE River line wi thin the

city limits aOO the bridge it had seized am together with HASKELL

and NORRIS cleared the town in 8 house to house search The reshy

maining elements of the Division were assembled in and around the

city The last r6sistance in TRIER ceased on the 2nd of March

NOTES FOR CI-~PTK XI

1Interview with Lt Ce1 J J hlch2rdsn at Trier 13 l ar 45

21nterview with aj C a King (~iv Historian) at Trier 10 Mar 45

3Interview with knj VJ B Haskell at Trier 13 Mar 45

4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~

9f Cit Maj C il King

l01hmiddotu1d bull

11poundE ill TruER p 17

12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII

SU)lWtY OF SEC OND PHASE

h battle-hardened Division capable of great offensive action

has been described in the chapters of this last phase The 10th

Armcred Division fresh from a rest and rehabilitation period was

corrmitted through the gap created by the 94th ~ivisi on ano through

a deliberately prepampred enerr~ defensive ~osition It was successshy

ful in gaining its initial )bjective at TA~ERN in a relatively short

perigtd of time

Frein that initial objective it fannen aut in team columns

towards the SJ-wR and LuSELLE Ri vers in an attempt to secure brid~e-crossings tef0re they CQuld be blown by the enemy_ This we know

it failed to do and confrontef with a natur~l otstacle to armor in

the SAAR Ri ver the seed of its exjloitation came to a sunnen

helt Her3 it wdted for the establishment of a bridgehead which

was necessary for the movement of the heavy tanks and vehicles of the

Di visi)n

The armored infantry battalions were rlivorced from the

armJr and crossed over the SAJR et a different point The infantry

and vehicles quickly reorgani zed at IRSCH ane pushed on towards ZERF

The capture of TRIEtt followed close on the heels of the capture

of ZERF an~ with the fall of this vital stronghol~ the ene~

released all holds cn the SAAR-~~OSELtE Triangle

- The cOf_trritment )f the 10th Arrr)red Division through the

gap created by the 94th iJivision provided the most favorable type of

107

shyoperation for the errployment of armDr in the offensive For such

~ction to be successful it rrust be executed with speed and violence

anrl in sufficient depth to lIlBintain the momentwr of the attack

This was most successfully accomplished as exemplifierl t~ the actions

of ecl in its nash to the Division ohjective This operation took

only one day even though the objective was in the nortrern tip of

tha Triangle ~fter renetrating the initial enemy positions the

lOth Arrrored Division lost no time in exploiting its success by

exerting constAnt ~)ressure l)n the retreating enemy

Close cordinatin by arm~)r ann infantry is essential This

is pointed up wherE lnck in coordinatim resultemiddotl in rlelay confusion

anrl unnecessary clsualties in Task F)rce HICBlrlSON on the morning

it launcherl its initie13ttBck

Once an armvrer divisiDn has brolcn through the main enemy

defense it must ~~intain the momenturrL of attack in order to exploit

successfully We saw hWl it is possibhl t) Ir3intain this momentum

by havin~ the leading elerrents skirt enemy t)ointsJf resistance

leaving these defGnse islanrls to be taken care of by the follow-up

infantry troops Suer an action was execllted by Teams SHIDDEhU

and HJLEH0USE in their eff)rts to completely break through the

enemy defenses north of SINZ

A Wide latitude in freedom of actiJn sh0uld be allowed an

armored division One mcthv1 vf insuring such latitude with the

resulting flexibility of plans is the assi~nment of mission type- orders Hi 6her headquarters visualizeO the ultimate capture )f

108

TRIEtt from the very beginning of the second offensive in Ue Triangle

aOO thi s objective was kept foremost in its planning throughout the

operation Therefo~e when the 10th Armored Division failed to gain

its bridgehead at OCKFEN the tanks and vehicles were dispatched

south to cross via the 94th Division bridgehearl while the armored

infantry battalious executed a typical infantry river crossing in

the vicinity of CCKFEN This freedom of action within the C0rps zone

enableti the arreor to continue forwarrl Jr)vement when faced with an

unfordable obstacle on its original axis of cdvance Freedom of

action and flexibility pxe prerequisites for successful armored action bullbull

An annored -1ivision is ngtt well suiter for forcing river

cr)ssings Bridging rrust be constructed to transport tanks carriers

and supply vehicles When Team HOLEHOUSE failed to secure the bridges

at j(J~NZEE anti WILTINGEN the armer came t- ariniing halt We have

seen that thi s resulte-4 in a complete chan6G of plans The liroi tatims

of Armor in river cr8ssings have IJng been recJ~nized and are

mentioned afain here f)r emphasis

Reconn~issance units are vital to an armored division for

~ t t ~ dscreemIli ml1nClnlng con ac and pr)Vl Insect an econoIIY force The

90th Cavalry Recnunaissance Squadrm formed and maintained an effect-

i ve c ounter-rec JLnais sence Sl-reen between SJJRBURG and riERTERT The

screen also Jrovided contact between the three combat commands

When the 90th Cevalry 3econnai ssance Squariron relieved elements of

CCA at TAWERN the initial Division obje~tive it provi~ed economy-of force by releasing the armor f)r another IrissLm

109

Detampiled planning is a most essential element of any operashy

tion The failure of the engineer assault boats to arrive at the

OCKFEN crossing site in time for the initial river crossing may

hampve ~elayed the capture of TRIER ~y days The delay gave the enerey

valuable tim~ to shift his forces in order to man nefensive

pcsitiJns for meeting the crossing Plans must be made in advance

which Will provide tor continuous support

Combat teals shjul~ be organized within the division

enerally in battamplicn sized units to provide a balanced fighting

force Tanks infantry ann engineers shoulrl f)rm the core of these

tea~s When Tea~m HOLEHOUSE of CCA encountered the minefield just

east of AYL the engineers who clearer tbe rQa were an essential

element of the team Again the enrineers were necessary in breaching

the concrete l)illt )xes which the arrrored infcmtry battalions enshy

countered while rovin~ sJuth from CCKFEN to IaSCH Tanks ani

infantry cmtinu~l1y -Jrronstrated their aLUity to perfurm as a team

in )vercomin o~st~middot~3 w ich might have sbl~pe( either an all-tank

or allinflntry ferce

Flexi1 j~y elf plans must be kept foremgtst in the minds of

comrampnders of all 8(h-ons The chame of the status of the attack

of the 10th Armor3cl Di-i sion at CCKFiN from a main tJ a secondary

attack is an excellent example At the moment this became apparent

all efforts were c)ncentratcd in the 94th ~ivisim area to secure

a bridgehead across the SAAR Comlr3nrlers nust be ready an~ able to

- change their plclDs as well as tbe dispositLm Jf tactical troops

under their command in order to take immediate advantage of any enemy

weakneea as soon as that weakneww becomes ap)arent

110

The reduction of fortified areas requires detailed plans

and close cooperation between all oambatarms If at all possible

a rehearsal of such an attack should be held on terrain similar

to the actual position The training for an attack of a fortified

area by the 10th Armored Division while in the vicinity of llETZ

proved extremely helpful to the armor~ infantry battalions when

faced with the reduction of eleven pillboxes between OCKFEN and

IRSCH The success of this operation can be ~irectly attributed

to the previous training which prescribed team formations detailed

attack plans an~ cooperation and coordinati~n between all commanders

and their units

stress rllst continue to be made on the prompt and timely

reporting of all information of an intelligence nature The armored

infantry battalions knew the exact location of ten out of the eleven

pillboxes between C(~~~FEN and IRSCH This information proved to be

of the utmost impo~~r~e oin the successful reduction of these

fortifications

The SlltCCSSS of the capture of ZERF by elements of the 10th

Armored Division C~~11 te 8ttributed to coordination and control

exercised through th2 Jltple means of communication available

to an arrlored diri slc n Here agrJin coordination ann teamwork were

displayed betwtlen infGntry and arrror Due to the limitation of

the tanks and the characteristics of the terrain it was necessary

to employ tbeir fire ef~emiddotti rely shy

The ca~ture )f tactical objectives requires detailed planning

III

--initiative and aggressiveness m the part of leaders of all

echelons This was demonstrated in the majority of actions of

the 10th Armored Division However a laxity of these charactershy

istics was noted during certain phases of the operation on the

part of sorre subordinate leaders This was true in the capture

of tho south bridge over the LOSELLE River in the City of TRIER

If it had nJt been for the timely arrival at the south bridge of

Lieutenant Colonel lUCHIlliDSON it is entirtl1y possible that the

bridge wuld have been blown which might have resulted in a

delay of days in the reiucti0n of TtUErt and waul hnve consequently

resulted in additional casualties and loss of equipment to our

forces This exerp1ifies the fact that the comnander of a force

must be well furwarri ana must render personal su~ervision at

critiasl points during combat bull

-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll

The actions of the 10th Armored Di vision described and

analyzed in this report were typical of armored employment in the

European Theater during World War II Some mistakes of course

were made In large part however those mistakes which were of

a tactical nature can be attributed to faulty tank doctrine as it

existed before and during the early years )1 the War Other

mistakes caused by command decisLms ann orders Vl6re primarily

due it is believerl to the so-calleri t fog of war Which is inshy

finitely more apparent on the battlefield than in the classroom -- On the whole the Division was well-employed under the

existing circumstances It f)Ught well Viith the advantage

of hindsigbtit becomes quite clear that the Division fought

better and was outstandingly more successful when it was

employed in accordance with present day principles of armored

warfare

Foremost among these now-accepted principles is that of

attacking in column of battalion teams when the enemy is still in

a position to resist in strength Had this )rinciple been applied

in the November-)ecember operation had the Division been given

the one objective of taking 11ETZIG rather than the two widely sepashy

rated objectives which it was assigned it is quite within the

~- realm of possibility that the SAAR could have been crossed in late

Novemler Thi s in turn ndght have allowed the capture of TRIER

113

-- at that time And the capture of TRIER woulri certainly have made

the German ARDENNES campaign almost impossibl e to mount

Other principles as they are presently stated were or

were not adhered to by the Division during this campaign with

resultant success or failure as discussed in the summaries

following both phases of this report

Since both operations involved river crossings it is

worth while to note that armor is best employed in such a si tuation

when it is committed after the bridgehead has been established an

secured by infantry elements Nhen this procedure is followed

the armored unit wastes none of its momentum on fighting to reach

a 90sition from where it can launch a decisive attack on objectives

deep in the enemy rear

It cannot be too highly emphasized or often enough repeated

that commanders and their units ~ remain flexible in all respects

Commanders ~ be able to change t)revious )lans as conditions

change and fresh oportunities ~re gained or lost Units must-be capable of reorganization to meet changiniS situations of the

en~ terrain and weather and troops available The characteri shy

stic of the combat command in this respect is admirable The

10th Annored Division retained its flexibility to a high degree

and much of its success can be attributed to this factor

Lastly it is vital to all cOIlmanders and staff officers

but especially to those of armored units where time and space calshy

~ cUlations are fore-shortened that operations be carefully planned

114

then violently executecl Artnor is 11 ttle retter than infantry if

its attack is launched in a haphazard manner or if it moves in

a hesitant fashion To achieve the maximum from its inherent

characteristics it must seem virtually to explode on the enemy

when the opportunity tG do so exists This ty)e action is an

impossihility if it has not been most carefully planned in all

respects The attack of our ~ivisiun which started its

February operation is a prime exal11tJle In a sineuro~le day it peneshy

trated to the extrerre north portion of the Triangle proper

This cOIDrrttee as a result of its research ia unanimous

in holding the following beliefs

1 That the principles of armored employment as they ~ -- are set forth in ~ 17-100 are sound

2 That there is nnw and will continue to be in

the foreseeable future a ~efinite need for the armored division

in the U S Arrry

3 That the current organization of the annored

di vi sion is basically suitable for present-day warfare

-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman

) 1 J CANTEY M~jor FA

t

c J R PEYTON kaJor CaY

C C EDM~DSON i~ajor Cav

J C NOEL Jr t aj or Inf-h E DREWS tajor Cav

H J CiiOUCH capt Inf

J B STOCKTON C2pt Cav

116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS

II - TErut~IN NALYSIS

III - ORDER OF BATTLE

IV - OPERA nONS ORDERS

V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy

A ~ PEN D I X II-TEllliP IN lUltLYS rs IjIr TFE S~ RMOSFLtE TRTAN(LE

(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)

The SJAH-~OOELLE Trifgtngle is the npme whioh for uurnoses

of military expedlenoy ~s bepn given t~ the strip of Germpny

lying betwpen the S~R ~nd MOSFLLE Rivers The poex is thp oonshy

fluenoe of th- twn rivers bolt thrall mile8 southwest If the oity

of TRIER The western leg is the MOSFoLLE end the epstern leg is

the SMR The bfse is formed by the sOtthern flAnk of e mountpinshy

aus ridge running etlst from SIERCK on the MOSFoLLE to MERZIG on the

SAAR

Geologioplly the arae oomprise the northern extremity of

shy ~ LOHRrnTE Plr-te9u elthouyh its tprrllin more neprly resembles

Ghe rugged oountry of the EIFEL end thE l111NSHUCK tl) the north end

northetlst

The Triftngle is approximat~ly nineteen miles lon~ from bpse

to apex end ten miles wide et its ~se

The terrtin is dominated by lnng ridgfl whioh runs northp

nd south tlnd biseot thp Trbngle THs rtdge repohes its highest

elVftion (436 mpter) t KARR~N p point bout hplrwy Along lts

length

The flnks of thie dominlting rtdpe rise grldully frOJn the

two rivers wtth shoulders initilly rl)ur-h tnd wooded but bp-ooming

relntively open ~nd smooth ps the orest is poprOPched

-iii

The ridge is deeply cut by llUIUerous short streams

Two excellent roads run the length of the Triangleparallel

to and nanking the crest of the ridge In ganef-aI however the

road network within the Triangle is restricted by difficult terrain~

The area is dotted by numerous small well-kept farms and

forest area s

The terrain east of the SMH lliver from MERZIG to TRIER is

also dominated by a long ridge which runs north and south parallel

to the river at about five miles distance

ilie ridge reaches its highest point (510 meters) at Hill 508

one mile west of LtJAhDEN a point about halfway along its length

One excellent road runs the length of the ridge and follows its

crest In general however the road network in the area is also

stricted

This strip of terrain is practically a reproduction of that

just discussed within the Triangle but on a larger scale The ridge

is higher by approximately 100 meters Ihe streams are longer and

more numerous and the wooded areas are larger in size and density

ilie primary roads are excellent two-lane macadam highways

while the secondary roads are not so wide and are of gravel conshy

struction All were in need of repair during the winter of 1944-45

he wooded areas are not serious obstacles to armor as they

are usually small enough to b() skirted FlPd by-passed

During rainy weather the two rivers and small stroams rise

rapidly and the sandy loam of the top soil becomes soft and spongy

iv

p ttIJj~ilA t1 111 Jie lowllnds nd IttElTm hadsmiddot Fowelf3r the ~ ren in

generl will support rrmor eXde~~ in ~ fe~ smhll ~rp~s during very

wet w~ther

The two rivers re not for~ble ndtheir bnks pre stef3p

with thp comm~ndtng ground ~lwpys on the e~stt or cnpmy side of

both strems

The SAJR ve~ges bout o~e hundred find twenty meters wide

whi1e the MOOELLE is rpproxiMltply twice this width Currnts of

Nltur~ o~rved the SPAR_M0SFLLE Trifgtnpolp nd thp rAP oining

it to the e1st hrto ntu~l )bstof to ff~nsivf mllitry of)prshy

ns The Enemy oompl(t-fd thr- job ()pound dfvploping this roo into

lpnd fortrEss by building ernt1nuous line of fortificr-tions cross

the brse rnd long th~ G~n side of the two rivers

v

JcJV

bull

SAA~ - NfJS1116 7J1fIAN L~ _ vi)

7kRRAINSruDY

S c E - IO~OO I 0 I l

M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull

zJlPIENOrX III - P Y

TEE WEST WPLL JlND SWITCH LINE FORTIFICATIONS

Hitler set the Third Reich to building In impregnpble

wnl1 p10ng the western border of Germ~ny in 1936 At thrt time

only the fortifiC1tions repchlng fr1m the MOOELLE south nd epst

to the ruHNE were cllled the VVelit WRll but in 1938 tho nnme

w~s extended to include the entire system of fortifictions nd

boctlme known AS the ItS IEGFRIED Line The wpll strted t

point n9fr MUENCHEN-CLA DID CF t the s outhPf st cornfr of the

NptherVnds 1nd ext~nded south through th~PjI CPEN snctor where

Jlte defoonses warp doubled tt) block ny dvnce ntt) th COLOGNE

100pPd to th~ erst bok of the SflPR wh i oh t t followed to r point

north(~st ot FORBCH It then turrlFld grdully st until it rprched

the RHINE in the vicinity of KJlRLSRUlIE From herp it followed

o1ong the GelWln bnk of the HIINE to BASEL rt the Swiss frontier

A serios of extensions werp p1nned in 1939 nd 1910 but

none were construoted exce1t the Switch Line cross thp bfgtse of

the SAAR-MOSELLE TriAngle

Due to the ~ptd ~11 of Frnce the Gprm~n def~nsps were

moved west to the chrnne1 nd the West 1pound111 w~s neglFcted until

August 1944 At this time Allericrn IIrInor W8 rcing cross

Fr1nce tOWJrd the Germlln bordfr so on August 20 1944 Fit1er

vi

issued a decree tor a levy of people sn labor to put th e tort itications in repair Con(retej It~e1j niahhinErY and manpower

were all in short supply but by December the ~vest Wall and

Switch Line had been strengthened in those areas where the

lJlies had not already made a penetration

lh etrategic impgtrtance attributed by the Germans to

the SAAH-UOSWE Triangle can be een by the fact tha t in 1939

and 1940 when the SIIDFnIED line was cltnpleted they saw fit to

build across the base of the Triangle a switch line to the main

5AM1 River fortifications hoping thereby to bar access to the

high gr0und overlo~king TRIER This switch line was buUt in

- lccorciance with the same tactical cbctrine vhich had eli ctated

the construction of the SrEnOOED Une properl The Germans wanted

a continuvus line of obstacles constructed in such depth t-at the

enany who succeeded in breaking through w(luld have so exhausted

himself in the attempt that mobile counter-attacking forces held

cmstantly in reserve behind the fortified line would be able to

make short Wvrk of him

lhe Switoh Line approximately two kilmetors in depth

was composed of pillboxes dragons teeth ana anti-tank ditches

and was Erected along the first natural barrier inside the German

border Its construction was based m the sound milltary prinshy

ciple of increasing the defensive potential of the terrain where

__ the natural barrier was weakest there the pillbox concentration

was strongest JutuRlly supporting clusters of two or three

vii

pillboxes linked by conmunitetion ttenches were placed wherever

the terrain indicated a ~tt~ble use of machine guns or antishy

tank weaX)ns Interlocking fire botween cluste~s was ought so

that a contjnuous line of fire might be achieved The individual

concrete installations were similiar in construction to the pillshy

boxes of the main SIEGFHIED Line As a rule their horizontal

dimensions were 20 to 30 feet by 40 to 50 feet and their overall

height only hal of Wlich protruded above ground was from 20 to

25 feet he walls were from four to six feet thick Fields of

fire from individual gun ports were limited never exceeding a

5O-degrce arc From the beginning however it was intended that

-the installations should be defended from the outside Consequentshy

Ly while each shelter contained living quarters for personnel

the actual defense was conducted from the field fortifications

built at a distance of from 10 to 20 yards in front of the shelter

and only as a last resort from the firing ports of tOO builc1ing

itself

Camouflage originally good had been so improved by four

years accumulation of turf and undergrowth that only with the

greatest difficulty was it possiblo to detect the presence of

many of the pillboxes Every intelligence agency and particularly

photo recormaissancc had to be exploited to the fullest in order

to provide a complete and accurate picture )f these defenses

It will be seen then that although its builders were

nable to anticipate and provide against the vastly increased

viii

effeotfvFness th~t fi~yp~rs of ~r hd brought to the weppons

of 8 modern amy the S~itoh Line guerding the SAAR1WSELLE

Triangle W$s~ like the main STEGF~IED Linebullbull defensive berrier

of the most fonnideble sort~ ~nd one which txpd the strength

end ingenuity of the etteoker to the utmost

-

1x

webull AUJpound~ Od~q ~ BArnpound

lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI

~ AImiddotJ pound-f ~ ~

j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I

4--ut shyAlU6D aez OF JlArrLE

S~ INS

Uepound111 A Ie twOSP

(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)

TROOP LIST-10TH US ARMORED DIVISION

HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I

ISO or AC~~I1D RQ C- LlSICCO 10 AOIV

I HQeuroH(CD HQ ~4Cd

CC4 CCa -f T I I I

311D 11TH ~T p~~ 20TH 5(TI( ~STTKJN TK~ T(~ 1113 AlB AI

I I 9tJT0 c ~5TI(1 ~tB 2DrNmiddot 1~Jv7it s pound1161lt ~FA fll[3 AFIIJ

U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU

ItL~I- - shy __ -llMNOI

I I 132 D 8OndOlfJ3 EP8If

ATTACHED- 60~TD BN 7 ~ A II AtY-j3N Co C BlsT eM MIIT1f 3N (IO-Z1 NtJtH)

APPENDIX lV

1 xx Corps FO i2j 3 ~or 44

2 XX Corps Opns Instns 133 141130 Nov 44

3 XI Corps FO 13 220400 Nov 44

4 XX Corps FO 16 191000 Feb 45

5 XX Corps FO ill 21100 Fe~ 45

x

---FIELD DnnER NUMBER TWELVE

flO XX CORPS 3 Nov 44

APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12

MAPS 1100000 Mllp I)f FRANCE

1 Q Annex 1 -- Int

b (1) Third tTS Army resumes offensive on D-~y ~t H-Hour to seize the DARM8TADT-FHANKFURT eree

( 2) (9) XII Corps etks on the right (S) f1 of XX Corps to seize thpt portion of Army obj within its Z pnd to essist XX Corps to iso1te And destroy the METZ gprrison

- (b) 60 Inf Di~ (XII Corps) Atks to cross SEnlE RAnd seile FftULOUEMONT (FPLKENBERG) (Q170496)

(0) -6 Prmd Oiv (XII Corps) p~sses through brhd of 80 Inf Oiv to tk FPULOUEMONT

(3) III Corps conopntrptes vic ETA IN

(4) XIX TflC sup~orts tk of XX Corps (See Annex 3 -Air SUDlOrt)

2 XX Corps ~tks I)n D-Dry to enoirole ~nd dpstroy thr g~rrison of

METZ fortified rep nd to seit brhd over th SfIR R vic SAARshy

BURG To reconnoiter ln fl)rc p to seize crossings over tho SAAR H

intpot Prp~r~d to resume the ~tk to the NE

Trs Annex 2 Tr List

D-Dny To be tlnnounced

FOrtnF1tion bdries pnd obj Opns Over1t1y

LO Existing Line of con

o 5 Inf Di v (Reinf --Annox 2) bull bull

(1) On Corps 0 ntk to seize high ground (overlAY) making

mAin effort on right (8) f1 (overl~y)

xi

(2) In coordination with 90 lnf Div make vigorous demonshystration of cro ssing MosmLE R vic UCK1NGE commencing at 1500 hours on D-Day md continuing for a ~In of fifteEn hours Trs will crgtss the MOSELLE R during this demonstration Demonstration will build up and not be permitted to taper off until time of cessation

I

(3) In cgtnjunction with demonstration vic UCKANGE reduce en pocket E of MJZIEliES to the ilOSELLE R both efforts to be coordinated as to create the iAdlcati~n of a major atk

(4) Vigorously contain en within Z Maintain constant pressure on en and rapidly follow-up any en lrlthshydrawal

(5) On ()rps 0 atk and seize the city of METZ

(6) Be prepared on Corps 0 to assist 5 Inf Div in proshytection of brs over IDSELLE R with one In Bn Mtz from 95 lnf Div transpJrtation

c 90 Inf Div (reinf - Annex 2)

(1) Under cover of darkness nt of DD-l pass trough TF POLK and cross MOSELLE R in vic of KOENIGSli1CHID (overshylay) c(wrdinating with 95 Inf Div demonstration vic UCIUNGE

(2) Seize high ground (overlay) making main effort on left (E) fi

(3) On Corps 0 pass 10 Armd Div 83 Inf Div (- 1 Rcr) and 3 Cay Gr (reinf) (ill 0 listed) ttJrough brhd over MOSElLE R

(4) Within Z prevent en withdrawal from ~~Z area and in conjunction with 10 rmd Div prevent en roinf of the MElZ garrison

(5) Establish and maintain con with 5 Inf Div 10 rmd Div and 83 Inf Div

d 10 Armd 01 (rein -- Annex 2) (initially less Div Arty)

(1) Upon r~lief in Z cntaining en brhd by 95 10pound Div move tP initial assembly area vic of IfmS-la-TOUfi (overlay) Displace to forward assembly area (to be designated) 1)ll Corps O

(2) On ()jrps 0 at k through 90 Inf Di v Brhd to seize high gfound (overlay) making main effort on lett (B) fl

(3) (a) Upon passage through 90 In Div Brhd reconnoiter to SAR R with one C Comf to seize intact crossshying over R fram MERZIGvQ20593S) (Incl) to the S

Priorities of Reconnaissance

l MiRZIG area

2 P~CHTEN (vQ24584S) -- DILLIGm (vQ2758)8) area

3 S1JUfLl~UTmN (vQ285800) area

(b) fny brs seized intact will be protected and held at all ltDsts

(4) Prevent en rein of METZ garrison from the E or NE and in conj1lIlction with 90 Inf Div prevent en withshydrawl from METZ area

(5) Establish and maintain ron with 90 Inf Div 83 In Div and elms 0 f XII Corps

(6) Protect E fl of Crops

e 83 Inf Div

(1) With 1 ROT cJntinue protect LUXFtUQURG and contain en in N of Z Div (-1 nCT) initially remain resent positions oomentrating with maximum secrecy in areas to be designated on Corps O

(2) TF POLK (3 Cav Or reinf~ atchd 83 In Div on Qnrps 0 t) relieve 330 Inf hegt containing Vi bank of MOSELLE R

(3) On (sups 0 pass elrls of Crops thNUgh SAARBUIG brhd ss directed

f XX wlrPs Arty (Jnnex 2 - TrList)

(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp

Gon support Z 90 Inf Jiv initially- flemf 10 rmd Div when Div crosses MOSELLE H

nil

(b) 40 FA Gp Reint 90 Int DIv

(0) 195 FA Goo GEn BUtlOort Z 90 Int D1v nd 10 hmd Div

( d) 193 F Gp Rpint 95 Inf Div

(e) III Cor~s Arty B~amp

(1) 203 FJ G-p Gen Support Z 5 Int Div

(2) 204 FA Gp Reint 5 Int Div

(t) lOth Armd Div Arty Gen supnort Z 90 Int Div under Corps oontrol initiplly Revert to 10 Armd Div prior to Div crossing MOOELLE R

(g) 4 TD Gp (Annex 2 -Tr List) Gen 8UpO(rt Z 90 Int Div

(h) Arty fire p1~n8 will be plpnned nd ooordin~t~d with Div Arty Comdrs by Cors Arty Comdr

(2) Annex 4 - FA

g XX Cors Engrs (Annex 2 - Tr List)

(1) () 1139 Engr 0 G Dir~ot SUOT)ort R croSlings pnd ess~ult o~n8 90 Int Div 10 Armd Div nd 8S Inf Div

(b) 1103 Engr 0 Gn Dir~et BUtIOort 5 Inf Div

(2) Annex 5 - Engrs

h 3 Cay Gp (TF POLK) (Annex 2 - T~ List)

(1) Contnin en in Z spcuring LD ot 90 Int Div

(2) Upon fssult crossing of 90 Int Div fssemb1e vic EVRANGE (vP8S501S) Atchd to 83 Inf Div on Cor-ps O-

xivshy

-x (1) Primary mission of all trs is the destruction or capshy

ture ot the METZ garrison without the investitu~e of siege ot the l4ElZ Forts All leaders are responsible for maint of aggressive mb1 attitude within their comds

lift er reaching their objs all units XX Corps to be prepared for oftensive action tig the NE or E

Attct ieaching their objs all in divs (except 83 Inf Div) to be prepared to furnish one mtz nCT tor atcbnt to the 10 rmd Div I on Corpamp 0

Utmost secrecy will be lOterted prior to resumption of ems to prevent en knowledge of change in Crops disshyposition or intentions

Local bomb line to be fumished by units requesting bull close air support

(6) Upon con with GerlMn ciVilians non-fraternization policy to be rigidly enforced ~ civUians will be

~ peJDlitted to interfere with military ppns Passage of lines will be strictly prohibited to all civilians

(7) In Divs to thoroughly mop up areas through which they pass

4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com

xx Corps -JfBNY (vU650635) itfiYEIZ (vU700925) - MONVILLE (vU860055) -SAU1J3URG (wlJ4013Q)

95 In Div -MOnDVRE GrUNDE (vU770737) - to be reported

90 Inf Div - ZOUFFIDm (vU838970) -- BOCKJNGE (vqQ45720)

5 Int Div -- VILLms-sous-pnENY (vU730398) - LOUVIGNY (vU865415) bull

10 rmd Div - MARS-1a-lOOO (vU6501tO) - Fr1l[STROFF-- (wC87765)

83 Inr ni - OONNEVOIE (vP850111) -- WiilBUHG (wL140130)

c CPs

xx Corps -- JhRNY (vU650635) 95Inf Div -- WYEJVRE GRANDE (vU77CJ737) 90 In Div -- ZOUFFroaJ (vU838970) 5 Inf Div - VILLER5-SOUS-PRENY (vU730398) 10 Jrmd Div - R5-1a-TOUR (vU650570) 83 In Div -- BONNEVOIE (vP850111)

d Rad Transmissions

(1) A Units Vi ofi4OSElLE transmit only when opnl necessity exists

(2) 5-In Div and 95 In Div Normal

(3) 90 In Div Rad silence Wvf MOSELLE transmissions E of MOSELLE hald to necessary minimum

(4) 10 hrmd Div lh~n relieved by 95 In Div rad silence VI of MOSEUE transmissions E of MOSELLE held to necessary mininlum

(5) 83 Inf Div Rad silence tor unitsW of MOSELLE not in con lift silenceE of R on en con or Curps O

(6) Corps trs Had silence except CaY and Arty units remaining in old positions Lift silence on en con or Crops O

(7) No Adm traffic to interfere with tactical net opn

e Special Attention to Sig Security

WALKER CG

COLLIm cis

OPEriATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NlntBFll THIRTY-IHRB

HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY

141130 Nov 44 TO CG 5 Inf Div

CG 10 lrmd Di v CG 90 Int Div CG 95 Int Oiv 00 3 Oav Gp CO 1139 Fllgr 0 Gp ~onfirming Oral and FraBJDentary Orders)

1 BOUNDJRY New bd between 90 and 95 Inf Div per Opns Instr No 32 HQ XX Corps 13 Nov 44 is effective at time 10 lrmd Div initiates crossing over the llUONVIlLE br

2 95 Inf Div

~_ a Within new bd atk S in oonjunction with 90 Inf Div to clear the E bank of the MOSELLE fi

b J Maintain con with 90 Int Div on left (E) flank

3 90 Int Div

a Pass 3 Oav Gp (reint) and 10 Armd Div thru brhd as soon as practicable

(1) 3 OaV Gp (reinf) via 01TTENOM br

(2) 10 kmd Di v via THIONVILLE br

b Priority of movement in 1rhd

(1) one Sq of 3 Cav Gp (reinf)

(2) 10 Annd Div

(3) Balance of 3 Cav Gp (reinf)

(4) it 10 rmd Div is delayed in crossing lHIONVIUE br additional elms ~f 3 Cav Gp may be passed over CNrIENOW br until such time as continuation of Cav movement might 1Oterfere with movement of 10 rmd Div

~

shyc In atk to Div obj maintain con with 95 Inf Div on right

flank

4 10 Armd Div

a Cross MOSELLE R via THIOOVlUE as soob as br is open

b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)

a Cross one sq via CAJTENOY br as soon as possible and reshylieve elms of 90 Int Div In left (S) flank of brhd

b Balance of force tr epared to ltrOss MOSELLE R as soon as pr~cticable (see par 3b above)

c Upm completion cro-ssing execute mission per Opn Instr No 32 HQ XX Corps 13 Nov 44

6 IHIOWIIa br

a Initially under XX Corps control until passage of 10 lrmd Div

b After passage of 10 Armd Di v on C0rps OJ control passes to 90 Inf Div

c Elms of 95 Inf Div E of MOSELLE H will be supplied over raquolIONVILLE Br

7 Troop issignments

Unit Relieved From Attchd to 241 FA Bn 135 Engr C Bn

90 Inf Div 1139 Engr C Gp

3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp

614 10 Bn (Estimllted ~rrival 19 Nov) 95 Inf Div

WJLKEn CG

OFFICIIl OOILIER SDIJlR cis

G-3

--

shyFIELD OUDgt WAInER THlRTEllN

HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44

Mapsl 1100000 Map of FF~CE Opns Overlay

1 a IInnex 1 - Int

b (1) XII Curps (Third US llny) continues atk to the NE

(2) VIII Corps (First US frmyl remains in present position

(3) nx TAC supports atk of the XX Corps and cO)rdinates preplanned med bomb support wi th 9th Air Force

2 XX Corps atks on CJrps 0 to destroy en within Z W of the SAR R and cross the SitJR R preparec~ to exploit penetrlltions of Z and resune the atk to the NE

ForWttion Divs abreast (overlay)

LD Eldsting frmt lines

Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div

(1) tk NE in Z lDpoundIldng main effort on left (N) tlank to destroy en within Z and seize crossings ot the SJAR R between SMRLAUTERN (wQ285800) and PM1ITEN (wQ256850) (both incl)

(2) Establish brhd in crossing 8rea and expand brhd to the N uncovering REHLINGEN (wQ240874) to tacilitate bridging opns 90 Inf Iiiv

(3) Maintain cmtact with m Coxps on the S

90 Inf Div (-ReT 358)

(1) 1tk NE in Z making main effort on right (S) flank to destry en Vi m the SAIJt R

dx

(2) hssist crussing oIns of the s~ R by the 95 In Div with maximum fire support

(3) On Corps 0 br SJhR R within Z in brhd estaQliahed by 95 Inf Div

c 10 irmd Di v (ROT 358 atChd~

(1) Continue atk NE to seize crmiddot)ssing of the SAR R vic of SAARBURG and MERZIG destroying en VI of SAAR R m~

(2) Protecting brhd over SAAR R with minimum necessary force atk SE (on Crops 0) to seize area PRIMSTAL (wL450050) -- BUEElLER (wL4l5075) - WADmN (lIL390050) - NUNKIRCHEN (wQ350988) - NIEDERHOFEN (wQ430000)

(3) PrepartuL to exploit between SAAR R and div obj on Corps O

d 5 Inf Div

(1) Contain isolated en installations in ~Z area with not to eXceet one RCT (remf)

(2) 5 Inf Div (-1 RCT) prepare plans to

(a) Atk in any portion of Corps Z on six hrs notice

(b) Destroy en in Z W of SAAR R and maintain con with XII Corps on th e S

(0) Br SAlR R within Z to contmue attack to NE

e 3 Cav Gp

(1) Protect N flank of Chrne

(2) Maintain con with VIII CoIpS on N

f IXCorps Arty supports the Corps ~tk

(1) Btry A 7 FA Obsn Bn Support Z 10 Armd Di v

(2) 5 FJ Gp Reinf 10 Armd Div

(3) 40 FA Gp Reinf 90 Inf Di v bull

(4) 195 FA Gp Gen Support Z 10 Jrmd Div

( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)

7 Fii Obsn Brl ( t Btry) A Btry 286 FA Obsn Ell Support Z 90 and 95 In gtivs

(b) 193 FA Gp Rein 95 Inf Div

(c) 203 FA Gp Gen support 90 and 95 In Divs

(d) 204 FA Gp Gen support 90 and 95 Inf Divs

(6) 5 Inf Div Arty ()t Gen support 95 Inf Div

(7) en XX Corps Arty will coordinate fire plans and posn areas of arty with the corps

g XX Corps Engr

(l) 1103 Engr G Gp Driect support Ri ver Crossing Opos of 95 In Div including Cons two (2) class 40 brs over S1tampR R in vic SJJRLiiUTERN (Q2SB05) - ENSOORF laquo(305790)

(2) 1139 Fngr G Gp Direct support Opos 90 Inf Div and 10 middotArmd Div including cons of M-2 Tdwy Br over SAAR R in Z of 10 Armd Div

h 4 TD Gpamp Gen sUPlXlrt 95 Inf Div

i 112 AAA Go

(1) Protect orossings over defiles

(2) Protect CJrpa hrty

(3) Be prepared on Corps 0 to furnish direct fire on Siegfried Line SnplacemEnts with elms of 119 A1gtA G Bn

j (1) Units requesting close air support furnish local at with request for mission

(2) Upon completion of mission all units prepared for further offensive action to the E or NE

(3) Non-fraternization policy and strict control of civshyilians to prevent interference with military opns will be rigidly enforced

Ij See Adm 0 No 10 with Changes 1 and 2

5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b

XX Corps - THOINVILLE (vU850865) DILLINGEN (~70840) 90 In Div -- VECKFUNG (wQ01l830) -OBERESCH (wO~2B93h 95 In Div - roRNY (vQ8lt18578) - OOtJUY-MOSELLE (wQ09865S) - BRETTNAai (wQl49739) - SAARLUTllRN (wQ285800) 10 Armd Div - kPACH (wQ012965) - SAARFlJRG (wIU40130) - NlTNlURQiEN (wQ370995)

c CPs

XX Corps - IHIONVILLE (vU860865) 90 In Di v - VECKRING (wQOll830) 95 In Div - roRNY (vU898578) 10 Armd Div --APtCH (vQ012965) 5 In Di v -- to be reported

-- d Radio Security NOlfDal

WALIcm CG

OFFICIAL COIJIER SNYDffi cis

G-3

FIELD ORDm NUMBER SIxrEEN

HQ XX CORPS APO 340 -- US h~

191000 Feb 45

FO 16

Maps 1100000 Map of FRJNCE OP1s Overlay

1 a See current G-2 Periodic Rpts and Publications

b (1) nlird US Army continues aggressive defense maintaining pressure generally twoard the E over entire front

(2) XII Cor-ps Third US hrmy continues atk to the N and E to secure PRUM R line and prepared to seize BITBURG

(3) XV Corps Seventh US Jrrmy continues aggressive deshyfense generally along SAAR R line

(4) XIX TAC provides air cooperation for atk of XX Corps

2 n OORPS

a AtkB 19 Feb to clear SAAR~OSELLE triangle seize intact crossirig~ ~1er SAAR R atWILTINGm~ (wL17l8) and KANZEM (wL16l9) prepared to eontinue atk NE on ArmyO

b Continues to defend along SAAR Rand SAARLAUTERN Brhd

c Protects right flank of nlird US Army

d Formation Bds LD Objs -- (see overlay) Trs -Annex 1 Tr List

3 a 94th Inf Div (Reinf)

(1) Continue present atk bO seize inition Obj (see overlay) and clear OORG-MUNZINGEN Hwy

(2) After Seizing initial Obj atk without delay to seize final Obj (see overlay)

(3) Pass 10 Irfld Div through Trs presently in 10 Armd Div Z on Corps O

(4) Maintain Con with 3 CaY Gp to right (9) flank and 10 hrmd Di v to 1eft (ml) flan14

(5) Be prepared to atch one R6T and one Co 81 Qnl liiort Bn to 10 Armd Div

b 26 Inf Div (Reinf) bull

(1) lggressive1y defend ShAR R in Z and SAAHLAUTJi1gtN Brhd

(2) Maintain Con with XV Corps to the right ( S) flank and 3 Cay Gp to the lett (N) flank

(3) 3 Bn 101 Regt (Mtz) designated as Co rps Res

c 10 llrmd Div (Reinf)

(1) Pass through 94 Inf Div on Corps 0 and atk NE to seize initial and final Objs

(2) Make every effort to seize intact Bra at WILTENGEN (wL17l8) and KANZEM (wLl619) and established Brhd to

_ protect same

(3) Be prepared to employ one RCT of the 94 In Div

d 3 av Gp (Reia)

(1) jggressively defend SAhli R in Z

(2) Maintain Con with 2b Inf Div to the zight (S) flank and 94 Inf Div to the left (N) flank

e Corps Rea

(1) 3 Bn 101 (Jllftz) rEllIlEin in present position

(2) Be prepared for comniimcnt in any portion of ColPS Z

f XX Corps Arty Support Atk to the N and defense along SAiJi R

(1) 7 FA Obsn Bn Gen support

(2) 5 FA Gp Reinf 94 Inf Div Be prepared to Atch 689 Fl Bn and one Btry 558 Fh Bn to 10 Armd Div on Corps o

(3) 195 Fi Gp Gen support Z 94 In Div 10 irmd Div and 3Cav Gp

xxiv

204 FA Gp ReW 26 In Div

Corps Arty Comdr di1 cGordlrlate position areas and tire plans Arty with the Corps

g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp

(a) SupfX)rts directly Opos 10 hrmd Div 94 Inf Div and J Cay Gp

(b) Executes all Engr work in Gp Z pf responsibility

(2) 1152 Engr C Gp

(a) Supports directly 6pns 26 Inf Div

(b) Executes all Engr work in Gp Z of responsibility

h 4 TIl Gp

__ (1) Attchd to XX Corps Arty

i 112 UA Gp

(1) Furnish Ai protection Corps Z

(2) Priority of protection

(af Crossings of SAAR and JltfOSELLE Rivers

(b) Corps Arty

(c) Corps supply installations

x (1) EEr

(a) Nature of Fll reaction to our Jtk both in and outside the SJAR-MOSEUE triangle to include time plan strength and direction of commitshyment of local reserves against the main effort or of other forces on the Corps front in spoiling or diversionary ~tks

(b) Location strength and movements of Fll Armd forces in into or toward the SAAR-MOSEL(E triangle with prticular references to 11 pz Div or any suborshy

~ dinate Elms or any Assua1t G units

(c) Indentification strength location and G effi~ iency of En forces moving toward the Corps Zj or reinforcing units already identified on the Corps front

(d) Ground conditions in the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle including guaging of flood stages and status of Brs over th e ShAR R

(e) Any lividence of a general withdrawal by the Ell towards the RHINE

(2) XIX TAG provides air cooperation Targets to be assigned by Air Corps ground controllers Units be prepared to mark targets with smoke on call Units requesting preshyplanned missions will furni~ local BL with requests

(3) Non-fraternization pgtlicy and strict control of civil shyians will be forcefully carried out

(4) Bds amp Tr lists in effect as of 191900 Feb Vfuere reshyquired DiV$ may continue to use areas outside new Bds

(5) Absolute Rd priority to 10 hrmd Div in its Z when it is committed

(6) All Armd units will take maximum steps to protect exist shying nre Coms by burying ground lines at crossing and by being especially watchful for overhead lines

4 Adm 0 No 13 with change No 1

5 a Current SOl

b Axis Sig Com XX Corps To be announced Divs fo be Rptd

c CPs XX Corps THIONVILLE 94 Inf Di Vi SIERCK 26 Inf Div BOUUY 10 Armd Div iPACH

d Rad Security Hatmal 10 Annd Div Rad silence until iImledshyiately prioz to its Jtk

WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3

lnnax No 1 - Tr List

Opns Overlay

xxvii

FIEID ORDm NUIJBER SEVENTEEN

HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17

Maps 1100000 Map ot mANCE OIns Over lay

1 a See CUrrent G-2 Periodic Rpts and pUblications

b (1) Third US Army exploits XX Corps breakthrough Atking geoerill7 toward the 8 over ent1re front

(2) XII Corps lhird US Amy Atka to NE and protects XX Corps N flank

(j) XV Corps Seventh US Army continues aggressive deshyfense genera~ along SAAR R line

(4) XIX TtCprovides air cooperation for ltk of XX Corps

2 XX Corps

a Atks 22 Feb to exploit breakthrough seize TRIER and exshypand Brhd to line PFALZEL to HAJD (both EKcl) as shown on overlay prepared to continue the Atk to the NE or N on 1frmy O

b Protects right (S) flank of lhiid US Army

o Fonnation Bds Ooja -- (See Overlay) Trs Annex No1 - Tr List

3 a 10 Armd Div (Rein)

(1) Atk NE to seize TRIER

(2) EKpand Brhd in Z to line shown on overlay

(3) Be prepared to continue the Atk to the NE or N on Corps O

b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii

(1) Atk across the ampAR R betwen SAARBURG (wlJ413) and HAlO4 (wlJ8)8) rlight 21-22 Feb

I

(2) Establish line GEINIDiN~ (Incl) (wL2620) S to R bend at HAMl4 (hel) (~lao8gt prepared to contin1e the Adv to the NEon Corps O

(3) Maintain Con with 3 CaY Gp on right (S) flank and 10 zrmd Div on lett (N) llank

(4) S Ranger Bn Reld from Atehmt and Atchd to 3 CaY Gp effective 212400 Feb 45

c 26 Inf Div (Reinf)

(1) Aggessively defend SAAR R in Z and SltARLUTERN Brhd

(2) Maintain Con with XV Corps to the right (5) flank and 3 Cay Gp to the left (N) flank

d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)

(1) Aggressively defend Srlf~ R in Z

(2) llaintain with 26 In Div to the right (5) flank Con and 94 In Div to the left (N) flank

(3) 5 Ranger Bn Atched effective 212400 Feb 45

e XX Corps Jrty Supports Atk to the NE and defense along SAlR R

(1) 7 FA Obsn Bn Gen Support

(2) 5 Fh Gp Rein 94 Inf Div

(3) 195 FI Gps Gen Support Z 94 In Div 10 Armel Div and 3 Cay Op

(4) 204 FAGp Reinf 26 In Div

(5) Corps hrty Comdr will coordinate position areas and fire plans Arty with the Corps

f XX Corps Ehgr

Supports htk per PO 16

g ll2 AM Gp

xxix

(1) ~dteet crossings and defiles

(2) Protect Corps Arty

x bull (1) W

(a) Indentification strength location and C effi shyciency of 1lh forces in occu~tion of the SIJDiIshyFltZED UNE almg the conmanding ground S of the SAUER and SAAR Rivers in the sector between TRIER and MERZIG (both Incl) specifically to include the garrison of TRUR

(b) Natlr e of En reaction to our 1tk including time direction and strength of reserves committed against our main effort or of other fer ces on the Corps front in spoiling or diversionary Atks

(c) Ientification strength and location of Eh forces including tactical reserves moving toward the ColpS Z or moving to Rein units already conmitted movements of Armd units are of particular imporshytance

(d) Any evidence of a Gen withdrawal by the Eh towards the RHINE

(e) Location nature and strength of defensive VtOrks not shown on current defense overprints location and nature of terrain features not shown on exshyisting maps with particular reference to natural and artificial obstacles and demolitions

(f) GroWld and Rd conditions in the Carps Z including status of Brs and waterways

(2) XlX TAe provides air cooperation Targets tomiddot be~ assigned by Air Olrps ground oontrollers Units be prepared to mark targets with smoke on call Units requesting preplanned missions will furnish local m wi th requests

(3) Non-fraternization policy and strict control of civshyilians will be forcefully carried out

4 Adm 0 No 13 with Change No1

)bull a Current 001

b Axis Sig Com XX Corps to bp tnn~oed Diva To be Rptd

c CPS XX Coma THIONVILIE Diva To be reptd

d Rd Seourity --Nonnfll

WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg

1 Mejor Gener~l W H H MORRIS~ JR

2 Brigftdier Gen~~l K G JLTIIAUS

3 Brigpdier Genc~l E W PIBURN

4 BrigAdier Genero1 W L ROBERTS

5 Colonel W C GATCHELL

6 LieutellPnt Colonel T C CPAMBERLA IN

7 Lieutennt Colonel H T CHERRY

8 Li eutell nt Colonel W R DESOBRY

9 Lif)utpn~nt Colonel W B FASKELL

10 Lieutenpnt Colonel N T NORRIS

11 L1RUt~nnt Colonel J OHARA

12 LIEut p nnt Co1ond J J RICHPRIEON (decM-sd)

13 Liutnnnt Colonel J ll RILEY

14 L1rutnrnt Colonel M f STftNDISH ( decprspd)

15 M~or C L IIDSTEPD

xxxii

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM H H ~mRRISmiddot JR

Major General MORRIS WAS bom in Oce1n Grove on the const

of New Jersey on 22 Maroh 1890 Followingmiddot hts gr~du~tion from the

United S~tes Militrgtry ACldemy he wrs ppotnted Second Lieutenlnt

of Infrontry GeneIl MORRIS SflW service in World War I Ind rose

to the tcmnorrry grrde of Lieutpn~nt Colonel

ms first duty ftlr rr-opiv1ng his commisston W1S with the

19th Infntry It ~mp Jos~n Philippine Islpnds He then sPiled

to Chin~ for duty rt Tientsin with the 15th Inf~ntry until October

1914 when he ~s rpturned to the United StT-tes for duty t LAredo

Texas with the 9th Infflntry After finishing ~ tour of duty IS

--middotofessor of Militflry Science rnd Ttlctics pt the Texts Agricultural

~nd Meoh~niQnl College he wns trrnsferred to Leon Springs Texns

AS on instructor ~t the Offioers Treining Cemp

In June 1918 General MORRIS sailed for Frrnce in commnd

of n Bnttlion of the 360th InfAntry 90th Division pnd with his

Bntttll1on took pnrt in the MEDSE-ARGOIDE opertgttion FollOWing the

Armistice he served in the Occunrtion

Gene~l MORRIS wnmiddots returned to the United Stites in June

1919 ond served s Professor of Militlry Sci~nce pnd T~ctics ~t

Bucknell Univprsity Lewisburg Pennsylvrni~ In MArch 1920 he

was trnnsferrpd to To~s Agrioulturrl rnd Mpchlntcpl College in the

snme c~p~city Aft~r grrdurting from the Commtlnd rni GenerAl S~ff

School Fort Lefvcmrorth Kflnsps he WflS rssigned to H~dunrters-

bhth Corps Area Fort Sam Houston TexfS He grndUflted from the

xxxiii

-army War College in June 1930 and was then assigned as an instrucshy

tor there

During the interval between 1930 and the outbreak ot World

War II he was a member of the InfantrY Boarti at Fbrt Benning

Georgia attampnded the F1eldArtillery School at Fbrt Sili Oklahoma

and served 68 Chief ot the Planning Branch ot the Personhe1 Divi

sion War Depattmeurollt General Staff~ After turther dutJ with troop

in MaY1942 he was appointed Commanding General of the 6th l~rmored

Division camp ltl1aifee Arkansas bull J

After participating in th e Louisiana and Desert Maneuvers

he was designated Commanding General SeCond ArlOOred Corps San Jose

~lifornia in May 1943 In September1943 he was Ground Forces

server at the Battle of Balarm Italy In October 1943 he beshy

came Cammander of the 18th Corps at Camp Bowie TeXaS In July 1944

he assumed coamand of the lOth Armored Dlvision and sailed with it

to France

He commanded the 10th Armored Division in the reduction of

the Baar4doselle Triangle the Battle of the fulge the breakthrough

to the Rhine and the capture of Heidelburg and Ulm

Throughout the operations of the 10th Armored Division in

Europe General MORRts commanded the unit during a series of brUshy

liant maneuvers He quickly took advantage of every situation

which offered an opportWlity of success and pressed the offensive

action relentlessly

His professional ability as exhibited while-

manding the 10th lrmored Division reflected his broad experjence

xxxiv

and military eduoation and toa high degree the finest tradition

of our armed forces

Jmong the various decorations received b7 General ~ORRIS

throughout his oareer are the Distinguished Service Cross Disshy

tinguished Service Medal Legion of Merit Silver Star and the

Bronze Star Medal In addition to these deaorations he has reshy

ceived the following foreign decorations The Frenoh Legion of

Honor with Croix de Guerrewith Palm the Belgium Croix de Guerre

and the Brazilian order of Military Merit with Grade of Commander

He is presently assigned as Senit)I Ground Member of the

Jointmiddot Brazil-United States Military Commission ~h Station in

~o De Janeiro Brazil

lIUGADIER GENlRtL KEmmIH G JlHhUS

General J)T1J)US was born in Ohio 13 June 1893 and upon

graduation from the University of ltl1io joined the National Guard

in the State of Ohio and waS commissioned Second Lieutenant of

Infantry in 1916 He is a graduate of the Company Officers Course

ot the Infantry School and graduated frem the Conmand and General

Staff School in the Blass of 1932

Brigadier General ALfIIAUS commanded Ccmbat Colllllandlll~1I of

the loth Irmored Division during the initial operation of the Divshy

ision in the Saar-Moselle Triange He has been awarded the Bronze

- lr Medal in recognition of his services as Commander of Combat

--

CollllMnd flAil during this operation General ALTHAUS is retired and

living in Marion City Floridamiddot

IRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN W PIBURN

Brigadier General PIEURN was gaduated from Lamont High

School Grant County Oklahoma and later attended the University

of Iowa Iowa City His tirst association with the military sershy

vice waS when he joined the Oklahoma National lllard in 1916 He

attended the First Officers Training Camp at Fort Snelling and

was commissioned Second Lieutenant of Infantry 15 August 1917

General PlBURN has had a distinguished career in the army

record of service primiddot~r to World War II includes service with

the 1st Infantry Division and the 12th Infantry Division wring

VlJrld War I and subsequent duty with the Occupation Forces in

Germany until 1922 He was then assi6ned to the Infantry School shy

at Fort Benning and later to the Taryk Schmiddot)ol at Fort Meade Maryshy

land These along with numerous other interesting assignments

aft~rded him the valuable experien~e and background that enabled

him to become a distinguished commander during World War II

j~t the beginning of the War he served with the 2nd lrmgtred

Division until Febru~ry 1941 Ne waS then assigned as observer

with the British Eighth jrmy iri Egypt with additional duty as De-

tense Iud Representative and Lend-Lease Mministrator to the Jliddleshyshy

t Countries He was thenmiddot assigned in pril1942 to the G-2

xxxvi

Seetdon of the War bepaHmertt Geriefal staff UPon the activation I I

of the lOth Armoi-ed IllVision he was given CQlIllMnd of its 3rd Tank

Regiment He was later assigned to the 14th Armored Division

From this assigrment he was transferred to the 9th Armored Division

and then to the 10th ~rmored Division in November 1944

General PlBURN was later assigned cOlll1ander of Combat

Command Bn which assignmont he retained until the conclusion

of the First Phase of the Saar-Moselle Triangle operations Thereshy

after he commanded Combat Command Aft

General PlEURNte present assignment is Assistan Division

Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Japan

~ Gena-al PIBDRH has received many awards and decorations

1roughout his years of distinguished services These include the

Silver Star Medal Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster Purple

Heart with Cluster European-AfriCampnMiddle Elstern Campaign Ribbon

with four battle stars the Order of the British Empire the North

Star Medal the French Legion of Honor and the croix de Guerre

with Palms

mIGrlDI]sectt GENERAL WILLIJM L ROBERTS

Itmong the General Officers who served with the lOth Armored

Division in the Saar-MoseJle lriangle operations was Brigadier

General 110BERTS In the second phase of the Oporation he canmanded -

mbat Command Btt with distinction and ability

Born in Ohio 17 September 1890 he itlaa graduated trom the

Uutted States 1lilitary Academy in 1913 and was ccmmissioned in the

Infantry In 1925 he graduated from the Infantry Jdvanced Course

at Fort Benning Georgia and the following year graduated from the

Command and General Staff School During 1Jbrld War I he attained

the rank of Lieutenant Coll)ne1 Throughout his military career

General ROBERTS has had a broad and varied experiEnce In 1941

he was prcmoted to the rank of colonel He was eventually assigned

to the 10th Annored Division At the beginning of the second phase

of the Triangle operation he was given command of Combat Command

B relieving Brigadier General PlBORll He was promoted to Brigshy

~ier General on 1 August 1945

General ROBERTS has been awarded the Legion of Merit the

Silver Star tne the Bronze Star Medal

His present station a nd assignment is Advisor to Director

Internal Security United States lfilitary Government in Korea

OOlDNEL WADE C Gi~TClIElL

Colmel GATCHELL was born at Saxtons River Vermgtnt in

the year 1895 He attended high school at Cranston Rhode Island

and at Portland Maine He later attended Norwich University On

3 May 1917 he entered the First Training Camp at Plattsburg New

York and was graduated therefrom on 14 iugust 1917 as Second

~ 9utmant of Cavalry He Was assigned as an R O T C instructor

xxxviii

in the Olicago High Schools From this assignment he was transshy

fer1led to dlty with the Civilian Conservation Corps in the State

of Kentucky

In 1940 he was assigned to the ArJOOred Force Replacement

Center at Fort Knox Kentucky In January 1942 he joined the

511 Jl1l1Ored Division where he became Trains Commander From this

assigrmcnt he was transferred to the 13th Armored Division with

duties as Jcting Qlief of Staff In September 1944 he assumed

the duties of Elcecutive Officer of Combat Command S 10th Jr

mored Division Colonel GATClIELL was then assigned as Reserve

Commander of the DiviSion which command he retained until he was

-retired from the service in October 1946 on a permanent disability

lt holds the following awards and decorations Legion of MeritJ

the Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster the Croix de

Guerre with palm

C)lone1 GA1CHEU is at present living in San Diego Califshy

ornia

UEDENJNT cxnom THOWIS C CHAMBERLAIN

Without doubt one of the most outstanding subordinate

commanders of the 10th 1rmored Division during the units opershy

ations in the Saar-Moselle Triangle was Lieutenant Colonel CIWampshy

DERLAIN who cgtmmanded the 11th Tank Battalion This Battalion

-~th attachments was designated Task Force CrrAMBERLAIN and reshy

~ained this designation throughout the operation

This Task Force of Ogtmbat Command In spearheaced the drive

to the east and the Slbsequent drive north ta Trier~ Throughout

the entire operation Lieutenant C)lonel QBAMBERLAIlfdEmortStrated

at all times a cCdIlpetent grasp of the situation a nd exercised a

shrewd ability ip maneuvering his Task Force which contributed

greatly to the success of the Division

Lieutenant CJLmel CHAMBERLAIN was born in lIUssouri in

1917 and was graduated fram the United States Military Academy in

1940 He is also a graduate of the Command and General Staff School

in the Class of 1943 He has been awarded the Legion of Merit the

Silver Star and the Bronze Star Medal

r-- He is presently assigned to the Logistical Division of the

3neral Staff of the Department of the Jrrny in the Pentag0n Buildshy

ing Washington 25 D C

LIEIJTENfNT COLONEL HENRY T ClfERRY

Lieutenant Clonel Henry T OBERRY was born in Macon

Georgia in 1912 He was gracuated from the Lanier High School of

Macon in 1939 He entered the United States Military Academy at

iest Point the follJwing year Upon graduation in 1935 he was

commissioned Second Lieutenant of Cavalry and was assigned to the

1st Cavalry Division In 1933 he attended the Regular Course of

the Cavalry School at Fort Riley Kansas and upon graduation was

tained there as an instructor Upon its activation in July ~942

xl

was assigned to t he 10th Armored Division as Commanding Officer

~ a Tank Battalion At this time he held the rank of Major In

December of 1942 he Was promoted to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel

in this roorganization of the Division Lieutenant Colonel CIIERRT

Was assigned as commander of one of the authorized tank battalions

Be was given c)mmand of the 3rcl Tank Battalion Ybich command he

held until the deactivation of the 10th zmored Division in July

1945 ht present Lieutenant Colonel CHERRY commands the rmored

Section United States Military cademy West Point New York

Lieutenant Colonel C~RRY hJlcls the following decorations the

Distinguished Service CrOSs the Silver Star with Two Oak Leaf

Clusters Legion of Merit the Bronze Star Kedal and the Purple

Heart with one Oak Leaf Cluster-- LIIDTENfNT COLONamp VvILLIiM R DESQBRY

Lieutenant Colonel DES013RYmiddot was born in the Philippine

Islands at Manila in Septanber 1918 He attended Punshov icademy

in Manila and was graduated in 1936 In 1937 he arrived in the

United States and entered GeorgetMn University in Hashington D C

from which he was graduated in 1941 Upon graduation he recoived

a commission of Second Lieutenant of Infantry in the Regular rmy

as honor graduate from the R O T C unit of the University

His first assignment was as Platoon Leader 29th Infantry Regiment

Fort Benning Gevrgia In November 1942 he was assigned as a

xlimiddot

Reconnaissance Platoon Leader in tile newly-fvImed lOth 1Imgtred

Division He was later made company Commander and was given

successive assignments in the Division as Battalion 3-3 Combat

Conunand S-4 and finally Battallon Commander J rising in rank to

ldeutenarlt Colmel tro~ t~ pldes OOillM1ins~fAte~Wi tn thl9middot Vfrious

a~signments held

In February 1945 he was c~~ed during the final phase of

the Saar-Moselle Iriangle operation while commanding the 20th

hrmored Infantry Battalion

He has received the follOwing decorations the Silver

Star the Bronze star Medal the French Cruix de Guerre (with two

~~ronze Stars and one Silver Star) the Belgian Croix de Guerre with

a1m and the Purple Heart

Lieutenant Colonel DESODRY is presently assigned as bssistshy

ant Personnel and 1dministration Officer at the Headquarters of

United States F)rces in ustria

LUlTTENbNT COIDNEL WiRREll B HSKlLL

Lieutenant Colonel HASKELL was bgtrn in Minneap)lis mnnshy

esota in 1917 He attended the Lee Jcademy Lee Maine graduating

in 1936 Shortly after graduation he enlisted in the Army and in

S$ptember 1941 he Wls coam1ssioned a Second Lieutenant of Cavalry

upon graduation from the Officers Candidate School at Fort Knox

During the following year he served as a company officer

)n the 4th Armored Division at Pine Camp New York In June 1942

nas transferred to the 10th Armored Division as Regimental 5-4

of the 54th Armored Infantry Regiment bull

In September 1943 when the Division reorganized he was

assigned to he 54th hrmored Infantry Battalion as Executive

Officer where he remained until February 1945 when he was apshy

pointed Battalion Commander He remained in Command of the Batshy

tallion until the Division was deactivated in July 1945 At presshy

ent Lieutenant Colonel HASKEIL is lssist-3nt G-4 TIle Infantry

Center Fort Benning Georgia He has received the following

awards and decorations the Silver Star with one Oak Leaf Cluster

the Purple Heart and the French Croix de Guerre

UIDTENhNT OOLltlJEL NED T NORRIS

Born in Ohio 7 July 1912 Ii-eutewmt Colonel HORRIS attended

the University of Michigan He en~ered the United States Military

Academy in 1932 and graduated in 1936 as Second Lieutenant of Cavshy~

alry He graduated from the Cav~lry School in 1940 and from the

Command and General Staff Schoo~ in 1943

He was then assigned as EKecutive Officer of Combat Command

All of the lOth Armored Divislon in vhicll capacity he continued to

serve during the operations of this unit in the Ellropean Theater

Lieutenant Colonel lfOilRts has been aarded the Silver Star and the

Bronze Star Medal

xliii

Lieutenant Colonel ~ta is presentl1 assignee to the

Intelligence Division of th~ Department of the rmYi General Staff

Pentagon Building Washington 25 D C

UEVTENJNT COLONEL JMES OHARA

Lieutenant Colonel Jrunes 0 ~RA was born in New York City

9 August 19l~ Uron graduation from the United States Military

Academy in 1934 he was commissioned in the Infantry_ In 1938 he

graduated fram the Infantry School Fort Benning Georgia

Upon the activation of the 10th hImOred Di vision he was

assigned to it and given command of the 54th Armored Infantry- ~alion During the Saa~oselle Triangle operation he conmanded

his Battalion with noteworthy ability

Lieutenant Colonel OHARA has been awarded the following

decorations for meri torious service the Silver Star and the

Bronze Star

His present station is 25th Constabulary Squadron 1 P 0

305 In Care of Postmaster New York City New York

UElJTENANT OOLONEL JACK J RICi~RDSON

One of the outstanding conunanders of the loth Armored Divishy

sion during its operations in the Saar-iwioselle Triangle was Lieushy

tenant Colonel AICHARts6N This Officer commanded his Battalion

Jh exceptio~~ ability and distinction deserving of the highest

xliv

~nmendation8 Jiter the termination of the Saar-Moselle Trishy

angle operations by the lOth Arm9red Division Lieutenant Colonel

RICHAJiIBOH we-e lQllod in action in SUQsequent operations near

Crailsheim 101 his Mlieet service he was awarded the Silver

Star with TWO Oak Leaf Clusters the Bronze Star Medal and the

Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster

In Further recognition of his services one of the buildshy

10gs of the 1cadanic Group of the Armored School has been named

Richardson H~

LIEUTENANT COLONEl JOHN R RILEY

Lieutenant Colonel RILEY was born in Danville Virginia

~pril 1909 After graduating fram the Danville High School

Jn 1926 he entered the Bank of Virginia in Roanoke Virginia

He Qecame a manber of tile National G~ald in the City of Roanoke

and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the National Gultrd in

1935 He was called to a cti ve duty with the hrmy of the United

States 3 February 1941 and ai this time holding the rank of

Captain was given command of Coltpany D 19lst rank Battalionbull

His subsoquent assignments were first 5-2 and later 8-3 1st

I

Bettalion 37th rmored RegimEflt

Onl July 1942 Lieut~nt Colonel RILEY waS transferred J

to the 10th Iftlored IlivlisioX 1Wdae~gned as Conmanding Officer-of

tqe 3rd Batta1~~n ot the 3rd Armored Regiment Upon the reorganshy

~9tion of the Division he waS ass1gned as Commanding Officer of

xlv

-the 21st Tank Battalion in which assigrment he served with rbility

il the close of the ~

LieutehahQolone1 RILiY has been awarded the Silver Star

the Legion of Merit the aronze Star wi1ah Oak Lear mUster the

Croix de Guerre of lwtembow-g and the French Croix de Geurre

LIMERANT COLONEL JpoundILES Le STANl)ISH

Lieutenant Colonel SlANDISa served with distinction as

Canmanding Officer of the 6lst hrmored Infantry Battalion of the

lOth itrmored Division During the operations in the Saar-Moshy

selle Triangle this Battalion with its attachments was desigshy

nated Task Force Standish of Combat Q)nmand IIA of the Division

-During the Triangle operation Lieutenant Colonel STANshy

olE was killed in Ockfen Gezmany on the 25th of February

1945

In recagnition of his splendid record and outstanding

leadership a building of the Academic Group of the Jirmored

School at Fort Knox has been recently named in honor of this

distinguished officer

Lieutenant Colonel STANDISH was awarded the Silver star

with one Oak-Leaf Cluster J the Bronze Star Medal with Dile Oak

Leaf Cluster and the Purple Heart with one Oak Leaf Cluster

xlvi ~

---------------

MAJOR CHARLES L HUSTEjJ) -JR

Major BOSTIAD Commanded the 20th Armored Infantry Bat-f

tallon ot the loth Armored Division -He was ~m in Nebraska

29 November 1913 and attended the Universit1 of Nebraska H1J

received a commission as Second Lieutenantlnfantry Reserve in

1940 and rose to the grade of Major HG co4unanded his Battalion

with exceptional ability during the operatjons ot the 10th l~rmored

Division in Europe

Major HUSTEAD was integrated into the Regular Jrmy subshy

sequent to the War with the permanent rank of First Lieutenant

He has received the Silver Star and Bronze Medal for meritorious

~rvice

His present assignment is 7890 Headquarters Group ElJOOM

New York City New York

xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1

Third US rmy 1 l-iug 44 - 9 May 45 Volume I he Operations

10th Armored Division 1 - 30 Nov 44

10th rirmored Division 1 Jan - 8 liay 45

COA 10th ~~ored Division Nov 44 - May 45

CCE 10th hrmored Division Nov 44

20th ~~ored Infantry Battalion 10th Armored Division Oct 44 - Feb 45

54th zmred Infantry Battalion 10th jrmored Division Dec 44 - May 45

61st hrmored Infantry Battalion 10th Armored Division Nov 44 May 45

90th Cav Recon SqdD (~eczd) 10th Armored Division Nov 44

W~TIONL REPORTS

12th Jrmy Group G-3 Reports for Nov 44 Dec 44 Jan 45 Feb 45

xx Corps 1 Sep - 6 Dec 44 The Reduction of Fortress 14ctz

xx Corps 15 Dec 44 - 12 Mar 45 lfCapture of Saar-Moselle Triangle

ampI Trier

OFFICIAL PUBLIClTIONS

Dr HM Cole untitled draft manuscript on history of Third irmy

chapters VIII X XI XIII (Historical Division DjA)

Gen E Feucht~ger Report or Combat Oper~tions of the 21st Panzer

Division Against American Troops in France and Germany (MID

DA)

~en Wietersheim Repptt of th2 11th Panzer Division (MS B-417MID DjA)

xlviii

1ot Gen Zimmerman et al OBWestAStudyin remand (Hist DivDIA)

Terrifyind Destrpx (story of 10th Arma Div in ETO)

iq I

hlttidaLjrltlt Registatj 1 Jan 46 (US Govt Printillg otfice~jash DC)

Orderopound Battle of the German jmY (MID blA)

Ihe Invasion of Western-Mope (Dept of Mil ]ilt amp Ehg USrL~ 1946)

The Invesion of Western Europe

VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen

Col SL~~ Marshall Bgstogne (Infmtry Journal Press 1946)

RE Merriam Dark December (Ziff-Davis Pub1 Co 1947)

Gen GS Patton Jr Was 13 I Knav It (Houghton Mifflin 1947)

~en BG Wallace Patton SQd His lhird JrmY (llfil Svc Publ Co 1946)

middot1 HG Wruker Pgttons Ihird rmy

Hlstorl of the 94th Infantry Divsioll

History of thpound 376th WWnBlfdmeBt trga lm 9 1945

Hitgn g xx Q2rps jrtillerY

-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY

IFTIi1t AGgON RRIjlRTS

Ihird US Jrmy 1 Aug 44 - 9 MAY 4~ ~alume I liThe Operations loth rmored Division 1 - 30 Nov 44 loth Armored Division 1 Jan - S May 45 CC loth rmored Division Nov 44 - May 45 CCB loth Armored Division Nov 44 20th Armored Infantry Battalion 10th Armored Division Oct 44 - Feb 45 54th lrmored Infantry Battalion 10th I1Dored Division Dec 44 - May 45 6lst rmored Infantry Battalion lOth Armored Division Nov 44 - May 45 90tt Cav RecoD Sqdn (Meczd) lOth irmored Division Nov 44

OPERATIONiL REPORTS

12th J)rmy Group G-3 Reports for Nov 44 Dec 44 Jan 45 Feb 45 XX Corps 1 Sep 6 Dec 44 The Reduction of Fortreas METZ Xl Corps 15 Dec 44 - 12 Mar 45 Capture of Saar-Moselle lriangle

amp RIm--Dr Hili Cole untitled draft manuscript on history of lbird lrmy

Cl1apters VIII X XI lin (Historical DiviSion DA) Goo E Feuchtinger R of bat 0 tio h s P

Division A inst frnerican Troo s in France and German MID D) Gao Wiatersheiln Reeort of the 11th Panzor Division MS B-4l7 MID

DI) Lt Gan Zimmerman et al OB JiMh A Study in Commfd (Hist DivDA) Terrify and Destroy (story of 10th Umd Di v in ErO 0laquoi9ial Amr Reseter 1 Jan 46 (us Govt Printing Office Wash DC) Order ot Battle of t8Ef Germ~ rrPlv (4ID DI A) The InvapQn OJ Western km (Dept of Mil Art amp amplg USMJ 1946)

VOLUMESs

Col RS l1len Lucky Forward (Vanguard Press 1947) ChI SLI Marshall Bastogne (Infantry Journal Press 1946) RE Merriam Derk D~canber (Ziff-Davis Publ Co 1947) Gen GS Patton Jr ~i~r 1s I KneW It (Houghton mfflin 1947 J Gen BG viallace Patton and His lhird hrml (Uil Sve Publ Ch 1946) Col HG Halker Patton t s Third lrmy-

xlviii

r- ltorl ot the 94th Intantry Division -stott 2t the 76th Intantrx Regiment trom 1921 to 1942

H~iWrl ot XX Corps ArtillerY

-shyxlix

--

PREFACE

As is known to most professional and some amashy

teur military historians troops of the Third US Army

were making a concentrated effort to crack the vaunted

SIEGtlRIED Line north and south of SAARBRUCKEN in Decemshy

ber 1944 when the urgency of the German counterattack

through the ARDEN~lliS caused a temporary halt to this

effort The operation had begun early in November and

had been primarily successful in its first objective - shy

the capture of the heavily defended METZ fortified area

As soon as possible after the ARDENNES thru~t had been

repulsed General PATTON directed his forces to resume

the task which had been left uncompleted In midshy

February the attack was again launched

The SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle lay in the zone of

XX Corps during both the November-December and February

phases of the operation Of the many units wtich partici shy

pated in one or the other of thesE phases only one of

division size took part in botr This unit was tbe

lOth Armored Division commanded by lYajor General

W H H MORRIS JR

The authors of this report have undertakm to - make a study of the loth Armored Division in both

phases Our decision was based on several factors

ii

_------------__-__ ___---shy

























Jrmored School

iii










following foreword

iv

-

~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page












vi

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

























Jrmored School

iii










following foreword

iv

-

~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page












vi

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix










following foreword

iv

-

~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page












vi

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

-

~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page












vi

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

~- t

-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page












vi

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

shyChapter Page








-

vii

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

bull bull bull



Opposite Page















viii

--








ix

CJiJ~PTER I

INTRODUCTION






















1

shy


























2

























3


M

--

shy


































4 AAAW Battalions







Group) bull









5

-shy


























6

-------------------------------------------------------

~---




NOTES FeR CHAPTER I





7

---

-CHAPTER II





















8














candidampte units












9



to HhUCOICOURT













LETZ









10

























11


















12


( )

B NO V TO 16 DEC ~~

10

MORRIS

A C ) 10 ALTHAUS

B

CHCllity

10

~3(-) ~A120 ITtiI855~C15i

11(-)

AS1

A155(-) Y



IOfV RESI GATCHELL


-


CHAPTER III











fight








idyll



13










for c--bflt
















14










rOSELLE Hiver line





commanr1 of CCh)







Ge Il9 ral WALKER




15






















- -l-See page 5

16




east of LETZ




















hi s missLm


17




















nade



-

18

-----------------------



Irnored Division




bridgu




19

CHAPTERmiddotIV













laround it











20

of the ~R fliver 2

























21

















therein to failure









22

























23

OL _ c -t IN


~ 13-2~ I

























24


























25


























26


































passage of vehicles

















26

bull


the cavalry














MOSELLE Triangle










29











cavalry















30

~----


























31

---

















and seek cover









fire

32


























33


























34

----








not as yet


strength 5
















35











the attack resumed














eneIll8 bull -











far int) the night















37

_ __)i _________ ~~__


























38


























39


















zone








7Ibid bull

40

-

o bull 1 bullbull 1

o I Voishy ~~

V~middot NTtgt $


Ijlshy

CHAPTER V

CCE THRUSTS EAST























41







as its objective











STROFF by nightfall








--

















positions









43


























44

















NOTES FOR CHAPTER V



3Ibid


45

CHAPlER VI






















46


























47














































was almost doubled





49



























50





















accompli shed bull




3~ p40



51

CHAPTER VU
























the Bulge) 2

52


























53























54













- l














55









to fight again















56

CHAPTER VIII

fiN TTAK IS PLINNED









-shy






offensive

Intellig~nce Data







57










effectively2















58







The C orES Plan



















opposi te page

59

---

























60









of opportunity










therein







61










gence channels



2~ p 8



shy

62


glo MOR Itas

A ( ) 0 ~(=~ FI T f

CHAM N

It ~11I(-)1 ~AIO ~A55





LiT RIEY

LEY


ICOIIa55 [AROLEY

I (HASK(IL)



I LANG


CiAMZAT


I OHARA


CHAPTER IX
























63






Triflngle









hands











64




































66





















the outskirts 0





67




difficulty_





supply trains
















at 1915

68














21l1d p 132


69


shy

CHAPTEx X





I















THIER





70


























71
















roans










72









fdvel line







32










73

-







on Division order







he First Attempt












74







The Second

Attempt




















75







to TRIEfi








pinned them ~own











76

The Crossing






waters edde




















77


























78

---


























79



the fire of the gun











north of AYL












80

--



without resistance




















February



81







south of TABEN





















~nge in Plans

























83




Intelligence Delta9






















84


























85


























86


























87












surremer










Germans surreniered



surrender ed bull

88






speed anri teamwork








infantry






of ZErlF






89














position












90



























91











12pound ~ TRIEh p12

2Imiddot~ 12~ p

3Il22bull p 13




9~ Cit TRIER 15



12Ibid


-92

--

CHAPTER XI

THE FALL OF TRIER

Team A Tyenkes ZERF




west of ZERF


















93








for this purpose


















town 94









0100 on the 27th



TltIEh

ceB ~oyes North













95


























9-6















was CGA












97

I






leiing to t herr












northeast and east









98

--


























99


























100

























101











the flank9














102

--

T

~

TRIER is Entered












were not used













103 bull

























104

























105



os- 0

















4n~i(i bull

5~

6Jlig

710 ~


l01hmiddotu1d bull


12llid h 30

13Ibii p 30

106

-CHAPTER XII








perigtd of time







Di visi)n









107

























108

























109




























110











and their units






fortifications









III















-shy

112

CHAPrER XIII

CONCLUSI(ll














warfare









113

























114















in the U S Arrry



-

115

---~T-~~==~~~--~------- Chairman


t






116

APPENDICES

I - MJPS




V - PERSONu nEB

VI - BIBLICGR~)HY

shy


(Se~ M~ps C pnd D)








SAAR




northetlst






length




-iii






forest area s








stricted












iv



wet w~ther



both strems








v

JcJV

bull


7kRRAINSruDY


M IL E

w ORM eLO NGE

II wAS$ERIlIL

A -Alt) n IAN

I

bull

bull























vi

























vii

















itself









viii






-

1x


lJ ho 1Jltf

r 7fIu vs ArJ

I bull Pu_

I I XII CnI


j 2t fi~L ~3S

(11lt 8rd )

((- ) (~J

x rAe ~ IJP kcl u

I


S~ INS


(PtaI-)

VIle-f)

t$1

(Os)

(1fItI11t )

(z)

~It)

CHk Brice)

(1)


HQ IDA DIV 0 I I I



CC4 CCa -f T I I I



U I~ H~C Pl~IRIIIIU




APPENDIX lV






x



APO 340 US flRMY

FO 12


1 Q Annex 1 -- Int











Trs Annex 2 Tr List







xi


I
















l MiRZIG area







e 83 Inf Div





(1) (a) 5 FJ Gp


nil










(2) Annex 4 - FA




(2) Annex 5 - Engrs




xivshy










4 Adm 0 No 10

5 Sig Com

a CUrrent SOl

b Ax Sig Com







c CPs


d Rad Transmissions









WALKER CG

COLLIm cis


HQ XX LncPS

APO 340 - US J1UY




2 95 Inf Div



3 90 Int Div






(2) 10 Annd Div



~


flank

4 10 Armd Div


b Bltocutero 12

5 3 CaY Gp (reinf)




6 IHIOWIIa br




7 Troop issignments



3 CaY Gp3 Cay Gp


WJLKEn CG


G-3

--


HCl XX CORPS

~PO 340 - US ARMY

PO 13 220400 Nov 44


1 a IInnex 1 - Int







Bds Overlay

Trs knnex 2 Tr List

3 a 95 Int Div






dx







d 5 Inf Div






e 3 Cav Gp








( 5) III Corps Arty

(a)







g XX Corps Engr




i 112 AAA Go








5 Sig COlUS

a CUrTent $01

b Ax Sig b


c CPs



WALIcm CG


G-3



191000 Feb 45

FO 16







2 n OORPS


















_ protect same


d 3 av Gp (Reia)



e Corps Rea







xxiv



g XX Corps Engr

(1) 1139 Ehgr ~ Gp



(2) 1152 Engr C Gp



h 4 TIl Gp


i 112 UA Gp




(b) Corps Arty


x (1) EEr













5 a Current SOl




WAIKBt CG

degFFicrJ SNYDER

COLLIEn cIs

G-3


Opns Overlay

xxvii


HQ xx CORPS

APd3rO - US ffiMY

211700 Feb 4 FO 17







2 XX Corps








b 94 Inf Oiv (Rein)

xxviii


I







d 3 Cav Gp (Reinl)










f XX Corps Ehgr


g ll2 AM Gp

xxix



x bull (1) W










)bull a Current 001




WALKER CG

OFFICIAL SNYIER

G-3 COLLIER

cis

-

xxxi

-AP1ENDIX V

PERS ONAL IT ttg
















xxxii


























xxxiii


tor there














to France








action relentlessly



xxxiv


of our armed forces






















--
























xxxvi


















with Palms





























xxxviii



of Kentucky












Guerre with palm


ornia































xl























xlimiddot






a~signments held








































Bronze Star Medal

xliii














Bronze Star








xliv









Richardson H~











I






xlv














1945








xlvi ~

---------------








Division in Europe




~rvice



xlvii

- APPENDIX VI

13IBLIOORhPH1










W~TIONL REPORTS




ampI Trier






DA)


xlviii



iq I





VOLUMES

Col RS Jlen









-

xlix

APPENDIX VI

BIBLIOORAPHY



OPERATIONiL REPORTS






VOLUMESs


xlviii



-shyxlix

u 2 1 1965 - oclc

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