scir spring 2013 issue

Southern California International Review

Volume 3, Number 1 Spring 2013

The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international

studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.

Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues. SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates

valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.

Copyright 2013 Southern California International Review.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in anyform without the express written consent of the Southern California International

Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.

Southern California International Reviewscinternationalreview.org

StaffEditor-in-Chief:Samir Kumar

Assistant Editor-in-Chief: Andrew Ju

Editors:Natalie Tecimer

Matthew Prusak

Dhwani Thapar

Taline Gettas

Rebecca Braun

Cristina Patrizio

Layout: Rebecca Braun Cover: Samir Kumar

ISSN: 1545-2611

Contents

1. The Political Economy of Mad Cow Disease and U.S.-Japan Trade RelationsDaye Shim Lee

11

2. Why Did the United States Enter the 1991 Persian Gulf War?A Study of Psychological Theory and Offensive Realism

Leyla Tosun

27

3. The Macroeconomic Trajectory of MyanmarA Predictive Analysis

MoeMoe Chaee and Matthew Prusak

41

4. Regionalism and European IntegrationA Complementary Process

M. Beau Feibus

63

Dedicated to Professor John Odell

Dear Reader,

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the fifth issue of the Southern California International Review (SCIR). This bi-annual undergraduate research journal based at the University of Southern California is a unique opportunity for students to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and related fields throughout the country, SCIR seeks to promote a better understanding of the global challenges facing our world today. The need to not only study, but also interrogate, interna-tional relations and related disciplines, has never been more important. Thus, this journal desires to contribute fresh ideas to this fascinating and essential field of study.

The pieces contained in the journal are written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our eight-member editorial board through a rigorous review process. The graphics, tem-plates, and formatting were also done by our editorial board. In an effort to not restrict stu-dents in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety of topics in the realm of international studies, thereby emphasizing our commitment to interdisciplinary learning.

The articles included in this issue span international studies, from a political economy per-spective on the rising and trendy Myanmar to a multi-theoretical look at the 1991 Gulf Crisis, the structure of the questions asked in these articles shows the breadth of the disci-pline we represent. As you read, ask yourself, Why is this article important? My hope is that your question is answered, and you find yourself with a host of more incisive questions that would incite enthralling answers. Keep an eye out for the authors you read, for they might soon be in a position to influence the very issues that they have examined!

Editors Note:

SCIR would not exist without the generous funding provided by the Robert L. Freidheim Memorial Endowment, and the support of the School of International Relations. Significant appreciation goes to the Director, Dr. Robert English, and the wonderful faculty and staff that have assisted us over the past three years. I would particularly like to thank Linda Cole for her unwavering support at each step of the journey.

Finally, we would love to hear your feedback on this issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and suggestions at [email protected], and we will take these into account or offer a thoughtful reply.

Sincerely,Samir KumarEditor-in-Chief

The Political Economy of Mad Cow Disease and U.S.-Japan Trade Relations

Daye Shim Lee

Since the first American case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow dis-ease) in 2003, beef trade has been one of the most sensitive issues in U.S.-Japan trade relations. Japan immediately banned the import of all U.S. beef and refused to resume the trade until 2006. Even then, Japan made the stringent age limit a prerequisite for the lifting of the ban. However, following the discovery of mad cow disease in California last April, Japan voluntarily announced that it would not suspend any U.S. beef imports. Moreover, Japan decided to ease the age restrictions that had been in place for more than six years. This paper examines the stark contrast between Japanese responses to U.S. Mad Cow cases in 2003 and 2012, and raises questions about Tokyos underlying rationale for its trade policies. Based on the broader un-derstanding of realist theory in international relations, this paper argues that Japans policies on U.S. beef imports were motivated by specific national interests, and that Mad Cow disease in the United States provided the Japanese government with political leverage to pursue those goals.

Introduction

Japans policies on U.S. beef imports since the U.S. outbreak of bovine spongiform en-cephalopathy (BSE or Mad Cow disease) have been driven by factors beyond food safety concerns. When the first American case of Mad Cow disease broke out in 2003, Japan banned the import of U.S. beef entirely and refused to resume trade until the U.S. Congress threatened to take retaliatory measures in 2006. Even then, Japan eased the ban only for meat from cattle of twenty months or younger.1 Following the discovery of Mad Cow dis-ease in California this April, however, Japan voluntarily announced not to suspend U.S. beef imports.2 It also decided to ease the age restrictions that had been in place for more than six years. The stark contrast between Japanese responses to U.S. Mad Cow cases in 2003 and 2012 raises questions about Japans underlying rationale for its trade policies. This paper argues that the inconsistency in Japans policies on U.S. beef imports is often driven by specific national interests, and that Mad Cow disease in the United States provided the

1 Stephanie Strom and Hiroko Tabuchi, A Break for Embattled Ranchers, The New York Times, January 29, 2013, accessed March 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/global/japan-to-ease-restrictions-on-us-beef.html.2 Aya Takada, Japan Has No Plan to Halt U.S. Beef Imports on Mad-Cow Case, Bloomberg, April 25, 2012, accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-25/japan-has-no-plan-to-halt-u-s-beef.

Daye Shim Lee is a junior in Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service studying International Politics.

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Japanese government with diplomatic leverage to pursue those goals: the 2003 ban sought to protect the Japanese beef industry in the aftermath of Japans own Mad Cow outbreak in 2001, while the 2012 decision aimed to win the U.S. support for Japans bid to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In order to demonstrate these points, this paper examines the effects of Mad Cow disease on U.S.-Japan beef trade and provides the political and eco-nomic analyses of Japanese responses in 2003 and 2012. It then concludes by discussing the implications of Japans beef policies for the contemporary U.S.-Japan trade relations from a realist perspective.

Beef Politics in Japan and the United StatesEven before the outbreak of Mad Cow disease, beef trade negotiations between Japan

and the United States had been heavily influenced by domestic politics in each country. In Japan, agriculture has traditionally been one of the most politically powerful and highly protected sectors.3 Three factors empower Japanese farmers to maintain the governments support in achieving their goals despite the growing public concern about high domestic food prices (studies show that food prices in Japan are nearly twice as high as international prices) and the deterioration of Japans trade relations.4 First, their political power is founded on a strong organizational basis. More than five million Japanese farm households are uni-fied under Nokyo, or the Agricultural Cooperative Association. Although only eight percent of those households raise beef cattle, their political activities such as anti-import campaigns are orchestrated by Nokyo on a national scale.5 Second, farmers form a coherent voting bloc in the electoral district system that is skewed in favor of agricultural constituencies.6 These districts have long supported the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been in power in Japan since 1955 (except for an eleven-month period between 1993 and 1994 and for a three-year period between 2009 and 2012). In Japans 2012 election, the party leader and the former nationalist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe regained control of the govern-ment. The LDPs near-permanent hold of power in Japanese politics implies that its biggest support groupJapanese farmers and those closely associated with the agricultural sectoris also well-represented in the governments policy formation process. This leads to the third and last factor: Japanese farmers have secured the Diet politicians loyalties, as the predomi-nant ruling party is electorally indebted to farm voters and their organizations. The Diet or Kokkai refers to Japans bicameral legislature, which is composed of a lower house called the

3 Aurelia George Mulgan, The Politics of Agriculture in Japan (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1.4 Kym Anderson and Yujiro Hayami ed., The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: East Asia in International Perspective (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 1-3.5 Hideo Sato and Timothy J. Curran, Agricultural Trade: The Case of Beef and Citrus, in Coping with U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts, ed. I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), 128.6 Aurelia George Mulgan, The Politics of Agriculture in Japan, 207.

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House of Representatives and an upper house called the House of Councilors. Furthermore, Politicians from rural areas in the Diet often hold key agricultural policy positions.7

Due to these three factors, Japanese farmers and their determination to maintain the governments agricultural protection policies play a critical role in Japans political econo-my. Yet, globalization and the increasing volume of international tradeespecially through free-trade agreements (FTAs)have led the Japanese government to seriously consider implementing measures of agricultural reform. This owes to the fact that with strict agri-cultural protection measures, the Japanese government cannot persuade other countries to sign FTAs with Japan. Consequently, Japanese farmers tend to oppose any sign of free trade talks as FTAs are designed to significantly reduce or eliminate tariffs and import quotas on most goods and services traded between countries. They fear that the dismantling of Japans high protective farming tariffs will open up the country to cheap foreign agricultural goods and ultimately threaten their livelihood. According to the Japanese Agricultural Ministry, 90 percent of Japans rice cultivation would disappear, and wheat, sugar, dairy and beef pro-duction would also be harmed if the country joined the free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific. This would cost Japan about 4 trillion yen (or $49 billion) in lost production, as well as 3.4 million lost jobs.8 The Japanese government therefore, faces a dilemma over whether to open the countrys agricultural sector to the rest of the world and join the free trade movement, or to maintain its traditional policy that would please its domestic farmers.

In response to these recent developments in Japans political economy, many inter-national scholars and policymakers in the field of U.S.-Japan trade relations have debated about the possibility of major agricultural reform taking place in Japan. Scholar Aurelia George Mulgan, for example, wrote extensively on how Japans agricultural politics are in transition from an old to a new model due to broader changes in the Japanese political economy.9 According to Mulgan, these changes include efforts to rebalance electoral power from rural factions and to strengthen the executive power of the Prime Minister over the Diet. At the same time, she argues that the impact of these changes on Japans agricultural policy has been modest as vestiges of the old system continue to complicate the outlook for agricultural reform.10 It is, therefore, difficult to currently predict the speed and extent to which the Japanese government will open up its agricultural sector to foreign competi-tion. However, the general consensus in both academia and the policy-making world is

7 Sato and Curran, 128.8 Hiroko Tabuchi, Japans Farmers Oppose Pacific Free-trade Talks, The New York Times, November 11, 2010, accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/business/global/12yen.html?pagewanted=all.9 Aurelia George Mulgan, Where Tradition Meets Change: Japans Agricultural Politics in Transition, Journal of Japanese Studies 31, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 261. 10 Ibid.

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that the strong political influence of Japanese farmers over Japans trade policies will not be exhausted anytime soon.

In the United States, the agriculture sectors political power remains strong despite the decline in the farm population. Meat producers, in particular, maintain great political clout because they exercise influence over both the legislative and the regulatory areas.11 Unlike large corporations on Capitol Hill that spread their funds across many different groups of lawmakers in attempts to gain more political influence, the meat industry targets a small number of relevant legislators who have a direct impact on the industrys interests.12 The U.S. meat industry, like its Japanese counterpart, is also represented by powerful trade and lobby-ing groups such as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Meat Institute; the American Farm Bureau Federation spends between $2 million and $8 million per year lobbying for its agenda in Washington.13 Given the substantial amount of power granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution and the important role that legislators play in American politics, it is not an overstatement to say that lobbyists and interest groups representing the U.S. meat industry indirectly exert significant influence on the formation of U.S. foreign trade policy. Furthermore, these organizations often secure their influence by establishing close ties with officials in the upper echelons of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

The importance of politics in the U.S.-Japan beef trade is clearly reflected in the beef and citrus case of the 1980s. At the time, the American agricultural sector was expressing frustration over its failure to gain fair access to Japanese markets, and pressures were building up in Washington for retaliatory measures.14 In 1982, the Reagan Administration decided to push for new beef and citrus quotas that would allow American farmers to export significantly more beef and citrus to Japan. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Congressional elections were to take place in the same year, and President Reagan needed the support of the states that produced beef and orangesFlorida and almost all states west of the Mississippito win the seats in the Senate and the House.15 Yet, the U.S. government eased its pressure to open Japans agricultural market in the first six months of 1983, especially after Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visited Washington in January of that year. Japans domestic elec-tions were coming up in April and June, and Japanese voters were criticizing Nakasone for giving in to American pressure and selling out Japans interests.16 In consideration

11 Steve Johnson, The Politics of Meat: A Look at the Meat Industrys Influence on Capitol Hill, PBS, April 18, 2002, accessed December 7, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/politics.12 Ibid.13 Senate Office of Public Records, Annual Lobbying by American Farm Bureau, OpenSecrets.org, October 31, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021832&year=201014 C. Peter Timmer and Michael R. Reich, Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and Oranges, Challenge 26, No. 4, (1983): 20-21.15 Ibid.16 Timmer and Reich, Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and Oranges, 22.

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of the Japaneseleaderships difficult position amid domestic political turmoil, U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock made only one public reference to agriculture during his visit to Tokyo in February, and this comment was in response to a question brought up by the Japanese side.

This brief history demonstrates the deeply ingrained interplay between politics and economics in the U.S.-Japan beef trade. It also provides a real-world example of how domes-tic politics play a critical role in shaping a countrys foreign policy. Domestic politics matter even more in modern liberal democracies like the United States and Japan, where authority, legitimacy, and the power of a national leader are derived from voters. Therefore, leaders must pay close attention to the demands of their peopleespecially in the areas of econom-ics and trade because these issues are directly affect peoples livelihoodsin order to win elections. Domestic politics and elections thus influence the timing and the intensity of de-mands on international trade, and often set the tone of negotiations by affecting government positions and defining acceptable limits of adjustment. Additionally, with globalization and the arrival of the information age, it is no longer possible for national leaders to pursue an entirely secretive, elite-driven foreign trade policy. Each of these factors combines to create more cohesive ties between politics and economics in todays world.

The Outbreak of Mad Cow Disease and U.S.-Japan Beef TradeThe beef trade negotiations between Japan and the United States have become further

politicized and emotionalized since the outbreak of Mad Cow disease in North America. Mad Cow disease, a fatal neurological disease found in cattle, first appeared in the United Kingdom in 1986. Studies since then have suggested that the source of Mad Cow disease is cattle feed prepared from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agent-infected cattle parts, and people who consume contaminated beef can be susceptible to a human version of Mad Cow disease called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD).17

The first case of U.S. Mad Cow came from a Canadian-born dairy cow in the state of Washington in December 2003.18 Nevertheless, the USDA announced that no highest-risk tissues had entered the countrys food supply. The International Review Team (IRT) also reported in March 2004 that Mad Cow disease was highly unlikely to become established or to spread in the United States. Furthermore, the World Organization for Animal Health

17 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 113: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, November 2002, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs113/en.18 U.S. Congressional Research Service, BSE (Mad Cow Disease): A Brief Overview (RS22345; December 19, 2006), by Geoffrey S. Becker, accessed December 7, 2012.

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(OIE) recognized the United States as a controlled risk country for Mad Cow disease, mean-ing that U.S. beef from cattle of all ages could be safely traded.19

Despite various organizations safety assurances on American beef, U.S.-Japan beef trade relations rapidly deteriorated after the outbreak of Mad Cow disease in the United States. Prior to the first American Mad Cow case, Japan was the leading importer of U.S. beef.20 Initially, the level of meat consumption in Japan was low as the Japanese had tra-ditionally relied on fish for protein and avoided eating red meat for cultural and religious reasons. However, the Japanese began to consume more beef when the U.S. occupied Japan after the Second World War and started to import U.S. beef in significant quantities in the 1970s. During the occupation, the USDA played a critical role in supporting the Japanese school lunch program, and this partnership between the USDA and the Japanese food sector helped the U.S. beef industry gain more access to the Japanese market.21 As a result, Japan alone accounted for 37 percent of U.S. beef export markets in 2003.22

In response to the USDAs announcement of the first American Mad Cow case, many countries, including Japan, banned the import of U.S. beef. Although Canada and Mexico resumed importing some U.S. beef in 2004, Japan and South Korea refused to reopen their markets. Having lost more than 60 percent of its beef export markets, the United States went from claiming 18 percent of the worlds beef market to only three percent.23 In October 2004, Japan and the United States developed a new framework for their beef trade. Japan agreed to admit low-risk U.S. beef if the United States could verify that it had come from cattle under 21 months old. Japan also demanded that the U.S. definition of specified risk materials (SRMs) expand to include the entire head, and that these be removed before arriving in Japan.24 However, Japan did not allow U.S. beef imports until December 2005 and abruptly halted the imports again in January 2006, following the discovery of vertebral column bones in several boxes of veal from New York. Despite U.S. apologies and promises of stronger safety inspections, Japan did not reopen its market until July 2006, and even then, the U.S. beef industry gained only limited access.

The Japanese governments reluctance to reopen its beef market sparked anger among U.S. officials. In addition to signaling a financial disaster, this decision became a sensitive

19 U.S. Meat Export Federation, A Ruling by the World Organization for Animal Health, http://www.usmef.org/news-statistics/press-releases/a-ruling-by-the-world-organization-for-animal-health-or-oie-adds-some-14313.20 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Japan-U.S. Beef Trade Issues (RS22115; April 13, 2005), by Geoffrey S. Becker, accessed December 7, 2012. 21 U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service, The History of U.S. Beef Exports to Japan, Last Modified April 30, 2009, http://www.thebeefsite.com/articles/1965/the-history-of-us-beef-exports-to-japan.22 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade (RS21709; December 6, 2006), by Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker, accessed December 7, 2012.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.

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issue evoking strong emotions from both sides.25 President George W. Bush frequently brought up the matter in his phone calls with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, and Vice President Dick Cheney urged Japanese officials to lift the ban on U.S. beef im-ports during his visit to Tokyo in 2004; both the President and the Vice President had come from the countrys biggest beef-producing states. Other American politicians also argued that Japan should guide its decisions based on science, not politics.26 Frustration mounted on both sides as the negotiations dragged on. In Washington, Congress passed resolutions calling for retaliations against Japanese exports to the United States. In Tokyo, the politi-cians and consumer groups criticized U.S. pressure as a form of foreign intervention. In both countries, Mad Cow disease and beef trade were no longer a mere glitch in U.S.-Japan economic relations; the whole issue had become a symbol of national sovereignty and pride.

Analysis of the Japanese Response in 2003Although Japan was not the only country to stop the import of U.S. beef after the 2003

Mad Cow disease outbreak in the United States, the Japanese response is unique in that it took Japan nearly three years to reopen its market to U.S. exporters. Even after that, Japan never fully normalized its beef trade relations with the United States. While it could be argued that Japan had also banned European beef in response to the widespread outbreak of Mad Cow disease across Europe in the late 1990s, the European case is significantly different from the American case in terms of context. The European case did not have a great impact on Japanese consumers as Japan was importing a negligible proportion of beef from Europe to begin with.27 On the other hand, U.S. beef accounted for 30 percent of Japanese beef con-sumption.28 If the U.S. imports took up such a large portion of the Japanese beef market, why did it take so long for Japan to resume its trade with the United States? If food safety was the biggest concern for the Japanese government, why did scientific reports guaranteeing the safety of U.S. beef fail to speed up the trade negotiations to reopen the Japanese beef market?

For the Japanese government, a goal paralleling the importance of food safety was the protection of the Japanese beef industry in the aftermath of Japans own Mad Cow out-breaks. In September 2001, Japan confirmed its first Mad Cow disease discovery. As a result, the Japanese beef industry faced sharp reactions in both its domestic and export markets. Despite the Japanese governments efforts to reassure domestic consumers and to persuade other countries to drop bans imposed on Japanese beef, the Japanese beef market saw its

25 Brad Glosserman, U.S.-Japan Relations: History Starts Here, CSIS Comparative Connections 7, No. 1 (2005): 1-3. 26 Ibid.27 Hyun J. Jin and Won W. Koo, The Effect of the BSE Outbreak in Japan on Consumers Preferences, European Review of Agricultural Economics 30, No. 2 (2003): 177.28 U.S. Congressional Research Service, BSE (Mad Cow Disease): A Brief Overview.

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sales fall by as much as 50 percent due to concerns over Mad Cow disease.29 The price of domestic beef dropped significantly, and 60 percent of Japanese consumers stopped eating beef.30 To exacerbate the situation, a second infected cow was found in November 2001, fol-lowed by a third and fourth in the next month, further pressuring the Japanese government to seek measures that would help the countrys beef industry recover as quickly as possible.

When the first U.S. Mad Cow case was found in 2003, Japanese beef industry was still recovering from its own Mad Cow outbreaks. Japanese consumers willingness to pay higher prices for higher quality domestic beef, which had traditionally served as the main driv-ing force behind Japanese beef production, no longer existed to support the domestic beef industry. Furthermore, a surge in the production of the famous Kobe beef in the United States began to further threaten the Japanese beef industry.31 The U.S. exporters sold the Kobe style beef in Japan at lower prices, which began to replace the BSE-threatened do-mestic Kobe beef. Until the Japanese government banned the import of U.S. beef in 2004, many Japanese consumers preferred to buy Kobe style beef from the United States over its authentic Japanese counterpart.32

The discovery of Mad Cow disease in the United States gave the Japanese government both an incentive and an opportunity to pursue trade policies that would protect the crip-pled domestic beef industry, resulting in three big political advantages. First, it provided the Japanese government a legitimate reason to ban imports of U.S. beef and preserve its strict beef trade policies. With food safety at stake, no country could blame Japan for playing tough against the United States, especially during the months that immediately followed the December 2003 Mad Cow disease outbreak in the state of Washington. Rather, other countries followed Japan when setting standards and implementing regulations on Mad Cow disease for their own beef markets. For example, South Korea announced in 2004 that it would not resume the import of U.S. beef until Japan did.33

Second, the 2003 U.S. Mad Cow case restored the Japanese governments diplomatic power in negotiating with the United States by creating a level playing field for the two countries. The Japanese government began to raise its voice about not just regulating U.S. beef imports in Japan but also increasing Japanese beef exports to the United States. In fact, before Japan finalized its decision to resume U.S. beef imports in December 2005, the United States had agreed to permit Japanese beef to enter the U.S. market.34 Prior to this revision,

29 Hyun J. Jin and Won W. Koo, The Effect of the BSE Outbreak in Japan on Consumers Preferences, European Review of Agricultural Economics 30, No. 2 (2003): 177.30 Ibid.31 Meghan Staley, Kobe Beef, American University TED Case Studies, No. 711, December 2004, accessed December 17, 2012, http://www1.american.edu/ted/kobe.htm.32 Ibid.33 Brad Glosserman, U.S.-Japan Relations: History Starts Here, CSIS Comparative Connections 7, No. 1 (2005): 1-3. 34 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade.

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the U.S. government had banned Japanese beef imports due to animal disease outbreaks in Japan, such as Mad Cow and foot-and-mouth diseases.

Third, the outbreak of Mad Cow disease in the United States bolstered some Japanese beef producers claim that Mad Cow disease in Japan came from infected imported animals. When the ninth Japanese Mad Cow case was confirmed in November 2003, a number of Japanese meat companies started blaming imported beef as the source of Mad Cow dis-ease. A farm ministry panel in Japan also announced that the source of the outbreak was either cows imported from Britain in the 1980s or meat-and-bone-meal imported from Italy before 1990.35 Although no one had directly pointed at the United States, its own outbreak in 2003 strengthened Japans unproven argument that domestic beef is safe, while creating the notion that Mad Cow is inherently a Western disease.36

These three points suggest that the primary goal of the Japanese government in re-stricting U.S. beef imports was to protect and revive the exhausted domestic beef industry. It earned Japan both the justification and time to slow down the rate of beef imports into the country. As the resumption of trade was delayed, however, the Japanese government faced sharp criticisms from the United States for not satisfactorily explaining why Japanese beef is safe to eat when U.S. beef may not be.37 Yet, the fear of Mad Cow disease in Japan continued to be played out in favor of the Japanese government in protecting the countrys endangered beef industry.

The Analysis of the Japanese Response in 2012In April 2012, the USDA announced that it had identified a case of Mad Cow disease,

the first in six years, in a California dairy cow. As the news reached the public, many U.S. beef exporters immediately feared that the already cautious Asian countries would imple-ment even stronger protectionist measures against the American beef and cattle products.38 South Korea proved their concerns legitimate as two major Korean retailers pulled U.S. beef off the shelves of their stores right after the USDA confirmed the California Mad Cow case.39

Surprisingly, however, Japan voluntarily announced that it would not suspend U.S. beef imports. Japanese Ministry of Agriculture official Minoru Yamamoto told the U.S.

35 Unknown, Ninth Mad Cow Case Confirmed by Ministry, The Japan Times, November 5, 2003, accessed December 17, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20031105a2.html.36 Michael Fitzpatrick, Japan and BSE: Panic, Protectionism or Simply Good Science?, Just Food, December 8, 2003, accessed December 17, 2012, http://www.just-food.com/analysis/panic-protectionism-or-simply-good-science_id94069.aspx.37 Alison Myers, Japan Using Mad Cow to Boost Own Beef Industry, CBC News, June 28, 2003, accessed December 20, 2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2003/06/28/bse_japan030628.html.38 Stephanie Storm, Case of Mad Cow Disease Is Found in U.S., The New York Times, April 24, 2012, accessed December 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/health/case-of-mad-cow-disease-is-found-in-us.html.39 Paul Vercammen, S. Korea Curbs U.S. Beef Sales After Confirmation of Mad Cow Disease, CNN, April 26, 2012, accessed December 20, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/25/health/california-mad-cow/index.html.

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mediajust a day after the USDAs announcement of Mad Cow disease outbreak in Californiathat Japan is importing beef from the United States under the rules agreed between the two nations, and will therefore not halt imports merely because of the new discovery in California.40 This starkly contrasts with Japans immediate closure of its borders to U.S. beef after the 2003 discovery of Mad Cow disease in the state of Washington.

Japan also made another friendly gesture and announced its decision to further relax the current Japanese restrictions on U.S. beef imports. The age restriction on importing beef from cattle of 20 months old or younger had been in place since 2006 and faced wide-spread criticisms from U.S. exporters; the age limit meant that only 20 to 30 percent of U.S. beef would meet the new Japanese standard.41 Yet, in September 2012, the Japanese Cabinet Offices Food Safety Commission began to consider lifting the age restrictions. According to the revised plan, imports will be allowed for U.S. beef from cattle of 30 months old or younger.42 A November op-ed piece that appeared in The Yomiuri Shimbun praised this decision as a realistic approach based on scientific knowledge and international trends in connection with an important issue.43 What is this issue then, and why did it prompt the Japanese government to deviate completely from its long-held protectionist trade policy towards U.S. beef imports?

The biggest motivation behind the Japanese governments decision to ease the import restrictions on U.S. beef was Japans potential entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Joining the TPP, a U.S.-led multilateral free trade agreement that encompasses the econo-mies of the Asia-Pacific, has been one of the most important items on former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Nodas agenda. The TPP not only promotes the elimination or review of tariffs, but also seeks to liberalize services such as banking and insurance. This was significant to Noda because Japans domestic service industries have remained largely isolated from foreign competition and, as a result, the country has struggled to create new opportunities for entrepreneurs and workers in the service sector.44

The United States, the country that holds the key to Japans future participation in the TPP talks, has demanded the Japanese government to ease restrictions on the age of U.S. beef imports. In a meeting with Prime Minister Noda in April 2012, President Obama reit-erated that the beef issue was one of the most important preconditions for Japans entrance

40 Takada.41 Glosserman, 1-3. 42 Unknown, Beef Move to Aid TPP Entry: Relaxing Controls on U.S. Imports Likely to Boost Japans Bid, The Yomiuri Shimbun, September 7, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T12.htm.43 Unknown, Easing Import Restrictions on U.S. Beef Justifiable, The Yomiuri Shimbun, November 3, 2012, accessed December 20, 2012, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T121103002010.htm.44 Unknown, A TPP Stimulus for Japan, The Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2012, accessed December 20, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443819404577632953734008664.html#articleTabs.

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into the TPP.45 Therefore, when Mad Cow disease broke out in California earlier that month, it gave Japanese officials an additional political advantage to set the tone of negotiations re-garding the countrys TPP entrance. Announcing their plan to not halt the U.S. beef imports immediately after the Mad Cow disease outbreak in California meant that Japan was helping the United States to convince other countries that U.S. beef was safe, and to maintain relative stability in the Asia market. Since Japan had offered a helping hand first, it was then naturally the United States turn to listen to Japanese demands. In fact, following the Japanese an-nouncement regarding the continuation of importing U.S. beef, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucuswhose committee has jurisdiction over trade including the TPPmentioned in the official statement that he is encouraged by the steps taken by the Japanese government, and that the United States and Japan were headed in the right direction.46

Japans decision to lower the level of restrictions placed on U.S. beef imports was thus a political move to reassure Washington that Japan was making an effort to improve U.S.-Japan trade relations, as well as a diplomatic maneuver to gain U.S. support for Japans en-trance to the TPP. Additionally, it was an attempt to create a more diplomatic atmosphere before the meeting between Noda and Obama, which was scheduled to be held at the end of April that year.47

Concluding RemarksUnderstanding Japanese Motives: A Realist Perspective

The above political and economic analyses of Japanese responses to the 2003 and 2012 U.S. Mad Cow cases imply that Japan has been, and is likely to continue, using Mad Cow disease as a powerful political tool in pursuing its national interests. According to the realist paradigm of international relations, states always act in accordance with their national inter-ests, with self-preservation as their primary goal.48 In the absence of an international sover-eignthat is, within the anarchic structure of the international systemit is also in a states best interest to search for opportunities to gain more power over other states to guarantee its national security.49 In todays world, economic prosperity and the capability to influence international trade are important sources of state power. Unlike the liberal school of thought in international relationsthat the increase in international trade results in growing inter-

45 Unknown, Japan to Ease Age Restrictions on U.S. Beef Imports, The Ashahi Shimbun, October 23, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201210230057.46 Unknown, Japans Action on U.S. Beef Encouraging U.S. Senator, Reuters, September 5, 2012, accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/05/us-usa-japan-beef-idUSBRE88415P20120905.47 Ibid.48 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).49 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

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dependence among states, inducing them to seek mutual rather than national interestsinconsistent Japanese reactions to Mad Cow disease outbreaks in the United States in 2003 and 2012 confirm that states rarely operate based on trust. This is especially true considering that Japan has been widely recognized as one of the most important U.S. allies in the world.

Based on this theoretical assumption, as well as evidence provided by the two case stud-ies of Japanese responses to Mad Cow disease outbreaks in the United States, it is fair to con-clude that the United States does not have as much control over the direction of U.S.-Japan beef trade as it did prior to 2003. Washington may raise the issue of fairness and demand that the U.S.-Japan trade relations operate based on trust, but Japan will make decisions that best serve its national interest. Although Japan is currently willing to ease its age restric-tions on U.S. beef imports, this is likely to be only a temporary improvement. Depending on the intensity of Japans desire to join the TPP or the potential emergence of a new Japanese political goal in the future, it remains possible that the Japanese government will develop a very different approach to its beef import policy. Given the dramatic comeback of the right-wing LDP led by Shinzo Abe in the most recent Japanese election, as well as the increasing share of Australian beef imports in the Japanese market that has been replacing U.S. beef, there remain serious doubts as to how much U.S.-Japan beef trade relations can improve in the years to come.

Implications for Overall U.S.-Japan Trade RelationsFor overall U.S.-Japan trade relations, Japans continued use of Mad Cow disease as

diplomatic leverage could lead to strong negative emotions involved in the agricultural in-dustry to spill over to different economic sectors. In fact, Senator Mike Johanns has already linked the beef issue with the Toyota recall crisis in 2010. Toyota announced a recall of over 2.3 million vehicles in 2010 to correct problems associated with gas pedals, and this was a separate case that happened in addition to the then-ongoing recall of 4.2 million Toyota and Lexus vehicles. According to several news reports, the biggest Toyota recalls that have been made were neither in Europe nor in China, but in the United States.50 Senator Johanns cited this as an example of unfairness in U.S.-Japan trade relations, as he argued that Tokyos strict stance on U.S. beef imports directly contrasted with Washingtons more cautious handling of Toyota cars amid recalls over their acceleration problems.51 Mad cow disease thus not only applies to beef trade, but tends to influence other areas of U.S.-Japan trade relations as well.

With the Obama administration so eager to increase American exports in keeping its promise to rebuild the nations economy, reopening the Japanese market to U.S. beef and

50 Peter Valdes-Dapena, Toyota Recall: 2.3 Million Cars, CNN, January 22, 2010, accessed March 27, 2013, http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/21/autos/toyota_recall.51 Hiroko Tabuchi, White House Presses Japan to Reopen Market to U.S. Beef, The New York Times, April 7, 2010, accessed December 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/business/global/08beef.html.

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further liberalizing other Japanese economic sectors are likely to remain the top priorities for the administration on the bilateral trade front. In that sense, Mad Cow disease will con-tinue to be one of the biggest obstacles for the United States in pursuing its trade interests with Japan. As demonstrated throughout this paper, Mad Cow disease is not simply an epi-demic. Instead, it is an important element of political economy that greatly influences the contemporary U.S.-Japan trade relations.

BibliographyAnderson, Kym, and Yujiro Hayami eds. The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection:

East Asia in International Perspective. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986.Fitzpatrick, Michael. Japan and BSE: Panic, Protectionism or Simply Good Science? Just

Food. December 8, 2003. Accessed December 17, 2012. http://www.just-food.com/analysis/panic-protectionism-or-simply-good-science_id94069.aspx.

Glosserman, Brad. U.S.-Japan Relations: History Starts Here. CSIS Comparative Connec-tions 7, No. 1 (2005): 1-5.

Japans Action on U.S. Beef Encouraging U.S. Senator. Reuters. September 5, 2012. Ac-cessed March 27, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/05/us-usa-japan-beef-idUSBRE88415P20120905.

Jin, Hyun J., and Won W. Koo. The Effect of the BSE Outbreak in Japan on Consumers Preferences. European Review of Agricultural Economics 30, No. 2 (2003): 173-192.

Johnson, Steve. The Politics of Meat: A Look at the Meat Industrys Influence on Capi-tol Hill. PBS. April 18, 2002, accessed December 7, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/politics.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.Mulgan, Aurelia G. The Politics of Agriculture in Japan. New York: Routledge, 2000.Mulgan, Aurelia G. Where Tradition Meets Change: Japans Agricultural Politics in Transi-

tion. Journal of Japanese Studies 31, No. 2 (2005): 261-298.Myers, Alison. Japan Using Mad Cow to Boost Own Beef Industry. CBC News. June 28,

2003. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2003/06/28/bse_ja-pan030628.html.

Sato, Hideo, and Timothy J. Curran. Agricultural Trade: The Case of Beef and Citrus. In Coping with U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts, edited by I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato. Lex-ington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982.

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Staley, Meghan. Kobe Beef. American University TED Case Studies No. 711. December 2004. Accessed December 17, 2012. http://www1.american.edu/ted/kobe.htm.

Strom, Stephanie. Case of Mad Cow Disease Is Found in U.S. The New York Times. April 24, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/health/case-of-mad-cow-disease-is-found-in-us.html.

Strom, Stephanie, and Hiroko Tabuchi. A Break for Embattled Ranchers. The New York Times. January 29, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/global/japan-to-ease-restrictions-on-us-beef.html.

Tabuchi, Hiroko. White House Presses Japan to Reopen Market to U.S. Beef. The New York Times. April 7, 2010. Accessed December 10, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/business/global/08beef.html.

Takada, Aya. Japan Has No Plan to Halt U.S. Beef Imports on Mad-Cow Case. Bloomberg. April 25, 2012. Accessed December 7, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-25/japan-has-no-plan-to-halt-u-s-beef.

Timmer, C. Peter, and Michael R. Reich. Japan and the U.S.: Trading Shots Over Beef and Oranges. Challenge 26, No. 4 (1983): 18-24.

A TPP Stimulus for Japan. The Wall Street Journal. September 6, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443819404577632953734008664.html

Beef Move to Aid TPP Entry: Relaxing Controls on U.S. Imports Likely to Boost Japans Bid. The Yomiuri Shimbun. September 7, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T12.htm.

Easing Import Restrictions on U.S. Beef Justifiable. The Yomiuri Shimbun. Novem-ber 3, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/editorial/T121103002010.htm.

Japan to Ease Age Restrictions on U.S. Beef Imports. The Ashahi Shimbun. October 23, 2012, accessed December 10, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/economy/business/AJ201210230057.

Ninth Mad Cow Case Confirmed by Ministry. The Japan Times. November 5, 2003. Ac-cessed December 17, 2012. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20031105a2.html.

U.S. Congressional Research Service. BSE (Mad Cow Disease): A Brief Overview (RS22345; December 19, 2006), by Geoffrey S. Becker. Accessed December 7, 2012.

U.S. Congressional Research Service. Japan-U.S. Beef Trade Issues (RS22115; April 13, 2005), by Geoffrey S. Becker. Accessed December 7, 2012.

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U.S. Congressional Research Service. Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade (RS21709; De-cember 6, 2006), by Charles E. Hanrahan and Geoffrey S. Becker. Accessed December 7, 2012.

U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. The History of U.S. Beef Ex-ports to Japan. April 30, 2009. http://www.thebeefsite.com/articles/1965/the-history-of-us-beef-exports-to-japan.

U.S. Meat Export Federation. A Ruling by the World Organization for Animal Health.

http://www.usmef.org/news-statistics/press-releases/a-ruling-by-the-world-organization-for-animal-health-or-oie-adds-some-14313.

U.S. Senate Office of Public Records. Annual Lobbying by American Farm Bureau.

OpenSecrets.org. http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/cli-entsum.php?id=D000021832&year=2010.

Valdes-Dapena, Peter. Toyota Recall: 2.3 Million Cars. CNN. January 22, 2010. Accessed March 27, 2013. http://money.cnn.com/2010/01/21/autos/toyota_recall.

Vercammen, Paul. S. Korea Curbs U.S. Beef Sales After Confirmation of Mad Cow Dis-ease. CNN. April 26, 2012. Accessed December 20, 2012.

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/25/health/california-mad-cow/index.html.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

World Health Organization. Fact Sheet No. 113: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.

http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs113/en.

Why did the United States enter the 1991 Persian Gulf War?

A Study of Psychological Theory and Offensive RealismLeyla Tosun

This paper will use two international relations theories to explain the U.S. entrance into the Gulf War in 1991. Yuen Foong Khongs psychological theory suggests that the 1938 Munich agreement analogy weighed heavily upon President George H.W. Bush and ultimately influ-enced his decision to use aggressive military force rather than to appease Saddam Hussein. John Mearsheimers offensive realism theory can also explain this event by evaluating the U.S.s desire to intervene in response to Iraqs control of vast oil reserves, and its ambition to become a regional hegemon. The merits of each theory in explaining this event in U.S. history will be considered and potential weaknesses in both will be addressed. Ultimately, it is concluded that both theories have strong explanatory value for the U.S. invasion of Iraq on January 17, 1991.

On August 2, 1990 Iraqi troops invaded neighboring Kuwait. In response, on January 17, 1991 the United States and coalition forces began an aerial bombardment of Iraq. This paper will present two theories offering possible explanations for the United States invasion of Iraq. First, psychological theory will demonstrate how the Bush administration employed the 1938 Munich Conference analogy in justifying aggressive action against Iraq instead of appeasement. Next, offensive realism theory will be presented as an alternative theoretical explanation this second theory uses the Iraqi pursuit of regional hegemony and a decrease in U.S. security to explain this involvement. Finally, this paper will examine any potential weaknesses in these theories and evaluate their merits in explaining the U.S. entrance into the Gulf War.

BackgroundTo fully analyze the U.S. entrance into the Gulf War, the regional context behind the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait must first be examined. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the U.S. provided billions of dollars worth of aid, weaponry of non-U.S. origin, military train-ing, and military intelligence to Iraq. While not considered allies, the U.S. also provided substantial diplomatic support for Iraq during this conflict. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also provided additional monetary support, but resulted in Iraqs heavy indebtedness to the two Gulf nations by the conclusion of the war. Although Iraq pressured Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

Leyla Tosun is junior at the University of Virginia studying International Relations and Economics.

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to forgive the debt, the two countries refusal resulted in mounting tensions after the war in addition to a continuing territorial dispute with Kuwait and conflicts over OPEC quotas.

This territorial dispute had its origins in the creation of two separate countries, Iraq and Kuwait, by Britain in 1922. Since Kuwaits independence from Britain in 1961, Iraq has re-fused to recognize Kuwait as an independent state, viewing the land as legally a part of Iraq. This dispute was compounded by a conflict over oil production, in which Iraq correctly ac-cused Kuwait of overproducing above the OPEC approved rate. As supply increased, prices declined, reaching prices as low as ten dollars per barrel in 1989, resulting in a loss of seven billion dollars a year to Iraq.1 Additionally, U.S.-Iraqi relations began to spiral downwards due to human rights abuses and Iraqi threats to use binary chemical weapons on Israel, and Iraq became increasingly isolated.2 It was in this atmosphere that Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, citing violations of the OPEC quotas.

Psychological TheoryIn light of this historical context, this study begins with an examination of the psycho-

logical elements behind the policy decisions that lead up to the January 17 bombardment of Iraq. Yuen Foong Khong, a scholar of psychological theory, studies the use of historical analogies in policy decisions. In his book, Analogies at War, he explains the six diagnostic tasks of an analogy: define the situation, stake an assessment, make an implicit policy pre-scription, predict the likelihood of success, assess the moral, assess the moral righteousness, and warn of dangers associated with a decision.3 According to Khong, these analogies pro-vide a framework for how leaders begin to understand the problems that they face, and can significantly influence their policy decisions. The Bush administration employed a crucial analogy in its decision to invade Iraq in January 1991. The administration found itself facing the aggressive regime of Saddam Hussein, and it used the Munich analogy to ultimately decide against a weak foreign policy of appeasement.

The Munich AnalogyThe Munich analogy uses experiences from World War II policy decisions to warn

against the inherent dangers of appeasing an aggressor. At the 1938 Munich conference, the French and Italian governments followed the lead of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in appeasing Adolf Hitler and allowing Nazi Germany to annex the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. This eventually resulted in the full-scale invasion of Czechoslovakia, in the subsequent invasions of neighboring countries, and in the magnification of Germanys

1 Geoff Simons, Iraq: From Summer to Post-Saddam (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 339 - 340.2 Simons, Iraq: From Summer to Post-Saddam, 337-338.3 Yuen Foong Khong, The AE Framework, in Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992): 21.

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power. By the time that the Allied Powers finally sought to halt German expansion with a declaration of war in 1939, the Nazis had already taken control of Czechoslovakia and invaded Poland. Their failure to deal firmly with Hitler in 1938 suggested an unwilling-ness to get involved and emboldened Hitler in his quest to conquer Europe.4 The Munich Agreement is generally viewed as a failure of appeasement and of the international com-munity to defend values of freedom and sovereignty against the rising power of a dangerous dictator.

For decades following World War II, the Munich analogy was used as a warning against the dangers of a weak foreign policy in response to an aggressive state. In the months lead-ing up to the 1991 Gulf war, this analogy impacted the framework that President George H.W. Bush used to understand the situation at hand. He was influenced by his meetings with Margaret Thatcher and with the National Security Council, and ultimately adopted this analogy. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Bush insisted that he was not contemplating any type of military intervention. However, in the weeks that followed, it is evident that his thinking changed. Later in the day on August 2, Margaret Thatcher flew to Aspen, Colorado to meet with President Bush to discuss the conflict in the Middle East. From her memoirs, Thatcher recounts that she cited the costs of appeasement in the 1930s and told Bush that they needed to move quickly to stop Saddams aggression. She urged that the United Nations had to enact a strict economic embargo upon Iraq until they withdrew from Kuwait.5 Thatcher had no reservations as to the seriousness of the conflict or in her belief that appeasement was not a viable option. Shortly after their meeting, the two leaders held a press conference where Bush altered his earlier statement about the possibility of a military intervention, instead insisting that he had not ruled it out as a policy tool. While Bush did not specifically mention the Munich analogy in the closed-door meetings of the next few days, it can be surmised that Thatchers argument had an impact on his thinking for the remainder of the conflict, as the administration resolutely decided that appeasement was not an option after the Aspen conference.

In a National Security Council meeting the next day, on August 3, President Bush said, The status quo is intolerable language that proves that appeasement was not an option for him.6 National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft supported this notion, stating that, to accommodate Iraq should not be a policy option.7 He later announced that a mili-tary track was being considered in addition to diplomatic and economic ones. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gave updates on possible military fronts and Chairman of the Joint

4 The Learning Network, Sept. 30, 1938 | Hitler Granted the Sudentenland by Britain, France and Italy, The New York Times, September 30, 2011, Accessed March 10, 2013.

5 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: Visiting Aspen [memoirs extract], Accessed March 10, 2013.

6 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: National Security Council minutes [declassified 2000], Accessed March 10, 2013.

7 Ibid.

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Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell explained two possible options for using force in the region. From these statements, it can be concluded that military intervention was already a strong policy choice for the Bush administration.

Two days later on August 5, in another closed meeting of the National Security Council, when Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady suggested that the administration have someone talk to Saddam, General Scowcroft replied, We dont want to appear to be negotiating.8 The President also responded: Our solidarity would crumble if we are seen talking to Saddam.9

Scowcroft talked about deterring Saddam from invading Saudi Arabia, while President Bush inquired about using F-16s to destroy his tanks.10 The group of men meeting that day was clearly not moving towards a policy of appeasement, but rather one of aggressive economic sanctions and military force. There seemed to be a sentiment in the meetings that appeasing Saddam was never really a credible policy option.

On August 6, in a press conference after meeting again with Margaret Thatcher in Washington, President Bush made definitive declarations such as, These things will be enforced, whatever it takes.11 While the decision to use force to intervene in Kuwait was not publicly discussed for the first month of the conflict, it is evident from these statements that it was a valid policy option being discussed behind closed doors. The administration appeared convinced that appeasement would not suffice and that a coalition of forces had to show a strong front against Saddams aggression.

Saddam is Compared to Hitler In addition to these examples of how the Bush administration came to value the les-

sons of the Munich analogy, there were also significant comparisons being made between Saddam Husseins behavior in the Gulf and Adolf Hitlers behavior in World War II. The neo-conservative media promulgated most of this, but it was soon picked up by the administra-tion and used in many speeches as additional evidence tying the two events together. These comparisons were made in a few different ways; for example, Iraqs invasion of its neighbor, Kuwait, was similar to Germanys invasion of neighboring Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and France. Saddams pretext for invading Kuwait was also eerily Hitlerian in that he ac-cused a fairly powerless neighbor of a deliberate policy of aggression.12 This kind of absurd accusation was similar to those made by Hitler against Czechoslovakia in 1938. Saddams clear desire for regional power also paralleled Hitlers quest for European hegemony and

8 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: National Security Council minutes [declassified 1999], Accessed March 10, 2013.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Remarks after meeting President Bush (Welcomes UNSC4665), Accessed March 10, 2013.

12 Charles Krauthammer, Iraqs Thug: Nightmare From the Hitler Era, The Seattle Times, July 31, 1990.

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eventually global domination. These comparisons seemed to imply that both leaders were evil tyrants with the potential to gain much more power if left unchecked.

The use of this analogy linking Hitler and Saddam was especially prevalent among pun-dits who drew upon the analogy to persistently advocate for military action. For example, in The Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer-prize winning syndicated columnist (who was generally considered to be a conservative commentator), criticized Bush for his seeming hesitance in adopting the Munich analogy, saying that Saddam would get what he wants [Kuwait and Saudi Arabia] because there is no one to stop him George Bush is not eager to get bogged down in a land war in a God-forsaken patch of desert.13 On August 5, New York Times editor Abraham A.M. Rosenthal commented that it seemed that the Western powers had failed in their duty to address the plainest threats of aggression since Adolf Hitler.14 Prominent Democrats in Congress also criticized Bush for his disin-clination towards military intervention. Senator Clairborne Pell, Democratic Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was one of the first American politicians to characterize Saddam as the Hitler of the Middle East after the invasion of Kuwait, additionally citing President Bushs earlier lack of resolve to head-off an invasion.15

While the media and politicians used this language to mount pressure upon Bush to in-tervene militarily in Kuwait, the administration also started adopting this analogy between the two men. By August 8, it was obvious that the inundation of editorials and speeches on the Hitlerian nature of Saddam Husseins invasion had influenced the Bush administra-tion. The central image of President Bushs August 8, 1990 speech, Addressing the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, was none other than the 1938 Munich conference. About four minutes into the speech he said, If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.16 This explicit language indicated that the administration would no longer push for economic sanctions alone, but that it was prepared to use force to resist aggression. Even prior to this public speech, President Bush referred to Saddam as a madman who has shown he will kill, in a National Security Council meeting on August 6.17 It is evident that the Bush administration

13 Charles Krauthammer, A Festival of Appeasement, The Washington Post, August 5, 1990: E19.14 A.M. Rosenthal, Making a Killer, The New York Times, August 5, 1990: E19.15 The Iraqi Invasion; Invading Iraqis seize Kuwait and its oil; U.S. condemns attack, urges united action, The New York Times, August 3, 1990.16 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address on Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait (August 8, 1990), George H. W. Bush, Ac-cessed November 10, 2012, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/5529.

17 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Gulf War: National Security Council minutes [declassified 1999], Accessed March 10, 2013.

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was seeing similarities between Hitlers behavior in World War II and Saddams aggressive actions.

In the weeks following President Bushs August 8 speech, the Munich analogy emerged many more times in his rhetoric. In a speech to Department of Defense employees one week later, Bush again invoked the World War II analogy saying, A half a century ago our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should and could have been stopped. Were not about to make that same mistake twice.18 Just five days later on August 20, in a speech to Veterans of Foreign Wars in Baltimore, Bush praised Mikhail Gorbachev for condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He said that this showed that nations which joined to fight aggression in World War II can work together to stop the ag-gressors of today.19

Employing the Psychological TheoryWith this public engagement with the Munich analogy, the situation in the Gulf was

transformed into a battle of good versus evil. Following Khongs framework, the Bush ad-ministration used the analogy to define its situation as one of dealing with a murderous tyrant. The Bush Administration assessed there to be a grave risk that Saddam could threat-en the sovereignty of neighboring countries, which would inevitably lead to a bloody and destructive war with the West. The administration decided that their best policy option was to act aggressively to deter Saddam from advancing further. The United States and its allies were militarily strong, and so they believed that they had a high likelihood of success with this policy.

Finally, the administration believed the Munich analogy proved that appeasement was ineffective and the only thing that would deter Saddam was the effective use of aggressive military power. In President Bushs January 16 address to the nation he said, We and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.20 He contin-ued to say, We now believe that only force will make him leave [Kuwait].21 His conclusion was, A decision not to protect Saudi Arabia would have been viewed by Saddam as a lack of resolve on the part of the U.S. and, thus as an invitation to continue with his policy of expansionism.22 The Bush administration obviously determined that their only effective

18 George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, Remarks to Department of Defense Employees, Accessed November 18, 2012. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?=2165&year=1990&month=8.

19 The American Presidency Project, Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Baltimore, Mary-land, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?=18774.

20 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq, (January 16, 1991), George H.W. Bush, Accessed November 10, 2012, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3428.

21 Ibid.22 Alex Roberto Hybel, Power over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1993).

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choice was a military invasion. Therefore, as Khongs psychological theory would predict, the Munich analogy clearly had an impact on President Bushs assessment of the situation in the Gulf, and his decision to invade Iraq.

WeaknessWhile the psychological theory has great value, we must address a weakness in its ex-

planation. It is reasonable to propose that Khongs psychological theory is uncertain as to whether President Bush would have employed the Munich analogy without Margaret Thatchers influence and pressure from media and politicians. However, this concern can be remedied by examining George Bushs personal experiences. Bush had served as a fight-er pilot during World War II and was shot down at one point. While in office as the Vice President to Ronald Reagan, Bush spoke about the influence that his combat service had on him. He is quoted as saying, Theres no question that today it has a real impact on me as I give advice to the President.23 Khong theorizes that policy makers tend to latch onto comparisons that are easily accessible in their mind, often due to personal experiences. He quotes social psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross as saying, Objects and events in the phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they were sui generis configura-tions but rather are assimilated into preexisting structures in the mind of the perceiver.24 Khong continues, Individuals will be strongly attached to historical lessons in which gen-erational and personal effects reinforce one another.25 Applying this to George H. W. Bush, it is evident that the generational effects of living through the destruction of World War II, combined with his personal experience of being shot down as a naval aviator, would com-bine to create a strong historical lesson. This lesson leads the theory to predict that Bush would have a proclivity towards using the Munich analogy, and so it is safe to assume that his employment of the comparison was not wholly due to outside influences. However, an-other theory must additionally be considered to explain why the U.S. entered the Gulf war.

Offensive Realism TheoryOffensive realism can also be used to explain this event in U.S. history. This theory, as

detailed by John Mearsheimer, is based on five central assumptions: That the international system is anarchical that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capa-bility that states can never be certain about other states intentions that survival is the primary goal of great powers [and] that great powers are rational actors.26 In his book,

23 Naval Historical Center, Vice President Bush Calls World War II Experience Sobering, Accessed November 10, 2012, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq10-3.htm.

24 Khong, The AE Framework, 24-25.

25 Khong, The AE Framework,33.

26 John J. Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for Power, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001): 30-31.

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The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer discusses the effect that this system has on state behavior. He argues that ultimately, states are trying to survive in a self-interested world. The best way to ensure their security is to achieve regional hegemony because there is a security dilemma in which an increase in one states power will decrease another states security. However, Mearsheimer theorizes, Regional hegemons do not want peers.27 Therefore, a state will try to check a potential hegemons power, since they would prefer that there be at least two great powers in another region. Mearsheimer labels this check on power as offshore balancing.28 The two powers would balance one another and prevent a potentially threatening hegemon from emerging. Offensive realism theory also suggests that a state will have an incentive to strike preemptively because it can never be certain of another states true intentions. This leads to an aggressive international system with big payoffs for the state that strikes first.

The theory of offensive realism can help to explain the events in the Gulf in 1990-1991. When Saddam invaded Kuwait and positioned troops capable of invading Saudi Arabia, he created a potentially dangerous increase in Iraqs regional and global power. In his August 8 speech, President Bush acknowledged his concern over this possible regional power imbal-ance in when he said, Iraq is already a rich and powerful country that possesses the worlds second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. Its the fourth largest mili-tary in the world.29 The invasion of Kuwait gave Iraq access to Kuwaiti oil and a further ad-vance could put them in control of Saudi reserves. Bush spoke of the dangers of this move in saying, An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors neighbors who control the lions share of the worlds remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless.30 This kind of jurisdiction over the worlds largest oil reserves would allow Iraq to monopolize a strategically important amount of oil. This created a po-tential threat to the economic and political security of the United States.

Power and SecurityAn increase in Iraqi power would decrease American security in two different ways.

First, there was the fear that Iraqi domination of enormous quantities of oil could allow them to become an economic, and eventually a political, hegemon in the Gulf region. As noted in offensive realism theory, great powers pay special attention to how many resources the rival

27 Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for Power, 41.


29 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address on Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait (August 8, 1990), George H. W. Bush.

30 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (September 11, 1990), George H. W. Bush, Accessed November 10, 2012, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3425.

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states control, because rich and populous states usually can and do build powerful armies.31 This explains the U.S. concern that Iraqi oil revenue could be used to advance Iraqs military capabilities. The U.S. saw this increase in military power as a threat to the balance of power in the region. Also in accordance with offensive realism theory, it was clear that the Bush administration did not want Iraq to become a hegemon in the Gulf. In numerous speeches, President Bushs rhetoric emphasizing the need to keep the status quo in the region is clear. In his August 8 speech he said that he was committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.32 In the same speech he continued on to say that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.33 He emphasized the importance of Saudi power in maintaining this status quo in by saying, The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States.34 The U.S. did not want Iraq to become a regional he-gemon because it would be a powerful foe in global relations. The U.S. much preferred that Saudi Arabia retain its oil reserves and the accompanying influence and power in order to preserve another strong power in the region to balance Iraq.

The fact that the U.S. was not invading Iraq to occupy them was important. In President Bushs January 19 speech, he stated, Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq. It is the liberation of Kuwait.35 This emphasized the point that U.S. interest in the region was to prevent Iraq from becoming a regional hegemon and therefore to restore the status quo. In his October 1 speech to the United Nations, President Bush used similar rhetoric to expand the perceived security threat to the entire globe. He said, The present aggression in the Gulf is a menace not only to one regions security but to the entire worlds vision of our future.36 Mearsheimer notes that the balance-of-power logic, which theorizes that security increases when mili-tary capabilities are evenly distributed so that no one state is stronger than the others, often causes great powers to form alliances and cooperate against common enemies. This can be seen in the coalition of 28 countries that invaded Iraq in 1991. They banded together to prevent an aggressive state from gaining a disproportionate amount of power by invading Kuwait and possibly Saudi Arabia.37


32 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address on Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait (August 8, 1990), George H. W. Bush.

33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address to the United Nations (October 1, 1990), George H. W. Bush. Accessed November 10, 2012. http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3426.

37 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address to the Nation on the Invasion of Iraq, (January 16, 1991), George H.W. Bush.

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Economic ImpactAside from the security threat that Iraq as a regional hegemon posed, there were also

economic concerns regarding oil. By invading Kuwait, Iraq became very close to Hama, Saudi Arabias most valuable oil fields. Iraqi control of these fields would have given it an un-precedented monopoly, which could have caused a huge spike in the price of oil. Normally, Saudi Arabia possessed such large oil reserves that it could increase or decrease production levels to moderate world prices. However, if Iraq gained control over Saudi reserves, Saddam would be able to force world prices up by restricting production.38 Even though the U.S. only gets about 16 percent of its oil imports from the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC, Saudi Arabia owns the second biggest oil reserves in the world, and so the world price of oil would be affected by an Iraqi monopoly of these resources.39 An increase in the world price would ultimately cause oil to become more expensive for everyone, including the United States. Overall, the U.S. imports about 60 percent of the crude oil that it uses, so global price in-creases would definitely impact U.S. commercial interests.40 Oil is the most important source of energy for the U.S. economy, as it is needed for production, fuel, and transportation. Iraqs seizure of oil in Saudi Arabia could potentially cause an abrupt fall in the world supply if they chose to restrict production, resulting in a surge in world prices, a disruption of U.S. economic activity, and perhaps even a recession.41 These very real worries about dependence on oil surfaced in President Bushs August 8 speech, as he stated, Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats.42 Only a month later, he again acknowledged, Vital economic interests are at risk.43 This kind of rhetoric showed how worried the Bush administration was about the impact that Iraqi monopoly over oil reserves could have on the health of the U.S. economy, as well as on the world economy as a whole.

Oil and the U.S. MilitaryIn addition to the importance of oil to the American economy, it is also crucial to rec-

ognize the importance of oil in the continuing power projection of the U.S. military. The

38 Middle East Research and Information Project, Oil and the Gulf War, Accessed March 9, 2013, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer171/oil-gulf-war.

39 Consumer Energy Report, Where the U.S. Gets Its Oil From, Accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.energytrendsin-sider.com/research/crude-oil/where-the-us-gets-its-oil-from/.

40 U.S. Energy Information Administration, How Dependent Is the United States on Foreign Oil? Last modified July 16, 2012, Accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=32.

41 Middle East Research and Information Project, Oil and the Gulf War.

42 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address on Iraqs Invasion of Kuwait.

43 Miller Center at University of Virginia, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.

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United States Military is the biggest single purchaser of oil in the world.44 The B-52 bomber consumes 3300 gallons per hour, the F-16 Falcon burns 800 gallons per hour, and the KC-135 Statotanker (an aerial refueling tanker aircraft) consumes 2650 gallons per hour.45As an of-ficial U.S. report states, Out of the $20 billion the U.S. military spent on energy in 2008, 82.5% was to purchase crude oil.46 Additionally, a fleet of 500 Humvees would consume over 1,660 gallons of gas in just one hour.47 These figures show how crucial an affordable, reliable supply of oil is to the U.S. military in being able to work effectively. An increase in the world price of oil or a shortage could pose a huge risk to national security if the military does not have access to the oil it needs to function properly.

WeaknessesWhile Mearsheimers theory of offensive realism has great value, a weakness in its ap-

plication to the present case must be addressed. Offensive realism explains the economic threat that Iraqi control of Kuwait and/or Saudi oil reserves posed. However, due to the cooperation among other oil producing countries to increase their exports to the United States during this period, we cannot be certain that the potential long-term economic conse-quences would actually have been as dire as the theorys predictions. However, even though the predicted devastations were only estimated, potential economic effects clearly still had an impact upon the administrations thinking as can be judged by their rhetoric and doc-umentation of conversations during closed meetings. This is not a detrimental weakness underlying the theory, because as has been detailed in this paper, both major political and military considerations were of importance in addition to economic effects. An increase in Iraqi power and their potential regional hegemony were very plausible security risks to the United States.

Conclusion: Assessing the TheoriesAfter evaluating both of these international relations theories, it is evident that they

both have strong explanatory value in describing U.S. entrance into the Gulf War. From the Bush administrations rhetoric leading up to the invasion of Iraq, it is clear that, as the psychological theory would predict, the 1938 Munich analogy weighed upon their decision-making. This was influenced by the inundation of neoconservative criticism of President

44 Top 5 Facts on U.S. Military Oil Consumption, Accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.newlaunches.com/archives/top_5_facts_on_us_military_oil_consumptio n.php.

45 Ibid.46 Kohl, Keith. U.S. Military Cries Peak Oil. Energy & Capital. Last modified April 14, 2012.Accessed November 18, 2012. http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/peak-oil-military/1121.

47 TreeHugger, 7 Gas Guzzling Military Combat Vehicles, Accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.treehugger.com/cars/7-gas-guzzling-military-combat-vehicles.html.

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Bushs lack of resolve to use military force in the Gulf. The theory also provided an appli-cable explanation for the Presidents behavior due to his personal and generational experi-ences with World War II. Offensive realism can also explain the U.S. entry into the Gulf War, although based on different considerations. John Mearsheimers theory evaluated the international system as being anarchical and driven by the security dilemma, resulting in aggressive tendencies. This theory evaluated the increase in Iraqs regional power and what this potential hegemony meant for the United States economic, political and military se-curity. Examining the situation in the Gulf and noticing an imminent change in the status quo led the Bush administration to see the necessity for offshore balancing. The events and decisions leading up to the American invasion of Iraq can be told through more than one story, so ultimately both these theories help us to explain this event in United States history.

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