scir fall 2015 journal

7/25/2019 SCIR Fall 2015 Journal

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S CI R

Volume 5, Number 2 Fall 2015


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Te Southern California International Review(SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal o scholarship in the field o international

studies generously unded by the School o International Relations at theUniversity o Southern Caliornia (USC). In particular, SCIRwould liketo thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.

Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to oster and enhance discussion betweentheoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.SCIRis managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates

valuable experience in the fields o editing and graphic design.

Copyright 2015 Southern California International Review.

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in anyorm without the express written consent o the Southern California International

Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those o the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those o the editorial board, aculty advisors, or the University o Southern Caliornia.

S C I Rscir.org

Staff

Editor-in-Chief:Aaron Riind

Deputy Editor-in-Chief:Reid Tom

Editors:

Peter Hughes

SarahBelle Selig

Katie McDowell

Anna Merzi

ISSN: 1545-2611

Patrick Vossler


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We dedicate this journal to those affected by the violence in Syria andvictims o terrorism across the world.

Tis journal is also dedicated to the outgoing University o SouthernCaliornia School o International Relations Director, Robert D. English.

Tank you or your unwaivering support over the years.


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Contents

1. Spending Spree

Security and Sino-Indian Maritime Infrastructure Investments in theIndian Ocean

Michael Sliwinski

10

2. Internet Censorship and Strategic SignalingCyber-Nationalism in China During the 2012 Sino-Japanese SenkakuIslands Dispute

Jackie, Siu-Hei Wong

22

3. owards Mature JusticeExpanding the Mandate of the International Criminal CourtsIndependent Oversight Mechanism

Emily sui

58

4. Chinas Parallel Grand StrategyRoads oward Hegemony Trough an Emerging Military Presence in Africa

Alexander Bobroske

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Dear Reader,It is with great pleasure that I introduce you to the tenth edition o the Southern CaliorniaInternational Review (SCIR). Tis semesters issue continues our mission o providing aplatorm or undergraduate scholars o international affairs to provide their work to a largeraudience.

We were incredibly ortunate to have over orty articles to select rom. Our editors spenttedious hours pouring over submissions rom all across the country and several romthroughout the world. O the many impressive submissions, the ollowing our stood out tobe outstanding. In reading this journal, you will understand why.In the creation o this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative o the supportive role thatthe University o Southern Caliornias School o International Relations has played. Teschools outgoing director, Robert English, the Associate Director, Linda Cole, and the resto the aculty and staff gave us the guidance we needed to grow. As always, I extend our

thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim or her generous scholarship that provides the oundationupon which our endeavor thrives.As China reaches global hegemony, many scholars have taken note o the countrys actionsacross the world. Tree o the our articles in this edition o the SCIR discuss Chinas growingimportance in different regions. From Chinas relations with India in the South China Seato the countrys censorship o protests over the Senkaku Islands dispute and relations withArica, three authors have tackled these complicated and oen-controversial issues. Teourth article marks a departure rom the other three and argues or more transparency in

the International Criminal Court.

I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. I invite you to readon, and remember that this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.

Please read, ponder, explore and enjoy.Sincerely,Aaron Riind

Editor-in-Chief

Editors Note:


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Spending SpreeSecurity and Sino-Indian Maritime Infrastructure

Investments in the Indian OceanMichael Sliwinski

Te military order of the Indian Ocean is a critical policy focus for the world, particularlyIndia and China. Tis study elaborates on a less-explored method of power projection: infra-structural developmental aid, particularly maritime infrastructural investments. Chinese andIndian investment in ports across the Indian Ocean demonstrate a spending race to secure na-val replenishment arrangements and influence over the domestic political decision-making ofrecipient states. Explaining the actions of China and India will shed light on the gains to theirIndian Ocean agendas as well as their positive and negative effects on the other states and onbroader regional security.

IntroductionTe Indian Ocean comprises one-fih o the total ocean area in the world. At over 28

million square miles, it is home to numerous states and islands rom the east coast o A-rica to the edge o Southeast Asia, with the Indian subcontinent bounding it to the north.1rade routes crisscross this massive area, especially those emerging rom the Middle Eastby way o the Red Sea and the Persian Gul and moving west towards the Americas and

east towards East Asia. Historically, inhabitants and expeditious outsiders traversed theIndian Oceanextensively or trade and exploration, bringing a degree o cultural exchangeand the national agendas o those exploring. In the modern era, though, it has been su-ficiently explored; the waters and coastal areas o the Indian Ocean remain a busy orumin which many internal and external players interact and sometimes clash.

Te initiatives taken by the Peoples Republic o China in recent years have demon-strated a keen awareness o the value o the Indian Ocean and demonstrate how Chinasexpanding national identity maniests itsel in diplomacy and security policy. Its effortsto navigate the waters and visit the states o the Indian Ocean have not gone unnoticedby the central power o the regionIndia. Due to its proximity in the Indian Ocean,India has elt the effects o Chinas expanding voyages into the Indian Ocean over the past30 years as China transitioned rom a fledgling power to a confident nation with strongregional influence in politics, economics and security.Te two nations, who share both astrong trade relationship as well as border disputes, ace a challenge in cooperating with

1 Philomene A. Verlaan, Indian Ocean, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Encyclopaedia Britanica Inc. 2015.

M S is a senior at Georgetown Universitys Walsh School of

Foreign Service studying International Politics concentrating in InternationalSecurity with a Certificate in Asian Studies.


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S C I R -Vol. 5 No. 2

Spending Spree

each other and the states surrounding the Indian Ocean.Te security interactions between China and India fluctuate between competition

and cooperation as both nations expand their military capabilities and pursue strategicdoctrine. In a material sense, it is easy to predict that the nations will be competitive inpursuing a stronger military presence in the Indian Ocean. Yet there is more to the secu-rity balance between the two regional powers than the number o guns or boats stationedin the Indian Ocean. Tis paper will ocus on explaining a less-explored component ostrength and influence: the field o inrastructural development aid, specifically, the e-ects o maritime inrastructural investments on military security relations. Chinese andIndian maritime inrastructure investments in ports across the Indian Ocean demonstratea spending race to secure viable naval replenishment arrangements and, more broadly,influence over the domestic political decision-making o recipient states. Investigating andexplaining the actions o China and India will shed light on the potential gains that eachnation has to make through their Indian Ocean agendas as well as their impact on sur-rounding states and regional security.

China: Seizing the InitiativeIn recent years, China has aced great criticism or its expansionist policies in the

South China Sea. Others staunchly oppose Chinas direct presence in the area, threatenedby the diplomatic implication that China is claiming ownership. Yet Chinas intentions inthe Indian Ocean are decidedly murk. China does not declare any territory in the regionon historical or strategic grounds.

Several theories have tried to explain Chinas grand strategy in the Indian Ocean. Tefirst discussed herein originated in a 2005 report rom Booz Allen Hamilton, a deenseconsultancy in the U.S. Te firm identified Chinas interest in visiting and developing

various ports across the Indian Ocean as aiming to construct a string o pearls to projectnaval power and constrict Indian efforts to rise as a regional competitor.2Consistent withthe ears o the rising superpower, media rhetoric so requently casts Chinas initiatives asaggressive, competitive and disruptive to stabilityto the extent that it has been associ-ated with actual Chinese policy.3

Te Chinese government did not adopt a cohesive strategy to explain its involvement

in the Indian Ocean until 2014, when President Xi Jinping announced his Maritime SilkRoad initiative.4Te language is markedly different and symbolically demonstrative; in-stead o a string o pearls strangling and encircling the Indian Ocean, the concept borrows

2 Siyu Yang, Te Pearl Harbors: Chinas Port Diplomacy, China Hands: Te Huffington Post Online, last modified 23 April2015.

3 Te Chinese government does not officially reer to its strategy in the Indian Ocean as aiming to build a string o pearls.

4 Ibid.


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Michael Sliwinski

rom the historical Silk Road, an overland trade route that was a major corridor or theearliest commerce and cultural exchange between East and West. Te notion is that thisdistinctly Chinese idea is a constructive contribution to the region can be utilized by all ina mutually beneficial ashion. Tis rebranding characterizes the disparate views o Chinas

motivations to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean, but both sides agree that Chinahas taken the initial action. From a doctrinal standpoint, China has a strategic advantagethat it can use to explain its actions as peaceully diplomatic.

Te concrete evidence o Chinas approach to building its Maritime Silk Roaddisplays an unprecedented investment agenda, with billions o dollars being pouredinto ports across the Indo-Pacific region to und the building and renovation o portinrastructure. wo ports in Sri Lanka have received particular attention: Colombo andHambantota. In 2014, two Chinese submarine dockings in Colombo, including one whichcoincided with the visit o the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, sent ripples through

the diplomatic community.5India criticized its close neighbor or what it saw as a disrup-tion o peace and a step towards increased militarization o the Indian Ocean while aspokesperson or the Chinese military dismissed criticisms o the act, which the Chi-nese viewed as a routine technical docking.6Additionally, the submarine docked at theColombo South Container erminal, controlled by a Chinese company, China MerchantsHoldings (International), rather than the Sri Lanka Port Authority, the traditional dockingor military vessels.7Tough the purpose or even legality o this action is unclear, the SriLankan government under President Rajapaksa signaled its willingness to deal with Chinaby tolerating this docking.8

With the change in presidency in early 2015, the new President Sirisena took a lessaccommodating line to submarine dockings but still approved a $1.4 billion investmentin the Colombo Port City development project rom China.8Tis plan included a landtranser o 108 hectares next to the main commercial port o Colombo, held by the ChinaCommunications Construction Co. Ltd. on a split outright/99-year lease basis.9 Eco-nomic incentives also explain Chinas controlling stake at Hambantota Port, where SriLanka agreed to grant Chinese state-owned companies operating rights to our berths inexchange or an easing o loan conditions.10Tis demonstrates how China supplemented

5 Abhijit Singh, A PLA-N or Chinese maritime bases in the Indian Ocean, Center for Strategic and International Studies,Washington, D.C., last modified January 26, 2015.

6 China Denies Reports to set up 18 Naval Bases in Indian Ocean, Te Economic imes; India, last modified November 27,2014.

7 Singh 2015.

8 Ankit Panda, Sri Lanka May Bar Port Visits by Chinese Marine, Te Diplomat, last modified March 3, 2015.

9 Shihar Aneez, Sri Lanka reviews land transer to China as port deal draws scrutiny, Reuters, last modified February 20,2015.

10 Singh 2015.


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its security agenda with development and economic efforts and signaled that politicalhesitation could give way to development investment.

Other potential partners in Chinas investment efforts appear to be even less politi-cally conflicted in receiving development aid rom China. Tis is the case with Pakistan,whose relationship with China was reaffirmed by efforts to build and invest in inrastruc-ture in the cash-strapped state. Most notably, Chinese President Xi Jinpings April 2015

visit to Pakistan came with a rather warm hospitality gi$46 billion or inrastructuraldevelopment across the country, including continued investments in the ports o Gwadarand Karachi.11Gwadar in particular has been the beneficiary o Chinese investments orover a decade, with the China Overseas Ports Holding Company taking operational con-trol in 2013 or the next 40 years.12

Evidence suggests that Chinas large stakes in Gwadar are ocused on elevating theport to a dual-use base. Te principle behind this concept is that, by assisting in theconstruction o a modern developed port, a powerul nation like China has the abil-ity to upgrade a commercial port to support military operations in conflict scenariosand even use it as a cover or construction o secret munitions stockpiles and other portinrastructure.13Such arrangements may be less likely ound in port projects o uncooper-ative states like Sri Lanka but are conceivable in states with a policy alignment or pressurerom the Chinese to take advantage o aid. Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan, Chittagong inBangladesh and perhaps non-unded agreements, including those between China and theSeychelles, could all fit this model. Tis notion is buttressed by Chinese arms sales to Paki-stan as well as Bangladesh, with Pakistan purchasing six nuclear-powered subs in 2014and Bangladesh receiving three reurbished Ming-class vessels in 2019.14Tese initiativescan be seen as Chinas dedication to empowering states and maintaining regional securityas well as suggesting that India may not be the sole guarantor o stability in the IndianOcean.

Te Chinese government has a clear and executable strategy or engagement in theIndian Ocean, as the Maritime Silk Road is the impetus or increased attention to portsthroughout the Indian Ocean. Instead o permanent military presence as expected byIndia, China has taken advantage o dual-use bases and economic leverage. As a result,China could easily maintain rhetorical consistency between its claims o not maintain-ing oreign bases and ulfilling its strategic aim o having a point o operations in a crisiscontingency. In other words, China would not need any oreign bases i riendly ports can

11 Keith Johnson, China Invests Billions in Its All-Weather Friendship With Pakistan, Foreign Policy, last modified April 15,2015.

12 Ibid.

13 Singh 2015.

14 Jack Detsch, China Boosts Submarine Fleets or Indian Ocean Allies, Te Diplomat, last modified February 13, 2015.


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be easily converted to serve that purpose. Trough its proactive investing in the IndianOcean, China has seized the initiative and claims a certain advantage in projecting its se-curity objectives in a concerted way that has been overlooked in its Indian Ocean strategy.

India: On the DefensiveFor India, the Indian Ocean is a central ocus o policy and security. Surrounded onthree sides by its waters, it must protect a wide coastline accessible to the myriad nationsand islands in its periphery. Beyond the geographical considerations weighing on theIndian government, there is a strong cultural notion bounding the Indian outlook over theocean: India perceives the Indian Ocean as its own, first and oremost. Any other powers

jockeying to influence the region, then, would be viewed as intruding on Indias mare nos-trum. Naturally, globalization has necessitated an easing-up on this view o exclusivity, butthese deep-seated notions are not easily dispelled. Ultimately, India has an active approach

to Indian Ocean relations, but the country must balance its assertiveness and cooperationin the geopolitical sphere.

Chinas strategy outlined above serves as a very agitating challenge to India. As aras reacting to direct military presence in the Indian Ocean, it is easy or India to criticizeChinas expanding presence; the Indian Ocean is, aer all, by not controlled by China.Even multilateral efforts like anti-piracy campaigns in the Gul o Aden may be viewedpessimistically by India as a pretense or Chinas immediate presence in the Ocean andlonger-term investments in regional ports or reueling its navy.

Te larger problem or India is not the presence o the ships themselves or even the

avor curried through Chinese aid initiatives. It is the noticeable lack o a regional strategyon par with Chinas Maritime Silk Road. Tis strategy has given China a guide or howto go about ostering its overt economic goals in the region and its more tacit securityobjectives. In contrast, there are concerns in the Indian government, particularly underPrime Minister Narendra Modi, that continentalism has distracted Indias attentionrom Indian Ocean affairs with border disputes and other land-based security concerns.15Modis efforts to revive the 2003 notion o Sagar Mala which is related to engagementwith political actors in the Indian Ocean, have yet to solidiy into a tangible strategyandmay at best be an effort to mimic Chinas own Maritime Silk Road idea.16Other ideas

rom Indian leadership, like an Indian Ocean Zone o Peace, may have been inspired bysimilarly-named ASEAN efforts to avoid increased regional militarization. Likewise, simi-lar to ASEANs Zone o Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), it can serve to diplo-matically cloakan effort to exclude Chinese military presence in a broad agreement.17I

15 C Raja Mohan, Modis Sagar Mala. Indian Express Online: Te Indian Express Ltd., last modified March 11, 2015.

16 Ibid.

17 Singh 2015.


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this is the case, there remains little promise or this to be the grand strategy India needsone needs only look to ZOPFANs ineffectiveness at precluding Chinese maritime activityin Southeast Asia to cast doubt on the prospects o such broadly-principled approaches inthe Indian Ocean.

It appears that, at least in recent years and or the immediate uture, the only strategicapproach gaining traction in India is reacting to Chinas initiatives with investment planso their own. Te posts India may pursue around the region may not be critical to Indiaspower projection, but competition or these islands with China can justiy Indian effortsto secure these allies. While unoriginal, there is no reason to see this approach as lesseffective than Chinas aid disbursement strategy and indeed the logic is much the same.By directing substantial sums o inrastructural investment to ports, states, and islandsaround the Indian Ocean, India can earn trust and leverage to utilize these posts or theirown strategic benefit.

Returning to the example o Sri Lanka, successul calls rom the Indian governmentto preclude China rom accessing Sri Lankas ports with its naval vessels signal reluctanceon Sri Lankas part to depart rom one o its traditionally-close allies in avor o a regionalnewcomer.18India has ollowed up by unding development projects in the north o theisland, including the construction o a power plant, 27,000 new homes, and a hospital;the dredging o the war-devastated Kankesanthurai port; and the reconstruction o theNorthern Railway Line.19Even the geographic concentration o many o these projectsin the northern part o Sri Lanka, compared to Chinas efforts in the southern ports oColombo and Hambantota, indicates a keen awareness o specific Indian aid. Similarly,in spite o historically close relations with China, India appears to be courting Myanmarthrough financial support or the Kaladan Multi-Modal ransit ransport Project, includ-ing Sittwe, one o Myanmars busiest ports, [receiving] an Indian-sponsored aceli to thetune o $100 million.20Just as India ought to be mindul o Chinese overtures to tradi-tionally Indian-aligned allies, so too should China be aware that its riends in the IndianOcean are not necessarily averse to exploring new relationships with India.

India can easily orchestrate alignment with certain nations; the Maldives, or ex-ample, situated just off the tip o the Indian subcontinent, are understandably inclinedto maintain positive diplomatic relations with their large neighborthough it should benoted that they too agreed to allow Chinese vessels into their ports or reueling.21It ispossible that this has been less problematic to India than Sri Lankas leniency due to the

18 Panda 2015.

19 Nilanthi Samaranayake, Indias Key to Sri Lanka: Maritime Inrastructure Development, Te Diplomat, last modifiedMarch 31, 2015.

20 Jack Detsch, Te Mixed Consequences o Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean, Te Diplomat, last modifiedJanuary 28, 2015.

21 Ibid.


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Maldives relatively low military strength and the lower impact o Chinese involvement inthe long run.

Other small island nations in the southwestern Indian Ocean, particularly Mauritiusand the Seychelles, have similar inclinations to uphold their standing alignment with In-

dian policy. Already home to Indian listening stations, Modis recent tour o Mauritius andthe Seychelles has come with more dedications o inrastructural aid. India will be upgrad-ing sea and air links on the remote Agalega islands o Mauritius, including reurbishing anair strip, which will improve Indias ability to project power in the lower Indian Ocean andcloser to Arica.22Similarly, an agreement was reached between India and the Seychellesto develop inrastructure on Assumption Island, which the Seychelles government leasedto India. Tis builds off o prior assistance India gave the Seychelles through conductingocean mapping, providing aircraand launching a radar project.23Tese efforts reaffirmIndian commitments to these island allies and complement the existing security arrange-

ments.Aside rom new developments in directing inrastructural aid abroad to tip the

security balance in Indias avor, it is worthy to note that India already has a significantnumber o security advantages over China in terms o its present posture. Te most obvi-ous advantage is its expansive coastline in the Indian Ocean, which it can control directlyand use to monitor and project power throughout the northern Indian Ocean with ease.A less-obvious advantage is Indias island holdings in the eastern Indian Ocean: theAndaman Islands and the Nicobar Islands. Te Andaman Islands are home to Port Blair,another Indian naval base, and both island chains are strategically situated right at the

entrance to the Strait o Malacca, the main maritime thoroughare into Southeast Asia.24Tese sovereign resources surpass any Chinese naval agreement.

Overall, Indias security position in the region, though lacking in some places romthe incremental orays China made through its substantial inrastructural investments, isunderpinned by the immutable position o the Indian subcontinent in the Indian Ocean.China, consequently, has no choice but to develop a strong strategic outlook and ollow-up on its objectives and efforts with huge resource allocations. Tis explains why Chineseactions in the region seem all the more threateningthey are marginal gains buildingupon a very minor prior presence. In the short run, the Indian Ocean will remain mostlyIndian. However, the greatest challenge or India is to ensure that these marginal gainson Chinas part can be brought to a halt. No broader strategy to counter the voluminousspending and unified doctrine propelling Chinas thrust into the Indian Ocean makes itmore difficult or India. I such a strategy cannot be developed and executed, it may prove

22 Jean Paul Arouff, India in pacts to develop inrastructure in Mauritius, Seychelles, Reuters, last modified March 12, 2015.

23 Ibid.

24 Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean. Image. 2009.


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extremely difficult to prevent the Chinese navy rom establishing a durable military oot-hold in the Indian Ocean.

Te Race for the Indian Ocean: Who Stands to Win?

Te huge flow o money spent on maritime inrastructure in the Indian Oceanrepresents a strategic competition between China and India. Overt attempts at increasingmilitary presence would be heavy-handed and serve to disrupt both the bilateral relationsbetween China and Indiawhich, aer the competitive spending, are still airly stableand regional security as a whole. Based off o the evidence above, it would seem that eachstate is pitted against each other in a zero-sum game or influence and power.

Tere is, however, reason to cast doubt on such a pessimistic view. Tere are crediblegrounds to assert that the pattern o investments seen throughout the Indian Ocean is not

just a proxy race or military security influence between China and India.Tis notion is

supported by the material benefits that inrastructural investments have made or indi-vidual states, gains afforded to China and India and the positive externalities or overallsystematic security. Tese three groupings illustrate ways in which China and Indiasmonetary contributions should not be viewed as adversarial.

When considered through a strategic analytic lens, it can be easy to lose sight o whatChinese and Indian investments mean or their recipient countries on the groundacrucial flow o resources and expertise, which help sustain some o the smallest econo-mies in the world. It is not new that aid disbursements o various sorts come with stringsattached, be they explicit loan conditionality measures, memorandums o agreement that

complement aid packages or even tacit expectations o support and accommodation.25Ultimately, these conditions and costs may be worth the substantial improvements to thequality o lie and economic activity that inrastructural development can offer to low-income nations. Many o these small islands and poor states offer little strategic value tocountries besides China and India, and i they wish to provide service to their constituen-cies, they should leverage relatively small concessions o port access or huge improve-ments in trade capacity and transportation inrastructure.

Some o these inrastructural developments stand to comercially benefit China andIndia. Ports throughout the Indian Ocean that are properly equipped with machinery and

storage space to operate as container ports offer both countries greater accessibility toexport their products worldwide. Tis benefits these two nations in particular, given theirparticularly high rates o export. In the example o Colombo, China may have significantholdings in the port, and its most recent inrastructure investment will expand the portscapacity even urther. Nonetheless, about 13% o Indias container traffic travels via Co-

25 See James Raymond Vreeland, Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton WoodsTe Swiss-Bloc Case, TeReview of International Organizations6, no. 3-4 (2011): 369-391.


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lombo. I the new terminal ran at ull capacity and dedicated itsel to transshipping con-tainers to India, that could rise to 28%which is tantamount to a major rise in efficiencyor India, unded on Chinas dime.26Better ports in the states o the Indian Ocean, thoughperhaps more inclined to deer judgment to their beneactors, still provide economic trade

incentives to both nations.Finally, the increased offshore presence afforded to both China and India in the Indi-

an Ocean represent a new chapter in systemic security in the region. Te issues o piracy,terrorism and disaster relie have been pressing stressors to states in or traveling throughthe Indian Ocean or many years. I China and India have a greater stake in the area, theywill be more likely to deend against the dangers posed by leaving these problems unat-tended, which will provide saety, stability and prosperity or all the nations which rely ontrade or navigation through the Indian Oceanthe 70 percent o globally shipped oil thatpasses through the Indian Ocean alone demonstrates the universal benefit afforded by a

secure global commons.27

In sum, not all the effects o Chinese and Indian maritime investments in the IndianOcean should be viewed as zero-sum competitions only benefitting one power or theother. Tere are gains to be had on the part o the recipients, mutual increases to capacityand trade among the two powers and a more reliable security environment or the wholeworld. In light o the ideology guiding the investments, however, these benefits are, at best,positive externalities to the true intentions o the states: an advantageous and robust mili-tary presence and projection into the Indian Ocean. It would be inaccurate to characterizethese benefits as negating or outweighing the security-related agenda o China or India,

and analysis ought to continue its ocus on the relative balance o power between the twocountries.

Conclusion: Te Future of the Indian Ocean and the Balance of Global SecurityTe maritime inrastructure spending spree in ports throughout the Indian Ocean

financed by China and India is a strategic competition or naval accommodations andinfluence over the smaller states in the region. While these investments have resultedin non-exclusive and collective positive externalities, the Chinese approach to buildingits Maritime Silk Road and Indias response underscores the differences and desires o

the powers as they strive or regional security dominance. Open naval conflict remains apossibility in the immediate uture, especially as the states continue to solidiy their IndianOcean ootholds. In the long run, this stasis may shi and send shockwaves through thestates bilateral relations and the entire international system.

It is imperative to also ocus on external actors, such as how the United States inter-

26 Te New Masters and Commanders, Te Economist(Print), June 8, 2013.

27 Detsch 2015 (Te Mixed Consequences).


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acts with the Indian Ocean or borrows rom the lessons offered by this strategic inra-structural spending agenda. Since 2009, President Obamas pivot [or rebalance] to Asiahas been portrayed as a concerted shi away rom the Middle East, which dominatedAmerican oreign policy during the 1990s and 2000s. Endemic instability in the MiddleEast hindered this process o reocusing, but the policy remains a priority or PresidentObama and the United States military. While diplomats would vehemently deny thatthis pivot is meant to contain Chinese expansion, annual Department o Deense reportsdemonstrate the militarys concerns over Chinas rapid military growth and increasinglyoutward-acing policies.28In the United States, the Chinese military discourse is moreocused on a aiwan Strait contingency or bellicosity in the South China Sea, with littlethought afforded to projects to improve docks and ports in Hambantota, Sri Lanka orChittagong, Bangladesh. Te military, and, by extent, all o United States oreign policy inthe Indo-Pacific, should be sensitive to the inrastructure race in the Indian Ocean and itsimplications or Chinese naval power projection and diplomacy in the area. For its part,India may be able to capitalize on these American concerns to block Chinese investmentsrom giving China too much influence in the Indian Ocean.

Te investments in maritime inrastructure described above are just one acet in Sino-Indian engagement with each other and in the Indo-Pacific. Te lesson this study offers isthat money can drive international security in ways beyond simply buying ships or sellingsubmarines. Naval security is a complex matrix o international territories, expansivesupport systems across thousands o miles o water and the cooperation o states, big andsmall, each with their particular national interests. No understanding o this area o studyis complete without considering both physical military strength and ways that strengthmay be supplemented through seemingly disparate methods like oreign inrastructureinvestment.

28 See Office o the Secretary o Deense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeoples Republic o China 2014.


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Works Cited

Arouff, Jean Paul. India in Pacts to Develop Inrastructure in Mauritius, Seychelles. Re-uters. Last modified March 12, 2015.

China Denies Reports to set up 18 Naval Bases in Indian Ocean. Te Economic imes;India. Last moified November 27, 2014.

Detsch, Jack. Te Mixed Consequences o Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean.Te Diplomat. Last modified January 28, 2015.

Detsch, Jack. China Boosts Submarine Fleets or Indian Ocean Allies. Te Diplomat. Lastmodified February 13, 2015.

Great Power Competition in the Indian Ocean. Image. 2009.

Johnson, Keith. China Invests Billions in Its All-Weather Friendship With Pakistan. For-

eign Policy.Last modified April 16, 2015.Mohan, C Raja. Modis Sagar Mala. Indian Express Online: Te Indian Express Ltd. Last

modified March 11, 2015.

Te new Masters and Commanders. Te Economist(Print). Last modified June 8, 2013.

Office o the Secretary o Deense. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security De-velopments Involving the Peoples Republic o China 2014.

Panda, Ankit. Sri Lanka May Bar Port Visits by Chinese Marines. Te Diplomat. Lastmodified March 3, 2015.

Samaranayake, Nilanthi. Indias Key to Sri Lanka: Maritime Inrastructure Development.Te Diplomat. Last modified March 31, 2015.

Singh, Abhijit. A PLA-N or Chinese maritime bases in the Indian Ocean. Center forStrategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Last modified January 26, 2015.

Verlaan, Philomene A. Indian Ocean. Encyclopaedia Britanica. Encyclopaedia BritanicaInc. 2015.

Vreeland, James Raymond. Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton WoodsTe Swiss-Bloc Case. Te Review o International Organizations 6, no. 3-4 (2011):

369-391.Yang, Siyu. Te Pearl Harbors: Chinas Port Diplomacy. China Hands: Te Huffington Post

Online. Last modified April 23, 2015.


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Internet Censorship and Strategic SignalingCyber-Nationalism in China During the 2012 Sino-Japanese Senkaku

Islands DisputeJackie, Siu-Hei Wong

Te aim of this piece is to investigate the use of Internet censorship as a new tactic to aidthe strategic signaling of autocracies in international negotiations. Te 2012 Sino-JapaneseDiaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute is used as a case study. According to Cornell University Pro-

fessor Jessica Weiss, risky and costly anti-foreign protests enable autocratic regimes to conveycredible signals to international rivals by demonstrating their domestic vulnerability. Te find-ings of this article suggest that autocratic regimes may use Internet censorship to aid their stra-

tegic signaling. Coding 2587 censored messages on the Chinese microblogging website Weiboillustrate that during the 2012 Sino-Japanese Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the Chinese

government successfully used Internet censorship to foment nationalist sentiment by censor-ing messages that criticized the anti-Japanese protests. A certain degree of criticism of theChinese governments moderate stance was permitted, and internet users were allowed to pro-mote nationalist protests in cyberspace. Tese findings suggest that the Chinese governmentstrategically used Internet censorship to increase the perceived sincerity of the protests, therebyconveying a more credible signal to Japan.

J, S-H W is a recent graduate from the University of Michigan

in May 2015 with departmental Honors and Distinction, majoring in PoliticalScience. He is now studying at the University of Chicago for the Master of Artsdegree in International Relations.

IntroductionIn 2014, Chinas President Xi Jinping made a speech that said the Chinese dream will

bring opportunities and to the world.Tis speech was consistent with Chinas convention-al approach to diplomatic relations with Japan where politics promote economics, andeconomics promote politics. However, the 2005 and 2010 Senkaku Islands disputes trig-gered massive nationalist protests in Chinas major cities. Netizens (Internet users) pres-sured the Chinese government to take a more assertive role in resolving the conflict. Tetwo waves o anti-Japanese protests in response to the 2012 Senkaku Islands dispute were

even more extreme: the protests spread across more provinces. Whereas many scholarssuggest that increased expression o nationalist sentiment reduces governments flexibilityin managing international disputes,author Jessica Weiss argues that nationalist protestshelp authoritarian states to credibly signal their resolve to international rivals.Since theyare costly to subdue, anti-oreign protests pose a particular threat to domestic stability,and thereore, the decision to allow these protests gives insight into the situation. On theone hand, allowing nationalist protests reveals a governments vulnerability and demon-


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Intenet Censorship and Strategic Signalling

strates resolve during international disputes. On the other, enabling nationalist protestsraises the audience costs, giving credibility to the hawkish stance taken by the state.

Autocratic regimes sometimes use news media to steer public opinion and controlnationalist sentiment. Political scientist Daniela Stockmann demonstrated the Chinesegovernments ability to manipulate nationalist sentiment by disseminating propagandaand implementing press restrictions in the 2005 Sino-Japanese dispute.1Yet, the currentliterature has not systematically analyzed the implications o Internet censorship andthe rise o cyber-nationalism or strategic signaling and bargaining during internationalconflicts.

o investigate these implications, the author constructed the ollowing two hypoth-eses. (1) Te Chinese government used news media to oment nationalist sentiment inresponse to the 2012 Sino-Japanese Senkaku Islands dispute but suppressed nationalistexpression aer the protest. (2) Te Chinese government allowed netizens to promotenationalist protest in response to the dispute but censored protest-related messages oncethe protests began.Te ormer hypothesis concerns the Chinese governments intent andattitude toward the Japanese government during the 2012 Senkaku Islands dispute ina systemic approach aided by the soware Yoshikoder; the latter concerns the Chinesegovernments manipulation o public opinion through Internet censorship to strategicallyconvey signals to political opponents.

Literature ReviewChinas Pragmatic Nationalism

Politicians, statesmen and intellectuals in China promoted nationalism since the 19thcentury. In a paper entitled Chinas Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?,Universityo Denver Proessor Suisheng Zhao describes Chinas nationalism as a pragmatic ormthat identifies China closely with the CCP.2He states that Chinas pragmatic nationalismis state-centric; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) solicits loyalty and support romthe Chinese people by encouraging devotion to the state. Te official rhetoric o national-ism involves phrases like loving the state and patriotism through love and support orChina.3

Te CCP gained power in 1949, but Maos emphasis on sel-reliance and nativism

during the 1960s hindered Chinese nationalism. According to Zhao, the Chinese believedthat the Leninist vision o the Chinese people uniting behind and sacrificing themselvesor a communist-led movement designed to keep out oreign invaders was merely a

1 Daniela Stockmann, Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects During the Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing, Te ChinaQuarterly, 202 (2010), 286-287.

2 Suisheng Zhao, Chinas Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable? Te Washington Quarterly,29.1 (2005), 131-133.

3 Ibid.


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business.10Te Chinese government also encouraged the countrys news media outlets toseek external unding via advertising and sales.11As a result, most modern media outletsin China und themselves, although a ew continue to receive state unding.12Aer threedecades o media reorm in China, the countrys media outlets are classified into the ol-lowing three main categories:13

(1) Official News Media

All news media outlets that are completely unded by the state. A representativeexample o this type o media outlet is the Peoples Daily() newspaper.

(2) Semi-official News Media

All news media outlets that receive approximately hal o their unding rom thestate and hal rom sales revenue. An example o this type o media outlet is theGlobal imes()newspaper.

(3) Commercialized News Media

All news media outlets that are fully commercialized or funded entirely by sales

revenue. An example of this type of media outlet is theBeijing Times ()

newspaper.

Whereas propaganda is always characterized by selective reporting, particularly on

sensitive topics, non-official newspapers are widely believed to publish real news. Teyprovide readers with news stories including inormation that may reflect negatively on

the government.14

Tereore, media practitioners regard inormation provided in Chinasofficial news media as propaganda, whereas semi-official and commercialized news mediaare believed to offer more balanced reporting.15Non-official news media are also subjectto sensationalist reporting.16Stockmann finds that people outside the media industry alsopreer to read non-official newspapers, which they perceive to be more credible. However,the reorm o Chinas news media has not made media outlets immune to censorship,especially when reporting on highly sensitive topics such as corruption cases and Sino-oreign relations.17Chinas Propaganda Department has the ultimate authority to imposepress restrictions at any time. For instance, it may orce all news media outlets to use

10 Ibid., 440-441.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Stockmann, Who Believes Propaganda, 271-274.

14 Ibid., 275.

15 Ibid.

16 Stockmann and Gallagher, Remote Control, 439.

17 Stockmann, Who Believes Propaganda, 271-275.


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Jackie, Siu-Huei Wong

sources provided by Xinhua News Agency, the official mouthpiece o the CCP, to reporton sensitive topics in times o crisis.

News Media and Nationalist Sentiment During the 2005 Sino-Japanese Protest

As Sino-oreign relations are regarded by the Chinese government as one o the mostsensitive topics o news reporting, the Propaganda Department closely monitors mediacontent concerning Chinas oreign relations. Instead o using traditional coding methodsto measure the tones o news articles tones, Stockmann uses the soware Yoshikoder toconduct a more objective measurement o the tone o Chinese newspapers. She illustratesthat during the anti-Japanese protests o 2005, the Propaganda Department successullycooled Chinese hostility towards the Japanese by immediately imposing press restric-tions.18In the Peoples Daily() (an official newspaper) and Beijing qingnian bao/Beijing Youth Daily() (a commercialized newspaper), the coverage o Japans

controversial history textbooks was toned down in immediate response to the pressrestrictions.19Tis tactic was particularly successul in alleviating anger toward the Japa-nese and making members o the Chinese public less inclined to join the anti-Japaneseprotests.20Stockmanns findings suggest a strong correlation between nationalist sentimentand the tone o newspaper articles. As news reports become more emotive, nationalistsentiment increases. Stockmann concludes that the commercial liberalization o Chinasmedia helped the Chinese government to oster positive public opinion.21As unofficialnewspapers are perceived to be more credible than official newspapers, they have morereaders. However, as soon as press restrictions are imposed, all newspapers all in line with

the states position. As a result, the Chinese government is able to use both official andunofficial media to elicit public nationalistic sentiment or crisis management.

Internet Censorship and the Growth of Cyberspace in ChinaAlong with traditional news media, the Internet provides an important outlet or

public expression in China. According to statistics released by the China Internet NetworkInormation Center, China had more than 600 million Internet users in 2014.22Althoughthe rate o increase in Internet usage diminished since 2014, there are still more Inter-net users in China than in any other country in the worldeven the U.S.23However, the

Chinese government continues to censor messages posted on the Internet that violate state

18 Ibid., 277-278.

19 Ibid., 278-279.

20 Ibid., 284-286.

21 Ibid.

22 CNNIC published the 35th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, accessed March 12, 2015.

23 Euan Mckirdy, Chinas Online Users More than Double Entire U.S. Population., CNN, February 4, 2015, accessed March 15,2015.


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policies and closely monitors cyberspace and other media outlets to censor any sensitivemessages posted online.

Methods of Censorship in China

In a paper entitled How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Si-lences Collective Expression, King, Pan and Roberts identiy the ollowing three censor-ship mechanisms used by the Chinese government:24

(1) Te Great Firewall, which prevents Chinese netizens rom browsing andexpressing opinions on oreign websites like Facebook. However, the authorspoint out that opinions can still be expressed on substitute websites. RenRen, orexample, is a semi-open substitute or Facebook.(2) Keyword blocking prevents users rom posting messages containing banned

words and phrases. However, according to the authors, this method is ineffectivebecause Chinese netizens oen use innocuous phrases as substitutes or similarlypronounced sensitive phrases, such as river crab, which has a similar pronuncia-tion in Mandarin as harmonious society.(3) Hand censoring, wherein messages posted online are read individually bycensors. According to the authors, this method is the most extensive orm ocensorship as it cannot be evaded using substitute phrases.

King, Pan and Roberts illustrate that the Chinese government allows Internet users to

criticize the state but censors messages in which collective action is promoted.25Tey findthat the rate o censorship is especially high or topics related to state stability, such as anincident involving Ai Wei Wei, a renowned dissident artist, internal protests and protestsin other countries. Pornography is subject to the greatest censorship.26King, Pan andRoberts explain that addressing grievances to the state actually reflects ones acceptance ostate legitimacy, and the state usually permits citizens to express their opinions as long asthey do not promote collective action.27

Although King, Pan and Roberts do not attempt to ascertain the true intent o theChinese government in responding to public opinion as expressed in nationalist protests,

they state that uture researchers can use the same approach to gain urther insights intoChinas international relations and oreign policy.28o evaluate her second hypothesis, the

24 Gary King, Jennier Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but SilencesCollective Expression,American Political Science Review, 107 (2013): 3.

25 Ibid., 14-17.

26 Ibid., 6.

27 Ibid., 14-15.

28 Ibid., 15.


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author uses a similar method to examine the insights offered by Internet censorship intoChinas oreign policy intentions.

Weisss Teory of the Use of Nationalist Protest in Strategic Signaling

Putnam and wo-Level Game Analysiswo-level game theory, first proposed by Robert Putnam, has long been used to

explain the interplay between domestic politics and the oreign policy o democraticcountries. In a paper entitled Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: Te Logic o wo-LevelGames, Putnam suggests that domestic politics and international relations are entangled.Only an actor whose status quo is likely to be improved by a change will agree to thatchange.29Putnam also proposes that the success o democratic leaders in making dealswith rivals during international negotiation (Level One o the game) is partly dependenton their ability to gain support rom constituents (Level wo).30Te win-set in the firstlevel o the game is shaped by the distribution o power between Level wo constituentsand political institutions and by the bargaining strategy adopted in Level One.

Audience Costs and SignalingIn this theoretical ramework, Putnam suggests that Level One players (political lead-

ers) may have an advantage in international bargaining i they are able to convincinglypresent themselves as subject to domestic constraints (Level wo), as such constraints en-able them to claim that they will be punished or making concessions.31Stanord ProessorJames Fearon defines the punishment at the domestic level as audience costs in which the

audience would punish its leaders or backing down in international disputes.32Duringinternational negotiation, political actors are able to signal their sincerity to other states byindicating that they are willing to endure the associated audience costs. In a paper entitledTe Strategic Setting o Choices,novelistJames Morrow states that audience costs arethe most undamental determinant o the effectiveness o strategic signaling.33

Nationalist Protest as SignalScholars traditionally argue that democracies have an advantage over authoritarian

regimes in signaling their intentions during international negotiations, since democratic

leaders can declare they are constrained by parliamentarians and constituents as strategic

29 Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, 436-437.

30 Ibid., 436.

31 Ibid., 450-453

32 James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation o International Disputes,Te American Political ScienceReviewVol.88, Issue 3 (1994), 577-578, accessed March 10, 2015.

33 James Morrow, Te Strategic Setting o Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics, InStrategic Choice and International Relations, edited by David Lake, and Robert Powell. Princeton, U.S.: Princeton University Press(2010), 109.


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tactics in international negotiation.34Although authoritarian regimes can also demon-strate that they are constrained by domestic elites, it is difficult to credibly signal this typeo audience cost to other states. Weiss suggests that nationalist protests offer one mecha-nism or authoritarian regimes to signal their intentions during international bargainingdue to the considerable threat posed by nationalist protests.35She outlines three majorexplanations or why nationalist protests are particularly risky and difficult to suppress inauthoritarian regimes.36

(1) Demonstration effects: I the government ails to suppress a protest immedi-ately, the scale o the protest may rapidly increase to the point o unmanageability.Protests triggered by nationalist sentiment are particularly threatening to authori-tarian regimes.37

(2) Elite split, which reers to the potential or nationalist protests to dividehardliners and moderates.38In China, nationalist protests may provide an excuseor hardliners to attack moderates, threatening both the unanimity o the CCPand the legitimacy o the current ruler, whose position is moderate. Te leader-ship change in China in 2013 made the elite more likely to pursue aggressiveaction to gain the support o the military or to consolidate power around the newadministration. Nationalist protests may have also enabled opponents to attackthe current leaders so diplomatic stance.(3) Resource mobilization: Protests beget protests by decreasing the cost o col-lective action and allowing other groups with ewer political resources to join theprotests. Tis increases the spread o protest techniques rom hard-core activiststo ormerly-passive actors.39

Weiss offers a comprehensive ramework to explain why, in light o the above threats,the Chinese government either allows public nationalist protests to continue or suppresses

34 Kenneth Schultz, Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises, Te American Political Science Review, Vol.92, No. 4 (1998), 840-841.

35 Weiss, Authoritarian Signaling, 1-3.36 Ibid., 5-6.

37 See Jessica Chen Weiss, Authoritarian Signaling, 5-6.; Tomas Schelling,Micromotives and Macrobehavior, (New York:Norton, 1978); imur Kuran, Now Out o Never: Te Element o Surprise in the East European Revolution o 1989, WorldPoliticsVol. 44, No.1 (1991), 7-8.; Susanne Lohmann, Te Dynamics o Inormational Cascades: Te Monday Demonstrationsin Leipzig, East Germany, 198991, World PoliticsVol. 47. No1 (1994), 42-101.

38 See Jessica Chen Weiss, Authoritarian Signaling, 5-6.; O Guillermo Donnell, and Schmitter Philippe. ransitions FromAuthoritarian Rule: entative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

39 See Jessica Chen Weiss, Authoritarian Signaling, 5-6.; Sidney arrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Conten-tious Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998).


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them.40In authoritarian states, nationalist protests can spiral out o control and are hardto suppress. Tus, allowing nationalist protests can credibly convey the signal by revealingstates vulnerability and demonstrating the states resolve during international disputes.Additionally, nationalist protests increase the governments concession costs. Since it is

hard or an autocratic regime to suppress nationalist protests, the hawkish stance takenby the state becomes credible. By the same logic, limiting national protests also conveys acostly signal to show the states willingness to cooperate. Weiss demonstrates that dur-ing the last two disputes between the U.S. and China, the Chinese government allowednationalist protests to continue only as long as the benefit to international negotiationoutweighed the cost o domestic nationalist dissent.41

Sincere Protests and Manufactured Protestso successully use nationalist protests to signal their resolve, autocratic regimes must

convince oreigners o the threat posed to stability by the protests and the cost o theirrepression at a domestic level. Weiss states that the success o such signaling depends onthe ability o external observers to distinguish clearly between sincere and manuacturedprotests. Protesters are sel-motivated, sel-chosen and sel-organized and cease todemonstrate only when the government curtails their activities or meets their demands.42In contrast, those who participate in manuactured protests are selected, organized and/or rewarded by the government. As sincere protests pose a greater threat to stability andare more costly to repress, they are more likely to be treated as a credible signal by oreignobservers, whereas the use o manuactured protests to signal resolve is likely to be un-

convincing.43Tereore, sincere nationalist demonstrations help the leaders o autocraticregimes to maintain a firm diplomatic stance.44

Weiss does not investigate the use o Internet censorship by autocratic regimes toenhance their strategic signaling. Te aim o this paper is to fill this gap by demonstrat-ing how Internet censorship can help the leaders o autocratic regimes to convey crediblesignals.

2012 Senkaku Islands DisputeTe 2012 Senkaku Islands dispute provoked the largest-scale anti-Japanese protests

in the history o the Chinese Communist Party. Te protests occurred in approximately200 Chinese cities in response to the Japanese governments decision to nationalize theSenkaku Islands, a group o disputed territories in the South China Sea. Te protests

40 Ibid., 30-31.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 10-12.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.


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took place in two waves. While the Chinese government sought to persuade the Japanesegovernment to withdraw its proposal, patriotic Hong Kong activists landed on the islandsin August 2012 and were arrested by the Japanese navy, which triggered the first wave oprotests on August 19. According to Weiss, the Chinese governments repression o all na-tionalist protests aer August 20 may have been perceived as a strategic signal. However,the Japanese government was not dissuaded rom its original proposal and subsequentlynationalized the islands, triggering the second wave o protests on September 28.

In a chapter o her book entitled Te 2012 Anti-Japan Protests and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Crisis, Weiss argues that the Japanese government incorrectly estimatedthe strength o the first wave o the protests because Japans top officials believed that theChinese government was strong enough to control and suppress the protests.45As a resulto this misperception, the Japanese government officially nationalized the islands, escalat-ing the crisis and triggering the second wave o anti-Japanese protests in September. Teselarger-scale protests, together with the reusal o Chinese officials to attend the annualmeetings o the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in okyo in September,provided Japan with a more sincere and reassuring signal.46

As the aim o this research is not to analyze the effects o the strategic signals pro-vided by the two-wave protest, the author does not develop the implications o the 2012anti-Japanese protests. Instead, the author examines the Chinese governments use oInternet censorship to aid its strategic signaling during the two waves o the 2012 protests.

Te author constructs two hypotheses to investigate this issue.

First Hypothesis and ResultsFirst hypothesis: the Chinese government used news media to oment nationalist sen-

timent in response to the dispute but suppressed nationalist expression aer the protests.Tis hypothesis is consistent with Weisss argument that the Chinese government uses

traditional state media to send signals to oreign observers. However, rather than usingWeisss qualitative method to analyze the tone o state media like the Peoples Dailynews-paper, the author evaluates tone more systematically, as recommended by Stockmann, byidentiying and counting the positive and negative words used in each news article.

MethodologyTe tone o the newspaper articles is usually measured by hand coding. However, this

method requires a relatively large number o people, each o whom may have different cri-

45 Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in Chinas Foreign Relations, (New York: Oxord University Press,2014), 209-211.

46 Ibid., 205-209.


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teria or assessing tone.47In Inormation Overload? Collecting, Managing, and AnalyzingChinese Media Content,Stockmann recommends measuring the tone o a news article bysubtracting the number o negative words rom the number o positive words used in thearticle.48Stockmans method was used or this study by creating a dictionary to examine

the tone o reerences to Sino-Japanese relations with two main categories: positive wordsand negative words. Te number o positive and negative words in each news article werecounted using coding soware.

o test the above hypothesis, 198 new articles were collected that were published intwo well-known official Chinese newspapers, the Peoples Daily(), the PeoplesLiberation Army Daily()and a semi-official newspaper, the Beijing Youth Daily(),49between April 1 and December 31, 2012. Newspapers were chosen as thedata source because they are the most popular source o news inormation in urban areaso China, and their content can be retrieved easily rom online databases.50wo types o

newspapersofficial and semi-officialwere examined to increase the reliability o theresearch.

Te period under study can be divided into five main components:

(1) April 1 to August 10: when the Japanese government considered nationalizingthe Senkaku Islands.(2) August 11 to 19: rom the Japanese Navys arrest o Hong Kong citizens on theSenkaku Islands to the Chinese governments crackdown on the first wave o theanti-Japanese protest.

(3) August 20 to September 10: the period aer the first wave o the protest.(4) September 11 to September 20: rom Japans official announcement o thenationalization o the Senkaku Islands to the Chinese governments crackdown onthe second wave o the protest (widely known as the 9-18 protest, which reachedits peak on the anniversary o the Mukden Incident).(5) September 21 to December 31: the period aer the 9-18 protest.

47 Daniela Stockmann, Inormation Overload? Collecting, Managing, and Analyzing Chinese Media Content, in Contem-

porary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies, edited by Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal,and Melanie Manion. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press (2010), 116.

48 Ibid., 121.

49 Tese particular newspapers are used as data sources because they are all available online, which allows or content analysisusing coding soware. Tis set o 198 news articles comprised o only articles on Sino-Japanese relations, such as news articlesrelated to the Senkaku Islands dispute. However, articles on internal Japanese politics that mentioned Sino-Japanese relationswere also included, such as articles on the 2012 Japanese parliamentary election. Te Peoples Dailyarticles were drawn rom theChina Core Newspapers database, the Peoples Liberation Army Dailyarticles were drawn rom the Jieangjun Bao database andthe Beijing Youth Dailyarticles were retrieved rom the Duxiu Knowledge Search database.

50 Ibid., 117.


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Te use o negative words to describe Japan in Chinese news articles can be regarded as agreen light to the anti-Japanese protesters. Tereore, the first hypothesis is supported ithe tone o the three newspapers was more negative in periods (2) and (4) than in periods(3) and (5).

Results As illustrated in Figure 1, all three newspapers used a moderate tone during thefirst period under study (April 1 to August 10, 2012). Te tone o articles on Sino-Japaneserelations in the two official newspapers was much soer than that o equivalent articles inthe Beijing Youth Daily. For example, 40 positive words were used in a Peoples Daily newsarticle on April 4to describe a visit to Japan by Xi Jingping. Te author o a news articlepublished in the Peoples Daily on April 19, Xi Jingping Meets Japanese Guests, statedthat both countries need to improve their mutual trust in political and strategic develop

ment and continue to contribute to the development o Sino-Japanese relations.51Amore negative tone was portrayed in news articles on Japan in the Beijing Youth Daily,probably due to the more sensationalist reporting style o semi-commercialized news-papers. Te findings or the first period indicate that the Chinese government wishedto oster harmonious relations with Japan beore August 11. Most articles in the officialnewspapers advocate or economic and strategic cooperation with Japan.

51 Yang Ye, Xi Jinping Meets with Japanese Guests, China Core Newspapers,D822.3:003 (2012), accessed March 10, 2015.


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Figure 1

Te tone used in these three newspapers changed dramatically aer August 11, whenthe Japanese Navy arrested the three Hong Kong citizens attempting to access the islands.

As displayed in Figure 2, harsher terms were used in all three newspapers to report onChinas relations with Japan. Interestingly, the tone o the newspaper articles changedlittle aer the first wave o the protest. For example, in an article entitled, Do Not LetIndividual Politicians Hijack Sino-Japanese Relations published in the Peoples Liberation

Army Daily on August 16, the Japanese government was only reminded that allowingright-wing parties to hijack Japans oreign policies would severely damage Sino-Japanese


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relations.52Te author o the news article also emphasized that although the Chinesegovernment would not initiate any conflict, it would not be araid to respond to urtheractions taken by Japan. In a news article published on August 29 entitled, Te reaty oMutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan Cannot Becomean Umbrella Protecting Japan rom Violating Chinas Interests, Japan was advised that itwould not be wise to regard the treaty as a protective umbrella permitting urther pro-

vocative actions, and that China would not make any concessions in response to thisincident.53Tese examples suggest that the rhetoric used in Chinas official newspaperswas craed mainly to warn Japan to avoid inciting urther disputes.54

52 Sheen Shihong, Do Not Let Individual Politiancs Hijack Sino-Japanese Relations,Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily),August 16,2012.

53 Fu Zhiwei, reaty o Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and JapanJiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily),August 29, 2012, last accessed March 10, 2015.

54 Peoples Dailynews articles are not available in the China Core Newspapers database.


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Figure 2

However, as displayed in Figure 3, a more negative tone was used aer September 11,when the Japanese government declared its plan to nationalize the Senkaku Islands. Sur-prisingly, a more negative tone was portrayed in an official newspaper, Peoples Daily. Tis

contradicted media analysts traditional assumption that more negative words are used incommercial newspapers than in official newspapers at times o crisis. On September 12,the day aer Japan announced the islands nationalization, Japan was warned in a PeoplesDaily news article, Japan Should Stop Playing with Fire, that i the Japanese governmentcontinued to play with fire over the Senkaku Islands dispute, it would be held respon-sible or the serious consequences.55Tis suggests that during this incident, the Chinese

55 Bells, Japan Should Stop Playing with Fire, China Core Newspapers,D823:003 (2012), last accessed March 10, 2015.


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government attempted to manipulate public opinion and conveyed a warning signal to Ja-pan rather than indulging in sensationalist reporting. As expected, the tone o the articlessoened noticeably aer the second wave o the protest on September 18.

Figure 3

Te findings support Weisss argument that the Chinese government thought the firstwave o the protest presented a strong signal to orce Japan to give up its nationalizationplan. However, the signals ineffectiveness inspired the CCP to increase the scale o theprotest. Te average tone o reerences to Sino-Japanese relations in the Peoples Libera-tion Army Daily, a state newspaper, was measured at negative five to negative six duringthe first wave o the protest, but changed dramatically during the second wave, droppingto approximately -14. Te findings also suggest that as the nationalist protest increased in


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scale, a harsher tone was used in the newspapers to describe the conflict. A more severetone in news articles may be interpreted as urther encouragement or domestic national-ists to organize or participate in protests. Lastly, the findings o this research are consistentwith the results o Stockmanns analysis o the 2005 Sino-Japanese protests. Aer the pro-

tests were repressed, a soer tone was used in the state media to describe Sino-Japaneserelations.

Second Hypothesis and FindingsSecond hypothesis: the Chinese government allowed Internet users to promote na-

tionalist protest in response to the disputes but censored protest-related messages once theprotests began.

o test this hypothesis, the author systematically analyzed the use o Internet censor-ship by the Chinese government as part o its strategic signaling in relation to the dispute.

Having the public promote protests is costly to the government and offers a credible signalto oreign observers. Tereore, the governments minimal use o censorship to incite na-tionalist protest encouraged oreign observers to regard the protests as sincere, consistentwith Weisss theoretical ramework o strategic signaling.

MethodologySina Weibo is one o Chinas most popular social-media platorms. It was created in

2009 to provide a service equivalent to witter and had more than 200 million users by theend o 2011.56According to a report rom the China Internet Network Inormation Centerin 2012, there were more than 538 million Internet users in China halway through 2012;one out o every two Chinese Internet users used Sina Weibo.57Te report also suggeststhat the use o more traditional orms o cyber communication like email and discussionorums diminished during this period.58

Censored messages obtained rom the Weiboscope Project conducted at the Journal-ism and Media Studies Center o the University o Hong Kong were aggregated and codedto test the above hypothesis. Tis project took regular samples o more than 350,000Chinese Weibo bloggers, each with more than 1000 ollowers and restored their censoredmessages.59

Te author collected all messages containing the word protest()that werecensored during the two waves o the 2012 anti-Japanese protests. Te first wave o theprotest lasted rom August 15 to 25 and the second rom September 11 to 23. In each case,the measurement period began with the first day o the protest (August 15 or the first

56 Microblogging Use in China Quadrupled in 2011: Tink ank, Reuters, last modified Jan. 16, 2012.

57 Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, China Internet Network Information Center.

58 Ibid.

59 Wa-Fu King, Chung-Hong Chan and Michael Chau, Assessing Censorship on Microblogs in China: Discriminatory Key-word Analysis and Impact Evaluation o the Real Name Registration Policy, IEEE Internet Computing, 17, 3 (2013), 42-44.


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wave and September 11 or the second wave) and ended five days aer the protest (August25 and September 23, respectively). Te author then created a method or classiying the

messages containing the word protest. Te categories were as ollows:

Item 1:Messages criticizing or mentioning aggressive action, arson (like burning

the Japanese flag) or vandalism (e.g. throwing stones at Japanese-owned retailerssuch as oyota).

Item 2: Messages mentioning anti-Japanese protests or promoting urther pro-

tests.

Item 3: Messages mentioning protests outside China during the period under the

study, such as anti-Japanese protests in Hong Kong or right-wing anti-Chinese

protests in Japan.

Item 4:Messages attacking the Chinese government or its moderate stance in

the dispute or urging the government to take urther diplomatic action, such as

implementing economic sanctions.

Item 5: Messages unrelated to the topic under study, such as those concerning

actory workers protests in South Arica, and messages containing insufficient

inormation or categorization (N/A).

Item 6:Messages relating to boycotts, such as those urging people to avoid using

Japanese cars.

First Wave of Protest and Results

Te first wave o the protests began on August 19, 2012 and were triggered by theJapanese Navys deportation o Hong Kong activists rom the Senkaku Islands on August15. Te protests involved Chinese citizens in various provinces.

Between August 15 and August 24, over 1,200 Weibo messages containing the phraseprotest were censored. Censorship increased dramatically when the protest took placebut diminished thereaer. As illustrated in Figure 4, the number o protest-related mes-sages censored between August 15 and 24 reached its peak on August 19 and decreasedrapidly by August 20.


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Figure 4

Messages in Item 2 were not subject to the greatest censorship. As shown in Figure5, the percentage o censored Item 2 messages diminished between August 15 and 18but increased rapidly until August 22. Tis suggests that the Chinese government took

a relatively moderate approach to censoring messages where anti-Japanese protest wasmentioned or incited. Notably, however, these messages were banned entirely aer theprotests had begun, in an attempt to prevent urther protest activity.

Interestingly, the Chinese government did not want the protest to be associated witharson or vandalism. As shown in Figure 5, Item 1 messages were rigorously censored. OnAugust 19, 153 o 468 censored messages contained reerences to arson and/or vandal-ism. One message censored on August 19I would break off relations with to my riends


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who participate in and support this protests because they may influence my intelligencequotientwas probably removed because the author criticized the aggressiveness o theanti-Japanese protesters.60Another message censored on the same day was as ollows:[...] people should go to the Senkaku Islands to protest, otherwise this protest is only apretense.61Tese two examples suggest that the authors o most o the messages censoredon August 19 were criticizing the protest itsel, rather than promoting urther protests.

Figure 5

Te government adopted a relatively lenient attitude toward Internet users promo-tion o the first wave o the protest. However, any messages related to arson and vandalism

60 See Fu, Chan, and Chau, Assessing Censorship on Microblogs.

61 Ibid.


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were stringently censored. Te findings also suggest that the Chinese government stronglyintended to control the scope o the protest via censorship in cyberspace.

Second Wave of Protest and ResultsTe findings or the second wave o the protest were airly similar to those or the

first wave. During the second wave o the protest, nearly 5,500 items were censored. Teauthor randomly sampled 25 percent o the messages censored per day rom September11 to September 23 (five days aer the protest), yielding almost 1,400 coded messages. Asdisplayed in Figure 6 below, the number o messages censored reached a peak on Septem-ber 16, the day aer the first round o the protests. Censorship decreased by September 17,although the major protest activities in this wave took place on September 18. Te numbero messages censored per day was lowest on September 20, when the protest had beenalmost completely suppressed.


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Figure 6 (see previous page)

Te percentage o items censored during the second wave o the protest generallysupports the hypothesis that the Chinese government allowed Internet users to promotenationalist protest in response to the dispute, with an official reminder that opinionsshould be expressed rationally and within law on September 16. Te second wave othe protest was largely suppressed by September 20, and no protests were reported onSeptember 19. As displayed in Figure 7, messages mentioning or promoting protests werenot subject to the greatest censorship until September 18, when the protests reached theirpeak across the country.


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Figure 7

Te Chinese government did not strictly censor messages in the second category betweenSeptember 11 and 17. During both waves o the protest, the Chinese governments attitudetoward reerences to or promotion o anti-Japanese protest was airly lenient, whereas

messages mentioning or criticizing aggressive action such as arson and vandalism werecensored. More than 54 percent o the messages posted on September 17 were censoredor criticizing the aggressiveness o the protests (Item 1). Te ollowing are typical ex-amples o messages coded as item 1 that were censored on September 17.

(1) Do people still remember the recent nuclear leak in Japan? Japan onlyreceived a small amount o aid at that time, but nobody was scrambling or sup-


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plies. Rather, they were lining up. Tose who did not receive aid simply continuedto wait, which reflected the Japanese sense o unity. Certain types o behavior,such as destroying Japanese-brand cars, will only cause chaos. We should staycalm. Tere is no use in being reckless and anxious.62

(2) When I see the anti-Japanese protests in mainland China, I can only exclaimcrazy and shameul.63

(3) Troughout the ages, historical change has been led by passionate but blinddemonstrators. In the end, these individuals are always sacrificed, and most othem are just youngsters.64

All o the examples above demonstrate that the Chinese government stringentlycensored messages that criticized the aggressive behavior o the protesters, asked peopleto calm down or blamed the government or sacrificing young people in the anti-Japaneseprotests.

Few messages were censored or criticizing the government. As illustrated in Figure 7,only seven to ten percent o the messages whose authors criticized the government werecensored, fitting into Weisss theory that the Chinese government wanted to expose its

vulnerability in order to demonstrate its resolve.

Teoretical ImplicationsTe two sets o results reported above support Weiss theory that the Chinese govern-

ment uses Internet censorship to aid its strategic signaling. Te results o investigating thefirst hypothesis confirm that a harsher tone was taken in Chinas state media during thesecond wave o the protests than during the first wave, offering a more definite signal atboth the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, the harsher tone usedin the state media may be interpreted as a sign encouraging nationalists to organize andparticipate in anti-Japanese protests. At the international level, this harsher tone persuad-ed oreign observers o the sincerity o the Chinese government during the 2012 Sino-Japanese dispute.

Te results o investigating the first hypothesis are also consistent with Stockmannsargument that the Chinese government used a soer tone aer the protests to assuagenationalistic sentiment. Te findings suggest that the Chinese government used statemedia and press restrictions on commercial media to manipulate public opinion or crisismanagement, especially during international disputes.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.


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Te results o investigating the major research hypothesis suggest that the Chinesegovernment censored messages that criticized the protest while allowing Internet users topromote protest activities until the protests were suppressed. Tese findings fit into Weissstheory that governments seek to make protests appear as sincere and as costly as possible

to increase the credibility o their signals. By censoring negative opinions o the protest,the Chinese government ensured that only messages promoting the protest were availableto oreign observers. At the domestic level, the large number o messages promoting na-tionalist protest in cyberspace helped the Chinese government to elicit nationalist protest.Tese messages also provided an outlet or nationalists to express their anger.

Te findings also suggest that Kang, Pan and Roberts oversimpliy the role o govern-ment censorship in stating that the Chinese government removes any online messagesrelated to collective action but allows some degree o government criticism in cyber-space.65Te findings o this research suggest that the Chinese government instead allows

Internet users to promote collective action that is conducive to state policy. Te results oevaluating the second hypothesis reveal that the Chinese government careully steered theopinions expressed in cyberspace during the 2012 Senkaku Islands dispute. Te Chinesegovernment was flexible in its censorship o messages related to collective action. Oncethe government identified certain collective activities as conducive to state policy or stra-tegic bargaining, it was likely to amend its censorship practices.

Japanese News Media CoverageAlthough the second set o research findings confirm that the Chinese government

did not strictly censor messages that criticized the governments moderate stance, thiscensorship mechanism may solely be or domestic purposes. An alternative explanation isthat the Chinese government could use nationalism to increase popular support while at-tempting to undermine violent nationalism, especially during the CCPs power transitionin 2012. In order to demonstrate that Internet censorship worked as part o the strategicsignaling, the author borrowed news articles rom two major Japanese newspapers, TeYomiuri Shimbun()and Te Asahi Shimbun(), during the two-waveprotests to solve this puzzle. While the ormer one is considered a le-leaning and pro-China newspaper, the latter one is considered a right-leaning newspaper. Te author

ound that both o these newspapers watched Chinese Internet users opinions towards thetwo-wave anti-Japanese protests in their news articles and believed that the two-wave anti-Japanese protests were sel-organized.

For the right-leaning newspaper, Te Yomiuri Shimbun(), an article entitledChina Shouldnt reat Suspects in Car Attack like Heroes was published aer the first-wave protests on September 3. Te news article said that an opinion survey conducted

65 King, Pan and Roberts, How Censorship in China, 14-17.


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by a Chinese portal site on the Internet showed that 80 percent o respondents supportedthe attack on the Japanese ambassadors car. Japan was alarmed that many people praisedthe attack and called the suspects heroes. Te news article also stated that the patrioticeducation in China added to the anti-Japanese sentiment but concluded that Japaneseand Chinese leaders must try to rebuild the relations between their nations by hold-ing numerous discussions rom a broader perspective and in a calm manner.66Anothernews article entitled China Should not go too ar in its Response Over Senkakus waspublished our days beore the second-wave protests on September 15. Te news articlestated that growing anti-Japan sentiment in China also is a cause o concern. With theapproach o the September 18 anniversary o the Liutiaohu Incident, which triggeredthe Manchurian Incident, calls to join anti-Japan protests have been made through theInternet across China, and China should not unilaterally close the channels o exchangeo communications.67

Te le-leaning newspaper, Te Asahi Shimbun(), published an articleentitled China nationalists Burn Japanese, Police Limit Damage a day aer the first-waveprotest on August 20.68Te news article reported that the Chinese government removedInternet messages about the protest but also observed that Chinese Internet users criti-cized the Chinese government or doing little aer Japanese nationalists landed on Sen-kakus. On August 30, a news article entitled China in Dilemma over Next Move in FlagFlap, stated that the Chinese government was caught in a dilemma in which it wanted toprevent relations rom worsening with Japan, and arresting the man who ripped a flagrom the limousine o Japans ambassador would ignite public anger.69Lastly, a day aerthe second-wave protests on September 19, a news article entitled Chinese AuthoritiesStruggle to Keep Lid on Anti-Japanese Protests noted that the Chinese government wastrying very hard to keep the protest in control, and Chinese police orces used the Intern

scir fall 2015 journal

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