producing effective maintenance strategies to control
TRANSCRIPT
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Producing effective maintenance strategies to control railway risk
ClaudiaFecarottiandJohnAndrewsResilienceEngineeringResearchGroup
TheUniversityofNottingham
PSAM14–ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandManagement
16-21September2018,UCLAMeyer&ReneeLuskinConferenceCenter,LA
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Motivations
• Complexanddiverseportfolioofassets• Heterogeneity• Highlyinterconnected(dependencies)• Expensivetomanage
• Manyassetsaresafetycritical
• Maintenanceisvitaltocontroltheriskandmaintainhighlevelsofservice
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Motivations
Need for an effective approach to asset management to run a SAFE,RELIABLEandAFFORDABLErailway
• Bespokemodelstopredictassetsresponsetomaintenance• Whole-life/Whole-systemapproach• Linkassetmaintenancetosystemperformanceandsafety
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Railway Asset Management Framework
RailwayAssetManagementModellingFramework tosupportboth localisedandsystemicoptimaldecisionsoninfrastructuremaintenance
Libraryofmodels
• Statisticalmodels• Predictivemodels• Optimisationmodels
Decisionlevels
• Infrastructure:asset/section/route/network• Planningstage:strategic/tactical/operational
Procedurestolinkmodelsforwhole-systemrepresentationandanalysis
Pastdata
Predictivemodels
Futuredata
Optimisationmodels
Optimaldecisions
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Predictive models
• Assetstatemodelstoassessassetsresponsetomaintenance
• Serviceprovisionmodeltoevaluatedelaysandjourneycancellations
• Riskandsafetymodelstoevaluateriskandconsequencesofhazardousevents
EnablepredictionofKPIs
• Assetsconditions• Servicereliability• Safety• Costs
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Asset State Models DEGRADATIONANDFAILURE
INTERVENTIONSTRATEGIES:• Inspectiontypeandfrequency• Levelsofdegradationtriggeringintervention• Componentsreplacementpriortofailure
• Condition• Age• Usage
• Opportunisticmaintenance• Renewal• Enhancement• Resourcesavailability(equipmentandpersonnel)
For any asset management strategy predictdistributionsof:• Assetconditions
• Failuremodesprobabilities• Durationoffailed/degradedstates• Futureconditions(atanytime)
• Assetavailability• Numberofeachinterventiontype• Assetremaininglife
&
ASSESSANDCOMPAREDIFFERENTMAINTENANCESTRATEGIESTOSUPPORTDECISIONS
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Common modelling technique: Petri nets
• State-based• Stochastic• Simulationfriendly• Anydistributionoffailuretimes
• Assetswear-out(increasingfailurerate!earlyreplacementoption)• Dependencyonpastconditions/events
• Complexmaintenanceprocesses:• Servicing,inspection,replacementpriortofailure(basedon;condition,age,use),reactiverepair,refurbishment,renewal
• Conditionandriskbasedinspection• Concisestructurecomparedtothecrediblealternatives• Modularity(Easylinkingtoformthesystemmodel)• Distributionofoutputsratherthanpointestimates
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Petri nets
PLACEcomponentstate,physicalcondition,logicalcondition
TRANSITIONevent:degradation,failure,repair(immediate,timed-deterministicandstochastic)
TOKEN(numberoftokensineachplacedeterminethestateofthesystematanytime–MARKING=SYSTEMSTATE)Tokensare“consumed”and“produced”wheneventsoccur(transitions“fire”)determininganewsystemstate
W W WF F F
D D D
R
Initialworkingstate Failureoccurs–transitionDfires
Componentisrepaired–transitionRfires
RR
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Track geometry maintenance model
• 4degradedstates
• Degradedstateaffectingserviceandsafety:• speedrestriction• lineclosure
• Weibulldistributionoftimestodegrade
• Notasgood-asnewaftermaintenance
Places(conditions):Progressivelevelsofdegradationtriggeringdifferentmaintenanceinterventions
Transitions(events):Degradationbetweenconsecutivestates(Anydistributionoftimestodegrade)
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Track geometry maintenance model
• 4degradedstates
• Degradedstateaffectingserviceandsafety:• speedrestriction• lineclosure
• Weibulldistributionoftimestodegrade
• Notasgood-asnewaftermaintenance
Places(conditions):Progressivelevelsofdegradationtriggeringdifferentmaintenanceinterventions
Transitions(events):Degradationbetweenconsecutivestates(Anydistributionoftimestodegrade)
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Track geometry maintenance model
• 4degradedstates• Degradedstateaffectingserviceandsafety:
• speedrestriction• lineclosure
• Weibulldistributionoftimestodegrade• Notasgood-asnewaftermaintenance
• Periodicinspection
• Currentstatesrevealed
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Track geometry maintenance model
• 4degradedstates• Degradedstateaffectingserviceandsafety:
• speedrestriction• lineclosure
• Weibulldistributionoftimestodegrade• Notasgood-asnewaftermaintenance
• Periodicinspection
• Currentstatesrevealed:
• UnrevealedneedforSRandLC(safety)
• RevealedneedforSRandLC(service)
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Track geometry maintenance model
• 4degradedstates
• Weibulldistributionoftimestodegrade
• Notasgood-asnewaftermaintenance
• Periodicinspection
• UnrevealedneedforSRandLC(safety)
• RevealedneedforSRandLC(service)
• Revealedstatestriggermaintenance
• Maintenanceeffectiveness
• Side-effectoftamping
• Renewalstrategies(e.g.age,pastmaintenance)
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Track geometry maintenance application
Strategy Inspectionperiod(T14)
Meantimetoperformroutinemaintenance
(T10)
Meantimetoperformmaintenancefromspeed
restriction(T11)
Meantimetoperformimmediaterepair
(T12) θ(days) µ(days) σ2(days2) µ(days) σ2(days2) µ(days) σ2(days2)
1 15 20 5 5 1 1 0.1 2 15 20 5 10 2 1 0.1 3 15 30 5 5 1 1 0.1 4 15 30 5 10 2 1 0.1 5 15 40 10 5 1 1 0.1 6 15 40 10 10 2 1 0.1 7 120 20 5 5 1 1 0.1 8 120 20 5 10 2 1 0.1 9 120 30 5 5 1 1 0.1 10 120 30 5 10 2 1 0.1 11 120 40 10 5 1 1 0.1 12 120 40 10 10 2 1 0.1
Table 3 Maintenance strategies.
Whatdoweuseitfor?Toinvestigateassetresponsetomaintenance.
SDop SDrm SDsr SDlc opportunistic
maintenanceispossible(associatedtoplaceP2)
routinemaintenanceisrequired
(associatedtoplaceP3)
SRandemergencyrepairrequired
(associatedtoplaceP4)
LCandimmediaterepairrequired
(associatedtoplaceP5) 1.5 1.8 2.5 3.5
Table 1 SD threshold values for each degraded state
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 β η β η β η β η β η 1.5 600 1.5 500 1.6 370 1.7 280 1.8 740
Table 2 Weibull parameters associated to each stochastic transition representing degradation
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Track geometry maintenance results
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
1 45
89
133
177
221
265
309
353
397
441
485
529
573
617
661
705
749
793
837
881
925
969
Num
berofinterventio
ns
Number of interventions per lifetime averaged over the number of simulations
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
Numberofsimulations
1414.515
15.516
16.517
17.518
18.519
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
strategies
NumberofRMinterventions
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
strategies
NumberofSRimposed
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12strategies
Probabilityofbeeingingoodconditions
0
0.0001
0.0002
0.0003
0.0004
0.0005
0.0006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Strategies
ProbabilityofimposedSR
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0.002
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
strategies
ProbabilityofunrevealedneedforSR
Resilience Engineering Research Group
Conclusions and future work
• Needforasystematicapproachtorailwayassetmanagement:
RailwayAssetManagementModellingFramework
• Assetstatemodelstopredictassetresponsetomaintenance
• Modellingtechnique:Petrinet
• Results(failuremodesprobabilities)areinputtoserviceandsafetymodelsthusenablingtolinkmaintenancetosystemperformanceandsafety
Futurework• Continuepopulatingtheframework…..