preliminary assessment the threat of genocide to the bahais of iran 2009

8/2/2019 Preliminary Assessment the Threat of Genocide to the Bahais of Iran 2009

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Preliminary Assessment: The Threat

o Genocide to the Bahs o Iran

Current to: 15 May 2009Threat Level: High

Preparation is sufcient or exterminationIntent is apparentIdeal conditions or extermination are not yet present

The Sentinel Project

for Genocide Prevention


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The Sentinel Project for Genocide

Prevention is a non-proft organization

devoted to effective early warning of

genocide and the implementation of

preventive measures before lives are

lost. Our goal is to achieve this through

the creative use of technology and

cooperation with threatened groups.


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The Iranian government has taken a

number of steps to weaken the Bah

community within Iran and appears

to be preparing them for possibleextermination.


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table of contents

1.0introduction: situation overview .....................................................12.0background information .........................................................................1

2.1 Demographic Inormation .................................................................. 12.2 Iranian Political History....................................................................... 1

2.3 Overview o the Bah Faith............................................................... 2

3.0predisposing factors for genocide in iran ...........................2

4.0intent ...........................................................................................................35.0stages of the genocidal process and practical

indicators present in Iran ...................................................................4

5.1 Classifcation........................................................................................... 45.2 Symbolization......................................................................................... 45.3 Dehumanization ..................................................................................... 55.4 Organization........................................................................................... 65.5 Polarization ............................................................................................. 65.6 Preparation.............................................................................................. 6

6.0

future escalation ...........................................................................................7 6.1 Potential Accelerators .................................................................7

6.2 Potential Triggers ................................................................................... 7

7.0expected indicators of future escalation ....................... 8

8.0potential perpetrators ...................................................................88.1 State Organizations ............................................................................... 88.2 Paramilitary Organizations................................................................. 9

8.3 Non-State Actors.................................................................................... 9

9.0further investigation by the sentinel project .............. 9

9.1 Questions Requiring Answers............................................................ 9

9.2 Future Sources....................................................................................... 10

10.0conclusion ............................................................................................. 10

endnotes...........................................................................................................11


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The seven leaders of the Iranian Bah community are currentlyimprisoned under harsh conditions.

Image source: Bah World News Service


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1.0 introduction: situation

overview

Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, IranianBahs have suffered intense and systematicabuses at the hands of their government. Thispersecution has mostly been motivated by thereligious convictions of the founders and lead-ers of the Islamic Republic. They view Bahs asa heretical sect of Islam due to their recognition

of a messenger from God after Mohammed,who Muslims hold to be Gods final prophet.

As a result, Bahs have been stripped oftheir legal rights and deprived of governmentemployment, economic participation, andhigher education. Their property and financialassets are often confiscated and their culturaland religious sites are the targets of an officialdemolition campaign.

Bahs are frequently vilified in the Iranianmedia and by government officials as foreignagents, spies, and enemies of Islam. Bahs arebarred from publicly practicing their religion ororganizing in any way; since 1979, their leadershave faced arrest, imprisonment, and execution.

Approximately 200 Bahs have been killedsince that time.

The remainder of the Iranian Bah popula-tion faces constant harassment, assault, andvandalism by government agents. Currently, thetop seven Bah leaders in Iran are awaitingtrial on such vague charges as the spreadingof corruption on earth, which carries thedeath penalty .1

This situation has made Iranian Bahsan extremely vulnerable, dehumanized, andthreatened minority. The Iranian governmentappears bent on destroying the Bah religionitself and coercing its followers to convert toIslam but it is also highly likely that, undercertain circumstances, they may turn to evenmore violent means and seek to physicallyexterminate the Bah population.

2.0 background information

2.1 Demographic Information

Iran has a population of approximately 70million people. Ethnically, Persians repre-sent a majority at 51% of the population,while Azeris account for 24%, Gilaki andMazandarani 8%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Lurs2%, Balochs 2%, Turkmens 2%, and other 1%.Religiously, Muslims represent a 98% majority;89% of the population is Shia and 9% is Sunni.Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Bahsrepresent a combined 2% of the population. Ofthese non-Muslim religious minorities, Bahsare the largest single group with an estimated300 000 members.2 Nonetheless, Bahs repre-

sent only 0.4% of the Iranian population.

2.2 Iranian Political History

Iran was a monarchy from 1795 to 1979. TheQajar dynasty ruled until it was deposed in


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preliminary assessment

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1925 in favour of the army officer Reza Khan,who had supported an earlier coup and becameprime minister. Parliament named Khan theShah (the title of the monarch) in 1925 and

took the name Pahlavi. During Pahlavi rule,Iran enjoyed an increase in prosperity andregional influence but political repression andWestern influence increased popular discon-tent. Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeinicame to prominence as an opposition leaderand was exiled from 1964 until his returnduring the Shahs absence in early 1979. Fol-lowing Khomeinis return from exile, theIslamic Republic of Iran was established on1 April 1979.3

Since the death of Khomeini in 1989, Iranian

politics have been marked by constant tensionbetween conservatives and those who advocate

reform and a more liberal interpretation of theconstitution. The latter also generally advo-cate normalized relations with neighbouringcountries, though they differ on social andeconomic policies.

Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsan-jani (19891997) and Mohammad Khatami(19972005) were both reformists who foundtheir efforts frustrated by significant oppositionfrom the clerical elite and parliament, whichwere dominated by conservatives.4

The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejadin June 2005 signaled a strengthening of theconservative position in Iran. Ahmadinejad isa hardliner who considers himself a man of thepeople. He promised to oppose corruption andremain in solidarity with the poor.

As a former Revolutionary Guards officerwho volunteered to serve in the Iran-Iraq War of198088, Ahmadinejad appears to be a true be-

liever in the Islamic Revolution and has vowedto maintain its principles. Since his election,Ahmadinejad has played a controversial roleon the world stage due to such issues as Iranssuspected nuclear program, his denial of theHolocaust, and his constant threats to Israel.5

2.3 Overview of the Bah Faith

The Bah Faith is a religion that was foundedin Iran during the mid-nineteenth century by

a man who came to be known as Bahullh(Glory of God in Arabic). Its followers havefaced severe persecution in their homelandsince that time and tens of thousands lost theirlives in outbursts of violence. Bahullh, whoclaimed to be a messenger from God, was exiledfrom Iran to Baghdad and was ultimately sentby the government of the Ottoman Empire towhat is the present-day State of Israel. Despiteintense persecution within Iran, Bahs havemanaged to retain their identity.6

The Bah Faith is an independent mono-theistic religion which recognizes the validityof all other religions. In fact, Bahs considerBahuullh to have only been the most recentin a long line of Messengers of God which in-cludes Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed.They regard humanity as a single race and giveno regard to age, race, ethnicity, or class in anyof their activities. Bahs renounce violenceand do not participate in partisan politics butprofess loyalty to the government of whatevercountry they live in. Today, Bahs numberapproximately 5 million worldwide.7

3.0 predisposing factors forgenocide in iran

A number of conditions increase the likelihood

of genocide taking place within a given stateand facilitate its perpetration, though they donot in themselves make genocide inevitable.

The following predisposing factors are pres-ent in Iran:

a) Pre-existing anti-Bah hostility Iranwas the birthplace of the Bah Faith in themid-nineteenth century, but its followers havebeen continuously persecuted as a combined


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result of popular hatred, clerical provocation,and the policies of successive regimes. Thosecurrently inciting hatred of Bahs have madesome attempts to exploit this history of preju-

dice.b) History of serious human rights abuses.Iran had a very poor human rights record evenprior to the Islamic Revolution and it has onlyworsened since then. Ethnic and religiousminorities, women, homosexuals, and politi-cal dissidents have all been targets of both of-ficial and unofficial abuse. Such systemic andsystematic abuses lower the value placed onhuman life and accustom the government andits agents to abusing and killing members ofthe population.

c) Economic distress and difficult life con-ditions Economic distress and difficult lifeconditions increase the likelihood of genocidefor three reasons. First, they create a sense ofinsecurity in the majority population which

prompts them to look for scapegoatssuchas internal minorities, external enemies, orbothto explain their misfortune and actaggressively towards them. This aggressionostensibly serves to preserve the threatenedcollective self-concept and self-esteem of themajority.8

Second, they increase the willingness of thepopulace to follow charismatic and radicalleaders,9 especially if they promise to improveconditions and return them to their (real orimagined) former prosperity, often throughdrastic measures.

Third, these conditions create large portions

of the population usually disaffected, unem-ployed youth who are willing to participate in,or at least support, attacks on minorities.10

This final point is of particular concern, asIranian government estimates place the unem-ployment rate at 12.5% as of 2008.

Unemployment is much higher among young

workers, which, combined with low wages, hasled to labour-related unrest in the recent past.

This situation is only promising to worsen inthe near future.13

d) Strong state apparatus The Iraniangovernment is able to call upon vast police,

military, paramilitary, and intelligence re-sources. It also exercises extensive control overthe media. Such a regime is able to easily quelldissent and crush any physical resistance to its

policies. Such a regime is well-positioned toperpetrate a genocide with almost completeimpunity.

e) Ideologically-motivated revolutionaryregime The current Iranian republic wasfounded during the 1979 Islamic Revolution,the values of which are enshrined in the Iranian

constitution. As the preamble of the constitu-tion states, The basic characteristic of thisrevolution is its ideological and Islamicnature.14 The remainder of the documentoutlines the structure of the populist theocracywhich exists today.

Such exclusionary, quasi-utopian visions are

very dangerous for minorities, especially whenthe ideology which they espouse is religiousin nature. Religious minorities within such astate are seen as dissenters by virtue of theirheretical beliefs and supposed links to theold social order that the revolution seeks tosweep away.

4.0 intent

It is difficult to determine whether or not theIranian government has the genocidal intentto physically exterminate the Bah popula-tion within Iran. Certain documents indicate

that the regime is making a deliberate effortto destroy the viability of the Bahs as a com-munity.

The Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Coun-cil issued a memorandum on 25 February 1991containing directives for government actions


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towards the Bah community.15 This docu-ment was brought to public attention in early1993 in a report by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, theUN Special Representative of the Commission

on Human Rights.

16

The document outlinespolicies to counter the Bah question,stating that the governments dealings withthem [Bahs] must be in such a way that theirprogress and development are blocked.17

While making some conditional promisesof Bah physical safety and subsistence, thedocument goes on to order that they must beexpelled from universities, that their political(espionage) activities must be dealt with, of-ficials are to deny them employment and any

position of influence, and that propagandamust be used to counter the... religious ac-tivities of Bahs.18 Ominously, the documenteven looks beyond Irans borders and states thata plan must be devised to confront and destroytheir cultural roots outside the country.19

While the Bah question memorandumdoes not call for the physical extermination ofIranian Bahs, it does provide clear evidenceof an overarching state-directed plan with theintent of destroying the Bah Faith and com-munity, apparently through forced conversionto Islam. This refutes subsequent governmentdenials of involvement in the intensifyingattacks on Bahs. Since the governmentsintent to suffocate the Bah community has

thus been established, it is possible that it willin the future turn to even harsher methods ifthis soft approach fails to produce the desiredresults.

5.0 stages of the genocidal

process and practical

indicators present in iran

While it has not been determined that genocideis currently taking place in Iran, the persecu-

tion of Iranian Bahs shares many commonfeatures with past and ongoing genocides.The model of the genocidal process used toassess the events in Iran is the Eight Stages of

Genocide developed by Gregory H. Stanton.

20

It must be noted that this model is non-linearand that, while the lower stages usually precedethe upper ones, the operational processes mayoccur simultaneously throughout a genocide.

A number of practical indicators (observableevents corresponding to each stage of the theo-retical model) have been documented and used

to assess whether or not each stage is takingplace in Iran.21

5.1 ClassificationArticle 19 of the Iranian constitution guaranteesthe rights and freedoms of all Iranian citizensregardless of ethnicity, race, or language.22 Itdoes not, however, explicitly mention religionas being irrelevant to individual rights.

On the contrary, the enjoyment of suchrights is actually contingent upon member-ship in the correct religions. Article 13 definesthe legally recognized religious minorities asZoroastrianism, Judaism, and Christianity.23

Thus, all the people of Iran are classified byreligion and Bahs are implicitly defined asan out-group and deprived of all legal rightsand protection within Iran.

5.2 Symbolization

This is the process by which a target groupcomes to be identified not as individual humanbeings but merely units within a collective.They are then labeled sometimes even with

their proper group name, as in the case ofBahs in such a way that supposed charac-teristics can be easily generalized to all mem-bers of a group.

Such generalizations are especially success-ful in the case of Bahs, who represent a tiny


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minority of the Iranian population. As a result,the majority of Iranians have never actuallymet a Bah and lack any experience against

which to compare the information they aretold. This is an important step in the formation

of stereotypes and the dehumanization of thetarget group.

5.3 Dehumanization

Bahs have long been the targets of propa-ganda and hate speech in the Iranian media,a campaign which has intensified in recent

years. They are often attacked as threateningand subhuman on religious, political, and social

grounds.In the first case, Islamic clerics define Bahs

as heretics because they recognize the found-

er of their faith as being a messenger from Godafter Mohammed (see section 1.0 Introduc-tion).

Politically, Bahs (despite being members

of a pacifistic and apolitical religion) are oftenaccused of being linked to foreign governmentssuch as Israel and the United States as well asthe pre-1979 monarchy.

Most notably, they are accused of acting asspies for Israel and of having collaborated withthe secret police of the former regime.

In the social realm, there has been an effortto discourage other Iranians from associat-ing with Bahs by constantly describing thelatter as being prostitutes, incestuous,and unclean.24 This propaganda appears inall media newspapers, television,25 radiobroadcasts, films, websites, and public state-

This map shows the extent of killings of Bahs across

Iran, as well as the destruction of their historical andburial sites.

Image source: Bah Community of Canada


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ments by government officials and serves toerode the humanity of Bahs. Once Bahsare effectively dehumanized, it will be easierfor perpetrators to kill them and for observersto either support the extermination or remain

neutral bystanders.

5.4 Organization

The Iranian state has a number of forces at itsdisposal which could be used to perpetrate agenocide of Bahs. These forces include theconventional army, the Army of the Guardiansof the Islamic Revolution, the police,and the Basij militia. These forces havewidely varying levels of capability andideological commitment, but each is apotential source of killers. In the caseof paramilitary forces such as the Basijmilitia and especially non-state groupssuch as the Ansar-i Hizbullah, theirostensibly weaker connections to thestate may allow the regime to deny itsinvolvement in any large-scale anti-Bah violence. For more informationon these forces, see section 9.0 Poten-tial Perpetrators.

5.5 Polarization

The Iranian government is working, especiallythrough the media, to separate Bahs as far aspossible from the rest of society. This strength-ens the position of both clerical and secularconservative hardliners who wish for theirdestruction while neutralizing the moderatecentre which has the most potential to helpBahs. This has been accomplished by castingBahs as both heretics and internal enemieslinked to powerful foreign threats. Any Iranianwho advocates equal treatment for Bahs or

defends their rights is then accused of being inleague with these enemies.

5.6 Preparation

The Iranian government has taken a numberof steps to weaken the position of Bahs

within Iran and to prepare them for possibleextermination. Most notably, Bahs have beenexcluded from government employment, haveonly restricted economic participation, and are

barred from higher education. Many of theirhistorical and cultural sites, including cem-eteries, have been destroyed in order to eraseevery trace of their existence. Bah property

and financial assets are often confiscated, and

both vandalism and violence against individu-als are increasing.

In late 2005, the headquarters of the Iranianmilitary instructed various police forces, intel-ligence agencies, and the Revolutionary Guardsto identify and monitor all Bahs within Iran.26In 2008 the top seven Bah community leaders

in Iran were arrested and imprisoned withoutcharge. In early 2009, these leaders were ac-cused of espionage and are now awaiting whatis likely to be a purely show trial.27

If convicted which is highly likely theymay be executed, a fate met by numerous other

These tombstones are the remnants of a Bah cemetery that was

bulldozed near Najafabad. Bah burial sites have been desecratedand destroyed all across Iran.Image source: Bah Community of Canada


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Bah leaders since the 1979 revolution. Thesedevelopments have left the Bah communityextremely vulnerable to further attacks as itis now impoverished, undereducated, closely

monitored, and leaderless.

6.0 future escalation

The Iranian government clearly has the intentof destroying the cultural viability of the Bahcommunity within its borders, and also pos-sesses the capability to destroy it physically.The Iranian government has not yet takenthis very grave step, but there are a number offactors which could intensify the persecution(accelerators) or provoke a genocidal massacre(triggers).

6.1 Potential Accelerators

The security of Iranian Bahs is likely todeteriorate further under the following condi-tions:

a) Further economic decline A worseningof the economic situation in Iran may haveseveral implications for Bahs. Social tensions

will continue to increase, particularly amongunemployed youth who will be increasinglyradicalized and primed for recruitment intomilitias. Anti-Bah hostility may also increaseas Iranians search for scapegoats upon whomto blame their hardships.

b) Increases in conservative power If reli-gious hardliners gain further influence, they arelikely to feel more comfortable implementing

harsher treatment of all religious minorities,particularly Bahs since they enjoy the fewestprotections of all.

c) Challenges to conservative power Weak,

unstable, and threatened regimes are danger-ous because they are unpredictable and may

begin to act irrationally in an effort to eitherretain power or fulfill their ideological goalsbefore losing power. Thus, any challenges tothe power of religious hardliners may increase

their likelihood of taking drastic actions.d) Continued frustration of attempts toconvert Bahs to Islam Iranian religiousleaders may begin to promote harsher methodsof dealing with Bahs if they are unable todestroy their community and religion throughsofter means.

Such leaders are currently attempting tocoerce Bahs into renouncing their hereticalfaith but have so far met with failure; if Bahscontinue to successfully resist conversion theirtormentors may begin to consider extermina-tion to be the only viable option for removingtheir religion from Iranian society.

6.2 Potential Triggers

A general massacre of Iranian Bahs is likely tooccur if any real or perceived threats to Iraniansecurity or Islamic domination arise. The mostlikely cases will be:

a) Foreign military strike on Iran The re-alization of perceived external threats to Iran

could cause the government to turn againstperceived internal enemies. This is especiallylikely in the case of an attack by Israel or theUnited States for two reasons. First, Bahs arealready linked by Iranian propaganda to bothof the countries for which they supposedly actas espionage agents or fifth columnists.

Second, Iran would be unlikely to be ableto retaliate immediately and directly againsteither of these countries and would therefore

be even more likely to turn against a perceivedinternal enemy which could be used as a tem-

porary scapegoat while organizing for actualmilitary action. War also provides an excellentopportunity for the perpetration of genocide asfear and confusion reign while normal inhibi-


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tions against killing are reduced.b) Significant internal unrest and/or vio-

lence If a significant popular opposition wereto rise up against the Iranian regime, or if any

of the low-level ethnic secessionist movementscurrently active in several of Irans provinceswere to become more aggressive or successful,it is likely that the consequent repression wouldinvolve increased persecution of Bahs. Eithersituation would provide both a likely motiveand an excellent opportunity for the regimeto perpetrate a genocide, for similar reasonsas relate to a foreign military strike.

7.0 expected indicators offuture escalation

If the Iranian regime does escalate its persecu-tion of Bahs in the future or move to com-plete their preparation for extermination, thismay be recognized by a number of indicatorssuch as:

a) Immobilization of Bah population An

important part of the genocidal process is pre-venting the target group from accessing escaperoutes. In Iran, this may be seen as the restric-tion of Bah travel within the country and/orthe prohibition of emigration.

b) Concentration of Bah population Simi-lar, and usually subsequent, to immobilizationis the act of concentration, or ghettoization,as the perpetrators gather the target popula-tion into central areas where they may be moreeasily killed or from which they may be moreeasily expelled.

c) Segregation of males and females The

removal of males from the target group is oftena pre-killing measure taken by the perpetratorsin order to break down social bonds within thegroup and neutralize those members thoughtto be most able and likely to resist.

d) Removal of Bah children Because

the persecutors of Iranian Bahs consider theharmful nature of their targets to be rootedin Bah beliefs rather than any innate orbiological traits, they have sometimes offered

condemned Bahs the opportunity to savetheir lives by recanting their faith. While thishas proven unsuccessful with adults, they mayeventually remove children from their familiesand attempt to raise them as Muslims, thusdestroying the Bah communitys generationalcontinuity.28

8.0 potential perpetrators

There are several organizations upon which theIranian government could call to perpetrate agenocide against Bahs. Some are conven-tional forces (i.e. police or military) directlycontrolled by the state.

The non-conventional forces present in Iranare either paramilitary organizations controlled

by the state or non-state organizations whichwould be likely to aid in a genocide of Bahs.This section outlines potential perpetratororganizations. Individual leaders and other

persons-of-interest will be investigated furtherand discussed in a future report.

8.1 State Organizations

The Iranian government has significant con-ventional forces which it can call upon to serveboth internal and external security purposes.

a) ArmyThe Iranian Army has an esti-mated numerical strength of 350 000 men.29

This is believed to be a well-trained, efficient,

and disciplined force due to modernizationefforts following the bitter experience of theIran-Iraq War.30

b) Army of the Guardians of the IslamicRevolutionWith a ground force strengthestimated in excess of 100 000 men, this force,


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commonly called the Revolutionary Guards,is a more ideologically-committed militaryorganization operating independently, butparallel to, the conventional army while playing

a large role in internal security.

31

This wouldmake them likely to help perpetrate a genocideof Bahs.

c) Police forcesIran has an estimated 40000 personnel in its law enforcement forces

which are distributed throughout the coun-try.32

8.2 Paramilitary Organizations

The Iranian government is also able to call upon

a large, though mostly young, untrained, andlightly-armed body of men for internal use. Atpresent, only one such force is of note:

a) Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij The mainparamilitary force in Iran, this groups namemeans Mobilization Resistance Force inEnglish, though it is often referred to simply asBasij (also Bassij or Baseej). Basij is a primarily

youth organization with an estimated activestrength of up to 300 000 personnel,33 thoughit can draw on much larger reserves; someestimates place its mobilization strength ashigh as 3 million.34

Basij is under the control of the Revolution-ary Guards and aids in internal security op-erations. Its members are primarily concerned

with monitoring the activities of citizens andenforcing Irans moral laws. Some segments ofBasij also perform riot control operations.

Overall, the organization is thought to beenjoying something of a revival under theAhmadinejad presidency.35 This organizationprovides the Iranian regime with a large body ofindividuals who have received ideological andmilitary training; they are likely to participatein a genocide of Bahs and to possibly makeup the bulk of the perpetrating forces.

8.3 Non-State Actors

Some Iranian groups have mandates that eitherexplicitly or implicitly make them likely perse-

cutors of Bahs. These groups act indepen-dently of the government but have suspectedlinks to it.

a) Ansar-i Hizbullah This organization,whose name means Followers of the Party ofGod, is a paramilitary organization with semi-official links to figures within the government,though many in the regime deny this. The sizeof the organization is unknown.

It is primarily focused on attacking thosewhom it views as violating the precepts of Islam

or who advocate change (e.g. reformists or stu-dent protesters), which it views as threateningthe permanence of the Islamic Revolution.36

Ansar-i Hizbullah is already involved in anti-

Bah activity as evidenced by a 2007 incidentin the city of Abadeh when graffiti was left ona building which said Hezbollah is awake anddespises the Bahs.37 This organizationappears to have the ideological motivationto assist in intensified persecution or even agenocide of Bahs, though more informationis needed to assess its capabilities.

b) Hojjatieh Society Little reliable infor-mation is available about Hojjatieh, but it isknown to be a somewhat secretive organizationfounded in 1954 specifically for the purpose ofeliminating the Bah Faith, which was viewedas the greatest threat to Islam. This organiza-tion had significant influence over the laymembers of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.38 Itis rumoured that President Ahmadinejad wasonce a member of Hojjatieh.

9.0 further investigation bythe sentinel project

9.1 Questions Requiring Answers

There are a number of points which have not


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been covered above, either because they arebeyond the scope of this report or because theyrepresent gaps in our knowledge of the situa-tion in Iran. These will be expanded upon in afuture comprehensive report. In the latter case,

the following questions must be answered:a) What individuals are likely to be the lead

perpetrators of a genocide of Bahs?b) What level of support would the Iranian

population give to a genocide of Bahs?c) What are the true size, capabilities, and

intentions of groups such as Ansar- i Hizbullahand Hojjatieh?

d) Are certain segments of the Iranianpopulation likely to assist Bahs in hidingor escaping?

e) What has been the international reactionto anti-Bah persecution so far?

f) What factors are currently restraining theIranian government from harsher anti-Bahmeasures?

g) What measures will be most effective inpreventing a genocide of Bahs?

9.2 Future Sources

There are numerous ways to answer the ques-tions posed in section 9.1 Questions RequiringAnswers. The Sentinel Project (SP) gathered the

majority of the information used in this reportfrom open sources such as the media, govern-ment reports, and scholarly publications. Asthis work continues and seeks to answer theabove questions, it will be necessary to expandthe information gathering effort.

For example, SP is currently conducting aninterview program to gather firsthand accountsfrom Bahs who have left Iran and now reside

in Canada. Another possible source of infor-mation may come from contacts made eitherwithin Iran itself or in neighbouring countrieswho can supply locally available information.Persian-language sources are also currently

untapped but may provide a wealth of infor-mation once reliable translators are recruited.Analysis of anti-Bah propaganda may also

provide useful insights into the intent of theIranian regime.

10.0 conclusion

The Bahs of Iran are a threatened reli-gious minority living amongst a much largerMuslim population. The Iranian regime hastaken advantage of a long history of anti-Bah

persecution in order to achieve its present-day religious and political goals. There are anumber of economic, historical, and politicalfactors present in Iran which predispose it toexperiencing a genocide. Documentation ex-ists which establishes government intent todestroy the Bah community as a viable en-tity by suffocating it and attempting to coerceits members to convert to Islam. Genocidalintent cannot yet be entirely established, butthe intent to destroy the Bah Faith itself maybe extended to its adherents if other measuresprove unsuccessful.

The Bahs of Iran are impoverished, leader-less, and without legal protection. Government-sponsored propaganda, however, portrays themas powerful internal enemies serving powerfulforeign enemies. The Iranian regime is well-prepared to carry out a genocide against Bahs

if such a policy decision were made, and couldlikely do so with impunity using several militaryand paramilitary forces at its disposal. The situ-

ation in Iran requires further investigation toachieve a full understanding. Work must beginas soon as possible to determine what measures

will be most effective in de-escalating the perse-cution or assisting Bahs to reach safety, andhow to implement those measures.


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endnotes

1 Iranian Bah leaders may face new accusation on anniversary of imprisonment. 12 May 2009.Bah World News Service. http://news.bahai.org/story/713, accessed 13 May 2009.

2

Hassan, Hussein D. Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities. CRS Report for Congress. CongressionalResearch Service, 25 November 2008.3 Country Profile: Iran. Library of Congress - Federal Research Division. May 2008: 10.4 Ibid.5 Hassan, Hussein D. Iran: Profile of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. CRS Report for Congress.

Congressional Research Service, 9 July 2008.6 Bah Faith. Encyclopedia Britannica. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/48930/

Bahai-faith, accessed 12 May 2009.7 The Bah Faith. Bah Topics: An Information Resource of the Bah International Community.

http://info.bahai.org/, accessed 12 May 2009.8 Staub, Ervin. The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence . New York: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2000. pp. 13-15, 35-36, 44.9 Ibid, p. 24.10 Alvarez, Alex. Militias and Genocide. War Crimes, Genocide, & Crimes against Humanity. Volume

2 (2006) 1-33.11 Iran. CIA - The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

geos/ir.html, accessed 23 April 2009.12 Country Profile: Iran.13 Melik, James. 27 February 2009. Iran Threatened With Economic Meltdown. BBC News.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7907326.stm, accessed 23 April 2009.14 Iran - Constitution. International Constitutional Law.

http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, accessed 23 April 200915 Iran: Chronology of Events June 1989 - July 1994. January 1995. Immigration and Refugee Board of

Canada. http://www2.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/ndp/ref/index_e.htm?docid=191&cid=0&version=printable&disclaimer=show, accessed 14 May 2009.

16 For the full text of Mr. Galindo Pohls report, see E/CN.4/1993/41 Report on the Situation of Hu-man Rights in Iran. 28 January 1993. United Nations. Acquired from the Human Rights and De-mocracy Library at http://www.iranrights.org/english/document-226.php, accessed 14 May 2009.

17 Bah Question memorandum (English translation and Persian original), 25 February 1991. InThe Bah Question: Cultural Cleansing in Iran. Bah International Community, September 2008,83-85.

18Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Stanton, Gregory H. The Eight Stages of Genocide. Genocide Watch.

http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages.htm, accessed 22 April 2009

21 The final two stages, Extermination and Denial, have been omitted since large-scale massacresof Bahs have not yet taken place in Iran; hence, there is also nothing for the government to deny.It should be noted, however, that the government has consistently denied any systematic abuses ofBahs and does not even admit to any violation of their human rights.

22 Iran - Constitution.23 Ibid.


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24 Various interviews conducted by Sentinel Project volunteers with Iranian Bahs who have fled toCanada.

25 For an example of anti-Bah propaganda, see the Iranian television documentary entitled TheSecret of Armageddon. This production accuses Jews and Bahs of conspiring to take over Iran anddestroy Islam. It is available on the website of the Middle East Media Research Institute TV Moni-

tor Project at http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/1802.htm26 Text of secret Iran letter ordering monitoring of Bahis made public. 24 August 2006. Bah

World News Service. http://news.bahai.org/story/473, accessed 5 May 200927 Erdbrink, Thomas. Iran Accuses 7 Jailed Leaders of Bah Faith of Espionage. 18 February 2009.

Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021703011.html, accessed 5 May 2009.

28 Such an event could also be considered the beginning of the extermination phase, as the forcibletransfer of children out of the target group is defined as a genocidal act by the UN Conventionon the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide if done with the requisite genocidalintent.

29 General Information - Iran. Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network.http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumsfolder/iran.html, accessed14 May 2009.

30 Janes World Armies - Iran. 15 April 2009. Janes Information Group.31 Ibid.32 General Information - Iran. Federation of American Scientists.33 Ibid.34 Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij - Mobilisation Resistance Force. GlobalSecurity.org.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm, accessed 14 May 2009.35 Ibid.36 Ansar-i Hizbullah - Followers of the Party of God. GlobalSecurity.org. http://www

.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/ansar.htm, accessed 14 May 2009.37 Iranian government campaign against Bahs shows new facets.

21 September 2007. Bah World News Service. http://news.bahai.org/story/578, accessed14 May 2009.

38 US Religious Freedom Official expresses fears for Bahs in Iran. 20 March 2006. Bah WorldNews Service. http://www.bahaiworldnews.org/story/432, accessed 14 May 2009.


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The Bahs of Iran face a grave threat to their existence.

They, along with persecuted peoples all around the world,

need your assistance to enjoy a safe future. Contact your

government representatives and media outlets to ensure

that human rights in Iran receive their attention.

To support the Sentinel Project you can also make a donation

or volunteer. For more details, visit www.thesentinelproject

.org, join our network on Facebook, or ollow us on Twitter.

The Sentinel Projectfor Genocide Prevention
http://thesentinelproject.org/http://thesentinelproject.org/http://thesentinelproject.org/http://thesentinelproject.org/http://thesentinelproject.org/http://thesentinelproject.org/http://twitter.com/sentinelprojecthttp://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Sentinel-Project-for-Genocide-Prevention/137876239579438http://thesentinelproject.org/

preliminary assessment the threat of genocide to the bahais of iran 2009

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