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LPNPP Exercise Data Handbook

Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP)—The Hypothetical Facility 1 The Twenty-Seventh International Training Course

Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP)¶ Hypothetical Facility Exercise Data Handbook

Table of Contents¶

Section

Title

Page Section 1. Republic of Lagassi Description and Map ............................................................. 3 Section 2. Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP) Regional Map ...................................... 4 Section 3. LPNPP Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions ........................ 5 Section 4. LPNPP Site Layout and Response Force Locations ............................................. 6

Table 1. Specific Access Controls and Physical Barriers for Vital Areas ............. 7 Section 5. Threat Data .......................................................................................................... 8 Section 6: Design Basis Threat ............................................................................................. 9 Section 7. Sabotage Scenarios for LPNPP ......................................................................... 11

Table 2. Vital Areas and Other Areas in Sabotage Target Sets for LPNPP. ...... 12 Section 8. Response Forces at the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant ................................... 13

Table 3. Response Force Deployment Data ..................................................... 15 Table 4. Average PPS Response Times for Entire 8-Person Tactical Response

Team to Respond .............................................................................. 16 Section 9. Operations at Gates and Portals at LPNPP ........................................................ 17 Section 10. LPNPP Overview .............................................................................................. 21

Table 5. Other Nuclear and Radioactive Materials and Their Enrichment at the LPNPP ................................................................................................ 31

Section 11. Detection Component Data .............................................................................. 33 Table 6. Intrusion Detection Component Class ................................................. 33 Table 7. Access Control Detection Component Class ....................................... 34 Table 8. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class ............................... 35 Table 9. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class ............. 36

Section 12. Delay Component Data .................................................................................... 38 Table 10. Barrier Delay Component Class ........................................................ 38 Table 11. Security Officers Delay Component Class ........................................ 39 Table 12. Penetration Times—Fences .............................................................. 40 Table 13. Penetration Times—Gates ................................................................ 41 Table 14. Penetration Times—Walls ................................................................. 42 Table 15. Penetration Times—Doors ................................................................ 45

Table 16. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters ........................ 48 Table 17. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/

Acetylene Cutting Torch...................................................................... 49 Table 18. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene

Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar ............................................... 50 Table 19. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of

Package Weight ................................................................................. 51 Table 20. Running Rates .................................................................................. 52 Table 21. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers .............................................. 53

Section 13. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level ........... 54 Table 22. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials .................................... 54

The information in this book is hypothetical and is not based on any performance tests that have been conducted by the United States Government, Department of Energy.



Table 23. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures .............................. 57 Appendix A: LPNPP Layout Details ..................................................................................... 60



Section 1. Republic of Lagassi Description and Map The Republic of Lagassi, the smallest of the regional republics (Figure 1), possesses large fossil fuel reserves and plentiful supplies of other minerals and metals. It also has a large agricultural sector featuring livestock and grain. Lagassi’s industrial sector rests on extracting and processing these natural resources and also on a growing machine-building sector that specializes in construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery, and some defense items. The country’s solid 3.5% economic growth is largely due to its booming energy sector but also to economic reform, good harvests, and foreign investment. To prevent overdependence on the oil sector, the country has embarked on an industrial policy designed to diversify the economy by developing light industry and a nuclear energy infrastructure.

Current industrial policy issues include expanding the development of the country’s emerging nuclear energy resources, achieving an export capacity of electrical energy to border countries, and strengthening relations with neighboring states and other foreign powers.

Figure 1. Country Map of Lagassi

Get a better map and blow this part up??



Section 2. Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP) Regional Map The hypothetical nuclear power plant, the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP), is located just to the east of the Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) facility on a tributary of the Upper Lagassi River.

Figure 2. Lake Winowich Regional Map



Section 3. LPNPP Introduction with Environmental and Physical Conditions The LPNPP Site is portrayed in Figure 3.

Figure 3. LPNPP Site Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP) The hypothetical nuclear power plant, the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant, is located just to the east of the Hypothetical Atomic Research Institute (HARI) facility on a tributary of the Upper Lagassi River. The LPNPP was built in 1972 to produce 1150 megawatts electrical for the Lagassi power grid. The LPNPP is located in the Republic of Lagassi, approximately 30 km (18 mi) east of Hashbakar.

Topography LPNPP is located in the semi-arid steppes of Central Asia.

Vegetation Small shrubs, cacti, hardy desert trees, and grass are the only vegetation.

Wildlife Small animals inhabit the area, such as rabbits, squirrels, prairie dogs and coyotes. Birds of all sizes are also present.

Background Noise Regional earthquakes cause seismic disturbances occasionally. Some noise may also occur because of heavy passenger vehicle traffic and low-flying aircraft.

Climate/Weather The climate is a typical high-desert environment with approximately 300 clear days of bright sunshine per year. On cloudy days, there are areas with a high light-to-dark ratio because of moving cloud shadows. Rainfall is about 15 cm per year, with the majority occurring during thunderstorms in the late July-August rainy season. The spring is very windy for 2 to 3 months, with continuous winds of 2 to 5 km/hr and gusts up to 50 km/hr. Dry debris, dust, and dead vegetation are blown about during the windy season.



Section 4. LPNPP Site Layout and Response Force Locations The LPNPP site layout and response force locations are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. LPNPP Site Layout and Response Force Locations

The LPNPP site’s controlled area is surrounded by an unalarmed 8-foot-high concrete fence to keep out trespassers.

The LPNPP protected area is surrounded by two 2.5-m-high chain-link fences with a well-alarmed isolation zone between the two fences. The sensors in the isolation zone consist of active infrared sensors in a self-protecting pattern and a fence vibration sensor on the inner fence. Alarm assessment is provided by closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, augmented with visual assessment by guards in 4 towers on the protected area perimeter (T1 to T4).

The LPNPP was analyzed employing the approach described in IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) No. 16, Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities. This approach identified several sets of areas containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material that, if protected, would prevent sabotage that could directly or indirectly lead to high radiological consequences. One of these sets was designated as a vital area to be protected as required by NSS No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). These vital areas are listed in Table 1. The vital areas within the LPNPP are enclosed by 20-cm-thick concrete walls with access through 0.75-cm steel-plate watertight doors. Access is controlled by an electronic key card system that releases a door latch. In addition, each of these doors is alarmed with a balanced magnetic switch (BMS) and CCTV to detect unauthorized entry. Table 1 also shows the area-specific access controls and physical barriers for these vital areas.



Table 1. Specific Access Controls and Physical Barriers for Vital Areas

Plant Area Building Equipment of Interest

Access Controls and Physical Barriers1

Turbine Driven (TD) Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump Room

Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building

Turbine-driven AFW pump and associated valves and piping

- Key card access control - Earthquake-resistant

barriers Battery Room A or Battery Room B

Control Building First Floor

Emergency electrical control power for electrically controlled components in engineered safety features train 1


barriers

Cable Spreading Room


Cables for control of plant operating systems and engineered safety features


barriers

Reactor Containment Reactor Containment

Primary coolant system, steam generators and piping, engineered safety feature components

- Key card access control with radiation interlock.

- Earthquake-resistant, bullet resistant barriers and doors.

Control Room Control Building Second Floor

Controls for plant operating systems and engineered safety features

- Key card access control.

- Bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.

Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and Piping

Site Protected Area

Preferred water source for AFW system

- Earthquake-resistant barriers.

- Lock and key access control to valves and other insider sabotage targets.

Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Building Spent fuel - Dual card, key card access control with guard present

- Earthquake-resistant barriers

Main Steam Valve Building


Main steam line - Key card access control - Earthquake-resistant

barriers Scram Relay Room Control Building

First Floor Relays and logic cabinets for Reactor Protection System (SCRAM) system.

- Key card access control

1 Access controls and physical barriers listed are in addition to the protected area physical barriers and access controls.



Section 5. Threat Data Intelligence Sources from the National Government • Items were recently confiscated from a political terrorist group’s hiding place, which was

located less than 200 km from the LPNPP. The items included internal engineering drawings of the LPNPP with circles drawn around the nuclear power plant and waste storage area; various weapons, including automatic weapons; and evidence of correspondence and communication with a foreign terrorist group. Interviews with property owners and residents indicated the group consisted of three to five men.

• Surveillance of several members of the terrorist group shows extensive travels in and out of the country.

• The economic and civil strife in a neighboring country has caused many refugees, some of which are suspected terrorists, to enter Lagassi illegally.

• Plans by a political terrorist group to attack shipments of nuclear material in a neighboring country were discovered.

• The local police intelligence reports several Special Forces members had been offered large cash payments to provide special training to unidentified individuals.

• The national intelligence organization reports terrorist groups are operating in cells of four to six individuals and compartmentalizing information.

• A group of international terrorists made threats that they have the ability (skilled members and weapons) to take over or create a radiological release of a foreign nuclear facility. They demanded the release of several political prisoners. Investigation proved that they do have the weapons and equipment they claimed to have.

Crime Study An analysis of crime incidents leads to the following conclusions:

• A major bank robbery was committed in the capital two months ago. Four robbers escaped with a large amount of money. Investigation shows the bank vault was breached by the sophisticated use of high explosives stolen from the local army base.

• Nationally, many thefts of highly valuable items have occurred. The crimes do not appear to be related to each other. It is speculated that several groups committed the crimes. Organized crime may be involved.

Professional Organizations • A recent meeting of the Lagassi Atomic Energy Ministry included a special session on

analysis of threat to nuclear facilities and material. No substantiated data on threats were available. However, the general feeling among members was that a threat to nuclear facilities does exist.

• During a meeting of the Industrialists Society, some corporate managers expressed concern that some of their employees had been approached by unnamed groups to help them carry out theft of valuable equipment and materials from the corporations. The employees had been offered large amounts of money.



Section 6: Design Basis Threat Definition of the Adversary

The adversary’s motivation is anti-nuclear terrorism. The adversary’s intention is sabotage.

Definition of Capabilities

Group Size

• Tactical team with 4 members Weapons

• Individual Weapons o Submachine gun. 9mm parabellum Cal. Open Sights.

Total of 4 magazines with 30 rounds each by member of tactical team.

o Sub automatic pistol. 9mm parabellum Cal. Total of 1 magazine with 15 rounds each by member of tactical team.

• Platoon Weapons Explosives

• Each team member of tactical team is equipped with 4 kg of plastic explosive.

• The tactical team has a bulk mass of explosives with an equivalent quantity of 250 kg of TNT transported in a medium-weight vehicle.

Communications Systems

• The team uses cellular phones and a two-way radio system for communications.

Tools

• Portable manual tools available in the market. Modes of Transportation

• The team is transported by land using two vehicles at least. • Vehicles include one four wheel drive vehicle and one small

van. Technical Skills

• The team has enough technical skills to use equipment, including weapons, explosives, communication and vehicles. They are familiar and well trained in the tactics supported by such equipment.

• They have paramilitary training and experience and know tactics for small groups.

Cyber Skills

• The adversary has basic cyber skills.



Knowledge

• The team leader has information about target locations in LPNPP.

• The team has basic information about technical aspects of LPNPP, including general layout, security, nuclear safety and radiation protection.

Funding

• Not described Insider Threat

• The tactical team would act in collusion with 1 passive and nonviolent insider.

• The insider has advanced technical knowledge about LPNPP and has access authorization for protected areas and some vital areas.

Supported Structure

• Not supported in the nearest surroundings of the nuclear site. Tactics

• Stealth and force.



Section 7. Sabotage Scenarios for LPNPP The fresh fuel for the LPNPP produces negligible levels of radiation. Removing the fuel from the fuel rods and dispersing it would not have any appreciable radiological consequences; consequently, the fresh fuel is not an attractive sabotage target. Once the fuel has been used in the reactor, it produces high levels of radiation and heat due to the decay of the fission products. Sabotage of the reactor that causes rupture of a significant number of the fuel rods in the core or in the spent fuel pool could cause release of radioactive material sufficient to exceed the high radiological consequence (HRC) limit established by the Lagassi regulatory authority.

Direct Attack Scenario A direct sabotage attack that would damage and disperse fuel from the core or spent fuel pool would require the adversary to enter the Reactor Hall or the Fuel Building and place a large explosive charge adjacent to the reactor or adjacent to the spent fuel pool.

Indirect Attack Scenarios The fuel in the core and the spent fuel pool produces significant amounts of heat. The heat is removed by cooling the water in the reactor and by a forced air/water heat exchanger that discharges the waste heat to the atmosphere.

The vital area identification study conducted for the reactor concluded that at least one of the locations in Table 2 is involved in every combination where sabotage could be accomplished to cause a radiological release with high radiological consequences. Thus, all of these areas must be protected to prevent sabotage of the reactor. Table 2 also shows any other area or areas that must be accessed in addition to the vital area for an adversary to cause high radiological consequences. (Note: Only the combinations with the lowest number of areas are shown.)

Note: The selection of areas is one of several possible selections for the hypothetical LPNPP and the area combinations are hypothetical.

Because each of the vital areas could be involved in many sabotage scenarios, which would involve damaging different equipment or components in the vital area, depending upon the other areas attacked by the adversary, it is not practicable to determine sabotage task times for the vital areas. Thus, the physical protection program needs to be designed to prevent an external adversary from gaining access to any of the vital areas and to preclude insiders from abusing their vital area access to commit sabotage.



Table 2. Vital Areas and Other Areas in Sabotage Target Sets for LPNPP.

Vital Areas Locations Other Sabotage Targets in Smallest

Target Sets

1. AFW-PUMP-RM-TD (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Room),

Engineered Safety Features Building

Intake Structure

2. BATT-RM-A (Battery Room A)


Battery Room B (Control Building First Floor)

3. CABLE-SPREAD (Cable Spreading Room)


None

4. CONTAINMENT (Reactor Containment)

Reactor Containment None

5. CONTROL-RM (Control Room)**

Control Building Second Floor

None

6. CST (Condensate Storage Tank) and CST-PIPING (Piping from Condensate Storage Tank)

Condensate Storage Tank and Piping from Condensate Storage Tank

None

7. FUEL (Spent Fuel Pool) Fuel Building None

8. MS-VALV-BLDG (Main Steam Valve Building)


None

9. SCRAM-RELAY (Scram Relay Room)**


None



Section 8. Response Forces at the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant Types of Response Force Personnel

The response force consists of three types of security personnel:

• unarmed guards • the onsite tactical response force • the offsite response team

Responsibilities of Response Force

These security personnel are responsible for:

• assessment of alarms • administrative duties such as access control and key service • routine patrol and staffing of fixed posts • armed response to all intrusion alarms

All posts and patrols have defined policies and procedures with which the security personnel must comply.

Supervisors For each shift, two supervisors are present: • Supervisor 1 supervises the guards that conduct administrative

duties and access control • Supervisor 2 is the commander of the tactical response team

Tactical Response Team Members

The onsite tactical response team has eight members (including the commander of the tactical response team) present during operational as well as non-operational hours. Four of these eight members are deployed in two 2-person response teams that are on random patrol in unarmored vehicles at all times. All members are trained in close-quarters combat and have the authority to enter target locations to ensure the safety of critical assets and target material. The tactical response force commander for each shift is responsible for the oversight and supervision of all daily activities as well as emergency response to intrusion alarms.

Offsite Response Team

A 15-person offsite response team is deployed from the Regional Army Base near Hashbakar. This force is Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) trained and can arrive in 120 minutes after being notified.

Equipment: Guards

All guards are equipped with: • a straight baton • one set of handcuffs • a small flashlight • a handheld radio



Equipment: Tactical Response Team

The tactical response team members are equipped with • a 38 caliber revolver with 25 rounds and

an automatic submachine gun with a total of 5 magazines • Both weapons are carried fully loaded but without a round in

the chamber • a straight baton • handcuffs • flashlight • handheld radio • 2 vehicles not armored

Training Classroom training (all security staff):

• access control procedures • use of force continuum • target locations • response procedures • chain of command • other administrative responsibilities

Tactical response team personnel receive additional training on:

• close quarters combat • recapture and recovery of nuclear material/facilities • advanced firearms training for both the revolver and the

automatic submachine gun Firearms training:

• The tactical response team personnel are required to qualify with their firearms four times a year

• Tactical response teams are provided with firearms training each month to ensure proficiency

All response force personnel receive routine physical fitness training when in the training mode.

Alarm Stations and Communication

The Central Alarm Station (CAS) is located in P11 and is staffed by two guards during the day and one guard at night. All alarms are received at the CAS (P11) and SAS (P10). Alarms from the Lone Pine facility are assessed by CAS using video cameras. The guard is responsible for assessing alarms and communicating them to the response forces. The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) is located in P10, the Main Access Control Point, and is staffed by two guards during the day and one guard at night. The SAS monitors the activities of the CAS to ensure appropriate actions are taken. The CAS only relinquishes monitoring and control during maintenance and other temporary facility outages. Both the CAS and the SAS are equipped with:

• 100-watt radios that can communicate to all posts and patrols within the boundaries of the Institute.

• 2 telephone lines. One is linked to each fixed post via a buried



telephone cable and the second telephone is a direct link to the Ministry of Interior headquarters located in the city.

Extensive testing of the communication system has shown that the radio communications are good throughout the site with the exception of the lower level interiors of the Lone Pine facility buildings. Testing concluded that security personnel on these lower levels are able to monitor transmissions from both the CAS and the SAS but are unable to transmit to the CAS and the SAS with their handheld radios. All handheld radios and fixed posts are equipped with a duress switch to allow a covert signal to the CAS and SAS of unauthorized activity. When the CAS or SAS receive a duress alarm, the response team is notified and the response force commander initiates a tactical response. Supervisor 1, the guard force commander, is normally located in the CAS during the day shift.

Deployment of Response Force

The response force is deployed as described in the following table.

Table 3. Response Force Deployment Data

Post No.

Description Security Personnel

No. of Personnel Workdays Non-

workdays S1 Guard Commander (Supervisor 1) Lieutenant 1 1 P10 Lone Pine Main Access Control Point Guard 4-102 3 P10 Secondary Alarm Station Guard 2 1 P11 Central Alarm Station Guard 2 1 P15 Northwest Lone Pine Vehicle Access

Control Point Guard 1 1

T1-T4 Four Guard Towers Guard 4 4 S2 Tactical Response Force Commander Response

Captain 1 1

P11 Onsite Tactical Response Forces (Stationed in the Security Building)

Response Force 3 3

P16 Two-person vehicle patrol Response Force 2 2 P17 Two-person vehicle patrol Response Force 2 2

Offsite Offsite Response Force Response Forces 15 15 Totals 38 34

2 The LPNPP Main Access Control Point staffing is increased from 4 to 10 beginning 45 minutes before each LPNPP shift change and reduces back to 4 at 30 minutes after the LPNPP shift change. The six guards are re-deployed to other plant duties.



Response Procedure for Response Force

All alarms are received and assessed at the Central Alarm Station (CAS). The Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) verifies the CAS operator’s assessment to ensure all alarms are properly assessed. The CAS operator immediately notifies the Commander of the Response Force so preparations for deployment can begin by the tactical team. In addition, institute procedures require that the nearest vehicle patrol also be dispatched to the point of the alarm to provide additional assessment and to observe and report any unauthorized activity. The three response force members stationed in the Security Building and the tactical response force commander collect their firearms from the armory in the Security Building, and prepare to respond either by foot or vehicle to a location directed by their commander. The farthest of the two-man vehicle patrols also responds. Both two-person patrols have their weapons with them in their vehicles. Once all eight tactical response team members arrive at the appropriate location, they deploy as a team and proceed with operations to enter the facility and ensure the protection of material and assets.

Response Force Performance Data

The Institute has conducted extensive performance testing of the CAS/SAS in the areas of alarm assessment, alarm communication, and response force notification and has recorded preparation, travel and deployment times for onsite tactical response forces alarms at the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant. The average times are listed in the table below. Procedures require that all tactical responders be available to respond to an alarm from P-10. All tactical responders are fully equipped with their duty gear with the exception of their rifles, which are kept in storage in the armory until needed. The CAS provides information to the tactical response force during a security incident. Should the CAS operator become unable to continue to direct the response, the SAS operator takes his place. Note that the first 2-person vehicle patrol can arrive in 30 to 60 seconds.

Table 4. Average PPS Response Times for Entire 8-Person Tactical Response Team

to Respond Alarm Location PPS Reponse Time

Protected Area Fence 60 to 150 seconds Control Building 120 to 150 seconds Engineered Safety Features Building 60 to 90 seconds Condensate Storage Tank 60 to 90 seconds Reactor Containment 5 to 10 minutes



Section 9. Operations at Gates and Portals at LPNPP Employee Vehicle Entrance (P12) The gate to the entrance is unlocked and open during normal working hours and locked during off-shifts.

Guard Force Staffing: During operational hours, 2 guards are present; one at the gate and one available for other duties. At night, 1 guard is present.

1. On entry, vehicles drive slowly and all passengers show the guard their badges. 2. The guard looks inside the vehicle and allows it to pass. 1. On exit, the vehicles must stop and wait for the guard to wave them out. 2. A guard observes exiting vehicle for proper actions.

Main Protected Area Access Control Point (P10) Guard Force Staffing: 1 guard is present at P10 at all times. If a vehicle requires entry into the LPNPP, the guard at P10 calls another guard to assist with the vehicle entry.

Personnel entering the Protected Area undergo a search for contraband by passing through metal detectors. Hand-carried items are X-rayed and passed through metal detectors. Suspicious items are physically searched and individuals who fail the metal detector search are “wanded” with handheld metal detectors or subjected to a pat-down search. After verification that individuals are not carrying contraband, they undergo a badge exchange, turning in their Institute picture badges and picking up their LPNPP picture badges and key cards. The personnel then enter the LPNPP Protected Area via a turnstile operated by their key cards. The guards who perform the badge exchange are in bullet-resistant enclosures and have a “panic” button that will override the key card reader, freezing the turnstiles and precluding any entry to the Protected Area. In a site emergency, the turnstiles can also be reconfigured to permit egress from the Protected Area to facilitate evacuation. The layout of the entry control section of the LPNPP Main Protected Area Access Control Point is shown below.

Personnel exiting the Protected Area undergo a search for SNM by passing through metal and SNM detectors. Hand-carried items are X-rayed. Suspicious items are physically searched and individuals who fail the metal detector search are “wanded” with handheld metal detectors and SNM detectors or subjected to a pat-down search. After verification that individuals are not carrying SNM, they undergo a badge exchange, turning in their LPNPP picture badges and key cards and picking up their Institute picture badges. The personnel then exit the LPNPP Protected Area via unlocked doors.



Figure 5. LPNPP Main Protected Area Access Control Point



LPNPP Main Vehicle Portal (P10)

1. On entry, the vehicle’s driver drives the vehicle up to the outer gate. 2. The driver may push an electric buzzer at the gate to alert the guard. 3. The sensor is put in “access” mode and then the guard at P10 unlocks and opens

the outer gate. 4. The vehicle enters the portal and then the driver leaves the vehicle and goes back

outside. 5. The guard shuts and locks the outer vehicle gate. 6. The driver enters the pedestrian portal, is subjected to the same checks as all

personnel entering the protected area, and must remain in the portal until the vehicle has been inspected.

7. The guard inspects the vehicle for contraband while it is still in the vehicle portal. 8. When the inspection is complete the guard unlocks and opens the inner vehicle gate. 9. The driver may exit the personnel portal, reenter the vehicle, and drive into the area.

10. The inner gate is closed and locked by the guard. 11. The sensor is put in “active” mode.

1. On exit, the process is reversed. The vehicle’s driver drives the vehicle up to the

inner gate. 2. The driver may push an electric buzzer at the gate to alert the guard. 3. The sensor is put in “access” mode and the guard at P10 unlocks and opens the

inner gate. 4. The vehicle enters the portal and then the driver leaves the vehicle and goes back

inside the area. 5. The guard shuts and locks the inner vehicle gate. 6. The driver enters the pedestrian portal, is subjected to the same checks as all

personnel leaving the protected area, and must remain in the portal until the vehicle has been inspected.

7. The guard inspects the vehicle for stolen material while it is still in the vehicle portal. 8. When the inspection is complete, the guard unlocks and opens the outer vehicle

gate. 9. The driver may exit the personnel portal, reenter the vehicle, and proceed.

10. The guard shuts and locks the outer gate. 11. The sensor is put in “active” mode. LPNPP Protected Area Vehicle Gate (P15) This gate is normally closed and locked with high security padlocks. When a delivery vehicle arrives, 2 guards are dispatched to the gates. They verify that the individuals driving the vehicle have LPNPP badges (exchange badges) permitting access to the LPNPP Protected Area or have the required guard force escorts. They review the manifest or other documents to verify that the vehicle requires entry to the LPNPP. The guards then contact the LPNPP Control Room and verify that the vehicle is expected. Once they have verified that the vehicle is expected, they inspect it for contraband. If the vehicle passes inspection, the guards contact the Central Alarm Station (CAS) requesting that the Protected Area intrusion detection system zone at the gates be placed in the access mode. The guards then unlock the vehicle gates to permit the vehicle entry to the LPNPP Protected Area. After the vehicle has entered the Protected Area, the gates are locked and the Protected Area intrusion detection system zone at the gates is returned to the secure mode. When a vehicle needs to exit the Protected Area, the driver notifies the Central Alarm Station, which dispatches 2 guards to the gate. On exit, vehicles are scanned with a radiation monitor to ensure that there is no contamination and searched for Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Once vehicles



are verified not to be contaminated and not to have unauthorized SNM, they are permitted to exit. The contamination scan and SNM search are performed inside the Protected Area with the vehicle gates locked.



Section 10. LPNPP Overview Note: The description of this reactor is purely hypothetical. Students interested in factual reactor design information are directed to the IAEA publication, Directory of Nuclear Research Reactors or other technical references.

General Description The LPNPP Site is located in a semi-arid high desert. The LPNPP is a two-loop pressurized light water reactor (PWR) with a reactor power level of 1,150 megawatts electric at full power. LPNPP is a dual-cycle nuclear power plant consisting of a reactor, a closed primary coolant loop connected to the reactor vessel, and a separate power conversion system (secondary coolant) for the generation of electricity. The primary coolant is light water under pressure (typically 2,235 psi) containing chemicals to control the nuclear reaction (boric acid, referred to as “chemical shim”) and corrosion. The secondary coolant is also light water containing chemicals to control corrosion. The primary coolant system transfers heat from the reactor core to the steam generators, which transfer heat to the secondary coolant, causing it to boil. The steam passes from the steam generators to the turbine generator where the thermal energy of the steam is converted into mechanical and then electrical energy. The steam is condensed in the main condenser and the secondary coolant is returned to the steam generators by the feedwater pumps. The use of a dual cycle minimizes the quantities of fission products released to the main turbine, condenser, and other secondary plant components, and subsequent release to the atmosphere. The reactor is equipped with a once-through cooling system.

The entire Reactor Coolant System (RCS), including the steam generators, is located in the Containment Building, which isolates the radioactive RCS from the environment in the event of a leak. The basic arrangement is shown in Figure 6. However, the LPNPP is a once-through cooling system so the cooling tower was never built and the river supplies the cooling.

The intake structure houses the circulating water system, the service water system, and the screen wash system. The intake structure consists of six intake bays, each with a traveling water screen and a circulating water pump. The capacity of this pump house is approximately 1,000,000 gallons per minute (GPM).

The following major systems are included in the intake structure:

a) Circulating Water System. The six pumps of this system take water from the river and provide cooling to the main condenser. This cooling water is then discharged via a cooling canal to the river.

b) Service Water System. The four pumps of this system also take water from the river and discharge via the cooling canal to the river. Service water is used to cool other systems, such as the primary and secondary (steam) system, component cooling system, containment cooler, diesel generators and other heat exchangers.

c) Screen Wash System: Six traveling water screens are provided to remove trash and foreign mater from the water used to supply the service and circulating water systems.”



Figure 6. Basic PWR Arrangement Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Building

The ESF building is marked in black in Figure 7.

Figure 7. ESF Building (marked in black)

The systems in the ESF Building are designed to mitigate the consequences of loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and plant transients. The ESF is designed to provide emergency cooling water to the reactor core to maintain fuel rod integrity in the event that normal cooling water (the river) is lost. This prevents the release of radioactive fission products to the containment and possibly to the environment. The ESF systems also serve to maintain the structural integrity of the containment if the pressurized primary coolant were released into the containment atmosphere during a LOCA.



The ESF Building houses the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Figure 8). The AFW is the vital equipment in the ESF. This system, consisting of two motor-driven and one turbine-driven pump takes suction from the Condensate Storage Tank and supply feedwater to the steam generators to remove heat from the primary coolant system during very low power operations and during transients that cause the main feedwater system to be unavailable. The turbine-driven pump is powered by steam from the steam generator, so the heat from the steam generator provides the motive power for the pump. The AFW pumps are flow cooled.

Figure 8. ESF Building and Hydrogen Recombiner



Control Building

The Control Building is marked in black in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Control Building (marked in black)

The Control Building is a two-level structure. The lower level houses the switchgear and motor control centers that control and power motor-driven pumps, motor-operated valves, and other electrical plant electrical equipment. The lower level also contains (i) the battery rooms that supply backup instrumentation and control power, (ii) the electronics that control the reactor protection system (in the SCRAM Relay Room), and (iii) the Cable Spreading Room where the instrumentation and control cables from the Control Room are routed to the appropriate instruments, motor control centers, and other control equipment. The lower level also contains (in the SCRAM Relay Room) the auxiliary shutdown panel from which the reactor can be monitored, controlled, and safely shut down should the control room become damaged or unavailable. The arrangement of equipment in the lower level of the Control Building is shown in Figure 10. Control Building Lower LevelFigure 10.

The upper level of the Control Building houses the main control board and the plant computer. Control of both the reactor and turbine generator can be accomplished from the control room, which contains all instrumentation and control equipment required for startup, operation, and shutdown under both both normal and accident conditions. The arrangement of equipment in the upper level of the Control Building is shown in Figure 11.



Figure 10. Control Building Lower Level



Figure 11. Control Building Lower Level



Fuel Building

The Fuel Building is marked in black in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Fuel Building (marked in black)

The Fuel Building is designed as a transfer and storage area for new and used fuel. During operation of the reactor, uranium is consumed and radioactive fission products are created. The average residence time of fuel in the core is about three years, and the reactor is refueled annually. Thus, one-third of the reactor is refueled every year. After removal from the reactor, the fuel is called “used fuel” or "spent fuel" and is highly radioactive. It is handled remotely using special underwater fuel handling equipment. The spent fuel is removed from the reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel storage pool for at least six months. During this time, the shorter-lived radioactive fission products decay and the radioactivity level is reduced by 99.9 percent. The fuel can then be shipped to another storage facility or a reprocessing plant.

If the spent fuel is shipped, it is placed in specially designed shipping casks made of steel and lined with lead. The casks range in size from 25 to 100 tons. The smallest casks can be transported by truck, but the largest must be shipped by rail. Fresh fuel is stored in the new fuel casks and transferred to racks in the spent fuel storage pool prior to refuelling. The door to the new fuel portion of the building is a 30-cm dual wooden vehicle door with metal sheeting and a personnel emergency exit door. It is equipped with BMS sensors and CCTV assessment.

All of the fuel assemblies in the core are of similar design. The fuel rods in an assembly are arranged in a square array with 17 rod locations per side or 289 rod locations per assembly (some assembly designs may have fewer fuel rods). Of the 289 possible rod locations, 264 actually contain fuel rods. The other 25 locations are filled by 24 guide tubes for the rod cluster control assemblies (control rods) and one guide thimble for incore nuclear instrumentation and experiments. Each fuel rod contains uranium oxide fuel pellets. The uranium-235 enrichment in the fuel assemblies is either 2.1, 2.6, or 3.1 weight percent. The varying uranium enrichments help ensure uniform neutron flux throughout the active area of the reactor core. (The higher enriched fuel assemblies are loaded around the boundary of the core.) A core loading consists of 193 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly contains



about 1,154 pounds of uranium oxide. With the zircaloy clad and other mechanical components, each fuel assembly weighs about 1,500 pounds (3/4 ton).

The Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System, consisting of cooling and purification pumps, heat exchangers, filters and dimineralizers, is designed to maintain clarity and purity of the fuel pool water and to keep the stored spent fuel at a cool temperature. The arrangement of the equpment in the Fuel Building is shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13. Fuel Building Layout




The Main Steam Valve Building is marked in black in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Fuel Building (marked in black) The Main Steam Valve Building contains the main steam line, which runs between the steam generators in Reactor Containment and the turbine in the Turbine Building. The building isolates the lines from missiles and helps insulate the steam pipes to reduce steam degradation from cooling between the steam generators and the turbine. This building also contains the main steam line flow restrictors and the steam dump system, which provides a means to dissipate excess heat during turbine load rejection. The Main Steam Valve Building also contains the main feedwater pumps and the lines that transport feedwater from the condenser hotwell in the Turbine Building to the steam generators in Reactor Containment.



Condensate Storage Tank and Piping from Condensate Storage Tank

The Condensate Storage Tank is marked in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Location of Condensate Storage Tank

The Condensate Storage Tank serves as the normal supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. A minimum amount of water is required by technical specifications to meet design considerations for cooldown. The hotwell level control system can affect the level in the Condensate Storage Tank by either making up to the hotwell if the level in the hotwell is low or rejecting water to the Condensate Storage Tank if the level in the hotwell is too high. If the required minimum level in the Condensate Storage Tank is approached, an alarm is sounded in the main Control Room to prompt operator action before the limit is violated.

In the event of a loss of off-site power, the reactor coolant pumps lose power and no longer supply forced circulation of coolant through the core. The AFW system is essential for core decay heat removal under these conditions. Since the condenser circulating water pumps also lose power, the condenser steam dumps are not available for steam release from the steam generators. The steam generator power operated relief valves are used to relieve the steam.

The AFW system is also essential in supporting core decay heat removal during a small break LOCA (SBLOCA). During an SBLOCA, the injection flow rate from the emergency core cooling systems is not sufficient to provide adequate flow through the core for decay heat removal because of the reactor coolant system backpressure effect on emergency core cooling system flow and the slow reactor coolant system depressurization rate resulting from the coolant discharge through the small break. Decay heat removal via the reactor coolant

Condensate Storage Tank



system and heat transfer to the steam generators is necessary for core cooling considerations under SBLOCA conditions.

NOTE: During a large break LOCA, the emergency core cooling system flow alone is adequate to provide core cooling since the rapid reactor coolant system pressure reduction allows a much higher emergency core cooling system flow rate through the core.

Since auxiliary feedwater is necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident as discussed previously, the complete AFW system, with the exception of the suction supply from the condensate storage tank, has been designed to Seismic Category I specifications. In the event that the Condensate Storage Tank is damaged or destroyed, the Seismic Category I service water system is available as a backup suction for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

The AFW pumps will automatically start upon actuation of one of the following start signals:

1. Steam generator low-low level 2. Loss of both main feedwater pumps 3. Loss of one main feedwater pump with power above 80% 4. An engineered safety features actuation signal 5. Loss of off-site power.

Other Nuclear and Radioactive Materials at the LPNPP

Table 5 provides information about the Auxiliary Building and Waste Disposal Building, which are described further in Appendix A.

Table 5. Other Nuclear and Radioactive Materials and Their Enrichment at the LPNPP

Location Form of Material

Amount of Material on Site (wt% enrichment)

Total Isotope Amounts

Level of Radiation

Auxiliary Building

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Neutron

Generators

Other Rad Sources

Gaseous Wastes

100gm U (70% 235U)

Cs, Am, Sr

Volatile Fission Products

70 gm Micro-curies

Curies 22 kg

235U 70 gm total

235U

Low Low High

Low

Waste Disposal Building

Solid and Liquid Wastes Various Fission Products curies Moderate



Three-Dimensional Site Layout To aid in visualizing the layout of the LPNPP, the image below provides a three dimensional presentation of the site layout looking from the northwest and southeast. This drawing shows the major features of the plant.

Figure 16. Three-Dimensional Image of LPNPP



Section 11. Detection Component Data Each of the following tables represents a detection component class. Within each table, the component types and descriptions are listed with the probability of detection by adversary defeat method or adversary attribute.

Table 6. Intrusion Detection Component Class

Component Type

Component Description

No Equipment PD

Hand Tools

PD

Power Tools

PD

High Explosives

PD

Land Vehicle

PD Exterior Sensors

Seismic Buried Cable 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 Electric field 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.9 Infrared 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 Microwave 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 Video motion 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 Multiple non-complementary

0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.99

Multiple complementary

0.99 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.99

Interior Sensors

Sonic 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Capacitance 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Video Motion 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Infrared 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Ultrasonic 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Microwave 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 N/A Multiple non-complementary

0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 N/A

Multiple complementary

0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 N/A

Position Sensors

Position Switch 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 N/A Balanced Magnetic Switch

0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 N/A

Fence Sensors

Taut Wire 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.85 Vibration 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.75 0.85 Strain 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 Electric Field 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.9 Multiple Sensors 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9

Barrier Sensors

Vibration 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 N/A Glass Breakage 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 N/A Conducting Tape 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.9 N/A Grid Mesh 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.95 N/A Multiple Sensors 0.99 0.9 0.9 0.99 N/A

Helicopter Detector

Radar 0.1 Sonic 0.1



Table 7. Access Control Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description Independent

PD Land

Vehicle PD

ID Verification Casual Recognition 0.02 Credential 0.05 Credential and PIN 0.35 Picture Badge 0.1 Picture Badge and PIN 0.6 Exchange picture badge 0.5 Exchange picture badge and PIN 0.8 Retinal scan and PIN 0.99 Hand geometry and PIN 0.95 Speech pattern and PIN 0.95 Signature dynamics and PIN 0.95 Fingerprint and PIN 0.95

Personnel Access Authorization Check

General observation of authorization

0.1

Authorization verification each time location is accessed

0.6

Two Person Rule

Presence in area 0 Within sight 0.1 Dedicated observation 0.5 Dedicated observation with alarm 0.95

Vehicle Authorization Check

Authorization form check 0.35 Serial number verification 0.45 Visual check of insignia/ license plate

0.15



Table 8. Human Surveillance Detection Component Class Component

Type Component Description

No Equipment

PD

Small Arms

PD

Light Antitank Weapons

(LAW) PD

Independent of threat attribute

PD

SO at Post Observation

Duress, LAW protected

0.8 0.8 0.8

Duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.8 0.45

Duress, small arms protected: LAW protected on alert

0.8 0.8 0.45

Duress, unprotected 0.8 0.45 0.45 Duress, unprotected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

Duress, unprotected: small arms protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, LAW protected

0.8 0.8 0.45

No duress, small arms protected

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, small arms protected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0.45 0.45

No duress, unprotected

0.8 0 0

No duress, unprotected: LAW protected position on alert

0.8 0 0

No duress, unprotected: small arms protected on alert

0.8 0 0

SO in Tower Observation

LAW resistant tower 0.05 0.05 0.02 Small arms resistant 0.05 0.05 0.02

SO on Patrol

Random 0.02 Scheduled 0.01

General Observation

Personnel always in vicinity

0.02

Personnel generally in vicinity

0.01



Table 9. Contraband and CATEGORY 1 Detection Component Class Threat Attribute

Component Type


No

Equi

pmen

t P D

Han

d To

ols

P D

Pow

er T

ools

P D

Hig

h Ex

plos

ives

P D

Met

al

Con

trab

and

P D

Smal

l Arm

s P D

Rad

ioac

tive

Con

trab

and

P D

Explosives Detector

Animal Olfaction

0 0.1

Handheld vapor collection

0 0.45

Thermal Neutron

0 0.25

Vapor Collection

0 0.35

Handheld Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Ferrous materials only

0 0.85 0.75 0.25 0.5

Item Search Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous 0 0.75 0.75 0.45 0.65

Personnel Search

Pat down 0 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.9 Strip inspection

0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9

Portal Metal Detector

Ferrous and solid lead materials

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials and all forms of lead

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Ferrous materials only

0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6

Vehicle Search

Cursory 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Rigorous including cargo

0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.4

X-Ray Inspection

Standard 0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.9



Threat Attribute Component

Type Component Description

No

Equi

pmen

t P D

Han

d To

ols

P D

Pow

er T

ools

P D

Hig

h Ex

plos

ives

P D

Met

al

Con

trab

and

P D

Smal

l Arm

s P D

Rad

ioac

tive

Con

trab

and

P D

Drive thru CATEGORY 1 Monitor

Plastic Scintillator

0 0.5

Sodium Iodide Scintillator

0 0.5

Handheld CATEGORY 1 Monitor


0 0.75


0 0.75

Portal CATEGORY 1 Monitor


0 0.85


0 0.85



Section 12. Delay Component Data Each of the following tables represents a delay component class. Within each table, the component types and descriptions are listed with the delay times by adversary defeat method.

Table 10. Barrier Delay Component Class

Component Type


No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Hand Tools (mm:ss)

Power Tools

(mm:ss)

Explosives (mm:ss) Land

Vehicle (mm:ss) Stage

1 Stage

2 Walls 60 cm reinforced

concrete wall Infinite Infinite 15:00 3:00 5:00 Infinite

30 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 14:00 2:00 0:54 N/A

20 cm reinforced concrete wall Infinite Infinite 10:00 2:00 0:00 N/A

Wood studs and sheetrock 1:00 0:30 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Doors 60 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 15:30 3:20 5:00 N/A

30 cm steel and concrete rolling door Infinite Infinite 10:40 2:40 0:54 N/A

30 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite Infinite 8:50 2:40 0:30 N/A

10 cm wood door with metal sheeting Infinite 5:00 3:00 1:18 0:00

0:05 for large vehicle door

5 cm wood door Infinite 0:12 N/A 5 cm wood door with glass panel Infinite 0:12 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

.75 cm steel plate door Infinite 5:00 0:12 0:12 0:00 N/A

Class V or VI vault door Infinite 8:00 0:30 0:30 0:00 N/A

Steel turnstile Infinite 1:12 1:00 1:00 0:00 N/A Miscellaneous Barriers

High security padlock Infinite 1:30 0:18 0:18 0:00 N/A

Concrete Block Vehicle Barrier 0:00 5:00 1:00 0:30 0:00 0:05

2.5 m chain link mesh fence 0:10 0:10 5:00 0:30 0:00 0:01

Welded wire fabric fence 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 0:01

2.5 m concrete panel wall 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A

Tempered glass window 0:05 0:05 0:10 0:10 0:00 N/A

Electromagnetic Strike Lock 0:15 0:10 0:05 0:05 0:02 N/A



Table 11. Security Officers Delay Component Class

Component Type Component Description

No Equipment

(mm:ss)

Small Arms

(mm:ss)

Light Antitank Weapons

(LAW) (mm:ss)

SO at Post Delay

Unprotected post 500:00 0:00 0:00 Small arms protected post 500:00 0:30 0:00 Unprotected post normally but moves to small arms protected position on alert 500:00 0:30 0:00 LAW protected post 500:00 2:05 2:05 Unprotected post normally but moves to LAW protected position on alert 500:00 2:05 2:05 Small arms protected post normally, but moves to LAW protected position on alert 500:00 2:05 2:05

SO in Tower Delay

Small arms resistance 1:00 0:30 0:00 LAW resistant tower 2:05 2:05 1:00

Exercise Data

The Hypothetical Facility—Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP) 40

Table 12. Penetration Times—Fences

Penetration Time (mm:ss)

Barrier Description Penetration Equipment

Equipment Weight (kg)

Min. Mean Max. Standard Deviation

2.5-m chain-link mesh with outriggers 4-mm x 50-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Tarpaulin 2.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Manual bolt cutters 3.0 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Circular saw 10 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Manual bolt cutters, gloves (more cuts)

3.5 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Circular saw (more cuts) 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Gloves 0.5 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

Vinyl-coated 3-mm x 50-mm mesh


Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Circular Saw 11.0 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

2.5-m chain-link mesh without outriggers vinyl-coated, 1.8-mm x 40-mm mesh

Ladder 5.0 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:02

No equipment 0.0 0:03 0:06 0:09 0.02


Pliers 0.5 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Vise grip pliers 0.5 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07



Table 13. Penetration Times—Gates


Barrier Description Penetration Equipment



Chain-link mesh pipe 2.4-m x 4-m chain-link gate on metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Truck 1,500 0:03 0:06 0:09 0:01

Pliers 1.0 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Chain-link mesh pipe 1.2-m x 2.4-m gate, 11-gauge x 5-cm mesh on 4.8-cm metal pipe frame, chained and padlocked

Sledgehammer 5 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

1.8-m pry bar 10 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Bolt cutters 3 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Hacksaw 0.2 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25



Table 14. Penetration Times—Walls


Barrier Description

Penetration Equipment



Concrete-10 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, 6.4-mm dia., 15-cm x 15-cm mesh

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

10 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:30 5:00 7:30 1:01

Circular saw, sledge-hammer 5 4:18 8:36 12:54 1:46

Rotohammer, chisel, punch, sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters, generator

50 3:12 6:24 9:36 0:34

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, manual bolt cutters

20 2:18 3:30 5:15

Explosives (3.0), hand bolt cutters

10 1:12 2:30 3:42


7 1:12 2:18 3:24

Explosive (10) 10 1:00 2:00 3:00

Sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:24 4:48 7:12 0:59

Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Sledgehammer, cutting torch 30 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Rotohammer, chisel, hand hydraulic bolt cutters, generator

50 3:54 7:48 11:42 1:35



Table 14. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)


Barrier Description




Concrete- 15cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 20-cm centers

Sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

15 4:00 8:00 12:00 1:38

Explosives (1.0), sledgehammer, hand bolt cutters

14 2:30 3:42 5:36


5 1:54 2:54 4:18


7 1:42 2:30 3:48

Concrete-20 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 5 rebar, 15-cm centers

Rotohammer, drill, sledge, chisel, punch, cutting torch, generator

65 7:00 14:00 21:00 2:52

Explosives (2.0), sledgehammer, hand hydraulic bolt cutters

30 4:18 6:30 9:42

Explosives (3.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

20 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (5.0), hand hydraulic bolt cutters

22 2:30 3:45 5:36

Explosives (12) 12 1:30 3:00 4:30



Table 14. Penetration Times—Walls (continued)


Barrier Description




Concrete-30 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete- 210 kg/cm2 one layer, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers


8 2:12 3:15 4:54

Explosives (7), hand bolt cutters

9 2:18 3:30 5:12


14 2:30 3:48 5:36


18 2:30 3:48 5:36

Concrete-46 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 two layers, No. 4 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (16), hand-held power hydraulic bolt-cutters, generator

282 5:00 7:30 11:12 1:13


22 2:30 5:00 7:30

Concrete- 60 cm Thick, Reinforced Concrete-350 kg/cm2 four layers, No. 6 rebar, 15-cm centers

Explosives (30), gas-powered hydraulic bolt cutters

59 7:18 11:00 16:30



Table 15. Penetration Times—Doors

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description




Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.6-mm metal, panic hardware, cylinder lock, rim set, butt hinges with removable pins

Explosives (1.0) 1 1:15 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire resistant suit

171 1:36 3:12 4:48 0:39

Cordless drill 2.7 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Pry bar 7 0:06 0:12 0:18 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:54 3:48 5:42 0:47 Hammer, suction cups, punch, chisel

4 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Suction cups, sledge, cutting torch

25 0:30 1:00 1:30 0:12

Explosives (.5) 2.5 1:12 2:30 3:12 Lock picking tools 0.2 0:06 2:30 5:00 1:00

Pipe wrench 1 0:12 1:12 2:30

Explosives (2.0) 2.0 1:12 2:30 3:42

Standard industrial pedestrian door, hollow steel 1.6-mm narrow glass one side, louvers near bottom.

Hammer 2.0 0:09 0:18 0:27 0:04

Fire ax 4.5 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20



Table 15. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description




Sheet Metal Standard industrial pedestrian door, 1.3-mm half glass expanded metal 2.8-mm grill

Grappling hook, wire cable, truck

1,520 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07


Standard industrial vehicle door, hollow steel panel, 1.6-mm

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:45 1:06 1:42 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 0:48 1:36 2:24 0:20

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

275 1:30 3:00 4:30 0:37

Truck 2,025 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 0:45 1:30 2:15 0:19

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27 Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:15 1:54 2:48

Standard 10cm wooden vehicle door, with 1.6-mm sheeting

Explosives (0.5) 0.5 0:48 1:18 1:54

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit

171 0:39 1:18 1:57 0:16



Table 15. Penetration Times—Doors (continued)

Penetration Time (mm:ss) Barrier Description Penetration

Equipment Equipment Weight (kg)


Sheet Metal Truck 2,025 0:21 0:42 1:03 0:08 Pry bar, wooden plank 9 1:00 2:00 3:00 0:25

Fire ax 4.5 1:06 2:12 3:18 0:27

Explosives (1.0) 1.0 1:18 1:54 2:48

Steel Plate Magazine door, 6.4-mm steel plate, one padlock

Explosives, linear shaped charge (0.5)

0.5 0:30 1:00 1:18

Sledge hammer, cutting torch, fire-resistant gloves, water

248 2:00 4:00 6:00 0:49

Circular Saw 16 2:06 4:12 6:18 0:52 Suction cups, sledge-hammer, chisel

4.5 0:36 1:12 1:48 0:14

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 1:15 2:30 3:45 0:31

Steel Plate/Void/Steel Plate Heavy door with two large-hinged hasps for padlocking, 19-mm steel, 10-cm air space, 1.3-mm

Explosives (4) 10 1:18 1:54 2:48 Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant suit, water

385 3:06 6:12 9:18 1:16

Sledgehammer, cutting torch, burn bar, fire-resistant gloves

165 0:18 0:36 0:54 0:07



Table 16. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using 1-Meter Bolt Cutters

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts



Table 17. Cutting Rates for Reinforcement Bar Using Portable Oxygen/ Acetylene Cutting Torch

40 80

Time (seconds)

0

No. 5 (16-mm)

120 160 200 240 280

5

10

15

20

0

25

30

No. 4 (13-mm)

No. 6 (19-mm)

Num

ber O

f Reb

ar C

uts



Table 18. Cutting Rates for Mild Steel Sheet & Plate Using Oxygen Acetylene Cutting Torch or Iron Oxygen Burn Bar

Thic

knes

s (c

m)

Burn Bar

Cutting Torch



Table 19. Time Required to Set an Explosives Package as a Function of Package Weight

Expl

osiv

es P

acka

ge W

eigh

t (K

g)



Table 20. Running Rates

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)



Table 21. Vehicle Rates for Experienced Drivers

Dis

tanc

e (m

eter

s)



Section 13. Table of Trials and Failures Giving PD for Designated Confidence Level Table 22. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 4 0 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 21 0 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 4 1 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 21 1 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 4 2 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 21 2 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 4 3 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 21 3 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 5 0 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 22 0 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 5 1 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 22 1 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 5 2 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 22 2 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 5 3 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 22 3 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 6 0 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 23 0 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 6 1 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 23 1 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 6 2 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 23 2 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 6 3 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 23 3 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 7 0 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 24 0 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 7 1 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 24 1 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 7 2 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 24 2 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 7 3 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 24 3 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 8 0 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 25 0 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 8 1 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 25 1 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 8 2 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 25 2 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 8 3 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 25 3 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 9 0 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 26 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 9 1 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 26 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 9 2 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 26 2 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 9 3 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 26 3 81% 80% 78% 76% 73%

10 0 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 27 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 10 1 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 27 1 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 10 2 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 27 2 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 10 3 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 27 3 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 11 0 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 28 0 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 11 1 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 28 1 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 11 2 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 28 2 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 11 3 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 28 3 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 12 0 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 29 0 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 12 1 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 29 1 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 12 2 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 29 2 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 12 3 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 29 3 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 13 0 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 30 0 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 13 1 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 30 1 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 13 2 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 30 2 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 13 3 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 30 3 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 14 0 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 31 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 14 1 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 31 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 14 2 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 31 2 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 14 3 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 31 3 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 15 0 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 32 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 15 1 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 32 1 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 15 2 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 32 2 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 15 3 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 32 3 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 16 0 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 33 0 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 16 1 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 33 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 16 2 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 33 2 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 16 3 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 33 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 17 0 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 34 0 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 17 1 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 34 1 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 17 2 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 34 2 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 17 3 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 34 3 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 18 0 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 35 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 18 1 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 35 1 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 18 2 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 35 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 18 3 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 35 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 19 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 36 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 19 1 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 36 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 19 2 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 36 2 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 19 3 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 36 3 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 20 0 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 37 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 20 1 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 37 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 20 2 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 37 2 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 20 3 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 37 3 87% 86% 84% 83% 80%



Table 22. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials (cont’d)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 38 0 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 55 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 38 1 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 55 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 38 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 55 2 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 38 3 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 55 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 39 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 56 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 39 1 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 56 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 39 2 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 56 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 39 3 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 56 3 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 40 0 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 57 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 40 1 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 57 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 40 2 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 57 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 40 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 57 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 41 0 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 58 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 41 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 58 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 41 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 58 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 41 3 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 58 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 42 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 59 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 42 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 59 1 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 42 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 59 2 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 42 3 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 59 3 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 43 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 60 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 43 1 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 60 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 43 2 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 60 2 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 43 3 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 60 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 44 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 61 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 44 1 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 61 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 44 2 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 61 2 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 44 3 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 61 3 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 45 0 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 62 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 45 1 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 62 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 45 2 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 62 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 45 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 62 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 46 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 63 0 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 46 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 63 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 46 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 63 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 46 3 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 63 3 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 47 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 64 0 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 47 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 64 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 47 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 64 2 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 47 3 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 64 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 48 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 65 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 48 1 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 65 1 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 48 2 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 65 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 48 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 65 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 49 0 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 66 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 49 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 66 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 49 2 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 66 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 49 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 66 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 50 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 67 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 50 1 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 67 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 50 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 67 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 50 3 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 67 3 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 51 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 68 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 51 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 68 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 51 2 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 68 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 51 3 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 68 3 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 52 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 69 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 52 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 69 1 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 52 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 69 2 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 52 3 90% 90% 89% 88% 86% 69 3 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 53 0 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 70 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 53 1 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 70 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 53 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 70 2 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 53 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 70 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 54 0 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 71 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 54 1 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 71 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 54 2 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 71 2 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 54 3 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 71 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 89%

PD at designated Confidence level (sorted by number of trials)



Table 22. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Trials (cont’d)

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

Tota

l Trie

s

Failu

res

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 72 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 89 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 72 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 89 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 72 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 89 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 72 3 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 89 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 73 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 90 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 73 1 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 90 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 73 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 90 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 73 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 90 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 74 0 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 91 0 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 74 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 91 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 74 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 91 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 74 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 91 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 75 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 92 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 75 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 92 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 75 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 92 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 75 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 92 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 76 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 93 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 76 1 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 93 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 76 2 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 93 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 76 3 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 93 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 77 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 94 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 77 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 94 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 77 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 94 2 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 77 3 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 94 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 78 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 95 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 78 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 95 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 78 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 95 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 78 3 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 95 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 79 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 96 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 79 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 96 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 79 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 96 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 79 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 96 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 80 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 97 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 80 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 97 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 80 2 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 97 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 80 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 97 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 81 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 98 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 81 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 98 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 81 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 92% 98 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 81 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 98 3 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 82 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 99 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 82 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 99 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 82 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 99 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 82 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 99 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 83 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 100 0 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 83 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 100 1 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 83 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 100 2 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 83 3 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 100 3 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 84 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 84 1 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 84 2 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 84 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 85 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 85 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 85 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 85 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 86 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 86 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 86 2 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 86 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 87 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 87 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 87 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 87 3 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 88 0 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 88 1 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 88 2 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 88 3 94% 94% 93% 93% 91%



Table 23. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Trie

s

Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%

0 4 71% 67% 62% 56% 47% 0 72 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 5 76% 73% 68% 63% 55% 0 73 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 6 79% 76% 73% 68% 61% 0 74 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 0 7 82% 79% 76% 72% 65% 0 75 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 8 84% 82% 79% 75% 69% 0 76 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 9 86% 84% 81% 77% 72% 0 77 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 10 87% 85% 83% 79% 74% 0 78 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 11 88% 86% 84% 81% 76% 0 79 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 12 89% 87% 85% 83% 78% 0 80 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 13 90% 88% 86% 84% 79% 0 81 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 14 91% 89% 87% 85% 81% 0 82 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 15 91% 90% 88% 86% 82% 0 83 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 16 92% 90% 89% 87% 83% 0 84 98% 98% 98% 97% 96% 0 17 92% 91% 89% 87% 84% 0 85 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 18 93% 91% 90% 88% 85% 0 86 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 19 93% 92% 91% 89% 85% 0 87 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 20 93% 92% 91% 89% 86% 0 88 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 21 94% 93% 91% 90% 87% 0 89 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 22 94% 93% 92% 90% 87% 0 90 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 0 23 94% 93% 92% 91% 88% 0 91 98% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 24 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 0 92 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 25 95% 94% 93% 91% 89% 0 93 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 26 95% 94% 93% 92% 89% 0 94 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 27 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 95 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 28 95% 94% 93% 92% 90% 0 96 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 29 95% 95% 94% 92% 90% 0 97 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 30 95% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 98 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 31 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 99 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 32 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 0 100 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 0 33 96% 95% 94% 93% 91% 1 4 46% 42% 37% 32% 25% 0 34 96% 95% 95% 93% 92% 1 5 55% 51% 47% 42% 34% 0 35 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 6 61% 58% 54% 49% 42% 0 36 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 7 66% 63% 59% 55% 48% 0 37 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 8 70% 67% 64% 59% 53% 0 38 96% 96% 95% 94% 92% 1 9 73% 70% 67% 63% 57% 0 39 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 10 75% 73% 70% 66% 61% 0 40 97% 96% 95% 94% 93% 1 11 77% 75% 72% 69% 64% 0 41 97% 96% 95% 95% 93% 1 12 79% 77% 75% 71% 66% 0 42 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 13 81% 79% 76% 73% 68% 0 43 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 14 82% 80% 78% 75% 70% 0 44 97% 96% 96% 95% 93% 1 15 83% 81% 79% 76% 72% 0 45 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 1 16 84% 82% 80% 78% 74% 0 46 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 17 85% 83% 82% 79% 75% 0 47 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 18 86% 84% 82% 80% 76% 0 48 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 19 86% 85% 83% 81% 77% 0 49 97% 97% 96% 95% 94% 1 20 87% 86% 84% 82% 78% 0 50 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 21 88% 86% 85% 83% 79% 0 51 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 22 88% 87% 85% 83% 80% 0 52 97% 97% 96% 96% 94% 1 23 89% 88% 86% 84% 81% 0 53 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 1 24 89% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 54 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 25 90% 88% 87% 85% 82% 0 55 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 26 90% 89% 88% 86% 83% 0 56 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 27 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 0 57 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 28 91% 90% 88% 87% 84% 0 58 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 29 91% 90% 89% 87% 85% 0 59 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 30 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 0 60 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 31 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 61 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 32 92% 91% 90% 88% 86% 0 62 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 33 92% 91% 90% 89% 86% 0 63 98% 97% 97% 96% 95% 1 34 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 0 64 98% 98% 97% 96% 95% 1 35 92% 92% 91% 89% 87% 0 65 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 36 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 66 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 37 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 67 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 38 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 0 68 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 39 93% 93% 92% 90% 88% 0 69 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 40 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 70 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 41 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 0 71 98% 98% 97% 97% 96% 1 42 94% 93% 92% 91% 89%



Table 23. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures (cont’d) Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels Failures Total

Tries Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 1 43 94% 93% 92% 91% 89% 2 14 74% 72% 69% 66% 61% 1 44 94% 93% 93% 91% 90% 2 15 76% 74% 71% 68% 64% 1 45 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 2 16 77% 75% 73% 70% 66% 1 46 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 17 78% 76% 74% 72% 67% 1 47 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 18 79% 78% 76% 73% 69% 1 48 94% 94% 93% 92% 90% 2 19 80% 79% 77% 74% 71% 1 49 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 20 81% 80% 78% 76% 72% 1 50 95% 94% 93% 92% 91% 2 21 82% 81% 79% 77% 73% 1 51 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 22 83% 82% 80% 78% 74% 1 52 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 23 84% 82% 81% 78% 75% 1 53 95% 94% 94% 93% 91% 2 24 84% 83% 81% 79% 76% 1 54 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 25 85% 84% 82% 80% 77% 1 55 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 26 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 1 56 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 27 86% 85% 83% 81% 78% 1 57 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 28 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 1 58 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 29 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 1 59 96% 95% 94% 94% 92% 2 30 87% 86% 85% 83% 80% 1 60 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 31 88% 87% 85% 84% 81% 1 61 96% 95% 95% 94% 92% 2 32 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 1 62 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 33 88% 87% 86% 85% 82% 1 63 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 34 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 1 64 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 35 89% 88% 87% 86% 83% 1 65 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 2 36 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 1 66 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 37 90% 89% 88% 86% 84% 1 67 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 38 90% 89% 88% 87% 84% 1 68 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 39 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 1 69 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 2 40 90% 90% 89% 87% 85% 1 70 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 41 91% 90% 89% 88% 85% 1 71 96% 96% 95% 95% 93% 2 42 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 72 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 43 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 1 73 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 2 44 91% 91% 90% 88% 86% 1 74 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 45 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 75 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 46 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 76 96% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 47 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 77 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 48 92% 91% 90% 89% 87% 1 78 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 49 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 1 79 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 50 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 80 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 51 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 81 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 52 93% 92% 91% 90% 88% 1 82 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 53 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 83 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 54 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 1 84 97% 96% 96% 95% 94% 2 55 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 1 85 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 56 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 86 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 57 93% 93% 92% 91% 89% 1 87 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 58 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 88 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 59 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 89 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 60 94% 93% 92% 91% 90% 1 90 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 61 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 1 91 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 62 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 92 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 63 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 1 93 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 64 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 1 94 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 65 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 95 97% 97% 96% 96% 95% 2 66 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 96 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 67 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 97 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 68 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 98 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 69 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 1 99 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 70 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 1 100 97% 97% 97% 96% 95% 2 71 95% 94% 93% 93% 91% 2 4 24% 21% 18% 14% 10% 2 72 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 5 36% 33% 29% 25% 19% 2 73 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 6 45% 41% 38% 33% 27% 2 74 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 7 51% 48% 45% 40% 34% 2 75 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 8 57% 54% 50% 46% 40% 2 76 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 2 9 61% 58% 55% 51% 45% 2 77 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 10 64% 62% 59% 55% 49% 2 78 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 11 67% 65% 62% 58% 53% 2 79 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 12 70% 68% 65% 61% 56% 2 80 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 2 13 72% 70% 67% 64% 59% 2 81 95% 95% 94% 94% 92%



Table 23. Table of Trials and Failures—Sorted by Failures (cont’d)

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

Failu

res

Tota

l Tr

ies Confidence Levels

75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 2 82 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 53 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 83 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 54 91% 90% 89% 88% 86% 2 84 95% 95% 94% 94% 93% 3 55 91% 90% 89% 88% 87% 2 85 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 56 91% 90% 90% 88% 87% 2 86 95% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 57 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 87 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 58 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 88 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 59 91% 91% 90% 89% 87% 2 89 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 60 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 90 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 61 92% 91% 90% 89% 88% 2 91 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 62 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 92 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 63 92% 91% 91% 90% 88% 2 93 96% 95% 95% 94% 93% 3 64 92% 92% 91% 90% 88% 2 94 96% 96% 95% 94% 93% 3 65 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 95 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 66 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 96 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 67 92% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 97 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 68 93% 92% 91% 90% 89% 2 98 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 69 93% 92% 91% 91% 89% 2 99 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 70 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 2 100 96% 96% 95% 95% 94% 3 71 93% 92% 92% 91% 89% 3 4 7% 5% 4% 3% 1% 3 72 93% 92% 92% 91% 90% 3 5 19% 17% 14% 11% 8% 3 73 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 6 30% 27% 24% 20% 15% 3 74 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 7 38% 35% 32% 28% 23% 3 75 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 8 44% 42% 38% 34% 29% 3 76 93% 93% 92% 91% 90% 3 9 50% 47% 44% 40% 35% 3 77 93% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 10 54% 52% 49% 45% 39% 3 78 94% 93% 92% 92% 90% 3 11 58% 55% 53% 49% 44% 3 79 94% 93% 93% 92% 90% 3 12 61% 59% 56% 52% 47% 3 80 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 13 64% 62% 59% 56% 51% 3 81 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 14 66% 64% 62% 58% 53% 3 82 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 15 68% 66% 64% 61% 56% 3 83 94% 93% 93% 92% 91% 3 16 70% 68% 66% 63% 58% 3 84 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 17 72% 70% 68% 65% 60% 3 85 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 18 73% 71% 69% 67% 62% 3 86 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 19 75% 73% 71% 68% 64% 3 87 94% 94% 93% 92% 91% 3 20 76% 74% 72% 70% 66% 3 88 94% 94% 93% 93% 91% 3 21 77% 75% 73% 71% 67% 3 89 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 22 78% 76% 75% 72% 68% 3 90 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 23 79% 77% 76% 73% 70% 3 91 94% 94% 93% 93% 92% 3 24 80% 78% 76% 74% 71% 3 92 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 25 80% 79% 77% 75% 72% 3 93 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 26 81% 80% 78% 76% 73% 3 94 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 27 82% 81% 79% 77% 74% 3 95 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 28 82% 81% 80% 78% 75% 3 96 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 29 83% 82% 80% 78% 75% 3 97 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 30 84% 82% 81% 79% 76% 3 98 95% 94% 94% 93% 92% 3 31 84% 83% 82% 80% 77% 3 99 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 32 85% 83% 82% 80% 78% 3 100 95% 95% 94% 93% 92% 3 33 85% 84% 83% 81% 78% 3 34 85% 84% 83% 81% 79% 3 35 86% 85% 84% 82% 79% 3 36 86% 85% 84% 82% 80% 3 37 87% 86% 84% 83% 80% 3 38 87% 86% 85% 83% 81% 3 39 87% 86% 85% 84% 81% 3 40 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 41 88% 87% 86% 84% 82% 3 42 88% 87% 86% 85% 83% 3 43 88% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 44 89% 88% 87% 85% 83% 3 45 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 46 89% 88% 87% 86% 84% 3 47 89% 89% 88% 86% 84% 3 48 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 49 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 50 90% 89% 88% 87% 85% 3 51 90% 89% 89% 87% 86% 3 52 90% 90% 89% 88% 86%



Appendix A: LPNPP Layout Details This appendix describes additional buildings on the Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant (LPNPP) site that are of lesser security significance, but may affect decisions regarding security force deployment and response strategy. Intake Structure

The intake structure houses the circulating water system, the service water system, and the screen wash system. The intake structure consists of six intake bays, each with a traveling water screen and a circulating water pump. The capacity of this pump house is approximately 1,000,000 gallons per minute (GPM). The following major systems are included in the intake structure:

1. Circulating Water System (CWS). The six pumps of this system take water from Little Bear Lake and provide cooling to the main condenser. This cooling water is then discharged via a cooling canal to the lake. A recirculating tempering line brings a portion of the warm discharge from the condensers back to the inlet of the intake structure for ice prevention and to reduce marine fouling.

2. Service Water System. The four pumps of this system also take water from Little Bear Lake and discharge via the cooling canal to the lake. Service water is used to cool other systems. such as the primary and the secondary (steam) system, component cooling system, containment cooler, diesel generators and other heat exchangers.

3. Screen Wash System. Six traveling water screens are provided to remove trash and foreign matter from the lake water used to supply the service and circulating water systems. The fish trough permits fish captured by the traveling screens to escape. The traveling screens are cleaned by spraying water supplied by two pumps at 90 psig into the back face of the screen. The water knocks the debris. into an adjacent trash sluice trench (not shown)

The arrangment of the equipment in the Intake Structure is shown in Figure A-1.



Figure A-1. Intake Structure



Auxiliary Building

The Auxiliary Building contains reactor plant auxiliary equipment and components to accomplish the following:

1. Purify reactor coolant system and add make-up water to the reactor coolant system (Chemical and Volume Control [CVCS]). Periodically, changes in the reactor plant operating conditions or minor adjustments in reactor water inventory require the addition of make-up water using one of three charging pumps. This system also purifies the reactor coolant water, removing corrosion products and other impurities present in the reactor coolant system to protect equipment and to reduce the radiation level of the coolant. This action is accomplished via a filter and de-mineralizer system. Due to the ability of the element boron to absorb neutrons in a nuclear chain reaction, boron is added to the reactor coolant water (as boric acid) to control the reactivity level of the reactor. The boron recycle portion of the CVCS processes excess water to concentrate and recover the boron for reuse.

2. Provide cooling water for system com-ponents (Component Cooling Water [CCW]). The Component Cooling Water System is a closed loop cooling system consisting of pumps, heat exchangers and piping that is designed to cool various reactor plant components, many of which are safety related. The service water system transports the heat from the heat exchangers to the ultimate heat sink.

The arrangement of the equipment in the Auxiliary Building is shown in Figures A-2 and A-3.



Figure A-2. Auxiliary Building Section



Figure A-3. Auxiliary Building Level 2



Service Building

The Service Building is a support facility designed to house maintenance groups and their equipment. Facilities include: machine shops, tool rooms, electrical shops, instrument shops, health physics facilities, chemistry laboratory, locker facilities, cafeteria and miscellaneous office spaces. The arrangement of facilities and equipment in the Service Building is shown in A-A-4.

Figure A-4. Service Building



Waste Disposal Building

The Waste Disposal Building is designed to store and process radioactive liquid wastes generated by the reactor plant for future transfer off the Lone Pine NPP site. The systems enclosed within the building include storage tanks and solidification systems. Solidification of the liquid wastes makes the waste easier to handle and is required for transport to offsite disposal sites. The layout of the Waste Disposal Building is shown in Figure A-5.

Figure A-5. Waste Disposal Building

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