Has the Belfast Agreement Reduced Consociationalism in Northern Ireland by Privileging Extremists?W.H. Fletcher

IntroductionWith the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 NorthernIreland was predicted to enter a new golden age. Fourteen years later the province is again rocking to the sound of bombs, bullets and riots. Why? This work proposes that the Belfast Agreement itself is part of the problem through its pandering to extremist minorities on both sides, thus breaking its pledge to consociationalism.The Belfast Agreement (hereafter referred to as the Agreement) was initially presented as a triumph (BBC News, 1998) which would avoid people going back to war (Hutchinson, quoted in The Guardian, 1998). What was actually created was a document which appeased bigots of both green and orange shades and created entrenched systems for promoting their views whilst ignoring the moderate, white majority.Section 2: 1 vi of the Agreement states that both governments:recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British andIrish citizenship is accepted by both Governments.It is stated almost as an after-thought that there may be people in Northern Ireland who choose not to identify with either community. These people are operating under a post-nationalist concept of theirethnic identity and beginning to see themselves in terms of class or gender (see Roulston & Davies, 2000) than in narrow sectarian terms. In other words they are operating under political assumptions which are the norm in any democratic society.Whilst the Agreement does refer to all instead of both sections of society (see Strand 1, Belfast Agreement, 1998), it talks of cross-community decision making purely in terms of nationalist and unionist political parties. Those who have already moved beyondsuch a basic sectarian gap, instead of being lauded and encouraged are, in essence, ignored. The result of this may be seen in the data showing moves toward Sinn Fin and the DUP in subsequent elections. More recently it is reflected in moderate politicians leaving the UUP and the loyalist electorate rejecting even the DUPs hardline stance. Both political parties and the Northern Ireland electorate have been forced to the extremes to have their voices heard.Though there are still those who exist to find compromise- the Alliance Party, or Basil McCrea and Jim McCallisters proposed new party- they are in grave danger of being shouted down by the enhanced political presence of the less moderate parties around them. Why has the Belfast Agreement, launched with such hope, allowed the political situation to descend to such a dangerous level once more? And now that the province is once again on the brink of descending into sectarian conflict is there anything that can be done to prevent such a heinous outcome?

How did the current situation arise?For the generations which have grown up without living in a sectarian war-zone the Northern Ireland of 1998 would be a virtually unrecognisable place. A return to the extreme violence of the 1970s was predicted, and not without reason, should the peace talks of the time fail. An analysis of the data on the CAIN website shows the truth of this view. The situation was tightening. The peace talks which John Major started and Tony Blair continued had been repeatedlyinterrupted by often random acts of sectarian violence. Whether it be the case of Norman Harley, beaten to death in 1995 because his jewellery showed his religion (McKittrick et all, 2000, p1383), or the death of Billy Wright in the high security Maze prison in 1997, the violence was increasing. Analysis of the data in McKittrick et al also shows a marked increase in sectarian attacks against civilians. Measures which would once have been inconceivable were used to bring the men of violence from both communities on board. Face to face meetings with the Secretary of State for the province were used to show the sincerity of the London Government to both sides. Attack after attack, by both sides, was ignored and the convenience of a new group codename accepted at face value. Murderers and sectarian bigots had access to the highest level of government, an access the ordinary moderate on the street could only dream of. A communicant who does not wish to be named stated that there was an on-going joke in his family that the moderates should set up a terrorist group to take out members of all other groups and the terrorist parties; not only would they be providing a public service but they would also then have access to governments to put their views across (personal correspondence for dissertation; March 2001). Leaving aside the dark humour, this shows the frustration of those caught in the middle of a conflict they wanted no part of as they watched terrorists set free and go on to earn an excellent wage in government.But of course such a route for moderates remains only a black joke. The Governments in London and Dublin were bombed, shot and blackmailed into submission. Not unreasonably such dramatic actions had an impact on the mind-set of those coming into the province to try and broker a better future. It is no surprise that listening to the bigots causing the problem they assumed that all local people felt the same way; and so minimal protection was offered in the Agreement to those who had had minimal representation throughout the talks beforehand. It can be argued that London and Dublin should have realised there were moderates being shouted down when the cross-community Womens Coalition was told to leave the talks table and get back to the kitchen to maketea, but as it was a verbal attack rather than the violence Northern Ireland was used to perhaps it was unremarkable to those, English or Irish, trying to make sense of the province and its foibles.The concept of two communities and a small, easy to ignore, moderate middle ground became enshrined into law when both the UK and Ireland adopted the Agreement after its overwhelming support (71.12%) in a referendum. Rather than promoting peace such a path has seen the vote for these other parties descend from 6.53% in 1998 to 3% in the 2011 Assembly Elections (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/elect.htm). By promoting the two extreme ends of identities in Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement is effectively destroying the middle ground. Unfortunately, extremes are not a way forward to a lasting peace. No conflict has ever been ended by forcing people to opposite ends of a political spectrum. Northern Ireland is going in the wrong direction to forge a lasting peace, and it is being pushed alongits way by a document designed to put an end to violence.

What can be done to prevent deterioration in the province?Despite what people in both communities like to believe, the majority of people in both Ireland and England do not understand them and donot want to tolerate them (Sellers, 2001). Dublin and London have no interest in once again trying to pick up the reins and guide the province towardspeace; economic and national matters have superseded events in a place that was supposed to be fixed. Another protracted peace process is profoundly unlikely.Europe is perhaps a different issue.The developments within the European Union as a result of both the Schengen Agreement and the ideal of a Europe of the Regions have made concepts of national identity more fluid and more capable of expansion. The development of a post-nationalist identity as defined by Kearney can assist greatly in challenging the old, problematic constructions of national identity which have led to such problems in the province.This work was begun by the Womens Coalition during the initial peace process in the 1990s. Created by women from both sides and the middle of the political divide, the party recognised the problems women faced in the province and that said problems were simply not going to be addressed by men. The situation they faced when told to put the kettle on during all-party talks demonstrated quite conclusively why. Not interested in the old sectarian divisions, the party worked instead along gender and class lines. The PUP and UDP similarly tried to work along class lines, with Gusty Spence and David Ervine being especially ready to comment on the fact that it was the upper class unionist representatives who seemed willing to prolong the conflict but they expectedthe working class to continue it for them (Moloney, 2010). All three parties showed post-nationalist tendencies in their constructs of identity, though only one was able to step fully away from the sectarian divide to create their concept.The up and coming generations are showing more tendencies in this direction than those who came before. Jobs, education, healthcare and addressing social needs play more of a role than ever in their thinking (personal interviews, 2010). It would not be difficult for themto step beyond a British, Irish or religious identity into one that embraced the role of world citizen which is actively taught in English and Welsh schools through PSHCE lessons. The current economic downturn makes these new concerns more relevant than ever before, making this an excellent time to expand the political debate in the province.This is recognised by certain forward-thinking politicians. After leaving a UUP that shows very little difference to the DUP which has come to dominate unionist politics, Basil McCrea posted a note to Facebook describing the new party which he and John McCallister intend to create. In it he recognised that economic austerity and rising unemployment threaten the peace and prosperity we have fought so hard to achieve.He also added, Many who would not describe themselves as Unionist are happy with a Northern Ireland identity (McCrea; 2013). There are some politicians who recognise that moderate voices which see more than religion are still needed in the province, butthese post-nationalist leaders are all too often lambasted by the parties that are enhanced by the Agreement and denigrated to the wider populace.How then to combat this? The introduction of citizenship, as has been done in Great Britain, would greatlyenhance the awareness of the general electorate in the province. The old adage about knowledge being power is accurate, and a more aware electorate would be less likely to fall into the machinations of politicians who want to remain on the proverbial gravytrain and create trouble to ensure their own success. These basic lessons may have helped minimise the horrific response and misguided blame seen in Belfast in December last year. Political awareness would also lead to politicians facing more challenges about what they are doing to fix thing like the economy. The outrageous salaries many have earned through double-jobbing should be justified.A keener awareness of the EU, and the roles of national identities and nation states within it, would also help. This has the potential to mark a major way forward in Northern Ireland. The results of the 2004 and 2009 elections to the European Parliament show that the DUP/Sinn Fin extremes losttheir share of the popular vote whilst the then more moderate UUP and SDLPincreased theirs. On a wider scale, the electorate of the province do shy away from the extremes. The challenge now is to move that awareness into a smaller, local scale.Perhaps it is time to revive the Womens Coalition slogan of Say Goodbye to Dinosaurs (Ttreault & Teske, 2003, p183). Politicians need to be held to account for their refusal to move on with the times and address the serious crises the province is facing on sectarian, economic and healthcare fronts. An educated, politically savvy electorate is needed to recognise that too many of the dinosaurs are moving backwards towards what they know and risking destroying the gains of the peace process for their own selfish ends. Too many of them claim the letter of the Agreement without representing the spirit of it so ensure the future so many dreamed of when the document was signed.

Consociationalism in Northern IrelandSo has the Belfast Agreement led to a reduction in consociationalism in Nothern Ireland? Technically, no; if we accept Dixonsconcept that consociationalism is a topdownform of powersharing which is eliteoriented and distinctive in its preference for ethnic autonomy or segregation as a means for producing a more conducive environment for conflict resolution (Dixon, 2007) then the Agreement has been a glowing success. Again, this refects the letter of the theory rather thsn the ideal behind it. What Northern Ireland needs is less top-down power-sharing and more bottom-up cross-community links which build awareness ofhow much both sides have in common and thus move the extremes towards the middle. The problem with the Agreement was that it was exclusively brokered by politicians and had no input from the more moderate electorate. A future cannot be built without recognising and actively promoting the moderates. Whilst it is too late to enshrine a constitutional commitment to these least represented of people, politicians in the province need to start bring them to the centre of the fold before the violence of the past becomes the all too likely reality of the future.

BibliographyBooksDixon, P.Paths to Peace in Northern Ireland (1):Civil Society and Consociational Approaches.Democratization; Volume 4:2, Routledge, 2007Dixon,P.Consociationalism andthe Northern Ireland peace process: The glass half full or half empty?Nationalism and Ethnic Politics; Volume 3:3, Routledge, 1997Higson, R.Anti-Consociationalism and the Good Friday Agreement: A Rejoinder.Journal of Peace, Conflict and DevelopmentIssue 12, May 2008Kearney, R.Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy. Routledge, London, 1997.McKittrick, D; Kelters, S.; Feeney, B.; Thornton, C.; McVea D.Lost LivesMainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1999.Moloney, E.Voices from the Grave: Two Mens War in Ireland.Faber and Faber, London, 2010.Roulston, C.; Davies C.Gender, Democracy and Inclusion in Northern Ireland.Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000Sellers, S.Dissertation. 2001Ttreault,M.A.; Teske, R.L.Partial Truths and the Politics of Community: Volume 2.University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 2003WebsitesARK Northern Ireland;Electionshttp://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/BBC;Northern Ireland Peace Deal Reachedhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/10/newsid_2450000/2450823.stmCAIN;Belfast Agreementhttp://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htmCAIN;Chronology of Key Eventshttp://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/pp9899.htmCAIN;Election resultshttp://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/elect.htmFearon, K.Northern Irelands Womens Coalition: Institutionalising a political voice and ensuring representation.http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/northern-ireland%E2%80%99s-women%E2%80%99s-coalition-institutionalising-political-voice-and-ensuringMcCrea, B.;A New Party, a New Beginning; See Mr. McCreas facebook page.The Guardian;The Long Good Fridayhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1998/apr/12/northernireland1