conditional consociationalism: electoral systems and … · i extract the core de nition of...

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Conditional Consociationalism: Electoral Systems and Grand Coalitions * Nils-Christian Bormann March 25, 2011 Abstract Consociationalism is a complex set of rules and norms that is sup- posed to enable democratic governance and peaceful coexistence of different social segments in plural societies. Statistical studies of con- flict often reduce it to either a PR or federalism dummy in a regression. I extract the core definition of consociationalism from Lijphart’s writ- ing and explicitly link its institutional and behavioral dimensions. I also address the possible endogeneity of electoral systems and show that once endogeneity is accounted for PR has a positive effect on eth- nic elite cooperation although historical, socio-structural and interna- tional factors exert a more robust influence. A history of violence in a country seems to antagonize elites and hinder cooperation. * Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop on Political Violence and Institutions from 12-17 April in St. Gallen, Switzerland. I thank Manuel Vogt and Julian Wucherpfennig for helpful discussion and comments. Center of Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Email: [email protected] 1

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Conditional Consociationalism: ElectoralSystems and Grand Coalitions∗

Nils-Christian Bormann†

March 25, 2011

Abstract

Consociationalism is a complex set of rules and norms that is sup-posed to enable democratic governance and peaceful coexistence ofdifferent social segments in plural societies. Statistical studies of con-flict often reduce it to either a PR or federalism dummy in a regression.I extract the core definition of consociationalism from Lijphart’s writ-ing and explicitly link its institutional and behavioral dimensions. Ialso address the possible endogeneity of electoral systems and showthat once endogeneity is accounted for PR has a positive effect on eth-nic elite cooperation although historical, socio-structural and interna-tional factors exert a more robust influence. A history of violence ina country seems to antagonize elites and hinder cooperation.

∗Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop on Political Violence andInstitutions from 12-17 April in St. Gallen, Switzerland. I thank Manuel Vogt and JulianWucherpfennig for helpful discussion and comments.†Center of Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Email:

[email protected]

1

1 Introduction

Was Lijphart (1977, 238) correct in pronouncing that “[f]or many of the

plural societies of the non-Western world (. . . ) the realistic choice is not

between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational

model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all?”

The appraisal of the alleged blessings of consociationalism has been incom-

plete and/or hotly disputed. Most studies focus on the application to single

cases, and large-N studies have only gained systematic insight at the expense

of conceptual clarity. Too often consociationalism is equated with propor-

tional representation and/or federalism. However, consociationalism is more

than institutions. It consists of at least two dimensions: institutions and elite

behavior. The behavioral dimension has been completely ignored by quan-

titative scholars, and it is unclear whether the institutional side, often PR

electoral rules, actually increases the likelihood of elite accommodation in

a grand coalition, the “primary characteristic” of consociationalist arrange-

ments (Lijphart, 2002b, 39).

Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there may be a connection. Up

to 1977, politics in Brazil were not structured along ethnic lines. When the

military regime partially retreated in 1977 the sizable Afro-Brazilian minor-

ity began voicing political demands. Ethnicity became a relevant cleavage in

the political system governed by proportional electoral rules. Afro-Brazilians

remained powerless for 26 years, but in the early 21st century the Lula gov-

ernment implemented anti-discriminatory reforms, appointed multiple Afro-

Brazilians to the cabinet and made some executive power-sharing a reality.

2

In the United States, a far more economically advanced but similarly un-

equal presidential and federal democracy, it took until 2009 before minority

ethnic groups gained access to the highest state offices.1 Halfway around the

globe, in a completely different political environment Zimbabwe and South

Africa emerged out of years of the worst racial discrimination in the early

1980s and 1990s respectively. While South Africa adopted a completely new

constitutional framework, Zimbabwe stuck to its British majoritarian insti-

tutions although it reserved some parliamentary seats for minorities. While

under Mugabe’s rule a majority of Blacks was represented by the govern-

ment, whites basically left the country and the political exclusion of other

linguistically different groups continued and even increased in recent years.

In South Africa, under a system of proportional representation the ANC has

managed to give representation to all ethnic groups within the country. But

did the electoral system really play a decisive role? After all, India has man-

aged to maintain ethnic cooperation among the majority of ethnic groups in

the similar catch-all Congress party under a majoritarian electoral system

since independence in 1948.

As much as these examples refer to the interaction between institutions

and elite behavior within a country they also address a second fundamen-

tal problem of the quantitative literature on institutional effects. To my

knowledge, all studies that investigate the consequences of institutions as-

sume them as given. However, institutions understood as the “rules of the

game” are often the outcome of historical legacies, social structure and dis-

1Although some minority members did serve in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton admin-istration, none of them really made any claims on representing an ethnic group or tried topush minority issues explicitly.

3

ruptive events (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). In early writings, Lijphart

(1977, 53-99) himself argued that the success of consociational institutions

depends partly on exogenous conditions among which he listed colonial his-

tory, cleavage structure, or the presence of prior conflicts. Unfortunately,

he later cast aside these considerations and nowadays recommends consen-

sus institutions to all societies irrespective of their social make-up (Lijphart,

1999, 1999). Yet, external constraints need to be taken seriously because PR

systems surely will work differently in the Netherlands than in South Africa.

Put differently, proposing that electoral rules will have the same effects in

all countries irrespective of conditions historical conditions is a daring state-

ment or as Cheibub (2007, 25) puts it: “The language of institutional ‘choice’

must be used carefully, since this choice is usually constrained by historical

circumstances.”

In order to take into account the conditions under which electoral systems

operate in a country I employ conditional recursive mixed-process models, a

generalization of the more widely known bivariate probit regressions. The

models allow me to account for the endogeneity of electoral rules and esti-

mating the endogenous effect on ethnic elite cooperation in all states where

ethnicity is or was politicized from 1946 until 2000. My empirical analysis

still falls short of capturing the complexity of consociational systems. Yet, it

steps beyond equating consociational democracy with the presence or absence

of PR, and makes an explicit link between the institutional and behavioral

components of consociationalism.

The paper is organized in four parts. First, I will superficially review the

long debate on consociationalism and try to dissect from it the core definition

4

of consociationalism. Second, I will argue that attempts to measure consoci-

ationalism have been insufficient so far because they have solely focussed on

one institutional aspect of consociational theory but ignored its behavioral

components. Third, I will develop hypotheses on the conditional nature of

consociational institutions and how they influence consociational practices.

Fourth, I will describe my data and method in greater detail, and finally

analyze the effect of electoral systems on ethnic elite cooperation.

2 Confusing Consociationalism

One possible reason for the simplistic equation of consociationalism with PR

electoral rules and the complete disregard for the behavioral pillars may be

Lijphart’s frequent reformulations of consociationalist theory. In this section,

I will give a concise summary of the evolution of consociational theory.

Since its first formulation in the late 1960s (Lijphart, 1968), the con-

cept of consociational democracy has been a moving target. Lijphart and

his critics altered and redefined the concept multiple times and extended it

far beyond its originally conceived scope (Lijphart, 1977, 1985; van Cranen-

burgh and Kopecky, 2004; Van Cranenburgh, 2006). Lijphart first described

consociational democracy in the Netherlands as seven implicit political rules

governing elite behavior (Lijphart, 1968) – a characterization lacking any

mentioning of institutions and one he never returned to again (Bogaards,

2000, 400). Later consociational democracy was integrated with the pre-

vailing types of democracy: majoritarian, centripetal and centrifugal democ-

racies (Almond, 1956; Lijphart, 1969). It was understood as the type of

5

democracy present in the low countries in Europe and juxtaposed with the

Anglo-American majoritarian version as an alternative stable democratic sys-

tem. In these early formulations, the institutional setup was inextricably

linked to the social structure of society. The more homogeneous societies of

the West could sustain the conflictual atmosphere inherent in majoritarian

democracy, while the plural societies of the third world could not. Accord-

ingly, Lijphart moved from case studies of smaller European countries to a

comparison of states around the globe. Here for the first time, consociational

democracy was clearly defined by four pillars: (1) a grand coalition of elites

from different groups, (2) a veto for each group in important policy areas,

(3) proportional representation in key institutions, and (4) group autonomy

(Lijphart, 1977, 25). The first pillar, the grand coalition, is the “primary

characteristic” of consociational democracy, while the three remaining pillars

are “secondary instruments”. Behavioral components, i.e. elite cooperation,

and institutional rules, e.g. federalist arrangements as an expression of group

autonomy, are both equally important features of consociationalism.

Later, consociational democracy was re-baptized power-sharing democ-

racy (Lijphart, 1985). Now, it was recommended not for plural societies

but for post-conflict environments like Northern Ireland (Nagle and Clancy,

2011), Bosnia (Monteux, 2006), or South Africa (Lijphart, 1998). Over time,

power-sharing took on various meanings and lost its erstwhile consociational

definition. While it could be conceived that power-sharing is a more gen-

eral and more loosely defined collection of conflict-resolution strategies than

consociationalism with its more rigid definition, the two have been too often

conflated in practice. “Starting with Power-sharing in South Africa, Li-

6

jphart has used power-sharing as a synonym for consociational democracy”

(Bogaards, 2000, 415) and this has become common practice in academic

writing.2 This had unfortunate consequences, as power-sharing is sometimes

used as a description of any post-conflict solution. Sisk (1996), for example,

subsumes Lijphart’s consociational and Horowitz’ vote pooling suggestions

under the heading of power-sharing, although the two are usually regarded

as rival, or even polar opposite, concepts (Bogaards, 2000, 416). Return-

ing full-circle to the older juxtaposition of majoritarian and consociational

democracy Rothchild and Roeder (2005) have advanced power-dividing insti-

tutions based on the US constitutional model as the best method to resolve

conflict in plural societies. Finally, in a series of statistical studies, Hoddie

and Hartzell have lumped together power-sharing and power-dividing insti-

tutions into one compound measure to assess their effect on post-conflict

peace (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007).

Partly due to the complexity of the consociational package, partly due to

a simple lack of data, Lijphart turned to the more tractable concept of con-

sensus democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1999) that focuses on purely institutional

characteristics of established democracies3. Surprisingly, Lijphart found two

consensus dimensions instead of a simple one dimensional majoritarian-consensus

continuum (Lijphart, 1999, 248). In short, the executive-parties dimensions

assesses the broadness of the government coalition, while the federal-unitary

2In From Power Sharing to Democracy the first chapter is entitled ‘Debating Consoci-ational Politics’ (O’Leary, 2005) and in Consociational Theory the first chapter’s headingis ‘Power shared after the deaths of thousands’ (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). Subsequentchapters in both books alternate between power-sharing and consociationalism.

3Although note the later addition of corporatism, clearly a more informal, potentiallyeven a behavioral arrangement (Lijphart and Crepaz, 1991).

7

dimension captures a separation of powers outside the parliament. Interest-

ingly, the only first-dimension component of consensus democracy that can be

directly engineered seems to be a proportional electoral system which, ironi-

cally, has the lowest correlation to the index measuring consensus democracy

(Taagepera, 2003, 7).

Given the confusion of concepts and types in Lijhart’s own writings as

well as in the expansive literature on power sharing, it is little wonder then

that statistical studies trying to measure consociationalism have frequently

resorted to a simple dummy variable indicating the presence of a system

of proportional representation (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Schneider and Wiese-

homeier, 2008; Brancati and Snyder, 2010; Selway and Templeman, forth-

coming). However, using a dummy for proportional electoral system is not

faithful to the concept of consociationalism. It is not even a good proxy for

the pillar of proportionality which Lijphart described as “a method of allo-

cating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of

government subsidies among the different segments” (Lijphart, 1977, 38). If

a credible link could be established between PR electoral rules and the pro-

portionality principle in key state institutions, especially the civil service or

the army, and the proportional distribution of resources, then a PR dummy

would be a partial proxy for a sub-component of consociational democracy.

Yet, civil service representation of ethnic groups may have very different

sources. Two of the countries that are regularly credited with effective ac-

commodation of their diverse population are Botswana (Rothchild, 1997,

78/9) and India (Lijphart, 1996). Neither of these two countries make use of

proportional electoral rules but both have managed to achieve proportional

8

outcomes in resource distribution and/or civil service appointments (Jalal,

1995, 20-1). Moreover, countries like Spain or Italy that do have PR electoral

rules are not or at least not any longer considered consociational prototypes

(Bogaards, 2005). This is not to suggest that Arend Lijphart has not regu-

larly argued for the adoption of PR rules in the electoral arena. Quite on the

contrary, he has repeatedly recommended PR in his work (Lijphart, 1985,

1999, 2002b, 2004). However, PR is only a small part of consociationalism, it

has little to do with the proportionality concept in consociational theory, and

does not really differentiate between consociational and non-consociational

cases.

Some authors also assess the difference between parliamentary and presi-

dential systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008) or the presence and absence of

federal arrangements (Selway and Templeman, forthcoming) as operational-

izations for consociationalism. However, as noted above, presidentialism is

not a central feature of consociationalism although Lijphart does seem to

favor parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2004, 101-3). Additionally, introduc-

ing federalism as a consociational indicator confuses more than it explains.

Federalism is only a good measure of group autonomy if it overlaps with

group boundaries, not if it cuts across them. US- or German-style federalism

is clearly different from the arrangements in former Yugoslavia, in India or

in South Africa; the convoluted federal arrangement in Belgium might even

be so different that it escapes any attempt of comparative analysis. Specific

cases aside, a dummy indicating the presence or absence of federalism does

not adequately measure the presence of consociational systems. Moreover,

group autonomy can also be assessed by non-federal solutions like ethnically

9

separated legal codes, self-managed educational institutions or the recogni-

tion of other linguistic or religious prerogatives.

In light of the lack of adequate empirical measures of consociational con-

cepts, I will argue for an ideal measurement close to the original definition,

and then introduce a sub-optimal but still much improved proxy for conso-

ciatioal arrangements.

3 Getting Consociationalism

Before describing an ideal consociational measurement it is important to

ask what cases should be included in the measurement? A good starting

point is Lijphart’s conjecture that consociational democracy is appropriate

for plural societies (Lijphart, 1977) which are characterized by politically and

socially charged as well as differentiable segments. Of the classical consocia-

tional cases, the Netherlands are not a good example any longer, as Lijphart

admitted himself (Lijphart, 2002a). I suggest to focus instead on societies

where ethnicity is a politically charged category. While other lines of divi-

sion exist within a society, ethnically charged nationalism is among the most

divisive and most consequential of cleavages. Ethnic fragmentation is linked

to a number of vices within societies like a lower provision of public goods

(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999), lower economic growth (Alesina and La-

Ferrara, 2005), and a higher probability of ethnic civil wars (Buhaug, 2006).

If ethnicity becomes politically mobilized and the legitimacy of rulers is de-

rived from their ethnic basis, ethno-nationalism can become the grounds for

violent struggles for power (Wimmer, 2002; Wimmer, Cederman and Min,

10

2009). Indeed, the pervasive logic of the nation-state makes ethnic cleavages

more often a salient political identity than other types of identities (Wimmer,

1997, 632), and thus more relevant for explaining institutional engineering.4

In order to gauge consociationalism accurately in ethnically diverse so-

cieties, what should be measured? At best, this measure should include an

indicator of a grand coalition in the executive of all relevant ethnic groups,

an indicator of territorial and cultural autonomy regulations, an indicator

assessing proportionality in the bureaucracy, the military, the legislature,

the judiciary and in the distribution of resources, and finally, an indicator of

de facto and de jure veto rights. These individual measures would measure

proportions and deviations from an ideal distribution, and be aggregated

into one scale to assess the degree of consociational practices in a country.

Unfortunately, data for the majority of consociational pillars does not exist.

Existing measures of consensus democracies (Lijphart, 1999) or veto players

(Tsebelis, 2002) are not of much help. Their temporal scope is extremely lim-

ited, they are restricted to economically advanced states, and include cases

independent of the plurality of their societies. Data on proportional repre-

sentation in key institutions is almost non-existent outside of Europe, and

data about cultural autonomy as coded in the Minorities at Risk dataset is

troubled by selection bias.

Given the absence of empirical indicators of consociationalism’s key di-

mensions is there any way to improve upon a dummy for proportional rep-

resentation? I believe that at the very least, an empirical indicator should

4A focus on countries where ethnicity is politically relevant does only exclude a minorityof all countries from the analysis. Examples include Burkina Faso, Germany or Ireland. Inmore than 150 states with more than 500,000 inhabitants, ethnicity is politically relevant.

11

represent the institutional as well as the behavioral side of consociational-

ism. As argued above, consociationalism is mostly about elite accommoda-

tion, and the rules to ensure it. At the same time, Ljphart has argued that

proportional representation will lead to this elite accommodation (Lijphart,

2002b, 53). While PR is an imperfect proxy for the proportionality principle

of consociationalism it is hypothesized to be the institution that enables the

grand coalition. This is exactly the causal mechanism which Lijphart’s main

critic Donald Horowitz has challenged by arguing that a simple presence of

ethnic groups in parliament does not incentivize elite cooperation (Horowitz,

2002).

Acknowledging both the behavioral and the institutional dimension of

consociationalism, I suggest to measure the grand coalition as the proportion

of the ethnically relevant population included in the central government.

Data on ethnic inclusion was recently assembled by Cederman, Wimmer and

Min (2010). The data is especially pertinent because it measures de facto

cooperation at the elite level. Not only has Lijphart repeatedly alluded to

the centrality of the grand coalition among consociational features (Lijphart,

2002b, 38-9), he has very much emphasized the elitist nature of the grand

coalition, going so far as to call it an “elite cartell”. On the institutional side,

several measures of proportionality exist but there are important differences

between them. Golder’s classification of electoral systems around the world

is probably the best as it records electoral rules from 1946-2000, and has the

decisive advantage of only counting electoral rules that are actually used but

not those that only exist on paper (Golder, 2005). Looking at the interplay

of institutions and behavior now comes much closer to Lijphart’s original

12

formulation of consociationalism and also, for the first time, actually assesses

the hypothesized relationship.

Previous research has already demonstrated that ethnic inclusion or Li-

jhpart’s grand coalition decreases the risk of ethno-nationalist civil war sub-

stantially (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). However, it is not clear what

drives inclusion of different ethnic groups at the center. In the next section

I will address the possible links between electoral rules and the inclusiveness

of government.

4 Conditional Consociationalism

How to arrive at elite cooperation in a grand coalition is probably the most

rigorously debated question in the long debate on consociationalism (Li-

jphart, 1977, 1985; Horowitz, 1991, 2000, 2002; Lijphart, 2002b). Pre-1975

Lebanon and post-1995 Bosnia where elite representation of all ethnic groups

in the executive was/is prescribed by the constitution are grist to the mill of

consociational critics. Both cases vividly exemplify that ethnic elites’ mere

presence in government institutions does not entail cooperation between the

different segments.5 This is why Lijphart and his supporters have later pro-

moted proportional representation as the “liberal consociational” solution

(McGarry and OLeary, 2007, 675/6) in which groups are not pre-determined

but those political forces that are most appealing to the electorate find ex-

pression in parliament. Nonetheless the question remains whether elites opt

5Another disheartening example of the negative effects of the prescribed segmentationof an electorate is colonial India, where Hindus and Muslims voted in different constitu-tencies despite being neighbors. The bloody history of partition in 1947 is interpreted bysome scholars as a result of exactly that segmentation.

13

to cooperate only because they are proportionally represented in parliament.

The critics of consociationalism contend that ethnic elites, especially in

polarized environments, have few incentives to cooperate and prefer dead-

lock or coercive control (Lustick, 1979) to accommodation. Research on civil

wars has reinforced the perception of ethnic group representatives as strate-

gic and rational actors (Stedman, 1997; Cunningham, 2006; Metternich and

Wucherpfennig, 2010). From the theoretical vantage point of self-interested

ethnic elites Horowitz and other critics of consociationalism have argued

for vote pooling mechanisms that force ethnic elites to reach across ethnic

boundaries in order to gain parliamentary majorities. They assume a strongly

constructivist view of ethnicity when arguing that appropriate electoral rules

are able to alter ethnic allegiances (Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2005). There are

several problems with the institutional proposal and the underlying assump-

tion. First, Bogaards (2003) shows that the suggested mechanism does not

work in many African states and suggests an alternative electoral system that

he coins ‘constituency pooling’. Second, both Bogaards’ and Horowitz’ sug-

gestions lack any comparable empirical record. Bogaards’ draws his example

from a now defunct electoral mechanism in Uganda and Horowitz’ only cases

are Papua New Guinea from 1964 until 1975 and the short-lived Fiji consti-

tution of 1998. Third, I believe that the absence of AV electoral mechanisms

as well as their inappropriateness for several of the most ethnically divided

countries is due to a lack of appreciation for their endogenous adoption. In

other words, in those societies where ethnicity is a politically charged cate-

gory, it will be very difficult to convince leaders of ethnic segments to agree

to letting go of their powerful positions. AV systems are so rarely found be-

14

cause they are not appreciated by ethnic entrepreneurs. On the contrary, PR

systems increase the likelihood that ethnic leaders will keep their powerful

positions even if an ethnic group is not geographically concentrated. Which

factors then influence their adoption?

A few years ago the adoption of PR systems in the established democ-

racies was already investigated by Boix (1999) and Blais, Dobrzynska and

Indridason (2005).6 While developed Western countries are not free of ten-

sions between ethnic segments, most problems occur in the developing coun-

tries. What are then the driving factors behind electoral systems in a ex-

panded sample? Colonial heritage exerts probably the strongest influence

on the adoption of any electoral system. Former Spanish as well as Bel-

gian and Dutch colonies usually employ PR electoral systems, while British

colonies most often run majoritarian systems. Similarly, the majority of for-

mer French colonies inherited the French two round run-off system which is

majoritarian in nature. At the same time several continental European coun-

tries operate PR systems. In Lijphart’s 1999 sample of advanced democracies

three out of four consensus democracies are economically highly developed

while only one in two majoritarian democracies show similar levels of de-

velopment (Muller-Rommel, 2008). More generally, democratic systems are

much more likely to be present in economically highly developed countries.

PR systems are also more likely to be found in smaller countries. The oper-

ation of list-PR systems that only feature one country-wide district is hardly

feasible in countries beyond a certain threshold. In larger countries, local

electoral districts are much more appealing. Finally, the violent history of a

6Also see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006, 79) for a critique of Boix’s findings.

15

country should play a role. In the wake of civil wars new electoral systems are

adopted, and more recently these systems have been proportional systems.

Examples include Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Iraq, South Africa or Indone-

sia. As about two thirds of all civil wars recur, not taking into account the

possible endogeneity of electoral systems to violence is a possible omission in

estimating their causal effects.

Regarding elite cooperation, Lijphart himself formulated a number of

favorable conditions for consociationalism to work. Conducive to elite coop-

eration are the balance of power among ethnic segments, smaller states, a

developed sense of nationhood, cross-cutting cleavages, and traditions of elite

accommodation (Lijphart, 1977, 53-99). Bogaards (1998, 478) who peruses

all of Lijphart’s publications on the conditions for consociationalism adds

the geographical concentration of segments, the absence of a majority seg-

ment, socioeconomic equality between segments and the moderation of party

systems. Several of this conditions like national loyalties or socio-economic

equality are rather effects or by-products of consociational practices than

causal priors. Other factors, like country size, colonial history, cross-cutting

cleavages or the absence of a majority segment can more safely be assumed

exogenous. Returning to electoral rules it should be noted that a grand coali-

tion can also exist within authoritarian regimes. Indeed some states in Africa

like Cote d’Ivoire under Houphouet-Boigny built up sophisticated clientelist

systems of elite accommodation. On average however, dictatorships like Al-

Assad’s Syria, Indonesia under Suharto, or Guatemala under military rule

should have lower levels of ethnic inclusion than their democratic competi-

tors. Combining the expectations of endogeneity and the inclusiveness of

16

democratic regimes I hypothesize:

• H1 Considering historical and sociostructural constraints, PR electoral

rules increase the degree of ethnic inclusion in comparison with non-

democracies.

When evaluating Lijphart’s main argument, it is necessary to note that

he always juxtaposed the British-style majoritarian system with the propor-

tional consociational system. Majoritarian electoral systems would inevitably

lead to tyranny of the majority, especially under plurality regulations: “For

many of the plural societies of the non-Western world, therefore, the realis-

tic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the

consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democ-

racy at all.” This is not difficult to fathom. As soon as an ethnic group

makes up a plurality in the population it is attractive for group leaders to

directly appeal to their own group for votes. Although PR is assumed to lead

to similar dynamics, the distortive nature of first-past-the-post rules severely

aggravates the outcome. Ceteris paribus, in majoritarian systems groups

smaller than 51% can already dominate the center while in PR systems that

should not be possible. Additionally, in PR systems very small groups will be

more likely to gain representation and can become crucial players in coalition

governments – a path closed to them in majoritarian systems.

• H2a Considering historical and sociostructural constraints, PR elec-

toral rules increase the degree of ethnic inclusion in comparison with

majoritarian systems.

17

5 Analysis

5.1 Data

My dataset consists of over 5000 country-year observations from 1946 until

2005. The dependent variable is the proportion of the included population

of the politically relevant ethnic population as coded in the Ethnic Power

Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). The included

population is defined as the sum of the relative sizes of those ethnic groups in

a country that have de facto access to executive positions. In non-democratic

states executive power can be vested in a variety of institutions like a royal

family, the top army brass or revolutionary councils. In multiple countries the

ethnically relevant population is not tantamount to the overall population.

Prior to the passing of the voting rights act in 1965, for example, Asians or

Hispanics are not coded as a relevant ethnic categories in the United States.

Taking the proportion of the included population would therefore paint a too

optimistic picture of the actually included population.7 As an alternative

dependent variable I also code the relative number of included groups from

all politically relevant ethnic groups in a given country and year. There are

vast differences between the most ethnically diverse states like Russia – with

up to 60 groups – and less plural societies like those in South America with

only two or three groups.

As my principal independent variable I take Golder’s classification of elec-

toral systems from 1946-2000 (Golder, 2005). Each major family of electoral

7A group is defined as ethnically relevant if representatives of the group make politicalclaims on behalf of the entire group or if the group is discriminated against by the state.

18

systems, i.e. PR, mixed and majoritarian rules, takes a value of 1 if it was in

effect in a given year. The base category are non-democratic regimes which

take a value of zero. In alternative specifications I also test the impact of

a less precise classification of electoral systems (Gerring and Thacker, 2008)

which is coded from 1946 until 2002.8

The majority of my control variables comes from the Ethnic Power Re-

lations dataset. In order to test the historical influence of elite cooperation,

I include the degree of inclusion in the first year of independence of a state.

Additionally, I control for the size of the largest group as a proxy for the bal-

ance of power between ethnic segments. I expect countries with numerically

dominant groups, to have a lower degree of inclusion as those groups have

less incentives to build alliances with other ethnic groups to attain executive

power.9 To gauge the effect of cleavages, I make use of an ethno-linguistic

fractionalization index calculated from the groups in the EPR dataset. I

also use the linguistic distance measure by Fearon (2003). Higher degrees

of ethno-linguistic fractionalization or cultural distance should decrease the

included population as there are less symbolic ties that bind elites and the

groups they represent together. Additionally, I include a count of previous

ethnic civil wars in a country to assess the hostility of inter-ethnic relations.10

8Gerring & Thacker often backdate their measure of electoral systems even if it wasnot used in practise due to authoritarian rule.

9In alternative specifications I considered the log of the largest group and a quadraticspecification to control for the fact that with increasing size the dependent variable ofinclusion may be growing in direct proportion. It could be that the effect of the largestgroup reaches a maximum at mid-range before inclusion grows because the largest groupis growing. This effect should not play a role in specifications using the proportion ofincluded groups as a dependent variable.

10The conflict data is adopted from the Expanded Armed Conflict Data assembled byCunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009).

19

More civil wars should translate into a lower degree of ethnic inclusion. To

gauge the effect of external threats, I include the international rivalry data

from Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). According to Lijphart a greater feeling

of external threats should lead to a higher degree of internal cooperation.

Furthermore, I incorporate data on country size and economic development

from Gleditsch (2002). A larger population should increase the complexity

of ethnic relations and therefore decrease the size of the included population,

while GDP/capita, as an indicator of modernity, should exert a positive effect

on the included population. Finally, I include dummy indicators for world

regions and colonial history from the Quality of Government project (Teorell

et al., 2010). Summary statistics and correlations between the main variables

can be found in tables 3 and 4 in the appendix.

5.2 Method: Conditional Mixed Process Regression

In order to correctly estimate proportions which are continuous between zero

and one, I utilize the Tobit regression model with a lower and upper bound-

ary.11 As argued above the influence of electoral systems on inclusion may

be endogenous to a variety of factors such as colonial heritage or economic

development. Therefore, I estimate the endogeneity of electoral systems with

conditional mixed-process (CMP) models (Roodman, 2008). CMP regression

is a generalization of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models that can

be used with response variables that are not continuous but bounded at an

11I also tried OLS regressions. The results were not substantially or statistically sig-nificant different. Optimally, I would have employed beta regressions but they are notavailable for conditional models. I ran a few one-stage beta and logistic regressions andthey provided similar results as simple tobit or OLS models.

20

arbitrary threshold value and are assumed to have a normally distributed

error. Normally distributed errors are not unique to probit models but are a

characteristic of several Maximum-Likelihood (ML) estimators like multino-

mial probit, ordered probit or tobit regression models. A more widely-known

variant of a CMP model is a bivariate probit regression model which allows

bivariate normal error distributions – from the SUR framework – and the

inclusion of an endogenous indepdendent variable in the second-stage equa-

tion. Essentially, two equations are estimated together and the endogenous

variable y∗1i appears as a predictor in the second equation:

y∗1i = Xβ1j + ε1i

y∗2i = Xβ2j + δ2 ∗ y1i + ε2i

where Xβ is a matrix of j independent variables and their respective

coefficients. y1i is dummy variable indicating the choice of an electoral sys-

tem. It enters the second equation as an endogenous factor estimated by δ.

In a probit regression framework the latent variable y∗1i would theoretically

indicate the utility of choosing one electoral system over another. It is fur-

ther assumed that the assumed outcome is observed whenever the utility of

choosing the alternative is positive:

y1i = g(y∗1i) = (1{y∗1i > 0})

y2i represents the degree of ethnic exclusion at the center. As a proportion

it cannot take values below zero or above one. A tobit regression model with

an upper and lower threshold captures these natural boundaries.

y2i = g(y∗2i) =

c if y∗2i ≤ c

y∗2i if c < y∗2i < c

c if y∗2i ≥ c

21

The linked error distributions consist of a shared part η and the unique

part u:

ε1i = ηi + u1i

ε2i = ηi + u2i

Moreover, the bivariate error variance ε is assumed to be normally dis-

tributed with mean zero and variance Σ:

ε = (ε1, ε2) ∼ N (0,Σ)

Σ captures the correlation ρ between the omitted factors explaining the

choice of an electoral system y1i and the degree of ethnic cooperation y2i.

Σ =

1 ρ

ρ 1

Essentially, this means that unidentified factors like elite choices are con-

nected through both equations. As argued above I expect ρ to be negative

since PR should more often be present in those situations when there is

conflict over inclusion, i.e. when inclusion is smaller.

The model can be identified in one of two ways. In the classical simulta-

neous equation model an exclusion restriction needs to be introduced. Put

differently, an appropriate instrument needs to be entered into the first stage

regression. I utilize colonial heritage as a clearly exogenous factor driving

the adoption of electoral rules from a colonial power. However, I admit that

colonial history is not the best instrument since a large number of colonies

were and are authoritarian regimes that do not hold elections. A second

possibility is to identify the model based on the assumption that the error

distributions are truly bivariate normal distributed. Admittedly, this is a

somewhat heroic assumption which is hard to defend. However, an indirect

22

way to assess the viability of the assumption is to try out different error dis-

tributions. Recently, Winkelmann (2009) has developed bivariate ML models

that rely on a number of Coppola distributed errors. If the results hold under

different error distributions, a higher confidence in their reliability would be

achieved.

5.3 Results

In this section I present two regression tables, one cross-sectional analysis

from the 1990s and one time-series cross-section analysis from 1946 until

2000. Table 1 presents the conditional estimates of majoritarian and PR

electoral systems in 1996, and their effect on ethnic inclusion at the center

in 2004.1213 Ethnic inclusion in 2004 is still strongly shaped by the extent of

ethnic cooperation at independence which forcefully underlines a sticky view

of (informal) institutions. Another historical variable, the age of a state, has

virtually no effect on inclusion. It is either a bad proxy of nationalist consol-

idation or its effect is washed out by the history of elite cooperation. Other

influential indicators are the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and

the size of the largest group. Number of wars fought in a given country also

increases the degree of inclusion, showing the endogeneity of ethnic inclu-

sion to actual violence. Surprisingly, neither population size nor economic

development seem to have any effect on the degree of inclusion.

12The year 2004 was chosen as the last year in my dataset for which all independentvariables other than the electoral systems had no missing values. The year 1996 was chosenbecause it is the first year after the democratic transitions in the early nineties in whichthe state system contains the same members as in 2004. I also ran analyses from 1995 and1994 to 2004 which showed no significant differences.

13The upper part of the table displays the second stage equation and the lower partshows the equation explaining the distribution of electoral systems in 1996.

23

Table 1: Cross-section CMP modelVariables Incl.

Pop.Incl.Pop.

Inclusion Year 1 0.320(0.108)**

0.356(0.114)**

PR 0.028(0.053)

0.312(0.118)**

Mixed 0.051(0.047)

0.070(0.063)

Major. 0.270(0.116)**

0.086(0.054)

ELF -1.031(0.338)**

-0.846(0.336)*

Stage Age 0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

Max. Group -0.909(0.375)*

-0.375(0.198)*

War Hist. 0.015(0.008).

0.014(0.008).

Log(Pop.) -0.006(0.017)

0.017(0.018)

Log(GDP) 0.020(0.022)

-0.019(0.026)

AIC 92.49 90.26

Electoral System Maj. PR

Civil War History -0.133(0.092)

-0.108(0.099)

Log(Population) 0.236(0.114)*

-0.094(0.107)

Log(GDP/capita) -0.210(0.177)

0.445(0.155)**

Hispanic Colony -1.137(0.463)*

0.375(0.311)

British Colony -0.102(0.398)

-0.160(0.417)

French Colony -0.401(0.540)

-1.391(0.572)**

ρ -0.516(0.236).

-0.805(0.146)**

N 121 121

Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses

24

The effect of electoral systems is not straight-forward. If not modeled as

endogenous indicators their effect on grand coalition formation in the exec-

utive of a country is non-existent.14 However, if the endogenous adoption

including of electoral systems is accounted for in terms of colonial history,

economic development, population size and history of violence, both ma-

joritarian and PR electoral systems increase the degree of ethnic inclusion.

Additionally, the correlation ρ between the two equations is negative and sig-

nificant as expected, meaning that PR systems are more often found where

inclusion is difficult to establish. This also seems to be true for majoritarian

systems in the cross-section. It could be that the effect is caused by those

African countries that became democratic in the early 1990s. That view is

supported by the fact that majoritarian systems seem to be found in poorer

countries despite the fact that the base category are authoritarian systems.

Civil war history actually decreases the likelihood of any electoral system

although it is not significant.15

Table 2 includes four conditional time-series cross-section models from

1946 until 2000. The first and second column show the effects of endogenous

PR institutions and the third and fourth column display the consequences

of endogenous mixed and majoritarian systems respectively.16 Again the

strongest predictor of ethnic elite cooperation is the amount of cooperation

14Cf. 5 for time-series results. I do not represent simple cross-section estimations.15It may be that a simple count of small-scale civil wars is not equivalent to disruptive

events and that the number of more intensive or a different operationalization of intensitydoes a better job of accounting for different electoral systems. It may also help to onlylook at a sample of post-war societies only.

16All four equations include controls for time-trends that are not shown in the table.Time, operationalized as the cubic polynomial of state age and age of electoral systemsdoes not exert a sizable influence.

25

in the first year. Mixed and majoritarian electoral systems (unconditional)

have small effects while the conditional estimate of PR systems exerts a pro-

nounced and highly significant influence on inclusion. While none of the con-

trol variables from the cross-sectional comparison undergoes any substantive

changes in signs, the confidence in their statistical accuracy declines despite

an increase in observations. The drop in statistical significance levels of the

ELF index and the war history variable was only to be expected. The ELF

measure is not time varying and cannot account for changes in inclusion. The

war history variable is a count indicator that cannot be high in early years

of a countries existence. Increasing the time frame of the analysis allows the

introduction of international rivalries into the analysis. Against Lijphart’s

expectation external threats do not increase internal cooperation. It is rather

the other way around. One explanation could be that external threats divert

attention from the plight of excluded minorities. An alternative mechanism

could be that international rivalries exist exactly because of internal exclu-

sion as in irredentist conflicts. The size of the largest group does not seem to

influence the level of inclusion over time. This may be due to the fact that in

EPR, ethnicity is coded from a constructivist point of view, i.e., groups can

join or dissolve into subgroups. Indeed the mean of the size of the largest

group is slightly bigger than the sample average in 2004. More importantly,

the long-standing exclusion of large swaths of the population in Liberia and

South Africa had ended in 2004. Regarding the endogeneity of the electoral

system, PR rules are more often to be found in smaller and more economially

advanced countries. Colonial history now also proves to be a reliable predic-

tor of the presence or absence of PR systems. Against Lijphart’s prediction

26

that Belgian or Dutch colonies would inherit consociational institutions these

countries show a strong strain of authoritarianism.

The second hypothesis stated that conditional on the environments in

which electoral systems operate proportional systems should lead to higher

levels of inclusion than majoritarian systems. Running a naive regression

analysis without taking into account the endogeneity of electoral systems as

in table 5 on page 40 in the appendix would lead us to believe otherwise.

PR systems do not seem to have any effect on inclusion while majoritarian

and mixed systems are at least partially successful in increasing the level of

inclusion. Even in the cross-sectional analysis presented above, majoritarian

systems seem to at least be on par with proportional systems although a

direct comparison of effects is difficult if they come from two different equa-

tions.17 In table 2, conditional estimates of majoritarian and mixed models

are presented for the period from 1946 until 2000. While mixed electoral

rules show a similar positive effect on the degree of inclusion as do PR rules,

majoritarian electoral rules lose statistical significance. Although their sub-

stantial effect is still positive, the confidence intervals are too large to be

overlooked. Before drawing too sweeping conclusions one should be wary of

these estimates as the selection equations do not do a good job of predicting

mixed or majoritarian systems.18

17I tried to run a multivariate regression model in which both, majoritarian and PR sys-tems would be introduced as endogenous variables, however, the likelihood was intractablewith the amount of data I have at my disposal and the model did not converge.

18The addition of other control variables in table 6 on page 41 seems to support thereached conclusions but changing the dependent variable to the number of included groupsor using a different operationalization of electoral systems as in table 7 weakens the con-fidence in the results. The different operationalization of electoral systems by Gerringand Thacker (2008) also counts the de jure existence of electoral rules or put differently,authoritarian spells. Therefore, it is not too surprising that both PR and majoritarian

27

Table 2: TSCS CMP models of electoral systems

Variables Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Inclusion at Independence 0.736(0.066)***

0.680(0.067)***

0.685(0.064)***

0.683(0.067)***

PR 0.220(0.046)***

0.244(0.043)***

0.005(0.021)

0.012(0.029)

Mixed 0.042(0.024).

0.050(0.026).

0.293(0.071)**

0.079(0.036)*

Majoritarian 0.040(0.021).

0.041(0.022).

0.047(0.025).

0.165(0.284)

ELF -0.307(0.171).

-0.353(0.178)*

-0.396(0.176)*

Stage Age 0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

International Rivalry -0.034(0.019).

-0.044(0.021)*

-0.046(0.023)*

Largest Group -0.292(0.202)

-0.351(0.202).

-0.375(0.198).

Civil War Historty -0.005(0.011)

-0.007(0.011)

-0.004(0.011)

Log(Population) 0.013(0.010)

0.005(0.009)

-0.002(0.018)

Log(GDP/capita) -0.015(0.015)

0.008(0.012)

0.001(0.025)

AIC 476.81 589.96 -1424.71 994.90

Electoral System PR PR Mix. Maj.

Civil War History -0.022(0.119)

0.028(0.104)

0.056(0.092)

-0.062(0.080)

Log(Population) -0.148(0.071)*

-0.169(0.081)*

-0.036(0.062)

0.275(0.125)*

Log(GDP/capita) 0.482(0.109)***

0.541(0.115)***

-0.040(0.104)

0.358(0.177)*

Hispanic Colony 0.482(0.201)*

0.442(0.190)*

-0.121(0.226)

-0.651(0.402)

British Col. -1.309(0.462)**

-1.193(0.433)**

-0.450(0.634)

0.372(0.639)

French Col. -1.726(0.610)**

-1.598(0.563)**

-1.008(0.607).

0.057(0.586)

Belgium or Dutch Col. -1.981(0.658)**

-2.000(0.591)***

N/A N/A

ρ -0.767(0.112)***

-0.796(0.091)***

-0.585(0.245).

-0.354(0.784)

N 5246 5001 5001 5001

Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1 ’ ’ 1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country

28

Why do majoritarian systems have such varying effects in a cross-sectional

analysis, in a naive regression and in a conditional TSCS regression? As men-

tioned above several African countries that do have majoritarian traditions

democratized in the early 1990s (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). At the

same time international activism by the international community led to peace

missions that introduced power sharing agreements in the wake of civil wars.

Both democratization and these power-sharing effects increased the level of

elite inclusion in Africa as can also be seen in figure 1 in the appendix. During

the Cold War period majoritarian regimes were rather sparse and often they

would exclude at least a small part of their population from de facto access

to executive power. The UK excluded the Northern Irish for longer peri-

ods of time, Australia even discriminated against the Aborigines, India while

more inclusive toward a vast variety of linguistically diverse groups, never-

theless excluded non-Hindu minorities and the US, the oldest democracy in

the world has struggled to incorporate much bigger segments of Blacks and

Hispanics.

6 Conclusion

Going back to the examples at the beginning of this paper, do electoral sys-

tems really make a difference? Is the PR system in Brazil responsible for

the faster inclusion of minorities? Is PR also responsible for the greater sta-

bility of ethnic elite cooperation in South Africa? The preceding analysis

electoral systems have a negative influence on inclusion since they are now conflated withauthoritarian regimes. However, this does not explain the catastrophic performance of PRsystems when tested in relation to the proportion of included groups.

29

provided some evidence that PR systems may be more successful at enabling

ethnic inclusion into the government executive. As Lijphart claimed over

forty years ago, majoritarian electoral systems have more difficulties incor-

porating minorities, simply because they do not even help minorities over

the first political hurdle, getting representation in parliament. This is not to

say that PR systems are really the inevitable causal factor leading to a grand

coalition but under the right circumstances they do increase the chances of

elite cooperation.

In this paper I have explicitly linked consociational institutions to conso-

ciational behavior and pointed to an important gap in the existing quantita-

tive literature that tries to link consociational institutions directly to conflict.

Yet, this is only a first go at the problem. Consociationalism is a complex

concept and the data we have do not allow us to measure it accurately.

Moreover, it seems to depend on multiple factors that cannot be influenced.

Historical patterns of elite cooperation have by far the strongest impact on

contemporary grand coalitions. Additionally, cultural distances, the struc-

ture of group relations or international dynamics all have an impact. Among

these powerful historical and socio-structural factors, the electoral system

is one of the few screws that “constitutional engineers” can turn. But we

should be careful to simply throw any electoral system at a society. Ex-

isting institutions are often interlinked with longstanding informal practices

and we should at least take into account how a new electoral system will

work given the existing social circumstances. While the presented analysis

lends some credence to the assertion that simple majoritarian systems are not

the best solution for ethnically divided societies if not coupled with explicit

30

power-sharing deals, the alternatives need to be analysed more carefully.

One important step forward is to further disaggregate electoral systems,

and possibly come up with an index of proportionality. The strong perfor-

mance of mixed electoral systems should be scrutinized more carefully and

the role of electoral quotas or party bans should be considered. Figuring out

how proportional or majoritarian, mixed systems were A second important

factor that needs to be taken into account is geography. Are ethnic groups

concentrated in a specific area or are they dispersed throughout a country?

Do they have ethnic kin in neighboring countries? And how does the geo-

graphic distribution of electoral systems influence their possible adoption in

other countries? On the methodological side, more carefully analyzing com-

parable cases after conflicts or in culturally homogeneous regions may help

us to disentangle the effect of electoral systems from the influence of political

leaders. Matching regression techniques may bring us closer to actual causal

pathways. As elite cooperation in a grand coalition is one of the strongest

determinants of peace in plural societies, investing the levers that enable elite

cooperation is a worthwhile undertaking.

31

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37

7 Appendix

Table 3: Summary of Variables

Variables N Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max.

Included Pop. 5860 .771 .9 .278 0 1

Included Pop.Year 1

5860 .772 .895 .282 0 1

Included Groups 5860 .501 .5 .289 0 1

Included GroupsYear 1

5860 .509 .5 .283 0 1

PR 5246 .176 0 .381 0 1

Mixed 5246 .0255 0 .158 0 1

Majoritarian 5246 .132 0 .338 0 1

ELF 5860 .495 .504 .27 .0238 1

Log Population 5488 9.3 9.2 1.42 5.78 14.1

Log GDP/capita 5488 8.07 8.03 1.06 5.79 11.1

Civil War History 5860 .519 0 1.39 0 13

Int. Rivalry 5860 .339 0 .473 0 1

State Age 5860 80.4 59 62 0 189

Largest Group 5860 .638 .649 .239 .16 .988

38

Tab

le4:

Corr

ela

tion

matr

ixof

main

vari

ab

les

Incl

.P

op.

Incl

.G

rps.

Gol

der

ES

CW

His

t.E

LF

Pop

.G

DP

Riv

alry

Max.

Grp

.S

tate

Age

Incl

.P

op.

1.00

Incl

.G

rps.

0.52

***

1.00

Gold

erE

S0.

22***

0.06

***

1.00

CW

His

t.-0

.11*

**

-0.2

2***

-0.1

1***

1.00

EL

F-0

.41*

**

0.03

*-0

.29*

**0.

21**

*1.

00

Pop

.0.

06***

-0.3

3***

0.0

00.

40**

*0.

011.

00

GD

P0.

27***

0.00

0.47

***

-0.2

0***

-0.3

3***

0.03

*1.

00

Riv

alry

-0.0

1-0

.12*

**

0.0

10.

19**

*0.

05**

*0.

25**

*-0

.03*

1.00

L.

Gro

up

0.34

***

-0.1

2***

0.2

6***

-0.1

8***

-0.9

5***

0.02

0.35*

**-0

.04**

1.0

0

Sta

teA

ge0.

10***

-0.2

1***

0.3

3***

0.08

***

-0.3

2***

0.36

***

0.35*

**0.1

7**

*0.

32*

**1.

00

39

Table 5: Naive ML Regressions

Models Tobit Logit w/ FE

Variables Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Incl.Grps.

Incl.Pop.

Incl.Grps.

Inclusion Year 1 0.808(0.067)***

0.785(0.075)***

0.926(0.065)***

109.655(10.358)***

36.881(2.583)***

PR 0.044(0.032)

0.013(0.029)

0.002(0.027)

0.150(0.139)

0.149(0.103)

Mixed 0.075(0.031)*

0.013(0.029)*

0.041(0.071)

0.799(0.340)*

0.206(0.372)

Major. 0.050(0.030).

0.050(0.031)

0.025(0.028)

0.375(0.232)

0.125(0.171)

ELF -0.357(0.195).

-0.201(0.158)

1.503(2.465)

-2.851(0.990)**

State Age 0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

0.013(0.010)

-0.001(0.008)

Int. Rivalry -0.057(0.024)*

-0.043(0.021)*

-0.044(0.104)

-0.003(0.068)

Largest Group -0.396(0.221).

-0.318(0.184).

-2.078(2.312)

-3.804(0.882)***

Civil War History -0.007(0.012)

-0.011(0.009)

0.050(0.093)

0.016(0.050)

Log(Pop.) -0.006(0.010)

-0.019(0.009)*

-0.746(0.403)

-0.177(0.308)

Log(GDP) 0.003(0.016)

-0.010(0.014)

0.095(0.237)

0.074(0.173)

AIC 725.37 668.49 -245.71 2668.09 3738.43

N 5246 5001 5001 5001 5001

Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country

40

Table 6: Additional Control VariablesVariables Incl.

Pop.Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Incl.Groups

Inclusion at Independence 0.659(0.063)***

0.629(0.071)***

0.623(0.076)***

0.778(0.049)***

PR 0.213(0.036)***

-0.030(0.026)

-0.047(0.030)

-0.184(0.053)**

Mixed -0.009(0.024)

-0.298(0.074)

-0.005(0.029)

0.020(0.052)

Majoritarian -0.009(0.026)

-0.016(0.030)***

-0.250(0.079)**

0.004(0.029)

ELF -0.404(0.158)**

-0.307(0.171).

-0.494(0.168)

-0.294(0.144)*

International Rivalry -0.014(0.014)

-0.014(0.015)

-0.013(0.015)

-0.028(0.016).

Largest Group -0.422(0.186)*

-0.524(0.193) **

-0.525(0.184)**

-0.391(0.165)*

Civil War Historty -0.009(0.010)

-0.007(0.009)

-0.007(0.008)

-0.010(0.007)

Log(Population) 0.003(0.009)

-0.002(0.009)

0.011(0.010)

-0.020(0.009)*

Log(GDP/capita) -0.006(0.017)

0.026(0.015)

0.040(0.017)*

0.025(0.017)

Democracy 0.072(0.033)*

0.069(0.036).

0.077(0.037)*

0.023(0.028)

Eastern Europe 0.072(0.025)**

0.034(0.024)

0.023(0.027)

-0.012(0.035)

Latin America -0.025(0.030)

-0.012(0.028)

-0.029(0.034)

0.020(0.039)

SSA 0.010(0.054)

-0.037(0.054)

-0.027(0.052)

0.010(0.053)

Asia 0.112(0.040)**

0.076(0.038)*

0.069(0.042)

0.009(0.043)

Middle East -0.035(0.052)

-0.084(0.052)

-0.080(0.051)

-0.039(0.039)

AIC 296.43 -1502.8 639.73 -467.21

Electoral System PR Mix. Maj. PR

Log(Population) -0.135(0.070).

0.015(0.079)

0.220(0.095)*

-0.175(0.085)*

Log(GDP/capita) 0.575(0.108)***

0.429(0.168)**

0.372(0.110)**

0.650(0.124)***

Hispanic Colony 0.650(0.224)**

-0.070(0.294)

-0.451(0.367)

0.744(0.235)**

British Col. -0.996(0.395)*

-0.787(0.723)

0.350(0.301)

-1.350(0.475)**

French Col. -1.401(0.578)*

-1.265(0.498)*

-0.096(0.290)

-1.163(0.635).

Belgium or Dutch Col. -1.690(0.611)**

N/A N/A -0.223(0.350)

ρ -0.802(0.079)***

0.753(0.130)***

0.671(0.148)***

0.634(0.145)**

N 5001 5001 5001 5001

Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered by country

41

Table 7: CMP model - Gerring & Thacker electoral systems

Variables Incl.Pop.

Incl.Pop.

Inclusion Year 1 0.635(0.071)***

0.652(0.070)***

PR 0.004(0.028)

-0.208(0.067)**

Mixed 0.010(0.034)

0.043(0.036)

Major. -0.243(0.050)***

0.034(0.023)

ELF -0.427(0.179)*

-0.475(0.199)*

Stage Age 0.000(0.000)

0.000(0.000)

Rivalry -0.025(0.017)

-0.037(0.018)*

Max. Group -0.419(0.206)*

-0.433(0.227).

War Hist. -0.010(0.011)

-0.001(0.011)

Log(Pop.) 0.022(0.012).

-0.003(0.010)

Log(GDP) 0.040(0.017)*

0.031(0.016).

AIC 2802.66 1505.36

Electoral System Maj. PR

War Hist. -0.084(0.064)

-0.072(0.098)

Log(Pop.) 0.177(0.071)*

-0.146(0.098)

Log(GDP) 0.350(0.093)***

0.397(0.112)***

Hisp. Col. 0.067(0.190)

0.643(0.240)**

Brit. Col. 0.678(0.236)**

-1.132(0.420)**

Fren. Col. 0.148(0.214)

-0.472(0.331)

BeNe. Col -0.819(0.519)

0.845(0.392)*

ρ -0.802(0.079)***

0.753(0.130)***

N 5244 5244

Signif. codes: 0 ’***’ 0.001 ’**’ 0.01 ’*’ 0.05 ’.’0.1;Standard Errors in Parentheses; Errors clustered bycountry

42

Fig

ure

1:E

thnic

Incl

usi

on

by

Worl

dR

egio

n

43