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The Political Economy of RepressionGinger Albertson

Introduction

The Authoritarian Model

For some time the common argument in favor of the use of repression for stability

and economic growth used China’s growth model as an exemplary paradigm for growth

—an ideal. The model is based on the idea that an authoritarian regime, using repression,

controls the spending/saving habits of its citizens; limits or outlaws unions or guilds

(thereby limiting wage costs and increasing profits); and provides political stability.1

The

outcome of these controls, then, is remarkable growth allegedly improving the lives of

all. Rowan Callick describes the China Model as follows:

It has two components. The first is to copy successful elements of liberal

economic policy by opening up much of the economy to foreign and domestic

investment, allowing labor flexibility, keeping the tax and regulatory burden low,

and creating a first-class infrastructure through a combination of private sector

and state spending. The second part is to permit the ruling party to retain a firm

grip on government, the courts, the army, the internal security apparatus, and the

free flow of information. A shorthand way to describe the model is: economic

freedom plus political repression. 2

This is the same description of the model of authoritarian regimes implementing

structural adjustment programs in the 1980’s and 90’s. Those programs failed in their

purpose—states implementing the programs did not achieve sustained economic growth

1 While Henderson did not discuss the China Model, he did outline how and why states might use controlsto increase economic growth and control resource allocation. Conway W. Henderson, “ConditionsAffecting the Use of Political Repression.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35 No. , pp. 120-142(March 1991).2 Rowan Callick, “The China Model.” The American , November/December 2007,http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/the-china-model .

http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/the-china-model




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and the levels of poverty, supposedly to improve eventually with SAPs, deepened. 3 Asa

Laurell writes that SAPs in Latin America caused deeper poverty because the rapid

application of economic austerity did not provide for a reasonable transitional period,

resulting in destruction of industrial and agricultural enterprises and jobs. Laurell, and

Kawewe and Dime argue that SAPs were the cause of higher unemployment rates, which

destabilized growth due to reduction in consumption and deepened poverty.

What many proponents of the China model seem to miss is that China maintained

(and continues to maintain) firm control over both the depth and speed to which it

privatizes state industry and opened its markets to foreign investment and imports. Also,China did not receive any funds from the World Bank or IMF and therefore was not

under the same pressures as states who received structural adjustment loans. It could be

argued that China’s economic success has more to do with the strategies employed to

open its economy rather than those used to maintain social and political control over its

citizens, though clearly these components worked in tandem. Authoritarian regimes

dominated by fiscal responsibilities to the World Bank and IMF did not have the luxury

to control the speed and depth of their market reforms, and may be why on average many

countries who went through structural adjustment programs experienced little change in

economic growth. 4

3 Asa Laurell writes that SAPs in Latin America caused deeper poverty because the rapid application of

economic austerity did not provide for a reasonable transitional period, resulting in destruction of industrialand agricultural enterprises and jobs. Laurell, and Kawewe and Dime argue that SAPs were the cause of higher unemployment rates, which destabilized growth due to reduction in consumption and deepened

poverty (Asa Christina Laurell, “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in LatinAmerica.” International Sociology International 2000, Vol. 15 Issue 306; Saliwe M. Kawewe and RobertDime, “The Impact of Economic Structural Adjustment Programs on Women and Children: Implicationsfor Social Welfare in Zimbabwe.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare , Vol. 27 Issue 4 (Dec2000).)4 Change in growth hovered between 1% and 2% post structural adjustment implementation according todata found in USDA Real Historical GDP and Growth Rates of GDP for Baseline Countries or Regions1969-2007 .



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State Violence and Its Consequences

After reading several articles and books about why impoverished countries could

not break out of their cycle of political violence and poverty, I became curious about the

relationship between the two. My interest in repression began when I read about the

destruction of civil society in Haiti after the 1991 coup against democratically elected

Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide. The junta, led by Raoul Cedras, used FRAPH, a

CIA-trained military arm, to systematically murder, torture and rape members of trade

unions, religious groups, farm collectives and all other groups that were perceived to

threaten the hegemony of the ruling junta.5

During this time, Haiti was under an embargointended to put pressure on the insurgent government to relinquish power. The embargo

was notoriously porous—Texaco and other companies openly violated it with tacit

support from their governments .6 But, even though the embargo wasn’t being enforced

and transnational companies could still conduct business with the junta and the business

elites, the existing Haitian economy collapsed. Why?

Later, while writing a case study examining US foreign policy in El Salvador

during the early to mid-1980’s I discovered a similar pattern. The US was actively,

though covertly, supporting a repressive regime that became wealthy while the country’s

economy stagnated and then failed. At this point, I became aware of a pattern of political

instability, repression and stagnant or negative growth and this discovery informs my

study on the relationship between repression and growth. As there is little literature

exploring this relationship, I realized neoliberal structural adjustment programs (SAPs),

5 AWHRW 1993. Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti . Human Rights Watch, NewYork (1993).6 US documents from 1993 state that there were over 26 shipments of petroleum to Haiti in 1992 and thatTexaco affiliates made payments of millions of dollars to the ruling junta of Haiti. Neither Bush nor theClinton prosecuted Texaco for breaching the embargo. Further information on this can be found in TheUses of Haiti by Paul Farmer, Common Courage Press: Monroe, ME, 2006.



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supported by means of structural adjustment loans (SALs), would be a good tool to create

temporal and spatial boundaries, thus limiting the study to a more manageable group of

countries within a particular time period.

Within these boundaries, I argue that states using repression on their population

hindered economic development and growth. To begin with, the World Bank

restructuring loans from 1980 through 1992 required borrowing countries to quickly

move from state-centered welfare states to decentralized, deregulated monetarist states, in

which government spending is strictly limited. 7 This led to high unemployment coupled

with reduced infrastructure spending, limiting the public’s resources and access tonecessities of life. Various social, political and labor organizations responded by resisting

the changes and this led to state repression. 8 Thus begins a cycle of political instability.

Instability hampers production, whether agricultural, extractive, or manufacturing.

Without stability and security, production cannot continue apace with demand. And

reduction in GDP negatively impacts economic growth.

Christian Davenport contends that repression is an unreliable tool for social

control and that it actually breeds further and stronger opposition .9 But only rarely during

the time period in question were populations persuaded, not coerced, to allow for SAPs to

work. 10 In this analysis, the majority of states receiving SALs during the 1980s and 1990s

7 This was the case whether structural adjustment programs were initiated first by the state and supported

financially by World Bank or whether these programs were required as part of a conditional loan.8 This model is supported in their various papers by Hristov, Kawewe and Dime, and Abouharb andCingranelli. Jasmin Hristov, “Freedom and Democracy or Hunger and Terror: Neoliberalism andMilitarization in Latin America.” Social Justice , Vol. 2 Issue 2, pp. 89-114 (2005). M. Rodwan Abouharband David Cingranelli, “Money Talks? The Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending onHuman Rights, 1981-2000.” American Political Science Association , Conference: Annual AmericanPolitical Science Association, 2003. Kawewe and Dime 2000.9 Christian Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order.” Annual Review of Political Science , Vol. 10

pp. 1-23 (2007).10 Abougarb and Cingranelli 2003.



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used medium to high levels of violent repression during the implementation of structural

adjustment programs. This demonstrates that most of the time violent repression was

used to coerce people to submit to structural adjustment whether or not they directly

benefitted from it.

So, if repression doesn’t work why do states use it? What role do exogenous

pressures play—i.e. from other states, intergovernmental organizations (like the World

Bank and IMF), private lenders, and multi-national corporations? When it comes to

economic performance or economic policy changes to stimulate growth, is there a

correlation between growth and repression? If so, what are the outcomes economicallyand politically? If growth is experienced in countries that employ repression, what type of

growth is it? Short-, medium-, or long-term? Is the type of growth related to the type of

repression? Are there consistent results? These are the questions this study will attempt to

address.

To help answer these questions, I will employ literature on economic growth,

repression, neoliberal policy and those relating to the relationship between economic

growth and political practices. These explain what repression is, its various types and

levels, and the different repressive strategies governments use to attain different goals.

This paper will also include studies on the relationship between stability, repression and

growth.

First though, I will provide a brief history of neoliberal policy implementation

using structural adjustment loans (SALs) provided by the World Bank and an

introduction to neoliberal theory. Next, I will provide a brief conceptual structure for my

argument, followed by study objectives and the theoretical structure I plan to use. Then, I



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will expound on the methodology that will be used to choose case studies. This will be

followed problems not explained in the hypothesis.

Background:

During the Great Depression of the 1930’s, economist John Maynard Keynes

proposed economic policies which called for state intervention to control the market and

provided welfare services for those hardest hit. These were implemented in the United

States in 1933 by President Roosevelt through the New Deal. After World War II, the

United States used these same policies to rebuild the devastated European nations andthis caused the market to flourish throughout the 1950’s and early 1960’s. But by the late

1960’s international growth slowed and by the early 1970’s many countries were

experiencing financial crisis. During this time Friedrich von Hayek, a political

philosopher, and Milton S. Friedman, an economist, developed the ground work for

neoliberal political and economic theory, for which each won the Nobel Prize .11

David Harvey writes that the first experiment of neoliberal policy implementation

took place in Chile after General Augusto Pinochet took power in 1973. In order to free

the labor market from “regulatory or institutional restraints (for example, trade union

power),” Pinochet dismantled and violently suppressed social movements, political

organizations, and all forms of popular organization. This gave his government the

freedom to privatize natural resource exploitation and public assets, and by freeing

market lines, facilitated foreign direct investment and free trade. Foreign companies were

11 The bulk of the information regarding the history of neoliberalism was taken from writings by DavidHarvey, a preeminent anthro-geologist at the City University of New York Graduate Center. In particular, Iused A Brief History of Neoliberalism and “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction”. David Harvey: A Brief

History of Neoliberalism . Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005). Also interesting is “Neoliberalism asCreative Destruction.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 610 no.1, pp. 21-44 (2007). This is an updated version of the same title published in 2006.



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also guaranteed the right to repatriate their profits and export-led growth replaced import

substitution industrialization (ISI). 12 Increased growth rates, capital accumulation, and

returns on foreign investment in Chile seemed to show neoliberal policies were a success.

This led to the modeling of “more open neoliberal policies both in Britain (under

Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan).” 13

Reagan followed the Chilean model of deregulating “everything from airlines and

telecommunications, to finance,” which opened new free-market zones. Tax breaks and

incentives moved corporations away from unionized zones in the US (primarily in the

Northeast) and encouraged them to look for investments opportunities in non-unionizedunregulated zones (both in the Southern US and abroad). As a result of the migration of

corporations that represented investment opportunities, private US financial institutions

decided to invest in the governments of developing nations because “governments can’t

move or disappear.” But, loans to these governments were in US dollars and any rise in

interest rates could push these countries into default, something that first happened in

Mexico.

Opening markets through deregulation and undermining trade union power to free

the labor market was labeled the “Volcker shock”. One of the first casualties of the

Volcker shock was Mexico. In 1982 it defaulted on loans to private US banking

institutions and in order to protect these banks from serious losses, the Reagan

12 Import substitution industrialization is an industrialization program that protected local industries in their infant stages by imposing protective tariffs, import quotas, exchange rate controls, special preferentiallicensing for capital goods imports, subsidized loans to local infant industries. This was supposed to havethe affect of allowing for the new industries to have a chance to grow and become established beforecompeting in the open market. The results were positive for some countries and negative for others so itwas considered a failed policy by lending institutions and for many countries, neoliberal economic policyreplaced it. For more information: http://www.uap.vt.edu/classes/uap4764/session7.htm . 13 David Harvey, “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction.” Geography Annual, Vo. 88 B (2): 145-158(2006)

http://www.uap.vt.edu/classes/uap4764/session7.htm





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Administration joined the US Treasury to the IMF in order to roll over the debt. But, in

return for continued US support, both the IMF and the World Bank were required by

donor countries (specifically the United States) to implement neoliberal reforms in their

lending policies. “In return for debt rescheduling, indebted countries were required to

implement institutional reforms, such as cuts in welfare expenditures, more flexible labor

market laws, and privatization,” and this was the origin of structural adjustment programs

(SAPs).

Neoliberal Theory Neoliberalism theory “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by

the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework

characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade”. 14

It sets forth political-economic principles that ostensibly increase economic growth by

decreasing government controls on a state’s economy. And it concludes that governments

operate the economy inefficiently and only a free-market economy, one without

government intervention, can operate at maximum efficiency, thereby maximizing

growth.

Neoliberal theory asserts that a free-market naturally balances out wages and

prices, eventually regulating trade, stimulating growth and decreasing poverty. To attain a

free-market economy, the central government, which regulates and controls certain

industries, and imports and exports, must move to deregulate and privatize these

industries, as well as lower trade barriers. These were classic Adam Smith policies to

14 David Harvey. “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction.” Geography Annual, Vo. 88 B (2): 145-158(2006).



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liberalize the state’s markets, freeing capital to invest in the state’s comparative

advantage. To operate the government at maximum economic efficiency, the state must

decrease spending by cutting services and reducing its bureaucracy, which decentralizes

its power structure and places these responsibilities in local government structures. This

type of program was termed “structural adjustment” and was implemented globally, to

one degree or another, during the 1980’s and 1990’s.

Counter argument to neoliberal reforms

Jasmin Hristov criticizes neoliberalism for worsening social conditions “byturning human rights into a commodity” in her article “Freedom and Democracy or

Hunger and Terror.” 15 Hristov argues that to implement neoliberal plans, states have to

militarize to suppress opposition from the majority poor of the population. She defines

neoliberal reforms as policies that “reduce the role of the state in national development,

erode the social welfare of the poor, and deny their economic, social, and cultural rights”

(p. 90). These policies are intended to give primacy to the market and reduce state

intervention unless it favors business. It includes removing trade barriers, privatization of

public enterprises, deregulation of labor and finance.

In most countries receiving structural adjustment loans during the 1980’s and

90’s, economic policies, termed structural adjustment programs (SAPs), were

implemented due to conditionalities on loans taken to service external debts. These loans

originated primarily with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). 16

15 Jasmin Hristov, “Freedom and Democracy or Hunger and Terror: Neoliberalism and Militarization inLatin America.” Social Justice , Vol. 2 Issue 2, pp. 89-114 (2005).16 In some instances, the World Bank and private institutions co-financed loans to countries. Information onthis can be found in the 1980 World Bank Annual Report, pp. 69-71.



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Hristov specifically reviews the neoliberal agendas, and methods used to carry them out,

in Columbia, Ecuador, and Mexico.

For example, in Colombia 17 the state systematically used terror tactics, including

massacres, to forcibly relocate entire populations in certain regions in Colombia in order

to increase access to natural resources. Internally, 1,029 people are displaced daily “in

areas of untapped oil and gas reserves”. While there are peaceful movements in

Colombia, its largest guerilla movement FARC formed in the 1960s as a defense of the

rural poor against state repression. Even today the tension between the state and FARC

continues to destabilize the country. Instability created by long-term armed conflictresulting from repressive state actions, caused the deep poverty Colombia is currently

experiencing.

Later on, Hristov argues that Latin America’s “transition to democracy” actually

increased violence, the role of the military, the police and various paramilitary forces.

This she says is because “the essential function of the neoliberal nation-state of providing

social order and stability is thus increasingly performed through direct coercion and the

expansion of law-and-order policies that seek to manage the neoliberal crisis through

increased militarization and criminalization of the population.” In order to push through

neoliberal agendas, the state must militarize and criminalize activities which it perceives

will interfere with the “transition to democracy”. They criminalize activities by labeling

them terrorist.

What is curious here is that neoliberal reforms, essentially economic reforms, are

equated to a transition to democracy, which is a political reform. It is not unusual to see a17 Here Columbia is used to describe certain outcomes of neoliberal reforms while realizing these reformsdid not take place within the bounds of SALs. It is interesting to note that the tactics used by Columbiangovernments correlates to the authoritarian model of the distribution of limited state resources described byConway Henderson, which is more thoroughly discussed in the Repression Theory section of this study.



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comparison drawn between “free market capitalism” and democracy but the irony lies in

the fact that many states used fairly high levels of violent repression while implementing

structural adjustment programs. Too, there is the question of whether this is a true

transition to democracy, which actually limits state power in order to increase the number

of tools available for democratic participation in governance. Not only does repression of

any sort violate the tenets of democracy but it also ends up hurting free market

capitalism. State repression actually contributes to destabilization. As we will see later,

this causes a reduction of capital gains.

SAPs failed not just because they concentrated wealth in the hands of traditionalelites, increasing poverty while at the same time removing social services, but also

because of how they were implemented. Governments rapidly executing neoliberal

programs inevitably encountered resistance from the population, due to increasing

income disparities and reduced services, and used various strategies of repression to

suppress it .18 Politically, neoliberal structural adjustment projects destroyed the freedoms

and democratic inclusion promised by proponents of neoliberal ideals, reducing popular

support for governments implementing them. Economically, I will argue, it hindered

economic growth because the combination of inequitable economic restructuring

followed by repression led to economic failures. How? Conceivably this occurred

through political instability.

Theoretical Structure:

Various forms of repression have been used as a tool for social control throughout

history. The goal of this paper is to analyze the relationship between repression and

18 See Hristov, Laurell, Kawewe and Dime, and Abougarb and Cingranelli.



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economic growth, wherein social control is needed to push through unpopular

institutional changes for the purposes of stimulating economic growth.

To counter economic crisis or stimulate economic growth, developing countries

have in the past implemented SAPs as part of loan agreements with both the World Bank

and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Economic restructuring was based on

neoliberal policies to open markets through lowering trade barriers, privatizing state

industry, and reducing and decentralizing governance. In response to initial opposition to

the implementation of these reforms, states used repressive measures to push through

economic agendas.19

While the SAPs were purported to fail due to the state’s lack of readiness for a

free market, I will examine whether the use of repression created political instability,

leading to lower, stalled or negative economic growth. To better understand this, I will

consider discourse in three areas: types of repression used for social control; literature

surveying the outcomes of neo-liberal policies and the factors contributing to those

results; and findings on the relationship between repression and economic growth. To

clarify what I mean by repression, I will explore literature that defines different forms of

repression and why governments might use it. For the outcomes of neoliberal policies, I

compare literatures that evaluate the end results of neoliberalism as promoted through

structural adjustment tactics that took place in different countries. Finally, in support of

the claim that repressive measures used to force through neoliberal designs retarded

economic growth, I will employ literature to show that transnational corporations are less

19 This is an argument favored by Harvey, Farmer and Hristov in their writings and which I will later betesting as it conforms to my hypothesis. I will test it by checking the change in repression between fiveyears prior and five years post SALs agreements.



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likely to benefit from authoritarian regimes because repression has a negative relationship

with economic development and growth through capital formation.

Repression theory

Christian Davenport states that repression consists of “the actual or threatened use

of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial

jurisdiction of the state for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as

deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging government

personnel, practices or institutions.”20

It compels certain type of behavior and, in the caseof violent state repression, personal integrity rights to survival and security are threatened

in order for the state to retain power. Davenport outlines two schools of thought: hard

structuralism 21 and soft rationalism. This paper will focus on the latter as Davenport

states that repression theory has evolved toward soft rationalism.

Soft rationalism analysis looks to the decision makers and how they make their

decisions. Using a cost/benefit analysis, decision makers deliberate on whether one set of

actions is more beneficial than alternatives. Davenport says that this theoretical model

developed two core findings: The Law of Coercive Responsiveness, and The Domestic

Democratic Peace. 22 For the purposes of this study, I focus on the former. In this finding

Davenport states that repression is consistently influenced by political conflict. When

20 Christian Davenport. “State Repression and Political Order.” Annual Review of Political Science , Vol. 10

pp. 1-23 (2007).21 This theory sees state repression as a pathology due to a system deficiency. It is direct cause and effect,and therefore less nuanced than soft rationalism because it doesn’t look at how state leaders decide oncertain strategies of repression.22 This theory explains the role of repression in democratic societies. It states that democracies provide analternative method of control, participation and contestation, and that democratic values (passivity,toleration, communication and deliberation) are undermined by repression so it is not a viable tool for control. Also, democratic institutions increase the cost of repression—one can be voted out of office. Asthis paper is focusing on violent repression, it will look at coercion rather than democratic resolution andtherefore this theory is not relevant to this discussion except as a comparison to coercion.



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“challenges to the status quo take place, authorities generally employ some form of

repressive action to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat.”

Here Davenport makes an interesting discovery. If the causal arrow is reversed

and the effect of repression on dissent is measured, the results are inconsistent.

Sometimes it is effective and sometimes not. This, he says, is one of the core aspects of

“collective action theory regarding the importance of costs” (p. 8). It cannot be

conclusively stated that repression will have the desired effect of gaining or retaining

power and control over a society, therefore the cost/benefit analysis of decision makers is

fallible. He goes on to say that there is no way of discerning how authorities perceivethreats and how they are influenced by the masses or elites attitudes. Knowing this, why

is it authorities chose to continue with repressive measures?

In “Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive

Policy, Vince Boudreau identifies various methods of repression as having short and long

term goals .23 In the short term, repression is used in response to immediate threats against

power. The State sets out over the long term to stabilize its power, “deepening state

influence…to establish more extensive social control, expanding the state’s reach where

it has been overly short.” This way the State can either extend its reach of power to the

territorial borders or deepen existing power which encompasses the territory.

Boudreau also asserts that how a state perceives a social challenge depends upon

the state’s power resources and the relationship of the challenger to the state’s program of

domination. In other words, their threat level will be evaluated by the extent to which

“their power resources undermine state actors.” Political power in this regard is in how

23 “Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy.” Repression and Mobilization (Social Movements, Protest and Contention) , ed. Christian Davenport. University of Minnesota Press, 2005.



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deeply the state controls social relations. It is not the threat to public order that make a

social organization a threat, but the challenge to state control. This may not mean

challenge through direct action but more a perceived threat “based on what activists are

believe or want.” He also discusses “match-up” problems. In other words, the state may

be weak in certain areas where the opposition is strong (i.e. rural community rule to rural

community political organization—as was the case with Haiti). This relationship could

define a state’s repressive strategies, wherein one group is systematically terrorized and

another, seemingly stronger group ignored. Boudreau summarizes his article by asking

that state repression be understood in terms of the logic its strategic use of coercion rather than the magnitude of violence.

Jennifer Earl writes a comprehensive analysis of types of repressions, the actors

using it, and against whom, why and to what degree .24 To begin with, she says that the

common definition for repression is insufficient and quotes Charles Tilly’s definition,

which states that repression is “any action by one group which raises the contender’s cost

of collective action” (p. 46). Then she provides the three key dimensions of repression:

the repressive agent, the character of the repressive action, and whether or not the action

is observable.

The repressive agent is differentiated into three groups: state agents tightly

connected with national political elites; those loosely connected with national political

elites; and private agents (counter-demonstrators, counter-movement participants). Earl

points out that she deliberately qualifies the connection to “national political elites”

because the relationship of local, more autonomous governing bodies directly affects the

24 Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression.” Sociological Theory , Vol. 21 No. 1, pp 44-68 (March 2003).



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ability of national elites to “actualize their will” since they rely on these local bodies for

enforcement. With private actors, direct control cannot be established and therefore will

be excluded from this study of state repression.

Earl characterizes two models of repression: coercion and channeling. Coercion

through force “involves shows and/or use of force and other forms of standard police and

military action (e.g. intimidation and direct violence).” Channeling is “indirect

repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest available, the timing of protests,

and/or flows of resources to movements.” Both are used to place limits on public

opposition to national elite decision-making. Lastly, covert and overt acts of coerciverepression are distinguished, with the caveat that these were coarse distinctions used to

simplify the discussion. These types of acts embody the strategies of repression used to

stop or limit a movement.

With these descriptions, Earl creates a typology of repression, providing a sample

of each. For example, murders, disappearances, and political arrests fall under the

category of state actors tightly connected with national political elites using observable

coercive measures—e.g. Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. She further evaluates the level

of threat a state perceives a movement and political situation will be to its goals and how

it responds. Here she states that there is a positive correlation between political

opportunity and repression “when examining repressive state agents tightly linked to

national political elites…especially in the case of observable, coercive repression.” This

typology is useful for this discussion as it provides detailed evaluation of approaches

used to attain/retain social control.



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Davenport supplies a more general description of what repression is and explains

that it is used to retain state control when hegemony is threatened. He goes on to say that

theorists believe that states use cost/benefit analysis to determine the best course of action

and that even when the outcome is inconsistent, states still continue to rely on repression.

He mentions that pressure from the masses or elites cannot be proven to determine state

behavior, which again begs the question of why in the face of uncertainty states use

coercion. Curiously, Davenport does not address the possibility that exogenous pressures

to achieve stability for economic reasons play a role in this seemingly irrational behavior.

Boudreau argues that repression is a strategic tool used to quell certain groupswhile leaving others unmolested. This, he says, is the result of a combination of factors.

In the short term, states see an immediate threat, either through action or perceived future

action. And, in the long term the state pushes for deeper and wider control over society

using different methods of compulsion. It is the level of state power, and the strength of

the challenge, that determines how and when force is applied. These measures are

advantageous when evaluating cases in which apparent random, or widespread and

lengthy, acts of state violence is used.

While it is important to understand the structure of repressive strategies in

endogenous terms, Boudreau also misses the point of exogenous pressures. He discusses

state strategies of repression from endogenous pressures—groups challenging the

authority or power of the state. But he doesn’t examine possible external influences on

both state and non-state actors. Repression and opposition power struggles do not occur

in a vacuum. It is important to understand the motivation of repression as what informs

the strategy outside the need to capture or retain power.



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The specific motivation of repression may be best understood as exerting social

and political control in order to control national resources. Conway Henderson suggests

that economic dissatisfaction becomes a political variable in that in a society with limited

resources, the government seeks “workable strategies to allocate scarce goods and to

further develop its economy.” 25 He says governments unable to cope with socioeconomic

problems resort to repression to stay in power and manage the scarce resources. “The

greater the scarcity, the greater the repression.” This shows a desire not just to retain

power and control but also to control allocations of resources for whatever purpose.

Earl gives a comprehensive model in which to study the actors, methods andreasoning behind state repression. She discusses the relationship between national

political elites and agencies that will act upon their needs. She explains two methods of

repression used: coercion and channeling and explains how each can be used overtly or

covertly to gain or hold political and social control. And she talks about different

literatures that relate to perceived threat levels and state response. At the end of the study

she provides ten hypotheses that bear further study. The models she set forth supplies

dimensions within which to understand various combinations of actors, methods and

reasoning in repressive acts, which is one step closer to examining the influence of

outside forces.

External Pressures: World Bank SALs and Repression

Abouharb and Cingranelli discuss how and why World Bank structural

adjustment loans (SALs) affect human rights conditions. 26 They say that “austerity

25 Conway W. Henderson, “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression.” The Journal of ConflictResolution, Vol. 35 No. , pp. 120-142 (March 1991).26 Abouharb and Cingranelli 2003.



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measures required by the implementation of structural adjustment conditions lead to

worse human rights practices.” This is because structural adjustment conditionalities

require that decision-makers implement policies that cause hardships, and these hardships

cause often protest (at times violent) and governments respond with repression. In

developing countries the majority of the population is usually poor and the most reliant

on government services, and it is they who are hit the hardest by the measures and the

most likely to elicit physical integrity abuses (such as torture, disappearance, political

imprisonment or state-sanctioned murder). In their empirical analysis, they note that in

many cases human rights improved the year in which the SALs were received but in thetwo years following receipt of the loan violent repression 27 increased significantly. These

findings support the theoretical model that SALs bring unrest, and states use repression as

a means to regain or retain social and political control. 28

Economic evaluations

In “Macroeconomic Conditions and Political Instability,” Mark Gasiorowski

writes that political instability scares potential investors and leads state officials to

increase public spending, reduce interest rates, and take other measures that might reduce

instability. 29 Empirical evidence shows that this causes inflation to increase and growth

rates to decline. Through his causal model, Gasiorowski proves that there is a strong

27 This is characterized by physical integrity measures, which include torture, disappearance, state-sanctioned murder and political imprisonment.28 Comparisons within my data showed that there was very little variation in repression between 5yrs prior and 5yrs post SALs. The Abouharb and Cingranelli data field was for 161 countries while mine covered 65countries (all found in World Bank annual reports only—none from IMF). It is also interesting to note thatgrowth rates during the 1980’s and 90’s varied between 1% and 2%, not a great deal considering the SAPswere supposed to stimulate greater growth.29 Mark Gasiorowski, “Macroeconomic Conditions and Political Instability: An Empirical Analysis.”Studies in Comparative International Development , Vol. 33 Issue 3, pp. 3-17 (Fall 1998).



20

correlative relationship between political unrest and macroeconomic conditions and

specifically that “[s]low economic growth seems to be associated with higher levels of

violent unrest.” He further states that though “the direction of causality is not clear,” his

study shows that political conditions, e.g. instability, have more of an effect on

macroeconomic conditions than the reverse. This is because instability “adversely affects

inflation, growth, and other macroeconomic trends…political instability scares investors”

and causes state leaders to reduce instability. But, it is important to note, political

instability is not greatly affected by “adverse economic conditions.” This demonstrates

that that the causal relationship is likely to originate with the political condition of a state.It follows that state efforts to implement economic policy—as opposed to economic

fluctuations—may well trigger instability.

Jakob de Haan and Clemens L. J. Siemann consider similar issues. Their study

compares the effect of both political instability and political repression. They found that

political instability affected Africa negatively while it had less impact in Latin American

or Asian countries. 30 When examining how political repression affects economic growth,

measured in terms of level of political freedoms and civil liberties, their findings seems

conflicted. They found “little support for the view that political repression negatively

affects economic growth” except in Latin America, but did say that capital formation is

negatively influenced by political repression and that IIR “is negatively related to

political freedom” in the total sample. While Gasiorowski used the effect of political

unrest on inflation, de Haan and Siermann used investment-income ratio (IIR) in their

30 Jakob de Haan and Clemens L.J. Siemann, “Political Instability, Freedom, and Economic Growth: SomeFurther Evidence.” Economic Development and Cultural Change , Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 339-350 (January1996).



21

model, which measures the change in return on investment rather than on price increases

and its effect on the value of currency. This may account for the conflicting findings.

These two studies, however, do provide indicators that there is a correlative relationship

between the two.

Connection

As stated above, the relationships between repression and growth are quite

tenuous at this point in the study. But we can understand repression as a strategic tool

used to retain political and social control, as explained by Henderson, Davenport,Boudreau, and Earl. When states use repression, we have seen outcomes are inconsistent

with intended results and can actually cause a backlash, leading to further repression and

instability, as found by Abouharb and Cingranelli.

As Gasiorowski, and de Haan ad Siermann have shown, political instability is

negatively correlated with economic growth. And so there is a relationship, admittedly

tenuous, between repression and growth. I contend that this is because pushing through

economic reforms has a detrimental effect on the quality of life for the majority of the

population and this causes strong opposition, which states have to repress. The

effectiveness of repressive measures is unstable, causing need for further repression,

leading to stronger resistance, and so on. Looking at this model, one can see a cycle that

leads to political instability, and in turn reduced FDI and capital flight. With further

investigation using methodological analysis and case studies this theory can be carefully

tested.



22

Theoretical limitations:

The biggest obstacle to my thesis is finding causality. The literature shows that

political instability negatively impacts growth, while growth does not appear to affect

stability. But the literature also shows there is little more than a tenuous relationship

between growth and repression. Moreover, there is very little literature exploring the

relationship between repression and political instability. At best the literatures’ concepts

can be linked to form the following simplistic model, which explains the relationship

between growth, instability and repression as follows:

state repression political instability negative growth

As stated earlier, implementation of economic policies that harmed the economic

well-being of the majority of the population caused opposition (or instability), resulting

in repression and in further instability. This instability had a negative impact on growth

because instability causes increased inflation and reduced FDI or capital flight.

Methodology:

The World Bank SAPs 31 frame the spatial and temporal boundaries for this study

so I am looking at the time period between 1980 and 1992 (SAPs became formal policy

in 1980) 32, in which economic restructuring took place in many developing countries in

the form of structural and sectoral adjustment programs. I use the following variables to

create and interpret scatter plot charts and test my hypothesis. They are: 1) level of

31 For this study I am concentrating on World Bank lending and not IMF lending. The reason for this isIMF lending is short term and addresses balance of payment problems on prior debts. IMF loans are not

project specific even though they may carry loan conditionalities as do World Bank SALs. The key is theyare short term loans and that they are meant to make payments on prior loans, not to generate deepinstitutional changes. Further information can be found at:http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm .32 World Bank Annual Report, 1980 (pp. 67-68).

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm



23

political freedom and civil liberties using Freedom House scores; 2) CIPRI PHYSINT

scores, which measures disappearances, torture, political imprisonment, and state-

sanctioned murder; 3) Political Terror Scores (PTS), which measures the same; and 4)

level of growth.

To accommodate the temporal boundary stated above, the measurements I am

using are for each country for each year over a 15yr time span, beginning with five years

prior to the first structural adjustment loan or credit, or the first sector adjustment loan or

credit, and proceeding with 5years post SAL and 6-10 years post. This study is intended

to locate relationships between the above factors.

Questions of Methodology

Why use World Bank structural adjustment lending?

In this study I use World Bank structural adjustment lending because it is well

documented and has clear temporal boundaries as well as spatial boundaries (i.e. the

contractual obligations to make institutional changes within a country’s borders,

specifically in areas of trade and governance). Structural adjustment lending includes

structural and sector adjustment credits, and any loans in support of state-initiated

structural adjustment programs, as well as sector adjustment loans. While World Bank

structural adjustment lending provided funds to assist a country’s general development or

shift to free market programs or policies, sectoral adjustment lending focused on a

specific project within a specific sector, i.e. agriculture.

With regard to external pressures inducing repression, once the World Bank

extends credit or provides loans to support a state’s economic programs—whether its



24

debt restructuring or structural adjustment programs—it has an economic stake in the

outcome of implementation. Because of this, it might leverage pressure using contractual

conditionalities thereby intensifying to what degree and how swiftly the state implements

its policy changes. Here we should note that World Bank loans were provided both to

countries that initiated SAPs on their own and those who accepted the loans for other

needs but had to accept adjustment conditionalities. What is important for this study is

not the state’s intentions upon receiving the loans, whether to implement state-driven

SAPs or reach general development goals, but the state’s reaction to conditionality

pressures. In other words, this is not a criticism of World Bank conditionalities on loans but a question of how state reactions to exogenous pressures and how this affects state

behavior and economic growth.

Why look at SAL over SAP?

Because with structural adjustment loan (SAL) conditionalities, the state cannot

rescind its decision to implement structural adjustment and it cannot alter the timeline to

which it agreed. It is contractually bound to the loan agreement. Also, SAPs that are state

initiated and controlled are less well documented. Whether or not other pressure is

brought to bear is not at issue because the effects of SAL agreements has a clear

relationship to the implementation of SAP within a certain timeline. This then affects the

urgency with which a government acts and may affect the methods it employs to meet the

agreed upon timeline to make institutional changes a fact.

Why World Bank SALs and not other types of lending?



25

World Bank SALs were chosen because as an IGO with many member countries,

it has been required to make stipulations public. Tracking demands of private lending

institutions is impossible as these institutions are not obligated to make their demands

public and in fact are encouraged to keep contracts private. Also, the World Bank has

more political clout, wielding pressure to fulfill combined interests of one, a few or all

Western nations and their agendas as opposed to the pressure that can be brought to bear

by a single lending institution or institutional group.

Why start from initial year of SAL? This provides a base year against which to test hypothesis of the relationship

between repression and growth. I aggregated the data in five year blocks to better handle

the volume of data I’ve accumulated. Five years prior to implementation of SAL is the

first block, five years post implementation the next, and finally 6-10 years post

implementation. For example if the SAL were approved for 1981, then measurements of

repression and growth would begin five years prior and proceed through ten years post.

These measurements would then be compared with each other to test the hypothesis.

What measurements are used?

Freedom and Repression Measurements

This paper uses three sources, Freedom House, CIRI, and the Political Terror

Scale, 33 to identify the level of state freedoms as well as measurements of its repressive

33 The data bases are as follows: Freedom House, “Comparative scores for all countries from 1973 to2006.” Freedom in the World, 2006. < http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 >. Cingranelli,David L. and David L. Richards (2008), The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual Version 2008.2.14. http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf . Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., (year of publication) Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. DateRetrieved, from the Political Terror Scale Web site: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ .

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15

http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf



http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/



http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/



26

practices. Freedom House is a not-for-profit organization that measures “freedom”

through an analysis of political freedoms (electoral process, political pluralism and

participation, and functioning of government) and civil liberties (freedom of expression

and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and individual rights).

Initially I began only with Freedom House scores. Then, as I compared Freedom

House with the two other data bases, CIRI and the Political Terror Scale, I realized that

the databases covered different aspects of repression and freedom. To be sure, I

compared data from the Freedom House scores and Political Terror Scale during the

same time periods and saw the fit between the variables was poor (R = 0.371).34

This toldme that Freedom House was looking at largely abstract models of freedom based on

limits to freedom by both state and non-state actors. “While the survey considers

restrictions on freedom imposed by governments, it does not measure government

performance per se. Rather, it measures the wider state of freedom in a country or

territory, reflecting both governmental and non-governmental constraints.” 35 The

measurement does not measure actual state practices.

As this study focuses on the effect of state repression (seen through actual

practices), I chose to use the Freedom House as a measure of institutional strength and

the resulting political stability. In other words, deviation from state policy in state

practices can relate a story of political stability and institutional strength. If a state has a

law criminalizing murder yet this law is completely disregarded and consistently broken

on a broad and regular basis without fear of sanction, the state’s institutions (legislative,

executive and judicial) are weak. This is especially true when the criminal activity is

34 R-squared measures the goodness of fit of a model with 1.0 showing a perfect fit.35 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=277






27

state-sanctioned. And, in if state institutions are weak, the social contract with the people

of the state is null and there is no guarantee of political stability. So, we can look at

Freedom House scores, which measure the limits to freedom in each state, as a measure

of the success of the rule of law that guarantees the free exercise of will within agreed

upon boundaries. 36

The CIRI database, created by Dr. David Cingranelli and Dr. David Richards of

Binghampton University, and The Political Terror Scale (PTS), created by Dr. Mark

Gibney and a group of human rights scholars and students, measure actual state practices

with regard to government human rights practices not human rights policies or overallhuman rights conditions, which may be affected by non-state actors .37 Both the

PHYSINT section 38 of the CIRI scores and Political Terror Scale measure violent state

repression in the form of state-sanctioned killing, torture, political imprisonment and

disappearances.

Both CIRI and PTS measure the same types of state practices and coders for both

use Amnesty International and US State Dept. reports as their source for measurements.

As I wish to avoid redundancy in comparisons, I chose to use the PTS scores primarily

and CIRI scores to fill in missing data from the PTS data. This is because PTS measures

cover a greater period of time, from 1976-2006 as opposed to 1981-2006 (CIRI), which

better serves the timelines of the SALs (1980-1992). To confirm that the two data bases

measurements could reasonably be used interchangeably, I put data from the same

36 A good resource to parse out the relationship between the rule of law and stability is Democracy and the Rule of Law by Adam Przeworski and Jose Maria Maravall, Cambridge University Press (2003), pp. 1-5.37 http://ciri.binghamton.edu/faq.asp#138 The PHYSINT section of the CIRI data base aggregates the scores of four separate sections of the CIRIdatabase: torture, disappearance, state-sanctioned killing and political imprisonment. This study is focusedon the effects of violent state repression and uses this section of the CIRI database as one of its dataresources.

http://ciri.binghamton.edu/faq.asp#1





28

timeline into a scatter chart and found the R = 0.883, a high level of correlation or

similarity.

Explanation of Scales

In the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” measurements, each country and

territory covered in the survey is assigned two numerical ratings-- one for political rights

and one for civil liberties--on a scale of 1 to7; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of

freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. While these scales are logically distinct, in

practice they are closely related: when one rating is low, the other tends to be as well, and

vice versa. For this reason I have aggregated the scores taking the mean measurement to

represent the country’s score. For example, if Paraguay has a political rights score of 4

and a civil liberties score of 2, the mean score would be 3.

The data used in compiling Political Terror Scale comes from two different

sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. StateDepartment Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The score is measured as

follows: 39

Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies

place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or

ideological goals.

39 Conway Henderson uses the REP scale, which is almost identical to the Political Terror Scale. His is based on measurements used by Raymond Gastil in creating the Freedom in the World measurements in the1980’s. Conway Henderson, “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression.” Journal of Conflict

Resolution , Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 120-142 (March 1991).



29

Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the

population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its

generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such

imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common.

Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.

However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder

is rare.

Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view,

and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

Economic Measurement: Economic Growth

Wordnet (Princeton University) defines economic growth as “steady growth in the

productive capacity of the economy (and so a growth of national income).” 40 The reason

this study uses economic growth as a measurement of economic status, as opposed to

FDI, GDP, is that growth measurements show change in a country’s economy whereas

the other measurements given are static measures. Also, growth encompasses these

measures when taking into account the “productive capacity” and “national income”. FDI

provides the capital to produce and GDP is the outcome. I chose economic growth

because it is a generalized measure of fluctuations in a state’s economy.

40 “Economic Growth,” WordNet® 3.0, © 2006 by Princeton University.http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/economic%20growth .

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/economic%20growth





30

Initial Analysis

The initial analysis was meant to answer two questions: if FH scores could

measure institutional strength, what affect did this have on economic growth? Next, it

explores how a State’s actual practices, using PTS scores, affected growth. Scatter plot

charts and R-squared were used to measure correlations between nine variables: three

mean FH, PTS, and growth scores (as mentioned before all mean variables are based on

5year blocks: 5 prior, 5 post, 6-10 post). It is important to understand that this tested bi-

variate causal relationships in order to test a direct causal relationship between repression

and growth. For instance, if a state regularly employed repressive tactics (measured with

PTS) against its population did it have a direct impact on the country’s economy, or did

other factors play a role? Or, if a state’s institutions were strong (according to FH scores)

did that directly influence its economy, without accounting for other conditions? Also to

limit variables, this analysis assumes that all external conditions (world economy and

events) remain constant.

If FH scores could measure institutional strength, what affect did this have on economic

growth?

Hypothesis: If world economy and events remain the same, the strength of

institutions can have an effect on a state’s economy. To find the correlation between

institutions and growth, I used both R (to mathematically determine correlations) and



31

scatter plot charts, which would help locate outliers that might influence the outcome of

R.

To begin with I compared FH scores and growth rates for the three periods

mentioned above (fig. 1 below). In each case there were absolutely no trends and the R-

squared was at or below 1%, showing no correlation between institutional strength and

economic growth. The first comparison measured the immediate affects of structural

adjustment programs (SAPs) on growth (FH/growth 5 years post) and the results were the

lowest. Next I compared the following time period of 6-10 years using FH scores and

growth measurements, which had an R-squared of 0.0134. In order to determine any

medium term affects of SAPs, I compared FH scores post 5 years and growth rates 6-10

years post. The results showed less than ½% correlation.

Fig. 1 Charts 1 – 3 FH and Growth Comparisons



32

The scatter plot charts I generated showed several outliers and so I excluded them

in my next analysis to see how they skewed the results (fig.2 below). I used the scatter

chart comparing FH post 5 years to growth post 6-10 years (its R-squared fell between

that of the other two charts so was likely the best chart for this comparison). First I

removed cases that fell far outside of the norm: Togo, the Democratic Republic of Congo,



33

and the Republic of Burundi. There was almost no change in correlation: R-squared was

less than 5 %. Next I ran R-squared without the extreme cases and also excluded Rwanda

as it received SALs in 1991 and experienced a civil war and genocide in 1994, making it

an anomaly of the cases. The results were almost the same. Finally, I removed an

outlying cluster of five countries in addition to the original three and Rwanda. Still there

were no significant trends and the R-squared remained at or around 5 % (0.046).

Charts without outlying casesFig. 2 FH and Growth Comparisons without outlying cases



34

How do state practices affect economic growth?

Hypothesis: If world economy and events stay constant, states’ use of repression

will harm economic growth, causing slowed, stagnant, or negative economic growth.

The comparisons with the PTS scores were to determine the effect of state’s

practices on economic growth. In fig. 3 below, I used the same time blocks, 5 years and

6-10 years post SALs, and the same comparisons: PTS/growth at 5 years post;

PTS/growth 6-10 years post; and PTS 5 years post and growth 6-10 years post (to

determine medium term effects of repression). In the first comparison there was

absolutely no relationship whatsoever: R-Squared = 1E – 06. The second comparison, 6-

10 years post SALs, faired a little better at R-squared of 0.0218. And finally, PTS post 5

years with growth 6-10 years post, measured at 0.0004. These results show that

repression has no direct effect on economic growth.

Fig. 3 PTS and Growth Comparisons



35

Here again I removed outliers visible on the scatter plot charts. As with the above

analysis, I removed the farthest outlier and then added the outlying cluster (six countries)



36

to it (fig. 4 below). In both cases the outcomes demonstrated no perceptible trends or

correlations. The best comparison between PTS and growth was both at post 6-10 years,

yielding a 3% correlation (R-squared = 0.0314).

Fig. 4 PTS and Growth comparisons without outlying cases



37

Methodological Conclusion

From the above analysis we can conclude that the bi-variate causal models

comparing both FH and PTS with growth are faulty models. There is little to no direct

correlation between these two variables and growth, even when excluding outliers. This

means that neither institutional strength (measured with FH) nor repression (measured

with PTS) have any direct effect on economic growth. It is important to note that the

direct causal relationship is does not include the multi-variate comparison this study’s

model intended but was necessary to rule out direct influence of either institutional

strength or repression on economic growth. It was an initial foray into the relationship

between institutional stability (as represented by Freedom House) or violent state

repression (as measured by the Political Terror Scale) and economic growth and proves

there is no direct relationship between these variables. Since there is no direct causal

relationship, there can be no universalizeable theory which assumes that institutional

stability or repression has any direct influence on growth, either positively or negatively.



38

It must be noted too that this analysis conflicts with the analysis of de Haan and

Siermann, and with Gasiorowski. This is likely due to the fact that it used different data

to test similar theories. De Haan and Siermann measured repression using Freedom

House scores—which for reasons stated above did not fulfill the criteria set for violent

political repression. And Gasiorowski measured instability as political unrest, not the

stability of institutions as measured by this study’s interpretation of Freedom House

scores. Here we can see this is not a conflict of findings, but a difference in comparisons.

A multi-variate comparison would better test the model of instability, repression,

further instability and economic growth. This more sophisticated comparison should also

take into account the affect of regionality (for instance Sub-Saharan Africa or Central

America) in order to contextualize the model in terms of historic development issues

when analyzing the outcomes. Each region developed at different paces with diverse

political and cultural pressures—it would be impossible to understand failures of

economic policies without understanding the environment in which they are beingimplemented. Another variable that would add another interesting dimension to this

analysis would be dominant industry, i.e. extractive, agricultural or manufacturing.

Though Columbia was used to describe certain outcomes of neoliberal reforms not within

the bounds of SALs, it is a good example of how states might behave with regard to

different types of industries.

Conclusion

At the outset, I acknowledged that in this study the data analysis fell short of

drawing a direct relationship between repression and growth. But that was only one



40

austerity measures accompanying SALs, states reduce government, privatize industry,

open up trade—all of which cause increase in unemployment and social unrest .41 Add to

this a reduction in social programs meant to cushion those with least resources and the

need for control becomes more acute. Therefore, once committed to the SAL, states have

to implement unpopular reforms while at the same time maintaining social and political

control as well as control over resources, and using repression offers an immediate tool

with which to do gain and maintain these controls.

When it comes to economic performance or economic policy changes to stimulate

growth, is there a correlation between growth and repression? As stated earlier in the data

analysis, my initial analysis did not show any direct correlation between these two

variables. A further analysis using multiple variables, including repression, growth,

stability, region and industry type, would provide a clearer understanding of the

relationship. Too many factors affect use of repression and growth outcomes, and so it is

impossible to apply a generalizeable theory stating repression affects growth. However, itwould be useful to see how growth and repression correlate when looking at other

factors.

Growth is experienced in countries that use repression. It is also experienced in

countries that do not. In the cases I examined most of the countries used medium to high

levels of repression during implementation of SAPs. But the data did not show a

significant change in Political Terror Scale scores from prior 5yr scores to post 5yr and 6-

10yr scores. Country scores remained the same or varied by one degree on average. This

41 When states shrink government and privatize industry there are reductions in staff and supportingindustries, thereby leading to higher unemployment. Opening trade forces local businesses and industries tocompete with which they might not be competitive, causing them to fail.



41

means that in general one cannot say that SAPs caused further repression. However, one

must keep in mind that these are aggregate scores over a 15yr period and does not reflect

a more nuanced analysis of the affect of SALs on repression (as is likely the case with

Abouharb and Cingranelli’s study).

So, the question remains: how can one package human rights in a way that

appeals to the Smithian fulfillment of self-interest? A more complex analysis of the data

used for this study can explore patterns and relationships between a more diverse set of

variables, thereby enlightening us as to how each may propel or stymie another. Too, a

closer examination of the model used by Abouharb and Cingranelli (which shows state

repression, and instability, increased with coercive change in economic policy) and

studies relating to instability and growth need to be integrated to demonstrate the better

human rights practices can be economically beneficial to governments and businesses,

even if the converse (bad human rights practices) cannot be proven to harm the economy.

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USDA 2007. USDA Real Historical GDP and Growth Rates of GDP for BaselineCountries or Regions 1969-2007.








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http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/ .

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/

final thesis draft 08-08

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