ferreira.cia and jacobo arbenz.disinformation

THE CIA AND JACOBO ARBENZ: HISTORY OF ADISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

By Roberto Garcia Ferreira*

INTRODUCTION

The covert operation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) toforcibly oust Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954 has beenalmost completely documented now, thanks to the near-total declassificationof the operation's records. It is now clear that this event represented a decisivemoment in U.S. relations with Latin America during the Cold War. Notsurprisingly, given the significance of the event (a fact perceived at the time),a good number of studies have been dedicated to its analysis.

Half a century later, and through the study of new records, thehistoriographie debate seems to have arrived at the conclusion that in the U.S.decision to overthrow Arbenz, the ideological imperatives and policiesdemanded by the global bipolar confrontation were more important than anyeconomic motivation related to the influence of the banana monopoly, theUnited Fruit Company, on governing circles in Washington.'

It is interesting that despite the abundant scholarly literature on thevast CIA operation to overthrow Arbenz via a military coup,^ there are onlyscarce and dispersed references by those scholars to the exile of Arbenz. Hisexile has been treated as a painftil personal drama. But on the contrary, the CIAdocumentation alerts us to how much the agency continued to dedicate itselfcovertly to destroying the public image of the president after he was toppled.Arbenz was considered a political figure of the first order of importance withinthe Latin American spectrum, a fact corroborated in the historiographieliterature. For that reason the CIA seems to have taken an immediately vigilantattitude toward Arbenz.

Based on the declassified documents consulted for this article, notonly is it possible to determine the existence of a rigorous control andsurveillance of each one of the former president's steps; also revealed is theextent to which the agency focused on targeted operations against the interestsof Arbenz. Sometimes these were efforts to infiuence, and other times to

*Roberto Garcia Ferreira is Professor in the Deparment of History of the Americas, TheCollege of Humanities and Educational Science, University of the Republic, Montevideo,Uruguay. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2© 2008 by Association of Third World Studies, hic.

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orchestrate, some of the trials and tribulations, rumors, speculations,denunciations, and misinformation published by the media (especiallyGuatemalan and Uruguayan print media) about Arbenz, his family, his friends,and his political future.

It is fitting to point out that this CIA media strategy, the central andspecific topic of this article, was particularly intense between 1954 and 1960.With the eruption of the Cuban revolution Arbenz's notoriety entered a phaseof some decline. After 1960 CIA records on Arbenz are scarce, and mostprobably, the efforts of the CIA were not necessary because by that time the ex-president was a symbol of defeat.'

In any case, the proposal to investigate more deeply the surveillanceand the attacks inspired by the CIA mainly during the first years of Arbenz'sexile provides us the opportunity to understand a facet heretofore unknown ofthe CIA's methods. And no less important: the case reveals how opinion maybe constructed. The Arbenz affair illuminates a strategy that the CIA valuedpositively. Indeed, one of its analysts commented, "[T]he language, thearguments and the techniques of the Arbenz episode" were "used in Cuba in thebeginning of the decade of the 60s, in Brazil in 1964, in the DominicanRepublic in 1965, and in Chile in 1973."" This significant affirmation confirms,as noted in much literature, that the 1954 "stainless"' triumph went far beyondthe case of Guatemala.'

As of this moment, the new materials permit us to establish threecertain principles. First, one must point out that "the historian, in these yearsof Arbenz's life, cannot do otherwise than to simply narrate the facts" since he"completely disappeared from the history of his country" after his resignation.'Second, it is necessary to realize that we are beholding an event as painful asit has been silenced in Guatemalan history.* Third, everything indicates that inthe innumerable judgments about Jacobo Arbenz, one important element stillhas not been discussed: how mueh infiuence the propagandistic actions of theCIA still have in the extreme polarization that surrounds the president and hiswork in Guatemala.

JACOBO ARBENZ, «THE PEOPLE'S SOLDIER"

Jacobo Arbenz, son of a Swiss pharmacist of the same name and aGuatemalan woman fi-om Quetzaltenango, was bom in September 1913. He,who was to eventually be President of Guatemala, moved to the capital city,where he entered the Escuela Politécnica, the military academy. He graduatedwith excellent grades, which were key for later becoming a professor at thesame institution.

Those were the times of Jorge Ubico, a dictator in power from 1931to 1944, who could not mask his sympathies for fascism. In 1944, Ubico was

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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinformation Campaign

forced to resign under pressure from a heterogeneous set of rebel forces.Arbenz, then a young army officer, was one of the leaders that inspired therebellion. With that episode he began his vertiginously rising political career.Before being elected to the highest position in govemment at the end of 1950,his three important political roles were: leader of the 1944 October Revolution;member of the Junta that convened the elections for 1945; and Minister ofDefense, a guarantor of legality, during the democratic presidency of Juan JoséArévalo from 1945 to 1951.

Under Arbenz, the revolutionary program initiated by Arévalo was tobe accelerated. The agrarian reform plan, which Arbetiz himself characterizedas the most beautiful fruit of the revolution, was the main axis for a quitesuccessful project to structurally change the country. Without idealizing thisproject, and taking into account some evident errors in strategy, we should notforget, as a U.S. specialist points out, that this was the first and only occasionin Guatemala when "a significant part of the state authority was used topromote the interests of the nation's masses."'

Unfortunately, this project was aborted by the CIA-orchestratedinvasion of 1954. After several military coup attempts and an intensive nationaland intemational campaign by the Eisenhower administration against PresidentArbenz, a small force of exiles and mercenaries invaded from Honduras andpenetrated a few miles into the country. Air raids by planes operated by CIApilots created terror and confusion, while U.S. diplomatic pressure forArbenz's ousting was applied locally and intemationally. The end ofGuatemala's "democratic spring" was approaching.

ARBENZ'S RESIGNATION: "IT WAS A TRAGEDY"

Betrayed by his military colleagues, without any intemational support,and after ten days of the highest tensions, Arbenz resigned and transferredpower to a military comrade he believed to be loyal. He assumed, naively,'"that his resignation would serve to safeguard the conquests of the revolutionaryperiod. It was the aftemoon of June 27, 1954, and that act marked the rest ofhis life. A very close friend to the Arbenz-Vilanova family during the periodthe family lived in Uruguay remembers that for Jacobo, both the invasion andhis resignation were "trapped in his head," and that he "kept on recalling thoseevents and reproaching himself for them.""

Without ignoring Arbenz's own insecurities, it must be added that themagnitude of CIA documentation exclusively regarding the pressure on Arbetizallows us to take some distance from simple explanations about his last hotirsin the presidency (it was insistently repeated again and again, in both friendlyand unfriendly circles, that his resignation had been an act of cowardice). Itrather seems that those who have judged that, at that stage, there were abundant

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reasons to delegate the position were correct.'^ Much later, Arbenz assessedthose circumstances in the light of the moments he had then lived andexpressed categorically: "it was a tragedy.""

The CIA came to know well both the strengths and weaknesses of thepresident. Beyond a 1950 "compliment," when the agency described him as"brilliant...cultivated,"'" Arbenz's weak points in both his life and personalitywere used, once he was out of power, in CIA actions against his image andprestige as a politician who had implemented a model agrarian reform. Asummary of the Guatemalan historical process noted the ascending career ofthat young military officer, first as a revolutionary and then as a defender oflegality as Arévalo's minister.'* Even then it seemed important for the agencyto be knowledgable about Arbenz's health conditions, and it had access to aclinical report of 1947, when Arbenz visited a specialist to treat his problemswith alcohol. '̂ It seems that the president was subjected to intense physical andpsychological attacks that caused notable deterioration in the Guatemalanduring the period before the 1954 invasion."

POLITICAL ASYLUM AT THE EMBASSY OFMEXICO IN GUATEMALA

The Embassy of Mexico was the first lodging place for Arbenz afterhis resignation. The 73 days he spent there were uncomfortable, given the factthat another 300 persons had also sought asylum. It was in this period that theCIA started a new phase of operations against him, with three main objectives.The first was to demonstrate the supposed communist connections of thedeposed regime. The second was to circulate the idea that "those in asylumshould be prosecuted in Guatemala and...they should not be allowed to extendtheir misbehavior to other countries in Latin America." And the third objectivewas to exploit that situation for propaganda purposes by attempting "toassociate Arbenz's supporters with Moscow."'*

Furthermore, there is proof that a diverse set of other ideas was usedthrough the media with the purpose of harming Arbenz's public image. CIAagents confiscated his personal papers, and, once they had been tampered with,they constituted the basis for elaborating "press releases" to generate adversepublic opinion. Through these measures the CIA made clear that it waspursuing deeper treatment of some issues: for example, due to Arbenz'sresignation, "to accuse [him] of cowardice" and "lack of courage to lead adesperate resistance;" to exploit his friendship with the communist Jose ManuelFortuny" as "very useful" to "reinforce the story of an intimate relationshipbetween the two;" and finally, to recall his "unfortunate personal life."^"

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By reviewing the perspectives and content of the Guatemalan media'scoverage of these events, we can trace a striking similarity with the CIA'splanned objectives.

Secretly, the CIA and the State Department promoted the view thatthose in asylum should be "prosecuted in Guatemala."^' In an opinion columnFabian Ymeri coincided with that orientation by stating that "if a delinquentseeks refuge in a foreign country, the government of the country where thecrime was perpetrated has the right...to request his or her extradition in orderto prosecute him or her," thereby "easily" solving "the asylum problem."^^

Regarding Arbenz's refuge, the propaganda stressed that far from hisexpected protagonism, the former president was "taking cover behind the fourwalls of the room he had been given, from which he never came out."Additionally, the propaganda diseminated "jokes" that were circulating "fromperson to person" among those in asylum, whose central "protagonist" wasArbenz. The publicity given to these humorous tales seemed to kill two birdswith one stone: on the one hand, it implicitly assessed the president's"cowardice," and on the other it made clear his supposed "links" withcommunism. The jokes included the following: "an old supporter of Arbenzhas nicknamed him Sandino, sarcastically comparing Arbenz with thatNicaraguan hero who honored his word by being killed;" and "Someone elsesays that the former president will go to the Russian university in Kurken,where he is going to lecture on how to govern...and defend the goverrmientagainst any invasion.""

Once safe conduct guarantees to go abroad were obtained, Arbenz leftGuatemala. The ostentious humiliation to which he was subjected (he wasforced to undress before the cameras at the airport) was not enough to makehim open his lips. Coverage of this event next day were particularly harsh, andagain, they followed the CIA's plan. According to the media, the formerpresident had left "gloomy" and "with arrogance" while his wife was "morecomposed." One journalist said that Arbenz "acted as in a play" and"disappointed the audience" by refusing "to say a single word." He arrived atthe airport in a "lackluster" car, and as soon as he got inside the terminalmembers of the public uttered "gross words" of "indignation." "He wasterrribly pale" and "he could hardly hide his...fear.. .He walked like a robot,"although in his favor the journalist also said that "in one moment he acted a bitmore human, and with his hand he caressed his little daughter" Leonora.

When Arbenz was forced to take his clothes off, the article indicatedthat it "gave the impression that a cold statue was taking off his marbleclothes." The search lasted one hour, and then Arbenz walked to the airplane'sstairway. At that moment one could see that Arbenz "lost his self-control andofficers of the Mexican Embassy had to help him." Finally, the article made thepoint that Fortuny's presence was noted, in his condition as "number one

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Communist of Guatemala," "inseparable" friend, and "as always," Arbenz'straveling companion.̂ "*

ARBENZ'S DAYS IN MEXICO

A few hours later Arbenz and his companions landed in Mexican soil.Press articles of that country, reproduced in the Guatemalan newspaper ElImparcial, were not any more encouraging. Again, Arbenz was presented as"gloomy," with a "corpse-like paleness," and in the place "only onewoman.. .attempted a timid clapping, which immediately died within the strangecoldness that pervaded the environment."" Arbenz thanked the Mexicanauthorities, and he was surrounded by some important personalities, such asmembers of the Cardenas family. However, not even there could he enjoy sometranquility, because, as an Uruguayan paper reported, his presence posed a"delicate diplomatic problem" for Mexico.^'

Denunciations and an extradition request arrived from Guatemala.Because of that, the former president convened a press conference.Anticommunist organizations, some of them facades behind which the CIAoperated, organized a protest at the hotel door, and Mexican authorities forcedArbenz to cancel the event. The news that spread after this episode containedthe same tendentious profile: Jacobo "abruptly let down" a hundredjournalists.^'

Partly overcoming the circle of silence, Arbenz gave his views toSiempre, a weekly magazine. The reaction was immediate. A vehement articleby Antonio Uróz suggested that this Mexican journalist was following a pre-established script. During the interview Arbenz had said that the Ambassadorof the United States in Guatemala was a "gangster" and that his fall was due tomilitary treason. According to the CIA, such "comments against the army"were useftil to be "emphasized in internal propaganda in Guatemala."^*Coinciding with this, Uróz asked Arbenz, "Why do you now accuse [theambassador] of being a gangster? Why did you not have courage enough to sayit at the time? You," Uróz continued, "do not have the character, and even lessthe courage. What soldier in our America, with more than 12,000 men,surrenders the way you did? We, the Indo-Hispanics, are ashamed of you."After that, Uróz asked Arbenz to "leave Guatemala in peace, because no onelikes you there and if they want you to return., .it is to apply the Talion law toyou."^'

TOWARDS EUROPE

Without either papers or stability, the Arbenz family left for Europe,where they had a chance to reach Switzerland and seek passports based on

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Arbenz's heritage. Informed of his plans, the CIA assessed that such a movecould be used in the media from "two angles": first, "that the Mexicangovernment had expelled him," and second, "that his trip to Europe was a lastattempt to travel behind the Iron Curtain for advice.'"" Maria Vilanova",Arbenz's wife, remembers that the route "took them through Canada in orderto pick up Arabella," their oldest daughter." After that, the journey continued,with a stopover in the Netherlands, before arriving the same day in Paris, wherethey stayed a few days and then continued to Switzerland by car.

During that time, the media circulated several rumors. Confirmationof Arbenz's presence in Switzerland since January 5, as well as his intentionto obtain Swiss citizenship, seemed to the CIA as two potentially interestingelements. A report written by Frank Wisner, the imaginative chief of the Officefor Policy Coordination," leaves no doubts about when, how and why theyshould pay attention to Arbenz. Quick action was justified because, in Wisner'sperspective, "it would be a mistake...if we waited with arms crossed whileArbenz successfully rehabilitates himself in Switzerland and wears the mantleof martyr and victim of cynical U.S. intrigues." Consequently, Wisner orderedthree lines of aetion. The first addressed how to deal with the problem vis-a-visLatin America, where Wisner noted that "with his request for a Swiss passport"Arbenz demonstrated that "he was not as Guatemalan" as he had alwayspretended. The second directive, "to be used in Europe," was "speculative andtendentious:" "[I] f Arbenz is not attempting to go behind the Iron Curtain" isbecause "the plans ordered by Moscow have been revoked." Finally, the thirdof Wisner's points was the most extensive and encompassed two tracks. Oneproposed "making available a certain number of documents and informationto the Swiss government regarding Arbenz and the reeord of his regime." Thesecond track was to plant "a few stories in the newspapers" including "verbalaccusations against Arbenz," a mechanism for which Wisner asked, "Do wehave contact with any paper in Switzerland in order to approach it... in asecure manner?""

Some time later, another CIA report noted that with the purpose of"discrediting Arbenz" "many operations were carried out," after instructionswere given to CIA stations to speculate that Arbenz was "going the route of arefugee beyond the Iron Curtain" while, simultaneously, in other media,"articles, pamphlets and posters were inspired portraying Arbenz as a traitorwho had abandoned his comrades.""

Some examples confirm that what was planned was carried out inpractice. In Guatemala, a column—suspiciously, without a byline—stated:"Very Guatemalan, people said of Mr. Jacobo, because he was the son of apharmacist of Quetzaltenango, and the whiteness of his skin derived from theclimate ofthat city and the fact that he bathed frequently." The column calledArbenz's conduct "disgraceful," because he had never before remembered his

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land, Switzerland, and now he was doing it only "to save himself fromextradition.'^

The fact that a photograph of the Arbenz-Vilanova couple appearedon the front page of one of the Uruguayan newspapers closest to the CIAstation in Montevideo," as well as the fact that the same newspaper publishedsoon after a colutnn about Switzerland and the "Arbenz case," seems to showits adherence to CIA orientations. This editorial piece contained especiallyharsh words: "If former president Arbetiz can and wants to one day provide thedocuments...he will automatically become a citizen" in Switzerland. "So far hehas not presented them [and] this distraction or lax attitude...has surprised andeven upset many Swiss, probably because they perceive that in such attitudethere is indifference or disdain towards a nationality they are justly proud of"Several lines later, the resemblance with another CIA suggestion seems to bedirect, as the columnist hinted that "Arbetiz had recovered or requested Swisscitizenship in order to protect himself against a possible extradition request bythe present Government of Guatemala. In fact...no Swiss citizen can be tumedin to a foreign country...[and] Arbenz, as a Swiss citizen, would enjoy theprotection and all the rights granted by Swiss citizenship. Nobody couldimpede him even to be a communist...because that party...is not banned inSwitzerland...[and] he could carry on any intemal or foreign policy hewanted.""

With the same diligence, a biweekly Mexican publication, Lucha,showed a cartoon of Arbenz going to Switzerland under the title "the quetzal[a bird that is a national symbol of Guatemala] is incensed."" Additionally, ElImparcial, a Guatemalan newspaper, circulated the rumor that Arbenz ' s alleged"change of nationality" was received with "profotmd displeasure by otherGuatemalan exiles in Mexico, who certainly will erase Arbenz's name in theirsedition plans...and look for a new caudillo.''^'^ Jacobo gave up his quest toobtain Swiss citizenship, and the CIA's strategy was exhausted becauseArbetiz's preference to remain a Guatemalan citizen led to the agency'sconclusion that it was no longer "very useful to deal with this issue."^'

France authorized Arbenz to reside there for a year, under thecondition of abstaining from all political activism. The former presidentaccepted and retumed to Paris with his family. Following the Arbetiz familywas an easy task for French agents, because, far from seeking conspiratorialobjectives, the family wanted to walk around the city. The agents offeredthemselves to take them to different places around the French capital.''^

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BEYOND THE IRON CURTAIN

Conditions for the Arbenz family continued to be inconvenient and thepossibility of moving to Czechoslovakia seemed to promise greater stability.For the CIA, Arbenz had crossed the "curtain" and that move made it possibleto act according to the most profitable path: Arbenz was a communist agent,and he was seeking "advice" in that country.

In Guatemala, the news immediately spread, and with that the analysesappeared one after the other. The following headline left no doubts about themanipulation of the news of the former president's move: "Communist formerPresident will receive instructions for subversion in Guatemala."^' In NewYork, the World Telegram and Sun, an evening paper, proclaimed: "FinallyArbenz has found asylum in a place that he must love, a land from the IronCurtain where they practice the same sort of democratic regime as his.'""

Again, repercussions reached as far as Uruguay, and, once again, theymust be attributed to a CIA operation. According to one CIA doctiment, two"inspired" articles published in Montevideo showed "that Arbenz's trip toPrague demolished the arguments of those people who defended him againstaccusations of communism.'"" Those "inspired" editorials appeared on twoconsecutive days in the pages of El Día and La Mañana. The first, a ferventlyanticommunist paper, dedicated its space to crowing that now Arbenz "will feelcomfortable." The passage of time had transformed the ex-president into a"former dictator," and the paper informed Uruguayan readers about the causesfor Arbenz's decision to live "for a long period of time" in "vassal" Prague:"the exemplary" Switzerland "did not please" Arbenz because there its citizens"practice democratic traditions and take life honestly and seriously.'"" The nextday, the second newspaper denounced Arbenz's actions as displaying "arevealing attitude about the Guatemalan problem." After reminding readers thatthe former president had not demonstrated "fervent patriotism" by requestingSwiss citizenship, it assessed his presence in Prague as leaving "his defenderspretty empty-handed, since they had tried so far to explain his fall based on aunilateral interpretation which was far from sticking to truth.'""

The New York paper Z,a Prensa did the same thing, stating, "It did nottake too long for Mr. Arbenz to confirm what people had long suspected abouthim, and which he used to deny." Moreover, this paper added a piece ofinformation that it considered confirmed: "Arbenz is now being paid...as apropagandist for the communist cause" and "it is believed that...he works forthe Latin American section of the Cominform.'"'*

The CIA also had links in communist territory, which provided first-hand information and told the agency that during an interview Arbenz"revealed that he was preparing a book on the events of 1954.'"" The receptiveGuatemalan media echoed that news, reporting that the former president lived

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"comfortably" in a "golden exile in Prague." One journalist said that "whileArbenz's life was inexorably linked to international communism," he wasdrafting a book on his experiences that "will probably be translated to alllanguages in the communist world, guaranteeing a circulation of hundreds ofthousands of copies."'"

Carlos Manuel Pellecer, a Communist Party leader in Guatemala whoat that time was Arbenz's friend and fellow exile in Czechoslovakia, wrotenotes on Arbenz's time in Prague that greatly differed from the abovementioned news reports. He gave the opinion that when Arbenz arrived helooked like "a castaway in search of refuge" and that far from being "an officialguest," "his treatment by the authorities was discourteous and even violent."Pellecer added that after sour negotiations Arbenz managed to get "a residencein the countryside, with no communication to the city and with manyinconveniences." Under those circumstances, Arbenz's trip to Mosow was"rather than a solution, a source of relief."''

According to the CIA documents, the days in the Soviet Union andChina were discreetly handled. "His departure from Prague was a carefullykept secret" and among other precautions both Jacobo and Maria used"pseudonyms." The secretiveness made almost impossible any filtration to thepress. In fact, any circulation of intimate details of the family would havejeopardized the privileged position held by the agent who was the CIA's mainsource of information, whose cryptonym was "Inluck.""

After some time, Jacobo and Maria returned to Prague with theiryoungest son, and then they went back to Paris. At that time the couple wastemporarily separated. Maria travelled to El Salvador to sell some properties,and, close to Guatemala, try to obtain her little son's birth certificate. Movinginto action, the CIA managed to influence public knowledge regarding her trip,reporting that "this information can be used as a facade, leaving hints that herreal intentions were much more sinister.""

The separation from Maria increased Jacobo's depression, and thanksto "Inluck" the agency continued to receive every detail. Based on "the historyof Inluck regarding Arbenz's personal life," in the chronological biographyproduced by the CIA, one reads that "his loneliness in Paris (what he calls "alife without hopes") leads Arbenz to excessively drink." Moreover, "hisdesperation drove him to remain in seclusion in his room for days...food wouldbe sent to him.. .and he would not talk with anyone, with the windows shut andthe lights off day and night. He stayed hours in a state of total depression,violent irritation and screams. Physically he was exhausted and looked old. Histemperament became more impulsive and violent. He looked like a man withno strength, without any desire to live or at least a person who wanted topeacefully live and not to struggle."'''

In some of his writings, Carlos Manuel Pellecer (in this moment also

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in Paris) offered a version almost identical to the CIA report just cited. "Theseñora and the child have departed," leaving Arbenz "alone in Paris," wrotePellecer. Of the "energetic and handsome official that we used to admire in theEscuela Politécnica, there is little trace...The disillusionment was palpable.""The ex-president passed the main part of his days and nights in his room,doors and windows closed, lights extinguished, in bed, smoking, thinking in theabsolute darkness of the night. He ate little, went out rarely."" At this point, hislines differed solely in the first letters of the name of the hotel where Arbenzwas staying.^' The similarity between the CIA reports and the writings ofPellecer was not a coincidence; everything indicates that "Inluck" was thecryptonym of the very same Pellecer, who, it is important to remember, figuredin the extensive list of collaborators of the CIA, as revealed later by one of itsagents."

AGAIN IN AMERICA

In a desperate situation, Arbenz sought ways to return to LatinAmerica. Since it was impossible to go to Mexico, one of his ex-ministers,living in Uruguay, raised the possibility that this country might receive him.The firm and traditional hospitality regarding political reftigees gave smallmargin to the maneuvers of the CIA, so that a visa for Arbenz seemed assured.In any case, various documents indicate that the efforts aimed at preventingUruguayan govemment permission for Arbenz to live in Uruguay were aspersistent as they were fruitless.

The CIA and the State Department worked together. The operationplanned diplomatic protests both formal and informal aimed to "emphasize thedanger for the hemisphere" constituted by the presence of this "Soviet agent,"an accusation proven by Arbenz's previous "residence behind the IronCurtain."'* The beginning of the visa process from Paris hurried the CIA to putits plan into practice. According to the CIA, the U.S. ambassador inMontevideo was instructed to "make representations to the Minister of ForeignRelations asking that a visa not be guaranteed" for Arbenz. In the same vein,at the request of the CIA's "staff" in Guatemala, "president Castillo Armas wasrequested to mandate his Ambassador in Montevideo to make a proposal to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay" to deny the visa for Arbenz "based onhis decision to go beyond the Iron Curtain."" Based on confidential reportspromptly sent to Montevideo, the Ambassador of Uruguay in the United Statesand his First Counsellor were approached by State Department officials.Without abandoning diplomatic subtlety, they made "very unfavorable"references "about ex-president Arbenz," suggesting that if he were accepted byUruguay "unfavorable" circumstances "would be created" as well as"difficulties of various types.', "60

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In any case, and despite demands to the contrary, the Government ofUruguay accepted the "request by Mr. Jacobo Arbenz to come to the country,"providing him "asylum as a political refugee."''

The CIA, once confirming the forthcoming presence of theGuatemalan citizen in South America, designed a series of "operations against"him, including the circulation of statements, in various stages and through theusual channels of information, emphasizing Arbenz's friendship with "theCommunists;" "exposing his political and subversive activities, and showingtherefore that he had violated the norms of asylum;" underlining "Arbenz'sunstable temperament... and his dependence on liquor;" and indicating that "hisdaughters still were behind the iron curtain."" A physician working for theagency was assigned to work on "a study of Arbenz that could be presented asa work of a psychiatrist having had a series of interviews with him." The planwas to have this study seem "as if it had come from a Czech desertor" andthe"idea behind it" was to "portray Arbenz as a person unfit for public life.""

Dates, expressions and contents of the Uruguayan anticommunistpress confirm the extent to which those media abided by the CIA's operativesuggestions'"*, which, we must add, was not anything new." Furthermore, theintensity of the operation corroborates one of the central ideas of this work: hewas not just any former president. It must be said that regarding this aspect theagency was right: in local leftist circles the former Guatemalan leader was animportant referent.'* Only this fact could explain a newspaper campaign of thismagnitude, in addition to following him and exerting a covert control of thissort."

The first news on Arbenz came to the media in Montevideo in April,when a newspaper reported that the former "Head of the pro-SovietGuatemalan Government" had obtained "a visa to travel to our country."'* Afew days later, the same newspaper devoted an exclusive editorial piece to thispoint in question: Arbenz was a "flilly-discussed figure" for having been the"first governmental official outside the iron curtain who accepted to be anofficial guest in a Commimist State." For this reason, it was "inadmissible toimagine that someone might have had the occurrence of inviting him," althoughif he eventually came we would have the "ungrateful duty to receive him.""

The following day, another morning paper also produced an editorialpiece saying that the Guatemalan citizen considered "moving" in order to "besurrounded by the well-known commie elements," and in case of confirmation"we will have, then, repetitions of case of Guatemala, already overcome, forthe.. .concern of the Interior Minister."™

The CIA's clandestine moves seem to have encompassed all possiblegroimds, with no room for improvisation. In this sense, it sent two wires toMontevideo aimed at organizing a "welcoming committee" with "Uruguayananti-Communist journalists" to wait for Arbenz at the airport with a

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"demonstration" against his presence."Arbenz arrived in Montevideo on May 13,1957. The day before, the

second largest paper published what it understood to be his main "biographicfeatures." We can note the tone in the four columns by reading some of itslines: "Arbenz had many of the traits that distinguish individuals of the Aryanrace," but there was something about him that "gave the impression of coldnessand distance," and for this reason he is "surrottnded by an environment whichis far from bringing him sincere friends and followers." Even worse, the mainfeature in his physiognomy was a "permanent mutism" leading to "view himas a pale wax figure."'^

As foreseen, some twenty joumalists were waiting for Arbetiz at theairport. As soon as he landed on Umguayan soil, they surrounded him andpresented him with suspicious questions: "Why did you go toCzechoslovakia?" "Are you a Communist or do you feel like one?" "Was yourGovertiment a Communist one?" "What about your wife and children?"'" Hewas taken from the airport to meet with the Head of the Police, who transmittedto him his obligations as a person in asylum, among them one that was imposedon him for the very first time ever: "to daily present himself to the policeauthorities."'" The local CIA station insisted again and again through the pressthat the Guatemalan citizen should be under tight control.'' Howard Hunt'*, theagency's chief in Montevideo confirms this, as does the official police recordof the Uruguayan Intelligence Service. Eventually this unusual measure wasgiven some flexibility and Arbenz was told to present himself every eight days.

The campaign reached the parliament as well, where several senatorsand congresspersons denounced the fact that public events had been organizedfor Arbetiz and that he should have canceled a press conference and a talk atthe National University. They mentioned that the front wall of the house wherehe was living had been painted with a hammer and sickle. Moreover, the citywas full with pamphlets, with no signature, accusing him of being a "Russianagent.""

The assassination of head of state Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemalain July provoked a marked increased in the media attacks against the formerpresident then installed in Rio de la Plata.'* Because of this episode, Arbenzspoke to the media. It would be the last time that he would publicly speak forthe next three years. His words (in essence, half a page written with atypewriter that he gave to the avid joumalists who came to his domicile) weretendentiously presented in the front page pretending to be an exclusiveinterview with him, even though Arbetiz was not permitted to hold suchinterviews." The local Intelligence Service, alert as always, analyzed the news.The govemment, however, ultimately did not take any action regarding thisissue.'"

As much as they could, Uruguayan fnends accompanied Jacobo and

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Maria Arbenz in solidarity and made more placid their asylum. A year afterJacobo's arrival, former Guatemalan president Arévalo came to Uruguay andestablished himself there for some time. The Arbetiz couple originallywelcomed the news,*' but rapidly the relationship became cold because ofsignificant differences.*^ In Montevideo, Arévalo was not under rigoroussurveillance and he could express himself, as he did through press articles.*^Arévalo left for Venezuela the following year, when he was hired to teach auniversity course.*"

Despite all their constraints, Arbenz's wife wrote that the couple wasgrateful for the hospitality they received. She said: "the friends we had werevery kind.. .if we had been given permanent residence, we would have stayedworking in this country."*^

CUBA AND MEXICO: THE FINAL YEARS

For Arbenz, the possibility of emigrating to Cuba after the revolutionthere seemed like a propitious opportunity to live in more freedom. He,therefore, accepted an invitation that a Cuban delegation offered to him duringa visit to Uruguay in mid-1960. Arbenz flew to Havana in July 1960 and hefotmd the city in elation. He was infected by this euphoria, and at first heparticipated in public events and gave some interviews. However, he becameupset at the repetition of the slogan: "Cuba is not Guatemala," because it wasa painful reminder of the 1954 defeat.

Arbenz's proximity to his country radicalized Guatemalan media andauthorities, because they were afraid that, with Cuban support, he might leadan expedition aimed at taking power. As had occurred since 1954, mediadenunciations and attacks in his country became increasingly harsh. Withoutdoctimentary proof of possible CIA involvement in propaganda campaigns*'he historian must be very cautious in his or her interpretations. But one cannotfail to observe that, at this time, there were media attacks with very similarcharacteristics to those of the years before 1960.

News from Guatemala reported that a "chalet" belonging to the formerpresident was "given back to its legitimate owners."*' When Arbenz wasaccused of being "one of the most active agents Moscow ctirrently counts onin South America."** few days after Arbenz arrived in Cuba, journalistClemente Marroquin Rojas*' warned in a long article that he was "in Havanaand will wage war on us."'" In next day's issue of the same paper, anothercoltimnist made it known that all seemed to "indicate that Jacobo Arbenz hasbeen pointed by the finger of the Kremlin to get all possible support from theGovernment of Cuba to head a revolt in Guatemala, directed from FidelCastro's land, aimed at overthrowing the present constitutional regime in thecountry in order to take power again.""

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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: History of a Disinfonnation Campaign

Some offers were made to Arbenz to be in command of arevolutionary movement in Guatemala, where the military had assumed a veryrepressive role. He was pessimistic, however, about the possibilities ofsuccessfully applying the Cuban guerrilla experience to Guatemala. For thisreason he postponed the decision to participate. In 1965, Arbenz was invitedto the Communist Congress held in Helsinki.'^ Soon after, Arabella, his oldestdaughter, committed suicide, shocking and weakening Arbenz even ftirther.Guatemalan newspapers echoed the family drama in these terms: the remainsof the "suicidal person" were transported from Bogotá to Mexico City, andafter the funeral, the former president left "his family in Mexico as indeflnitetourists.""

The following years Arbenz alternated between France andSwitzerland, where, Maria remembers, everything was "very different from thetreatment received before."'"* Living in Mexico continued to be Jacobo's goaland the positive response from that country revealed that time had passed byand consequently the pressures had ceased. Once in Mexico a "serious illness"that "he did not want to take care o f " became more acute, and his healthincreasingly deteriorated. By the end of 1970, Arbenz was sick. MarroquinRojas addressed this issue in his newspapers and did not hesitate to makequestionable claims. He dismissed any merit for Arbenz regarding the OctoberRevolution that overthrew dictator Ubico's autocratic regime. He said that atthat time Arbenz "returned to the country and, as is well known, joined therebellion that Colonel Francisco Javier Arana had initiated." His program ofgovernment was nothing but "simple," while his resignation "disappointed us."He immediately added: "He has had political ftiends in exile and good money."Meanwhile, he let Arbenz know that in Guatemala "few persons rememberhim," and that if he attempted to return "something very similar to what hadhappened to Arévalo could occur to him: Arévalo thought that he was going tobe greeted as a demi-God, but only a few hundred old friends embraced him."'*

Not long after, the end came. It happened in the loneliness of thebathmb after Arbenz suffered a heart attack. An Uruguayan teacher, who hadknown Arbenz well while he lived in Montevideo, summarized with accuracyArbenz's final departure: "His name sounds distant, but at one time he playeda fundamental role in Latin American revolutionary politics.""

FINAL COMMENTS

As we have demonstrated, it seems undeniable that the CIA played akey role in undermining Arbenz's prestige, particularly during his first yearsin exile. We should add that it was not the CIA only, given the fact that theconservative upper class, which would never forgive Arbenz's agrarian reform,enthusiastically joined the anticommunist campaign.

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The fiftieth anniversary of the 1944 October Revolution in 1994 wasa good time to begin to discuss those historical events. The following year, inOctober 1995, Arbenz's remains were repatriated from El Salvador. His widowonce again accompanied him, and the San Carlos de Guatemala NationalUniversity posthumously decorated the former president.

However, decades of terror, violence and fear are not easily forgotten.In Guatemala, a country of strong contrasts, Arbenz is still a topic of debate.The ambitious and well-documented Historia General de Guatemala faithfullyreñects this fact; there, interpretations of the govemment of Arbenz and itshistorical role continue to be completely contradictory."

NOTES

1. A specialized scholar on the issue affirms: "The original revisionistclaim that United Fruit masterminded Arbenz's defeat also appearsuntenable." See Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S.Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist,Perspectives," The History Teacher 34 (2000), athttp://www.historycooperative.org/joumals/ht/34.1/streeter.html. Similar conclusionsappear in Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala. The ForeignPolicy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004,[1982]) IX; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The GuatemalanRevolution and the United States, 1944-1954 Ç>iew Jersey: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1991); Stephen Rabe, "The U.S. Intervention inGuatemala: The Documentary Record," Diplomatic History 28(2004): pp. 785-790.

2. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS. La operación encubierta de la CIA enGuatemala, 1952-1954 (Guatemala: Avancso, 2002) p. 102.

3. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, p. 391.4. Nick Cullather, PBSUCCESS, p. 117.5. Theodore Draper, "Is the CIA Necessary?" The New York Review of

Books, XLIV, 13 (1997).6. Richard Immerman, TheCIA, 187-197; Nick Cullather, PASi/CŒ^S,

pp. 116-117; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the WhiteHouse and the Bay of Pigs," Journal of Latin American Studies 27(1995) pp. 1-42; Piero Gleijeses, "Mirando hacia atrás: DwightEisenhower y Jacobo Arbenz," Revista de la Universidad de SanCarlos de Guatemala 8 (2005) pp. 18-26.

7. Jesús Garcia Añoveros, Jacobo Arbenz (Madrid: Historia 16, 1987)pp. 137, 139. So far, this is the only biographical essay dedicated tothe life of Jacobo Arbenz, though, unfortunately, it lacks

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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz: Histoiy of a Disinformation Campaign

methodological rigor and depth.8. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, "La conspiración del silencio," SigloXXI,

Aug. 31, 1990.9. Greg Grandin, "Pensar globalmente, actuar ¡ocalmente," in Nick

Cullather, PBSUGGESS, p. VIII.10. Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp. 379-380.11. The former president often visited them and "he always came with a

bottle of whiskey that he placed on the table." That was the idealexcuse for his reliving for hours the final moments of the GuatemalanRevolution, "as someone who would like to go back" in time.Interview with Martha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005.

12. Stephen Streeter, "Interpreting."13. Marta Cehelsky, "Habla Arbenz. Su juicio histórico retrospectivo,"

^/ero, 8 (1968) p. 124.14. PieroGleijeses, ^/iaWez-ei/Z/ope, p. 142.15. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 'The Revolutions of 1944

(W/Attachments)," Document Number: 928377, 16 May 1952. The18 pages attached to this report are "totally censored." (From now onCIA sources will be quoted in the following manner: Source, Name,Document number and Date).

16. The agency had access to the clinical report that was prepared on thatoccasion, when Jacobo was advised that "it is imperative for yoursense of well-being as well as for your happiness to place yourself ina balanced life plan." The doctor added as an argument that "you feltmuch better when you were here." CIA, "Clinical Report on Arbenz'mental attittide," 915065, Jan. 25, 1952.

17. About Arbenz's political orientations see CIA, "Personal PoliticalOrientation of President Arbenz/Posibility of a Left-Wing Coup,"924149, Set 1952. Re possible attacks against Arbenz before theinvasion, see: "General-Kugown-Specific. Possible Attacks AgainstArbenz," 916073, 30 April 1954; "Hula-600. Possible AttacksAgainst Arbenz," 915676, 5 May 1954; "KUGOWN- Cartoons,"915235, 16 May 1954; "(Est Pub Date): Black and White List,"915774.

18. CIA, "Proposals of Combined Department of State and CIA forAction to Exploit Asylee Situation in Guatemala", 934416, 3 August1954; "Exploitation of Asylee Situation in Guatemala(W/Attachments)", 934415, 5 August 1954.

19. A personal friend of Arbenz since 1947, Fortuny was the main leaderof the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT, the CommunistGuatemala's Workers Party). After visiting many countries, he settledin Mexico, where he recently died at age 89. See La Hora

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(Guatemala), March 19, 2005.20. CIA, "Jacobo Arbenz, ex-President of Guatemala-Operations Against

(W/Attachments)," 919960, May 15, 1957. Written in 1957, thedoctmient is Arbetiz's "chronological biography" between 1950 and1957. Each of the "operational standards" to be carried out beforeeach trip, such as information to the press, circle of fHends, ups anddowns of his married life, and other personal aspects, were studied.

21. CIA, Document Number: 934416.22. El Imparcial (Guatemala), Aug. 6,1954. Most Guatemalan press was

reviewed in the Archive of Centro de Investigaciones Regionales deMesoamérica (CIRMA), in the city of Antigua, Guatemala.

23. £//w/7araa/, Sept. 8, 1954.24. El Imparcial, Sept. 10, 1954.25. El Imparcial, Sept. 10,1954.26. La Mañana (Uruguay), Sept. 11, 1954.27. El Imparcial, Oct. 21, 1954.28. CIA, Document Number: 919960.29. This refers to the vengeful and retaliatory practice of "an eye for an

eye, and a tooth for a tooth." "Due to its interest." Uroz's article wastotally reproduced in £//wj/>araa/, Dec. 11, 1954.

30. CIA, Document Number: 919960.31. She was a Salvadorean bom to a wealthy couple from El Salvador.

She was known for her high spirits and strong will, and she metJacobo at a party in Guatemala. Soon after they were married and hadthree children: Arabella, Leonora and Jacobo Antonio. She is now 91years old and resides in Costa Rica, where she finally settled in 1978.

32. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, el Presidente Arbenz(Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 2000) p. 93.

33. Francis Stonors Saunders, La CIA y la guerra fría cultural (Madrid:Debate, 2001), pp. 66-67, 140.

34. CIA, "Notes-Guatemala 1954 Coup", 920015, Jan. 6, 1955.35. CIA, "Mise Re Guatemala 1954 Coup (W/Attachment)", 919991,

Apr. 6, 1955.36. Laííora,Feb. 23, 1955.37. A short time earlier, on Jan. 8, a pictitre of the Arbenz-Vilanova

couple at the Paris airport was the issue cover, with a headline statingthat Arbetiz was the "procommunist" president "who had beenoverthrown last year," La Mañana, Jan. 8, 1955.

38. La Mañana, Feb. 14, 1955.39. In the drawing, Arbetiz looks older; he is carrying a suitcase that

suggests he is taking a million quetzals from "Banco Agrario" and abag where one can read three inscriptions: "treason to Guatemala,"

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Roberto Garcia Ferreira/The CIA and Jacobo Arbenz; History of a Disinformation Campaign

"sacrifice for the people," and "communist slave." The scene iscompleted by a quetzal that talks to the president while he walks by,telling him: "I hope you neither get there nor return here!" See ElImparcial, Jan 5, 1955.

40. El Imparcial, Jan \2, 1955.41. CIA, Document Number: 919960.42. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, 94. No opportunity was

missed in Guatemala to talk about the former president's "relaxationseason" in the French Riviera. El Imparcial, Apr. 14, 1955.

43. "The ones who met the Arbenz family in Prague say "(...) they arewealthy and Mr. Arbenz frequently gets together with the mainRussian and Czech communists." El Imparcial, Dec. 20, 1955.

44. In the Dec. 2 issue. El Imparcial reproduced the article from thatNorth American newspaper with the headline: "Arbenz finds acountry for himself (...) behind the Iron Curtain."

45. CIA, Document Number: 919960.46. El Día (Uruguay), Nov. 29, 1955.47. Z,aMiña«a, Nov. 30, 1955.48. The article was reproduced in El Imparcial, Jan. 26, 1956.49. CIA, "Kucage-Operational-Guatemalan Exiles-Jacobo Arbenz

(W/Attachment)", 919983, Dec. 6, 1955.50. El Imparcial. Feb. 2,1956.51. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz y yo (Guatemala: Artemis, 1997) pp.

262-263, 287-289.52. The CIA knew the Arbenz's daughters had stayed at a Soviet school

for a period of time, but the group of people who had that informationwas so small that the agents suggested caution in handling the news:even though it "was possible to publish that they were being educatedin a communist country, possibly, the USSR (...) the specific schoolor its location should not be mentioned." CIA, Document Number919960.

53. CIA, Document Number 919960.54. CIA, Document Number 919960.55. Carlos Manuel Pellecer, Arbenz, pp. 292-293.56. The CIA files say the name was "Vermont" while Pellecer argues that

it was "Frimont."57. In the appendix to his diary, Agee wrote textually: "Pellecer, Carlos

Manuel. CIA infiltration agent in the Guatemalan Communist Party(PGT) and in the communist movements and their connections inMexico City. After working for the CIA for several years, he brokeaway from communism. Code name: "LINLUCK." Philip Agee, LaCIA por dentro (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1987) p. 475. To be

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precise, there is one letter's difference in the name (the first L).However, it does not invalidate the statement; most likely, thatdifference was an error of memory of Agee's.

58. CIA,"Sit-Rep Uruguay's Grant of Asylum to-Expresident Arbenz ofGuatemala", 919961, May 10, 1957.

59. CIA, Document Number: 919961.60. Historical Archive of the Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations,

Source: Legations and Embassies, Section: Embassy of the RepúblicaOriental del Uruguay in Washington, box 52, folder 31, Apr. 26,1957and May 6, 1957.

61. General Archive of the Nation, ft-om Consejo Nacional de Gobierno,volume XXXII, Minute 281, Apr. 30, 1957.

62. CIA, Document Number: 919961.63. CIA, Document Number: 919957; Document Number: 919958.64. Roberto Garcia Ferreira, "'Operaciones en contra': el asilo politico

de Jacobo Arbenz Guzman en Uruguay (1957-60)", Política ySociedad 42 (2004) pp. 45-70.

65. Roberto Garcia Ferreira "Uruguay y Guatemala. La CIA en la prensade 1954" Revista de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala 16(2006) pp. 22-38.

66. Roberto García Ferreira, "El caso de Guatemala: Arévalo, Arbenz yla izquierda uruguaya, 1950-1971" Mesoamérica 49 (2007).

67. Archive of National Office of Information and Intelligence,Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligence and LiaisonService, Folder 280, Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman; Folder 280 A,Subject: Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Comentarios de prensa. SeeRoberto Garcia Ferreira, "Arbenz, la CIA y el exilio en Uruguay"Diálogo (FLACSO) No. Extraordinario, Oct. 2006.

68. La Mañana, Apr. 20, 1957.69. La Mañana, Apr. 25, 1957.70. El País (Uruguay), Apr. 26, 1957.71. CIA, Document Number: 919961.72. El País, May 12, 1957. Ex-president Arbenz's biographical

information published that day was taken from a book published inMexico by the Guatemalan writer Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla. At thesame time, an issue of this publication was donated to the NationalLibrary in Montevideo in 1957 as a "compliment of the Office of'Diffusion, Culture and Tourism of the Presidency of the Republic.'"

73. El País, La Mañana and Acción (Uruguay), May 14,1957.74. In the newspaper original, this is quoted in dark type. Acción, May

14,1957.75. El Día, May 9, 1957; El País, May 12, 1957 and El Plata, May 7,

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1957.76. Howard Hunt, Memorias de un espía. De la CIA al escándalo

Watergate (Barcelona: Noguer, 1975) 137, pp. 140-141.77. Diary of Parliamentary Reports, June 4 and 12, and Aug. 6, 1957.78. A column in the socialist weekly journal perfectly summarized the

contents of the anticommunist media of the time: "Arbenz was a riskto the country's security. Arbenz is in touch with our country's unionagitators. Arbenz is the mastermind behind a communist conspiracyin Latin America. Arbenz ordered the execution of Castillo Armas,the dictator. In conclusion, a proper cap for the unleashed repugnantcampaign (...) would be to fix posters revealing that Arbenz was thereal culprit of the total failure of Uruguayan soccer. Although, intruth, this would be nothing (...) For the moment we can inform thatthe LOA has gathered a sufficient number of secret documents tounmistakingly prove that Arbenz is responsible for the recent solarexplosions." LOA referred to Liga Oriental Anticomunista(Anticommunist League of the East, one of the CIA's fronts inMontevideo. El Sol (Uruguay), Aug. 9, 1957

79. La Tribuna Popular (Uruguay), July 28, 1957, "Arbenz speaks for'La Tribuna Popular.'" Arbenz strongly condemns the crimesperpetrated by traitors in Guatemala. Exclusive report by DOLORESCASTILLO."

80. Lieutenant Captain Fontana transcribed these statements in a reportto his superior, informing him that he made them known "in casethese statements might constitute a transgression of the normsregulating the right to asylum." Archive of National Office ofInformation and Intelligence, Montevideo Police, Office ofInvestigation, Intelligence and Liaison Service, Folder 280, Subject:"Jacobo Arbenz, sus declaraciones", Aug. 7, 1957, 1. It is verypossible that the rapid reaction of this official can be explained by hisclose relation with the CIA in Montevideo. P.Agee, the former CIAofficer, indicated that among his close collaborators "linked to thestation in Montevideo," lieutenant captain Fontana was key. PhilipAgee, La CIA, 465.

81. When the well-fed Arévalo came to Montevideo, "the Arbenz couplebought a very large bed" to place "in the living room." Interview withMartha Valentini, Montevideo, September 2005.

82. The death of Francisco Javier Arana, never well explained byArévalo, was an unsurmountable barrier and a sure reason for friction.While both lived in Montevideo, Jacobo suggested that Arevalopublicly clarify the way Arana had died. Arevalo refused, arguing thatbest thing to do was not to talk about that subject. Piero Gleijeses,

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JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES. FALL 2008

Shattered, p. 70. It may be recalled that one of the strongest issues theCIA used in its campaign against Arbenz was precisely the Aranaafffair. The fact that Arbenz was consistently accused by the media,without a single opportunity to respond, adds another element toprove Maria's testimony, cited by Gleijeses. José Manuel Fortuny,who at the time used to clandestinely visit Montevideo, states that thedifferences between the two former presidents were originated byArbenz's policy regarding the communists. Marco Antonio Flores,Fortuny: un comunista guatemalteco (Guatemala: Óscar de León,1994) pp. 268-269.

83. Marcha (Uruguay), May 2 and May 30,1958; Aug. 8,1958.84. The Uruguayan Intelligence Service gave a different interpretation:

"A few days ago, we obtained confidential information indicating thatthe person named AREVALO would go to live in Caracas, inaccordance with a perfectly devised communist plan, in order todirect the entire Latin American movement, and Arbenz would remainin Montevideo." Archive of National Office of Information andIntelligence, Montevideo Police, Office of Investigation, Intelligenceand Liaison Service, Folder 410, "Caracas - Centro de ActividadesComunistas en América Latina," memo dated March 12, 1959.

85. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, M/esporo, p. 140.86. There are few declassified documents on Arbenz's life in Cuba. CIA,

"Castro Regime Plans Arms Aid To Guatemalan Leftist", 132566;"NSC Briefing, 12 August 1960", 137334; "Cuban Developments",132785; "Cuban Situation: Economic Agreements With Bloc; LatinAmerican Youth Congress", 132769.

87. Prensa Libre (Guatemala), Feb. 12, 1960.88. El Imparcial, March 24, 1960.89. Journalist and intellectual of the right, with a large literature, mainly

with the daily paper La Hora. Years later he was elected VicePresident of the Republic (1966-1970).

90. Z,a//ora, Aug. 10, 1960.91. ¿a/fora, Aug. 11, 1960.92. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 118.93. El Imparcial, Oct. 20, 1965.94. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 120.95. Maria Vilanova de Arbenz, Mi esposo, p. 122.96. ¿a/fora,Nov. 2, 1970.97. A/arcAa,Jan. 29, 1971.98. See Alfredo Guerra Borges, "Semblanza de la Revolución

Guatemalteca de 1944-1954" and Alcira Goicolea, "Los Diez Añosde Primavera" in Jorge Lujan Muñoz [Dir.], Historia General de

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Guatemala (Guatemala, Asociación de Amigos del País y Fundaciónpara la Cultura y el Desarrollo, 1997) Tomo VI, pp. 11-22; 23-40.

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ferreira.cia and jacobo arbenz.disinformation

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