Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 6 : 3 (June 2000),pp. 445-458

The Precautionary Principle: A EuropeanPerspective

Peter H. Sand

Institute of International Law, University of Munich

Address: Elisabeth-Str. 38D-80796 Munich, Germany

Phone (49-89) 180-645Fax (49-89) 123-3985

e-mail <p.sand@jura.uni-muenchen.de>

1

ABSTRACT

The ‘precautionary principle’, as formulated in the 1992 Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development, calls for

regulatory action in the face of serious environmental risks

even in the absence of full scientific certainty. This paper

traces negotiation of the principle at the Rio Conference,

and its history in Europe, from 1969 Swedish legislation to

the latest directives of the European Union. As illustrated

by recent court cases from Germany and France, in particular

(on nuclear power plants, electro-magnetic fields, and

genetically modified organisms), judicial interpretation of

the principle has tended to be restrictive. Future law-

making in this field is likely to focus on public access to

environmental risk information, and on the development of

new ‘right-to-know’ instruments such as mandatory product

labelling and transnational pollutant release inventories,

an area where Europe can still learn from North American

experience.

2

KEY WORDS

biosafety standards

environmental risk management

European Union

hormone-beef dispute

international environmental law

public access to information

3

The precautionary concept has been described as “the most

important new policy approach in international environmental

cooperation” (Freestone, 1991, 36). After making its

international debut in a number of ‘soft law’ statements in

the 1980s – including the World Charter for Nature (UNGA,

1982), ministerial declarations at the 1984 and 1987 North

Sea Conferences, and in the Governing Council of the United

Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 1989) –, it has since

found its way into at least fourteen ‘hard’ multilateral

agreements (Cameron and Abouchar, 1991; Nollkaemper, 1991;

Hey, 1992; Scovazzi, 1992; Hohmann, 1994; Freestone and Hey,

1995; Primosch, 1996; McIntyre and Mosedale, 1997; Martin-

Bidou, 1999):

the 1991 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the

Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes

within Africa, article 4(3)(f);

the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, article

4

3(3);

the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, preamble;

the 1992 UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of

Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, article 2(5)(a),

and its 1999 London Protocol on Water and Health, article 5(a);

the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment

of the North-East Atlantic, article 2(2)(a);

the 1992 Helsinki Convention for the Protection of the Baltic Sea Area,

article 3(2);

the 1994 Oslo Protocol (on sulphur emission reductions), the

two 1998 Aarhus Protocols (on heavy metals, and on persistent

organic pollutants), and the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol (on

acidification, eutrophication and ground-level ozone) to

the 1979 UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary

Air Pollution, preambles;

the 1995 Agreement implementing the 1982 UN Convention on

the Law of the Sea, relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly

Migratory Fish Stocks, article 6(2);

the 1996 Syracuse Protocol (to the 1976 Barcelona Convention)

for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-

5

Based Sources, preamble; and

the 1996 London Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of

Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, article

1(3).

According to a landmark 1996 decision by the Indian Supreme

Court, the precautionary principle is already considered

part of customary international law (Vellore case, 1996,

confirmed in five subsequent judgments by the same court;

Anderson, 1998). Yet invocation of the principle as a basis

for global risk management remains controversial –

sometimes explosively so: witness the collapse of

negotiations for a biosafety protocol at the Cartagena

meeting in February 1999, where disagreement on

‘precautionary’ draft provisions was a contributing factor

(IISD, 1999, 3). Even after the compromise reached in

Montreal on 29 January 2000, the new protocol

<http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/BIOSAFETY-PROTOCOL.htm> leaves a wide

deficit of interpretation.

6

The standard English translation as ‘precautionary

principle’ is but an all too imperfect approximation of the

Vorsorge-Prinzip from which it was derived, since it fails to

bring across some of the linguistic ‘hyperlinks’ associated

with the original German concept – such as Besorgnis (concern)

and Sorgfalt (care, in the sense of diligence), let alone the

mystical figure of Sorge (care, in the sense of worry) from

Goethe’s 1832 drama, Faust (Part II, Act V, Scene IV),

recently re-discovered by American environmental lawyers

(Rich, 1994, 318; see Burdach, 1923). To avoid some of the

semantic confusion noted by critics (Gündling, 1990, 26;

Bodansky, 1991), let us take as a starting point the core

definition as formulated in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration

on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992, 6; Mann, 1992; Koh,

1994; Porras, 1994):

“Where there are threats of serious or irreversible

damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be

used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures

to prevent environmental degradation.”

7

Save for the not-so-innocuous rider ‘cost-effective’ – which

originated in article 7 of the Second World Climate

Conference (WMO, 1990; Kovar, 1993, 134), and which was

slipped into the Rio text by the US delegation, over the

objections of the European Union and Japan,1 – that sentence

in Principle 15 was a verbatim quote from the 1990 Bergen

Declaration by 34 environment ministers from Europe and

North America.2

1 While the ‘cost-‘prefix had not been part of the original US draft

proposal submitted to Working Group III of the UNCED Preparatory

Committee during its 4th session (A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.21 of 4 March

1992, principle 6), it was added as an oral ‘correction’ by the US

delegate, State Department lawyer Jeffrey D. Kovar, on 12 March 1992.

Even though the delegates of Portugal (on behalf of the European Union)

and of Japan on 24 March 1992 proposed to delete the rider, Working

Group III retained it [within square brackets] in the Chairman’s draft

of 31 March 1992 (A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.33, principle 12) which served

as the basis for the final text at Rio (A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.33/Rev.1,

principle 15). 2 Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the UN/ECE

Region (Bergen/Norway, 16 May 1990), article 7, Yearbook of International

Environmental Law 1 (1990), 431; also incorporated in article 3(3) of the

1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Inclusion of that same

sentence, with only minor variations, was formally proposed in the pre-

Rio negotiations by the USA (see note 1), by the European Union

(A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.25 of 6 March 1992, principle 6, revising an 8

Predictably, therefore, the principle was eyed with some

suspicion by Third World countries (the so-called ‘Group of

77’), who always considered it a typical ‘Northern’ demand

and who swallowed it without enthusiasm at the time, and

only in return for the acceptance of other ‘Southern’ points

in the bargain.3 It is all the more ironic now, eight years

after Rio, to see the United States and its ‘Miami group’ in

the biosafety negotiations opposing the precautionary

principle – and the Group of 77 (now called the ‘like-minded

group’) defending it, with diplomatic support from the

earlier proposal submitted at the 3rd PrepCom session, and replacing

‘should’ by ‘shall’), and by the Scandinavian countries

(A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.27 of 9 March 1992, principle 11). 3 The original proposal submitted on 4 March 1992 by China and by

Pakistan (on behalf of the Group of 77, A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.20) made

no reference to the precautionary principle, but eventually took it on

board – albeit with a rider reserving the special socio-economic

situation of developing countries, again drawn from the ministerial

declaration of the Second World Climate Conference (WMO 1990) – in a

revised compromise draft on 19 March 1992

(A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.20/Rev.1, principle 12). The United States

reserved its position on some of the ‘Southern’ points (by way of an

‘interpretative statement’ at the time of adoption of the Rio

Declaration, A/CONF.151/26, vol.IV, paragraph 16), but did not object to

Principle 15 (Kovar, 1994, 122; Sand, 1999, 67). 9

European Union

Not that Europeans have been all that unanimous about it all

this time. In 1995, when the precautionary principle was

for the first time invoked before the International Court of

Justice – in the Nuclear Tests case brought by New Zealand

against France –, the French Government responded that the

legal status of the principle was ‘uncertain’ (ICJ, 1995, p.

56; Bothe, 1996). And not so long ago, the UK Government had

even less kind things to say about the principle when it was

invoked by the European Commission as a reason for

precautionary trade restrictions against the risk of bovine

spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), popularly known as ‘mad cow

disease’ (Giddens, 1998, 29; Giddens, 1999, 9). Principles

are principles – alas, the French bomb is the French bomb;

and British beef is British beef.

From the point of view of comparative law, a country-by-

country study commissioned by the German Federal

Environmental Agency came to the conclusion that there are

indeed two distinct camps in the modern industrialized world

10

(Rehbinder, 1991): ‘precaution countries’ (including

Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, along

with the United States); and ‘protection countries’

(including France and the UK, along with Japan).

Historically, to be sure, the precautionary approach in

Europe goes back much further than the often-quoted German

parliamentary report on the environment (Umweltbericht, 1976;

von Moltke, 1988; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994; von Lersner,

1994) or the Swiss Federal Environmental Protection Act

(Umweltschutz-Gesetz, 1983, article 1/2; Koechlin, 1989).

Sociologists have long diagnosed a ‘crisis of the provident

state’ as Europe had come to know it in the 19th and early

20th century (Rosanvallon, 1981). François Ewald, at the

Collège de France, notes a transformation from traditional

social security to ‘insurance society’ (Ewald, 1986) in the

new welfare state which Anthony Giddens, at the London

School of Economics, now sees as ‘a form of collective risk

management’ (Giddens, 1999). Ulrich Beck, at the University

of Munich, comes to the opposite conclusion: What he calls

‘risk society’ or ‘world risk society’, in the wake of

11

globalization (Beck, 1986, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998; Lagadec,

1981), is actually un-insured (versicherungslos), he says; for

paradoxically, post-modern society’s insurance coverage

seems to decrease as the risks increase (Beck, 1991a, 122).

Be that as it may – it was in Scandinavia, at the peak of

that region’s own experiment with the welfare state, where

the precautionary principle was first translated into a

general legal rule: The Swedish Environment Protection Act

(Miljöskydds-Lag, 1969; Sand 1972, 6; Westerlund, 1981) –

enacted half a year before the US National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA, 1970) – introduced the concept of

‘environmentally hazardous activities’ (miljöfarlig verksamheter;

Westerlund, 1975, 1977), for which the burden of proof is

flatly reversed; i.e., the regulatory authorities “do not

have to demonstrate that a certain impact will occur;

instead, the mere risk (if not remote) is to be deemed

enough to warrant protective measures or a ban on the

activity” (Westerlund, 1981, 231). That, of course, is

nothing less than what international legal experts today

12

define as the most radical variant of the precautionary

principle (CSD 1996, 18). It has been the law in Sweden for

the past thirty years, and is also reflected in the

legislation of other Nordic countries, including Denmark’s

1973 Environment Protection Act, Norway’s 1981 Pollution

Control Act and Finland’s 1992 Environmental Permits Act

(Lindgard, 1998). (The idea of subjecting hazardous

industries to precautionary permit conditions can, of

course, be traced much further back in European

environmental law, including the 1906 Alkali and Other Works

Regulation Act in Great Britain, 19th century French

legislation on installations classées, and Prussia’s Gewerbe-

Ordnung of 1845).

In less radical garb, precautionary policies also made their

appearance in the emerging quasi-federal law of the European

Union, starting with some early environmental ‘directives’

adopted in the wake of the 1976 accident in Seveso/Italy

(‘Seveso Directive’, 1982; Hancher, 1995), and culminating

in more recent enactments such as the 1990 GMO Directive,

13

the 1997 ‘Novel Foods Regulation’ and the 1998 Biotechnology

Directive (Rehbinder, 1999), where EU law-making – because

of trade prerogatives in the intra-European common market –

has to a large extent superseded national regulatory powers.

The 1992 Maastricht treaty amendment, which may be said to

have elevated the precautionary principle to the rank of

European constitutional goal,4 was merely a logical

consequence and formal recognition of that trend. There is

no doubt that its impact will be felt well beyond the

geographical scope of the EU, as the latest row over

‘hormone-beef’ imports from the United States illustrates.5

Indeed, the precautionary principle “seems to loom as a

4 Article 130(r )(2) stipulates that EU environmental policy “shall be

based on the precautionary principle”; International Legal Materials 31 (1992),

247 (Epiney, 1997, 98). Pursuant to the 1997 Amsterdam consolidation of

the Treaty (effective 1 May 1999), article 130(r) has now been

renumbered article 174; Official Journal of the European Communities (1997) C

340/145. See also the Communication from the Commission on the

Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1.5 After the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 13

February 1998 found the EU ban on US ‘hormone beef’ imports contrary to

the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS, in force

since 1995; Walker, 1998), the EU submitted new scientific evidence in

May 1999 to maintain the ban, which now faces countervailing trade

measures by the United States. 14

major new controversial issue on the trade and environment

horizon” in negotiations in the World Trade Organization

(ICTSD, 1999, 8; von Moltke, 1999), with the European Union

pleading for clarification and expansion of the principle,

and the US calling for sanitary and phytosanitary measures

to be based on ‘sound science’.

Mind you, as we say in German, “we never eat our soup as hot

as we boil it.” European political and even legislative

pronouncements of the precautionary principle are one thing,

application by courts and administrative authorities is

quite another. So far, the European Court of Justice has

sanctioned the principle only implicitly, when confirming

the validity of EU Council Regulation 345/92 on Driftnet

Fishing, which had been challenged in a French court

(Mondiet case, 1993; Hey, 1998, 6). In Sweden, “even if the

principle is well and explicitly founded in law, the

authorities are often reluctant to make use of it – even

though in theory they are obliged to do so” (Westerlund

1981, 231). In the United Kingdom, where the principle was

15

formally endorsed by a Government White Paper (Department of

the Environment 1990, 7; Haigh, 1994), attempts at

establishing it in the courts have been notoriously

unsuccessful in at least two instances (Duddridge case,

1994; Gateshead case, 1996), and inconclusive in others

(McAlpine Homes case, 1994; Bodansky and Brunnée, 1998, 16).

In the Netherlands, two judgments involving wastewater

discharges and offshore drilling permits, respectively, did

invoke the precautionary principle but may also be founded

on other existing rules of Dutch environmental legislation

and administrative due process (Wadden Sea cases, 1996-97;

Nollkaemper, 1998; Backes and Verschuuren, 1998). The French

Council of State, in an action for closure of a nuclear

power plant on the Swiss border near Geneva, initially

refused to consider the precautionary principle formulated

in the Maastricht amendment (see note 4 above) as self-

executing in the member states of the European Union

(Superphénix case, 1997, 229; Colson, 1998), but has since

accepted it as “serious ground” to justify suspension of a

ministerial permit for the cultivation and marketing in

16

France of bio-engineered corn (by a Swiss corporation, tit

for tat: Transgenic Maize case, 1998).6 However, what

remains of the principle after it was transformed into

French national law reads rather different from the original

Rio text:

“Lack of certainty, taking into account scientific and

technical knowledge at the time, shall not delay

effective and commensurate measures, at economically

acceptable cost, to prevent the threat of serious and

irreversible damage to the environment” (Loi Barnier,

1995).7

The focus of the precaution debate in France (Godard, 1997)

has thus shifted to legal definitions of ‘irreversibility’,

6 Final judgment on the merits has been postponed, pending a request to

the European Court of Justice for determination of compatibility with

applicable EU law, in light of earlier decisions (97/98 and 98/294) by

the EU Commission to legalize genetically modified corn, Official Journal of

the European Communities (1997) L 31/69 and (1998) L 131/33. See case No.

6/99, Official Journal of the European Communities (1999) C 71/17 (Bojic

Bultrini, 1998, 484; Douma and Matthee, 1999, 157).7 Article 1(1)(3) [my translation and emphasis]. Curiously, the

authentic French text of Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration did

not contain the ‘cost-effective’ US rider (see note 1 above), an

omission for which the 1995 French statute more than compensates.17

as a criterion for distinguishing tolerable from intolerable

risks – so far with less than conclusive results (Fritz-

Legendre, 1998; Prieur,1998).

Germany has had the largest share of court cases involving

the precautionary approach, in response to the plethora of

federal environmental legislation enacted since the 1970s,

much of it sector-specific and anything but uniform or

consistent. Among the most heavily litigated precautionary

laws were the Federal Act for Protection against Pollution

(BImSchG, 1974, article 5/1/2), and the Biotechnology Act

(GenTG, 1990, article 6/2). The overriding tendency of the

courts has been to limit the margin of administrative

discretion which the precautionary principle inevitably

confers and which critics see as potentially ‘boundless’

(uferlos: Rehbinder, 1991, 11). E.g., as regards operating

permits for nuclear reactors, the two leading judgments by

the Federal Constitutional Court (Kalkar case, 1978) and the

Federal Administrative Court (Wyhl case, 1985) ostensibly

confirm the executive’s power to take precautionary measures

18

against identified ‘dangers’ as well as against as yet

unidentified ‘risks’, but then go on to define a lower-level

‘residual risk’ (Rest-Risiko) which the public (and the

plaintiffs adjoining the power plant) will have to tolerate;

and in a more recent decision, the Federal Administrative

Court considered leucemia risks in a power plant’s

neighbourhood too remote to warrant revocation of a lower

court’s permit approval (Krümmel case, 1998). Similarly, in

several appellate judgments concerning electro-magnetic

fields of mobile phone networks, actionable health risks

were distinguished from mere ‘concerns’ (Besorgnis) deemed

insufficient to invalidate operating permits.8 In a case

involving production of erythropoietin (EPO hormone) from

bio-engineered mouse cells, the Administrative District

Court of Giessen held that precautionary measures with

regard to genetically modified organisms were warranted only

“up to a degree which in light of risk assessment on the

8 Decision of 18 May 1993 by the Munster OVG (Administrative Court of

Appeal), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [New Administrative Law Review] 12

(1993), 1115; two further judgments reported ibid., 1116-1119 (Di Fabio,

1995); and recent cases following the 1996 German federal regulations on

electro-magnetic fields (Kirchberg, 1998).19

basis of the best available scientific and technological

information is sufficient to ensure control of the risk”

(EPO-Mouse case, 1992; Appel, 1996; Jörgensen and Winter,

1996). And in a landmark case concerning forest damage

attributed to acid rain, the Federal Supreme Court had in

1987 already dismissed attempts at invoking the

precautionary principle as a basis for holding the federal

government liable for ‘legislative inaction’ (Waldsterben

case, 1987; Rest,1997, 414). There is indeed a wide range of

legal and procedural constraints on precautionary action –

including the Administration’s duty to make full use of all

available information; the duty to undertake benefit-risk

assessments; the duty to motivate and disclose assessments;

and general due process rules such as the requirement that

precautionary measures be commensurate with the risk, and

not excessive (Von Moltke, 1988, 68; Rehbinder, 1991, 253;

Ladeur, 1995, 99; Di Fabio, 1996, 572).

That being said, the precautionary principle is alive and

well in Germany. It is perhaps worth recalling that the

20

principle was introduced by a Social-Democrat Government in

the 1970s, and the Social-Democrats are now back in power in

coalition with the Greens. One of their first long-term

policy decisions – to phase out nuclear power production –

was crucially dependent on the Vorsorge-Prinzip as a legal

basis to terminate existing operating permits. The German

Nuclear Energy Act (Atom-Gesetz 1976, article 7/2/3) provides

for ‘conditionally suspended injunctions’ (Verbot mit Erlaubnis-

Vorbehalt) rather than conditional permits, thereby shifting

the burden of proof to the operator. Whether the

precautionary principle will also serve to terminate

Germany’s existing long-term contracts for nuclear waste re-

processing in France and Britain remains to be seen. The

bilateral agreements concluded in 1990 between the German

Nuclear Fuel Re-Processing Corporation (DWK) and its French

and British counterparts (Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires

and British Nuclear Fuels plc), though backstopped by joint

governmental declarations, contain saving clauses in the

event of ‘act or restraint of government’ (‘Gesetze oder

einschränkende Massnahmen der Regierung’ in the German text; Wahl

21

and Hermes, 1995, 34). Significantly, the need to preserve

sufficient flexibility for executive action in transnational

nuclear relations is considered part of the rationale for

the precautionary principle as interpreted by the Federal

Constitutional Court (Kalkar case, 1978, 147).

The legal ramifications of the precautionary principle are

probably most significant when it comes to information

access. It was Peter Bernstein, in his fascinating book

Against the Gods, who said that “risk is not fate, it is

choice” (Bernstein, 1996, 8); and his point seems to be

borne out by anthropologists contending that “we choose the

risks in the same package as we choose our social

institutions” (Douglas and Wildawsky, 1982). It follows

that those who take the risk (and who will potentially

suffer the consequences) should be given equal access to all

information enabling them to know what their choices are.

Hence, information about risk of harm should never be

monopolized, whether by public or private knowledge-holders,

and should by definition be common property.

22

A number of mechanisms are becoming available for this

purpose – from precautionary labelling and life-cycle

product information, to new methods of public and private

risk disclosure. In this regard, most parts of the world

still have a lot to learn from the American experience.

Munich sociologist Ulrich Beck actually considers civil

society ‘disenfranchised in risk matters’ (Beck, 1991b, 68).

Except for Scandinavia, European legal systems have no

equivalent to what has been extolled as “the new Magna

Charta of ecological democracy” (Fischer, 1989, 152): the

US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 1966) and its Canadian

counterpart, the Access to Information Act (AIA, 1983), which

together with parallel state/provincial legislation such as

the Ohio Public Records Act and the British Columbia Freedom of

Information and Protection of Privacy Act make government-held

knowledge generally accessible to concerned citizens (CEC,

1999). The European Union’s timid Directive on Freedom of

Access to Information on the Environment (EC Directive 90/313, 1990)

has yet to be transformed into actual administrative

23

practice in most member states (Hallo, 1996; Kimber and

Eckardt, 1999); and the more progressive Aarhus Convention on

Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to

Justice in Environmental Matters (UN/ECE, 1998; Prieur, 1999) has

yet to enter into force.

There is even less international experience with rules on

access to privately-held risk information, by way of

community ‘right-to-know’ and ‘duty-to-warn’ statutes.

Communities outside North America can only dream of the kind

of geographically specific and user-friendly data now

available from the US Toxics Release Inventory (TRI, 1998; Bass

and MacLean, 1993; EDF, 1998) and Canada’s National Pollutant

Release Inventory (NPRI, 1997; UNEP, 1999, 309), which anybody

can download from the Internet. Efforts to extend this type

of risk communication across political boundaries – possibly

through voluntary commitments or ‘codes of conduct’ by

responsible multinational corporations – should be a

priority in making the precautionary principle work

transnationally (OECD, 1998). Rather than the ‘provident

24

state’, it is the provident citizen and the provident

consumer who must be empowered to take informed

precautionary action – so as to exercise the choice of risks

which we are told we have.

25

References

AIA (Access to Information Act). 1983. Revised Statutes of Canada

(1985), chapter A-1.

Anderson, M.R. 1998. International Environmental Law in

Indian Courts. Review of European Community and International

Environmental Law 7:1, 21-30.

Appel, I. 1996. Stufen der Risiko-Abwehr [stages of guard

against risk]. Natur und Recht [Nature and Law] 18:5,

227-235.

Atom-Gesetz. 1976. German Nuclear Energy Act of 23 December

1959, as revised in 1976. Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal

Legislation Gazette] (1976) 1, 3053.

Backes, C.W., and Verschuuren, J.M. 1998. The Precautionary

Principle in International, European, and Dutch

Wildlife Law. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law

26

and Policy 9:1, 43-70.

Bass, G.D., and MacLean, A. 1993. Enhancing the Public’s

Right-to-Know About Environmental Issues. Villanova

Environmental Law Journal 4:3, 287-310.

Beck, U. 1986. Risiko-Gesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne.

Frankfurt, Suhrkamp; 9th ed. 1992; English transl. by

Ritter, M.A. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.

London, Thousand Oaks/CA and New Delhi, Sage.

Beck, U. 1991a. Überlebens-Fragen, Sozial-Strukturen und

ökologische Aufklärung. In: Politik in der Risiko-Gesellschaft,

pp. 117-138 (Beck, U. Ed.). Frankfurt, Suhrkamp;

English transl. 1996. Risk Society and the Provident

State. In: Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology,

pp. 27-43 (Lash, S., Szerszynski, B., and Wynne, B.,

Eds.). London, Thousand Oaks/CA and New Delhi, Sage.

Beck, U. 1991b. Der anthropologische Schock: Tschernobyl und

27

die Konturen der Risiko-Gesellschaft. In: Politik in der

Risiko-Gesellschaft, pp. 67-81 (Beck, U., Ed.). Frankfurt,

Suhrkamp; English transl. 1995, in: Ecological

Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of Risk Society (Beck, U.,

Ed.). Atlantic Highlands/NJ, Humanity Press.

Beck, U. 1992. Modern Society as a Risk Society. In: The

Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into Contemporary Societies

(Stehr, N., and Ericson, R., Eds.). Berlin and New

York, de Gruyter.

Beck, U. 1995. Welt-Risiko-Gesellschaft: zur politischen Dynamik globaler

Gefahren [world risk society: on the political dynamics

of global dangers]. Munich, Deutsche Gesellschaft für

Auswärtige Politik.

Beck, U. 1996. World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society?

Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured

Uncertainties, Theory, Culture and Society 13:4.

28

Beck, U. 1998. Politics of Risk Society. In: The Politics of Risk

Society, pp. 9-22 (Franklin, J., Ed.). Cambridge, Polity

Press.

Bernstein, P.L. 1996. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk.

New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto and Singapore,

Wiley & Sons.

BImSchG (Bundes-Immissions-Schutz-Gesetz). 1974. German Federal

Act for Protection Against Pollution; enacted on 1

April 1974, consolidated on 14 May 1995. Bundesgesetzblatt

[Federal Legislation Gazette] (1995) 1, 930.

Bodansky, D. 1991. Scientific Uncertainty and the

Precautionary Principle. Environment 33:7, 4-8.

Bodansky, D., and Brunnée, J. 1998. The Role of National

Courts in the Field of International Environmental Law.

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law

7:1, 11-20.

29

Boehmer-Christiansen, S. 1994. The Precautionary Principle

in Germany: Enabling Government. In: Interpreting the

Precautionary Principle, pp. 38-52 (O’Riordan, T., and

Cameron, J., Eds.). London, Cameron May.

Bojic Bultrini, D. 1998. La directive européenne sur la

protection juridique des inventions biotechnologiques:

la vie enfin dans le ‘filet’ communautaire? Revue

Juridique de l’Environnement 23:4, 463-484.

Bothe, M. 1996. Challenging French Nuclear Tests: A Role for

Legal Remedies? Review of European Community and International

Law 5:3, 253-258.

Burdach, K. 1923. Faust und die Sorge [Faust and Care].

Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und

Geistesgeschichte [German Quarterly Review for the Science

of Literature and the History of Ideas] 1:1.

30

Cameron, J., and Abouchar, J. 1991. The Precautionary

Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy

for the Protection of the Global Environment. Boston

College International and Comparative Law Review 14:1, 1-27.

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, to the 1992 Convention on

Biological Diversity. 2000. Adopted in Montreal on 29

January 2000. International Legal Materials 39, 1027.

CEC (Commission for Environmental Cooperation). 1999. Public

Access to Government-Held Environmental Information:

Report on North American Law, Policy and Practice. In:

North American Environmental Law and Policy, p. 57-197 (Paquin,

M., Ed.). Cowansville/Qué., Editions Yvon Blais.

CSD (Commission on Sustainable Development). 1996. Report of

the Expert Meeting on Identification of Principles of International Law for

Sustainable Development. Background Paper No. 3 for the 4th

Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development.

New York, New York: United Nations, April 1996.

31

Colson, J.P. 1998. Superphénix et le droit. Revue Juridique de

l’Environnement 23:2, 157-169.

Department of the Environment. 1990. This Common Inheritance.

White Paper on Environmental Policy. London, H.M.

Stationery Office.

Di Fabio, U. 1995. Rechtsfragen zu unerkannten Gesundheits-

Risiken elektro-magnetischer Felder [legal questions

relating to unidentified health risks of electro-

magnetic fields]. Die Öffentliche Verwaltung [Public

Administration] 48:1, 1-9.

Di Fabio, U. 1996. Gefahr, Vorsorge, Risiko: Die Gefahren-

Abwehr unter dem Einfluss des Vorsorge-Prinzips

[danger, precaution, risk: defense against dangers in

light of the precautionary principle]. Jura 18:11, 566-

574.

32

Douglas, M., and Wildawsky, A. 1982. Risk and Culture: An Essay on

the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley,

Univ. of California Press.

Douma, W.T., and Matthee, M. 1999. Towards New EC Rules on

the Release of Genetically Modified Organisms. Review of

European Community and International Environmental Law 8:2, 152-

159.

Duddridge case, 1994. R. vs. Secretary of State for Trade

and Industry ex parte Duddridge and others . Queen’s

Bench. Environmental Law Reporter (1994), 151.

EC Directive 90/313. Council of the European Communities,

Directive of 7 June 1990 on Freedom of Access to

Information on the Environment, Official Journal of the

European Communities (1990) L 158/56; see also the code of

conduct (93/730) regarding public access to EU Council

and Commission documents, Official Journal of the European

Communities (1993) L 340/41.

33

EDF (Environmental Defense Fund). 1998. Chemical Scorecard.

<http://www.scorecard.org>. New York.

Epiney, A. 1997. Umweltrecht in der Europäischen Union

[Environmental Law in the European Union]. Cologne,

Heymanns.

EPO-Mouse case, 1992. Judgment of 2 September 1992 by the

Administrative District Court [Verwaltungsgericht] of

Giessen. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [New

Administrative Law Review] (1993 case reports) 6:RR,

534.

Ewald, F. 1986. L’Etat providence. Paris, Bernard Grasset;

German summary: Die Versicherungs-Gesellschaft

[insurance society]. Kritische Justiz 22:4 (1989).

Fischer, J. 1989. Der Umbau der Industrie-Gesellschaft: Plädoyer wider die

herrschende Umweltlüge. Frankfurt, Eichborn; English

34

transl. 1995 in: Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of

Risk Society (Beck, U., Ed.). Atlantic Highlands/NJ,

Humanity Press. (Joschka Fischer, prominent German

Green, is now the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs).

FOIA (Freedom of Information Act). 1966, as supplemented by

the 1996 Electronic Freedom of Information Act

Amendments. United States Code 5, 552.

Freestone, D. 1991. The Precautionary Principle. In:

International Law and Global Climate Change, pp. 21-39

(Churchill, R. and Freestone, D., Eds.). London, Graham

& Trotman.

Freestone, D., and Hey, E., Eds. 1995. The Precautionary Principle

and International Law: The Challenge of Implementation. London,

Kluwer Law International.

Fritz-Legendre, M. 1998. Biodiversité et irreversibilité.

Revue Juridique de l’Environnement 23 (special issue), 79-100.

35

Gateshead case, 1996. Gateshead Metropolitan Borough Council

vs. Secretary of State for the Environment and

Northumbrian Water Group plc. High Court judgment.

Property and Compensation Reports 7, 350.

GenTG (Gen-Technik-Gesetz). 1990. German Biotechnology Act,

enacted on 1 July 1990. Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal

Legislation Gazette] (1990) 1, 1080.

Giddens, A. 1998. Risk Society: The Context of British

Politics. In: The Politics of Risk Society, p. 23-34 (Franklin,

J., Ed.). Cambridge, Polity Press.

Giddens, A. 1999. Risk and Responsibility. Modern Law Review

62:1, 1-10.

Godard, O., Ed., 1997. Le principe de précaution dans la conduite des

affaires humaines. Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme

Gündling, L. 1990. The Status in International Law of the

36

Principle of Precautionary Action. International Journal of

Estuarine and Coastal Law 5:1, 23-30.

Haigh, N. 1994. The Introduction of the Precautionary

Principle into the United Kingdom. In: Interpreting the

Precautionary Principle, pp. 229-251 (O’Riordan, T., and

Cameron, J., Eds.). London, Cameron May.

Hallo, R.E., Ed. 1996. Access to Environmental Information in Europe.

London, Kluwer Law International.

Hancher, L. 1995. EC Environmental Policy: A Precautionary

Tale? In: The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The

Challenge of Implementation, p. 187-207 (Freestone, D., and

Hey, E., Eds.). London, Kluwer Law International.

Hey, E. 1992. The Precautionary Concept in Environmental

Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution. Georgetown

International Environmental Law Review 4:2, 303-318.

37

Hey, E. 1998. The European Community’s Courts and

International Environmental Agreements. Review of European

Community and International Environmental Law 7:1, 4-10.

Hohmann, H. 1994. Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern

International Environmental Law: The Precautionary Principle. London,

Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff.

ICJ (International Court of Justice). 1995. Nuclear Tests

Case. The Hague, 12 September 1995. Verbatim Record

CR/995/20.

ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable

Development). 1999. Special report on the WTO High-

Level Symposium on Trade and Environment in March 1999.

Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable Development 3:2, 7-10.

IISD (International Institute for Sustainable Development).

1999. Earth Negotiations Bulletin 9:117 (26 February 1999).

<http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/biodiv/bswg6>.

38

Jörgensen, M., and Winter, G. 1996. Rechtliche Probleme der

Freisetzung von gentechnisch veränderten Organismen

[legal problems regarding the release of genetically

modified organisms]. Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht

[Environmental Law Review] 4:6, 293-299.

Kalkar case, 1978. Judgment of 8 August 1978 by the German

Constitutional Court (Karlsruhe). Entscheidungen des

Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal

Constitutional Court] 49 (1979), 89.

Kimber, C.J.M., and Eckardt, F. 1999. Zugang zu Umwelt-

Informationen in Grossbritannien und Deutschland

[access to environmental information in Great Britain

and Germany]. Natur und Recht [Nature and Law] 21:5, 262-

268.

Kirchberg, C. 1998. Elektrosmog – und (k)ein Ende? [electro-

smog – (n)evermore?] Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [New

39

Administrative Law Review] 17:4, 375-378.

Koechlin, D. 1989. Das Vorsorge-Prinzip im Umweltschutz-Gesetz unter

besonderer Berücksichtigung der Emissions- und Immissions-Grenzwerte

[The Precautionary Principle in the (Swiss)

Environmental Protection Act, with special regard to

the Standards for Pollutant Emissions and Ambient

Environmental Quality]. Basel and Frankfurt, Helbing &

Lichtenhahn.

Koh, T.T. 1994. UNCED Leadership: A Personal Perspective.

In: Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), pp.

165-169 (Spector, B.I., Sjöstedt G., and Zartman, I.W.,

Eds.). London, Graham & Trotman.

Kovar, J.D. 1993. A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration.

Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 4:1,

119-140.

40

Krümmel case, 1998. Judgment of 16 February 1998 by the

German Federal Administrative Court

(Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Berlin). Neue Zeitschrift für

Verwaltungsrecht [New Administrative Law Review] 17

(1998), 631.

Ladeur, K.H. 1995. Das Umweltrecht der Wissens-Gesellschaft: Von der

Gefahren-Abwehr zum Risiko-Management [Environmental Law in

Knowledge Society: From Danger Guard towards Risk

Management] Berlin, Duncker & Humblot.

Lagadec, P. 1981. La civilisation du risque: catastrophes technologiques et

responsabilité sociale. Paris, Editions du Seuil; English

transl. 1982. Major Technological Risks: An Assessment of Industrial

Disasters. Oxford and New York, Pergamon Press.

Lindgard, E., Ed. 1998. The Precautionary Principle. Environmental

News No.35. Copenhagen, Danish Environmental Protection

Agency.

41

Loi Barnier. 1995. French Act No. 95-101 of 2 February 1995 on

the further strengthening of environmental law. Journal

Officiel of 3 February 1995,1840.

Mann, H. 1992. The Rio Declaration. Proceedings of the American

Society of International Law 86, 405-411.

Martin-Bidou, P. 1999. Le principe de précaution en droit

international de l’environnement. Revue Générale de Droit

International Public 103:3, 631-666.

McAlpine Homes case, 1994. Alfred McAlpine Homes (North)

Ltd. vs. Secretary of State for the Environment.

Queen’s Bench. New Property Cases (1994), 138.

McIntyre, O., and Mosedale, T. 1997. The Precautionary

Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law.

Journal of Environmental Law 9:2, 221-241.

Miljöskydds-Lag. 1969. Swedish Environment Protection Act of 29

42

May 1969, and related Environment Protection Ordinance.

Svensk Författnings-Samling [Collection of Swedish

Legislation] (1969), 387-388; English transl. 1971.

International Digest of Health Legislation 21, 180.

Mondiet case, 1993. Court of Justice of the European

Communities (Luxembourg), Judgment of 24 November 1993.

European Court Reports (1993) 1, 6133.

NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act). 1970. Public Law

91-190 of 1 January 1970. United States Statutes 83, 852.

NPRI (National Pollutant Release Inventory). 1997.

<http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/npri/index.html.>. Ottawa,

Environment Canada.

Nollkaemper, A. 1991. The Precautionary Principle in

International Environmental Law: What’s New Under the

Sun? Marine Pollution Bulletin 22:2, 107-110.

43

Nollkaemper, A. 1998. Judicial Application of International

Environmental Law in the Netherlands. Review of European

Community and International Environmental Law 7:1, 40-46.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development). 1998. Proceedings of the International

Conference on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers.

<http://www.oecd.org/ehs/prtr/index.htm>. Paris.

Porras, I.M. 1994. The Rio Declaration: A New Basis for

International Cooperation. In: Greening International Law,

pp. 20-34 (Sands, P., Ed.). New York, New Press.

Prieur, M. 1998. L’irreversibilité et la gestion des déchets

radioactifs dans la loi du 30 décembre 1991. Revue

Juridique de l’Environnement 23 (special issue), 125-130.

Prieur, M. 1999. La Convention de Aarhus, instrument

universel de la démocratie environnementale. Revue

Juridique de l’Environnement 24 (special issue), 9-29.

44

Primosch, E.G. 1996. Das Vorsorge-Prinzip im internationalen

Umweltrecht [the precautionary principle in

international environmental law]. Austrian Journal of Public

and International Law 51:3/4, 227-241.

Rehbinder, E. 1991. Das Vorsorge-Prinzip im internationalen Vergleich

[The Precautionary Principle in International

Comparison]. Düsseldorf, Werner.

Rehbinder, E. 1999. Das Konzept des anlage- und produkt-

bezogenen EG-Gentechnik-Rechts: die Freisetzungs-

Richtlinie und die Novel-Foods-Verordnung [the concept

of EU biotechnology law relating to establishments and

products: the GMO Directive and the Novel Foods

Regulation]. Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht [Environmental Law

Review] 7:1, 6-12.

Rest, A. 1997. International Environmental Law in German

Courts. Environmental Policy and Law 27:6, 409-422.

45

Rich, B. 1994. Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental

Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development. Boston/MA, Beacon

Press.

Rosanvallon, P. 1981. La crise de l’Etat providence. Paris, Editions

du Seuil.

Sand, P.H. 1972. Legal Systems for Environment Protection: Japan, Sweden,

United States. FAO Legislative Studies No.4. Rome, Food

and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Sand, P.H. 1999. Transnational Environmental Law: Lessons in Global

Change. The Hague, London, and Boston, Kluwer Law

International.

Scovazzi, T. 1992. Sul principio precauzionale nel diritto

internazionale dell’ambiente. Rivista di Diritto Internazionale

75:3, 699-705.

46

‘Seveso Directive’, 1982. Council of the European

Communities, Directive 82/501 of 24 June 1982 on Major

Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities.

Official Journal of the European Communities (1982) L 230/1, as

amended by Directives 88/610 and 96/82, Official Journal of

the European Communities (1988) L 336/14 and (1997) L

10/13.

Superphénix case, 1997. World Wildlife Fund Geneva et al. vs.

French Republic. Judgment of 28 February 1997 by the

Conseil d’Etat (Paris). Cahiers Juridiques de l’Electricité et du Gas

(1997), 217.

Transgenic Maize, case 1998. Association Greenpeace France

et al. vs. French Republic, Novartis Seed SA and Monsanto

Europe SA. Judgment of 25 September 1998 by the Conseil

d’Etat (Paris). Recueil Dalloz (1998): 2/IR, 240.

TRI (Toxics Release Inventory). 1998.

<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/tri/national.html>.

47

Washington/DC, US Environmental Protection Agency.

Established pursuant to the Emergency Planning and

Community Right-to-Know Act, enacted as part of the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.

Public Law No. 99-499. United States Statutes 100, 1613.

Umweltbericht. 1976. German Government Report on the

Environment, submitted to the Federal Parliament on 14

July 1976, BTD [parliamentary document] 7/5684. Bonn,

Bundestag; supplemented in 1986 by ‘Guidelines on

Environmental Precaution’ (Leitlinien zur Umweltvorsorge),

BTD 10/6028.

Umweltschutz-Gesetz (Bundesgesetz über den Umweltschutz). 1983. Swiss

Federal Act of 7 October 1983 on Environmental

Protection. Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts

[Collection of Swiss Federal Legislation] 814:1.

UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development). 1992. Report of the Conference (Rio de

48

Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992). A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, 1. New

York, United Nations.

UN/ECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe).

1998. Convention on Access to Information, Public

Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice

in Environmental Matters, adopted at Aarhus/Denmark on

25 June 1998; International Legal Materials 38:3 (1999), 517-

533.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 1989. Governing

Council Decision 15/27 of 26 May 1989. Nairobi, United

Nations.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 1999. Global

Environment Outlook 2000. London, Earthscan; see also

<http://irptc.unep.ch/prtr/nat00.html>.

UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). 1982. World Charter for

Nature. Resolution 37/7 of 28 October 1982; International

49

Legal Materials 22:2 (1983), 455.

Vellore case, 1996. Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum vs. Union

of India. Judgment of 28 August 1996 by the Supreme

Court of India. All India Reporter (1996) SC, 2715; Supreme

Court Cases (1996) 5, 647; Journal of Environmental Law 9:3

(1997), 387.

Von Lersner, H. 1994. Vorsorge-Prinzip [precautionary

principle]. In: Handwörterbuch des Umweltrechts [Manual of

Environmental Law], 2nd ed.,Vol. 2, pp. 2703-2710

(Kimminich, O., von Lersner, H., and Storm, P.C.,

Eds.). Berlin, Erich Schmidt.

Von Moltke, K. 1988. The Vorsorge-Prinzip in West German

Environmental Policy. In: Twelfth Report of the Royal

Commission on Environmental Pollution, Annex 3. London, H.M.

Stationery Office.

Von Moltke, K. 1999. The Dilemma of the Precautionary

50

Principle in International Trade. Bridges Between Trade and

Sustainable Development 3:6, 3-5.

Wadden Sea cases, 1996-97. Landelijke Vereniging tot Behout

van de Waddenzee (LVBW) [National Association for

Protection of the Wadden Sea] et al. vs. Minister of

Transport and Public Works. Judgment by the Dutch

Council of State, Judicial Division. Milieu en Recht

[Environment and Law] (1996), 243; and LVBW et al. vs.

Minister of Economics. Judgment of 28 April 1997 by the

Leeuwarden District Court. Milieu en Recht (1997), 99.

Wahl, R., and Hermes, G. 1995. Nationale Kernenergie-Politik und

Gemeinschaftsrecht [National Nuclear Energy Policy and

European Union Law]. Düsseldorf , Werner.

Waldsterben [forest die-back] case, 1987. City of Augsburg

et al. vs. Federal Republic of Germany . Judgment of 10

December 1987 by the German Federal Supreme Court

[Bundesgerichtshof, Karlsruhe]. Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt

51

[German Administration Review] 103 (1988), 232.

Walker, V.R. 1998. Keeping the WTO from Becoming the ‘World

Trans-Science Organization’: Scientific Uncertainty,

Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormone

Disputes. Cornell International Law Journal 31:2, 251-320.

Westerlund, S. 1975. Miljöfarlig Verksamhet [Environmentally

Hazardous Activity]. Stockholm, Norstedt.

Westerlund, S. 1977. The Legal Control of Land Use and

Environmental Quality in Sweden. In: European

Environmental Law: Legal and Economic Appraisal, pp. 392-398

(Ercman, S., Ed.). Bern, Bubenberg.

Westerlund, S. 1981. Legal Antipollution Standards in

Sweden. Scandinavian Studies in Law 25, 223-244.

WMO (World Meteorological Organization). 1990. Ministerial

Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference

52

(Geneva, 7 November 1990); Yearbook of International

Environmental Law 1, 473.

Wyhl case, 1985. Judgment of 19 December 1985 by the German

Federal Administrative Court (Berlin). Entscheidungen des

Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal

Administrative Court] 72 (1986), 300.

53