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Populations, Individuals and I-languages.

Tristan Tondino (word-count 5992, including references)

Abstract: Chomsky’s study of the complex “subsystem” of Homo sapiens, “informally” the “language organ”, contains many insights which are relevant to the debate and definition of ‘natural selection’ or ‘fitness’. I sketch Chomsky’s most pertinent views and find particularly useful the idealisation he coined “I-language” which I define and relate to the population/individual causality debate, by retracing the steps of Roberta L. Millstein and Frédéric Bouchard. The notion of a ‘causal mechanism’ is central to Chomsky’s work and to his rejection of behaviorism and the social or institutional view of language. The main theme of this paper is that a many-factored and robust theory of the causal mechanism of natural selection

is unavoidable and an asset for evolutionary biologists. The mechanism denoted by ‘fitness’ is too complex and varied to be simplified into one kind.

1. Philosophy of Language and Science. 2. The Terms and the Reference Problem. 3. Fitness Eliminativism and the PiTTness of x. 4. The PiTTness of Traits and the Language Trait. 5. I-language. 6. The Ontological Problem; Mathematical Objects and Objects with Mass. 7. The Property/Causality Problem (PCS). 8. Conclusion.

Introduction:

Following Chomsky’s lead, I argue that the scientific study of language has been largely

ignored by philosophers of language and that in so doing they have neglected to treat

language as a biological entity found in individuals. Thus, I defend the fundamental

distinction between scientific terminology (an artefact) and ordinary language usage (a

biological system). I argue, following Bouchard (2011) that “Persistence Through Time”

(I refer to as PiTTness) more properly represents what biologists are exploring than does

the essentially ambiguous notion of ‘fitness’. That is, the significant element for

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evolutionary biologists is the causal mechanism (See Skipper Millstein 2005) behind the

persistence of some x. However, I argue that x can be construed as a biological variable

e.g. population, interactor, lineage, etc. Therefore, two ontological approaches are

compared and partially resolved. The Chomskyan internalist approach to the biological

concept of an I-language is briefly presented and is contrasted to the externalist

approaches of Frege and Putnam on meaning and reference. This paper offers two

conclusions: 1) ‘fitness’ warrants elimination and being replaced by PiTTness 2)

Meanings are properties of individual human brains (albeit causally linked to the world)

in much the same way that human sight is.

1. Philosophy of Language and Science:

In 1969, Ernst Mayr suggested that ‘philosophy of science’ should be renamed

‘philosophy of physics’1

According to Chomsky, it is also arguable, that philosophy of language enthusiasts, who

view language as social, tend to pay inadequate attention to the facts about language

(Chomsky, 2006).

. In this vein, it is striking that there is no subsection of

philosophy of biology devoted specifically to the scientific study of language as it

actually exists, i.e. in individual human animals.

Our biological nature is also ignored in philosophy of mind. Eric T. Olson, a philosopher,

who calls himself an ‘animalist’ claims that 9 out of 10 philosophers do not believe we

are animals (Olson 2003, 318). What he maintains is that 90% of philosophers believe 1 Griffiths, P. (2011) "Philosophy of Biology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consulted on 10/01/13.

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that we are psychological entities (minds or spirits) of some sort.2 Religion and

thanatophobia may be, in part, the causes of this tendency, which arguably has significant

ramifications for how we study ourselves and how we understand our place in the

environment. But, this psychological approach

Some examples of this evidence are the following: 1) “the argument of the poverty of the

stimulus” (hereafter POTS, and also often referred to as Plato’s Problem

to what we are may also result in

philosophers placing philosophy before science and ignoring significant linguistic

evidence (facts), for which, scientists and philosophers must account.

3); 2) the

differences between human abilities and those of other animals; 3) the capacity for first-

language acquisition (the language acquisition device, hereafter LAD) versus secondary-

language acquisition; 4) language lost through brain trauma and regained; 5) the

generation or invention of an infinity of possible expressions from finite means (von

Humboldt) e.g. the natural numbers; 6) positive and negative evidence4.5

Chomsky initiated many arguments regarding the philosophy of language, by actually

hypothesizing about the causal mechanisms involved in language development. Whether

his solutions work or not is a scientific question. Nonetheless, philosophers have tended

to avoid linguistics on the assumption that “it’s basically wrong”

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2 See Tondino, T. (2011) p. 110

effectively ignoring the

3 Chomsky often refers to Plato’s Meno—i.e. why does an uneducated slave boy understand geometric principles?

4 ‘Positive and negative evidence’ refers to the facts about how we manipulate syntax.

5 All are Chomsky’s examples.

6 Putnam vs. Chomsky on Internalism and Externalism (2012).

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necessity for explanation of the evidence mentioned above. Yet, modern philosophers

cannot afford to ignore what is happening in science7

“Philosophy of linguistics is the philosophy of science as applied to linguistics. This differentiates it sharply from the philosophy of language, traditionally concerned with matters of meaning and reference.”

and the following quote from a

recently published Stanford article suggests development in this direction:

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In this paper, I draw on the work of Chomsky and others on language, which they treat as

a biological entity, in order to provide some insights regarding ‘natural selection’ or

‘fitness’ and the problem of reference to such entities as ‘populations’ and ‘individuals’.

Chomsky’s is not the only approach in linguistics. However, my consideration of that

issue would make this paper far more complex than it already is. I hope, at any rate, that I

will have managed to express something interesting for both philosophy of biology as

well as for philosophy of language.

2. The Terms and the Reference Problem:

The literature on ‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’ is vast, intriguing and filled with

controversy. I use ‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’ as synonyms although even that is

controversial since the expression ‘the survival of the fittest’ replaced ‘natural selection’

(Bouchard 2011, 1). Furthermore, there are a great many articles, which highlight

flagrant disparities in the usage of many of the frequently employed terms, from

7 A point made by F. Bouchard.

8 Scholz, B. C., Pelletier, F. J. and Pullum, G. K. (2011) "Philosophy of Linguistics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Consulted on 10/01/2013.

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‘organism’ to ‘individual’, and from ‘fitness’ to ‘population’ (See Millstein (2004, 2009),

Ariew and Lewontin (2004), Bouchard (2011), Haber (2006), Van Valen (1989), Sober

(2001), Ereshefsky and Pedroso (forthcoming) to name a few.)

To begin with, we may suspect there are terminological difficulties when natural

language connotations affect scientific terminology. For example, Wallace’s historical

claim that ‘natural selection’ connoted ‘intelligent design’ or ‘teleology’ was not

emblematic of terminological and scientific clarity9

Also, we can more or less dismiss ordinary language and common sense intuitions with

regard to the expression ‘the survival of the fittest’

, (nevertheless, lacking clarity is

understandable at the beginning of any scientific project).

10. This point involves an aspect of

Chomsky’s notion of E-language

The first line to draw, therefore, is between the sciences and ‘common sense’. An

important theme of Chomsky’s (and others) is that ordinary language is excellent for

or externalized language use. What community would

we study statistically to determine what the expression ‘the survival of the fittest’ means?

Graduate students in Harvard? Australian rugby players? This may be interesting from a

sociological perspective. However, it should be fairly clear, that meanings in the context

of ordinary language are rarely determined by experts, as Putnam (1973, 1975) claimed.

Furthermore, in the case of ‘the survival of the fittest’, the meaning is more likely to be

determined by powerful interests justifying the gap between the wealthy and the poor.

9 See Bouchard (2011, 1) for a discussion of the “teleological implications” of the term “natural selection”.

10 I will detail this as I continue, but, the basic problem is that both language use and therefore meanings in a given population depend on many things, not the least of which includes propaganda. See McGilvray (2012, 172-73) for his comments on the “alternative to a teleological explanation”.

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creative thinking, communicating, fantasizing, doing politics, and writing poems and so

on11

3. Fitness Eliminativism and the PiTTness of x:

. In short, referring in natural language is a very messy game, while reference in the

natural sciences is specialized and intended to be regimented.

The more one looks at the literature on fitness, the more one may wonder if there is any

one way for philosophers to understand what biologists mean when they speak of natural

selection or fitness. This should be fairly clear by the character of the examples listed in

the next few paragraphs.

We might read that ‘fitness’ really means “fit enough” (Scott, 2005, 37). For example,

what we may ordinarily think of as illness can create the conditions for survival. In Homo

sapiens, diabetes and Raynaud’s phenomenon may have been selected because these

illnesses helped in cold weather. Various forms of anemia as well as hemachromatosis

possibly developed in humans, according to some studies, because of the plague and

malaria. Humans with fairly ‘normal’ blood iron levels made better hosts for those

diseases.12

11 From Chomsky via Wittgenstein’s (1953) Philosophical Investigations.

Here, Gould’s (1996) arguments that evolution does not have any clearly

progressive quality, rings particularly true. While Moalem, in his Survival of the Sickest;

The Surprising Connections Between Disease and Longevity (2007) may have jumped to

many conclusions on various examples, the general point of his book is extremely

plausible. ‘Fitness’ also appears to mean ‘sickness’ and ‘weakness’.

12 Moalem, S. (2007) Survival of the Sickest; The Surprising Connections Between Disease and Longevity.

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Many of us exist because our ancestors were highly uncouth individuals. From a strictly

biological perspective, those who killed, raped and pillaged often survived. At times,

lying hoarders survived while the caring died off. This fuels social Darwinist arguments,

but, at times, altruism created the conditions for survival13

While vagueness may play an important role for creativity in natural language, it is not

desired for scientific concepts. The previous paragraphs show a problem for the word

‘fitness’.

.

The suggested prescription when confronted with verbal disputes is to coin a term that

has a specific non-controversial meaning14. In many ways, the attempt to coin new terms

has also been an aspect of the fitness literature. I will call the approach, which seeks to

replace or to redefine the notion of fitness by abandoning it, ‘fitness’ eliminativism

One example is the following interpretation of Van Valen’s work (1989, 1990) i.e. he

explains ‘fitness’ as a measure of “energy controlled” by a species. Van Valen’s view is

interesting but not unproblematic (see Bouchard 2011

.

While this is a version of “no fitness, no problem” (Bouchard, Rosenberg 2004, 700), I

do not have the same motivation as do either Walsh (2007), or Matthen Ariew (2002).

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13 Pelt, J.-M. (2009), La Raison du plus faible.

).

14 Chalmers, D. J. (2011) “Verbal Disputes”, pp. 515-566. There are Fregean overtones present here. Preferably, expression A in the head of scientist x is the same as expression A in the head of scientist y. The tautological A=A in Frege’s “Sense and Reference” is as important as expressions of the form A=B, which Frege claimed are “cognitively valuable”.

15 He notes that it is not clear that lack of efficiency is what we want to mean by fitness. I would add to this that fitness is referring (poorly) to a causal mechanism and that we need explanations rather than a simple reduction to measurement. We cannot reduce science to the practice of what Chomsky calls

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Bouchard provides a more plausible view, which can also be interpreted as fairly

eliminativist. ‘Fitness’ is construed as “Persistence Through Time of a lineage”

(Bouchard 2011, 8). I would suggest we adopt a new expression, PiTTness,

PiTTness of a lineage also seems to require consideration. Perhaps, lineages could be

compared as a quotient of energy over time, e.g. x kilowatt hours (or y kilojoules). This

approach, while not necessarily characterizing the causal mechanism itself, could be an

impetus to the quest for mechanism. If there are measurable differences, there ought to be

reasons why. At any rate, for the sake of argument I will drop ‘fitness’ for the remainder

of this paper and replace it with

to distinguish

this notion from ‘fitness’. PiTTness seems to relate to the expression “the survival of the

fittest” by effectively replacing it. In other words, if PiTTness means survival through

time, then we may ask, do we need ‘fitness’ any longer? Nonetheless, regarding

PiTTness, one might still wonder, how much time? And as I queried in my previous

footnote―does measurement, in this case of time, suffice?

PiTTness

I would hazard to suggest, in a blanket manner, that what evolutionary biologists are

looking to find is the simplest causal explanation for the persistence through time of x

(or, again, the PiTTness of x). The x will raise other problems, although lineages are one

good choice. I am going to further suggest that x be treated as a biological variable.

Therefore, we would speak of replacing x with some entity or entities, by virtue of what

biologists require to complete the causal story.

.

“meter reading”. Chomsky, uses this expression while arguing against behaviourism. (http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/19720629.htm), consulted on 10/01/2013.

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But, I would also suggest that the PiTTness of x (where x is left temporarily undefined)

will depend on a host of diverse factors. These factors can include but are not limited to:

1) the environment, 2) reliance and dependence upon other organisms, 3) genetic and

epigenetic factors 4) offspring numbers, 5) geographical location, 6) disease factors, 7)

hereditability 8) variation 9) the spandrel factor 10) altruism and selfishness16

The variable x can be replaced with individuals, populations, organisms, lineages, alleles,

species, reproducers (many others) and combined with one or more factors to generate

the requisite biological history, i.e. a sufficiently local picture or model (taken to be

marginally underdetermined and fallibilist) of a causal evolutionary mechanism. And we

could also leave room for the PiTTness of certain causal factors themselves. For example,

traits could be said to exhibit PiTTness.

11) drift

and 12) traits.

To summarize what we have so far, the point of this exercise, which is primarily indebted

to Bouchard (2012) and Skipper Millstein (2005), is to remove the ambiguous term

‘fitness’ and combine factors with biological variables to achieve a non-ambiguous

explanatory model. On these grounds, I suggest, it does not matter that there are many

kinds of individuals (e.g. Biofilms, see Ereshefsky, Pedroso, forthcoming) or many kinds

of populations (e.g. Futuyama in Millstein 2006), because the story has a causal

constraint, affecting the ontological one. I hope to clarify this point as we move forward.

4. The PiTTness of Traits and the Language Trait:

16Chomsky makes a point of how Kropotkin’s (non-social Darwinist) views have been ignored.

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Assuming we are biological entities and that one of our traits is language, it would seem

that this trait too should be considered as exhibiting PiTTness. I will reiterate a second

assumption just mentioned: that PiTTness is a feature of a living entity (biotic) or

geographically linked17

This will lead us to Chomsky’s distinction between I-language and E-language. But,

before this, I would like to provide a very brief analysis of the problem of reference and

the determination of meanings, which will hopefully clarify why I think we can get some

insights from Chomsky’s distinction between I-language and E-language.

group of living entities as well as non-living entities or factors

(abiotic); so, corpses, heat and the Leaning Tower of Pisa exhibit PiTTness.

Frege’s first puzzle in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” dealt with the problem of two or more

names for the same thing or reference (conceived of as abstract or concrete). He provided

an abstract example, the intersecting lines of the triangle and the concrete example of

Venus, Hesperus and Phosphorus among others. But, I will call this a many names for

one reference problem

Putnam (1973, 1975) worked in the opposite direction. He was predominantly interested

in cases where there was one name for two things or references. So for example, ‘tree’

versus ‘beech’ and ‘elm’, or the term ‘water’ for XYZ (twin water) and H2O (earth

water). I will call these examples, the

. For Frege, as we recall, these examples implied the necessity of

the introduction of the notion of sense.

one name for two references problem

17 E.g. mountain ranges.

. For Putnam,

these examples, are supposed to create in us the intuition that there is a “division of

linguistic labour” and that scientists (or experts) to whom we should “defer” are closer to

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the reference and therefore there is a causal link between the reference out there,

meanings and the “environment”. This showed, according to Putnam, that “meanings just

ain’t in the head” but are in fact determined by something out there as well as other social

factors, for example baptisms.

The problem with Frege’s puzzles is that they apply extremely well to scientific and

mathematical objects, which are rigidly defined and based upon agreements. Venus at t1

and Venus at t2 are numerically identical but not qualitatively identical18

The same kind of point can be made regarding Putnam’s examples. To Putnam, there are

actually two things out there (natural kinds or types) and his point is that we can be

naming these two references with only one name. Both approaches to reference are

essentialist to the extent that they presuppose that out there in the world there is an

essential fact about ‘water’ or ‘elms’. Again, not a problem if you are doing science. (See

McGilvray 2012, 206-231) Scientists make these presuppositions when referring to the

modelling objects they construct all the time.

. We agree not to

name the individual causally linked states of Venus and claim there is an essential

reference out there. Nothing is wrong with all of this if you are doing science or

mathematics but it has next to nothing to do with the facts about natural language as I

will show below by reconstructing Chomsky’s arguments.

There is however, a third possibility i.e. the internalist approach. We claim that the mind

projects onto the world various properties, when referring to things. We start by noting

that in the above cases we are using the word ‘reference’ in an odd way (noun rather than 18 This is Quinean.

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verb). However, we use words on occasions to refer to things and what we refer to

interests us in particular ways. Therefore, what we really have is a one name for n-things

problem

Now, most biological objects are difficult to understand and, not surprisingly, the

biological object

. The study of reference in natural language really fails by presuming a

connection to a scientifically established metaphysics.

referring

This is how McGilvray put it in a recent email correspondence:

(a technical term) is extraordinarily complex, because the

objects in question, to which we refer, are infinitely diverse. When we refer, we sort. And

there seems to be an enormous number of possible things to sort or even just one big one:

everything. For example, there are sculptures which are lumps of clay and lumps of clay

which are not sculptures. There are places like London, which can be moved if it had to

be, as well as be photographed millions of times, and there are mountains with can be

islands after climate change. There are names like ‘Snoopy’, which are indeed cartoons

of a dog, actual dogs as well as many cats and even a lunar landing module. There are

ships like Theseus and bald men with hair.

One way to look at the mess of issues here is to point to the fact that philosophers are often drawn - as the later Wittgenstein pointed out - to the relatively clean practices of the sciences, and try to force sentences and phrases used for all sorts of purposes in the commonsense framework into the molds set by the referring practices found in the sciences. Uses in the sciences are much more regimented (by choice) than in the commonsense domain.19

19 J. McGilvray (2013) – from a personal email correspondence (PC).

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What counts to us is what we refer to (how we sort). On these grounds, water isn’t H2O.

The two concepts do not overlap in the way externalist semanticists seem to think they

do. Meanings are in our heads (not out there) and as Searle (1983) queried “Where else

can they be?”.

Let’s consider two ontological pictures. The first is in the spirit of Meinong’s work.

1) We accept a Meinongian jungle or a gigantic ontology. In this view we say

everything exists, from square circles, to ghosts, numbers, to possibilities and

trees. We add that all things exist in different ways or following the terminology

of Meinong sosein or “being so”. There is no longer a sharp divide between

“brain children” and the real, because everything is internalized and requires an

explanation for the way in which it exists. In other words, trees do not exist in the

same way as numbers do. And, brain children, like aches, numbers, square circles,

Pegasus and colours simply exist.

2) Or we could razor back on what exists by realizing our language use generates the

impression of existence. This account can be characterized, following Goodman,

as the adverbial account

It does not really make a difference if your ontology is filled with furniture

(Meinongianism is a form of idealism) or if you accept only the existence of the mass

. Natural language does not generate being. Physics could

possibly account for the total mass of the universe and that would cover what

exists. Everything else we name is simply classificatory or adverbial. For

example, we could think species-ly without claiming such things as species add

any more “furniture” (mass) to the universe.

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physics accepts. In versions 1 and 2 above, the study of language can be construed as a

classificatory causal study of a reducible biological entity, i.e. individual human

mind/brains. Both versions must assume the same things exist (i.e. equal mass) but in

different ways.

1) We cannot understand except via the mediation of concepts; 2) commonsense concepts are innate, rich, and invite highly creative and flexible uses; and 3) the best way to understand how the mind relates to the world is to conceive of it constructing it (employing all the various tools our native resources provide). That is what 'projection' amounts to (McGilvray 2013, PC).

With this in mind we will consider Chomsky’s distinction between I-language and E-

language.

5. I-language:

Chomsky distinguishes I-languages from E-languages. An I-language or “internalized

language”20 is an idealisation of the language that any specific person actually uses while

speaking or thinking or dreaming. It is an idealisation, to Chomsky, because what “goes

on in our heads is far more complex”.21

Now, an I-language is connected to its I-concepts and to its I-beliefs. All of our various

sub-systems are unique to some extent in the way that our fingerprints are unique

So, for example, Chomsky has an I-language,

which differs in very many respects to Stephen Harper’s I-language.

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20 “I” for “intrinsic”, “internal”, “innate”, “individual”.

. So

21 From a personal email communication with Chomsky (2010) (PC).

22 Though not necessarily all equally healthy.

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for example, we each have our own I-vision, which is sub-system of the biological entity

we are and which has the kind of eye in question (McGilvray 2012, 156).

In contrast Chomsky describes an E-language as something we refer to in common sense

and ultimately unscientific terms. It is common to believe that out there in the world there

exists some specific entity known as the English or Japanese language. I will call this

view, the traditional view and point out that philosophers of language who believe that

language is a social phenomenon or that language is an “institution”23

6. The ontological problem; Mathematical Objects and Objects with Mass:

generally accept it,

or, at least in one form or another, are committed to it. The main issue is that whatever

“strings of words” are produced or externalized, they are characterized by Chomsky as

“epiphenomenal” to the extent that they are practically unpredictable in any scientific

sense. This is the result of von Humboldt’s notion that an infinite set of word strings can

be generated from finite means. I-languages exist in human brains, which have mass.

Is there a natural boundary that separates one population from another contributing to

why one population thrives or persists (see Bouchard 2011 on persistence) while another

does not? The related question for language is, where are the population-dependent-

boundaries or even ecological boundaries that allow us to judge when a person is

speaking, say Italian, and when they are not? The primary task ought really to be to

uncover how and whether these questions are related.

In discussing the ontological problem, McGilvray helps clarify regarding language:

23 Examples: Wittgenstein, Lewis, Putnam.

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“We do not invent the objects and systems that the natural sciences describe and explain, unlike—it seems—those of advanced mathematics. That [...] is why we think it is reasonable to say of a theory of an I-language that it describes a ‘real’ instantiated system in an ‘organ’ in the human mind” (McGilvray 2012, 169).

The two kinds of objects which McGilvray is distinguishing above are scientific objects

and mathematical objects. However, we can interpret McGilvray as saying that scientific

objects are about the mind-independent world while mathematical objects are mind-

dependent. In other words, the scientific object is an idealisation of an actual system

while a mathematical object is simply a rule-governed idealisation.

I assume that the properties of these two unique kinds of objects differ. For one thing,

mathematical objects aren’t causal—or if they are causal then what we are speaking of

the informational causality we find in mathematical functions. For example, we input the

number 2 into the function x2 = y and the output 4 ‘is caused’ in a somewhat strange

sense of the word. The point of this exercise is that causality, if it is anything, relates to

the properties of the objects in question.

However, this is not to say that the notions of causality and property are inseparable. In

fact, there are many examples where this is not the case. I hope what follows will help

clarify this idea because it is rather puzzlingly abstract. I will call what I am attempting

to express the property-causality-separability-thesis

7. The Property/Causality Problem:

(hereafter PCS thesis).

In order to demonstrate the acceptability of the PCS thesis, I suggest we follow

Millstein’s assumption (2006) and allow that there is a difference between properties of

populations and properties of individuals. An immediate reaction may be that populations

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do not exist and as a result they cannot muster sufficient ontological status for having

properties in any real or useful sense. What this reveals is that populations are similar if

not identical to mathematical objects. I will return to this assertion at the end of this

sequence.

The preliminary example Millstein (2006) offers deals with mimics and it will serve our

purposes.24 In the preliminary mimic example, an organism’s survival appears to depend

upon how it is viewed by its predators. So for example, a butterfly with markings that are

similar to the markings of another poisonous organism may have better chances of

survival and reproduction than the butterfly that does not resemble a poisonous organism.

The causal mechanism appears to be comparative. The possibly helpful markings which

may determine greater PiTTness are to be found on an individual butterfly, however, the

causal mechanism is a property of at least two organisms (obviously more; two is

sufficient to be considered a population and so arguably is one; see Bouchard 2011, 12-

25

Interestingly, the preferred notion of Millstein is “natural selection”, which operates on

two levels in the example. On the one hand we have the common sense concept that the

predator literally selects not to eat the butterfly and on the other, the scientific object of

natural selection.

13), hence here, the causal property seems to be in a population of at least two. The

poisonous organism is compared to the butterfly by the predator and this more or less

describes some significant elements of the PiTTness mechanism.

24 I will focus on mimics with regard to language also, because it too will prove relevant to the argument I am making.

25 “A population of 1 clone often beats out a population of 1000 individual trees” (Bouchard, 2011, 13)

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There are a few details worth noticing. Whether we characterize it as a mechanism or

something else, we may assume, that the existence of the universe in its entirety is

necessary to explain the butterfly’s PiTTness. The point however, is that the mechanism

must be understood locally to be of value. Millstein notes that we could characterize the

mimic mechanism on a manipulationist account of causality (Woodward, in Millstein

[2006]) or on a counterfactual account (Lewis, in Millstein [2006]) or even a causal

mechanical account

Population mathematics is not the kind of entity that can carry causality. A very

significant element in the causal mechanism creating the individual butterfly’s PiTTness,

in this case, happens to be in the head of the predator in the form of an I-belief relative to

another species. So we could perhaps conclude that populations can have properties but

that the causal mechanism ultimately winds through or is carried informationally through

individuals and other existing entities.

. The important element is that the most significant determining factor

in the mechanism is, arguably, the populational factor. If we ask the ‘what if question’,

we ought to agree, ceteris paribus, that the butterfly’s PiTTness is altered in relation to

non-mimic butterflies. So why does this support the PCS thesis? What has seemingly

occurred in this example is that we have introduced the consciousness of the predator. If

we think only of the properties of the entities involved we could say that: 1) the property

of being a mimic is fully dependent on the existence of a population 2) we can further

claim that the individual butterfly has the property of specific markings and 3) the

predator has another property: some form of consciousness regarding the markings.

However, the causal mechanism travels an alternative path to the simple set of property

ascriptions.

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Brain children are causal and this is particularly true in Homo sapiens. What is going on

in our heads is meaningful in a physical sense. For example, something as simple as

borders between countries influences PiTTness. The same holds for butterflies.

We could make the erroneous observation that the markings on the butterfly mean

‘poisonous’ and as a result that “meanings just ain’t in the head”. We could also analyse

the meaning of the markings in Gricean (1989, 213-15) terms by suggesting these are

natural meanings (meaningsn) as opposed to non-natural meanings or intentional

meanings (meaningsnn). For example, that “red spots means measles” to a doctor, and

analogously, so would such and such markings mean ‘poisonous’ to the predator. But,

both of these attempts at explanation fail to accommodate for the PCS thesis. Properly

tracing a causal mechanism requires that we correctly ascribe properties of things as they

actually are. Conscious living things create meanings. Meanings are properties of

conscious living brains not of abstract societies or populations.

However, the plight of the externalist semanticist turns out to be as bad as the internalist,

when it comes to understanding the PiTTness of the butterfly in question. Basing

scientific research on what is happening in the head of the predator is problematic for the

reasons Quine (1963) noted in Word and Object. How do we know (theorize) that the

predator has made the choice not to eat the mimic based on the I-belief (Chomskyan

term) that the butterfly resembles another poisonous creature and not some other reason?

In other words, how do we determine drift versus selection when appealing to something

in the head of a creature whose mind we cannot begin to imagine?

8. Conclusion:

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I have argued that ‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’ are not simply ontologically

problematic, they are implicitly ambiguous. This differentiates the two ambiguous

expressions (‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’) from what Millstein properly characterized

as “blurry edges” (2009, 268), i.e. the ontological limits of sortal names like

‘populations’ and ‘individuals’. I argued that there are too many kinds of things being

expressed by the term ‘fitness’ and this suggests that evolutionary biologists could

replace the expression. I maintain that Bouchard’s choice of “Persistence Through Time”,

which I have coined PiTTness, is properly simplified, thus removing the ambiguities

involved in both ‘fitness’ and ‘natural selection’. What evolutionary biologists search for

is the causal mechanism creating PiTTness. Tracing the causal mechanism (See Skipper

Millstein 2005) implies correctly attributing properties to variables (e.g. as well as the

careful analysis of significant factors). Chomsky’s notion of an I-Language properly

attributes the properties of meaning and reference to individual human minds. However,

the Property/Causal Separablilty Thesis (PCS) implies that causal factors can always be

found outside of individual minds suggesting that externalists appear to have confounded

property with causality.

References:

Ariew, A. and Lewontin, R. C. “The Confusion of Fitness.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, no. 2 365–370.

Bouchard, F. (2011) “Darwinism Without Populations: a More Inclusive Understanding of the ‘Survival of the Fittest’.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42, no. 1 (March): 106–114. Bouchard, F. and Rosenberg A. (2004) “Fitness, Probability and the Principles of Natural Selection.” British Journal of Philosophy of Science 55, no. 4 693–712. ———. (2004) Fitness. Edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2008.http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/fitness/. Consulted on 10/01/13

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Chomsky, N. (2006) Language and Mind, New York, Cambridge University Press. ———. (2010) PC.

Chalmers, D. J. (2011). “Verbal Disputes”. Philosophical Review 120 (4): 515-566

Ereshefsky, M. and Pedroso, M. (forthcoming) “Biological individuality: the case of biofilms” Biology and Philosophy (n.d.): 1–19. http://www.springerlink.com/content/28h1677k7847184h/. Gould, S. J. (1996). Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin. New York: Harmony Books.

Griffiths, P. (2011) “Philosophy of Biology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/biology-philosophy/>.

Haber, M. (2006) “Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process.” Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 57: 627–653. Millstein, R. L., R.A. Skipper Jr. (2005) “Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology & Biomedical Science. 36 327–347 Millstein, R. L. (2009) “Populations as Individuals.” In January 1, 2009; revised and accepted June 18, Biological Theory 4(3) 2009, 267–273. c! 2010 Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research ———. (2006) “Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process.” British Journal of Philosophy of Science (December) 57 (4): 627-653.

McGilvray, J. (2012), The Science of Language, Interviews with James McGilvray, Cambridge University Press, New York.

———. (2013) PC

Moalem, S. (2007), The Survival of the Sickest, New York, Harper Collins.

Olson, E. T. (2003), “An Argument for Animalism”, in R. Martin and J. Baressi eds., Personal Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, p. 318-334.

Pelt, J.-M. (2009), La Raison du plus faible, Fayard and Le Livre de Poche.

Putnam vs. Chomsky on Internalism and Externalism. (2012) http://www.florianschwarz.net/LING255/?p=69

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———. (1975/1985) “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. In Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, H. (1973). “Meaning and Reference,” Journal of Philosophy 70, 699-711.

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Scholz, B. C., Pelletier, F. J. and Pullum, G. K., (2011), “Philosophy of Linguistics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/linguistics/>.

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