logic, conscious and unconscious (hample, 1986)

Logic, Conscious andUnconsciousDALE HAMPLE

Tbis essay reconsiders the question, "Is human thought logical?" Some structural featuresof human cognition are described, focusing cbiefly on tbe distinction between consciousnessand unconsciousness. Tbe syllogism research which supports the conclusion that humanthougbt is not particularly logical is considered and set aside for several reasons. Researchdescribing general unconscious cognitive operations, as well as perception, compreben.sion, and inference in particular, is shown to support the idea tbat human cognition canbe modeled logically. Creativity and imagery are acknowledged as exceptions to tbe overallconclusion tbat human thought is logical. Tbis logicality pEu-ticularly typifies our un-conscious processes, wbicb are foundational to buman communication.

F OE NEARLY all our discipline's history, logic has held a pre-eminentrole in otir theories of discourse reception and production. Orators

were enjoined to invent enthymemes ("rhetorical syllogisms") in the ex-pectation that audiences would find that sort of presentation congenialto their methods of thought (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.2). Over the centtiriesa few protests were heard (e.g., Descartes, Discourse on Method, II, III,VI; Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, II.l), but these complaints did notprevent logic from holding sway well into this century.

About 25 years ago, however, two more objections to logic appeared.They were well argued and, perhaps just as importantly, were accom-panied with what seemed to be genuine alternatives to formal logic(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969 [1958]; Toulmin, 1958).' Forwhatever reason, this time the complaints took hold, and scholars andtextbook writers began using alternatives to logic—notably the Toulminmodel—in both scholarship and pedagogy. In argumentation, thespeciality most directly involved in this issue, a near-consensus is nowclaimed for the view that logic ought not be our fundamental theoryof argument (Cox & Willard, 1982; Willard, 1980). The mainstream ofspeech communication has also seen some prominent rejections of logic(e.g., Delia, 1970). Nor are we alone in this. Psychology, the otherdiscipline with a compelling interest in information processing, has pro-duced several important critiques of logic as well (e.g., Evans, 1982;Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The claim common to all these writers is that

The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 50 (Winter 1986), 24-40

Winter 1986 25

human reasoning is not logical; as we will see, an impressive body ofempirical evidence seems to support this position.

In spite of these explicit denials of logic, however, it continues to playan important role in our discipline. At virtually every turn in ourliterature, we find theoretic units which greatly resemble syllogisms.The practical syllogism has been harnessed for use by several varietiesof rules theorists (Cronen, Pearce & Harris, 1979; Shimanoff, 1980;Smith, 1982, ch. 3). A more or less syllogistic application of an observa-tion to a general principle in order to generate conclusions about otherpeople seems to be assumed in theories of person perception (e.g., Delia,O'Keefe & O'Keefe, 1982). System theorists claim that an organismsteers itself by comparing its current state to a goal state and choosingbehaviors which will more closely approach the goal (Fisher, 1978, ch.7; Littlejohn, 1978, ch. 2; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960); such self-regulation can easily be expressed in logical form. Exchange theory, too,regards people as rational, logical evaluators of relationships (e.g., Roloff,1981). And even argumentation, which has resisted the syllogism's yokewith more energy than any other speciality, still has some scholars work-ing with logical models (e.g., Hample, 1981; Jackson, 1982).

So we find ourselves in an awkward collective position. On one hand,we are inclined to insist that people do not reason logically. But we per-sist in theorizing logically ourselves (e.g., Berger & Calabrese, 1975)and in attributing logic-following behavior to others. How can we recon-cile these impulses?

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a solution-one that willacknowledge the results of logical reasoning studies and will allow usto use logical models of human behavior anyway. The key to my argu-ment is the tripartite distinction between text, consciousness, and un-consciousness. Since text has elsewhere been argued to be cleariy distinctfrom mind (Hample, 1985a), most of the present discussion will focuson the different implications of consciousness and unconsciousness forlogic.

This essay will begin with a sketch ofthe human mind's basic architec-ture. This section is not explicitly concerned with logic, but is essentialas a framework for the arguments that follow. The second part of thepaper deals with research which presupposes that suhjects consciouslyattempt logical solutions to various experimental problems. This is theevidence which makes a prima facie case against the use of logic in ourtheories. Thus, my discussion of this research is critical. The last mainsection considers the place of logic in our unconscious processes. I willargue that logic has a clearly defined and essential role in our un-conscious minds and that this is the chief justification for using logicas the kernel of so many of our theories.

26 Western Journal of Speech Communication

COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE

We each have two main cognitive resources: our consciousness andour unconsciousness. These can be immediately distinguished on thegrounds that we all have direct introspective access to our consciousminds. When we are aware of a thought, or of a thinking, we are monitor-ing our conscious processes. When we are not acquainted with mentalcontents and processes which affect behavior or other thoughts, thosecontents and processes are unconscious. So I might be conscious of talk-ing with a student but not conscious of the details of my memorysearches, eye gaze control, or voice-related muscular movements.

Toulmin (1982) offers us some useful vocabulary for making this sortof distinction. He says, in part, that we are unconscious when we areinsensible, as when a boxer is knocked out; or that we are unconsciousof something when we are inattentive to it, as when we ignore a distantbut audible conversation at a cocktail party; or that we are unconsciousof something when we are inarticulate about it, as when we cannot sayhow we went about choosing a particular metaphor or argument to usein conversation.

Our conscious resources are quite limited. Miller (1956) says that wecan keep only about seven items conscious at once, for example, andthis contrasts sharply with the dozens of things we do simultaneouslywhen we converse. Gregory (1970) indicates that humans can make onlyone conscious decision every half second. Eccles (1970), taking a difFerenttack, estimates that about 200 synaptic linkages in the brain will havefired before there is enough cortical stimulation for a person to reporta conscious experience. Severe capacity limitations Eire a defining featureof the conscious mind, in contrast to the effectively unlimited capacityof the unconscious mind (Shallice, 1978).Obviously, tben, a drastic selection process is necessary to prevent tbe higher brain centersfrom being swamped by irrelevant information. But tbe decision about wbat is essentialand wbat is irrelevant apparently varies from individual to individual and seems to bedetermined by criteria wbich are largely outside individual awareness. (Watzlawick, Beavin& Jackson, 1967, p. 95)

Necessarily, we must structure our minds so as to protect our con-sciousnesses from, overload. Our solution to this threat is to delegatethe greater part of our behavioral and cognitive decisions to the un-conscious and only retain conscious involvement in the highest-ievel con-siderations.

This delegation is accomplished by hierarchical structuring, where theconscious mind is at the top of our cognitive pyramid and everythingelse is unconscious. Broadbent (1977) says that this idea of "levels ofcontrol" was once a commonplace assumption in cognitive psychology.Certainly many contemporary theories in both psychology and com-munication have hierarchical structure as an essential ingredient (e.g.,Carver & Scheier, 1982; Greene, 1984; Norman, 1981). Each theoretical

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formulation of the hierarchy's nature differs slightly, of course, but forour purposes it is enough simply to ohserve the common principle: thatwe ordinarily function hy having conscious goals for which the im-plementation details are normally delegated to unconscious levels.

So long as the unconsciously controlled behaviors and cognitive pro-cesses move along smoothly, the conscious mind remains uninvolved.If, however, the unconscious encounters a problem which it cannot solve,it will signal the conscious mind, which will then intervene into nor-mally unconscious processes (Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). For instance,if I were to begin making an unusual number of typos here, I wouldfocus my attention on my typing and lose my normal concentration onthe content of what I wish to communicate. This illustrates not onlythe flexibility of our delegations (i.e., that they are potentially revers-ible) but also reminds us of our conscious capacity limitations.

Because the conscious mind does not intend to monitor or intervenein processes controlled unconsciously, these processes must be almostcompletely automated (Adams, 1976; Keele & Summers, 1976; Kelso& Stelmach, 1976; also see Underwood, 1982). Reason (1979; see Nor-man, 1981) theorizes that complex processes may be delegated as a seriesof subprograms. At the end of each subprogram, a branch point at whichseveral other subprograms can be called up is encountered, and controlbriefly reverts to consciousness in order for the correct decision to bemade. This is a useful explanation of how we can drive home, exertingconscious focal attention only under unusual circumstances along theroute.

Although automaticity, or habit, has a long history in modernpsychology, it has been forcibly applied to communication only in re-cent years (Berger & Douglas, 1982; Langer, 1978; Langer & Weinman,1981). These researchers prefer to label the phenomenon "mindlessness."They have shown persuasively that complex human interactions canbe conducted mindlessly, or unconsciously. Each of us is capable of car-rying on routinized conversations with little or no conscious thought—think of the exchange of phatic greetings, or the reflexive answer to aspouse who wants something done during a favorite television program,for instance. In the terms we have been using here, mindless behavioris delegated behavior.

The work on mindlessness is useful in that it shows how the un-conscious needs no conscious guidance at all for certain interactions.The more general case, however, is that the conscious mind establishesthe overall goal for interaction and then Eissigns the unconscious to reachthat objective. As several scholars have recently observed, however, weordinarily have multiple objectives in any given interaction (Clark &Delia, 1979; Tracy, 1984). Clark and Delia, for instance, believe thatwe will have instrumental, relational, and identity goals in everyconversation.


Other scholars have identified certain rules or conditions which humaninteraction must respect (e.g., Grice, 1975). These may also be viewedas goals for interaction. So in a conversation with my wife about whereto have lunch, I will be respecting all these goals: to jiersuade her toeat at the Deli, to reinforce her affection for me, to show myself in agood light, to say only true things, to be responsive and relevant to hercomments, to do all this politely, and so forth. These are all intentions,but they are not conscious intentions. I am likely to be consciously awaireonly of the first-mentioned goal.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that we have a varietyof intents, most of them unconscious, in communication (see Hample,in press a; in press b). In fact, every behavioral or cognitive unit whichmakes up a more global human activity (e.g., conversation) will haveits own goal, or intent, or criterion. Every participant in a conversationwill have many levels of intent. Most of those goals correspond to pro-cesses so completely automated that we normally have no awarenessof them or conscious control over them. Nonetheless they are essentialto the production and reception of discourse.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND LOGIC

Quite a lot of empirical evidence bearing on logical ability has ac-cumulated during this century. Most of these studies follow a similarexperimental paradigm. Usually, the experimenter constructs a seriesof logic problems, most often phrasing the parts of the problem as for-mally correct propositions. Subjects are asked, after having read twopremises, to provide (or select from a list) the valid solution. Theresponses are then graded, just as an exam in a logic course would be,and the experimenter has a measure of the subject's ability to reasonlogically.

Since literature of this kind has been conveniently reviewed in a vari-ety of places (e.g., Evans, 1982; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), I canafford to be cursory here. The general conclusion to be drawn is that"adult reasoning in propositional situations is . . . only in loose cor-respondence with what the ideal logical model would prescribe"(Falmagne, 1975, p. 2). Results of a few studies should suffice to outlinethe support for Falmagne's claim. DeSoto, London and Handel (1965)applied the usual paradigm to linear syllogisms (e.g., Sam is taller thanBill; Bill is taller than Ed; who is tallest?). Solution rates ranged from62% to only 38%. Erickson (1978, p. 44) summarizes the results forstudies of various figures of categorical syllogisms. Figure I syllogismswere solved correctly about 95% of the time, figure II about 20%, figureIII about 25%, and figure IV about 25%. Dominowski (1976) classifies12% of people as logical, 7% as atmosphere-using (i.e., they automaticallychoose negative conclusions if they have a negative premise, or "all"conclusions if they have "all" premises, and so forth), 67% as partlylogical, and 14% as other.

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Results of this kind are at the bottom of the explicit rejections oflogicality which I mentioned in the beginning of this paper. Axid, infact,it is difficult to look at these data and still maintain that logic is natural.However, I do. I offer two main reasons why results such as these oughtto be set aside.

My first reason might be called the phenomenological objection (seeHenle, 1962). It relies on the distinction between text and mind. Theargument is that subjects may not have been working with the problemsthe experimenters typed in the experimental booklets. If subjectsmisinterpret the problems' premises, they may still process thephenomenological premises validly, even though the eventual answersare invalid according to the experimenter's standards. The invalidresponses are therefore explained, not by invalid reasoning but by im-proper understanding ofthe premises. Perhaps some more concrete ex-planation will be helpful.

For instance, take the premise "All A is B." This statement can bereasonably understood in several ways. When Erickson (1978) asked sub-jects to draw Venn diagrams to represent the relationship between Aand B, he found that about 60% of his respondents drew a small A circleentirely enclosed by the larger B circle, and 40% made the A and Bcircles identical. From either set of diagrams, one would properly con-clude that all A is B. But is it true that all B is A? For the subjects whodrew the identical circles (and subjects are quite consistent in theirrenderings, by the way), all B is A. For the 60% of subjects who drewa little A circle inside the B circle, however, it will be obvious that allB is not A. Now the experimenter knows that "All A is B" does not validlyentail that "All B is A," but when 40% of the subjects are scored as wrong,is their mistake one of logic or one of comprehension? This same40%-those who draw identical circles-on being told "All A is B; allC is B" will (invalidly) conclude that all A is C. But according to thepremises actually being used by respondents (viz., all A is B; all B isA; all C is B; all B is C, with improper conversions italicized), the con-clusion that "All A is C" is validly available (because "all A is B" and"all B is C" may be in use, rather than the premises the experimenterintended). If the problem is one of comprehension, we must pay heedto Neimark and Chapman (1975), who report that premises using "all"or "no" are misunderstood 10-40% ofthe time by their subjects and that"some" and "not" premises aire misunderstood 70-100% of the time. Stein-fatt, Miller and Bettinghaus (1974) report that amount of logical am-biguity (i.e., the number of possible meanings a premise could have) cor-relates at r=.7O with error frequency.

Similar problems appear for hypothetical syllogisms as well. Peoplehave a logically unfortunate tendency to understand "If p, then q" asbidirectional - that is, as entailing that "If not p, then not q" (Geis &Zwicky, 1971; see Ray & Findley, 1984). This is not logically valid, butit does fit many everyday situations (e.g., "if you clean up your room,I'll give you a quarter"). So a person might reasonably but invalidly


offer the following series of propositions: "if you clean up your room,you get a quarter; j'ou did not clean up your room; therefore, you donot get a quarter." The problem is not that such a person is reasoninginvalidly, but that the person misunderstood the major premise. Theconclusion does follow if the person is reasoning as follows: "ifyou don'tclean up your room, you won't get a quarter; you didn't clean up yourroom; therefore, you do not get a quarter;" but the conversion ofthe firstpremise was illegitimate. Given the premises actually in use, the con-clusion is valid.

Several studies which have made special efforts to insure that sub-jects had "proper" understandings ofthe premises have produced higherestimates of people's logicality. Ceraso and Provitera (1971), for instance,cut error frequency in half and eliminated the atmosphere effect by giv-ing subjects problems which were presented with unusual exactitude.This gives special credence to the phenomenological objection andjustifies our insistence that text and mind must be carefullydistinguished.

In sum, the phenomenological objection to these studies is this: thatunless the researcher goes to unusual lengths to find out what subjectswere actually thinking about while solving the syllogisms, logic scoresare uninterpretable. "Observing a failure on the part of the subject tomatch some external criterion established by the experimenter is unin-formative with respect to the issue of whether the subject's logic is atfault or his understanding of the problem differs from the experimenter"(Pitz, 1975, p. 134).

My second objection to the claim that people do not reason logicallyis that it misses the distinction between conscious and unconsciousthought. Subjects in these experiments are presumed to be working onthe syllogisms consciously. This is an unusual situation and does notreflect how we do most of our reasoning.

Though the next section of this paper develops the idea of unconsciousreasoning in far greater detail, let us consider here the example of ayoung woman getting ready (for the first time) to ask a young man fora date. She begins the interaction with this goal consciously in mind;consequently all her subordinate goals are held unconsciously. Let ussuppose that her focal attention is on how she should phrase her invita-tion. That means that her unconscious mind must decide, among a greatmany other things, how close to the young man she should move. Un-consciously noting the distance between them, comparing the storedrecommendations for distances appropriate to casual-to-intimate rela-tionships, evaluating the environment's potential for allowing or hinder-ing a distance adjustment (e.g., does a table intervene?), the unconsciousselects an appropriate series of muscular actions and moves her body.I could render this example of distance regulation in even more detailand could add other decisions (about eye gaze, posture, gestures, andso forth), but my point is probably as clear as it will ever be: the un-conscious must combine new premises ("he has stepped back") with old

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ones ("if, in an intimate relationship, we are more than 18 inches apart,I should move forward") in order to control behavior. This informationprocessing is mindless, as we saw in the previous section, and must bereliable enough that conscious monitoring is not required. And as thenext section will show, this reasoning is modeled well by formal logic.

The studies of conscious logical effort, then, are focused at the wrongmental level. Even when we think consciously ahout a particular deci-sion, the cuing and combining of beliefs is generally controlled by theunconscious mind. Just because we are worrying consciously, we arenot necessarily reasoning consciously. Certainly the logical quality ofour conscious minds is of interest, but if we are to draw generalizationsabout logical ability, we must ask about the logicality (or lack of it) inour everyday, unconscious lives.

UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND LOGIC

In this section, I will provide evidence for the claim that unconsciousinformation processing fits a logical model. This may strike the readeras an indirect way of expressing my thesis, but we must keep in mindhow indirect our evidence on this point must be. We can observe inputand output but can only speculate as to the processes which convert oneinto the other (Feldman & Toulmin, 1976, p. 425; Searle, 1981, p. 302;Wyer & Carlston, 1979, p. 278). This indirectness is unavoidable. Ourobjective can only be to see if a logical model is adequate; proof thatit is true, or is the only possibly adequate model, is beyond the reachof our methodologies.

I will group my evidence into three classes. First, I will examine someof the basic features of the unconscious mind, as outlined in the firstmain section of this essay. Second, I will treat several ofthe higher levelcognitive processes essential to human communication; perception, com-prehension, and inference. This discussion will necessarily involve someattention to the structure and operation of memory. Finally, I will con-sider production of discourse, which involves the chief exception to mygeneral thesis.

Consideration of the general features of our cognitive architecturesshows that our fundamental processes conform to logical predictions.Initially let us examine the ways in which control is passed from levelto level. As indicated earlier, our behaviors and mental processes aremultiply controlled by various hierarchically-arranged levels. Con-sciousness will ordinarily be vested in only one such level, and that levelmay involve the overriding intention ("I'd iike John to go to a moviewith me"). Under normal conditions, consciousness will remain at thislevel, and control of all the subordinate thoughts and behaviors will bedelegated (e.g., facial control, discourse invention, personal distanceregulation, etc.). However, if one ofthe subordinate levels encountersa problem (e.g., acceptable discourse is not forthcoming), consciousnessmoves down (or up, for that matter) to the appropriate level (Kimble &


Perlmuter, 1970). This is commonly observed during exercises in in-troductory courses, when students begin to notice that confederates areusing the wrong gesturing to regulate turn-taking, for instance.

These control-passing procedures fit a logical model. Let us pursueour earlier example, and assume that a young woman has focused herattention on the goal of getting a date. Dozens of behavioral and men-tal efforts have been delegated to the unconscious, but again let us con-sider only distance regulation. The distance regulation program isequipped with distance standards, access to (and some control of) percep-tual information, and authority to move her body closer or further. Nor-mally, piersonal distance is established and maintained with no consciouseffort (Knapp, 1980, p. 81). However, suppose a problem for which theunconscious program is unequipped should occur: perhaps the youngman is sitting on a chair bolted to the floor, and the nearest availablechair for the woman is five feet away (too far) and immovable. Underthese conditions, we would expect her to "think about it," by which wereally mean "consciously think about it," and decide to endure thedistance violation, address him while standing (a violation of a differentexpectation), or take some other action (such as suggesting a move toanother spot).

We may model this procedure with the following logical analysis,which is restricted to distance regulation but easily extendable to otherdelegated programs. Based upon distance standards stored in memory,the distance program will have several distance rules. For example, "ifI am in an intimate conversation and am further away than 18 inches,then I should either move closer or call for conscious help." The programwill have some means of generating other such rules to meet the condi-tions of public, personal, and other relationships and the conditions ofbeing too close or too far away. For this example, however, the rule justspecified serves as a major premise. The second premise consists of therelevant perception, which is requested by a different part of the pro-gram. Here the perception is "we are further away than 18 inches." Fromthese two premises, the requisite action instructions follow: "move closer,or call for conscious help." This is both the conclusion to the two earlierpremises and the major premise of the next sequence. The next premiseis also perceptual and is the feedback ofthe intended action: "I am unableto move closer." The final conclusion is then the next action step, whichis "call for conscious help." This whole sequence can be generalized asfollows:

(1) Overriding intention (default conscious focus)[Various delegations—subprograms A, B, C, etc.](Al) If condition C, then do behavior B or call consciousness. (E.g.,

If in relationship type X and more than Y distance away, theneither move forward or call consciousness.)

(A2) Condition C is true. (E.g., I am in an X-type relationship and ammore than Y distance away.)

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(A3) Perform behavior B. (E.g., Try to move forward.){A4) Behavior B is not executed. (E.g., I cannot move forward.)(A5) Call consciousness. (E.g., Give this some thought.)

Obviously, this is a rather crude summary, but details could easily beadded to make the model a better reflection of human sophistication.The point, however, ought to be plain: namely, that control-passing canbe modeled logically.

The example also shows that each level's behavioral or mental con-trol fits a logical model. The sequence A1-A5 above can be generalizedor modified to fit control of any delegated behavior or mental process.The steps correspond to rule (Al), perception (A2), default execution {A3),feedback (A4), and backup execution (A5). This is quite close, allowingfor different terminology, to Miller, Galanter and Pribram's (1960)description of TOTE units and to various descriptions of open or closedloop motor control processes (Keele & Summers, 1976; Kelso & Stelmach,1976; Underwood, 1982).

Thus, basic systemic considerations suggest that logical processes canaccount for the unconscious conversion of input into output. Additionalevidence for the claim of unconscious logicality comes from research onperception, comprehension, and inference.

Perception can be understood as a process whereby people concludepercepts (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977). Stimulus information (minorpremise) is combined with information in long-term memory (majorpremise) to generate meanings which are passed on to the rest of thecognitive system. Thus Humphreys (1978) shows that when we perceivea letter or number, we perceive it as a number or letter, not as a pat-tern of colors and shapes. Our perceptual apparatus does not send brute,uninterpreted information into our conscious and unconscious processes;it sends compact, labeled conclusions.

Thus, in our example above, both A2 and A4 can be further detailed.The recognition that condition C is satisfied, or that behavior B has orhas not been performed, has some details:

(A2a) If the patterns Pj, Pa, P3, etc. appear in the environment, thencondition C is satisfied. (I.e., It P^, then C.)

(A2b) Patterns Pj, P , P3, etc., are perceived. (I.e., Pj is true.)(A2) Condition C is true.

And A2b can also be reduced, as follows:(A2bl) If stimulus information Sj, S , S3, etc. is present, then patterns

Pi, Pj, P3, etc. are present. (I.e., If Sj^, then Pjj.)(A2b2) Stimulus information Sj, Sj, S3, etc. is perceived. (I.e., Sjjj is

true.)(A2b) Patterns Pj, P , P3, etc., are perceived.

These simple formulations do not deal with problems such as fuzzy pat-terns (e.g., Oden, 1979) or other varieties of imperfect schema matching,but these complications would not change the overall logicality of themodel.


Notice several features of our expansion of A2. First, the perceptualsystem knows what it is looking for: it begins with a specification ofpatterns (A2a). This specification must be drawn from long-term storesafter the perceptual system has been delegated the goal of testingwhether condition C is satisfied. Second, the perception (A2) is inter-pretive and involves meaning assignment. Finally, the whole sequencecan be described by a formally valid series of propositions. One percep-tion researcher comments, " . . . the process of arriving at the perceptis one much like reasoning in which conclusions are drawn frompremises, except that in perception the process is not conscious and theoutcome is a percept rather than a conclusion" (Rock, 1983, p. 272).

This analysis of perception also applies to comprehension. Since mean-ing assignments appear during the perceptual process, simple com-prehension is contained within perception. That comprehension can beunconscious has been clearly demonstrated by a number of studies (e.g.,Corteen & Wood, 1972; see LaBerge, 1981; Underwood, 1982, pp.116-121). That it seems to have a logical structure can be quicklydemonstrated by appealing to two theories, spreading activation andconstructivism.

Spreading activation is a theory of semantic memory which posits thatmeanings are organized as a hierarchical network. Each word representsa node, and associated nodes are connected with one another. The closerthe association, the stronger the connection. Activating one node directly(e.g., by reading a word) automatically activates nearby nodes, thoughless strongly. This is the idea of spreading activation (Collins & Loftus,1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969).

These networks are theorized to have a more or less genus-speciesorganizing principle (Kintsch, 1980). So if one part ofthe network werethe hierarchy alive/animal/horse/four-legged, mentioning the word"horse" would automatically cue up the other attributes, alive, animal,and four-legged. In this way, "horse" is comprehended. This genus-speciesorganization is the basis of Aristotle's categorical logic (e.g., "All horsesare four-legged; Trigger is a horse; so Trigger is four-legged"). So thespreading activation theory supports the claim that comprehension pro-cesses can be modeled logically.

So does constructivism.^ The idea here is that percepts and memoriesare constructed by means of inference. Whatever comes through ourperceptual system is understood, and the understandings—not thestimulus information-are stored. Thus when people read the sentence,"Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath the log,"they are quite certain that they read that the fish swam beneath theturtles (Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972). These inferences/memoriescan be constructed at the time of perception, as we saw a moment ago,or they may be constructed at the time of recall (Christiaansen, 1980;Keenan & Kintsch, 1974). Either way, memory contains meaning, notsome hypodermically-injected dose of sensory information. And these

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comprehensions seem to be logical inferences: e.g., "if you swim beneaththe log, then you also swim beneath the turtles; the fish swam beneaththe log; so the fish swam beneath the turtles." (The major premise inthis example can be viewed as the conclusion to a previous syllogism.)So memories seem to be logically constructed.

Research on the nature of inference in general also points to logical-ity. Wyer (1974; Wyer & Gkildberg, 1970) has derived from Bayes'Theorem a formula which predicts the probability that someone willbelieve one thing, given his/her levels of belief in related items. Wyer'smodel has produced inapressively accurate predictions and, being derivedfrom Bayes' Theorem, does so from a logical base. Hample (e.g., 1981;1985b) has a similar model, this time derived from two generalhypothetical syllogisms, which explains as much as half the variancein individuals' adherence to argument claims and as much as 90% ofgroup variance in adherence.

What these models have in common, and what distinguishes them fromthe logicality research reviewed in the previous section, is that thisresearch does not deal with subjects who are intentionally trying to solvelogic problems. Instead, subjects merely indicate their levels of beliefin a variety of items. The experimenter then compares the consistencyof their beliefs to that which would be logically predicted. Subjects donot view their task as one of inference, but their self-reports reflect apattern of inferences which the experimenter can model. Logic-basedmodels such as Wyer's and Hample's seem to be quite accurate.

So perception, comprehension, and inference all seem to exhibit logicalstructures, as did control-passing and the overall operation of each levelof control. All this evidence for logicality refers to unconscious processes,which are dominant in human communication (Hample, in press a). Thefinal topic to be covered in this section, however, introduces an impor-tant qualifier to my general thesis. Let us consider the production ofdiscourse.

Invention is commonly asserted to have alogical characteristics(Hample, 1982; Haugeland, 1981, p. 18; Koestler, 1964, pp. 35-36;Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967, p. 253). Creativity often involvesimagery (Shepard, 1978), and imagery is nonlinear, nonsequential,nonverbal, and not disciplined by logic (Paivio, 1971). Logic is associatedprimarily with verbal behavior, which is sequential and inferentiallydisciplined (Hample, 1982). Though creativity is certainly cognitive, itmay not be logical in its originative impulses.

Let us briefly examine some work which attempts to reconcile verbaland imagic processes in discourse invention. Flower and Hayes (1984)discuss the various representations of meaning normally possessed bysomeone trying to write an essay. Some of these are verbal: for instance,phrases we want to use, lexical knowledge, and episodic declarativeknowledge. Other representations, however, are nonverbal: mental im-ages and procedural knowledge, for example. These nonverbal meanings


are the most difficult to express in the essay because their nature isfurthest from being textual. So they must be translated into verbal form.It is by means of this translation—this conversion of nonverbal intoverbal—that meaning is lost (Bateson, 1968) and verbal discipline is im-posed (Paivio, 1971).

My point is that even though the textual product is verbal and mayreflect logical constraints, the mental processes which created that textmay not have been logical. Considering that our discipline has been cen-trally concerned with invention for two millenia, we know surprisinglylittle about creativity. Nonetheless, it seems clear that whatever elseit is, we cannot rely on it being logical. Naturally, part of the produc-tion process will be logical, insofar as it relies on perception, comprehen-sion and verbal inference. But there is more to production than this.So creativity and imagery are the chief exceptions to the claim thathumans are essentially logical.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this essay has been to examine the hypothesis thatlogic is an appropriate model for human cognition. This is a controver-sial thesis, and quite a lot of evidence—which looks as though it oughtto be right on point—suggests the opposite. However, for several reasons,these results ought to be set aside. When we examine unconsciousprocesses—those which control our normal, automatic mentaloperations-we find considerable evidence for logical models. Only underthe unusual condition of consciousness and the special cases of imageryand creativity is there much reason to doubt the general claim thathumans are logical.

My principal arguments here have relied on distinctions among text,consciousness and unconsciousness. Traditional studies of logic wronglyassume that the experimenter's text is the subject's thought and thenwrongly generalize what is at best a conscious process to all humancognition, conscious or unconscious. By keeping these three ideas apart,we have been able to see clearly that logicality of text is not logicalityof consciousness is not logicality of unconsciousness. Conclusions aboutthe claims of logicality in these three domains are independent and mustbe argued for separately. Ofthe three domains, the one most in controlof human communication is the unconscious, and there we have con-sistently found that logical models fit our data.

This conclusion ought to replace the various complaints about logicwhich have been appearing in both speech communication andpsychology. This is a more sophisticated claim than earlier centuries'naive belief that the laws of logic are the laws of thought, for itdistinguishes the logical foundation of human cognition from the occa-sional conscious or creative exceptions to logicality. It legitimates boththe investigations of conscious logicality and the theories which eitherassume logical mental patterns or have logical infrastructuresthemselves. Human cognition is naturally logical.

Winter 1986 37

ENDNOTES

1. Whether or not Toulmin's analysis really is an alternative to logic is open to ques-tion {Hample, 1977). I suspect that a similar critique can also be made for Perelman.

2, This constructivism has no special relationship to the constructivism better knownin speech communication (e.g., Delia, O'Keefe & O'Keefe, 1982).

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