A NOTE ON COMMON, SIMPLE LANGUAGE: Although we have used terms such as neuron and nociception, we are no more in science over philosophy than p-zombies are exclusively in the realm of science fiction. Although we have used some terms common to each discipline, I hope that the writing is and continues to be accessible to the reader no matter what her background. If I have doneso I will have fulfilled Einstein’s maxum “if you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough” and his exhortation of students "It should be possible to explain the laws of physics to a barmaid".

What is characteristic of philosophy is not a special subject-matter, but the aim of knowing one's way around with respect to the subject-matters of all the special disciplines. Wilfred Sellars

METHOD: I will divide Chalmer's ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions into parts and explore them “with respect to the subject-matters of all the special disciplines”.

WHY: Is there truely no function of conscious experience? Is there an ‘extra ingredient’ that will explain the richness of conscious experience for human beings? Why is conscious experience so special?

WHAT: Can the nature of cause of conscious experience be defined in a way that is satisfying to the all the special disciplines that currently investigate consciousness?

HOW: Could conscience could have come about through evolution? If so what were the substrates of consciousness that evolution naturally selected such that conscious experience could manifest itself? Once manifested what benefits could conscious qualitative experience provide a species?

1. WHY: A. CHALMERS CLAIMS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE HAS NO FUNCTION

We agree experience arises from a physical basis, but we can't explain why and how it arises. Why does such a rich inner life come from physical processing?

"It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.”

Chalmers claims that there is no advantage to it and that our bodies function just as well without conscious experience. To illustrate thisposition, Chalmers uses his thought experiment of p-zombies…[Explain briefly p-zombies]

A. FLAWS IN THE “NO FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS” ARGUMENT - WOULD P-ZOMBIES REALLY BE INDISTINGUISHABLE?Chalmers statement that p-zombies could be indistinguishable from conscious beings presupposes his assertion that conscious experience has no function. However Chalmers had created the creatures that are supposedly identical to humans in behavior but then makes the assumption that his p-zombies without consciousness could behave functionally the same as conscious beings. It is a circular argument that proves nothing except the beliefs of Chalmers. Without a rigorousdefinition of conscious experience, how can Chalmers state exactly what it is these zombies lack?

Chalmer’s assertion that it is not hard for us to imagine that the p-zombies are unconscious but are indistinguishable from conscious creatures assumes too much. Certainly the zombies of my fictional stories and imagination are chillingly distinguishable from humans. Atthe very least there is a terrifying ‘fish-eyed’ expression upon closer inspection that foreshadows my imminent doom! In contrast to the zombie, it certainly seems to me that vampires, werewolves and most sentient aliens good or bad are conscious.

B. CHALMERS EXTRA INGREDIENTAs Chalmers states that as no functional explanations can resolve how brain processes give rise to conscious experience, he makes a case that something must be added to explanations of functional abilities of the mind - an extra ingredient of how consciousness arises. He discounts novel properties such as quantum mechanics as simply other versions of functional

explanations. Central to his argument is that conscious experience is non-reducible and proposes that conscious experience is a fundamental property of the universe to be added to mass, motion, form and spacetime.

B: CRITICISM OF CHALMERS’ EXTRA INGREDIENT - A LACK OF SCIENTIFIC FRAMEWORKI agree with Hardcastle that Chalmers’ theory of Concious Experience differs markedly from Maxwell’s electromagentism and other ‘brute facts’ of physics. While Chalmers celebrates that his theory does not conflict with any principles of physics, that is not a difficult achievement for his model as it also doesn’t interact with the scientific framework any of the sciences including physics. As the sciences continue to move toward the ‘hard problem’ of conscious experience it seems that Chalmers has retreated into the realm of agnostic metaphysics - adding a ghost in the machine in an attempt to call a truce with science and preserve some of the mystery of conscious experience from further scientific reduction. It is my observation that scientific breakthroughs help resolve a plethora of other problems with elegance (think of gravitation and explanations ofa host of phenomena including tidal action) more than they burden us with new abstract concepts that show no relation to the existing scientific framework. Chalmers model may be based in his theoretical mathematics background but does not fit within a much larger set of scientific theories in either the hard sciences or biology. All it resolves is some of the growing conflicts in Chalmers past work. I agree with Hardcastle and Armstrong’s position that it is implausible Chalmers’ proposed ‘brute fact’ of conscious existence should exist only in higher organisms when all other brute facts such as mass, spacetime and electromagnetism are manifested in all things.

Chalmers assertion that conscious experience is a newly discovered fundamental phenomenon (Chalmers, 1997 p. 221) and should be added to the recognized brute phenomena of mass, motion, form, electromagnetismand spacetime is a categorical error. Consciousness is certainly special but not a brute reality.

SO WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?CAN’T REDUCE EXPERIENCE BUT WE CAN REDUCE THE FUNCTIONS PRODUCING EXPERIENCEAlthough the sensation of conscious experience is not reducible, the

function and mechanisms behind how the mind/body generates conscious experience is not outside our current ability and technology. Howeverin order to explain the 'how' and 'why' of consciousing we need to define the function of 'hard consciousness'.

REDUCING CHALMERS ‘PHYSICAL BASIS OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE” NOT THE CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE ITSELF

p. 394 “Reduction works when an explanation is sought of one fuction or process in terms of more fundamental functions and processes. e.g. We can reduce genees to elements of DNA because the function of genes in inheritance can be carried out by the structure of DNA. But the question of how conscious experience arisesis not a question of reduction of one process to more fundamental ones, so it cannot be answered in these terms.”

By acknowledging that the perception of conscious experience could have evolutionary value, we are afforded an avenue of investigation that Chalmers has precluded. Also by acknowledging that consciousing is a process we understand that defining the physical basis is not defining the qualia of conscious experience itself. So the ability to reduce the body-mind processes (consciousing) that leads to conscious experience into evolutionary steps that arose from the value of consciousness to a species. In exploring this process, we must remain aware that we are not by analogy 'defining what saltiness is like', weare rather defining something alalogous to why the ability to perceivesaltiness is favoured by natural selection; the internal mechanisms that make the perception of saltiness possible; and perhaps even how the ability to detect salt flavour could have developed over our evolutionary history. In the process not only help to define consciousexperience better without reduction but also we may even discover a richer appreciation for the phenomenon of conscious experience itself.

WHAT: Can the nature of cause of conscious experience be defined in a way that is satisfying to the all the special disciplines that currently investigate consciousness?IS A MULTIDISCIPLINARY MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS ACHIEVABLE?Can the nature of conscious experience be defined in a way that is satisfying to the all the special disciplines that investigate consciousness without resorting to a reductionism of the richness of

conscious experience? I believe that inasmuch as it is a singular reality, we can not reduce conscious experience but that we can reduce the mechanisms that enable that experience and the functions that consciousness plays in the evolution of species.

TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCEIt may seem that without a definition of conscious experience determining what entity is or isn’t conscious may be impossible. We shall therefore attempt a definition.

I argue that the experience of consciousness is not a substance but isour singular perception ( consciousing ) of the fourth fundamental property that joins the other three fundamentals of mass, form, motion with blocks of time. From this perspective conscious experience is the sought-after human ‘sixth sense’ and although more categorically akin to vision, hearing then electromagnetism and yet at the same time a sort of ‘supersense’ that combines all perceptions and behaviour in the broadest sense of the word into an ego-centric model within the intentional entity.

EXPLAINING SPACETIMEIndeed consciousing is an entity's internal modeling and manipulation of what physicists and philosophical dimensionalists could aptly term temporal blocks of spacetime (3+1). The mass, form, motion of the entity itself is positioned in real or imagined environments and the blocks of time within which they occur.

SIMUTANEOUS MODELS SUPERIMOSEDAn entity's generating one or more ecocentric and physically coupled models of of 3+1 within itself simultaneously.

Equipped with these correlating understandings of consciousing, we areable to understand why conscious experience can lead consciousing entities to feel a connection with immortality.

IS CONSCIOUSNESS THE ELUSIVE CONNECTION BETWEEN BODY AND IMMORTAL MIND?

Yet another unique quality of consciousing is that it is the only way an entity can sense a connection with an immortal mind through the host of 3+1 generated qualia. These rich attributes of consciousing will be explored below.

Easy problems involve explaining an ability of the mind or a function that some part of the mind is performing. e.g. how to discriminate between two objects in its environment.

AN ABSOLUTELY UNIQUE SENSORY-IDENTITY-BEHAVIOUR SYSTEM SITTING ATOP THE FIVE SENSESAs is recognized generally, one of the mysteries of conscious experience is its singularity. I agree with Nagle, Chalmers and other mysterians' notion that a description of conscious experience (ie conscious experience is like X) is about as fruitful as a description of the saltiness of salt or the wateriness of water. If conscious is indeed our only sense that allows us to process our world in spacetimethis would explain its rich uniqueness. Each of our senses perceives mass, form and motion through sometimes redundant sensory mechanisms. If we were blind and unable to perceive motion and form with our eyes,then our senses of touch and hearing would still perceive the mass, form and motion of objects. Through our senses of smell and taste we would also still perceive the form and motion of molecules. However conscious experience is so unique exactly because there is NO alternate sensory system through which these 3+1 blocks of space and time can be perceived, manipulated and merged other than through consciousing itself.

REACHING OUT FOR FUNCTIONAL CLUESHave we exhaustively explored the function of conscious experience? Isthere another path of investigation that could lead to an understanding of the function of conscious experience if indeed one exists? There are a few disciplines that could illuminate an understanding of what is and is not a conscious human being.

CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND NONCONSCIOUS ORGANISMS

The first field of enquiry pertains to the field of animal rights which is generally based on the degree to which animals have consciousexperience. Descartes was reportedly cruel to animals because he did not believe they had a mind or were conscious. Legal ethics has also justified or condemned the infliction of distress in animals accordingto their degree of apparent consciousness. Without a rigorous study ofanatomy, physiology and functionality of neurons, it is difficult to comprehend how similar and often identical neural structures are between us and lower life forms. Thus when scientists make assertions based on study of life other than human it is easy to dismiss such studies as irrelevant. Nevertheless the certainty of certain extrapolations from animals are such the scientists place their and our lives on the line pending their accuracy.

THE MECHANICS OF NON CONSCIOUS BEHAVIOUR - SEA SLUGSIn reference to the mechanism of basic unconscious reflex behavior Nobel Laureate Erik Kandel invested over 20 years of his life studyingthe nervous system of the primitive life form Aplysia (sea slug). The slug is a model organism because it has both very few (on the order ofhundreds) and very large sized neurons compared to most other life. Nevertheless the chemicals and structures of Aplysia nervous system are identical to ours. When inflicting injury of some sort to Aplysia,the overwhelming consensus is that the withdrawal behaviour is simply a reflexive reaction due to nociception but not the actual pain that would be experienced by a conscious entity.Under attack, one or more neurons carries a distress impulse up the neuronal pathway from the point of contact on the skin of Aplysia directly to a motor neuron that causes the source area of the impulse to move away from the pointof distress. These creatures do not experience pain and by extension do not likely experience pleasure. Nevertheless Aplysia do clearly ‘move toward’ experiences that in conscious creatures would cause pleasure such as a recovering a scrap of food. As noted above they also ‘move away’ from experiences that we would perceive as painful.

SO WE DON’T NEED CONSCIOUSNESS?One conclusion from this case study could be that consciousness has nofunction as the responsive the behaviour of the human and Aplysia

appears to be the same. However by examining the two avoidance/seekingbehaviours in the two classes of creatures and reducing the stimuli and response behavior (and anything that may occur in between) we may gain insights into a mechanism and even a function of conscious experience.

HUMAN REFLEXESIn the case of the sea slug, Kandel could observe and measure exactly what is occurring in each of the neurons of its homologue to our brain. As humans we have similar direct stimulus-response mechanisms we call reflexes. Indeed if our knee is tapped a certain way or we touch a hot stove our body responds to this stimulus before we are even consciously aware of the experience.

FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SLUGWatching our own knee tapped by the examining doctor the behaviour mayseem foreign or not ourselves as unlike most of our movement it is nottightly coupled with our body sensation, decision conscious motor control behavior. Perhaps for the first fraction of a section we get asense of what it is like to be a slug watching its body be acted on? Nevertheless the activity is quickly followed by conscious awareness of both the tap and the movement of our body.

SLUGGISH BEHAVIOUR IN HUMANSApproaching the unconscious behavior of the sea slug more closely are some of the interior parts of the human body. As an example, within the colon there are sensory and motor nerves that are not connected toour nociception and seem to behave independently of concious sensationor control. For instance a surgeon could be performing a colonoscopy on a part of the colon without anesthesia as is the practice in some Scandinavian countries. The colonoscope is both a camera probe, a scalpel and a cauterizer. As the doctor moves the device inside the fully conscious patient we may feel discomfort as the large movements disturb areas of our body sensitive to pain. However, when the doctor finds and cuts out a small polyp using the tiny snare of the colonoscope we have no conscious awareness of movement or pain although inside the sidewall of the colon muscle can react to the

scope with a recoil. This is an example how even during full consciousness humans have behavioral response to injury that seem the same as the sea slug. We have conscious awareness of neither pain or movement nevertheless there is sensory stimuli and motor reflexive behavior to ‘protect’ the tissue of the colon from further damage. It is like the knee tap reaction but we never become aware of either the tap or the movement of our legs. Notwithstanding, if the surgeon failsto cauterize a significant lesion there is the possibility that a patient could unknowingly bleed to death despite the ‘efforts’ of the musculature to contain the bleeding. Yet to the conscious patient the experience could seem simply like falling asleep. This is an example of pain versus nociception but analogous examples could be used for pleasure and likely for other qualia functions that in one case we have as consciousness experience and in another we are completely unaware.

THE CLUE OF PAINBy examining the anatomical differences between species and within thehuman body concerning pain and simple nociception followed by similar behaviour, we gain further clues that can lead us to insights into the mechanisms and perhaps even the function of conscious experience.

ARE WE STILL ON TRACTBefore embarking on the next field of enquiry on our search for clues to the hows and whys of conscious experience it is useful to check ourbearings with regard to our initial objective. .

...We are exploring the process that leads to conscious perception not reducing conscious experience. Therefore we must remain aware that we are not by analogy'defining what saltiness is like', we are rather defining something alalogous towhy the ability to perceive saltiness is favoured by natural selection; the internal mechanisms that make the perception of saltiness possible; and perhaps even how the ability to detect salt flavour could have developed over evolutionary history.

Although I believe we have stayed on track, it may seem like we are nocloser than before, but I assure you we are closer to understanding all three of these questions related to the how and why of conscious

experience..

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOURMe only partially under anesthesia

WHEN HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS MAKES A MISTAKEAlthough only

It seems we could look for real-life cases where people act conscious to a certain extent and yet are not. Specifically where humans are unconscious but nevertheless seem functional to a certain extent. A characteristic of unconscious experience is that it is not within our awareness and is subsequently not subject to recall (REFERENCE). Thus remembered consciousness is a part of declarative memory (sometimes referred to as explicit memory) refers to memories which can be consciously recalled. Episodic memory is the category of declarative memory that involves the recollection of specific events, situations and experiences and for our purposes may be considered the stored segments of consciousness subject to recall.

HOW FAR CAN UNCONSCIOUSING GET ME?An interesting question is to what extent human sensory perception along with behaviour can be unconscious. Many of us have the experience of driving some distance and suddenly becoming aware that we are unable to recall driving the previous twenty or so minutes of road. I have personally experienced this even when driving through thewinding curves of the rocky mountains on my way home from University. How could this be? On a straight road it might be possible (however unlikely) to have slept the distance and miraculously held the steering wheel in position. However on a curved mountain road there isclearly more required of an explanation. The answer is that we do not need to be concious to perform certain complex actions (I hear a cheerfrom Chalmer’s p-zombies)! Actions involving another type of learning called procedural memory may require eye sight, hand eye coordination and even mental processing that requires judgement such as at what speed to take a sharp curve on a highway. Nevertheless we sometimes

perform these behaviors unconsciously. In these situations our person is “locked in the present” neither saving a mental record of the passing of time and space. We have been as a sort of temporary p-zombie.

So what can we do and not do without conscious experience? To examine this question I turn to the field of criminal law - specifically timeswhen capital crimes have been committed by individuals claiming not have been conscious of their actions.

Consider the sleep walker who gets up in the night perhaps from a frightful dream. Walks over to the gun safe. Unlocks the safe and removes a gun. Walks to another part of the house where the amunition is stored. This is a special sort of safe that wants to make sure a child does not enter. It therefore asks a question such as who is the current Vice-President of the United States. The sleepwalker immediately answers the question, the safe opens and she loads the ammo into the gun. She turns around, walks back to her bedroom and shoots her husband a fatal blow in his sleep. After the gun as fired she 'awakens' from the state. At her trail, the prosecutor points out that the claimed sleepwalker must have had use of eyes and ears and the ability to process information in order to obtain and load the gun. Further the sleepwalker wasn't simply shooting the gun anywhere but deliberately walked back into the bedroom and aimed directly at her husband before firing.

At her trial the wife says that her only inclination of what had happened came after she fired the gun. At that time she knew that she had frightened by a nightmare and she knew it was she who had obtainedand shot the gun but this recollection didn't come until after the gunwas fired.

Is this possible? Many of us may doubt this but there is an actual condition called Homicidal sleepwalking and these are actual examples:

In the 1880s, Robert Ledru (†1937), a French police detective, was asked to investigate the murder of Andre Monet on the beach at Le

Havre. Examining the evidence—the fatal bullet and some footprints—he decides he had been sleepwalking on the beach and fired the fatal shot. He turns himself in.

William Pollard was a farmer whose neighbors knew him well as a sleepwalker and sleepworker—doing his chicken-farm chores while fast asleep. One night he dreamed he was fighting with a marauding stranger. When his wife awakened him, he found he had killed their daughter.

Jo Ann Kiger, a teenager, was asleep when she took a revolver in each hand, poised to defend her family against a "monster." She fired, and fatally shot her brother and her father.—she was not found guilty.

In 1987, Kenneth James Parks was a married 23-year-old man with a 5-month-old daughter. He had a very close relationship to his in-laws, with his 42-year-old mother-in-law Barbara Ann Woods referring to him as "her gentle giant." The summer before the controversial events, he developed a gambling problem and fell into deep financial problems. Tocover his losses, he took funds from his family's savings and then began to embezzle at work. Eventually, in March 1987, his actions werediscovered, and he was fired from his job. On May 20, he went to his first Gamblers Anonymous meeting. He made plans to tell his grandmother the following Saturday (May 23) and his in-laws on Sunday (May 24) about his gambling problems and financial difficulties.

In the early morning hours of May 23, 1987, Parks reportedly got up (not awoke) from his sleep, drove roughly 23 km to his in-laws' home and broke in, assaulted his father-in-law, Dennis Woods, and stabbed his mother-in-law to death. After all this, he managed to drive himself to the police station. Aside from a few isolated events, the next thing he could recall was being at the police station asking for help, saying “I think I have killed some people…my hands.”

Parks’ only defense was that he was asleep during the entire incident and was not aware of what he was doing. Naturally, nobody believed it;

even sleep specialists were extremely skeptical. However, after careful investigation, the specialists could find no other explanation. Parks’ EEG readings were highly irregular even for a parasomniac. This combined with the facts that there was no motive, that he was amazingly consistent in his stories for more than seven interviews despite repeated attempts of trying to lead him astray, that the timing of the events fit perfectly with the proposed explanation, and that there is no way to fake EEG results, led to a jury acquitting Parks of the murder of his mother-in-law and the attempted murder of his father-in-law. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the acquittal in the 1992 decision R. v. Parks.

The next story is a situation where the sleepwalking defense did not hold up in court. Shortly after I moved to Phoenix, Arizona, a resident named Falater murdered his wife of 20 years and claimed he was sleepwalking at the time. A reconstruction of his activities revealed that the suspect had changed his clothes, put the murder weapon in a Tupperware container, put the container in a trash bag with his boots and socks, stashed the bag in the spare tire well in the trunk of his car, and took and hid all the items that showed that he was the person who killed her. On June 18, 1999 a prosecution expert testified that that Falater's actions were "too complex" to have been carried out while sleepwalking and hew was convicted of murder.

Nobody is sure why some people will commit murders in their sleepwalking episodes, but it seems reasonable to assume that many conditions must be met. Using Kenneth Parks as an example again, he was planning to go to his in-laws’ residence the next day, he was stressed and depressed from marital and financial troubles, and he hadbeen sleep deprived because he couldn’t get any sleep the night before.[9]

In all cases, similar to our driving without remembering, the defendants claim they were not conscious of what they were doing at least up to a certain point where a part or full recollection of what they had done may have become subject to recall. This episodes seem a

sort of amnesia of the present moment and correspond to a lack of ability to access episodic memories after the fact. Futher although seeing and hand eye coordination, navigation and a certain amount of recognition were involved during the crimes, there is also a definite loss of context with respect to who they were in relations to the victims and why what they were doing was contrary to their their usualvalues.

In cinema, many of us can recall the amnesiac woman whose spouse triesto approach her and she recoils in terror from the advances of this ‘stranger’. What is impaired is not the ability to kiss (procedural memory) or the ability navigate in space and time but an inability to connect the current experience in space and time with past experiencesin space and time the define her relationship with her husband. Indeedeven when assured by everyone that a particular person is their spouse, the relationship is not restored for the amnesiac. What is curious is that these episodic memories of past conscious experience in time and space may completely return (suddenly or gradually) and the person and all her relationships are restored as they were. It is similarly possible for amnesiacs not only to lose relationships but also to a greater or lesser extent their past value system. For instance the ‘new’ person may be more promiscuous etc.

So what have we learned about stored conscious experience? FIrst that our behaviour, relationships and even values can be dramatically and instantaneously changed by our inability to access past episodes of consciousness. Also that those who committ unconsious crimes seem to have procedural, spatial, and semantic memory to a certain extent but lack the ability for episodic memory to create context. For example… Canada guy stressed and not looking forward to talking with inlaws… Further they don’t seem to form episodic memories of what they have done or at least can not build on previous memories until regaining consciousness. Lastly it seems that although complex actions are possible and common, there is an absence of the ability to imagine future implications (temporal blocks of imagined spacetime) of what they are doing on their self and are also unable to perform complex planning through like mechanisms. Remember that the delivereate

efforts of Arizona man to change into clean clothes, dispose of his dirty clothes in a trash bag stored under the spare tire were what ledto the breakdown of his Sleepwalking Homocide plea. Finally it appearsthat our conscious experience may be stored as episodic memories. Although these memories may be sequenceable, they are clearly not stored in linear time; such as how a movie would be replayed. Rater these memories are storedin blocks of time that can be manipulated by the mind to give context to current consious states (the amnesiac ladywholse memory is restored does no need to replay linearly the various epidoc memories of experiencces with her husband. (Below we will talk about areas of the brain that are biologically perfect for consolidating, storing, integrating, and recalling spacetime.) Rather time is compressed into one or more blocks of experience that are composed of space and time.

Note that to this point there has been no reference to science. The earliest anscient philosophers could have defined the varous types of memory and reasoned through when and where conscious and unconscious experience is present.

Leaving science aside, we have only establihed the intimate relationship between conciousness , access to past episodic memories and the ability to form current episodic memories. This is givin g usa peek into the fufnction of consciousness.

A question at this point is how do some people commit unconcious experience crimes? Such an understanding extends beyond the realm of medicine and science and is sure to provide insight into the nature ofconcious experience. Perhaps it could even provide insigt into the source of consiousness. In the case of unconsciou crimes, the modern courts have relied on more`than simply the behaviour adn the recollections of defendants. Specifically people who have unconscious behaviour whether sleep walking or sleep crimes are found to have irregular slow wave sleep brainwaves. WHY SCIENCE IN A PHILOSOPHY PAPER?Acknowledging again that this is a philosophy paper, neverthelss a toplevel understanding of the scinece will pertain to us as philosophers

following Sellars encorangement to “know one’s way around with respectto the subject-matters of all the special disciplines”. This science will pertain to not only the philsophy of mind and consciousness but also of time. It is important to note that while the science that willbe presented is summarized we are now moving from speculative to empiracaly validated physiology. The new of this science is how I haveincorporated a number of studies and findings together to create an whole model that could satisfy all parties involved in consciousness exploration. If I am successful, I will join various independent scientific studies to form an overall model that is consistent with the observations and closely held beliefs of dualists and monists and in fact provide insights of big picture that could benefit the variousscience disciplines.

I should mention at the outset that neuroscience seems to indicate that the neural substrates of conciousness is widely distributed throughout the brain although have their own ‘signature’ that makes the identification of conscious versus non-conscious activity both identifiable and manipulatable.

In my youth I remember seeing television documentary and reading scientific papers on REM sleep. REM sleep has been associated with procedural memory consolidation and is more abundant in children. As you may know REM stands for Rapid Eye Movement and this sort of sleep alternates with a certain pattern of duration with SWS or slow wave sleep. Although calling the second sleep SWS we are still in the domain of two types of sleep observable without science. There is a recent but large body of evidence that links slow-wave sleep in humansand animals ot the consolidation and management of episodic memory. The orchestrator of brain action in SWS is the hippocampal network (HPCN) that interacts with the rest of the cortext where episodic memories are distributed in networks block spacetime that are described above. Not surprisingly the HPCN is the primary orgine of both spacial temporal modeling and manipulation and also episodic memory. Part of the HPCN is composed of special ‘place cells’ that actually physically map out a neural copy entities of the enviornment both current and during the previous hours or days experience. This

environment map may be more correctly called an experience map becausenot only does it represent 3 dimentional space but it also represents the dimention of time.

Let me give an example that needs some background. A fascinating insight into how entity’s are stored in the brain comes from the phenomenon of focal amnesia. This is when a person may temporarily forget that a certain type of entity exists! For instance a person maysuddenly no longer be able to identify dogs. Cats, horses etc. fine and otherwise normal brain functioning. Dogs simply become a foreign species to them as a capybara (very large south american rodent) wouldbe unidentifiable to many North Americans. The same type of focal amnesia can occur for a hammar, country etc.

This phenomenon suggests that although memories are distributed, thereis a single network or atleast tightly coupled network of neurons thatrepresents in the brain each entity. Obviously the more we have experience with dogs the larger this network as various temporal partsof our experience are attached in new or modified networks.

How do these declarative memories enter the brain? How can they be so efficient when during the course of the day there are radom experiences we may have with dogs and various objects and it seems ourcortex would constantly be rearranging itself like the RAM on a harddrive (we will return to the RAM analogy shortly).

The workplace hypothesis of consciousness is dismissed by chalmers as simply a functional item that has nothing to do with the hard questionof consious experience. Nevertheless it is part of the total model.

As much as this concerns the how and why of some elements of science, what we are about to read concerns an explanation of the how and why various branches of property dualism! So pay attention even if you hate science!

We will at this point hold off the evolutionary story and simply look at how things are now for healthy humans. Most of us know that as we

see or hear stimuli during the course of our consciess experience the stimuli travel through various levels to the visual cortex. Most of use think of neurons as analogous to computer chips but there are verysignificant differences. Nerves and neurons are comparatively very slow (XX km/hr). Therefore inorder to react in a timely manner to our environment, the processing of a typical ‘thought’ can only ‘afford’ 4to 6 sequential steps where information is passed from one neuron to adownstream neuron. Conversely in this time a computer could easily do billions of manipulations of data. What makes processing in the brain so powerful is that a signal branches with each transmission upstream.A typical neuron branches to between one thousand and ten thousand neurons with each step. This is called parallel processing of information. The way the brain then is able to do such amazing things such as recognize a new dog or a person from a perspective we’ve neverseen before is that these signals converge on the spacetime network episodic memories in the cortext and then ‘search’ for matching patterns. Obviously the patterns never match completely but through anelegant competition between neurons firing the signals converge towardthe most similar patterns.

Proportional to our degree of awareness and attention, at the same time the HPCN is forming as thespatial representation of our environment in spacetime blocks. As a block is formed there neurons inthe cortex have found the closest matches possible to the entities composing our visual field. The neural signals having converged in clusterns on these best matches for what has been supplied through perception are then firing such that they their firing corresponds to the 4 dimentional map being created simultaneously in the HPCN. Following Canadian Neuroscientist Donald Hebb’s rule ‘cells that fire together, wire together’ connections are made/strengthened between theneurons representing the locating and timing of an entity in our environment and the network of cells in the cortext that have identified what it is and additonal information we will not explore. In this way, in fractions of seconds, to greater or lesser degrees depending upon awareness and attention the HPCN is making space time maps of our episodic experience. For the most part, the bulk of information coming in that will form the episodic memory is not

represented by the HPCN in isolation. Rather the HPCN creates a representation of space and time with the place cells and then connects are made with the closest match of representations in the cortex.

As you can imagine by the time we drift out of conciousness into sleepour HPCN contains a web connections between the map of HPCN and the large number of entities we encounter and may remember during the day.Much of the information is not important but aside from awareness and attention the HPCN alone does not ‘judge’ what to keep and what to discard. Accordingly when we enter into slow wave sleep the HPCN and cortex have temporarily restricted communication between our sensory world such that consciousness is suspended so that the HPCN and neocortext can consolidate a host of memories into an efficient representation in the cortext. Thus how many times and places I talkedon my cell phone for the most part may not be represented but the large amount of use that resulted in my phone going dead when I neededit is incorporated into my entity representation of ‘cell phone’, ‘battery’, ‘charging locations’ etc so that stored is a series of related representations that will trigger and could with further processing when I see my cell phone the next morning lead me to a determination that I need to find a place to charge the phone part waythrough the day. There is much more that can and will be said about how all this relates to why and how of conscious experience but for now we have a foundation that will allow us to return from this surveyof a scientific discipline to our purpose - the how and why of conscious experience.

The influece of the direction of pysiological discovery on the philsophy of mind.

out During SWS the HPCN takes temporary and haphazard s

aim of knowing one's way around with respect to the subject-matters of all the specialdisciplines

Nevertheless it seems also to play a role in isolating a part of the brain called the hippocampus from the neo-cortex.

NOTE HERE WHEN TALKING ABOUT TIME BLOCKS

While all the cases are interesting, the Arizona case is particularly insightful in our pursuit of the functional value of consciousness. Inthis study we see what actions were judged impossible without possessing conscious experience.

Sleepwalking and other forms of disorders of arousal occur from deep non-REM slow wave sleep (SWS). SWS is a time of the consolidation of memories in the hippocampus. Awaking from SWS stage of sleep is accompanied by an extreme feeling of drowsiness, It is caused by an inappropriate physiological event where the brain tries to exit SWS and go straight to wake.

In normal sleep, the brain transitions from sleep either from stages 1or 2 of NREM or REM sleep, but almost never from SWS. As a result, thebrain gets “stuck” between a sleep and wake state.[8] In the case of Kenneth Parks, his EEG showed that his brain tries to wake from SWS 10to 20 times a night. Needless to say, this is an incredible number compared to normal sleepers who almost never experience this.

THE HIPPOCAMPUSMemory, both episodic and semantic (Klein, 2013), provides the ingredients for imagining possible future events. What has been termedepisodic foresight (Suddendorf, 2010), along with autobiographic memory and theory of mind, also makes up much of our mind wandering (Spreng and Grady, 2009), as we preview some future activity or consider possible future options in order to select appropriate action. The capacity to mentally relive past events and imagine possible future ones comprises has been termed mental time travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007), taking us into an imagined future as well as into an imagined past. Both are essentially constructive processes. Brain imaging shows considerable overlap in brain activation between the two, with slightly more frontal-lobe activity in imagining the future (e.g., Addis et al., 2007). Critical to both is the hippocampus, whose role is discussed in more detail

below.

A central component of mind wandering is mental time travel, the calling to mind of remembered past events and of imagined future ones.Mental time travel may also be critical to the evolution of language, which enables us to communicate about the non-present, sharing memories, plans, and ideas. Mental time travel is indexed in humans and rats by hippocampal activity. The hippocampus is active when we replay or pre play activity in a spatial environment, such as a maze. Mental time travel may have ancient origins, contrary to the view thatit is unique to humans.

A critical component of mind wandering is memory, which provides the basic elements from which our mind wanderings are constructed. Memory itself can be divided into declarative memory, which can be made explicit or conscious, and non-declarative memory, which comprises thenon-conscious products of learning, such as habits or learned skills like driving or playing the piano. Declarative memory, in turn, can bedivided into episodic memory, which is personal memory for past episodes, and semantic memory, which is basic knowledge about the world (Squire, 2004). According to Tulving (1972), episodic memory is unique to humans.

Indeed, language itself may have evolved precisely to allow communication about the non-present (Corballis, 2009; Gärdenfors and Osvath, 2010), so we can share our mental travels to other places and other times. The absence of articulate language in non-human species may therefore be considered evidence of incapacity for mental time travel itself. Recent evidence from neurophysiology, though, suggests that non-human animals may indeed have the capacity for at least limited mental time travel, even though they do not have the means to communicate it. A default mode network homologous to that in humans has been identified in the monkey (Vincent et al., 2007), and does suggest a basis for mind wandering, if not for mental time travel itself. More critical, though, may be the hippocampus, which performs two important roles in mammals, as well as in birds.

First, the hippocampus contains so-called “place cells” that encode where an animal is located in space, and so constitute what O'Keefe and Nadel (1978) called a “cognitive map.”

Second, the hippocampus appears to be critically involved in declarative memory systems and, in humans at least, in mental time travel generally. Loss of hippocampal function in humans results in severe amnesia, including an apparent inability to imagine possible future events as well as failure to recall past ones (Hassabis et al.,2007a,b; Andelman et al., 2010; Race et al., 2011). Conversely, the hippocampus is activated in neurologically intact individuals when they bring to mind past episodes and imagine possible ones As suggested earlier, the hippocampus appears to be the hub of the system, drawing detailed information from other regions of the brain, including the default-mode network (Addis et al., 2007), for the reconstruction of past or future events. There is some differentiationalong the long axis of the hippocampus, with the posterior hippocampusmore involved in storage and the retrieval of past episodes and the anterior hippocampus more activated by the imagining of future ones (Szpunar et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2011).

Based on this and other findings, the authors concluded that self-organized activity in the hippocampus, “having evolved for the computation of distances, can also support the episodic recall of events and the planning of action sequences and goals” (Pastalkova et al., 2008, p. 1327).

A similar conclusion is suggested by a more recent study in which ratswere given experience with 36 locations in an open-field environment, and learned that a particular goal location contained a reward. When located in randomly chosen locations, the rats were able to determine routes leading back to the goal, even though these routes had not beenpreviously traversed. Sharp-wave ripples pre-played these routes priorto the animal actually setting out (Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013). The authors suggest that the hippocampus “function in multiple conceptual contexts: as a cognitive map in which routes to goals might be explored flexibly before behavior, as an episodic memory system

engaging in what has been termed ‘mental time travel’ … ” (p. 5).http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3725404/

The trajectories implied by the hippocampal sharp-wave ripples are much more rapid than those actually taken by the animal. Diba and Buzsáki (2007) recorded hippocampal firing while rats ran back and forth along a straight track. Before each run, the ripples indicated aforward “preplay” of the next run, and after each run a second bout ofripples indicated a “replay” of the run in reverse order. These eventswere an order of magnitude faster than the sequence recorded during the run itself. While this may suggest that the ripples are not evidence of mental time travel, I suspect our own mental time travels are also speeded up. It takes me an hour to walk from my home to whereI work, but mentally it takes less than a minute. Diba and Buzsáki suggest that “preplay events may have a role in ‘planning’ upcoming trajectories” (p. 1242).

These findings, together with the role of the hippocampus is human mental time travel, suggest a strong thread of continuity between rat and human. Indeed, mental time travel in the sense of imagined journeys through space may well have evolved very early as a consequence of movement, and the need to be aware of location and to remember and plan movement through space. It is understandable, too, that the hippocampus should play a role in time as well as in space, since movement in time necessarily involved trajectories in space. That is, the hippocampus operates in 4D space-time. Mental travel, moreover, has one property denied actual travel, in that it can reverse time. We can mentally relive the past, and also imagine eventsin the reverse order-------Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that mental time travel in humans is more complex than that in the rat. Darwin (1871) famously wrote that “The difference in mind between man and the higher animals,great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind” (p. 126). Our own recollections of past events and imaginings of future ones arepopulated by more than just locations. We remember individual people, actions, objects, emotions, and so forth, and these are present in

different combinations in different episodes. Of course we do not yet know whether ripples in the rat hippocampus can signal more than location, and in future research it might be useful to add features orother distinctive characters to the environments in which animals are located, and seek markers in later hippocampal recordings. But for thetime being, it seems reasonable to suppose that our imaginings of pastand future carry a complexity far greater than that experienced by other species.-----THE NEED FOR UNCONCIOUSNESS (SLEEP): As the information from temporarymodels is integrated into the body of the long-term supermodel however, attention to the entities present environment (brain power devoted to the areas of episodic spacetime represented) would interfere with temporal memory being able to devote its resources to the supermodel in the synthesis process. Therefore a period when the entity disconnects from real-time input faciliatates both the synthesis with long-term without bias entering from current attention/happenings and the freeing up of resources in temporary storage (defragging) at a time when it is not required to make internal models.

NOT THE PINEAL GLAND BUT THE ...HPC is the organ that brings together the three dimentions of space and time in our brain. In fact it stores these as representations withplace cells and that fire during sleep at 5 to 8 times the speed at which events occured in real life. HPC is what give us our sense of self space and time and also what stores/manages temporary experience and then synthesises these experiences with the organisms overall experience. Once this is done the encoded experiences are destroyed inthe HPC. Largely done during sleep.CONVERGENT EVOLUTION OF THE PECEPTION OF SPACETIMENon-mammalian species do not have a brain structure that looks like the mammalian hippocampus, but they have one that is considered homologous to it. The hippocampus, as pointed out above, is in essencethe medial edge of the cortex. Only mammals have a fully developed cortex, but the structure it evolved from, called the pallium, is present in all vertebrates, even the most primitive ones such as the

lamprey or hagfish.[90] The pallium is usually divided into three zones: medial, lateral and dorsal. The medial pallium forms the precursor of the hippocampus. It does not resemble the hippocampus visually because the layers are not warped into an S shape or enfoldedby the dentate gyrus, but the homology is indicated by strong chemicaland functional affinities. There is now evidence that these hippocampal-like structures are involved in spatial cognition in birds, reptiles, and fish.[91]

In birds, the correspondence is sufficiently well established that most anatomists refer to the medial pallial zone as the "avian hippocampus".[92] Numerous species of birds have strong spatial skills, in particular those that cache food. There is evidence that food-caching birds have a larger hippocampus than other types of birdsand that damage to the hippocampus causes impairments in spatial memory.[93]

One of the consequences of this is that the medial pallium ("hippocampal" zone) of a typical vertebrate is thought to correspond to the lateral pallium of a typical fish. Several types of fish (particularly goldfish) have been shown experimentally to have strong spatial memory abilities, even forming "cognitive maps" of the areas they inhabit.[88] There is evidence that damage to the lateral palliumimpairs spatial memory.

Results show that the damage to the lateral pallium produces a profound deficit in spatial learning and memory in teleost fish. In addition, lateral pallium lesions produce a significant deficit in trace classical conditioning, whereas they have no significant effectson delay conditioning, or in heart rate conditioning. In contrast, medial pallium lesions disrupt emotional, heart rate conditioning and avoidance conditioning, but spare spatial memory and temporal stimulusprocessing. These data demonstrate a striking functional similarity between the medial and lateral pallia of teleost fish and the pallial amygdala and hippocampal pallium of land vertebrates, respectively. The reviewed evidence suggest that these two separate memory systems, the hippocampus-dependent spatial, relational or temporal memory

system, and the amygdala based emotional memory system, could have appeared early during evolution, having conserved their functional identity through vertebrate phylogenesis.

EvolutionCONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURAL SELECTION

We agree experience arises from a physical basis, but we can't explain why and how it arises. Why does such a rich inner life come from physical processing? "It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.”

As opposed to Chalmer's view that conscious experience bestows no evolutionary advantage for the entity over unconscious organisms, it is rather as if only the conscious entity's "eyes are open" (Genesis 3:7) and it exerts "dominion...over all the earth" (Genesis 1:26) in exploiting unconscious objects, other creatures with some degree of conciousing activity, and the nonconsciousing world via 3+1 spacetime manipulations .

SUMMARY OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCEComponents of Consciousness experience:1) Inseparable internally created model of an organism (remember reflex foreign), within its environment over time (creating experience).2) The form, mass and motion of the organism and its environment is seemlessly coupled with the model. The activated non-declarative memory of the organism is also seemlessly coupled with the model and add to the blend of conciousness experience.3) Although the present is usually the predominant model of conscious experience, time is also represented as block time (non-liear) and is at best semilinear in represenation.4) As part of the block time phenomenon of concious perception, the processing required to represent current models (experience), combinedwith the organisms unmet needs, and non-declarative memory, may trigger past stored models (declarative memory of experience) to superimpose their models (aka afterimages/echo/feeling awareness) on the predomenant model although the organism may not be completely aware of these past models.4a) As these past models (real or fantasy experience) superimpose on

the predomenant present, they affect how the present model is represented within the organism and how and where the organism devotesbrain processing resources to various components of the model.5) This block of time model includes a combination of present modelingand past stored models (delcarative memories) but may also include future or fantasy projective models.5b) Such future or fantasy models may generate based on patterns of similarity with current models and past in such a way as for the organism to attempt to fulfill the its own unmet needs. 6) Without the ability to model itself within space and across time, the organism would be confined to a single model of space and linear time within the absolute present allowing only reflexive and not reflective response.6b) By modeling itself within space and beyond the instantaeous present (past, present, fantasy or possible future experiences) the organism is able to compare. With only one model (the instantaneous present) there is no comparisons. 6c) Without temporal comparision the organism is limited to processingstimulus and reflex.7) If the essence of consiousness an organisms "self-modeling of itself and its environment in spacetime", there should be a mechanism in the brain that performs this function within organisms that can be concious.8) If such an organ exists, it is likely that animals besides humans have consciousness by degrees.9) The ability to compare or maintain more than one model of the instantaneous present opens the organism to the possibilities world ofblock time. Savouring, comparison, meditating, pondering, planning, feeling pain, feeling pleasure, relationships, accountability, empathyetc.

ABILITYConciousness 1) COUPLED MODELING: An entity creates within itself of apredominant model of its own form, mass and motion represented in the forms, masses and motions in its enironment so strongly couped that model and material seem perfectlly coupled. 2) TEMPORAL BLENDING OF MODELS: The more the stimuli or processing becomes similar to

information processing patterns used to represent models in the entity's past (declarative memories), the more an afterglow/echo of these past models persist such that they become part of the model of space and blocktime. 3) EXTRAPOLATION OF MODELS IN BLOCK TIME: Using the block of models in current consiousness, along with non-declarative knowledge and processing ability, the entity can generate one or more models of its own form, mass and motion and that of the form, mass and motion of other objects in the future in such a way that the object can compare and chose optimimum paths and also prepareto meet the oportunities and threats of the future before immediately apparent. 4) EXISTING SUPER MODEL: The contents of past models are notstored independently of others but relationships are maintained between the same or similar entities between models. This not only allows the entity to maintain the identity of different objects over time. It also causes further blocking of time such that events separated by along period of time but containing similar items may easily integrate into a single super model with the present predominant model. MECHANICAL FLOW OF EXPERIENCE5) TEMPORARY STORAGE: As new models are being generated, their significance (value for integration) is not fully understood so a temporary place is needed to store these models so that they can be later integrated with the value of hindsite into the stored 'super model' of the entity. 6) ATTENTION: In general the spacetime (experience) is recorded by the entity according to the amount of attention (brain power devoted to the areas of episodic spacetime represented) to one or more components of the continuous model. In thecase of the initial temporary storage, we have already established that attention (or 'brain power' amplified in a area of represented spacetime) is needed to store models temporariliy. The greater the attention the greater the storage. If the attention was too low, the model may be stored but only reach the activation of unconcious under most situations. INTEGRATION OF NEW MODELS WITH THE SUPER MODEL: Just as the current model, so the temporarily stored models of the recent past can interact with the super-model. However, it is to the entity's advantage to transfer the model out of temporary storage. A) The models contained in temporary storage are not as efficiently

stored as they would be in the supermodel as there remains redundancy in the storage of components that only loosely connects with the supermodel. B) The models in temporary storage do not have the full benefit of having been fully synthesized based on the supermodel of experience and the process of efficiently storing these temporal models ALSO is the process of synthesizing the information (behavior-affecting implications of declarative memory) learned from the temporary models with the information contained in the super model. C)Synthesizing the models and information from temporary storage into the supermodel (long-term declarative memory including values etc.) means that the models contained within temporary storage can be deleted to free up resources for generating new models.

Contrary to Chalmers, Conciousness does have an evolutionary function although its basic orgins were in a sense an spontaneous result of natual selecting meeting other independent forces that our early ancester faced. One of several reasons that conciousness is so amazingis that it is the only means through which we access one of the fundamental phenomenon of the Universe. Sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell all provide us with an inner model of the mass, form and motions of our environment. Each of these senses feeds this information to conciousness; however only through conciousness are we able to process and model Spacetime.

To understand the phenonoma of conciousness, we first take a look at XXXX's theory of how the earliest forms of conciousness may have evolved. Prior to about 350 million years ago there were no animals onland. The ocean environment is very different from a terrestrial one. Our sensory system would have adapted to this environment where sound travels more than 4 times faster than in air and where light is perceived from only very short distances. Under the right current condions a shark up to 1/4 mile away could detect blood as soon as seven minutes after it entered the water. On the subject of sharks, they developed a method electronavigation which overrides the sense ofsmell when animal is locating prey at very short distances (Fields, 2007). A proability here is that in the different environment of the

ocean an animal could rely more easily on mono-sensory stimulus response. For instance, a shark hears thrashing 1/4 mile away as a potential victim struggles to free itself from the claw of a giant lobster. The victim escapes the lobster but the shark has begun swimming towards where it heard the sound and after a few minutes encounters blood, blood becomes an overriding stimulus now and the shark begins a pattern to help narrow down location by increasing concentrations, within meters of the prey under poor light the shark can not see the victim. This is no matter as the creature is still navigating by increasing blood concentration. However, the wound has stopped bleeding by now so that within 1 meter of the victim, the water is at a constant concentration of blood. No problem for the mater of hunting as at this close of a distance the shark can detect the very faint electric fields emitted by living beings and that remain in constant proportional in stregth to distance. Thus the predator is led directly to the prey which unfortunately for its efforts I have imagined to be an 8 inch long pipefish. Fortunately as the shark reflexively swallows the prey, he lacks the conciousness to realize that he has exerted more energy in getting to the prey than the caloric value of what he has just eaten. Nevertheless from this example, we have a clear chain of sensory stimuli. It may be significant that in the oceanic environment only one or a few stimuli guide stimulus response in the organism at one time. It is clear that no matter how good the vision of the organism, the distance it can seeis on the order of several magnitudes less than the distance it can see on land.

So now we turn to the organisms that first ventured on land. Surely the most shallow parts of the ocean (near land) were the safest from the typically larger than prey predators. In fact, generally the closer to land the more shallow the water. Under these conditions mutations favoured animals that were also able to obtain oxygen from air after venturing too close to land during a chase and having a wavethrow them onto a beach for instance. Eventually organisms evolved theability to breath air exclusively, began to do most of their activity on land and the rest is as it were history.

It's likely that by now you are losing patience with my seeming diversion into evolution and talking about sensory experience in the ocean and the first land animals. Fortunately for me, it is at this point that the different environment on land could have resulted in the rutaments of conciousness. On land, there are more opportunities for using multiple senses nearly simultaneously. Whereas in the ocean a single stimulus of a pattern of light entering the eye, traveled up the heirachy of the sensory system and provoked a reflexive motor behavior, now accompanying the light from a 20 meters away is the sound of the potential prey or predator moving. While these multisensory experiences would have also taken place in the ocean, it remains that the extension of our field of vision caused at least one sense in diurnal animals to persist through other sensations of hearing and smell. So on land we began to experience an increase in the number of stimuli being processed by the brain at nearly the same time. According to a fundamental principle of neuroscience postulated by Canadian Donald Hebb in the 1940s "Cells that fire together, wire together". At this point we have stimuli not only traveling up along their different sensory pathways to evoke a motor reflex but we also have cells at the hologous levels of the heirarchy beginning to wire together in lateral or association networks.

Returning to the sight and sound the organism now sees another animal on the side of a mountain 50 meters away. Under these circumstances, we see the opportunity for natural selection to further the development of the ancient mind. Reflexive reactions such as freezing when incountering another organism unexpectedly in humans and animals are processed generally in under 100 ms. While gazing on the mountainsmy ancestor organism sees a sudden change in a pattern of light as theother organism stumbles on loose rock although it has quickly resumed a motionless stance. In this scenario, the light enters the first organism's eyes in far under 1 ms from from the stumbling event and iscompletely processed within another 100 ms. However the sound travelling through air does not arrive for nearly 125 ms to its ear. The two stimuli are perceived as two events. It may seem that this doesn't matter. The important thing is that it perceives and reacts toone of them. However in practice single stimuli are often vague and

not of themselves able to stimulate a response. For instance the motion may have barely been perceptible and the sound likewise. When processing the two simuli separately neither one may stimulate the threshold needed to elicit a behavioral response. However, if two stimuli can activate the brain at the same time the response is not only synergistically more likely to cross the threshold leading to a response but also causes the response more quickly than a single sensory stimulus! Under these conditions natural selection would againfavour organisms whose neurons were able to somehome maintain the sight stimulus long enough to fire simultaneously with the sound stimulus.

The question remains how does a neuron maintain a stimulus? After a neuron reaches threshold and fires, there is a refractory period or recovery time that it takes for the excitable membrane of the neuron to be able to fire again. With this physiological constraint the neuron can not simply mainting a static firing state. Earlier I mentioned lateral firing of homologous levels of heirarchy and this would entain some 'reverbrations' as neurons fired laterally.

THIS CAN INVOLVE LAMME’S OBSERVATION PRIOR TO EVOLUTIONThrough some elegant experimental design, Lamme has shown that these feedback signals actually cause lower level sensory processing neuronsto have their signal modified by the feedback information that returnsfrom higher level processing. Again returning to vision, the visual signal at time B may be a single dark dot from the visual field with relatively the same neuronal stimulation as time A's signal. However time A's signal has been processed by higher levels of the brain in conjunction with signals that have entered from the entire visual field. Through association of all this field of pixels, the higher level of the brain has determined that the signal representing this particular signal represents the border of an object in our visual field. The small number pixels in our visual field giving us the information to define the edges of object is comparatively much more important than any particular pixel within the objects body. Thus the part of the feedback signal sent to the lower areas of visual processing cause the signals at time B that fall on this edge to be

amplified. In this way the organism is better equipped with an awareness of the edges of objects to assist in a plethora of tasks such as object recognition, manipulation etc. The same can be said forinput from sound modifying the lower neurons processing sight etc. This situation is at least partly responsible for many illusions.

So Lamme's research shows how at least some sensory signals recursively modify each other and other sensory signals in the brain. Although the initial stimulus response path of processing sensory information is fast, these signals are maintained by the brain.

Chalmers is correct to state that consciousness could not have evolvedas an end unto itself.

Until recently it seemed a principle that nerons only fired from lowerareas of the heirarchy to higher processing areas but recent evidence challenges this assumption. In fact Victor Lamme and others have now observed that following a stimulus transmission form sensory organs tothe highest levels of processing where they may thereby invoke reflexive motor reactions there is a subsequent reverse in the path ofinformation flow or feedback loop. These feedback loops are not insignificant in humans. In fact Lamme estimates that in certain areasof the brain for every one signal that travels from bottom up (the traditional model), there are up to ten of these heretofore undetetcted feedback signals returning toward the lowest levels of sensory processing. Lamme has shown that these feedback signals extendthe processing of a single stimulus well beyond double the time of theinitial stimulus.

So feedback neural signals allow the brain to maintain a stimulus wellbeyond the time it takes for stimulus/response processing. For examplethese temporally expanded stimuli for vision are can now be available to modify, amplify and clarify a later arriving or later processed signal of sound. The bottom line of all this is that two stimuli that would have been 'evaluated' separately by mental processing now merge into a single neural transaction where a unified behavioural response

can be evoked faster and under conditons of uncertainty. This also forthe organism is the beginning of establishing a single identity event or object arising out of multiple-disjointed stimuli.

There is a fascinating consequence of this 'reverbration' of input from the senses. Consider vision in isolation as an example. As mentioned earlier visual stimuli enter the forward signal path and reach the higher areas where motor reaction is possible within 100 ms.Consider a visual signal that enters the visual processing pathway at time A. It is processed and after 100 ms has entered into a feedback loop between higher and lower processing areas. In the mean time a second visual signal enters the brain 100 ms later. The neurons along the feedforward path have ended their refractory period and are able to respond to the signal. However at the same time signals from time Aare traveling back and forth and sideways between lower areas of sensation and pre-motor function. The result is that there is a physical interaction between the two signals.

QUALIAFunction (Individual) More effective feeding, reproducint, escaping, energy use when actions can be based on models where time can be manipulated as a block (spacetime) rather than being locked in the sensations and reflexes of the present.

Function (Group) Since each individual entity is modeling environment,each has slightly better or worse vision, smell, firing of neuros on red versus. ie. The combination of each leads to a different perspective of the opportunities and danger of an environment than anysingle entity alone. An Example of how subjective differences lead to advantage for a group: Older people familiar with expression "They all look the same to me". Three racial groups are raised separately. Example black, asian, caucasion on a team versus black, black, black, white, white, white and asian, asian, asian. Object is for one member of a group is to be able to identify any given person in another group by their

face.of the unconcious entity (p-zombie invetibrate). Multi-racial will always win. Another example is how the essential tennents of dualism, physicalism, idealism, and religion combined with physics, neuroscience, meditation, evolution, and psychology lead to a philosophy the embodies many of the essential tennants of each.

THE IMMORTAL MINDBUT WHERE DOES MIND CONNECT WITH BODY: SHORT ANSWER is like where doeswalking connect with legs (Only 4th dimention). HPC and conciousness aren't the 4th dimention only an internally generated model of 4th dimention. In reality our body exists in 4D and never dies there (spacetime says 4D is more real than 3D).

Chalmers states that experience arises from a physical basis (Chalmers, p. ) and is due to the perception of a fundamental phenomenon of the universe which phenomenon can not be reduced to whatwe experience with eyes, ears, nose, touch or taste (Chalmers, p. XXX). As Chalmers acknowledges, and Galileo theorized centuries before, all our recognized 5 senses are actually the body detecting combinations of three fundamental phenomenae: mass, form and motion. Iagree with Chalmers that conciousness detects a fourth phenomenon to provide us with concious experience. It is true that conciousness in healthy humans also detects and synthesizes information regarding mass, form and motion; however because of consious experience we sensea rich inner life, and qualia that could not be had with merely processing of mass, form and motion as a computer program might. Unfortunately it is at this point in his argument that the richness and simplicity of Chalmers position falls apart as he tries to define the fundamental phenonomenon of experience. In doing so, his naturalistic dualism actually becomes a sort of metaphysical atheisim that seems inaccessible. So at this point I also much leave Chalmers and posit a my own putative fourth fundamental phenomenon.

The central problem of dualism is how the physical body can interact with an internal mind. I will propose two ideas that seem like they

must be contradictory and yet they actually provide the means for a reconciliation of philosophy of mind and science; of dualism and physicalism and even allow for idealism, religionism and atheism! The reader may assume that any such all-encompassing explanation must really state nothing at all. Nevertheless it seems to me that this position brings together the essential elements behind the positions of each of these posions on the mind/body prolem.

Now I will throw a curve ball at you. Before I reveal my fourth phenomenon I must tell you that I agree with Ryle's belief that dualism has made "one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind... namely, a category mistake." That mistake is to consider immaterial matter, the substance of spirit or the Ghost within the Machine" something that must connect to the body. The rationale behind this line of thinking is that the mind and body must connect as it is generally agreed that there is increasingly strong evidence that conciousness has a physical basis (chalmers, searl).

How can it be that mind and body could be so intimately associated andyet not be connected? I will give you a thought experiment to considerthis relationship. Most of us are familiar with the graphing of x versus y we did in gradeschool. Later in university we may have be required to graph x versus y versus z. This latter model is difficult to represent on paper but it makes intuitive sense as it represents our 3 dimentional world. Imagine that you have an x/y graph with units of of inches. I now color a solid area covering the domain x= 0"to 74" and y=0" to 24" and in the shape of the shadow of my body. Perhaps I am able to make a function the exactly describes the shape on my x/y graph Ytodd =f(xTodd). Now I decide to use this function on my 3 dimentional x/y/z graph in combination with the function defininghow thick I am along the z dimention Ztodd=f(xy). This function perfectly describes my shape in 3 dimentions.

Understanding these two different models of myself, which is more correctly me? Our initial reaction may be the 3 dimentional graph because it gives more detail. This feels intuitively correct. Nevertheless the x/y graph is not less correct within its sphere, it

is simply lacking the perspective of a 3rd axis.

Now imagine that I am not a human but rather a gingerbread man made from a very sharp cookie cutter. Yes I am 3 dimentional but my z-dimention does not change along the entire interval of space I occupy in this 0n this axis. So now I compare an x/y graph of myself and an x/y/z graph of myself. Which is more correct? We have already established that neither is more correct, only from different perspectives. Which is a better representation of how I the gingerbread man really am? Probably the x/y/z graph even though it lacks the richness of a function z= 0-1/2" along the entire x/y dimention.

Now here is the question whose answer is at the crux of beginning to understanding the mind/body dilemma. I the gingerbread man representedboth the xy and the xyz graph am the same identity. Neither representation is more correct than another. So where does the substance of the xyz graph connect to the substance of the xy graph? An initial response may be to say where z=0 on the xyz graph that is where the two graphs connect. However upon closer examination it is clear that the substance of these two dimentions never connect. There is no z=0 on the xy graph. It simply is not part of 2nd dimention. Therefore the xyz graph no more connects at z=0 as it does at z=1/4". The reason is that the substance of the xyz graph is volume and the substance of the xy graph is area. While it is true that we need an area to calculate the volume of me as a gingerbread man in xyz nevertheless my area as the substance of the xy graphy has no substance or volume in the xyz graph and therefore they do not connect. The lack of substance of the xy area in xyz is similar to theconcept that an infinately thing mirror (2-dimentional) could not reflect light in xyz as it has no thickness to change the direction ofthe electro-magnetic radiation it is supposed to reflect.

So how do 2 and 3 dimentional representations of the same thing whether a gingerbread man or myself tie into the mind body problem? The answer is that our 3 dimentionally measured body is the same identity as our other-dimentional mind. Now I know that it may appear

I am falling into the trap of dualism by resorting to other dimentionsor universes of immaaterial matter but for the moment please assume that I could have a scientific reason for believing that mind acually exists in another dimention. If mind is in a different dimention as body then it follows that the two can not connect even though they arethe same identity. Nor is our three dimentional body a more correct representation of us then our other dimentional mind. Nevertheless whichever of the two, body or mind is a higher dimention may be considered a better representation of how I really am.

So lets see where this gets us. To this point I have said nothing about the immortality of mind. I have only established that if througha scientifically reasonable way, mind and body are in a different dimentions, but are the same identity their respective substances could not be connected to each other. 2) Another consequence the lowerdimentional of the two can not conceive of the higher dimentional itemas it does not possess the additional axis needed to realize the higher dimentional substance. The higher dimentional item considers the lower dimention to have no substance even though the lower dimentional's parameters are essential for establishing the substance of the entity in the higher dimention. Before investigating to which dimention the mind may belong, it is worth taking another look at DesCartes' anatomical explanation for where he hoped the mind and bodyconnect.

MIND AND SPACETIMEEinsteins theories of special and general relativity hinge on the existence of a 4 dimentional world defined by Einstein's mentor H. Melkowski. As predicted by the xy perspective on xyz, Melkowski Spacetime seems to be impossible to represent in 3 dimentions. For purposes of E=mc2, an explanation of how gravity works and many other observations explained by relativity, Spacetime is represented by compressing our 3 dimentions into a two dimentional xy plain and usingthe dimention of time as the z dimention.

Confounding the difficulty for most of us lay physicists in understanding Spacetime is the realization the we largely deal with

Linear Time which this branch of physics is nearly completely dealing with a quite different concept - Block Time (more about this later). In spite of our 3D fixation on Linear Time, many physicists and philosophers assert that not only does Spacetime (founded on Block Time) exist (Furthering Chalmers above quotes he continues to recognizes Spacetime as one of the few fundamental phenomenon of existence alongside mass, motion, form, and his speculative 'existence'), but also that since spacetime is the only way to explaina plethora of observable phenomenon both to do with the Earth and Universe that a 4-Dimentional world is more real and logical then the 3D world our limited bodies regularly acknowledge.

Dimentionalism is a branch of the philosophy of time that applies a physicists view to our existence. Derived from this is the ontologicalphilosophy of eternalism. As opposed to presentism, eternalism claims that our identity is not wholely contained in the present. Instead we are equally exisiting in all our past also. To help visualize this thetemporal parts theory posits a thought experiment as follows. Consideryourself as if you were not simply who you are now but rather segments- a sort of earthworm. You would still be the same shape as you are now but like the worm you have segments that correspond to you at different blocks of time in your life. For instance, the eternalist sees Descartes in 1635 as equally part of Descartes as is Descartes in1670 and by extension as Descartes relatively static physical body in 2013 in a tomb in France. From this perspective the presentist considers Descartes to be wholly here and now. Descartes does not persist in 1635, 1670 or any time. Nevertheless extending modern physics (not available to the majority of philosophers through the ages) to ontology and identity, neither DesCartes, nor you, nor I wholly exist in the present.

Note that if I were go to DesCartes tomb, rob his grave, and take all remnants of his body to some sort of retain atomic collider and disinegrate all the atoms, Descartes still exists just as literally asif he were standing before me today. Thus the substance of our mind inthe reality of Spacetime is immortal.

So I have established that a part of our identity I will call mind in facts exist but that by necessity there is no connection between our body and mind eventhough they are the same entity! A critic may concede all these points as problably valid but say that everything I have established is irrelevant to the day to day science. Chalmer's may add this position still does nothing to explain the rich inner experience that is the hard question of conciousness.

Satisfying both critics requires further investigation. It will come as a relief to the brain damaged, mentally ill and simply people having a very bad day that Conciousness is not Mind. Neither is conciousness connected to mind in a Cartesian sense. Conciousness is not a fundamental phenomenon in the likes of mass, form and motion. That said, the hard problem of conciousness will not be solved by simply understanding all the easy problems. Qualia do exist and their subjectivity is in fact a key part of our success as homo sapiens.