leading in conflict zones: principal perceptions of armed military guards in southern thai schools

Leading in ConfLiCt Zones: PrinCiPaL PerCePtions of armed miLitary guards

in southern thai sChooLs

The purpose of this study was to understand the experiences, issues, and concerns Thai government school principals have about the presence of armed military guards and how this helps or impedes their school lead-ership. Data were taken from a larger ongoing study of this topic and the findings suggest that the military protection of schools largely hinders prin-cipals’ leadership. This study adds to the larger discussion of how school leadership is enacted in different contexts and sheds new light on the mili-tary protection of schools in areas affected by violent conflict.

Shadowy Islamic separatist groups have intermittently fought over the last century to establish an independent Muslim state in the southernmost border provinces of Thailand (Askew, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Jerryson, 2011; Liow, 2009; McCargo, 2008). This desire for separatism is grounded in a century of Thai-Buddhist discriminatory governance (Parks, 2010), Islamic fundamentalism (International Crisis Group, 2009), corruption (Chalk, 2008), and widening ethno-religious di-visions (Liow, 2009). Individuals working for the Thai government, in-cluding educators, are frequent targets and are assassinated on their way to and from school in drive-by shootings (McDonald, 2012), executed on school grounds in front of students (Human Rights Watch, 2010), or are kidnapped, beaten, or beheaded (Melvin, 2007). These killings are in retal-iation for the deaths of Muslim religious leaders and are also high profile, provoking a strong “response from the Buddhist community and the Thai state” (Abuza, 2011, p. 11; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Melvin, 2007). Over the last decade, the Ministry of Education (MoE) has stationed armed military guards in and around school grounds to be a visible force and pro-tect schools and educators; yet, even with this military presence, schools, principals, teachers, and soldiers continue to be attacked by Islamic sepa-ratist groups (Deepsouth Watch, 2013; Melvin, 2007). To date, over a 100 schools have burned and 187 teachers and school personnel have died and 191 have been wounded (Bernama, 2014). Attacks on educators have in-creased to levels not previously seen, and continue unabated.

There is little research that explores how principals lead schools during insurgent conflict, and none that we could find that inquires into principals’ perceptions of armed military protection of their schools. Con-sequently, the purpose of this study was to understand the experiences, is-sues, and concerns Thai government school principals have about the pres-ence of armed military guards and how this helps or impedes their school

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leadership. Seeking to fill this gap, this inquiry sought to answer the two questions: How do Thai government principals understand and experience the presence of armed military guards in and around their schools during insurgency? How does military presence help or impede their leadership of schools? This article begins with a literature review that provides an overview of the educational context in Southernmost Thailand, specifical-ly looking at government and Islamic schooling. This is followed by the specific issues related to the armed protection of Thai government schools. The methods section presents the data collection and analysis procedures of this qualitative case study. After a subsequent reporting of key findings, the article concludes with a discussion that helps us understand the differ-ent ways Thai school leaders view military protection of schools and how this type of government intervention largely hinders their ability to lead schools. This study adds to the larger discussion of how school leadership is enacted in different contexts (Dimmock & Walker, 2005; Leithwood & Hallinger, 2002; MacBeath & Cheng, 2008) and sheds new light on the military protection of schools in areas affected by violent conflict.

education in southernmost thailand

Southernmost Thailand, specifically the provinces of Yala, Nara-thiwat, and Pattani, suffer from the lowest learning outcomes in the coun-try (Farrungsang, Uttayawalee, Suntong, & Haji-Awang, 2011). The Thai MoE’s policies reflect neoliberal discourse of high-stakes accountability and test-driven improvement models as the means to build a literate soci-ety and improve the Thai economy (Maxcy, Sungtong, & Nguyên, 2010). These standards, however, do not apply to private Islamic education nor do they take into account school closures, the difficulty of keeping quali-fied teachers, the reality of unpredictable violence, or the presence of sol-diers in schools. Government school principals in southernmost Thailand face increasing competition from private Islamic schools, which are mon-etarily supported by the Thai government and do not have soldier pres-ence. To better understand school leadership in this complex education-al context, we provide a brief overview of the two systems of education available in southernmost Thailand.

overview of government education

Government schools teach the Thai national curriculum which is comprised of eight core subjects: Thai language, mathematics, science, social science, health and physical education, arts and music, technology, and foreign languages. The Ministry of Education (MoE) recognizes cul-tural variation within the country and allows schools to tailor educational curricula to meet the unique needs of local minority groups. In the border provinces, government schools integrated Malay culture, language, and

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Islamic subjects in the majority of government schools, with some adopt-ing an intensive eight subject Islamic curriculum in addition to the Thai national curriculum. Yet, even with these curricular modifications, Malay-Muslims view the presence of Thai Buddhist cultural norms in the core curriculum as an “anathema to Islamic values…represent[ing] more than a century’s worth of forced assimilation through politics targeting educa-tion, clothing, language, and legal reforms” (Abuza, 2009, p. 33). Malay Muslim families are increasing removing their children from government schools, with some estimates as high as 85% attending private Islamic schools (Liow, 2009, p. 41). Thai government schools face closure due to this attrition, and recruiting new students is paramount for principals. Government schools, especially those in the rural areas, struggle to remain open with low enrollment, and are supported by a mix of military and community security measures.

overview of islamic education

Even with its revered status by Malay Muslims, private Islamic schools have high dropout rates, low standardized test scores, and ineffec-tive administrative processes (Wisalaporn, 2009). Only 25-30% of Malay Muslim students attending private Islamic schools graduate and only 10% enroll in universities (Liow, 2009). Islamic schools are required to regis-ter with the government and teach a half-day of the national curriculum. In return for compliance, they receive on-going financial support from the government meeting 60–100% of their operational budgets (National Ed-ucation Act, 1999; Liow, 2009). This ongoing funding is a result of Thai “concerns over the influx of foreign funding, which falls outside of its purview and is difficult to monitor or regulate with any precision” (Liow, 2009, p. 67). Consequently, government school principals in the border provinces are in competition for students with private Islamic schools, which are flush with money and are not beholden to MoE regulations in regards to spending, recruitment, hiring, or locale. Islamic schools are not militarily protected, another reason parents choose private Islamic educa-tion for their children.

military Presence in government schools

For the Thai government and the MoE, an armed Thai military presence is viewed as an essential way to keep schools open and operating in the south. Yet, the Thai military’s role is broader than guarding schools and escorting principals and teachers to and from school. They conduct raids and arrest school personnel, students, and others suspected of Islamic indoctrination or hiding and protecting separatists (Human Rights Watch, 2010). This focus on counterinsurgency operations heightens soldiers’ risk of attack and intensifies feelings of uneasiness, anxiety, and worry (GC-

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PEA, 2012). The military presence also exposes students to the poten-tial of physical and sexual harassment and indiscriminate violence, a rea-son many parents choose to send their female children to private Islamic schools rather than government schools (Kirk, 2011; UN 2013). The Thai military presence in and around government schools exacerbates an al-ready fragile educational context and their presence is controversial (Ma-chel, 2001; Martinez, 2013; Shields, 2013; UNESCO, 2011; van Wessel & van Hirtum, 2013).

Thai government school principals are sometimes warned of pos-sible threats through local information networks or via intelligence gath-ering operations of military guards (Human Rights Watch, 2010). At other times though, they are not warned of possible dangers, which heightens their anxiety. For protection, Thai principals choose to be as politically neutral as possible so as to not give unintended impressions of partial-ity (Brooks, 2014). Some principals and teachers welcome the protection soldiers provide, while others do not want anything to do with the sol-diers and refuse their services because they feel it places them at increased risk (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Others do not have the opportunity to object to government protection (GCPEA, 2012). Even with armed mili-tary presence, some teachers and principals carry guns to and from school (Brooks, 2014). One young student summed up the fear, “What scares me is the thought that the school could be attacked because the soldiers are at the school, [and] that students and teachers would be the ones that get hurt” (Human Rights Watch, 2010, p. 16). Principals, teachers, and stu-dents have no agency to stop the insurgency or protect themselves from surprise attacks (Sheppard, 2013). Consequently, this study explored the case of soldier protection of schools, the views principals had concerning their presence, and how military presence influenced their leadership.

methods

This case study took place in the city of Pattani in southern Thai-land, a city of 580,000 people (National Statistical Office Thailand, 2000). We chose qualitative methods as the best way to obtain the “lived experi-ences” of school principals working in militarily protected schools (Clan-dinin & Connelly, 2004; Merriam, 2009). Since the area is dangerous and travel is limited, school principals traveled to a nearby university to be in-terviewed. To help facilitate the interviews, we worked in partnership with a Thai Buddhist professor who was not originally from the city but lived and worked in Pattani for the last five years. He likewise shared an inter-est in studying the influence of conflict on leadership and translated the interviews verbatim. Schnabel (2005) discussed the importance of work-ing in partnerships “based on mutual respect and appreciation of each oth-er’s strengths and limitations” (p. 31). This was the case during this proj-ect where we both understood the purpose of the research and were able


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to discuss issues from insider and outsider perspectives. Although Brooks previously worked as a Peace Corps Volunteer teaching English in govern-ment schools and speak limited Thai, she was restricted by her etic posi-tionality, as an American Caucasian. She was cognizant of being an out-sider to the cultures of the study but was able to develop rapport with the participants, which aided in data collection. In areas of conflict, it is espe-cially important to ensure the confidentiality of participants. We removed all “potentially compromising information that could identify the respon-dents,” even if such omissions weakened the findings (Schnabel, 2005, p. 33). Data collection took place over two visits spanning one year. Em-pirical data were collected through semi-structured interviews and school site observations (Silverman, 2007). A Thai colleague recruited principals who were former students of the university, all of whom were the subjects of the study. Brooks interviewed forty-five principals working in the three southernmost provinces, twenty-one who self-identified as Buddhist and nineteen who self-identified as Muslim. Data were also collected through six observations at government schools when perceived safe to visit.

This article reports findings from an initial exploratory step aimed at better understanding how principals perceive military protection of schools. Data were taken from a larger ongoing study of this topic, and in subsequent articles we will develop theory concerning the military protec-tion of schools and school leadership and suggest actionable strategies for practicing school leaders. As this inquiry is an initial exploratory study, analysis began with open coding, led by “insight, intuition, and impres-sion” of the data (Dey, 1995, p. 78). After open coding, we created major groupings of the data. Within these groups, we used axial coding to devel-op associated categories. Applying analytic induction along with the con-stant comparative method allowed me to identify relationships between concepts and reduce the concepts into categories (Saldaña, 2009). Lastly, as codes became theoretically saturated and data became increasingly re-dundant, categories were merged and emergent themes identified (Cre-swell, 2007). Throughout the study we conducted member checks with the participants and my colleague to ascertain internal validity (Silver-man, 2001).

findings

The presentation of findings is organized around the seven themes, namely: conflicting views of the ministry of education, concerns for safe-ty, mixed views towards soldier presence, personal security measures, re-sponses to instability, and principal perceptions of student experiences, and encounters with conflict. The findings reveal prominent issues affect-ing principal work, and provide insight into how military protection com-plicates education in southernmost Thailand.

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Conflicting Views Towards the Ministry of Education

Buddhist principals spoke negatively of the Thai MoE more than their Muslim counterparts. One male Buddhist principal viewed the MoE as wholly responsible for the problems facing education in the south. He ex-plained: “The reality of this region is that the problems come from the MoE. Schools cannot provide the right education that the people want.” This dis-connect frustrated principals. A Buddhist female principal elaborated,

The MoE issues some inappropriate rules and laws that do not fit the region. Some groups of people take advantage of this and do bad. They know the gap. Schools cannot provide good education here, and so this solidifies the groups in the region.

Additionally, principals complained about the MoE changing its policies on education in the south. A Buddhist principal from a large urban second-ary school stated,

The basic factor is that policies are not stable. Some years they stress something and then other years they stress something else. It changes a lot. Because of the problem, we have a lot of teachers from the community who cannot pass the teacher exam. We hire them as temporary teachers because we have few qualified teach-ers that still live here.

The instability of MoE policies added complexity to an already unstable context. A male Buddhist principal in Pattani said, “Earlier the govern-ment decentralized the region. Now they have to tighten all the schools, both public and private.” For him, ending private Islamic education was the solution to the problem. He explained, “The government should take care of the system and make everything public. The leaders of the com-munities do not know much about education so we should do away with the idea of private education.” The MoE funds private Islamic education in order to guarantee that Islamic schools teach the Thai core curriculum alongside Islamic curricula. This strategy was largely met with disapprov-al from Buddhist public school principals who felt that the government gave too much money to private Islamic schools and Muslim interests. One principal discussed financial corruption in regards to Islamic schools:

The government gives a lot of money to private Islamic schools and the money doesn’t go directly to the students. It goes to some-one else. At the same time, the private Islamic schools use tactics such as nationalism and enrollment campaigns to enroll new stu-dents and control students that are already enrolled. For example, if you are a parent of a child enrolled in the school and can recruit new students then you are given money by the school principal. They have so much money no one can track it.

A Buddhist male principal working in an all-Muslim community and school said,


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It is not good for the government to give the Muslim schools ev-erything. Whenever you stop giving, then that becomes a prob-lem. They are very familiar with receiving and the private Islamic schools gain a lot of benefit from the government, excluding the money they get from unidentified sources in Arab countries.

Buddhist principals felt that they were in competition with private Islam-ic schools for students and money. They saw themselves as losing ground due to changing government policies, limitations on district boundaries for student recruitment, and lack of quality teachers.

On the other hand, Muslim principals were more hesitant to criti-cize the Thai government or private Islamic education. A Muslim female principal of a small elementary school that experienced decreasing enroll-ment stated, “The private Islamic schools are growing very fast, but it is not a problem. Parents want religious education for their children.” An-other female Muslim principal spoke of how her school includes Islamic education in the curricula to appeal to students and parents,

In my school, we teach an Islamic curriculum alongside the Thai core curriculum. I send my teachers to primary schools in March to talk to students about our school. The decision is up to the father though. Studying religion is most important for many families. I send my son to an Islamic school because most of his friends go there. It is a good school, but very big.

She also felt that the government should be more involved with private Islamic schools. She stated, “I think that the government should take part in Islamic schools, look after them, and control them. But now, the gov-ernment just gives them lots of money.” Muslim principals supported both private and government education, but felt that Buddhists needed to know more about working with Malay students. One Muslim principal explained, “Many years ago, our teachers and government officials who wanted to work in this area had to be trained about Islam and the Malay culture. But they have stopped this requirement.” Specific reasons were not given as to why these trainings stopped; rather, she said that the gov-ernment felt that cultural training was no longer necessary.

Religious lines were drawn in discussing the MoE. Buddhists were willing to voice their dislike of MoE’s financial support of Islamic education. They more readily criticized the lack of consistent policies and what they viewed as unsuitable rules and laws. Muslim principals, on the other hand, were reserved in their comments about the MoE. They sup-ported Islamic education and the government’s funding of Islamic schools. Yet, both Buddhists and Muslim government school principals had great concern for safety.

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Concerns for safety

Buddhist principals leading schools in urban areas felt more se-cure than their rural Muslims and Buddhist counterparts. A Buddhist ur-ban school principal commented, “There is no problem with the safety. I am fine. It is outside and not in the city. There is only one entrance into the school, one way. We have a guard.” A female Buddhist principal of an urban elementary school said, “The safety of our school is okay. I have a very good relationship with the school community and I am active in the community. We also have cameras.” However, most principals, whether urban or rural, were deeply concerned about safety, for themselves, their schools, and their students. One Buddhist male principal leading a large urban school commented,

The school has been very alert because you have to be very care-ful when you come to school and go back home. It means that you know everybody, teachers, principals, and students. Safety first! If you hang out, you will die out.

A female Muslim principal of a rural school commented, “I don’t know who is who.” This refrain was common. Neither Buddhist nor Muslim principals acknowledged knowing anything about the identity of insur-gents. A Muslim principal discussed the safety of her community, “I think that it is not a dangerous area. It is only when unidentified groups of peo-ple come into the area and we don’t know them. This is when we become concerned.” Another female principal expressed her concerns:

My school is in the red area, the violent area. Before I became the principal, five people were killed at my school during the night. This happened when there was no principal at the school at all, just an acting principal. He never came to the school. He was too afraid.

It was common for principals and teachers to be in absentia out of fear of attack. A Muslim teacher explained, “Because this school is far away from the main road and it goes through a forest, some of the teachers felt scared about this. They transferred school and left only Muslim teachers.” In red zone areas, most Buddhist principals and teachers transferred to schools out-side the three southern border provinces. One Muslim principal commented, “Because violence is everywhere, no one wants to be principal. Only me.”

In rural communities, it was common for principals and teachers to be Muslim. A male Muslim principal reflected, “The teachers are from the community and they are all Muslim. Buddhist teachers are all gone.” The violence limited the ability for rural Muslim communities to recruit qualified teachers. One Muslim male principal said, “I have both good and bad teachers. About 30% of teachers arrive late each day.” Another Mus-lim principal discussed his views of teachers in his school:


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Teacher quality is not so good because they just work for the money. They do not have idealism about how to improve student learning or how to help their students. Most of my teachers can-not pass the teacher exam. They don’t have a good education and never had a job before teaching. Many have family problems and they have to take care of their children. Many come to school late and have to leave early. They also do not like to prepare lessons. They come, talk, show, and then leave.

The safety of the area influenced the ability of principals to recruit and retain quality teachers. Consequently, one principal reflected on a meet-ing he attended that centered on keeping principals and teachers safe. His pointed comment hinted at feelings of helplessness:

The regional area decided to close all the schools to send a mes-sage to the soldiers that they need to do better. This symbolic act of closing the schools was a signal for the soldiers to try to find the best way to close the gap because shootings occur too often. Even with the presence of the soldiers, bombings and shootings still occur. Teachers and principals continue to die.

In general, principals were concerned for their safety and they saw the unrest as affecting their ability to hire and retain qualified teachers. Is-sues of safety and the ensuing difficulty of keeping qualified teachers in rural communities contributed to the challenges principals faced leading schools in Southernmost Thailand.

Mixed Views Concerning the Presence of Soldiers In and Around schools

Principals had mixed views concerning the presence of soldiers in and around schools. Several principals felt that the soldiers provided much needed security. Others felt that the soldiers attracted insecurity and at-tacks. Either way, principals had little control over the presence of soldiers.

military presence provides security. Several principals felt that the presence of soldiers was positive and that they were beneficial in help-ing everyone arrive at school safely. One Buddhist principal commented:

My house is very far from my school, about 150 kilometers. I drive to and from the school every day. This is in the red zone and it is very dangerous. When I come to school, I have to have a soldier escort. This is very dangerous. The soldiers survey the street and the area in front of my car to make sure it is safe. They do this once I get close to the school. The other part of the drive I am unprotected and by myself.

In this case, the principal felt that the soldiers made his safety a priority. For the majority of his drive though, he was unprotected and continued to

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take the risk of traveling in a red zone. Similarly, another principal com-mented on the risk of travel: “I am very concerned for my teachers trav-eling to and from school. The way to school is risky for the teachers. The soldiers help the teachers.” A Buddhist principal also remarked, “The sol-diers clean up everything on the way to school and movements around the school. When they check everything and when it is okay, they allow us to go to school. I am still very alert.” Soldiers are often harmed and killed by insurgent bombs during these checks.

Another principal discussed the benefits of soldier presence at his school in regards to providing medications, food, and building relation-ships with the community. He stated:

We have a barrack in my school. Many soldiers guard the school. It is not only their duty to guard the school, but they are also sup-posed to make relationships with the children and the people in the community. The soldiers want to help. Sometimes they give the medication and have some military doctors come to help them. This is a good strategy for the military to use. They use the school as the medium to build relationships.

Soldier outreach benefited communities, which helped to build trust. An-other principal liked the presence of soldiers because they would give his school rice:

The soldiers give rice to the school for the students to eat. In this way they support the school. They are helpful. The bad thing is that sometimes when they visit the school, the insurgents may attack. They just want to attack the soldiers, but they attack the school. So this causes problems for the teachers and the students at the school when shootings occur.

In this case, the principal welcomed the soldiers although there was a height-ened risk of insurgent attacks. A female principal likewise viewed the sol-diers as a positive presence and likened them to members of the community:

I think the military presence is positive. The military isn’t the cause. The past doesn’t matter. I am focusing on the present. The community and the military have the same goal, peace. The sol-diers in my area work with the community. They make the com-munity feel familiar with the military presence, like a family. The military is part of the community.

When the soldiers actively contributed to the school or worked toward building relationships with the larger community, some principals viewed their presence as positive.

Other principals felt that the soldiers provided safety, and as a re-sult, their feelings of safety increased. A female Buddhist principal stated, “It is safe if you have soldiers with you. The school is near the Buddhist temple where there is a checkpoint. The soldiers are there all day.” Another female principal said, “The soldiers come every day and sleep at the school


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at night to protect the school.” Both of these principals felt that their schools were safer because of the presence of soldiers. A male principal reflected on when his school burned down:

When the school burned down, we took the students to study in another building. We didn’t close the school. The soldiers came and protected the school. When the students saw that the gov-ernment rebuilt the school and that everyone was okay, then they began to worry less and study more.

The visual presence of the soldiers seemed to help these students and teachers feel a sense of calmness and security after the tragic event. An-other principal commented that the presence of the soldiers gave her cour-age to continue working. She explained,

The school is a weak target and we easily get attacked. The sol-diers come to the school every day and talk to me. They stay all day in the school because one principal was shot dead and they don’t want this to happen again. They don’t want trouble. If there is any accident in the area, they will have trouble. So, they come very often and they plan what to do to take care of the school. I think the soldiers are helping, like they are watching my back. Now I have the courage to work.

Yet, even though principals commented that they felt safe at school with the soldiers present, this did not replace their anxiety. A male Buddhist principal expressed his concerns:

For my daily life at the school, it is okay. I feel confident because the soldiers will take care at the school. But outside the school, I am concerned with the situation. Even though the soldiers screen the road before I come to school every day, the majority just stand at the risky points and walk around. My school burned down in 2005. The situation is getting worse. There is no significant sym-bol to show that the situation is getting better. Now, anything can happen. We hear on the news that teachers are shot at schools. I am not scared, but I am alert. My family is concerned. My parents and wife are very worried.

For some principals, the presence of the soldiers in and around their schools was helpful and comforting. They felt safer although they still ac-knowledged anxiety and the risk they take traveling to and from schools. Additionally, some felt that they could still be attacked at school even with soldier presence. One principal summed up this conundrum, “Although we have soldiers, we have bombs all the time. The presence of soldiers does not mean that they bring peace.” Thus, even with the soldiers protect-ing schools, questions remain as to if their presence helps to improve the situation. In answer to these questions, many principals felt that the pres-ence of soldiers made their work much more challenging and risky.

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military presence draws insecurity. Several principals ex-pressed their dislike of soldiers largely because they felt their presence at-tracted insurgent violence. One Buddhist principal stated,

The soldiers asked to escort me to school. I said no. I am fine. I don’t want to be near the soldiers. If the soldiers visit the school frequently, the community may think that something is wrong and the school is not safe. If the soldiers travel with me all the time, the community will not like it because they not like the soldiers. I can be a target.

Understanding the risk traveling to and from school, a Buddhist princi-pal strategized with colleagues rather than relying on soldier escorts. He explained,

My intention is to not have soldiers at the school. Every month the schools in the region and the communities meet. There are three ways to go to my school. We discuss which way is the best way to go. We have the meeting often for the sake of security.

Buddhist principals knew that they were at a heightened risk of attack, but they viewed the presence of soldiers as increasing this risk.

Similarly, most Muslim principals distrusted the Thai soldiers and wanted little protection. Muslim principals often relied on community watch programs to protect schools. A Muslim principal explained how her community protected her school, “We have two security guards at night. They are from the community so they have good information.” This reli-ance on community for protection was common in Muslim communities, but this was not a foolproof method. One principal discussed the killing of the village headman, the pou yai ban,

Just two weeks ago, the head of the community was shot to death at night. The night before he died, he visited the school and walked around it for security. What is very interesting is that he died while the soldiers were protecting the school. I don’t know who killed him. I am so sad about this. I led a meeting with the teachers and they want the soldiers to leave. They think the soldiers played a part in the pou yai ban’s death.

Whether or not the soldiers killed the pou yai ban, the death gave the com-munity and the school a reason to reject soldier protection. Another Mus-lim principal expressed his concerns about the presence of soldiers and the importance of maintaining a good distance:

I do not have a close relationship with the soldiers who protect my school. We do our jobs separately. The people here feel that if you get close to the soldiers, you will get hurt. The soldiers are the only targets. The soldiers know they are the targets and so they try to keep away from the teachers.


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The distrust for Thai soldiers extended to even questioning if the soldiers were legitimate. One Muslim principal commented,

Sometimes we are scared of the soldiers because we don’t know them. Maybe they dress in disguises. Many people have been killed. The Imam was killed. Many Muslim people believe that it was the soldiers who killed him. We don’t really know though.

This confusion fueled distrust and heightened feelings of fear. One prin-cipal summed up his feelings about the presence of soldiers at his school, “Sometimes the soldiers come to my school and they must be aware that they are safe because they have to protect themselves too. I am not sure who is guarding who.” Thus, the topic of soldiers in and around schools was controversial, with some strongly supporting and others strongly dis-liking their presence.

Personal security measures

Both Buddhist and Muslim school principals used a variety of methods to enhance their safety. These methods included possessing fire-arms, remaining neutral on political issues, and relying on teacher knowl-edge of the community as a way to increase their security.

Possession of firearms. When Brooks asked principals about measures they took to increase their security, she was surprised to see sev-eral principals indicate that they had guns in their briefcases. One princi-pal pointed to his hidden gun and said, “The teachers at my school have been told to carry guns for their protection. No one has had to use a gun. You know the face but you don’t know the heart.” Another principal dis-cussed his gun,

Every day I put a gun in my bag. Before I didn’t take a gun. Don’t be careless my friends told me. So, now I have a gun in my bag. I don’t like it, but I have to be careful and protect myself. But my fear is that if something happens, I would be too scared to use the gun.A Buddhist principal discussed the additional precautions he took

for his safety, “I always notify the soldiers if I am not coming to school on a particular day. I take a gun to school with me every day. I took a gun training class to prepare.” Other principals she spoke with relied on the soldiers’ guns for protection. A Buddhist principal stated, “We do not have soldiers in the school, but they are along the road on the way to the school. The soldiers help us take care. I don’t carry a gun because the soldiers have guns.” Whether or not principals had their own personal gun or relied on soldiers’ guns for protection, it was clear that the possession of firearms was important and gave principals a sense of safety.

remaining neutral and maintaining silence. Another tool princi-pals used to increase their safety was staying neutral and maintaining their

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silence about the insurgency. A Muslim female principal said, “We don’t talk about the bombings or shootings because we don’t know who is who. People use disguises. Men wear hijabs or they dress as Thai soldiers. We don’t know who it is.” Not knowing whom to trust was an underlying fac-tor in principals’ resistance to talk openly about insurgent activity, politics, or other hot-button issues. They were especially concerned that their opin-ions might be misconstrued and put them at heightened risk. A principal explained:

When the soldiers visit the school, usually the commander comes and greets the principal. Both principals and teachers have to be careful in making conversation with the soldiers and the commander because sometimes the outside community will hear what you talk about. This could bring problems. We must be neutral and say little.

This concern about not speaking wrongly increased principals’ anxiety. One principal said, “If you speak more and talk more, you will bring prob-lems. The people with think you are an informant because you ask.” A fe-male Muslim principal provided an example of how she leads her school amongst the violence. She recounted a situation that happened a few days prior to our interview:

If violence and unrest happens near our school, we say nothing and are quiet. Being quiet is best. For example, a few days ago, the soldiers investigated and tried to arrest the insurgent who bombed near the school. I didn’t say anything. I just focused on my job and then went home. If you are quiet, you will be okay.

Thus, talking was viewed as risky. Principals relied on their silence as a way to protect themselves and their schools from insurgent attacks.

relying on the knowledge of teachers. Principals also kept themselves safe by relying on the knowledge of teachers who lived in the community, as they were more privy to insider information. For example, principals reported that did not make decisions without consulting their teachers. A Buddhist principal explained,

When the school has activities, it is my decision if I invite soldiers into the school or not. But, before I make this decision, I rely on my teachers to help me make that decision. If the teachers tell me not to invite soldiers, then I do not invite them. I talk with the teachers to find out what is or is not appropriate.

Another principal stated that she “talks with teachers” and has a good community network. She relied on her teachers’ honest assessments of situations and to speak truthfully. For her, this trust in teachers and in the community network was essential:

I don’t feel I am isolated from the community and I am very lucky because the community has a very good network. Information is passed by word of mouth because many villagers are related and I


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know that information will be passed along through my teachers.A male principal explained that his teachers were scared about the unpre-dictability of the insurgency, but expressed that working together helped ease some of this fear. He explained, “The teachers are still scared of the unrest and the shootings. But, the teachers get used to it. They have to learn how to deal with this and they have to help each other. By helping, they can still work.” Principals depended upon both their teachers and the schools’ communities to help keep them safe. They had to trust that the in-formation they were receiving was truthful and in their best interest. Thus, using a combination of firearms, maintaining neutrality and being silent on political issues, and tapping into information networks helped principals feel that they were more secure in the community and in the schoolhouse. Yet, even with these efforts, instability was commonplace and principals continued to be targeted and killed.

responses to instability

Thai principals readily discussed their perspectives on the insta-bility the conflict brings to the region and the effects this had on teachers and students. Principals found themselves in a unique role situated be-tween the Thai soldiers and the local community. They were faced with carefully navigating the intersection of school, community, insurgency, and soldiers. One Thai Buddhist principal explained his role, “I work in the school business. I do not work in a security business. It is the soldier’s responsibility to find the bad.” He continued, “I want the terrorists to help out at the school. They will not do bad things to the school when they are helping. They will not be a terrorist at the moment.” This comment reflect-ed the principal’s need to connect with community, no matter if the com-munity supported the insurgency or housed insurgents. For this principal, not knowing was a strategy that he found useful.

Another principal discussed a recent attack near his school, a com-mon occurrence that reinforced his uncertainty and underscored his lack of information. He explained:

I heard gunfire. I didn’t see it, but I heard it. This is very usual. The school didn’t get information about who was shot and which group did it. It is usual that I do not know the details. That afternoon we had an emergency meeting to figure out what happened. This took a long time to decide. I sent the students home and called the parents to come and get their children. I did this because I don’t know if the school is going to be the place for fighting. The military might use the school for something. I am really worried about the situa-tion and the fighting. It is really not safe at all. But I think it is okay because I have some religious practices to help me feel better.

In both these cases, principals did not have information. Whether they

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wanted information or not, they had to continue to work making assump-tions and decisions without full knowledge of people and events.

school closures. School closures were common in areas of insur-gent activity. A principal explained a recent school closure for which she saw no apparent good:

After a teacher was shot near my school, all the schools closed in the region. This was the consensus of the teachers’ association of Southern Thailand. They agreed that the schools should close to protect the security and the lives of teachers. This did not make a difference though. Students just lost the opportunity to learn.

Another Buddhist principal explained how the insurgency made learning difficult:

We have a hard time teaching all of the required curricula. At 3:00 pm the soldiers come and wait to escort the teachers home. The officials are very concerned about the security at our school, so we cannot stay after 3:00 pm. Every person has to leave.

School closures limited educational access and increased fear in parents and students. A principal explained that this worry started during 2007,

During the height of the insurgency in 2007, everyone was scared. Protests and crowds of people blocked the road at the entrance of the school. The students were scared and didn’t want to go to school. I went to every student’s home and asked the student to come to school. There were soldiers there to protect the school, but there were a lot of shootings, especially at night.

Principals commented about the decrease in student enrollment and how closing schools for periods of time harmed government education in the region. A Buddhist principal explained,

The reason that the insurgents target principals and teachers is be-cause it shocks the public. In my view the insurgents want the Buddhist teachers to move out of the area. Maybe they want the public schools to become Islamic private schools. Either way, ev-ery year our school sees students leave to attend the local private Islamic school.

Principals felt it was important to visit their school’s community in order to build relationships and ask parents to send their children to government schools. This only occurred when principals felt it was safe for them to venture into the community.

seeking Contact with Community. Principals were very con-cerned about being in contact with their schools’ communities. They knew the risk of going into villages, and many spoke of making sure they travel with local villagers. One principal said, “I go out into the community when I know it is safe. But, I also have to go with people from the community.”


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Another principal was aware of the risk he took reaching out to communi-ties. He explained,

My name is on the top of the terrorists’ list. I have three events to share. The first one occurred when the soldiers blocked the area. The next one is that when I drove back to my house, there was a group that tried to fire but didn’t because my car looked similar to the soldiers’ cars. Lastly, I see many bombs to and from work. I cannot escape the risk. I am a person who works very well with the community so I became the target. The terrorists don’t like it. For example, the principal who was just shot dead worked with the community very well. Some people told me that I should not work too much with the community. For me, I think that no matter if the community loves or hates you, you will die. So, I want to be loved by the community. It is the best way. It is very difficult for me to be neutral. Anyway, to be loved by others is better. You will die whether you are good or bad.

Principals on the whole felt that community was important to their suc-cess. Yet, they also were wary. A principal said, “Sometimes the insurgents disguise themselves as community members. It is difficult to tell who is who.” So, even though principals wanted to develop strong relationships with community and realized the importance of community support, they also knew that all is not what it may seem.

Principal Perceptions of student experiences

Most principals had little to say about students living in and around insurgent activity. Few would tell of students’ family members dy-ing and the efforts the school did to help surviving family members. One principal spoke about a recent death, “A student’s father died. The child thought it was a soldier who killed his father. After that, he was different. I don’t know who to believe.” Another principal commented on the death of a student:

A student at my school didn’t want to go to school because he was so scared when he saw the soldiers. Some people think the soldiers shot his dad. I am not sure. Maybe someone disguised himself like a soldier and then shot his dad. People are so scared when they see the soldiers. They can’t trust the soldiers.

It was common for principals to say that trust was in short supply and not easily given. An elementary school principal said, “The students have fun with the soldiers. They play with the soldiers.” At her school, the “soldiers know how to behave.” Yet, she had a difficult time building trust with par-ents and said that the “parents tell their children to stay away from the sol-diers and many parents are afraid.” Students are taught to fear the soldiers, because the soldiers are targets of the attacks. Another principal at an el-

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ementary school said that they do not talk about the insurgency with their students. She said, “The students don’t know much about the problems.” There was concern that if a teacher spoke about the conflict then her words would be misconstrued and “put her in harm’s way.” Principals overall were not concerned about student perceptions, worries, concerns, and in-securities about violence. They were fearful to discuss anything that could be misinterpreted, and as a result, students were not allowed to express their concerns.

Encounters with Conflict

The insurgent violence against schools affected how principals went about their daily work. Principals perceived the armed soldiers both positively and negatively and understood that “Muslims and Buddhists are in the same situation.” Principals wanted to share their experiences living and working in a context of conflict. Here are a few of their stories:• Five or six parents died whose children go to our school. Last year,

one teacher died. On the weekends, he also taught at the community college and on the way back home he was shot.

• A janitor of my school was shot. He was traveling to his home in the country to take care of his chicken farm.

• An unidentified group bombed the soldiers who were protecting my school. It was at 8:30 in the morning and one of the soldiers died. They bombed the small bunker at the school.

• When I was on my way to school, I saw a villager get shot and fall down near the street. I just passed. The insurgents fired at the officials and the school building was damaged.

• Two years ago, the soldiers came to our school to guard it. They just walked around the school and took care of the teachers. But, a year ago, an unidentified group of people attacked the soldiers who were protect-ing the school. They got away. The soldiers who died smelled rotten.

Buddhist and Muslim principals were quick to say that they are targets of the insurgents. There was a sense of futility in several of the principals’ comments. One said,

Both Muslim and Buddhist principals have to be careful. Both of them are targets of the terrorists. It depends on what the terrorists want. If they want and plan to attack a school or kill a principal, they are going to do it.

Another principal commented that because of the shock value of the at-tacks, killing teachers and attacking schools is gaining in popularity,

Teachers and principals are symbols of the government. They are very easy to attack. You know their routines. If the insurgents at-


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tack teachers, they are seen as doing an outstanding job. This idea is spreading very fast.In summary, principals felt that they had little ability to change

or alter the situation. Principals found themselves between the soldiers on one hand and untrustworthy communities on the other. Many of them re-lied on their Islamic or Buddhist religious beliefs to give them the courage to continue leading in conflict zones, and knew that just doing their job trying to lead schools put them at risk.

discussion

Leadership scholars have stated the importance of studying the challenges of leading schools in different cultural contexts (Dimmock & Walker, 2005; Leithwood & Hallinger, 2002) and to this end, school leadership in southernmost Thailand is inextricably linked to two differ-ing ethno-religious cultures complicated by an Islamic separatist insurgen-cy. Moreover, this study delved into an understudied phenomenon: school leadership in contexts of violent conflict. Principals understood why the soldiers were placed in and around government schools in Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces. They understood the need to protect students, teachers, schools, and themselves from attack. They also understood MoE policies and directives. Yet given the insurgent context, both Buddhist and Muslim principals experienced a mismatch between the formal and infor-mal aspects of their work, which suggested three areas for discussion. The first point focuses on principals’ perceptions of the misalliance between national education policy and their local contexts. The latter two points at-tend to principals’ perceptions of safety and their need to find a workable balance between the soldiers, teachers, students, and their communities.

mismatch of policy and context

Thailand’s 1999 Education Act allowed for the integration of Is-lamic studies and Malay language into government schooling and expand-ed curricula from an eight-subject core curriculum to a sixteen-subject curriculum for many Muslim students in the restive south. Allowing for the inclusion of Islamic subjects was helpful to an extent, but for school principals working in mixed school settings, finding a balance between Thai Buddhist cultural norms and Islamic expectations was challenging. Privileging one culture over the other was also risky (Barron-Gutty & Chupradit, 2009). Buddhist principals felt that they needed to know more about Malay culture and Islam. One principal reflected that in years’ prior they were required by the MoE to attend trainings about Malay culture and Islam. Now, they no longer occurred because the MoE saw these trainings as unnecessary. This rationale, whether true or not, is a stark example of a policy that was stopped without regard for the needs of the local context.

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Another discrepancy between policy and context is the govern-ment’s financial support of private Islamic schools (Liow, 2009). Monies given to Islamic schools are tied to their incorporating Thai core curriculum into their school day. Yet, additional money is not provided to government schools that choose to add Islamic curricula. This lopsided funding model hampered government schools’ abilities to compete with nearby private Is-lamic schools. Government principals stated that they do not have the mon-ey to provide financial incentives for student enrollment, purchase vehicles to transport students to and from school, hire parents, and fund enrollment campaigns. Consequently, principals commented on the numbers of Mus-lim students leaving their schools for private education (Liow, 2009). One principal said that fathers make all schooling decisions and that they have no authority to stop parents from un-enrolling their children. Additional-ly, Muslim principals often chose private education for their children, rath-er than government schools. Given this competitive context, government school principals do not feel that they are offered the financial support or the professional authority to be innovative leaders. They are beholden to MoE policies and government funding, regardless of local challenges. As a conse-quence, they experience decreasing student enrollment annually.

inconsistent safety

In regards to safety, government school principals were provid-ed with one type of security measure, armed soldiers (GCPEA, 2012). Yet, the presence of armed soldiers created myriad issues for principals to navigate. It was common for principals to state that armed soldiers in and around schools attracted insurgent attacks. Whether it was a roadside bomb on the way to school or the shooting of a guard near the front gate, the presence of the military added to an already unstable environment. When attacks occurred, the military often closed schools. This limited stu-dents’ access to education (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004). Many principals felt that they didn’t have access to information and were often not warned of possible threats (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Subsequent-ly, principals became resourceful in regards to security. They established their own information networks. They relied on teachers living in the com-munity for information. Several principals chose to carry guns for protec-tion. These were small measures, but taking action allowed principals to feel more in control of their security.

seeking a balance

Southern Thai Principals were in the middle of three competing fac-tions: insurgent groups, the Thai military, and the communities their schools served. The principals interviewed risked their lives traveling to and from school daily because they cared about education. They kept their schools


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open and functioning when possible because they valued education for their students, whether they were Buddhist or Muslim (Mundy & Dryden-Pe-terson, 2011; Winthrop & Kirk, 2011). They viewed education as a way to build up the three poorest provinces in Thailand, but struggled recruit-ing quality teachers because of the insurgency (Davies & Talbot, 2008). In seeking to find a balance between the military, insurgents, and communities, nearly all principals interviewed spoke about the importance of maintaining neutrality in regards to politics. They were hesitant to talk about national, regional, or local issues and chose to say a little as possible, out of fear that their words would be misconstrued and put them at risk of attack. Principals placed a high priority on establishing relationships with teachers and com-munity members, when possible. Yet, principals did not tap into their stu-dents’ experiences or perceptions of the context in which they lived. Even speaking to children concerning the insurgency, violence, and challenges they faced was seen as too risky to undertake. Rather than be problem solv-ers or acting as a bridge to bring the factions together, principals chose the path of least resistance, that of being present but saying nothing.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to better understand how Thai gov-ernment principals understood and experienced the presence of armed military guards in and around their schools during insurgency and how this helped or impeded their leadership of schools. These questions opened up an array of topics: MoE policies, personal and school safety, relationships with teachers and community, principal attitudes about school funding, and issues concerning private Islamic education. Given the complexity of the context in which southern Thai principals work, this research suggest-ed that armed military protection of school personnel and school build-ings is shortsighted. Locating armed guards in and around school grounds failed to address the underlying issues that continue to motivate insur-gent attacks on education. Principals had no control over MoE policies or military planning and were faced with the task of finding a workable bal-ance between MoE requirements, community expectations, and military occupation— all in the forefront of an unpredictable shadowy insurgency. Thai school principals have limited agency. They are not charged with any authority to alter education for their students. They do not have the sup-port to provide innovative leadership, to make schooling more effective at the local level. They also faced increasing competition from growing pri-vate Islamic schools. Nevertheless, they are the leaders nominally charged to provide innovative leadership and are required to improve educational outcomes. If and how they may be able to do this, given the violence, is an important topic for further research. Until the insurgency ceases their at-tacks on education, Thai children’s education will continue to be adversely affected and principals will continue to live and work in jeopardy.

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melanie C. Brooks is an assistant Professor in the departments of Curriculum & instruction and Leadership & Counseling at the uni-versity of idaho, Boise.

ekkarin sungtong is an assistant Professor and Chair of the doctoral Program in educational administration and associate director for


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international affairs and asean, mulitcultural education for sus-tainable development research Center at Prince of songkla univer-sity, Pattani, thailand.

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leading in conflict zones: principal perceptions of armed military guards in southern thai schools

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