greater synergy and improved collaboration: do complex partnerships deliver on the promise in...
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Greater Synergy and Improved Collaboration:Do Complex Partnerships Deliver on the Promisein Countries Emerging From Armed Conflict?
Kateryna Pishchikova
� International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2012
Abstract Complex or multi-stakeholder partnerships—those that include several
actors of different types, i.e. public, private or civic—are becoming increasingly
popular in different contexts and across policy domains. This is also the case in
countries emerging from armed conflict, where many donors are actively promoting
partnerships of different kinds that are seen as a solution to a number of concerns
from efficiency and effectiveness to empowerment, trust building and local own-
ership. However, the actual evidence supporting these assumptions remains scarce.
This article focuses on several core characteristics of intra-partnership dynamics
through original empirical research on complex partnerships operating in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and the DRC. It concludes by showing that real existing complex
partnerships in countries emerging from armed conflict demonstrate compositional
characteristics typically attributed to complex partnerships but not the modes of
governance expected of such partnerships, failing to exploit their added value as a
result.
Resume Les partenariats complexes ou pluri-acteurs - a savoir ceux incluant
plusieurs acteurs de types differents, c’est-a-dire publics, prives ou civils, devien-
nent de plus en plus populaires dans differents contextes et a travers certains sec-
teurs politiques. Ceci est egalement le cas dans les pays sortant d’un conflit arme, ou
de nombreux donateurs font activement la promotion de partenariats d’une nature
differente, consideres comme une solution pour une serie de problemes notamment
l’efficience et l’efficacite, l’emancipation, la construction d’une confiance et la
propriete locale. Cependant, les elements concrets venant soutenir ces hypotheses
demeurent rares. Cet article s’interesse a plusieurs caracteristiques centrales des
dynamiques entre partenariats par le biais d’une recherche empirique originale sur
des partenariats complexes mis en œuvre au Kosovo, en Afghanistan et en RDC. Il
K. Pishchikova (&)
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Piazza Martiri della Liberta, 33, 56127 Pisa, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]
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DOI 10.1007/s11266-012-9313-x
conclut en exposant que les partenariats complexes reels existant dans des pays
sortant d’un conflit arme illustrent les caracteristiques compositionnelles habitu-
ellement attribuees aux partenariats complexes mais non les modes operationnels
attendus de ces partenariats, echouant en consequence a exploiter leur valeur
ajoutee.
Zusammenfassung Komplexe Partnerschaften bzw. Partnerschaften mit einer
Vielzahl von Stakeholdern - diejenigen Partnerschaften, die eine Reihe verschie-
dener Akteure einschließen, d.h. offentliche, private oder burgerliche Vertreter -
gewinnen in verschiedenen Kontexten und Bereichen immer mehr an Beliebtheit.
Dies ist auch in Landern der Fall, in denen bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen
stattfanden und wo zahlreiche Spender aktiv Partnerschaften unterschiedlichster
Arten fordern, die als eine Losung fur eine Reihe von Belangen betrachtet werden,
die von Effizienz und Effektivitat uber Kompetenzubertragung und Vertrauen-
saufbau bis hin zur lokalen Eigenverantwortung reichen. Allerdings gibt es fur diese
Behauptungen nach wie vor nur wenige Beweise. Der vorliegende Beitrag kon-
zentriert sich auf die wesentlichen Eigenschaften innerpartnerschaftlicher Dynam-
iken und beruft sich dabei auf eine empirische Primarforschung zu komplexen
Partnerschaften in Kosovo, Afghanistan und der Demokratischen Republik Kongo.
Abschließend wird demonstriert, dass tatsachlich bestehende komplexe Partners-
chaften in Landern, in denen bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen stattfanden, die
kompositionellen Merkmale aufweisen, die komplexen Partnerschaften in der
Regel beigemessen werden, sie jedoch nicht uber die derartigen Partnerschaften
unterstellte Funktionsweise verfugen, wodurch es ihnen folglich nicht gelingt, ihren
Mehrwert zu nutzen.
Resumen Las asociaciones complejas o de partes interesadas multiples – aquellas
que incluyen a varios actores de diferentes tipos, es decir, publico, privado o cıvico -
se estan haciendo cada vez mas populares en diferentes contextos y campos de la
polıtica. Esto ocurre tambien en los paıses que emergen de un conflicto armado, en
los que muchos donantes estan promoviendo activamente asociaciones de diferentes
tipos que son vistas como una solucion para una serie de preocupaciones desde la
eficiencia y la efectividad al empoderamiento, la creacion de confianza y la pro-
piedad local. Sin embargo, la evidencia real que apoya estos supuestos sigue siendo
escasa. El presente artıculo se centra en varias caracterısticas fundamentales de la
dinamica intra-asociacion mediante investigacion empırica original en asociaciones
complejas que operan en Kosovo, Afganistan y la RDC. Concluye mostrando que
las asociaciones complejas existentes reales en paıses que emergen de conflictos
armados muestran las caracterısticas compositivas atribuidas normalmente a las
asociaciones complejas pero no los modos de funcionamiento esperados de dichas
asociaciones, lo que da como resultado el fracaso a la hora de explotar su valor
anadido.
Keywords Multi-stakeholder or complex partnerships � Participation � Quality of
collaboration � Countries emerging from armed conflict
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AcronymsCGAP Consultative group to assist the poor
DDR Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DIAG Disbandment of illegal armed groups
DRC The Democratic Republic of Congo
ILSC Community-based security dialogue/commissions in Ituri
KLA Kosovo liberation army
KPC-RP The kosovo protection corps resettlement programme
LID Local initiative department
MFI Micro-finance institution
MISFA Micro-finance investment support facility for Afghanistan
MoD Ministry of defence
MoI Ministry of interior
NK Nyumba Kumi (‘ten houses’)
RHA Reseau Haki na Amani (Justice and Peace)
UN/ANBP United Nations Afghanistan National Beginnings Programme
Introduction
Complex partnerships1 that include several actors of different types, i.e. public,
private or civic, are increasingly promoted in a variety of policy domains—from
multilateral cooperation to local development.2 Despite such growing attention to
partnerships, little has been done to actually investigate how they work under
different circumstances. Only few exceptions deal with multi-stakeholder partner-
ships that evolve and operate on a global or transnational scale, such as the well-
known edited volume by Hemmati that focuses on the global initiative Agenda 21,
or the work of Martens that discusses global partnerships as a new form of
multilateralism.3 However, the nature and role of complex partnerships in specific
national or local contexts has received little attention so far. According to
Brinkerhoff, ‘partnership is in danger of remaining a ‘‘feel good’’ panacea for
governance without obtaining a pragmatic grasp of the ‘‘why’’ and a clearer
understanding of the ‘‘how’’ of partnerships.’4 This is particularly true in countries
emerging from armed conflict where partnerships are being imposed by the majority
1 Other terms that describe these types of partnerships include ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’, ‘multi- or
tri-sectoral partnerships’ and ‘complex partnerships’. This article adopts the following definition
developed in the course of the MultiPart project: ‘Multi-stakeholder Partnerships (MSPs) are
arrangements that bring together major stakeholders—i.e. actors (private or public) that have a shared
interest in the outcome and demonstrate some degree of ownership-to address a particular issue’,
MultiPart. Theoretical and Methodological Framework and Guidance. p. 28, Available at www.multi-
part.eu.2 See for example, Martens (2007), van Tongeren and van Empel (2007), Zadek and Radovich (2006),
Zammit Zammit 2003.3 Hemmati (2002), Martens (2007).4 Brinkerhoff (2002b, p. 2).
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of donors as a result of recent policy ‘vogue’ rather than detailed analysis of their
added value, appropriateness for addressing a given issue, and knowledge of how to
‘make them work’.
One can think of addressing these questions on several levels. In fact,
Glasbergen, Biermann and Mol5 propose the following useful distinction between
three different levels of investigation applicable to partnerships and other
collaborative arrangements. The first one is the level of inter-organisational
dynamics within a particular partnership arrangement. The focus here is on different
modes of partnership activation and operation, its coordination and governance
mechanisms, factors that determine these and effects on participating organisations.
The second is the level of external relations and effects of partnerships with the
focus on whether and how partnerships achieve their goals (either in terms of
problem solution or in terms of improved public deliberation) and have an impact
on beneficiaries. The third level refers to the broader perspective on the governance
system as a whole and the impact partnerships have on the configuration of political
decision-making structures.
This article limits itself to the analysis on the first level as it focuses exclusively
on intra-partnership dynamics, which leaves beyond the scope of the present
analysis the question of partnership’s added value in terms of its impact on external
beneficiaries and contribution to the overall governance structure. It argues that
unpacking intra-partnership processes is crucial for improving our understanding of
actual and potential partnership impacts. In fact, it is the quality of partnerships’
internal processes that is quoted in the literature as partnership’s primary added
value.6 Collaborative processes within partnerships, if managed well, are expected
to lead to mutual partner empowerment, synergistic rewards, improved participa-
tion, and increased ownership of all partners.7 These qualities are then argued to be
crucial for improving donor-recipient relations in post-conflict reconstruction efforts
specifically.
This rationale was taken on board by main international organisations, such as
the UN, as far back as the 1990s. In fact, as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
said in a speech to the World Economic Forum in 1999: ‘The United Nations once
dealt only with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be
achieved without partners involving governments, international organisations, the
business community, and civil society. In today’s world, we depend on each other’.8
Nowadays, increasing the number of studies on peace-building stress the need to
engage with different kinds of actors—public, private and civic—and to build local
ownership on different levels, both elite and grassroots through a multi-sectorial
approach to conflict transformation.9 However, little research has been done to
5 Glasbergen et al. (2007).6 Provan and Kenis (2008, pp. 229–252), Ring and van de Ven (1994, pp. 90–118).7 Hemmati (2002), Innes and Booher (2003, pp. 33–59), Gray (1985, pp. 911–936), Eden and Huxham
(2001, pp. 351–369), Huxham (2000, pp. 337–357), Huxham and Macdonald (1992, pp. 50–56).8 Quoted in Dodds (2002).9 Chopra and Hohe (2004), Richmond (2001, pp. 317–348).
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operationalise and empirically investigate whether and how these qualities are
achieved and sustained in practice, especially in contexts that are different from
established democracies.
This article seeks to answer the following question: do inter-organisational
dynamics within partnerships that operate in countries emerging from armed
conflict confirm some of the core assumptions in the literature about their added
value? This question has a clear policy relevance as it contributes to an
understanding of whether and how partnerships should be promoted in countries
emerging from armed conflict. This article draws on the analysis of several case
studies of partnerships operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo and the DRC10 analysed in
the framework of a collaborative project MultiPart.11 It proceeds as follows. First, it
discusses the presumed added value of complex partnerships by focusing on the
quality of collaborative processes and synergistic rewards. Next, it deals with
different interpretations of asymmetries within partnerships that tend to characterise
partnerships in developing countries or countries emerging from armed conflict,
where donors play a disproportionately important role. Even though this article
shares some of the more critical concerns about the existing asymmetries, it argues
that complex partnerships merit a detailed investigation of their internal dynamics
and governance modes. It is through such analysis that one can arrive at an informed
evaluation of whether and how asymmetries can be overcome. Further, the article
presents an empirical exploration of real existing complex partnerships in countries
affected by armed conflict. It concludes by arguing that while the compositional
characteristics of the analysed partnerships confirm to most known definitions of
complex partnerships, the evidence on their formation and operation is in stark
contradiction with some central assumptions from the literature, such as empow-
erment, local ownership, and improved collaboration.
10 The in-depth cases analysed in the framework of MultiPart project are: in Afghanistan—Disbandment
of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), Micro-finance Investment Support Facility For Afghanistan (MISFA),
The National Solidarity Program (NSP), Action Plan On Peace, Justice And Reconciliation (AP); in the
DRC—Community-based Security Dialogue/Commissions in Ituri (ILSC), Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI), Appui A La Restauration De La Justice A L’est Du Congo (Rejusco), Sub-
Program: Installation Of ‘Clinique Juridique’/Mobile Courts, Groupes de Reflexion sur les Questions
Foncieres (GRF); in Kosovo—The KPC Resettlement Program (KPC-RP), Active Labour Market
Programme (ALMP), The Assembly Support Initiative (ASI), Sustainable Partnerships For Returns In
Kosovo (SPARK). Case studies were based on a combination of desk and field research and prepared by
the following institutions: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (IFSH); Institute for
Security and International Studies, Sofia (ISIS); Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations,
Brussels; University of Amsterdam; Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa; London School of Economics and
Political Science; European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Graz;
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg; University of Ljubljana-Faculty of Social
Sciences; Centre for International Relations, University of Florence-Machiavelli Centre for Cold War
Studies; University of Bradford-Centre for International Cooperation and Security. Field research was
conducted in partnership with local research partners ‘Center for Policy and Human Development’ at
Kabul University in Afghanistan, the Congolese ‘POLE Institute at Goma’, and the ‘Human Rights
Center of the Prishtina University’ in Kosovo over the period from April 2009 to January 2010. For full
reports of all case studies, please see the web-site (www.multi-part.eu) under the section ‘‘Publications
and Bibliography’’.11 For more detail please see www.multi-part.eu.
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The Added Value of Complex Partnerships
Authentic partnership implies a joint commitment to long-term interaction, shared
responsibility for achievement, reciprocal obligations, equality, mutuality and
balance of power.12
As captured in the quote above, regardless of one’s disciplinary background and
theoretical standpoint, there seems to be a shared understanding of what the added
value of partnerships can and should be. Moreover, a consensus has emerged that
partnerships can be important for countries emerging from armed conflict as ‘a more
serious commitment to reconciling international standards with local conditions
than has been demonstrated up to date’ and more emphasis on peace-building
process rather than outcomes’ have been repeatedly called for.13 Below I discuss in
more detail the quality of collective processes (including increased participation and
ownership over crucial issues in partnership formation and operation by all partners)
that in the best case scenario, are expected to lead to a series of synergistic rewards
for each partner and the partnership as a whole.
Several frameworks try to capture the quality of collective processes in
partnerships. For example, Brinkerhoff has introduced the ‘mutuality’ dimension of
partnership. Mutuality refers to ‘horizontal, as opposed to hierarchical, coordination
and accountability and equality in decision-making, rather than the domination of
one or more partners [including] jointly agreed purpose and mutual trust and
respect’.14 Here, the focus is on the collaborative endeavour, relations amongst
stakeholders that ensure respective capacity to set and take responsibility for an
agenda and to support and implement it. ‘Partnership approach should equip local
actors with decision-making ability making them part of the ‘‘policymaking team’’
[there is] a need to balance democratically the decision and policymaking processes
between policy maker and policy taker’.15
Another typology of collective processes developed by Skelcher and Sullivan
puts them on a continuum from weaker to stronger co-operative performance in a
partnership. The weaker ‘co-operative performance’ is associated with shared
information and support, it can evolve into common tasks and compatible goals,
whereas integrated strategies and collective purpose characterise real collabora-
tion.16 Skelcher and Sullivan’s typology is reminiscent of degrees of civic
participation captured in the famous Arnstein’s Ladder of Civic Participation.17
12 Fowler (1998, pp. 137–159).13 Tschirgi (2004, p. 11).14 Brinkerhoff (2002b, pp. 1, 15).15 Keane (2010, p. 249).16 Skelcher and Sullivan (2008, pp. 751–771).17 The famous essay by Arnstein (1969) was written as a passionate critique of the top-down technocratic
manner in which most of community development programmes were realised, paying lip service to
participation and bringing no real benefit—either in practical material or in normative democratic terms—
to community groups. The original ladder of Arnstein consists of eight steps, divided into three levels, the
first being ‘non-participation’, when citizen participation is not taken seriously at all, the second
‘tokenism’, i.e. when citizen participation becomes part of policy discourse but is not really implemented
in practice with citizens being simply ‘informed’ or ‘asked their opinions’ about a certain policy but
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What the two typologies have in common is the progression from declared forms of
participation and collaboration, where some partners (or citizens) are only informed
about the policies and strategies decided upon elsewhere towards more advanced
forms of participation and collaboration that presume shared decision-making.
Interestingly, the original Arnstein’s typology cites ‘partnership’ as one of the more
evolved forms of civic participation. Forty years later, we are still not sure if
partnership forms indeed confirm to this aspiration.
If the quality of the collaborative process is high, some authors argue that a
number of synergistic rewards can be achieved. For example, Lasker et al. suggest
that synergy can be seen ‘as the proximal outcome of partnership functioning that
gives collaboration its unique advantage.’18 The idea originates from the recognition
of competitive advantages implying that each actor has something unique to offer.
Synergies, therefore, arise from recognising the competitive advantages of each
partner and from exploiting them collectively. This logic led to the emergence of the
famous term of ‘collaborative advantage’. Collaborative advantage refers to
additional benefits from acting together, thus ‘achieving something that could not
be realised by a single organization acting alone’.19 These expectations are
particularly high for the so-called cross-sectoral partnerships since it is assumed that
each sector is rich in some resources and lacks others. For example, Gazley argues
that service-delivery partnerships between public and nonprofit organisations are
driven by ‘the desire to secure those recourses that are scarce for the respective
sector’.20
Despite these seemingly commonsensical expectations, ‘synergistic results are
often sought and referenced, but they are rarely fully articulated and measured.
Furthermore, the process of creating such synergistic rewards is more hopeful than
methodical or well understood’. In fact, in his more recent work Huxham himself
outlines a number of factors that are crucial for achieving the synergy, such as for
example, agreement on aims, power sharing, trust, and leadership attribution and
underlines that ‘making collaboration work effectively is highly resource-consum-
ing and often painful’.21 The recent work by Andrews and Entwistle, who study
bi-sectoral partnerships—namely, public–public with different jurisdictions, public–
private, and public-nonprofit—investigates whether and how the distinctive
advantages of each sector enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and equity in
policy implementation. Their results show that public–private partnerships are
negatively associated with effectiveness and equity, while public-nonprofit show
insignificant improvements.22 This evidence is limited; however, it confirms earlier
Footnote 17 continued
having no impact on decisions made, and finally the third one is labelled ‘citizen power’ and implies real
citizen engagement in decision-finding, decision-making, implementation, and benefit sharing.18 Lasker et al. (2001, p.182).19 Huxham (2000, p. 338).20 Gazley (2010, pp. 653–673).21 Huxham and Vangen (2004, p. 200).22 Andrews and Entwistle (2010, 679–701).
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doubts that cross-sector synergies may be imagined rather than real, especially in
certain policy areas or institutional contexts.
Asymmetry in Donor–Recipient Relations and the Quality of Partnerships
As argued above, complex partnerships have been put forward as a format that is
widely believed to empower individual partners as well as to improve their
interaction, thus raising the quality of collaboration and leading, as an ultimate goal,
to synergy creation also in countries emerging from armed conflict. In practice,
however, partnerships that are being created in those contexts face the crucial
challenge of clear and persistent asymmetry between international and domestic
partners, as the majority of those partnerships are donor-driven. In fact, ‘[a] major
challenge to the discourse and practice of partnerships is how to address unequal
relations between partners. Inequality may be based on difference in a range of
dimensions such as access to resources, power relations, knowledge, capacities, and
capabilities. Partners may also have different assumptions, perspectives/world
views, agendas and expectations’.23 Often the partner who sets up the partnership is
also the partner who has most resources and almost always most decision-making
power. This is true not only for partnerships promoted by governmental or private
donors but also for those set up by INGOs. For example, in her study of North–
South NGO partnerships, Hudock concluded that Southern NGOs were entirely
dependent on their Northern counterparts and embodied restricted notions of
interdependence.24 This example highlights that being of the same ‘type’ does not
necessarily help resolve inequalities, thus, we should not attribute a more
hierarchical behaviour only to public actors or expect that all civic actors adopt
an egalitarian approach.
Is this a premise that contradicts the core of the partnership notion or is it a
condition that can be overcome provided there are skills and commitment to do so?
The fact that partnerships are asymmetric from the start opens the ground for
conflicting approaches and as a result conflicting interpretations. Some authors see
such asymmetries as inevitable but not insurmountable. For example, the resource
dependency theory recognises that ‘in situations of resource scarcity some
organisations will control more resources than others and will be able to use this
power to challenge or compete with other organisations to improve the security of
their own position’,25 seeing thus conflict and competition as an integral part of any
partnership arrangement. A more pessimistic perspective comes from development
studies. A number of authors take a critical standpoint and use the ‘radical’
conception of power26 to criticise partnership rhetoric and practice in the context of
development.27 In substance, this literature is largely critical of the ‘partnership
23 Johnson and Wilson (2006, p. 71).24 Hudock (1995, pp. 653–667).25 Skelcher and Sullivan (2008, p. 759).26 As developed by Lukes (1974).27 Fowler (1998, pp. 137–159; 2000, pp. 1–13), Lister (2000, pp. 227–239), Robinson et al. (2000).
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rhetoric’ and concludes that it does no more than ‘mystify power asymmetries’, that
‘adopting partnership as a dominant concept [in development work] may be doing
more harm than good in improving system credibility and performance’,28 and that
it ‘simultaneously disguises and legitimises the interventions of international
agencies in domestic reform process’.29 It is argued that the ‘adaptation of
partnership framework […] serves to hide the fundamental power asymmetries
within development activities and essentially maintain the status quo’.30 In other
words, according to these authors, partnership rhetoric and practice that proliferated
in foreign aid policy and practice of the last couple of decades has not only failed to
lead to substantive improvement of North–South relations but has also created
negative consequences inasmuch as it discredited the partnership concept itself.
A more moderate approach, which takes a pragmatic approach to partnerships,
comes from management studies. This approach does not deny partnership failures;
however, it attributes them to poor conceptualisation and bad implementation. It
recognises that ‘the design and management of partnerships in development has
been little informed by theory or conceptual frameworks’ and argues that more
analytical work should be done to understand and enhance partnership’s potential
contributions to development outcomes.31 In order to understand partnership’s
added value and ways of improving partnership practice, this literature focuses on
successful partnership cases and identifies the main trade-offs, dilemmas and
success factors that can be used for improving partnership design and
implementation.32
An important addition to this latter approach comes from some scholars of public
administration, who argue that partnership form has to be analytically separated
from the mode of governance that predominates in a given partnership at a given
point in time. In their landmark article on the dynamics of multi-organizational
partnerships, Lowndes and Skelcher show that a different mode of governance
predominates at each stage of the partnership life-cycle. They argue that ‘the key
challenge for partnerships lies in managing the interaction of different modes of
governance, which at some point will generate competition and at other point
collaboration’. This framework presumes an analytical separation between the
organisational structure of a partnership and the modes of governance that
predominate in a given partnership at a given time.
Another important element in the debate about power asymmetries in donor-
driven partnerships and, consequentially, about aid’s effectiveness, is the notion of
local ownership. The 2005 Paris Declaration defines local ownership in terms of
effective leadership over policies, strategies and coordination and argues that donors
should be committed to respecting local partners’ leadership and work towards
strengthening it. The Declaration also stresses the need for ‘mutually agreed
28 Fowler (2000, pp. 1–13).29 Crawford (2003, p. 139).30 Lister (2000, p. 235).31 Brinkerhoff (2002b, p. 2).32 For example, Johnson and Wilson (2006, pp. 71–80).
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frameworks’ for performance assessment, transparency and accountability.33 This
understanding of ownership by local actors in donor–recipient partnerships is
applicable to macro country programmes as much as to the micro level of activation
and operation of specific complex partnerships. The core assumption here is that
more local ownership would lead to less power asymmetry. Indeed, asymmetries
have been operationalised in some studies as a unilateral establishment by one
partner of a partnership’s governance structure, priority areas, accountability
requirements and funding conditions.34 More recently, innovative research has been
initiated to unpack the relative influence of each partner over the intra-partnership
decision-making processes and linking those to the potential to overcome power
asymmetries as a way to enhance local ownership. On the basis of their study of
partnerships involving private aid agencies in Ghana, India, and Nicaragua, Elberts
and Schulpen conclude that asymmetries within partnerships could be overcome
through redesigning the institutional rules that regulate partners’ influence in
decision-making.35
This article offers an empirical exploration of ‘real existing’ complex partner-
ships in countries emerging from armed conflict to see whether the inherent
asymmetries are overcome over time and high quality collaborative processes
within partnerships are achieved. Below we try to investigate empirically if and how
the partnerships established in countries emerging from armed conflict manage the
asymmetries and whether the resulting composition and modes of operation fulfil
any of the ‘added value’ expectations presented above.
Examples of Complex Partnerships in Countries Affected by Armed Conflict
This article offers a preliminary exploration of the nature of real existing complex
partnerships in countries emerging from armed conflict on the basis of a select
number of partnerships operating in Afghanistan, DRC and Kosovo. It is based on
the original empirical research conducted in the framework of a European
collaborative project MultiPart. In each country researchers chose four cases that
corresponded to four core issue areas of primary importance to post-conflict
reconstruction efforts, namely (1) security, (2) socio-economic development, (3)
democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, and (4) reconciliation and inter-
communal bridge-building.36 The twelve in-depth case studies represented a broad
selection of a number of interesting cases that fulfilled a limited set of primary
criteria for case selection, such as a variety of types of actors (i.e. civic, public or
private), a minimum degree of institutionalisation, a reasonable time span of active
operation and their researchability.37 The cases were chosen in two steps: (1) on the
33 OECD (2005, p. 3–4).34 Ashman (2001, pp. 74–98), Crawford (2003, pp. 139–159), Ebrahim (2001, pp. 79–101), Lister (2000,
pp. 227–239).35 Elbers and Lau (2011, pp. 795–812).36 See the list of cases under footnote 10.37 See CICS (2009, p. 29).
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basis of broad mapping of partnerships per country and (2) through expert and
stakeholder consultations.
In terms of methodology, the project adopted a mixed method approach. All the
case studies drew on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data with a
minimum of 4 months of fieldwork per country conducted in collaboration with
local researchers. The core findings of each case study were presented at a
concluding roundtable with local stakeholders whose feedback was integrated into
final reports. It has to be underlined that the project in general and the case study
selection in particular were characterised by an exploratory approach. As there was
little literature available on real existing cases of complex partnerships in countries
emerging from armed conflict, the main aim of the project was to explore whether
indeed these kinds of partnerships were common in such settings and what their core
characteristics were. In fact, the secondary analysis as well as twelve in-depth case
studies shows that complex partnerships can come in all shapes and sizes depending
on the issue, security imperatives of a given area and so on.38
Overall, the results of the project show that partnerships can perform a whole
range of functions from addressing insecurity to development-related initiatives.
The coverage of different geographical areas within the countries emerging from
armed conflict remains uneven and dependent on the overall security situation. In
cases where a partnership operates across a number of communities, case studies
report substantial difficulties in linking and harmonising its activities across
different communities, especially when the local units are too small, as for example
with community-based security dialogue (ILSC) in the DRC, discussed in more
detail below. All the case studies have functioned for at least 3 years and some
continue, however, their future sustainability is problematic across the board. Out of
all MultiPart cases, a selection of four in-depth case studies is discussed.
As already mentioned, the majority of initiatives and partnerships in countries
emerging from armed conflict have some relevant foreign presence due to the lack
of resources and capacity of the majority of domestic actors. All four cases selected
as examples in this article were initiated by international actors but each represents a
donor of a different type—World Bank, an INGO and UNDP (two cases with two
different core domestic implementing partners—an NGO in one case and several
Ministries in the other). This selection is based on the assumption that different
types of donors are likely to build different relationships with domestic actors.
Much literature highlights that core characteristics of individual donor organ-
isations (mandate, mission and vision, organizational incentives and constrains and
so on) have a strong impact on degree and mode of its involvement with domestic
actors in recipient states. In fact, UNDP, World Bank, and big bilateral donors like
the USAID tend to have a hierarchical project structure that persists throughout the
whole project cycle, even if with components of capacity building for local partners.
International NGOs, on the other hand, invest considerable resources in capacity
building of domestic civic partners for both practical and ideological reasons. On
the one hand, international NGOs are unable to perform on their own a number of
38 Pishchikova and Perillo (2010).
Voluntas
123
functions in the field due to resource constraints. On the other hand, there is a strong
ideological commitment towards promoting local ownership of domestic NGOs.
Here, it has to be mentioned that different issue areas are characterised by
relative dominance of different types of foreign donors—INGOs, multi-lateral or
governmental donors. Not surprisingly, partnerships dealing with democracy and
good governance promotion as well as reconciliation have a stronger presence of
international NGOs, whereas those in the area of socio-economic development have
private foreign actors or international organisations like the World Bank. On the
other hand, security-related initiatives are often initiatives that follow up on
international accords and are therefore monitored by multilateral donors as well as
foreign governments (through corresponding agencies or ministries). Table 1 below
offers a brief presentation of the four case studies as well as a detailed list all
different partners and their relative roles in the partnerships.
Modes of Operation in Complex Partnerships
First of all, the selection of these four examples confirms the assumption that
different types of donors engage in different forms of collaboration with domestic
actors. The UNDP supported partnerships such as Kosovo Protection Corps
Resettlement Programme (KPC-RP), Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
(DIAG) and several others that are not quoted here all show a hierarchical
approach. On the other hand, international NGOs, such as IKV Pax Christi in
Community-Based Security Dialogue (ILSC) and CORDAID in other partnerships
in the DRC—not surprisingly—adopt a more networked and collaborative approach
with respect to at least one core domestic partner. There is also an important
difference with respect to the duration of the relationship between a donor and a
domestic partner. While big donors like World Bank or the UNDP have short-term
project cycles mostly due to a number of institutional constraints, international
NGOs tend to invest into longer-term relationships with their domestic partners. For
example, a CORDAID project officer stressed in an interview that CORDAID aims
at rendering their domestic partners gradually independent within a period of at least
5–10 years39—a period that goes well beyond most of the bigger donors’ horizons.
It has to be noted though that the nature of the projects funded and/or operated by
the UNDP and other big donors and those run by the INGOs differs significantly
with the former being mostly nation-wide projects that touch upon the core of
international peace-building efforts in a given setting and the latter being mostly
small-scale community-based programmes. This is not to downplay the importance
of community work with respect to nation-wide initiatives. However, it seems
logical that addressing the issues on a different scale translates into a different
partnership format and type of relationship between international and domestic
partners. It is also clear that realistically INGOs can set up and operate different
types of projects compared to big donors.
39 CIMA (2010, pp. 229–271, 256).
Voluntas
123
Ta
ble
1E
mp
iric
alca
ses
Co
mm
un
ity
-Ba
sed
Sec
uri
tyD
ialo
gue/
Co
mm
issi
on
sin
Itu
ri(I
LS
C),
DR
C
Th
eco
mm
un
ity
dia
log
ue
isin
crea
sin
gly
use
din
cou
ntr
ies,
such
asth
eD
RC
,w
her
eth
ew
arat
the
nat
ion
alle
vel
has
end
ed,
bu
tco
nfl
ict
and
vio
len
cein
larg
ep
arts
of
the
cou
ntr
yco
nti
nu
es,th
en
atio
nal
go
ver
nm
ent
oft
end
oes
no
th
ave
full
con
trol
ov
erth
ete
rrit
ory
,an
dlo
cal
mec
han
ism
so
fp
eace
ful
con
flic
tre
solu
tio
nar
eei
ther
no
n-e
xis
ten
t
or
wea
k.
ILS
Cs
inIt
uri
wer
ees
tab
lish
edb
yIK
VP
axC
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sti
and
thei
rlo
cal
par
tner
s.T
hei
ro
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ctiv
eis
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tate
ad
ialo
gue
on
secu
rity
issu
es,
whic
hin
vo
lves
reg
ula
r
mee
tin
gs
on
dif
fere
nt
lev
els:
ten
-hou
seco
mm
un
ity
(NK
),lo
cali
te(a
nte
nn
es),
gro
upem
ent
(co
ord
inat
ion
s).
Sec
uri
tyco
mm
issi
on
so
per
ate
asa
com
mu
nit
y-b
ased
secu
rity
and
earl
y-w
arn
ing
syst
em.
Th
eyar
eac
tiv
ein
the
mo
nit
ori
ng
of
new
reb
elin
surg
enci
esan
dre
du
ctio
no
fcr
imin
alit
y.
Th
eyal
sofu
nct
ion
asan
inte
rfac
eb
etw
een
the
po
pu
lati
on
and
the
stat
eas
wel
las
bet
wee
nth
ear
my
and
the
po
lice
.T
he
pro
ject
op
erat
essi
nce
20
07
Do
no
rD
om
esti
cp
ub
lic
Do
mes
tic
civ
icD
om
esti
cp
riv
ate
Inte
rnat
ion
alN
on
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ver
nm
enta
l
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atio
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VP
ax
Ch
rist
iC
hie
fso
fg
rou
pem
ents
and
coll
ecti
vite
s,ad
min
istr
ato
ro
fth
e
terr
itoi
re,
stat
eex
per
tso
nth
e
secu
rity
issu
es,
repre
senta
tives
of
the
Fo
rces
Arm
ees
de
la
Rep
ub
liqu
eD
emocr
atiq
ue
du
Con
go
(FA
RD
C)
and
the
Par
ti
Nat
ion
alC
on
go
lais
(PN
C),
and
in
som
eca
ses,
the
Ag
ence
nat
ion
ale
de
rense
ign
emen
ts(A
NR
)an
d
Dir
ecti
on
Gen
eral
ed
eM
igra
tio
n
(DG
M),
are
inco
rpo
rate
din
the
com
mu
nit
yd
ialo
gue
atal
lle
vel
s
IKV
Pa
xC
hri
sti
isw
ork
ing
wit
ha
civ
il
soci
ety
net
work
RH
Aan
din
par
ticu
lar
for
Mah
agi
terr
ito
ire,
wit
hC
omm
issi
on
Dio
cesa
ine
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ice
etP
aix
-C
DJP
Ma
hag
i-N
ioka
and
its
com
mu
nit
yn
etw
ork
.R
HA
net
work
isa
pla
tfo
rmo
fch
urc
hes
,h
um
an
rig
hts
org
anis
atio
ns
and
wo
men
’sg
rou
ps.
Th
ese
are:
Just
ice
and
Pea
ceo
fth
ed
ioce
se
of
Bunia
and
Mah
agi,
the
counci
lo
f
pro
test
ant
chu
rch
es,
Fo
rum
of
the
Mo
ther
s
of
Itu
ri,
Just
ice
Plu
s,A
CIA
R,
the
par
ish
of
Mam
bas
aan
dC
IC
Th
ere
are
no
acto
rsfr
om
the
pri
vat
ese
cto
r
Th
eK
PC
Res
ettl
emen
tP
rog
ram
me
(KP
C-R
P),
Ko
sov
o
Th
eK
oso
vo
Pro
tect
ion
Co
rps
was
esta
bli
shed
asa
civ
ilem
erg
ency
org
anis
atio
nin
19
99
un
der
UN
Sec
uri
tyC
ou
nci
lR
esolu
tion
12
44
and
was
un
der
the
exec
uti
ve
auth
ori
tyo
fth
eU
NM
issi
on
inK
oso
vo
thro
ug
hth
eO
ffice
of
the
KP
CC
oo
rdin
ato
rin
coo
per
atio
nw
ith
the
Ko
sovo
go
ver
nm
ent.
Hav
ing
acco
mp
lish
edit
sg
oal
s,K
PC
was
dis
solv
edo
n1
4Ju
ne
20
09
and
its
mem
ber
sw
ere
dem
ob
ilis
ed.M
any
form
erK
PC
mem
ber
sco
uld
no
ten
ter
into
the
new
lycr
eate
dse
curi
tyfo
rce
and
more
than
two
thir
ds
of
them
nee
ded
assi
stan
ceto
mak
eth
etr
ansi
tio
nto
civ
ilia
nli
fean
dfi
nd
alte
rnat
ive
civ
ilia
nli
vel
ihoo
ds.
In2
00
7U
ND
PK
oso
vo
beg
anh
elp
ing
the
KP
CC
oo
rdin
ato
r
mo
ve
the
KP
CD
isso
luti
on
pro
cess
forw
ard
by
the
pro
vis
ion
of
exp
erts
and
aR
eset
tlem
ent
Pla
nn
ing
Tea
m(R
PT
).In
20
09
un
der
the
ausp
ices
of
the
KP
CC
oo
rdin
ato
r,th
e
RP
Th
asp
rod
uce
da
Res
ettl
emen
tP
rogra
mm
efo
rth
ere
inte
gra
tio
no
fth
ose
mem
ber
so
fth
eK
PC
wh
ow
ill
no
tb
ere
cru
ited
into
the
new
forc
e.U
ND
PK
oso
vo
was
des
ign
ated
asim
ple
men
tin
gag
ency
toget
her
wit
hth
eK
oso
vo
NG
OA
PP
K(E
mp
loy
men
tP
rom
oti
on
Ag
ency
).T
he
Pro
gra
mm
ew
ascl
ose
do
nN
ov
emb
er4
,2
01
1
Voluntas
123
Ta
ble
1co
nti
nu
ed
Do
no
rD
om
esti
cp
ub
lic
Do
mes
tic
civ
icD
om
esti
cp
riv
ate
UN
DP
-Bure
auC
risi
sP
reven
tion
and
Rec
ov
ery
,D
epar
tmen
to
f
Pea
cekee
pin
gO
per
atio
ns,
Inte
rnat
ional
Civ
ilia
nO
ffice
/EU
Rep
rese
nta
tive,
NA
TO
,K
oso
vo
Fo
rce-
KF
OR
,U
.S.
Offi
ce,
EU
mem
ber
stat
eso
ffice
s.In
term
s
of
bu
dget
ing
for
the
KP
C-R
P,
UN
DP
itse
lfw
asd
irec
tly
acco
un
tab
leto
NA
TO
asth
e
pro
vid
ero
fth
eK
oso
vo
Tru
st
Fu
nd
,an
din
dir
ectl
yto
the
resp
ecti
ve
do
nor
cou
ntr
ies
of
the
tru
st
Pri
me
Min
iste
r’s
Offi
ce,
Min
istr
yo
f
Lab
our
and
So
cial
Wel
fare
,
Ko
sovo
Pro
tect
ion
Co
rps
Com
man
der
Ko
sovar
NG
OA
gje
nsi
on
ii
Per
kra
hje
sse
Pu
nes
imit
ne
Ko
sove
per
kra
he
ri-
inte
gri
min
(AP
PK
)o
rE
mp
loy
men
t
Pro
mo
tio
nA
gen
cy,
acte
das
the
UN
DP
’s
maj
or
imp
lem
enti
ng
par
tner
.L
oca
l
bu
sin
essm
enan
dco
mm
un
itie
s,w
ar
vet
eran
s,an
dfo
rmer
mem
ber
so
fth
e
Ko
sov
oP
rote
ctio
nC
orp
sas
dir
ect
ben
efici
arie
s
Th
ere
are
no
acto
rsfr
om
the
pri
vat
ese
cto
r
Dis
ba
nd
men
to
fIl
leg
al
Arm
edG
rou
ps
(DIA
G),
Afg
ha
nis
tan
Rec
ogn
izin
gth
en
eed
tosu
ppo
rtan
dst
ren
gth
ena
Go
ver
nm
ent
init
iati
ve
tota
ckle
the
pro
ble
ms
cau
sed
by
nu
mer
ou
sil
leg
alar
med
gro
ups
inA
fgh
anis
tan,
the
Dis
ban
dm
ent
of
Ille
gal
Arm
edG
rou
ps
(DIA
G)
pro
ject
aim
sat
sup
po
rtin
gth
eG
ov
ern
men
tin
imp
rov
ing
hu
man
secu
rity
thro
ug
hd
isar
mam
ent
and
dis
ban
dm
ent
of
ille
gal
arm
edg
rou
ps
and
redu
cin
gth
ele
vel
of
arm
edv
iole
nce
inth
eco
mm
un
ity
.D
IAG
also
seek
sto
empo
wer
exis
tin
gG
ov
ern
men
tp
rog
ram
mes
for
soci
o-e
con
om
icd
evel
op
men
tto
enh
ance
stab
ilit
yan
dth
ep
rom
oti
on
of
go
od
go
ver
nan
ce,
wh
ich
isan
esse
nti
alan
din
teg
ral
par
to
fth
eS
ecu
rity
Sec
tor
Ref
orm
sin
Afg
han
ista
n.
DIA
Gw
asla
un
ched
on
Jun
e1
1,
20
05
by
the
offi
cial
ann
ou
nce
men
tb
yth
eV
ice
Pre
sid
ent
Kh
alil
i.B
yfo
cusi
ng
atth
ed
istr
ict-
lev
elth
roug
hth
eD
istr
ict
Dis
arm
amen
tIn
itia
tiv
e(D
DI)
,th
eD
IAG
pro
gra
mm
ese
eks
tob
ette
rm
easu
reco
mp
lian
ce,
mob
iliz
eco
mm
un
ity
sup
po
rtfo
rd
isar
mam
ent
and
crea
tea
po
ten
tial
for
pro
mo
tin
gp
oli
ce,
jud
icia
lan
dad
min
istr
ativ
e
refo
rmat
the
dis
tric
t-le
vel
.It
targ
ets
those
dis
tric
tsid
enti
fied
asm
ore
read
ily
com
ply
ing
wit
hD
IAG
and
inw
hic
hg
ov
erno
rsfe
ltth
eyco
uld
del
iver
wit
hm
inim
alo
rn
o
exte
rnal
assi
stan
ce.
Th
eP
rog
ram
me
end
edin
Mar
ch2
01
1
Voluntas
123
Ta
ble
1co
nti
nu
ed
Do
no
rD
om
esti
cp
ub
lic
Do
mes
tic
civ
icD
om
esti
cp
riv
ate
Mai
nd
on
or
isth
eU
nit
edN
atio
ns
Dev
elop
men
tP
rogra
mm
e(U
ND
P)-
Afg
han
ista
nN
atio
nal
Beg
innin
g
Pro
gra
mm
e(A
NB
P),
wh
ich
is
sup
po
sed
tota
ke
ov
erth
ep
rog
ram
me
inth
efu
ture
.O
ther
do
no
rsin
clu
de
Un
ited
Nat
ion
sA
ssis
tan
ceM
issi
on
in
Afg
han
ista
n(U
NA
MA
),b
ilat
eral
do
no
rsfr
om
Jap
an,
UK
,C
anad
a,
CID
A,
Sw
itze
rlan
d,
Den
mar
k,
Ital
y,
Net
her
lan
ds,
No
rway
,an
dU
SA
;an
d
Eu
rop
ean
Un
ion
(EU
),w
hic
hp
rov
ided
tech
nic
alsu
ppo
rto
nly
inth
e
beg
inn
ing
,la
ter
wit
hd
rew
and
pro
vid
edo
nly
po
liti
cal
sup
po
rt
DIA
GU
nit
atM
oI
isre
spo
nsi
ble
for
the
dis
arm
ing
and
dis
ban
din
gco
mp
on
ent.
Min
istr
yfo
rR
ura
lR
ehab
ilit
atio
nan
d
Dev
elo
pm
ent
(MR
RD
)h
and
les
the
feas
ibil
ity
stud
ies
and
pro
cure
men
t
pro
ced
ure
san
dis
resp
on
sib
lefo
r
imp
lem
enta
tio
no
fth
ed
evel
op
men
t
pro
ject
s.It
also
reg
ula
rly
con
du
cts
fiel
d
mis
sio
ns
ton
ego
tiat
ew
ith
go
ver
no
rs,
eld
ers
and
oth
erco
mm
un
ity
mem
ber
s
on
the
sele
ctio
no
fd
evel
op
men
t
pro
ject
sta
ilo
red
toth
ed
istr
icts
’n
eed
s.
Oth
erac
tors
incl
ud
eD
isar
mam
ent
and
Rei
nte
gra
tion
Com
mis
sion
(D&
RC
),
Min
istr
yo
fD
efen
se(M
oD
),N
atio
nal
Dir
ecto
rate
of
Sec
uri
ty(N
DS
),th
e
Offi
ceo
fth
eS
eco
nd
Vic
ep
resi
den
t,
Nat
ion
alS
ecu
rity
Cou
nci
l(N
SC
),
pro
vin
cial
go
ver
no
rsan
dP
rovin
cial
Sec
uri
tyC
om
mit
tees
/Co
unci
ls
Dis
tric
tD
evel
op
men
tA
ssem
bli
es
(DD
As)
,C
om
mu
nit
yD
evel
op
men
t
Co
un
cils
(CD
C),
incl
ud
ing
thei
r
mem
ber
s(e
.g.
ex-w
arlo
rds,
ex-j
ihad
i
com
man
der
san
dm
ull
ahs)
Pri
nci
pal
lyn
op
riv
ate
acto
rsar
e
inv
olv
ed,
wit
hth
efo
llo
win
g
lim
itat
ion:
DIA
Gis
resp
onsi
ble
for
reg
iste
rin
gP
riv
ate
Sec
uri
ty
Co
mp
anie
s(P
SC
s),
bu
tit
rem
ain
sa
con
tro
ver
sial
issu
eto
wh
atex
tent
thes
eP
SC
sar
ein
vo
lved
inth
e
acti
vit
ies
of
DIA
G.
Th
ep
riv
ate
com
pan
ies
that
are
contr
acte
db
yth
e
Min
istr
yo
fR
ura
lR
ehab
ilit
atio
nan
d
Dev
elop
men
t(M
RR
D)
for
the
imp
lem
enta
tion
of
the
dev
elo
pm
ent
pro
ject
sca
nb
ev
iew
edu
nd
erce
rtai
n
circ
um
stan
ces
aspri
vat
est
akeh
old
ers
Mic
ro-fi
nan
ceIn
ves
tmen
tS
up
port
Faci
lity
for
Afg
han
ista
n(M
ISF
A),
Afg
han
ista
n
MIS
FA
was
esta
bli
shed
in2
00
3as
au
nit
wit
hin
the
Min
istr
yfo
rR
ura
lR
ehab
ilit
atio
nan
dD
evel
op
men
t(M
RR
D);
itst
arte
das
aW
orl
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rmed
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han
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A.T
he
mai
nst
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ob
ject
ives
of
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are:
(1)
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inat
ed
on
or
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atth
eco
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ng
do
nor
pri
ori
ties
that
are
end
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-co
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do
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up
lica
tin
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aren
tre
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gto
inst
ila
cult
ure
of
acco
un
tab
ilit
y.
Th
isp
artn
ersh
ipco
nti
nues
too
per
ate
up
tod
ate
Voluntas
123
Ta
ble
1co
nti
nu
ed
Do
no
rD
om
esti
cp
ub
lic
Do
mes
tic
civ
icD
om
esti
cp
riv
ate
Wo
rld
Ban
kan
db
ilat
eral
and
mu
ltil
ater
ald
on
ors
thro
ug
hth
e
AR
TF
Min
istr
yfo
rR
ura
lR
ehab
ilit
atio
nan
d
Dev
elop
men
t-M
RR
D(f
rom
20
03
MIS
FA
isa
go
ver
nm
ent
un
itw
ith
the
MR
RD
,as
of
20
06
,M
RR
Dis
rep
rese
nte
din
the
Boar
do
f
Dir
ecto
rs),
Min
istr
yo
fF
inan
ce-
Mo
F(a
sth
eso
lesh
areh
old
ero
f
MIS
FA
Ltd
.)
Most
MF
Isst
arte
das
NG
Oty
pe
MF
Is,
init
iall
yes
tabli
shed
by
inte
rnat
ional
NG
Os,
bu
to
ver
tim
ere
gis
tere
din
Afg
han
ista
n.
PA
RW
AZ
star
ted
asan
Afg
han
NG
O;
Afg
han
ista
nM
icro
-Fin
ance
Ass
oci
atio
n-A
MA
;M
FI
clie
nts
(soli
dar
ity
gro
ups,
ind
ivid
ual
s);
MF
Is‘l
oca
l
cou
nte
rpar
tsli
ke
mu
llah
s,v
illa
ge
lead
ers;
inte
rnat
ion
alN
GO
sth
atin
itia
ted
man
yo
f
the
MF
Is;
CG
AP
;in
tern
atio
nal
mic
ro-
fin
ance
exp
erts
(rep
rese
nte
din
the
Bo
ard
of
Dir
ecto
rs)
Fir
siM
icro
-Fin
ance
ban
k-F
MF
B;
Wo
rld
Counci
lo
fC
redit
Unio
n-W
OC
CU
Voluntas
123
Several different trajectories of partnership establishment illustrate these
differences. The first example here is the Micro-finance Investment Support
Activity for Afghanistan (MISFA)40 that was established to coordinate donors’
efforts, to transfer global ‘lessons learned’ and ‘best practices’ to micro-finance
institutions (MFIs) in Afghanistan, and to build an Afghan micro-finance sector
‘from scratch’. For this, the Bosnia-Herzegovina’s micro-finance apex, the Local
Initiative Departments (LIDs)—a World Bank Human Development Unit project,
funded largely by the World Bank—served as a role model. Bosnian success
allegedly depended upon the individual micro-finance experts (rather than a
consulting company, or ‘post-conflict’ experts) present amongst the in-country
donor staff. Other success factors were that ‘[a]pex financing was structured to
motivate MFIs to reach financial sustainability’ (e.g. eligibility criteria were set
progressively higher, and clear project end-terms were defined). Moreover, the apex
resisted loan disbursement pressures.41 The Bosnian ‘success story’ largely justified
the choice for an apex institution in Afghanistan, the World Bank/Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) involvement and the heavy reliance upon
international micro-finance experts. MISFA’s focus on building sustainable MFIs
stemmed from the Bosnia experience as well, although the LIDs had a more mixed
mandate, with peacebuilding as a primary objective (specifically targeting war-
affected and economically disadvantaged groups), and building viable MFIs as a
secondary objective.42
This scenario can be seen as beneficial for domestic partners in terms of linking
the Afghan MFIs to global micro-finance knowledge networks and pooling sizeable
donor funds to the MFIs present in Afghanistan. Had individual donors taken up this
task, technical assistance resources would have been more fragmented and
consequently less effective. On the negative side though, Afghan partners report
donors’ lack of sensitivity towards the local context. They argue that donor
application of benchmarks based on success elsewhere prevents Afghans from
creating and defining systems in accordance with their culture and social practices.43
On the contrary, the Community-based Security Dialogue/Commissions (ILSC)
in Mahagi territoire (DRC) is based on the local division into communities of ‘ten
houses or families’ traditionally called ‘Nyumba Kumi’ (NK) that have been
organised to tackle local problems in the community. What is interesting is that—
unlike in other states—in the DRC ten-house structures are not recognised as the
lowest administrative level of the state, are independent from both central and local
government and are in fact a grassroots reaction to the absence of functioning state
services.44 The ILSC donors have put these local communities at the basis of the
project both as core beneficiaries and as main units in project operation and
coordination. In 2003, IKV Pax Christi launched a network of several local NGOs,
the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church called Reseau Haki na Amani
40 Taken from Kamphuis (2010, pp. 133–175).41 Goodwin-Groen (2003, pp. 1–3), quoted in Kamphuis (2010).42 World Bank (1996, p. 8), quoted in Kamphuis (2010).43 Najib (2010).44 Taken from Risch and Hoebeke (2010, pp. 178–217, 185).
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[Justice and Peace] (RHA). The aim of this network within the ILSC was the
federalisation of the ‘ten-house’ structures. The strategy of IKV Pax Christi was not
to fund this process directly but to provide capacity building by training and
workshops on project management and reporting and to let local organisations work
on the federalisation itself. It was the RHA that was subsequently training the
community (NK) leaders.
Trainings and workshops were meant to raise local populations’ awareness of
certain security issues but also to professionalise the Congolese participants and
make them proficient in management and reporting. This project represents the case
when a donor-led project is embedded in local structures to create a certain synergy
between local resources and foreign expertise. In this case, the capacity of domestic
implementing partners is built before the programme is launched. This means that
when the programme begins, domestic partners are invested with a number of
implementation responsibilities from the start, even though foreign donors normally
contribute with overall coordination and additional training of its local counterparts.
This creates a situation in which local NGOs are learning by doing and are directly
involved in setting up the programme from its very beginning. It also means that
domestic partners join the programme not only because they are interested in
acquiring the skills it offers but also because they are ready to take up certain
responsibilities for its implementation. There is more reciprocity between domestic
actors and donors compared to partnerships, where domestic actors are expected/
pressured to join because the donor is interested in their participation for one reason
or another.
ILSC local partners are said to have acquired prestige in their local communities
and improved their intra-communal ties. ‘In the eyes of the NK leaders this
partnership has affected their lives extensively […] being a ‘‘reference point’’ and
receiving social recognition from the community gives a lot of informal power to
the NK leaders’. The RHA members have gained an important status through their
participation in this partnership and ‘have developed into a civic organization that
cannot be ignored when dealing with the local community in Mahagi’ due to their
direct access to information on a number of security issues. Also the state actors,
especially on the local level, report being empowered through participation in the
security councils as it keeps them informed about the priorities and needs of the
population and at the same time reinforces the credibility and legitimacy of
decisions they make.45 However, under different circumstances, being part of a
donor-led (and therefore externally imposed) initiative can play against domestic
partners and their position in the local context.
In addition to these two cases, our research found a number of complex
partnerships that on closer examination turned out to be the usual donor projects that
grew more complex in composition over time but have not changed their modes of
operation. For example, KPC-RP has followed a number of previous projects aimed
at demobilization of the former KLA members. These projects, however, despite of
posing ambitious goals failed to achieve their objectives. A more comprehensive
approach with a multi-stakeholder structure was seen as a solution for previous
45 Risch and Hoebeke (2010, p. 194, 197, 198).
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failures. However, if one looks at the KPC-RP Programme Board, it looks strikingly
similar to any other donor programme with the Board consisting of a number of
foreign donors and their local missions, communication, management and mid-level
operations being in the hands of one major foreign donor, UNDP in this case, and a
local NGO acting as a mere implementer on the ground. Initially, KPC-RP was
dominated by international input and decision-making in planning, budgeting,
implementing, overseeing and evaluating the entire programme. Local input was
often limited to mere consultation and advice.46
However, throughout the programme, decision-making remained in the hands of
international actors, such as United Nations Development Programme, NATO/
KFOR, and formerly, UNMIK’s KPC Coordinator, NATO/Kosovo Force, and
particularly UNDP. The KPC-RP Board comprised of the so-called Senior
Suppliers47 as well as Senior Beneficiaries48 and UNDP Programme Team with
APPK representatives. In principle, each Board member had a role in programme
monitoring and oversight. In practice, however, UNDP Programme Manager
conducted monitoring and evaluation and the Board was simply asked to approve.49
In addition, the working contact between the UNDP as the core partnership
coordinator and the APPK as its core implementer was characterised by ‘a clearly
hierarchical monitoring function on the side of the UNDP vis-a-vis its local
partner’.50 UNDP was particularly concerned about the proper use of financial
resources by APPK and performed strict monitoring through weekly meetings and
spot checks of APPK seven regional offices in addition to the UNDP usual
monitoring and evaluation system.51
Overall, different domestic partners questioned the notion of local ownership
with respect to the KPC-RP, by saying that
[…] many times international organizations and donors draft such projects
without prior consultation with local actors. I consider that in the drafting
process we should have been involved much earlier. […] We […] have been
informed last year about this project […]. However, in such information
meetings, we did not have any role in designing the project or giving essential
input on it. […] The KPC-RP was a programme of the international
community. […] They were interested in knowing about our ideas and feelings
regarding the resettlement programme but it was more of an information
meeting.52
46 Reported by Narten (2010, pp. 106–177, 131, 140).47 UNDP, NATO/KFOR, the US and Belgian office.48 Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the KPC Commander.49 UNDP (2009, pp. 119–120).50 Narten (2010, p. 133).51 APPK was made subject to a UNDP Audit team, see UNDP/APPK. UNDP Kosovo & APPK Project
Document: KPC Resettlement Programme—Component B. UNDP Kosovo internal document, 14
November 2008, quoted in Narten (2010, p. 133).52 From interviews with the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, with the Head of the Assembly
Committee for Internal Affairs and Security, and the War Veterans Association officials, quoted in Narten
(2010, p. 138).
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In this respect, the KPC-RP represents a complex partnership with top-down
patterns of decision-making during all phases of its project cycle management.
‘International actors effectively steered and controlled all phases of the manage-
ment cycle in a rather asymmetrical and hierarchical manner. Local input and
co-decision-making took mainly place on an advisory basis.’53
With respect to the increasing involvement of Kosovo’s government, it also has
to be noted that it ‘‘did not express an inherent interest in actually owning the KPC-
RP process and over a long period was hesitant to provide effective support.’’54
Foreign actors’ domination in Kosovo specifically coincided with the country’s
limited sovereignty under the international civilian UN administration and NATO
military oversight and control after the war. Based on this experience of limited
local say, the interest of the Kosovo government in the KPC-RP was relatively low
in the beginning of the programme and increased only slowly at later stages. By
claiming more responsibility for the resettlement process, national state actors are
just about to start demanding a stronger role in decision-making and control,
however, without trying to re-bargain the entire ongoing resettlement package. As a
result, political compromise on potentially diverging interests between the
stakeholders regarding KPC resettlement did not take place until to date, as was
the case beforehand with the Kosovo Liberation Army-KLA, Kosovo Protection
Force-KPC and Kosovo Security Force-KSF (KLA-KPC-KSF) transition process.
Overall, regardless of whether some of these partnerships have been successes or
failures in terms of their immediate objectives, there is no evidence that being
complex partnerships rather than traditional donor projects has created any added
value for its members or helped transform substantively patterns of cooperation
between actors of different types, both foreign and domestic. In fact, if one moves
up the ladder of co-operative performance, the contradictions of donor-led
partnerships become evident. In the longer-term, most partnerships represent a
situation in which the partnership activator and its most powerful partner (in terms
of material resources but also decision-making power) has a clear phase-out agenda.
In other words, donors do not aim at unified structure and combined cultures, and
often not even at integrated strategies and collective purpose,55 when they set up
partnerships in countries emerging from armed conflict, even though they do claim
that partnerships should yield a number of collaborative advantages for domestic
partners, as well as empowerment and local ownership. In other words, all the cases
present a significant ‘mutuality gap’ that is not being narrowed over time.56
Unintended Consequences of the ‘Mutuality Gap’
The ‘mutuality gap’ described above creates a number of unintended (decidedly
negative) consequences. It hinders trust building between all the partners involved,
53 Ibid, p. 140.54 Ibid, p. 137.55 Skelcher and Sullivan (2008).56 Brinkerhoff (2002a).
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domestic and foreign, and prevents domestic actors from strengthening their
collaborative ties both within the project framework and beyond it. In fact, having a
certain role within a partnership may spur competition amongst the domestic
partners as donors are always the ones who choose local partners. In KPC-RP, the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare felt negatively about the fact that their
involvement in the programme was limited to consultation and presence on the
project management board. Instead, they argued that the Ministry itself could have
been the sole coordinator and implementer of the programme, that it had sufficient
capacity and infrastructure, and that it would have disposed better of the funding
available.57 Even though in this particular case, the sensitive political environment
in and around Kosovo before and after the declaration of independence has had a
strong impact on the whole demilitarisation and resettlement issue and the role of
international community therein, these tensions are exemplary of donor—domestic
public actors relations in a variety of contexts.
Also in the case of DIAG, the contradictory involvement of the Ministry of
Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) created considerable tensions
and even difficulties in implementation both on the national and regional level. The
UNDP with its regional offices as the lead organization and the ANBP as the
implementing one for the DDR in Afghanistan had the most active role in defining
the strategy and modus operandi of the programme.58 What makes DIAG different
from the previous DDR initiatives in Afghanistan is, amongst other things, the shift
from the MoD to the MoI as the main implementing partner. This is surprising given
that it is the MoD that has emerged as the main leading public stakeholder for the
DDR, whose capacity was extensively built in the framework of increasing national
ownership of the DDR processes. In fact, the case study reports that the ‘district-
level capacity building within MoI has been considerably lagging behind’, it is
argued that it is the MoD that continues to be the most active DIAG implementing
partner. Moreover, some respondents argue that DIAG has been successful only
thanks to the MoD involvement and continue to question the transfer of the
programme to MoI. Even though DDR has been constructed by the international
actors as an ‘internal security’ issue (thus, in the MoI competence) and not the
‘border integrity’ issue (which would have been the MoD competence) this strategy
is highly contested. ‘The MoI is responsible for ensuring the security in the country
but the MoI does not have the capacity to control the DIAG. Should the UN/ANBP
stop working along with the MOI, we can forget that there has been such a
programme named DIAG. In the past the MoD was actively working in terms of
DIAG, but today we only have one representative of MoD in the Herat Province’.59
In general, the relevant ministries feel that it is their responsibility to be in the
driving seat of the programmes aimed at resolving strategic social and political
issues. The donors, on the other hand, do not let go of coordination and decision-
57 Narten (2010, pp. 134–135).58 Other international actors closely involved in DIAG initiation are UNAMA, ISAF, CFC-A and a
number of international donors.59 Interview quoted in Attanassoff and Plamen (2010, pp. 216–273, 245).
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123
making powers despite their pervasive rhetoric of local ownership, sustainability
and phase out.
Overall, there seems to be a rather clear division of roles between different types
of partners that is relatively constant across different partnerships operating in
different issue areas. International donors tend to have control over the agenda-
setting and decision-making, they also contribute most of material resources and
expertise. Participation of public actors is often limited to political support of a
particular programme, and they are mostly seen as beneficiaries of capacity building
components. In some cases, the project envisions a transfer of responsibilities to
public actors in the long-term, however, the success record of such transfer in cases
analysed by MultiPart are mixed. Domestic private actors are mostly involved as
sub-contractors, while domestic civic organisations are almost always and
exclusively involved for programme implementation. All the cases analysed show
internal partnership dynamics are based on inherently hierarchical patterns during
their formation and subsequent governance processes. Many cases that qualified as
complex partnerships on composition criteria are nonetheless similar to standard
donor-funded projects if one takes a closer look at their modes of operation.
Conclusions
Even a limited set of case studies of complex partnerships in countries affected by
armed conflict clearly shows that such partnerships come in all shapes and sizes.
This shows that while the idea of partnerships is gaining in popularity, no
consolidated practice of forming and promoting complex partnerships exists in
countries affected by armed conflict. Real existing cases can differ in terms of
geographical and administrative scope, composition (e.g. more and bigger private as
opposed to public or civic partners), time span, and degree of institutionalisation.
Some of these differences can be attributed to the priorities and dilemmas that
characterise particular issues. It is quite clear that, for example, the demobilisation
and disarmament issue may require a different approach than good governance
promotion. Despite these differences, we have found a set of common character-
istics and patterns of partnership activation and governance as well as a number of
shared challenges. Most common challenges that this study has documented are the
dominance of foreign actors during both partnership activation and its ongoing
governance, the challenges of coordination amongst different partners and across
different administrative levels, on which the partnership operates, and poor local
ownership over the partnership’s goals, management process, and outcomes.
Not all partnerships that have been studied deal with these challenges in the same
way. In this respect, we have found that specific patterns of partnership activation
have considerable impact on subsequent intra-partnership dynamics. In other words,
partnerships that have been initiated through a more collaborative and egalitarian
procedure are likely to demonstrate more collaborative governance modes, higher
levels of trust between partners and considerable local ownership over partnership’s
goals, management process and outcomes. Moreover, this paper confirms the
assumption that different types of donors are likely to build different kinds of
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123
relations with domestic actors. In our set of cases, the partnership characterised by
more collaborative relations and higher local ownership is the one set up by an
INGO. However, more case studies are needed to explore further the relationship
between donor types and degrees of collaboration. In particular, we need to know
more about the conditions that enable more collaborative relations between the
donor and domestic partners as well as about specific aspects of intra-partnership
relations that correspond to a higher quality of collaboration. Following Elbers and
Schulpen, we conclude that more detailed enquiry into (re)negotiation of intra-
partnership governance modes is needed.
Our analysis shows that better intra-partnership collaboration, improved trust and
local ownership correspond to partnerships, in which there is an extensive phase of
capacity building for domestic partners before the beginning of the actual project
and where domestic actors are imbued with more responsibilities and decision-
making power from the start. On the basis of this case study, we also conclude that
having more responsibilities within a partnership may raise the status and reach of
domestic partners outside of it. Even though detailed exploration of partnership’s
impact is beyond the scope of the present paper, we would like to highlight that the
quality of intra-partnership relations is likely to have a positive impact outside a
given partnership, which is exactly one of the reasons why it should be pursued. On
the other hand, poor participation of local actors in the initial phases of partnership
design as well as in decision-making throughout the partnership life-cycle has
dramatic effects on local ownership. This observation builds on one of the main
findings of this article which highlights hierarchical procedures within most
partnerships and clear divisions of tasks, whereby foreign actors tend to dominate
agenda-setting and decision-making processes, while domestic ones contribute only
to the implementation phase or simply provide consultations. We are therefore
tempted to conclude that in the majority of cases, partnership rhetoric has led to
cosmetic formal changes in a variety of donor projects in settings affected by armed
conflict, particularly in cases led by big donors, such as the UNDP or World Bank.
However, these cannot be seen as multi-actor collaborative arrangements and thus,
do not yield the expected added value. As argued above, the article cites only one
example, in which the partnership was activated by an INGO following a different,
notably, more collaborative pattern.
While the compositional characteristics of partnerships analysed for this article
confirm most known definitions of complex partnerships, the evidence on
partnerships’ internal dynamics and modes of operation is in stark contradiction
with some central assumptions from the literature, such as the presumed creation of
synergies, and improved quality of collaboration. In the absence of truly
collaborative processes, the expected results of increased local ownership and
long-term sustainability are also scarce across the board. Overall, the majority of
partnerships demonstrate low internal institutional synergies and dependence on
continued donor engagement. If one comes back to the distinction between the
organisational structure and the mode of governance of partnerships developed by
Skelcher and Sullivan, the problem with the majority of analysed partnerships is that
they represent partnership structures but follow hierarchical governance modes.
While these authors expect that partnerships can assume different modes of
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123
governance at different points in time due to shifting power relations between
various partners and the resulting dynamics, the findings presented above are less
optimistic. The relationships between different partners remain fairly static
throughout each case study and are unlikely to change in the short- or medium-
term as our case studies did not demonstrate any explicit effort towards remodelling
intra-partnership governance modes by any partner. Partly, this situation is due to
the fact that while complex partnership composition is increasingly cited as a
requirement for project funding, no similar incentives are in place as far as
collaborative intra-partnership governance is concerned. Moreover, subsequent
project evaluation tends to focus on ‘output’ indicators better attainable through
centralised and hierarchical project management rather than on ‘input’ indicators
that address the quality of intra-partnership collaboration.
These conclusions raise broader questions about partnership relevance and
applicability, especially in countries affected by armed conflict. Given high costs of
starting and running a partnership, is it the best format for interventions aimed at
concrete results to be attained within a short time-frame? Even though the donor
rhetoric tends to be somewhat idealistic with respect to any partnership form they
are promoting, thus, following a kind of ‘the more the better’ rationale, we would
like to argue that a more measured approach is needed towards articulating the
potential added value of such complex partnerships and identifying conditions under
which engaging in complex partnerships can indeed deliver on the promise.
Acknowledgments This article draws on several case studies and secondary research conducted in the
course of the Collaborative Project ’MultiPart’ (Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships for Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: The Role of the EU), funded under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European
Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities—Socio-economic and
Humanities research, grant agreement no 217564. The author is thankful to all project participants for
their engagement and availability.
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